Participation in EU decision making: Implications for the Hungarian political institutions

Abstract

Amongst the main concerns that preceded the European Union’s all time biggest enlargement of 2004 was whether the new Member States would smoothly integrate into the EU decision-making procedures. The worrying speculations of how the difference between the interest, political- and negotiation cultures of ‘old’ and ‘new’ Member States would slow down decision making in the EU ? turned out to be wrong. Empirical studies show that the accession of the new Member States did not slow down the legislative machinery of the EU. However, the challenge that the ‘new’ countries ? amongst them Hungary ? faced, were manifold and required significant constitutional and institutional preparation and adaptation for acting as Member State. The constitutional preparation required the introduction of the ‘Europe clause’, an authorizing article laying down the rules on the transfer of competences from national to EU level. In Hungary, the years-long debates resulted in a constitutional amendment that authorized the exercise of the powers at the EU level replacing the originally sole exercise by the Hungarian governmental institutions. The thesis analyzed the institutional linkages between the national institutions and the EU level in the different stages leading up to EU lawmaking. The coordination of EU policy at national level revolves around the establishment of a position that Hungarian representatives will exert in the EU decision making. The Government’s dominant role in operating the coordination structure through a multi-layered construct connecting departments reinforces the tendencies prior to accession, when the Government played a central role in the conduct of accession negotiations and the Parliament acted as a bystander. After accession, the Parliament augmented its intention to join the Government in the conduct of EU policies and now scrutinizes the participation of this latter in the EU law-making processes. The parliamentary involvement includes significant information and deliberating rights. However, despite the existing control tools that Parliament has at its disposal, practice has shown that Parliament has not held Government to account for its deeds in the legislative discussions in Brussels or enforced its views previously expressed. The national position is then channeled into the Brussels arena. The matrix of networks that Government has established in Brussels centers around the work and function of the Permanent Representation, but extends to various other actors in Brussels and has on multiple occasions lead to successful lobbying and interest-representation in the EU law-making process. Once the EU act is adopted, it arrives back to national level to exert its effect. For this aim, additional implementing legislation by national institutions is sometimes required. In this respect, the Hungarian legislative principles maintain principles such as democracy and the primacy of Parliament’s legislative role vis-୶is Government. Thus, while implementing legislation is a ‘new’ task as well, it fits neatly into the traditional constitutional principles and structure of separation of powers and confirms Parliament’s strong position therein. The findings of the research revealed that Europeanization does not necessarily lead to convergence between countries in every aspect of a country’s participation and membership to the EU.