Killing happy animals : Explorations in utilitarian ethics

Abstract

The Total View and the Prior Existence View are two coherent utilitarian views on whose welfare to take into account in the aggregation of welfare. Total Utilitarianism considers the welfare of all actual and all possible beings. Prior Existence Utilitarianism takes into consideration the welfare of all actual and all necessary beings. These are those that do already exist and those that will definitely exist, independently of the moral choice that is contemplated. Prior Existence Utilitarianism does not take into account the welfare of contingent beings, i.e. those possible beings whose existence depends on the moral choice that is contemplated. Total Utilitarianism and Prior Existence Utilitarianism in principle yield different verdicts about the permissibility of killing animals that could otherwise have had a pleasant future. Killingsuch “happy animals” is usually implied by the production of meat, dairy and eggs, even in so-called “animal-friendly” animal husbandry systems. Killing “happy animals” is also part of aquaculture, sports hunting, sports fishing, and the breeding of animals for animal experimentation. In those practices, animals that could otherwise have had a pleasant future are routinely killed on a massive scale. It is typical for those practices that other animals replace the animals that are killed. What is more, those latter animals would not exist if the other animals were not killed. Furthermore, the lives of the newly created animals are at least as pleasant as the future lives of the killed animals would have been. How do Total Utilitarianism and Prior Existence Utilitarianism evaluate such practices of killing and replacing animals? When considering whether it is permissible to kill an animal that could otherwise have had a pleasant future, Total Utilitarianism takes into account the effects of that choice on the welfare of the existing animal, which one considers to kill. It also takes into account the effects of the choice on the welfare of the possible future animal that would be brought into existence if and only if the other animal would be killed. Provided that the life of this newly created animal contains at least as much welfare as the future life of the killed animal would have contained, killing and replacing the animal yields as much welfare overall as letting the animal live. In such a case, Total Utilitarianism would in principle allow for the killing and replacement of an animal. Prior Existence Utilitarianism, in contrast, does not take into consideration the possible welfare of the contingent animal that might live if and only if the other animal will be killed. According to Prior Existence Utilitarianism, bringing into existence another animal cannot compensate for the welfare loss that is caused by the killing of an animal. Thus, those different utilitarian views on whose welfare to consider in the aggregation of welfare have different implications concerning the permissibility of killing.