Deep Brain Stimulation and the Self

Abstract

Deep Brain Stimulation is a technique used for the reduction of symptoms of movement disorders and currently also for the treatment of psychiatric disorders. The interventions in the brain that cause changes in behaviour, mood and cognition give rise to a feeling of unease. In this thesis this unease is central. It is analysed to what extent an argument against the use or further development of DBS can be derived from the unease. Behavior, mood and cognition appear to be close related to our notion of the self, our personal identity. Identity has numerous definitions and in ethical contexts identity-based arguments, such as authenticity, are represented in various forms. This thesis outlines different accounts of identity. It is discussed to what extent these theories are helpful for an ethical evaluation of DBS. Some of the theories appear to be relevant in the context of DBS. Other theories seem neither to be able to address the uneasy feelings nor to provide a valid argument that can be used for the moral justification or rejection of DBS. Strong normative claims appear to be hard to derive from the philosophical theories concerning identity. However, some of the insights acquired by theories of identity, can certainly provide guidance for DBS practice, and future.