Out-of-area: De Koninklijke Marine en multinationale vlootoperaties 1945-2001

Abstract

Between 1949 and 1962 the Netherlands renounced its sovereignty over most of its overseas territories. Nevertheless, during the entire period of the Cold War, the Royal Netherlands Navy (RNLN) stood by its point of view that it had a global task to fulfil. This military-naval deployment, outside the NATO treaty area during and shortly after the Cold War in relation to the structural global ambitions of the Royal Netherlands Navy’s leadership, is the central theme of this study. This theme is analysed on the basis of theories and an understanding of multinational fleet operations after 1945 and Dutch policy regarding naval operations outside the NATO treaty area, but above all through regional case studies (Korean War 1950-1955, operations around the Arabian peninsula 1984-2000, and in the Adriatic Sea and Montenegrin waters 1992-2001). These case studies were examined by addressing the following central questions: to what extent did these missions involve a traditional approach to Dutch foreign policy? To what extent did the Navy’s leadership influence the political-strategic decision-making on these out-of-area operations? To what extent were Dutch tasks and operations different from those of coalition partners, specifically those of the British Royal Navy, which the Royal Netherlands Navy considered to be its ‘sister navy’? To what extent did the existing national and international perceptions of the RNLN influence Dutch decision-making on these missions, and how much did the participation in multinational fleet operations subsequently contribute to the objectives the Dutch government had in mind? In all the three case studies, the national and international perception of the Netherlands as a maritime nation and the ability to deploy high-quality navy units were taken into account in the Dutch government’s decision-making regarding the RNLN participation in multinational fleet operations. The missions always received international, and especially British and American, appreciation and respect. The fact that political objectives such as international influence, export orders or immediate influence on the land front were not always realised probably had more to do with the expectations of the Dutch government being too high than with the navy’s operational execution. With its participation in out-of-area deployments after 1945, the RNLN proved that in fact it has always been able to conduct a mix of tasks in both the higher and the ‘new’ lower spectrum of force in both brown water and blue water environments. The reason behind this was that, thanks to the constant factors in foreign policy in the period 1950-1990, the navy leadership was able to retain both anti-submarine warfare tasks in the north-east Atlantic and a doctrine and the capability to carry out global presence and constabulary tasks throughout the whole spectrum of sea power.