

**Governance as glue**

**Urban governance and social cohesion in post-WWII neighbourhoods in the Netherlands**

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# Governance as glue

Urban governance and social cohesion in post-WWII  
neighbourhoods in the Netherlands

Karien Dekker

Utrecht 2006

Koninklijk Nederlands Aardrijkskundig Genootschap  
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*“If there is a destination implied it is a process dream of a democratic society that respects difference but yet collaborates and which can live sustainable ...”*

Patsy Healey, 1996, p. 222



# Preface

I have always been eager to understand why some people have fewer opportunities than others, how people cope in difficult situations, and what can be done to help them. My interest started rather innocently when I was nine years old by reading *Samsam* (a children's magazine on children in the Third World); it became rather worrying to my mother when I went to the outer reaches of France to work with prisoners when I was seventeen, and left for Indonesia at eighteen to live with Indonesians for a year. Happily for my mother, I returned to study in Utrecht. This choice was largely based on the possibility of more travel. I studied the Geography of Developing Countries and returned to Indonesia to do my fieldwork among the peasants and fishermen in a coastal village on Sulawesi Island.

Coming back to the Netherlands, I thought my contribution could be made just as usefully to poverty areas in the First World countries rather than fly all around the world, but live in gated communities with other expats. So I worked as a project manager in urban areas in Utrecht and other places, working on car-theft, men's pee and dog poop, litter, the use of bicycles, and other basic daily issues that highly affect people's lives in distressed neighbourhoods. However, after several years of practical project management, research became attractive again and I was lucky that Ronald van Kempen hired me for the EU funded UGIS<sup>1</sup> and the RESTATE<sup>2</sup> projects. This work gave me the opportunity to study the reasons why project managers like me have so much to do in distressed neighbourhoods. A very nice side-effect of being a researcher and project manager in such projects was that I had the chance to travel again. Since I started on the UGIS project in 2001, I have been to Sweden, Germany, Austria, Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Italy, Spain, France, Belgium, England, Scotland, and the USA. Who says being a researcher is hard work?

It must have been on one of those trips that Ronald van Kempen suggested that I should make a PhD out of all the research I was doing. At first I didn't see the need to do so, but Ronald was persuasive, and on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of November 2002 I was an official PhD student with a PhD plan. I felt a little nervous about the expectations that I had to live up to now (especially my own), and I need to thank a lot of people for supporting me over the last 3.5 years.

First of all, my thanks go to my supervisors Professor Ronald van Kempen and Dr Gideon Bolt. Gideon, your sharp eyes on my analyses have taught me to understand what I was doing, and to think twice about the interpretation of the figures. Ronald, your trust in my capacities has been very important to me. I will never forget the meaning and implications of a single word ('vague') written in the margin of a draft. Thank you both for thinking along with me, for criticizing me when necessary, and complimenting me when I deserved it. You are a great supervising team!

The research environment that I worked in at the Urban and Regional research centre Utrecht (URU) was very motivating. The meetings with other PhD students ('leerzittje') were particularly supportive and I learned a lot there from reading other people's papers and commenting on them. So thank you Rianne, Ellen, Matthieu, Erik, Daniël, Maarten, and Anne.

I also want to thank my colleagues Femke, Saskia, Peteke, Tim, and Gideon for much fun preparing the cabaret for each other's parties and other occasions. Thank you, Wanda, for sharing the burdens of the RESTATE management with me and doing the basic layout of this thesis; you have been very helpful throughout. Sendy, thank you for putting up with me when I needed to express my frustrations about one thing or another. Arianne, you stayed only for a short while, but it was good to have another mother in the department!

This thesis could not have been realised without the support of my dear friends and family. I hope to share many more nice meals, hours of sports, and relaxed evenings in the pub with you all. I want to thank Annemieke and Arjen, Inge and Timon, Paul and Patricia, Bas and Mirjam, and Emma and Olaf for the mutual exchange of children. It is great to share the care of our children with each other now and again! Liesbeth, we've been friends for so long. Despite our different lifestyles, we are never tired of talking and trying to understand each other's choices. You're a great friend. Tim, your friendship is warm and caring, always sincere, but still critical. Thanks a lot. Dear Kiki, thanks for being stubborn and very dear, you're great. Flip and Mirjam, *meiden*, you are very good at distracting me from work with wine, nibbles, and gossip.

Marina, your help with the children, but also for Keith and me has meant so much to us. You've always been supportive in the choices that I've made and you always believed that I would be able to cope. Anton, thank you for being so good to me, for being a grandfather and for supporting my mother. In the last phase of this thesis both of you worked hard on the literature list; you've done a great job! Han, thank you for your proud words. Marijn, I am lucky to have such a charming and warm person as my brother. Pam and Stephen, thank you for your interest and understanding that I want to do things differently.

Of course, those who need to be thanked the most are my husband and children. Hasse and Peije: mama's book is finished now. How do you like the pictures of our neighbourhood? Thank you both for always being interested in my stories about how my day has been. Keith, without you, life could never be so good. Thank you for reading draft versions of the articles, but most of all thank you for taking me away from work from time to time, for planning wonderful journeys, for bringing cups of tea, for caring for the children, for being who you are.

Karien Dekker  
March 2006

## Notes

- 1 UGIS is an acronym for Urban Governance, Social Cohesion and Sustainability
- 2 RESTATE is an acronym for Restructuring Large Housing Estates in Europe

# Photo impression

## Photo impression of the research neighbourhoods: Nieuw Hoograven (Utrecht)



*Photo 1.1* Shopping centre Smaragdplein, Hoograven, Utrecht, 2001. The shopping centres that were built in the 1950s are no longer sufficient. A partnership between private and public partners has led to a successful renewal of the shopping centre in 2002.



*Photo 1.2* Linschotensingel, Hoograven, Utrecht, 2004. A typical housing block.



*Photo 1.3* Bazuinhof, Hoograven, 2004. Some playgrounds in Hoograven have been improved with Big Cities Policy funds.



*Photo 1.4* 't Goylaan, Hoograven, Utrecht, 2004. A main street on a Saturday afternoon. This street divides two parts of one shopping centre.



*Photo 1.5* Wickenburglaan, Hoograven, Utrecht, 2004. The entrances of the housing blocks are mostly open to the public.



*Photo 1.6* 't Goylaan, Hoograven, Utrecht, 2004. This fountain was restored in accordance with the ideas of the residents to improve the quality of the physical space in the neighbourhood.

### Photo impression of the research neighbourhoods: Bouwlust (The Hague)



*Photo 1.7* Shopping centre Ambachtsgaarde, The Hague South West, 2001.



*Photo 1.8* Melis Stokelaan, Bouwlust, The Hague, 2001. A typical housing block.



*Photo 1.9* Eekhoornrade, Bouwlust, The Hague, 2001. The renovation of this playground is the result of a successful cooperation between public and private parties.



*Photo 1.10* Reinvis Feithlaan, The Hague South West, 2001. A street on a Saturday afternoon.



*Photo 1.11* Public green, Bouwlust, The Hague, 2001. The green areas in between the housing blocks attract many birds. Increasingly, these areas are closed to the general public.



*Photo 1.12* Otterwade, Bouwlust, The Hague, 2001. The front gardens of these single family homes in the social rented sector are well maintained by the residents.



# 1 Introduction

## A narrative

In the second half of the 1990s, a student needed a place to live together with her boyfriend. They didn't have much time, because there was a baby on its way. They didn't have much money, so the accommodation had to be cheap. They registered for a social-housing flat in Hoograven, a post-WWII neighbourhood in Utrecht. The flat was suitable, because it was in an unpopular area, which made the flat available at short notice, and affordable, too.

Soon after they moved in they became acquainted with the other six households in the portal: a mixture of people such as they had never seen before. There was an ex-psychiatric patient next door, a Dutch family of four in the flat below living on social benefits and where the father was an alcoholic. There were Asian asylum seekers, a large Moroccan family which occupied two houses, a Surinamese family (several generations and lots of people) and a Dutch four-generations family of which all the men were plumbers. The student couple became friends with the Dutch family below them: the twelve-year-old daughter would baby-sit for their baby girl and her mother would tell the young couple off when their music was too loud.

There were many less pleasant things in the portal. The Moroccan children littered the stairs and even peed in the corners; teenagers worked on their motorbikes; drug addicts used heroine. The student couple did not like to let their little daughter play outside; the young student mother was not keen on coming home alone after dark.

At one point the housing corporation decided to demolish the block, and the situation quickly worsened. The residents themselves did not care about their apartment block and its surroundings anymore, and neither did the housing association or the local authorities. The young couple started planning their way out. They were no longer students and they had saved some money, so they bought themselves a single-family house in a better part of the neighbourhood where the housewives still sweep the pavement twice a week and Saturday is car-wash-day for the male half of the population.

## 1.1 Introduction

The story above illustrates the situation in one of the research areas in this thesis. It is also the story of many other residents in urban neighbourhoods in the Netherlands and elsewhere in Europe. There are many people like the student couple and their neighbours. All these people have good reasons for living there: usually, affordability (low rents) and availability (short waiting lists) in combination with reasonable housing quality. Many people who live in the social-rented sector in post-WWII neighbourhoods do not have much choice on the housing market owing to their low incomes.

Consequently, the residents in these neighbourhoods are relatively homogeneous in terms of income, but rather heterogeneous in terms of social, ethnic, and educational background. Each

group has a different lifestyle with different values and there is little agreement on acceptable behaviour. In many neighbourhoods drug abuse, litter, safety problems and other less pleasant things make life difficult for the residents, not just in Hoograven, but also in Bouwlust, Hoogvliet, Bijlmermeer, Kolenkit or Holtenbroek, to name just a few post-WWII neighbourhoods in the Netherlands.

Of course, life is not uniformly bad in these neighbourhoods. As the story shows, people also show positive neighbouring behaviour, like the borrowed cup of sugar, caring for each other's loved ones (in the example above not just babysitting the children, but also the drunk 2-meter-tall neighbour who needed help getting up the stairs), and helping out with schoolwork. At the end of Ramadan, the street is one big festival, and the non-Muslims also join in the party. All this behaviour by these people, the good and the bad, has its own implications for the living environment in these neighbourhoods.

The narrative with which this chapter began is also the story of the Big Cities Policy in the Netherlands. In this policy, social, physical and economic measures go hand in hand, aiming to improve the neighbourhood and perhaps also the situation of the residents within it. It is a story of trial and error, of doing your absolute best, but failing because of problems in co-operation between the local government, the housing association, social work, residents' organisations, job centres, schools, mosques, churches, and so many other things.

An important part of the Big Cities Policy is the restructuring policy that aims to change the housing stock and the living environment in post-WWII neighbourhoods. The anticipated effects of restructuring are to a large extent of a social nature. Multi-family housing blocks in the social-rented sector, like the one above in the narrative, are replaced by single-family homes in the owner-occupied sector. Of course, some people (like the couple in the narrative above, who have some money to spend) can stay in the neighbourhood and have a housing career there, even though they have to get acquainted with new neighbours. For the less fortunate residents, this change means that their home is demolished, including their social network, and they have to move. The creation of 'socially mixed' neighbourhoods means that some people can stay or move in, while others have to move out.

Another policy response to the problems in post-WWII neighbourhoods is the stimulation of social cohesion. Policymakers suspect that a lack of social cohesion is one of the reasons underlying problems related to different values and norms concerning acceptable behaviour. Also, the lack of opportunities for identification and difficulties in the creation of social networks are related to the process of degradation in urban neighbourhoods. As a result, current policy initiatives relate the goals of urban governance to social cohesion. Policymakers expect that residents who participate in their neighbourhood may improve their social networks, develop common values on how to behave, and generate greater neighbourhood attachment.

The concepts of urban governance and social cohesion are also of interest in the academic world. As shown below, there is a large body of literature on social cohesion. At the same time there is an equally strong emphasis on the constraints and difficulties encountered in the policymaking processes in urban neighbourhoods. However, despite the persistent coupling of the goals of social cohesion and urban governance in current policy initiatives and the existence of a copious body of academic literature on each of the concepts, there has been little attempt to provide a systematic analysis of their interrelationship in either theory or practice.

*The aim of the study reported in this thesis is to gain insight into the relationship between urban governance and social cohesion in post-WWII neighbourhoods.*

To reach this aim we have focused on the following questions:

*In which context should the development of post-WWII neighbourhoods be placed? How can the urban governance process in the research area be characterised? How can social cohesion at neighbourhood level be characterised and how is this related to the socioeconomic and ethnic characteristics of the residents? How are urban governance processes related to social cohesion in post-WWII neighbourhoods?*

This dissertation comprises a collection of academic papers that have already been published in international scientific journals, or are forthcoming, or have been submitted. Consequently, there is some unavoidable overlap in the individual chapters in terms of descriptions of the research design and methodology used, or with regard to the reviews of the literature. The aim of this first chapter is to present an outline of the general framework of the research.

The structure of this introduction is as follows. First, we introduce the neighbourhood context in which this research has taken place. We then give an overview of the existing knowledge on social cohesion and urban governance, together with the relationship between these two concepts. We continue with a presentation of the research questions and conclude with the scientific and societal relevance of this research.

## **1.2 Post-WWII neighbourhoods: urban restructuring and social mix**

The research presented in this book focuses on post-WWII neighbourhoods in the Netherlands. After the Second World War there was an enormous housing shortage in the Netherlands, as in most other Western European countries. A socially-progressive philosophy in combination with the ideas of famous architects such as Berlage, Dudok, and Rietveld, resulted in neighbourhoods with long horizontal lines, square shapes, and large green areas between the housing blocks where many families found a home. At that time hardly anybody had a car, most mothers stayed at home, the children played in the streets, and the neighbourhood feeling was strong, which resulted in lively activities in the community. The quality of the houses was higher than in the pre-war neighbourhoods, and the tenants who were attracted there had reasonable incomes.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, many things changed, however. The children of the original residents grew up, went away, and left their now ageing parents behind in the neighbourhood. Other residents left to live in a larger dwelling. The once attractive neighbourhoods became unpopular. In many of them, concentrations formed of the elderly, the unemployed, ethnic minorities and/or low income households. Physical and social decline set in.

The problems in these areas have often been addressed by policy actions aimed to improve the quality of life there. As a response to the social problems, several policy approaches have been adopted in both the physical and socioeconomic fields. Social mixing policies in particular were often applied in Northwest Europe (Andersson and Musterd, 2005; Musterd and Ostendorf, 2005). Housing for the lower income groups was replaced by owner-occupied homes, which brought in middleclass households. This 'social mix' is supposed to be good for the mutual tolerance between groups and enhance liveability in the neighbourhood (Jupp, 1999; Veldboer

et al., 2002). The assumption is that the new households with a better socioeconomic position function as an example for the original households, and that the concentration of problems is lower. An expected co-development of social mix is the rise of positive forms of social cohesion: neighbours who help each other out, people getting to know each other; more opportunities to identify with the neighbourhood.

A substantial amount of research has been carried out on the social effects of these changes in post-WWII neighbourhoods (Kleinhans et al., 2000; Van Beckhoven and Van Kempen, 2003; Bolt and Torrance, 2005; Kleinhans, 2005). The outcomes of these studies show different results in different neighbourhoods: some areas have improved in social terms, while in others the new households contribute very little to solving the social problems of the neighbourhood. However, our focus is different from those in these previous studies. Instead of analysing the impact of urban restructuring measures on social cohesion, we have concentrated on the relationship between the way in which the policymaking process takes place and social cohesion. We now consider the concept of social cohesion.

### 1.3 Social cohesion

The notion of social cohesion was introduced by early sociologists such as Durkheim (1893), Simmel (1904), and Weber (1921). They focused on the division of labour in society, which led to economic interdependency and social order. In more recent times, the focus has been on the positive consequences of individuals being part of groups as a cure to problems in society (Portes, 1998).

As Pahl (1991) explains, sociologists such as Emile Durkheim, Bryan Wilson, and Robert Bellah were of the opinion that there is less binding normative framework in the society of the 20th century than in (usually unspecified) previous times, and as a consequence there is more conflict and dispute than before. The reason for the rise of social problems in society is aptly described by the sociologist Tönnies, who claimed in 1912 that the nation is changing from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft*. Within the *Gemeinschaft*, human associations were based on traditional ties of family and close kinship within small-scale communities in a shared space, enjoying cohesion and fulfilment. According to Tönnies, *Gesellschaft* characterised modern society: anonymity and individualisation, rationality and efficiency were the basis of social and economical relationships (Komter et al., 2000). Although Tönnies' ideas stem from the 1920s, until today individualisation has been held responsible for negative changes in society.

The concept of social cohesion gained popularity in the 1990s; it appeals to ideas of what is 'good' (but it also has a downside, as we see below). In the international literature, social cohesion has received attention from urban researchers, especially from those who study life within urban neighbourhoods. Among those researchers are the psychologists (Buckner, 1988; Puddifoot, 1995; Lochner et al., 1999; Uzzell, et al., 2002), geographers and urban planners (Ögdül, 2000; Forrest and Kearns, 2001; Allen and Cars, 2001; Boddy and Parkinson, 2004) and sociologists (Scheepers and Janssen, 2001; Vranken, 2005). These researchers use different definitions of social cohesion, although they have some elements in common. The definitions refer to the coherence of a social or political system, the ties that people have with this system, and their involvement and solidarity with it. In the more personal sphere, behaviour, perception, personal networks, and identity play an important part. Kearns and Forrest formulate it as follows:

*“a cohesive society ‘hangs together’; all the component parts fit in and attribute to society’s collective project and well-being; and conflict between societal goals and groups, and disruptive behaviour, are largely absent or minimal”* (Kearns and Forrest, 2000, p. 996).

The quotation clearly shows the positive effects that social cohesion may have. However, social cohesion is not randomly distributed between different groups in society, nor is there a constant level of social cohesion over space. The study here concentrates on the issue of the social cohesion of residents in post-WWII neighbourhoods. There are three reasons why social cohesion at neighbourhood level receives so much attention in literature. We review them below.

First, the neighbourhood is of continuous importance in an increasingly complex and globalising information society. This crisis in society rests on the general assumption that the cement of society is crumbling through individualisation, modernisation, and new information technology, which leads to more fluid forms of contact between individuals. In the rapidly changing society of Western Europe, it is difficult to deny that social relationships have changed, but it is exactly this change that also poses a greater emphasis on the level of the family, the community, and the neighbourhood (Pahl, 1991). The individualised way of life, the more fluid contacts and ‘indirect socialising’ (Guest and Wierzbicki, 1999) may give the familiarity of the neighbourhood greater significance as sources of comfort and security (Forrest and Kearns, 2001). Despite changing relationships at higher spatial levels, people still interact in their local environment (city, village, suburb) and they build networks with the other people who live there (Castells, 1997).

Second, problems with respect to social cohesion are concentrated in certain areas in the city, and are related to the characteristics of the resident population, such as socioeconomic status and ethnicity. In Western Europe the sociological notion of a lack of ‘glue in society’ is threatened by the pluralistic situation with immigration from the South and the East and rapid changes in gender, racial, ethnic, and religious relationships (Pahl, 1991). The type of contact that people have elsewhere influences the demands they make on their home environment, such as the provision of social contacts. The neighbourhood is thereby an important source of social identity and social networks (Forrest and Kearns, 2001).

Finally, social cohesion is often regarded as a bottom-up process in which the quality of social integration at the local level determines social cohesion at a higher scale (Forrest and Kearns, 2001; Morrisson, 2003). The chances of a neighbourhood generating social cohesion depend to a large extent on the characteristics of the population. One of the assumptions underlying the social mixing strategy that was mentioned above is that, in a neighbourhood with not only low incomes, but also average and higher income groups, the concentration of social problems would be less dense and the higher income groups may give an example to the lower income groups (Musterd and Ostendorf, 2005; Van Beckhoven et al., forthcoming). These studies show that policymakers have expectations regarding the effect of the creation of a social mix; but they do not evaluate the effectiveness of social mixing.

#### *What is social cohesion at the neighbourhood level?*

At the neighbourhood level, there are different facets to social cohesion. Kearns and Forrest (2000) have usefully broken down the concept into elements that refer to different dimensions of social cohesion at neighbourhood, city and national level:

1. Social networks and social capital
2. Common values and civic culture
3. Place attachment
4. Social order and social control
5. Social solidarity and reductions in wealth disparities.

In these five points, social networks and social capital are related to the high degree of social interaction either between family members or within other social structures in the neighbourhood. The second dimension (common values and civic culture) is linked to a common set of moral principles and codes of behaviour through which people conduct their relationships. A high engagement in public and collective affairs and a high level of social co-operation are implied. The third dimension of social cohesion is place attachment. This refers to notions of belonging, which result from a person's emotional bond with a place. At the neighbourhood level, this dimension means that people feel part of the neighbourhood, are attached to it, and derive part of their identity from living there. We refer to the dimension here as neighbourhood attachment.

This framework by Kearns and Forrest (2000) outlines the dimensions of social cohesion. It can also be applied at the neighbourhood level, although the last two dimensions are highly influenced by higher spatial scale levels. Social order and control refer to the absence of general conflict and the lack of a serious challenge to the existing (democratic) order and system. The social solidarity dimension is linked to a redistribution of finances and opportunities between groups and places (that is, reduced disparities in income, employment, competitiveness, open access to welfare services). This dimension is more of a concern at the city and national level (Amin, 2002). Since the last two dimensions are mostly shaped at the city or national level and less at the neighbourhood level, they have not formed part of the analysis undertaken in this neighbourhood-focused research.

We have narrowed down the dimensions of Kearns and Forrest: in our view, the first dimension of social cohesion (social networks) does not contain social capital. The difference between social cohesion and social capital lies in the function of the social network. Social capital theory starts from the principle of rational theory, in which the individual will maximise its own benefits within a particular social network (Coleman, 1988, Portes, 1998). This principle implies that social capital has a clear functional meaning, with two elements: the social structures, and the actions of actors within these structures (Coleman, 1988). The social network dimension of social cohesion, on the other hand, refers to the network itself. In contrast with high levels of social capital, high levels of social cohesive networks can be without any form of productive action.

A second reason for not putting social capital on the same line as social networks is that social capital is generally considered to consist of social networks and common values and a civic culture, which includes trust in authorities and ideas on reciprocity. As Putnam states, social capital "*features social organisations, such as networks, norms, and trust, that facilitate action and co-operation for mutual benefit*" (1995, p.2). Simply to add it to the social networks dimension would therefore not do justice to the complexity of social capital. That is not to say that the concept of social capital has no purpose. In fact, social capital is a very useful concept in relation to participation in decision-making, since it puts a strong emphasis on civic engagement and the relationship with governance (Dekker, 1999).

In conclusion, since the analyses in this research focus on the residents of post-WWII neighbourhoods, we have concentrated on the following dimensions of social cohesion at the neighbourhood level: social networks, common values and a civic culture, and neighbourhood attachment. The focus is also on the relationship between these dimensions of social cohesion and the diversity of the population in socioeconomic and ethnic characteristics.

#### *On the downside of social cohesion*

There is a downside to social cohesion, however, since social cohesion can lead to the exclusion of outsiders, excess claims on group members, restrictions on individual freedom, and downward levelling norms (Portes, 1998). We explain this assertion below, but first it is useful to understand that the degree to which members are willing to participate and identify with a social network largely depends on the feelings of obligation to live up to internalised norms of behaviour. These feelings of reciprocity and mutual agreement can only take place because people are part of a network, a group with a sanctioning capacity.

Only when people feel that they are part of the group are they inclined to stick to the rules of interaction within the group. Hence there is a strong sense of social control to keep people involved in the social network and to restrict them from becoming outsiders. Group solidarity is positively influenced by a common experience of adversity and opposition to 'others', but the ties between group members may easily exclude others.

Moreover, if part of the group identity is based on feelings of belonging to a certain space, no-go areas and feelings of insecurity for those outside the group entering this space are generated. Street gangs are an extreme example of such unwanted forms of social cohesion.

In addition, if the 'others' are part of mainstream society, this group identity means that members are under pressure not to show too much ambition to escape from the group. These downward-levelling norms and strong social control are the downside of otherwise positive networks that can generate reciprocity and mutual agreement.

Consequently, when considering social cohesion, it should be noted that high degrees of social cohesion are not just 'good', since social cohesion can restrict people from inclusion in mainstream society and may lead to conflicts between groups.

## **1.4 Urban governance**

Since the 1990s, cities in Western Europe have faced many changes in the ways in which they are governed. In the last decade of the 20th century, budgets for local governments were cut, while at the same time more responsibilities were passed on from the national to lower levels. Local governments had to change their ways of working, which often meant privatising certain government functions and involving other parties in policymaking processes (Elander, 2002). Urban governance became the new catchphrase, replacing urban government.

The reasons for the rise of governance are diverse. Some claim that the decline of Fordism in the post-war period generated a crisis of regulation and governance in western capitalist economies at different scales (Jessop, 1993; Tickell and Peck, 1992). Others assert that the rise of governance is related to the increasing differentiation in society; globalisation has led towards more social and spatial inequality as a consequence of economic growth and urban competition. Within the context of increasing globalisation, there has been a consequent 'hollowing out of the

nation state', which means that certain functions are being directed towards levels higher than the national government, and other functions to sub-national levels (Giddens, 1994; Fainstein, 2001; Salet et al., 2003).

In contrast with more traditional forms of government, one of the key aspects of urban governance is that not only the public sector, but also the private and voluntary sectors are included in policymaking processes (Jessop, 1993; Stoker, 1995; Coaffee and Healey, 2003). Urban governance is therefore characterised by diversity in the range of stakeholders, the fragmentation of political power between individuals and institutions, and an increased uncertainty regarding the social, economic, and political situation (Hall and Rowlands, 2005).

From the above it may be clear that governance is characterised by the development of policies at different spatial levels (from global to neighbourhood level) and by different types of party involved (public, private, and voluntary sector). For the analysis in this thesis, we have chosen three interpretations of governance that focus on the local or neighbourhood level and the involvement of at least the public sector and one other party. There are, of course, many more ways in which these developments could be discussed. For example, Rhodes (1996) lists six interpretations of governance, and Kooiman (2002) adds another six to this list. The elaboration of all of these interpretations would, however, take too much space here and moreover would not be useful, because most of them are not applicable to the neighbourhood level. Instead, we chose three interpretations of governance that we expected to be applicable in post-WWII neighbourhoods: *governance as self-organising*, *interorganisational networks*, *new public management*, and *place making through collaborative planning*. We explain each of these below.

The first interpretation of governance is based on Rhodes' concept of *governance as self-organising*, *interorganisational networks* which, as he states, builds on the six interpretations of governance he lists. He describes the shared characteristics of governance as follows (1996, p. 660):

- Interdependence between organisations. Governance is broader than government, covering non-state actors. Changing the boundaries of the state meant that the boundaries between public, private and voluntary sectors became shifting and opaque.
- Continuing interactions between network members, caused by the need to exchange resources and negotiate shared purposes.
- Game-like interactions, rooted in trust and regulated by rules of the game negotiated and agreed by network participants.
- A significant degree of autonomy from the state. Networks are not accountable to the state; they are self-organising, interorganisational. Although the state does not occupy a privileged, sovereign position, it can indirectly and imperfectly steer networks.

In this interpretation, governance is mainly concerned with the management of public-private networks based on reputation, trust, reciprocity, and mutual interdependence (Rhodes, 1996; 1997). There is a sharp focus on the relationship between the economy and the state. This concentration is also one of the drawbacks of this approach, since little attention is paid to the characteristics and political nature of the institutions that design the policies. Attention for the role of voluntary organisations or the participation of residents in governance processes is also scant.

A second main body of work considers governance as *new public management*, which is mainly concerned with inter-organisational networks within the public sector. The focus of the

new public-management approach is on the public sector, which is now ideally managed in a businesslike manner, for example through openness of information, integrity or straightforward dealing, and accountability (Barzelay, 2001). As a result, individuals rather than organisations can be held responsible for their actions (Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy, 1994). The business-like management of the public sector puts a strong emphasis on output, the decentralization of decision-making, profitable working methods, the prevention of problems, and the involvement of the private and voluntary sectors to raise effectiveness. If the public sector is managed in a businesslike way, the residents are the customers of this business and need to be empowered as such.

The approach has been widely used as a blueprint for the organisational design of the public sector. In some professional and academic discussions the countries that do not live up to this standard model are considered to be lagging behind. At the same time, this approach is based on the Anglo-American model, whose relevance outside its core cases may be questioned. Other governmental cultures may make new public management approaches less useful as a blueprint for the organisational design of the public sector in non-Anglo-American countries (Barzelay, 2001).

Third comes *place making through collaborative planning* (Healey, 1997), which has also received much attention in the Anglo-Saxon literature. According to Healey, both mutual understanding and conflict lead to two types of collaborative governance structures that reinforce each other: one process is soft and the other is hard. The *soft* process encourages mutual listening, understanding, respectful relationship-building, consensus identification, and mutual learning to build social, political, and intellectual capital. The *hard* processes arrange the different responsibilities of the partners, such as the right to participate for residents, what to do in the case of disagreement and the duty to challenge entrenched power relationships. Both processes (the hard and the soft) will lead to a public realm which encourages new communities to be politically active and in which new approaches are developed and inclusive strategies formulated.

Essential to the concept of collaborative planning is its involvement of all the groups who have a stake in the neighbourhood. In order to achieve maximum input from all the parties concerned, the policymakers need to be open to the diversity and culturally-specific context of different partners. The key question is how different types of input are recognised, how the negotiation process takes place, and how a shared vision can be reached that accommodates the differences between partners (Hall and Rowlands, 2005).

A criticism of Healey's collaborative planning concept is that the standard she sets for dialogue is too high; the policy process is always imperfect since the power relationships are unequal, so the standard for open dialogue is therefore either unrealistic or inevitably suppresses the differences between people (North, 2000). Another point of criticism is that, even when people understand why they are having conflicts, that understanding does not inevitably lead to a resolution of that conflict (North, 2000).

The interpretations mentioned show that there are several meanings of the concept, which may be helpful to the analysis of Dutch governance. Although all the interpretations discuss governance, more precise specification is needed. For the sake of our analysis we have focused on four dimensions of governance:

1. The kind of party allowed in the networks and partnerships
2. The extent to which residents play a part in decision-making processes
3. The way in which discussion takes place
4. The extent to which there is a spatial aspect to the governance process.

Below, we explain what we mean by these dimensions; we point out how each dimension is dealt with in the respective interpretations of governance. First, we consider the kinds of party who are allowed into the networks and partnerships. Governance is characterised by the diversification of decision-making throughout a wide range of organisations. Clearly, the people who are in the partnership have more to say than those that are outside it for one reason or another. In all three interpretations of governance, the local government authority has a central role, but the parts played by the other parties involved differ significantly in the various interpretations of governance from none to all to having a stake in the issue. In Rhodes' interpretation (1996), the focus is on the inter-organisational networks between the public and private sectors, whereas new public management focuses only on the public sector (Barzelay, 2001). The collaborative planning interpretation has a much wider scope and features the public, private, and voluntary sectors (Healey, 1996).

Second, the extent to which residents play a part in the decision-making process has changed over time, and the importance that is attached to it differs per interpretation of governance. At the one extreme, residents are seen as passive 'customers' who need to be empowered as receivers of services provided by the local government (Barzelay, 2001). Governance as self-organising, interorganisational networks (Rhodes, 1996) indicates that the voluntary sector is one of the partners in governance, although how this should be organised is not specified. At the other extreme there is collaborative planning theory (Healey, 1996), which puts considerable emphasis on the participation of residents. Healey asserts that the residents play a crucial part and should be actively involved in all stages of the policymaking process.

Third, governance is characterised by new ways in which the discussion takes place. Within governance, the role of the local government becomes less important and other parties have become involved; the way in which these parties communicate has been introduced. At the one extreme the emphasis is on more efficiency and accountability with the main goal: better results. Rhodes (1996) speaks of game-like interactions, rooted in trust, and regulated by rules of the game negotiated and agreed by networks participants. Within the negotiation process, power differences between the partners influence the degree to which each is listened to. The new public-management interpretation is more serious and concentrates on the management of the public sector in a businesslike way. There is a strong emphasis on the openness of information, integrity, accountability, and clarity about responsibility and roles (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992).

At the other extreme there is a strong emphasis on the process by means of which the main goal to involve all relevant stakeholders and create a common vision is achieved. In Healey's concept of collaborative planning, the way in which the discussion takes place is more important than the actual outcome of this process. She states that there is a clear connection between the policy discussion and the ideal image that people have of the neighbourhood, the city, or the region. Depending on who has the power to govern, the policy or plan of what the neighbourhood should be like is adjusted. In an ideal collaborative planning process, the different images of the city or neighbourhood are respected, while at the same time a common vision is developed.

The last dimension of governance refers to the extent to which there is a spatial aspect to the governance process. Many national governments have recognised the need for the decentralisation of decision-making power to the city or even the neighbourhood level. Within these spatial entities decisions can be taken more effectively, at shorter notice, and in a more integrated manner. However, the importance of place is not supported equally in the three interpretations of governance. Neither the interpretation of governance as self-organising, interorganisational networks, nor new public management focus on place. Only if co-operation between different departments of the local government authority generates more efficiency may area-based policies be a result. In Healey's approach, 'place making' means that the spatial entity is central, integrating all ideas on its development in one process. Policies can be integrated in neighbourhoods, cities, or regions and the partnerships in which the common vision is developed are organised on the respective spatial levels.

In the empirical analyses we focus on these dimensions of governance mentioned above. Of course, these dimensions are strongly interrelated. We have shown that the focus in each of these interpretations within the dimensions of governance is different. As mentioned above, the interpretations of governance are formulated within non-Dutch contexts. We do not know of any studies that have evaluated these interpretations of governance on the basis of a Dutch case study. We have therefore evaluated the relevance of these governance processes in one of our case studies.

So far, the interpretations of governance presented seem to bring change as opposed to government without being critical. However, the rise of government is not just a positive development, since problems are also generated. We consider the most important of these below: accountability, conflicting goals, and gated partnerships. In the empirical analyses we present a critical analysis of the governance process, indicating that some problems have also arisen as a result of the shift towards governance.

#### *Problems in governance*

First, *accountability* is a key problem with respect to urban governance. If the borders between public and private concerns are unclear, confusion about responsibilities ensues: whether the responsibilities lie between the public and private sectors, or between governmental levels of different government departments (Imrie and Raco, 1999; Newman and Verpreat, 1999). The same confusion arises among different levels of government, where unclear demarcation may also cause problems with respect to accountability. Another related issue is whether the partners in a partnership represent its target group. The answer depends on whether the target group has enough political influence to hold the agency to account; conversely, not all those who hold the partnerships accountable are part of the target group, but they may have powerful interests in the political environment (Viteritti, 1990).

Second, the *goals* of the various partners in networks and partnerships may *conflict*: members of a network cannot all be expected to have identical interests. Some problems can arise between elected policymakers and professional service deliverers, since the long-term goals of policymakers do not always coincide with the short-term goal of satisfying the customer. The problem of accountability arises, since the elected officials have little control over the performance of the service production. Hence, as work progresses, conflicts and contradictions may lead to difficulties for the networks themselves. These difficulties are often related to the different policy

cultures that have to work together under the umbrella of urban governance. Conflicts between partners may cause problems for the projects for which they are responsible (Raco, 1999). Within the partnership or network, commitment may well be based on self-interest rather than on the good of the neighbourhood as a whole. This assertion holds true for both the residents and the professionals. The increased heterogeneity of population compositions in urban neighbourhoods brings a greater diversity in needs, which makes it even more difficult for residents to represent the needs of 'the resident' (Taylor, 2000).

Third, participants in networks or partnerships are not democratically elected and *gated partnerships* may be the result. Usually, only those capable of adding resources, including political power or legitimacy, are admitted. The outside world may not feel that it is properly represented in the governance structures and problems of *legitimacy* may arise. It may be evident that setting up a partnership with an equal input from all parties is impossible, while each network leaves out some people that could have been included. Establishing a partnership is a natural process, but awareness of the gate-keeping function is an important step towards openness and inclusion (Wallace, 2001).

These three problems may lead to a lack of sustainability of the governance process (see also Andranovich and Riposa, 1998; Elander and Blanc, 2001; Andersen and Van Kempen, 2001; Andersen and Van Kempen, 2003), and they need to be taken into consideration when analysing governance processes.

From the above it may be clear that a considerable body of literature has been published about urban governance, enumerating the advantages, but also levelling some critical remarks. We have shown that networks and partnerships are central in governance processes, and that the role of residents has changed. Governance may be expected to influence the relationship between residents both with each other and with the authorities. Possibly, governance also influences social cohesion within the neighbourhood. We turn to this now.

## 1.5 The relationship between urban governance and social cohesion

In this section, we examine the extent to which there is evidence that urban governance is related to social cohesion. First, we review some research previously undertaken in this field.

Some authors have linked urban governance and social cohesion in theory, or have provided some empirical evidence of relationships between the two concepts. Forrest and Kearns (2001) developed a table that lists how social networks, common values and a civic culture, and neighbourhood attachment are linked to activities at the neighbourhood level. Examples of activities are 'publicising local events', or 'boosting the identity of a place via design, street furnishings, naming'. In addition, Lowndes and Wilson (2001) made an explicit link between social networks, common values, and a civic culture on the one hand, and local governance on the other. They explore the role of institutional design in explaining how governments can shape the development of these two dimensions of social networks and common values and a civic culture.

More recent contributions to the debate explicitly link urban governance to social cohesion. Vranken, for example, concluded on the basis of fieldwork in nine European cities that urban governance arrangements contribute to both the social network and the common values and civic

culture dimension of cohesion in urban neighbourhoods (Vranken, 2005). Buck and colleagues (2005) concentrate in their edited volume on the relationships between urban governance, urban competitiveness, and social cohesion within cities. Their definition of governance is derived from regime theory and thus focuses primarily on the relationship between public and private partners. Social cohesion is also defined at the city level, using indicators of connectedness, order, and equality. The volume concentrates on the city level, but the chapter by Goodlad and Meegan (2005) discusses the extent to which participation in regeneration initiatives at neighbourhood level in central Scotland and Merseyside contributed to two dimensions of social cohesion as they formulate it: social connectedness and social inclusion<sup>1</sup>.

These studies do not, however, provide a systematic analysis of the interrelationships of urban governance and social cohesion in all its dimensions, nor do they show how governance structures can be arranged in such a way that they have a positive impact on social cohesion. In the previous section, we outlined the shift from urban government to urban governance, focusing in turn on four dimensions. One of these dimensions is the changing role of residents in policymaking processes. Within governance, participation can be seen as “a response to questions about local electoral mandates, traditional local government practices and the alleged lack of accountability of non-elected local institutions” (Goodlad and Meegan, 2005, p. 190). Additionally, participation is probably positively related to social cohesion. We argue here that participation in governance is a crucial element in the relationship between social cohesion and urban governance.

Before we outline this relationship, we need to make clear exactly what we are talking about. What is participation at the neighbourhood level? *Formal* participation refers to people taking part in the decision-making processes that influence their neighbourhood positively. The degree to which communities can influence these processes depends on the degree of openness of government and the way in which decisions are taken. Participation requires the capacity to influence the final decision. As Arnstein (1969) has shown, different levels of power relate to different levels of participation. Only where citizens have decision-making power in issues that concern them do we refer to their actions as participation. For the sake of clarity, we limit the analyses to participation in neighbourhood-related issues. At this level, participation refers to such activities as being a member of the neighbourhood council, or having a say in decision-making or in drawing up a plan. In these cases participation is a form of mutual exchange and dialogue between authorities (both public and private parties) and residents.

*Informal* participation can also be an important source of social cohesion (Lelieveldt, 2004). For example, a resident can become a member of a street committee that organises events, joins up with others to clean up the street, checks the undesirable behaviour of loitering teenagers, and so on. Informal activities may enhance residents’ opportunities of participating in formal processes.

The participation of residents in policymaking processes is not new. In the Netherlands, until the early 1980s residents were asked to participate in order to give them a position against the bureaucratic government. Later, their individual rights as customers became central; procedures became more efficient and previously common functions were privatised (Edelenbosch et al., 2005). More recently, as elsewhere in Europe, legitimacy has become an important reason for participation, since the increased role of citizens in policymaking processes is a response to the declining numbers of voters, which results in problems with traditional representation, traditional local government practices (bottom-up instead of top-down), and lack of clarity around the accountability of non-elected institutions.

Urban governance processes have put a stronger emphasis on participation. How does participation relate to social cohesion? We turn to this topic now.

*Participation as an intermediary factor between urban governance and social cohesion*

The way in which the governance process is managed influences the level of participation. Participation is in turn mutually related to social cohesion. These relationships are described below.

First, governance structures can either motivate people to participate or discourage them from doing so. Policymakers at different spatial levels are gatekeepers in the process of participation: they decide who is given access to decision-making power and who is supported in the participation process. Local policymakers can give local people a role in the policy processes, both formally and informally (Forrest and Kearns, 2001). The policymakers work with “sets of routines, norms and incentives that shape and constrain individuals’ preferences and behaviour” (Lowndes and Wilson, 2001, p. 632); this description may be helpful in explaining who participates and for what reasons.

Not only formalised procedures, but also unwritten customs and unspoken conventions are important explanatory variables for the degree of participation (Coaffee and Healey, 2003). These sets, routines, norms, and incentives shape the kind of participation that takes place. The sets are decisive for the way in which the process of negotiation and conflict management are dealt with in the neighbourhood.

Second, the participation of residents in well-managed governance processes enhances social cohesion among residents in urban neighbourhoods. This is so, because in a well-managed governance process residents feel more involved; they get to know each other, they discuss their ideal view of the neighbourhood, and come to a common vision. For example, analyses have indicated that, through their interaction with each other and the balancing of arguments, participating residents’ interest in the collective project and well-being rise, as does their respect for the opinions and rights of others, reliability, and openness to reasonable arguments (Madanipour, 1998; Lowndes and Wilson, 2001; Dekker, 2002; Goodlad and Meegan, 2005).

Third, social cohesion has been analysed as having a positive influence on participation, which indicates that the relationship can also work the other way round: social cohesion positively influences participation. Research in the field of social capital has shown that extensive social networks, trust, and reciprocity have a positive impact on participation (Putnam, 1993; Healey, 1997; Taylor, 2000). Others have indicated that neighbourhood attachment also positively influences participation (Brodsky et al., 1999; Minkler and Wallerstein, 2003). Governance can thus either reinforce or mitigate the operation of the virtuous or vicious relationships between participation and social cohesion.

Evidently, there is a role for participation in the relationship between urban governance and social cohesion. Current research has not paid sufficient attention to this intermediary role of participation in the relationship between social cohesion and urban governance. We are of the opinion that the participation of residents in governance processes can help foster social cohesion, and vice versa; in a cohesive community, more people will participate in governance processes. In the following section we show how the empirical research is capable of ameliorating the above-mentioned lack of knowledge in this field.

## 1.6 Research questions

The general research question of this research is formulated as follows:

*How are urban governance processes related to social cohesion in post-WWII neighbourhoods?*

In order to answer this general research question, we formulated four detailed research questions, each of which contributes in part to the answer to the main question. The first question concerns a description and an analysis of the context of post-WWII neighbourhoods. The second concerns the policymaking process itself within this context and an analysis of the impact of decision-making power on the participation of residents in this process and the problems that are encountered. The third seeks an analysis of the impact of the population characteristics on social cohesion. The last research question seeks an analysis of the relationship between urban governance and social cohesion, and the role of participation in this relationship.

Below we set out the research questions formulated and the methods used to answer each of them.

1. *What types and combinations of social, economic, and physical problems can be identified in post-WWII neighbourhoods in Europe?*

Social cohesion is not a problem that exists in isolation, since it is often related to other developments in urban neighbourhoods. As indicated in section 1.2, problems seem to accumulate in these areas. At the same time, however, some positive developments seem to be taking place: definitely not all the characteristics and developments are negative in these areas. The existing literature tends to have a rather negative starting point which seems to assume an inevitable negative development of post-WWII neighbourhoods (see Murie et al., 2003 for an overview). Many of the existing studies do not show much discernment of the diversity within neighbourhoods, or for the effects of social policies on these neighbourhoods.

In the description of the developments and contributing factors, 29 neighbourhoods in 10 different countries in Europe are centrally featured. The information draws on the results of ten reports in the RESTATE series that were all written according to the same template, thereby facilitating comparisons of the data between countries. We have been able to draw on this broad collection of countries, because Dutch post-WWII neighbourhoods are not unique in their kind; all over Europe these types of neighbourhood were built in the period between 1945 and 1980. We discern five kinds of issue that are important in post-WWII neighbourhoods: physical, demographic and socio-cultural, economic, liveability, and safety. The division of topics has enabled us to write a systemic account of the current issues in the neighbourhoods.

Listing the problems in post-WWII neighbourhoods is one thing; finding solutions is quite another. The second research question therefore concentrates on the policy solutions that have been formulated in response to the problems in these urban areas in the Netherlands.

2. *What is the present Big Cities Policy response to the problems in the research area? How is this policy organised? Who participates in the policy and who has decided on this participation? How can the governance process be evaluated?*

As elsewhere in Northwest Europe, in Dutch post-WWII neighbourhoods the early policy answers (during the 1980s) to the problems identified were initially of a purely physical nature, while more recently social and economic problems have also played an important part. The Big Cities Policy is the present Dutch response to these problems. The Big Cities Policy is area-based, and entails intensive contact and co-operation between residents, government bodies (local and neighbourhood authorities, police, social welfare organisations), housing associations, and local employers (Van Kempen, 2000). The variety of stakeholders involved is rather large and the organisation is complex, as in governance processes.

As indicated in section 1.4, the governance process can be very complex, and problems with respect to sustainability may arise. Although the number of articles published on the topic of governance is enormous, little attention has been paid to the issues encountered in governance at neighbourhood level. This deficiency is the prime reason for this chapter. A second reason is that much of the theoretical framework is derived from Anglo-American situations, and until now it has remained unclear whether these perceptions of the governance process are applicable in the Dutch context.

We feature these issues in chapter three: How has the Big Cities Policy worked out in The Hague with particular respect to governance aspects? How can the governance process be evaluated? In chapter six the analysis concentrates on the position of residents' participation in the governance processes.

The analysis is based on interviews held with policymakers in Bouwlust, a post-WWII neighbourhood in The Hague South East. Also the policymakers at the city level were interviewed (see the list of respondents for an overview). On the basis of the analysis, we have been able to answer this second research question on the organisation of restructuring policies and who takes part in the decision-making process. In post-WWII neighbourhoods in particular, where the population is highly diverse in socioeconomic and ethnic terms, the question of representation and participation is important and is considered in this thesis. The evaluation focuses on the characteristics of governance: partnerships, the role of residents, the way in which the discussion takes place, a description of the areas, as well as problems related to accountability, conflicting goals, and gated partnerships as indicated in section 1.4.

Social cohesion is one of the central concepts in this research, and to analyse the importance of the relationship with urban governance the other factors capable of exerting an influence need to be known. We therefore turn to the issue of social cohesion in post-WWII neighbourhoods in the third research question.

3. *To what extent is social cohesion related to the socioeconomic and ethnic characteristics of the residents in the research areas?*

This research question focuses on the impact of socioeconomic and ethnic household characteristics on social cohesion, how it can be measured, and how the dimensions are interrelated.

As indicated earlier in this chapter, we identified three dimensions of social cohesion at neighbourhood level: social networks, common values and a civic culture, and neighbourhood attachment. Many studies have already featured social cohesion, but there remain at least two reasons for analysing social cohesion and the differences between socioeconomic and ethnic groups. First, how the dimensions of social cohesion are interrelated remains unclear. A better understanding of this interrelationship is needed, and our aim is to contribute to this. Second, the socioeconomic and ethnic characteristics of the population are supposed to be strongly related to social cohesion, and many policies are based on this assumption. However, as indicated in section 1.3, it remains unclear what the effects are of the increasingly heterogeneous population composition of post-WWII areas as a result of social mixing policies. We have therefore analysed how socioeconomic and ethnic characteristics are related to the social cohesion of residents in post-WWII neighbourhoods.

Chapter four presents a quantitative, multivariate analysis of the relationship between socioeconomic and ethnic population characteristics and each dimension of social cohesion. In this chapter we analyse how the dimensions of social cohesion are interrelated, thereby adding to existing knowledge in this field.

The analysis is based on a survey in two post-WWII neighbourhoods: Bouwlust in the Hague and Nieuw Hoograven in Utrecht (see map 1.1 and map 1.2). One of the central aims of the survey was to analyse to what extent the diversity of the population in post-WWII neighbourhoods may be related to social cohesion. Besides Bouwlust, also discussed in chapter three, we have added another post-WWII neighbourhood. We chose Hoograven, because this neighbourhood



Map 1.1 Location of Nieuw-Hoograven within the city of Utrecht



Map 1.2 Location of Bouwlust within the city of The Hague

is similar to Bouwlust in terms of the characteristics of the residents. This similarity facilitated the analysis of the impact of socioeconomic and ethnic characteristics of the population on social cohesion. A description of the neighbourhoods, data collection, and analysis can be found in chapters four and five; they are based on the same dataset. The questionnaire is based on an earlier questionnaire that was used in a comparative study between Cologne (Germany) and Utrecht (the Netherlands) in 1997 by Van Kempen and Dekker, and Friedrichs and Blasius.

Now that we have defined social cohesion and urban governance, and have distinguished the factors that are of importance in studying them, the last research question focuses on the relationship between these two concepts and the intermediary role of participation:

4. *To what extent does social cohesion influence the participation of residents in the governance process? How does participation in governance arrangements relate to social cohesion?*

In the fifth chapter, we address the first part of this research question. We concentrate on the impact of social capital and neighbourhood attachment on participation. In line with existing research on participation, the focus is on social capital, which is defined as social networks, trust, and norms. In addition, neighbourhood attachment is related to participation. The analyses have taken the socioeconomic and ethnic characteristics of the residents into account.

The second part of this research question is answered in the last empirical chapter. This presents the opinions of the policymakers, their attitude towards participation, the openness of the governance process, and the experienced effects of participation on the three dimensions of social cohesion. This chapter reports a qualitative analysis of the relationship between urban governance, participation, and the three dimensions of social cohesion in Bouwlust, The Hague. This analysis is based on interviews with policymakers (the same interviews as are used in chapter three) who have a gate-keeping function. Their attitudes and motives are thus decisive for the extent to which residents are involved in governance processes and in which residents can participate.

In the concluding chapter we first put forward our answers to the research questions from the material gathered in the empirical chapters. Some critical evaluations on the findings are given as well as suggestions for further research. We conclude with some suggestions for better policy practice in post-WWII neighbourhoods.

## **1.7 Scientific and societal relevance**

The scientific relevance of this thesis is threefold. First, we aim to bridge the gap between two large bodies of knowledge (urban governance and social cohesion). Up to this point it has remained unclear how the process of policy development in post-WWII neighbourhoods, where complex processes take place, are related to social cohesion. The existing research concentrates on the governance processes and is less clear about the relationship with social cohesion. Furthermore, these studies do not define social cohesion as a multidimensional concept with interrelated elements. These studies also tend to take a qualitative approach, while a quantitative approach can add much to the understanding of this relationship. There is clearly much to be done in this field. This thesis adds to the existing body of research by combining qualitative and quantitative approaches, defining social cohesion multi-dimensionally, and analysing the extent to which urban governance processes add to each of these dimensions of social cohesion.

Second, this research adds to the understanding of the opportunities and restrictions in governance processes. There is a large body of literature that describes governance processes and the advantages and problems encountered in these processes. Despite this large body of knowledge, little is known as yet on how the problems in governance processes can be evaluated in the context of the Big Cities Policy, and which theoretical notions can help in the analysis of the current style of policymaking.

Third, this research adds to the understanding of the elements that influence social cohesion as well as to the operationalisation and measurement of social cohesion within a neighbourhood context. Many studies have already paid attention to social cohesion at the neighbourhood level. There is, however, reason enough to analyse social cohesion and the differences between ethnic and socioeconomic groups. Part of this relationship is already known, but there is as yet no overall view. In addition, there are many studies that pay attention to social cohesion using either qualitative or quantitative methods. The frequent use of single indicators of social cohesion is often criticised (Lelieveldt, 2005). Also the neglect of the experienced bonds – rather than the actual relationships – has been noted (Blokland, 2005). In this thesis, multiple indicators of social cohesion have been used and qualitative and quantitative research methods have been

combined. Of course, we are not the first to measure social cohesion in a quantitative way, but social cohesion has not previously been operationalised multi-dimensionally, using refined data reduction to define a complex set of indicators of social cohesion that represent both experienced and existing bonds with other residents and with the neighbourhood.

The societal relevance lies in the large number of post-WWII neighbourhoods in the Netherlands and the many residents in these areas. It was estimated in 1995 that 1,687,000 households lived in 497 post-WWII neighbourhoods in the Netherlands (Wassenberg, 2004). These figures accounted for approximately 27 percent of all Dutch households and 13 percent of all Dutch neighbourhoods. Many post-WWII neighbourhoods can be seen as (potentially) problematic areas in many cities all over Europe. The focus of this research is on social cohesion; policymakers expect much good from it in these areas and the policy processes that aim to ameliorate the situation in these neighbourhoods.

This thesis is also of societal relevance to the process of policy development in urban neighbourhoods. The neighbourhood is the primary level of many policy actions in Dutch cities. The Big Cities Policy aims to integrate physical, economic, and social policies in distressed urban areas. The goal of the Big Cities Policy is to make these neighbourhoods and the city more 'complete'. Policymakers thus acknowledge the importance of the neighbourhood in the lives of many. This research adds to the understanding of what policymakers can do to make these neighbourhoods better places in which to live.

This concentration has recently become clear in the report by the Scientific Advisory Board for National Policy (Hazeu et al., 2005), which has shown that many policies focus on the neighbourhood: neighbourhood budgets enable residents to develop their own activities; the passing on of responsibilities to the neighbourhood; the involvement of residents in urban restructuring processes, and projects such as *Onze Buurt Aan Zet* (Our Neighbourhood's Turn) that aim to enhance social cohesion and liveability in the neighbourhood. But, as Lelieveldt (2005) concludes, the cases described in this report show that much policy is based on assumptions of the effects rather than clear effect evaluations of neighbourhood based policies. This research aims to add to the understanding of how urban governance and social cohesion are interrelated in post-WWII neighbourhoods.

## Notes

- 1 These studies were published when this research had already been completed. Wherever possible, the results of these studies are related to the findings in this study.

## 2 Large housing estates in Europe: current situation and developments

Dekker, K. and Van Kempen, R. (2004), Large housing estates in Europe: current situation and developments. In: *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie*, 95 (5), p. 570-577. Copyright © Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

### 2.1 Introduction

Urban policies often focus on certain areas within a city. Nowadays, area-based policies are popular in almost every Western European country (Andersen, 2001; Murie, 2002), but many policies have also targeted specific urban areas in other periods since the Second World War. Until the second half of the 1990s, urban policies seem to have focused on urban areas built in the 50 or 60 years before the Second World War (Murie et al., 2003). These areas were seen to be the most problematic in a city, with a multitude of problems, such as the physical downgrading of the housing stock, increasing concentrations of low-income households, rising criminality, decreasing quality of public spaces, and so forth. Other areas were less frequently targeted, because they were considered less problematic.

At present, however, a clear shift is taking place. More and more cities in Europe have shifted the focus of their urban policies to post-WWII areas. In Western Europe this shift means a focus on areas that were built roughly between 1945 and 1975; in Eastern Europe the focus is on areas built between 1950 and about 1985. During these decades, all the countries in Europe built large housing estates. It is estimated that in Europe, excluding the former USSR, about 41 million people live on these estates.

When the estates were built they were praised with positive evaluations and bright futures were foreseen. However, things have changed rather radically. The areas developed from unproblematic and attractive places in which to live to areas that are very problematic in many respects. A long list of problems is now rather common for many of these estates (see, for example, Power and Tunstall, 1995; Hall, 1997; Power, 1997; Evans, 1998; Taylor, 1998; Musterd et al., 1999; Andersen, 2001). At the same time, however, some positive developments seem to have taken place: urban policymakers have discovered these areas as important target areas and by no means all the characteristics and developments are negative in these areas.

The purpose of this paper is to give a generalised picture of the present situation, developments and problems in 31 post-WWII housing estates in Europe. We draw on the first findings of a European Commission project named RESTATE (Restructuring Large-scale Housing Estates in European Cities)<sup>1</sup>. In Figure 2.1, the countries and cities that are central in the RESTATE project are depicted. The first part of this research project was aimed at an inventory of these developments and problems on the basis of desk research and interviews with

stakeholders. The focus was more on description than on explanations. This paper therefore also has a descriptive rather than an explanatory goal. Moreover, the paper is also not focused on solutions to these problems. Our main aim here is to make clear what these estates look like at present. The paper draws on the results of ten reports in the RESTATE series (Aalbers et al., 2003; Andersson et al., 2003; Černič Mali et al., 2003; Chignier-Riboulon et al., 2003; Erdősi et al., 2003; Hall et al., 2003; Knorr-Siedow and Droste, 2003; Mezzetti et al., 2003; Pareja Eastaway, 2003; Węclawowicz et al., 2003). In order to avoid too many repetitions we do not mention these references again. It should be clear, however, that most of the data presented here are from these reports.



Map 2.1 The countries and cities in the RESTATE project

## 2.2 Developments in large housing estates in Europe

Neighbourhoods fulfil different functions within urban housing markets. Some neighbourhoods are clearly places for high-income households, because other income groups cannot afford to live there. Other areas are places where low-income households live, often because there are no, or hardly any, alternatives elsewhere. Many urban areas show no big concentrations of high or low incomes, but are places where middle-income groups live (Marcuse, 1989). And of course, many neighbourhoods in cities show a mix of all kinds of households: low and high incomes, minority ethnic households and natives, old and young, and so forth (see, for example, Musterd and Andersson, 2005). Mixed neighbourhoods with respect to the population show a clear correlation with a mix of housing types. In areas with a housing mix, a mix of households is a logical consequence. In areas with a monotonous housing stock, the chance of a more one-sided population is much greater.

Neighbourhoods are dynamic. Examples exist of urban areas that have fulfilled more or less the same functions for ages, for example, some luxurious neighbourhoods with a majority of villas or other expensive and well-built housing types. Some poor areas also seem to have been poor for decades, sometimes even since their existence. But there are many examples of poor areas that have witnessed an improvement of their position in the housing market as a consequence of targeted policies towards them (Kesteloot, 2002; De Decker et al., 2003), or as a consequence of more market-led developments, such as gentrification (Van Weesep and Musterd, 1991). And, finally, areas that were built for middle-class households after the Second World War may, after a few decades, have lost their popularity and gradually become areas where only poor people would live, again, because they have no alternatives elsewhere. This is the case for most of the estates in the RESTATE project.

All over Europe, post-WWII areas show interesting similarities between countries (see Turkington et al., 2004). These areas can be labelled housing estates, which can, according to Power (1997), be defined as groups of buildings that are recognised as distinct and discrete geographical areas. Murie and colleagues (2003) have added one element to this definition: the developments are planned by the state or with state support. In most cases these areas consist of prefabricated dwellings. *Large* housing estates can, according to Murie and colleagues (2003), be defined as housing estates that have at least 2,000 housing units.

The reasons for building these estates are well-known. After the Second World War there was an enormous housing shortage in most European countries as a consequence of devastation in the War and a low production of housing following it. In addition, a babyboom shortly after the War caused an enormous rise in the demand for dwellings. Especially in Northern and Western European countries, the enlargement of the welfare state brought more attention for building affordable housing, often in the form of social or public rental dwellings. Technical developments made building in (often pre-fabricated) large housing estates financially attractive.

Below we discuss issues of five kinds that are important in large housing estates: physical, economical, demographic and social-cultural developments, issues related to liveability, and finally issues related to safety. It should be noted that the division of topics enables us to make a systemic account of the current issues in the estates, but does not do justice to the complexity and interrelated character of the developments in the estates.

### *Physical developments*

The large housing estates in Northern, Western, and Southern Europe were mostly built in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, while those in the former socialist countries in Eastern Europe were built in the 1980s and in some cases in the 1990s. In the UK some parts of the estates were even built before the Second World War.

At first sight, the large housing estates in all European countries look very much alike (see also Murie et al., 2003; Turkington et al., 2004): middle- and high-rise apartment blocks, in Northern and Western Europe intermingled with single-family dwellings. The architecture is simple; the layout of the estates was, at least at the time the estates were built, more or less revolutionary. A generation of pre-war modernists (such as Le Corbusier in France, Walter Gropius and Max Taut in Germany, Oskar Hansen in Poland) were able to put their stamp on the new estates. This resulted in large blocks, large expanses of green between the blocks, and a separation of functions. Carefully designed urban landscapes emerged and the estates were hailed by many urban designers of that period. Positive opinions and evaluations about the large housing estates were very common in those days (Dekker, et al., 2005).

Estates are located outside the city centre. The first estates were generally built close to the city centre, but later they were built in more remote locations. In some cases, such as in Sweden and France, they were located close to and with an outlook on beautiful natural areas.

Those estates that are further from the city centre face physical isolation if public transport is not well organised. Good public transport is a problem in the Italian and some of the Spanish estates studied in the RESTATE project; here walking distances to public transport can be very long. There are examples in the Spanish estates where large-scale public action has finally led to good metro connections with the city centre, leading immediately to an increased popularity of the estate.

In Western and Northern Europe the estates have a very important function within the housing market; they provide affordable housing opportunities, allowing low-income households also to have a relatively spacious home. That is not to say that low housing costs guarantee success. Berlin presents an interesting case here. In an estate in former Eastern Berlin that was finished in the 1990s, there are at present many vacancies, despite the low rents. An estate in the former Western part has a much better position on the housing market: it is much more popular. One reason for that is the better quality of the buildings and dwellings, but the strong feelings of social cohesion here seem to be particularly important. Maintenance is problematic on all estates, certainly on those that were built several decades ago and where the building materials used were not of very high quality. Physical problems often occur, such as: infiltration of water in the dwellings, unsafe balconies, poorly functioning lighting systems, defects in heating systems, crumbling plasterwork or bad insulation. The estates are often described as areas of grey concrete, despite the large expanses of green between the apartment blocks.

The ownership structure of the housing units differs in the various countries. In Southern and Eastern Europe, owner-occupation is the most prevalent form. In the Eastern European countries, owner-occupation is of more recent date. After the fall of the communist governments, extensive privatisation processes were set up, which included selling a large part of the rental stock to the residents, often at very low prices (see Murie et al., 2005). In the case of Northern Europe (Sweden and Germany) the local government authority often owns the majority of the

dwellings, renting them out to low-income families. In Western Europe most dwellings in the estates can be found in the social-rented sector owned by housing associations.

The extent to which an estate experiences problems is influenced by the relative position on the housing market and the kind of people who are attracted to the area. In North and Northwest Europe the estates function near the bottom of the housing market (but not at the very bottom, since this position is still the 'privilege' of inner city areas), attracting low-income families, which can result in overcrowded units and a concentration of people with few opportunities. In Eastern Europe the relative position of the estates is usually better and these attract middle income families.

#### *Demographic and social-cultural issues*

The early estates were built in the 1950s and 1960s for family households. Since this was 30-40 years ago, the original population is now ageing, leading to an overrepresentation of the elderly. This is especially true in Southern Europe, where the elderly stay put in their homes and their children cannot find a home in the same area.

A different situation prevails in Eastern Europe, where the age cohort between 19 and 65 is overrepresented. These estates are still able to attract well-educated families, former communist officials and artists. Young childless couples are also moving in.

In Northern and Western Europe, the influx of ethnic minorities with numerous children is most prevalent. In Western Europe there are some estates in which over 80 percent of the total population belongs to minority ethnic groups. Their low incomes and large families often lead to a situation in which they only have a small number of opportunities on the urban housing markets; the affordable and relatively large dwellings in the post-WWII housing estates are a logical option, while those who can afford to do so move out. At the same time, the share of original residents diminishes because they die of old age.

As a result, in France, the UK, the Netherlands, and Sweden, the social-cultural heterogeneity of the population has rapidly increased in the past ten or fifteen years. In some cases this heterogeneity leads to a vibrant civic culture, at least in parts of the estates (such as in the Dutch Bijlmer), but in most cases this heterogeneity is negatively perceived, especially by the residents who have lived in the area for decades. Originally, the community feeling on many estates was strong, because many households started to live in these areas in much the same circumstances: they were young and they were starters on the housing and labour market, which led to strong social cohesion on the estates. Until today these – now elderly – residents have lived on the estates. The influx of other groups can hamper this feeling of cohesion and increase the nostalgic feelings associated with the past.

#### *Economic issues*

In general, the estates have higher unemployment levels than the city as a whole, although often not as high as in the older parts of the cities. This assertion does not always hold true for the Eastern European estates, where unemployment is sometimes much lower than in the rest of the city. In Poland, for example, in Warsaw's Ursynów, unemployment is only 2 percent, while it is 6 percent in the city and 18 percent in the country as a whole.

However, in most estates in European cities, gross participation (the share of the total population that has a job) is declining. There are three explanations for this. The first is that the estates were originally built for low-skilled manufacturing workers. The change from an

industrial to a service economy led to increased unemployment among the low-skilled workers. In the older estates, an additional reason for the decrease of participation is the increased share of pensioners among the residents; people who started their professional career in the 1960s have now retired, but, as we said above, many of them stayed put.

In the Netherlands, France, the UK and Sweden, another reason for the low participation rate is the influx of ethnic minorities into the estates. Employment opportunities for ethnic minorities are often lower than for the indigenous population. Also, they often have large families and teenagers are overrepresented. These young people often have difficulties in finding a job.

Third, employment opportunities within the estates were originally limited since the initial design of the estates put the emphasis on a separation of functions rather than mixing housing and economic development. More recently, however, the spread of employment opportunities from the inner cities towards locations near motorways or public transport has offered opportunities for some estates. An example is the Utrecht case of Kanaleneiland where the 'Woonboulevard' (a concentration of furniture shops) offers many low-skilled job opportunities. In Eastern Europe there are also many new business developments near the estates.

### *Liveability*

All estates are characterised by a separation of functions and large green public areas between the apartment blocks. These characteristics are now seen as both an asset and a problem. The positive side is that there is often a lot of space for recreation purposes, parking facilities, a lack of disturbances from public functions, and there is a feeling of spatial grandeur. Unfortunately, these assets also have their problems; everywhere, the green areas and public spaces are poorly maintained. Consequently, these spaces are sometimes vandalised and cannot be used. Areas where cars are not allowed minimise the possibilities of police patrol and attract all kinds of criminal behaviour such as drug dealing and drug abuse.

Traffic is a related issue. When the estates were built, there were far fewer cars than today. As a result, green areas are used as car parks, especially in the East European estates where the number of cars has increased enormously. Owing to the separation of functions, commuter-traffic is dense in the mornings and evenings, leading to traffic jams on connecting roads.

Another problem is the lack of good shopping facilities. In the Northern, Western, and Southern estates the shops are outdated and too small. In the countries in Southern and Eastern Europe, where large shopping malls have opened close to the estates, the shops on the estates will soon leave. In countries such as the Netherlands and Sweden, the shopping centres on the estates have been renewed because planning policies aim to keep car traffic limited by providing services within the neighbourhood.

### *Safety*

On all estates, safety is one of the major problems. On top of that, on the estates where the population composition is heterogeneous, the differences in lifestyle lead to feelings of insecurity. A lack of meeting places leads to young people hanging about in public or semi-public parts of buildings, in shopping centres, and other external spaces. The loiterers make other people feel insecure. Furthermore, the physical structure of the areas facilitates drug dealing and drug abuse: there are many hidden places where drug pushing can take place. On all the estates with many poor people, drug or alcohol related problems are reported, but it should be noted that

these problems also arise in old inner-city neighbourhoods. Nevertheless, the young population structure with many people in the age group of 15-25, gives a high chance of drug abuse in the large housing estates.

So, the socioeconomic, social-demographical, and physical characteristics all influence the feeling of safety. The perceived lack of safety, together with a concentration of low-income families, ethnic minorities, insufficient maintenance, and grey and monotonous building blocks can easily lead to the stigmatisation of the estates. The problem with a stigma is that it is more easily gained than lost; it is repeated over and over again by the media. Some estates were stigmatised from the beginning; others became notorious later on as a result of problems with criminality or a large number of ethnic minorities.

## 2.3 Conclusions

Some generalisations can be made about the post-WWII large housing estates in European cities. The physical layout is mostly the same: large middle- or high-rise multi-family dwellings with large green public spaces predominate. In most areas a number of positive points can be detected. Many people value the design of the estates with large green public spaces positively. Also, the estates provide relatively large, bright and sunny dwellings for a good price. The estates clearly serve an important function for low- and middle-income households. Unfortunately, common negative points can also be mentioned:

- Many dwellings show clear signs of physical decay.
- The estates are mostly located on peripheral locations.
- Nearly all estates have relatively high unemployment rates.
- The separation of functions that is so typical of most of these estates leads to unsafe spots in the areas and conflicts about the maintenance of public space.
- The increasing number of cars in the last two decades causes traffic jams and parking problems.
- Safety problems on the estates can be related to vacancies, drug abuse, the lack of meeting places for young people, and the anti-social behaviour of some groups.
- Stigmatisation of an estate can be the consequence of downgrading processes in the area, especially when these processes are broadly covered in the media<sup>2</sup>.

Despite these lists of generalisations, many developments and problems seem to be typical of only a few estates. Of course, it is impossible to list these deviations from the general picture at this point. But it can be said that, because of these differences, it is not possible to present an explanatory model that accounts for all developments on all estates. A few words can be said on the explanation of the results, however.

The most important remark to be made here is that any mono-causal explanation should be avoided. The large post-WWII estates are not in a bad position *only* because of their monolithic design, *only* because of their dominance of high-rise, or *only* because of their peripheral location, or *only* because of the over-representations of affordable dwellings, or *only* because of inadequate management, or *only* because of the increasing concentration of low-income people (Murie et al., 2003). “We need to see the interaction between a variety of factors which increase the likelihood of failure but which individually are not sufficient”, according to Murie and colleagues (2003, p.

52). They continue with the warning that there is no single lever that can be pulled that would turn estates around.

Typologies of welfare states (for example, Esping-Andersen, 1990) also do not seem to have enough explanatory power. Although there are differences between, for example, the estates in the former socialist states and the estates in the Netherlands, it is always the case that at the same time there are many similarities. This indicates, again, that many different aspects and developments are needed to explain the specific position of estates in one city, in one country.

The situation is even more complex. Many developments outside estates (the global restructuring of the economy, international migration, changing patterns of housing preferences, building new, often more attractive dwellings, to mention just a few), also impinge on local developments. The only way to find solutions to specific estates in European cities is to start with a careful and detailed analysis of situations and developments that go far beyond the estates themselves. Any quick copy of policies or actions from one situation (estate) to another will fail if national, regional and local contingencies are not taken into account.

Looking for explanations is one thing; finding solutions is another. Many estates, many buildings, and especially many of their inhabitants cannot wait too long before something is done to counter the (multitude of) problems and negative developments. Fortunately, all kinds of successful policies, actions, and efforts have already been undertaken. As researchers, our task is to follow these initiatives critically and try to find out the circumstances in which they could be applied in other situations.

## Notes

- 1 For more information, see [www.restate.geo.uu.nl](http://www.restate.geo.uu.nl).
- 2 In listing these problems, it is recognised that they never come alone. In fact, many problems are the consequence of other problems that in their turn may create new problems. Spirals of decline have often been described in the literature (see, for example, Prak and Priemus, 1985) as typical of post-WWII large housing estates in Europe.

### 3 Urban governance within the Big Cities Policy: ideals and practice in The Hague, the Netherlands

Dekker, K. and Van Kempen, R. (2004), Urban governance within the Big Cities Policy: ideals and practice in The Hague, the Netherlands. In: *Cities*, 21 (2), p. 109-117. Copyright © Elsevier Science, Ltd.

#### Abstract

The Big Cities Policy is currently the major urban policy in the Netherlands. Prepared unhurriedly in 1994, it picked up steam at the end of the 1990s when the new Minister for Big Cities Policy asked the cities to prepare their plans to spend the money made available for this policy. Now it is in full swing and the first results, both positive and negative, can already be seen. This paper reports an evaluation of the implementation of the Big Cities Policy in The Hague, the third largest city in the Netherlands. The focus of the evaluation is urban governance, a key term in urban policies in Europe. We first focus on certain urban governance issues that have been raised with respect to urban policies in Europe in general. Then an introduction to the background and aims of the Dutch Big Cities Policy is given. A brief introduction to The Hague precedes the main part of the paper: the evaluation. We concentrate specifically on governance aspects. The paper concludes with some general lessons derived from the evaluation<sup>1</sup>.

#### 3.1 Introduction

In 1994, the newly-elected government of the Netherlands decided to introduce a new field of policy addressing the problems in the big cities. This policy was precipitated by a Memorandum compiled by representatives of the four largest cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, and Utrecht) identifying the problems of these cities and outlining a rescue plan (*Een Deltaplan voor de Grote Steden*, 1994; see also Priemus et al., 1997). Now, some eight years later, this new policy is in full swing.

Current urban policy in the Netherlands differs significantly from previous policies. Dutch urban policy is now integrative, area-based, governance-oriented, and based on contracts. The Big Cities Policy (as it is known) can now be evaluated in terms of its success and failures. The policy was implemented in 1994, but only really got underway in 1999 when the 25 cities involved in the policy were invited to write their own development plans, which had to be approved by the Minister for Big Cities and Integration. This Minister has no separate portfolio, implying

that policy is made without any funding: resources from other departments are integrated into one policy.

The aim of this paper is to report the evaluation of this Big Cities Policy in one of the four largest cities of the Netherlands, namely The Hague. The focus is on governance aspects. In our view, although a considerable body of literature has been published about urban governance, with advantages enumerated and critical remarks made, as yet few studies have sought to investigate how the various aspects of urban governance have worked out in practice. The results of the UGIS research project (see footnote 1) gave us the opportunity to focus on aspects of governance and to investigate the aspects which do or do not work well.

In Section 3.2 the issues are listed that have been raised with respect to urban policies and urban governance. In Section 3.3 we briefly describe the background, aims, and content of the Dutch Big Cities Policy. After a short introduction to the city of The Hague (Section 3.4), we consider the empirical results in Sections 3.5 and 3.6. The final section gives some general lessons that can be derived from the paper.

### **3.2 Urban governance and urban policies: a brief literature review**

Urban developments can be characterised by their complexity, dynamism, and diversity (see also Kooiman, 1993). This characterisation refers to both inter-urban and intra-urban issues. Inter-urban issues are concerned with urban development in a spatial sense, such as the emergence of new areas at the outskirts of the cities and the increasing competition between cities. Intra-urban issues, on the other hand, concern the quality of life, such as security and access to basic utilities and services. In the last few years, the topic of social inclusion or cohesion versus social exclusion has come to the fore in research programmes in this field (see the Fifth Framework Programme of the EU)<sup>2</sup>.

Inter-urban issues are related to spatial conflicts, while intra-urban issues refer to social aspects. In each case, many actors are perceived to be stakeholders, including public and private organisations and various societal groups. The intricacy of the problems associated with these issues is such that the involvement of so many stakeholders does not necessarily lead to adequate policy. There seems to be general agreement that top-down and command-and-control models of governance are no longer appropriate, or in any event are not as appropriate as they previously might have been (Healey et al., 1995). This is even more evident when the agendas of competitiveness between cities and social cohesion have to be combined (Friedrichs and Vranken, 2001) and countless parties and organisations have to collaborate.

*Urban governance* is the new catchphrase (Imrie and Thomas, 1999; Elander and Blanc, 2001). It differs from traditional forms of government by including actors representing not only the public sector, but also the private and voluntary sectors. The actors are engaged in partnerships and other kinds of networks that are fairly autonomous with respect to the state. Participation in such a network is usually based on mutual interests, exchange of resources, and commitment; the relationships between the participants do not have to be balanced (Andersen and Van Kempen, 2001).

Different kinds of collaboration can be distinguished. First, cooperation can be between central, municipal, and sub-municipal levels. Particularly in the 1990s, through the devolution of tasks, central governments worldwide increased the burden on local governments (Elander and

Blanc, 2001). The shift may also be in the opposite direction: in some cases, European policies take over responsibilities from national governments (with respect to agriculture, for example).

Second, the move to increase the involvement of the private sector is clear. The private sector has resources that could be used for projects. Private companies usually profit from their investments in financial terms, but sometimes only in terms of public relations (a willingness to invest might be looked on as social engagement). The most important private partner is usually the housing association, but private companies may also be involved.

Finally, voluntary and community sectors (neighbourhood organisations, trade unions, the Church and other religious organisations) have become involved in the governance of urban issues. On the one hand, local communities have themselves sought for a greater say in decision-making (Hambleton, 2000). On the other hand, local and national government authorities have sought opportunities to increase the participation of inhabitants. This concern plays a part in much of the recent literature on neighbourhood restructuring (see Parkinson, 1997). The idea is that the residents of a particular locality should transform themselves from passive to active participants. Citizens are seen as actors, not objects. Government must not only listen to the people, but also involve them actively in all stages of the policy process. The philosophy is that, by providing such competence, the residents are supposed to be capable of managing their own lives and undertake the necessary actions for improvement. The catchword here is *empowerment* (Andersen, 2001).

Urban governance has led to hierarchies, bureaucracies, and top-down approaches being set aside by self-organising networks and bottom-up initiatives. The boundaries between organisations involved in governance structures have become permeable (Stoker, 1995). More than ever before, residents in targeted areas are involved and are listened to, sometimes by order of the central government or a ministry, for example. Of course, it should be noted that there has been no clear break: there has always been governance and there still is government (Imrie and Raco, 1999).

A complex, dynamic, and diverse urban environment requires substantial governing capacity; urban governance seems capable of providing it. Collaboration between various stakeholders with numerous partners in the governance process engenders knowledge. But governance structures may generate tensions and conflicts with respect to accountability, legitimacy, and power, especially in situations where there is devolution of responsibility without proper devolution of decision-making authority, competence, or (budgetary) power. The sustainability of governance then becomes problematic. In specific terms, the following problems with respect to urban governance may arise (see also Andranovich and Riposa, 1998; Andersen and Van Kempen, 2001; Elander and Blanc, 2001). Accountability is a key problem with respect to urban governance. If the borders between public and private concerns are unclear, confusion about responsibilities ensues. The same applies to different levels of government, where unclear demarcation may also cause problems with respect to accountability. Who is responsible when something goes wrong? To which organisation or person can residents turn when their neighbourhood requires attention, or when a policy measure has failed?

The goals of the various partners in networks and partnerships may conflict: members of a network cannot all be expected to have identical interests. Hence, as work progresses conflicts and contradictions may lead to difficulties for the networks themselves. These difficulties are often related to the different policy cultures that have to work together under the umbrella of

urban governance. Conflicts between partners may cause problems for the projects for which they are responsible.

Participants in networks or partnerships are not democratically elected. Although there are no physical barriers to participation, a partnership can be experienced as being closed or gated, because usually only those capable of adding resources, including political power or legitimacy, will be admitted. The outside world may not feel that it is properly represented in the governance structures and problems of legitimacy may arise.

With respect to the involvement of residents, the individuals involved in networks or partnerships might act on their own account, or for their own particular interest group, and not for the community as a whole. Commitment may well be based on self-interest rather than on the good of the neighbourhood as a whole.

These problems form the guidelines for the empirical part of the paper. How has the Big Cities Policy worked out in The Hague, in particular with respect to governance aspects? The research consisted of interviews with stakeholders (including people working at the ministerial department for Big Cities Policy and Integration, The Hague local authority, housing associations, local policy, welfare organisations, active residents). The interviews were held in two rounds, first by a national researcher and later by an international team of researchers. First, we discuss the Dutch Big Cities Policy.

### **3.3 The Dutch Big Cities Policy: main issues**

The problems of European cities are similar. In The Hague, as elsewhere, one of the most pressing problems is the relatively high numbers of unemployed, particularly among the immigrants and young people. Even within a thriving economy, unemployment was significantly higher in the largest cities than in the rest of the country. Other problems in The Hague are well-known in urban Europe: high and rising crime rates, a loss of feelings of safety, neighbourhood decay, increasing polarisation between income groups, and growing spatial concentrations of low-income households and ethnic minority groups. In addition there are physical problems; many of these are found in spatial concentrations of social or public housing, which in many European countries are often in a poor state of repair, or situated in grimy, dysfunctional public spaces. These problems tend not to occur in isolation, but to accumulate in some areas, notably those built at the end of the 19th century, the beginning of the 20th century, and the early post-WWII period (1945-1960) (see also Priemus et al., 1997; Musterd and Ostendorf, 1998; Marcuse and Van Kempen, 1999; Verweij et al., 1999; Van Kempen, 2000; Andersen and Van Kempen, 2001).

The Big Cities Policy is the Dutch policy that aims to tackle the problems of the cities. Initially, only the four major cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, and Utrecht) were targeted, but over time many medium-sized towns have become part of the focus as well. The Big Cities Policy concentrates on deprived areas. An area-based approach should lead to long-term economic, physical, and social improvements at the local level. The approach entails intensive contact and cooperation between residents, government bodies (local authority, police, social welfare organisations), housing associations, and local employers (Van Kempen, 2000). There is a clear implication here that governance is an important aspect of the policy.

These new Big Cities Policy programmes are characterised by a shared policy responsibility, which is expressed in partnerships between different political levels as well as between political levels and other stakeholders. Written agreements established these partnerships between, for example, the national government and the city governments and between city districts and other parties involved. Usually, policy implementation devolves to the lower political levels whereas policy planning remains at the higher levels. An important aspect of the Big Cities Policy is the interaction and co-operation of all relevant stakeholders, including the active involvement of local residents. Cities that are part of the Big Cities Policy sign covenants with the Minister for Big Cities Policy. In these covenants they promise to reduce negative developments by a certain percentage or increase positive developments (Dekker et al., 2002).

The main objective of the Dutch Big Cities Policy is to make the cities “complete”. A city is said to be complete if it has a strong economic, physical, and social structure. The Big Cities Policy therefore rests on three pillars: (1) the economy and employment; (2) the physical infrastructure; (3) the social infrastructure. For each of these three pillars, attention is devoted to a number of policy fields. The main goals for the economy and employment pillar are more jobs and lower unemployment rates, economic growth, better conditions for new and expanding firms, diversification of the economic base, and the growth of small and medium-sized firms. Better accessibility to the cities (including workplaces), a better position for urban areas on the regional housing market, better quality of the residential environment, and the sustainability of the urban environment are the main focal points of the physical infrastructure pillar. With respect to the social infrastructure, vulnerable people should be helped to escape from a disadvantaged situation (such as unemployment or homelessness). Other important goals are improved safety on the streets and in schools and help for young people (education, career guidance) (Van Kempen, 2000).

Although these goals have been listed separately, the Big Cities Policy should be perceived as an integrative policy. Money allocated to the achievement of these goals is now used in an integrated manner to improve the physical situation of the living environment and the quality of urban space, to create more jobs in the city, stimulate the local economy, and cultivate attractive living environments at the neighbourhood level. Many problems are interrelated, so the implementation of many policy measures is synchronised. The integral approach (as urban governance is referred to within the Big Cities Policy) can also be found in the way each of the partners in the policy process is involved: the participants are asked to plan together, work together, and carry out their tasks together.

A typical feature of the Big Cities Policy is ensuring commitment through the instrument of covenants. The most recent of these were signed on 20 December, 1999. These covenants are drawn up between the ministers concerned and individual cities. The agreements are based on the development programmes the cities themselves have formulated. In the covenants, both parties agree on the goals to be reached within a four-year period.

### **3.4 The City of The Hague**

The Hague is a city with about 440,000 inhabitants. It is the third largest city of the Netherlands, after Amsterdam and Rotterdam. While Amsterdam is the capital of the country, The Hague houses the government of the kingdom, and is the location for many embassies, consulates, and

related activities. The Hague is an important city for the United Nations, with its International Court of Justice and the current UN tribunal for Yugoslavia. Situated on the North Sea coast, The Hague is a major tourist destination; during the summer months, many people visit the beaches near the city.

Anyone familiar with The Hague knows the geological division of the city: one part was built on peat, and another part on sand. Historically, the part built on sand housed the more prosperous households, while the poor lived on the peat area. This division still holds today, although the sandy area has some disadvantaged neighbourhoods and the peat area has some prosperous neighbourhoods.

In 1997, a daily newspaper compared the neighbourhoods of 33 Dutch cities. From this study it was concluded that 8 of the 15 most deprived neighbourhoods were located in The Hague (including all of the top five), while 7 of the 20 best neighbourhoods were also located in this city (including the first and the second best neighbourhoods) (Gemeente Den Haag, 1999). With respect to segregation indices for minority ethnic groups, in many cases The Hague shows the highest figures of all Dutch cities. Clearly, the verdict that The Hague is the most segregated city of the Netherlands is not based on vague impressions and subjective judgements alone.

The Hague's municipal organisation is large and complex employing more than 4,000 officials. In addition to the top level of directors and cabinet members, there is a middle-level of policymakers at the city level. These middle-level policymakers prepare policies, while the top-level makes the final decisions and provides the central government with the rationale for the activities and expenditures. At the bottom of the organisational tree are seven urban districts, each with its own coordinator. These implement the policies formulated at the local level. Every district has a Management Team in which all local departments are represented, together with the housing associations and the police. Welfare institutions, residents, and commercial organisations such as retailers have an advisory function. The situation in these neighbourhood Management Teams is monitored closely and reaction can be at short notice.

### **3.5 Big Cities Policy and urban governance in The Hague**

The Big Cities Document for The Hague, the second and most recent covenant period, is called 'De Kracht van Den Haag, een stad die actief investeert in mensen, hun werk, wonen, cultuur en welzijn' [The Strength of The Hague, a city that actively invests in people, their work, housing, culture and well-being] (Gemeente Den Haag, 1999). The title emphasises the main tenet of the policy: a focus on the positive attributes of the city. The report does not state a clear objective other than an explicit trust in the internal strength of the city and the will to make it even stronger through an integral investment plan. The main items addressed in the Big Cities Policy are elaborated in four Master Plans:

1. Master plan 'Mensenwerk' [People's Work] (Gemeente Den Haag, 2000): extra investments in the human capital of the city by means of extended schooldays, fighting unemployment, more volunteers, and introduction programmes for newcomers.
2. Master plan 'Een herstructureringsplan' [A restructuring plan] (Gemeente Den Haag, 1997b): a change in the one-sided social-economic structure in some neighbourhoods by replacing cheap, small houses with more expensive ones, selling some of the social-rented stock and paying extra attention to clean and safe neighbourhoods.

3. Master plan 'Hoog Haag' (Gemeente Den Haag, 1997c): large-scale, high quality offices in the centre of the city in combination with improved access.
4. Master plan 'Stadseconomie' [Urban Economy] (Gemeente Den Haag, 1997a): jobs for people with relative little education by means of stimulating small businesses, especially in poor areas.

The Big Cities Policy in The Hague can be summarised as follows (based on Dekker et al., 2002):

*Main characteristics of Big Cities Policy*

- Period: from 1998 to 2003
- Initiative: central government, local government
- Financial means: provided by the central government and the local government, 105 million euro from 1995-1999
- Area: Area-based approach in which all areas are classified in three groups: maintenance areas, pioneer areas, and central renewal areas, moving in an upward direction
- The intensity of the approach.

*Goals of Big Cities Policy*

- Focus: a positive approach, focusing on the strengths of the city. One programme for all aspects and four Master plans for the social, economic, and physical development of the city
- Target: more employment, a better qualified population, less (youth) criminality, the physical restructuring of weaker areas, stronger social cohesion within neighbourhoods, high quality offices in the centre, and improved transportation facilities
- Actors involved: public authorities (municipality, urban districts), housing corporation, inhabitants' organisations, police, welfare work
- Levels involved: national level indicates directions; local level develops UDPs, local level and urban district level initiatives.

*Other aspects of Big Cities Policy*

- Communication between departments and disciplines is regarded as one of the most important elements in policy
- The pilot project 'Hard/Zacht' [Hard/Soft] aims to improve this communication
- Area-based approach is only applied in physical policy
- Social and economic policy is mainly directed at the urban level
- The first truly coherent approach of urban development
- Public Private Partnerships are regarded as essential.

One of the most ambitious goals of the Dutch Big Cities Policy is to demonstrate the effectiveness of an integral approach (Raad voor Maatschappelijke Ontwikkeling, 2001). This aims to integrate urban renewal policy (the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment) with economic and social policy (the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment). Urban governance aspects play an important part in the integral approach.

Table 3.1 Data The Hague and The Hague South West, 2002

	The Hague South West	The Hague
Number of residents	103,592	457,674
% unemployed	9.3*	7.6*
% single family dwellings	9.5*	17.4
% native Dutch population	59.2	57.2
% children 0-19 year-old	22.6	22.9
% pensioners 65 +	17.6	14.6

\* 2001, others 2002

Source: <http://www.buurtmonitor.nl/denbaag>, visited on September 15, 2003

Earlier in this article we defined urban governance as “*the engagement of different actors in partnerships and other kinds of network that are more or less autonomous with respect to the state. The partners are willing to become involved, because in so doing they anticipate maximizing their benefits individually as well as collectively*” (Andersen and Van Kempen, 2001). Normally, participation in such networks is based on mutual interests, exchange of resources, and commitment, although the relationships between the participants do not have to be balanced. These partnerships are central here.

Partnerships can be recognised at the local level and at the city district level. The emphasis on partnerships as this way of policymaking has become stronger, and partnerships are seen as a fruitful and positive way of making and implementing policies, with an increasing number of parties involved.

Moreover, this belief has gained territory both horizontally and vertically within the administration. When the first Big Cities Policy programmes were written in 1994, only the civil servants of the responsible government departments were involved. This situation changed markedly in the years that followed; first on small project level, later in integrated policy reports for each pillar of the BCP and after that in a multi-level and multi-partner programme ‘Hard/Zacht’ [Hard/Soft], where one of the main aims was to achieve better cooperation between different municipal sectors, housing associations, churches, voluntary, and residents’ organisations. As the name implies, this project aimed at the integration at the local level of different ministerial departments involving both the hard (physical) and the soft (social) sectors. In addition to the departments, other parties have also become involved. Such a project brings together more disciplines; subjects such as responsibilities and input are no longer incidental questions, but become structural and principal subjects of discussion. The quantity of actors and meetings has increased, the subject matter is now more complex, and self-evidently discussions become more difficult and time-consuming (Gemeente Den Haag, 2001). Also, within the previously-mentioned Management Teams at urban district level, issues such as accountability and the functioning of the partnerships are important. We focus on those issues below. Examples are derived from The Hague South West, a large-scale post-war housing estate located in the South West of The Hague (Table 3.1).

### 3.6 Evaluation

How can the Big Cities Policy in The Hague be evaluated? Which aspects of urban governance have worked out well? Which were more problematic? We provide answers to these questions on the basis of our literature review in Section 3.2 of this paper. We focus on certain central aspects in the urban governance literature: accountability and conflicting goals.

#### *Accountability*

Accountability is a central issue in governance. Confusion arises when lines of responsibilities become blurred, whether they lie between the public and private sectors, or between governmental levels or different government departments (Imrie and Raco, 1999; Newman and Verpraet, 1999). Whether the partners in a partnership are synonymous with its target group depends on whether the target group has enough political influence to hold the agency accountable; conversely, not all those who hold the partnerships accountable are part of the target group, but they may have powerful interests in the political environment (Viteritti, 1990). This confusion is readily identifiable in The Hague at all levels of policymaking.

Within local administration, numerous examples show that responsibilities are not always clear. Within the 'Hard/Zacht' [Hard/Soft] project that was funded to fill the gap in the organisation of the 'new' way of working at both the local level and in The Hague South West, responsibilities were not clear, as the coordinator of the social pillar reveals:

*'The management structure that was set up was so complex, that every individual thought he or she was making important decisions, while in fact these decisions were taken in different places simultaneously.'*

Moreover, the confusion about responsibilities leads to frustration among many participants, resulting in a loss of interest in the process. As the coordinator of the social pillar observes, the residents lose track of what is actually happening.

*(...) 'those civil servants at city district level were very enthusiastic and went to work straight away, involving many residents and promising that this time they could make a plan themselves. Then the civil servants from the local level joined in and said 'You can't do it like that', and then the aldermen would come and say 'We will do it differently'. Thus, within no time a lot of frustration grew, especially among the residents and the civil servants at the district level, because it had not been clear what the official structure would be, or who was to be in charge of the process. (...) This is such a silly and unprofessional process and projects are only successful if everybody is in favour of them.'*<sup>3</sup>

Sometimes the great variety of input from the different group members makes it difficult to ascertain what has actually been decided and by whom. Innovative solutions may seem practical, but can lead to confusion about responsibilities. As one of the directors of a housing association in The Hague South West put it:

*'The local government wants to be in the lead of the restructuring process, but lacks the necessary personnel and funds. Since the government cannot provide the necessary funds, we are very important financial partners in this process. In addition, the decision-making process is slower in municipal organisations than we are. To speed up the process and increase the decisiveness of the administration,*

*we provide our colleagues in the town hall with ready-made neighbourhood plans and analyses and perform tasks that they ought to do.'*

This confusion about input enhances the uncertainty about responsibilities. Who can be held responsible when such a neighbourhood plan fails? Where do the residents turn when things go wrong? The government approved the plans, but the housing association formulated them.

Altogether, problems of accountability have been encountered in the implementation of the Big Cities Policy in The Hague. Such problems would seem inevitable when different parties work together, but clear agreements about responsibilities and expectations can help to bridge the gap. But in order to make this sort of agreement, the goals of all partners must be clear and in the same direction. That this is not always the case is shown below.

### *Managing conflicting goals and representation*

Networks and partnerships are important components in the concept of urban governance. It is supposed that participants contribute to a partnership because they feel either that they can benefit themselves, or a communal goal should be supported. The partners gain different benefits from a partnership and so their motivation differs. To some extent, the way in which partners work together has to involve the integration of goals; that is never easy to achieve. Conflicts can be the result of political and ideological dimensions of institution building and can be very effective (Lefevre, 1998). Mostly, however, consensus is regarded as the condition for success. Variations in interest and policy cultures can generate severe difficulties for the networks and hence for the results of a project (Raco, 1999).

The capacities of the manager are of the greatest importance in deciding who should be supported and who should be disregarded. For example, in 1998 a broad range of partners was invited to join 'Hard/Zacht' [Hard/Soft] including civil servants from all ministerial departments, representatives from the housing associations, welfare organisations, residents' organisations, and educational institutions. In the formulation of 'Hard/Zacht' [Hard/Soft], an independent manager was appointed to avoid any appearance of bias. She undertook many tasks that could influence the process; inviting people, writing notes, arranging meetings, and so forth. Of course, the manager had to be paid; the local government authority footed the bill. At first, people were happy with this appointment, because she had no interests other than that of seeing a job well done.

All parties were present at the first meetings; a slow, ill-defined start provoked the withdrawal of the non-governmental partners and the civil servants from the municipal Department of Economic Affairs and the process stagnated. 'Hard/Zacht' [Hard/Soft] became an in-crowd of civil servants from the municipal Departments of Housing and Social Affairs.

Some of the partners who left found other partners. The director of a housing association, for example, set up regular meetings with the directors of the municipal departments to consider housing issues, thereby creating a partnership based on mutual interests, exchange of resources, and commitment in a well-balanced association.

One and a half years after the start in 1999 the mid-term evaluation of the Big Cities Policy included a self-evaluation of 'Hard/Zacht' [Hard/Soft]. This report gives an account of lack of vision, diffusion of responsibilities, poor management, and the need to persevere (and not to lose faith) (Gemeente Den Haag, 2001).

The problems encountered within the 'Hard/Zacht' [Hard/Soft], project exemplify the problems frequently encountered in partnerships in The Hague. The concentration on goals and the choice of partners in realising a fruitful partnership needed to be supplemented with communication skills. The secret of a good partnership is the enrolment of partners with common goals, a focus on communication between these partners, and an ability to avoid distraction along dead-ends.

It may be evident that it is impossible to set up a partnership with an equal input from all parties while each network leaves out some people who could have been included. Establishing a partnership is a natural process, but awareness of the gate-keeping function is an important step towards openness.

With respect to the involvement of residents, it might be the case that individuals involved in the networks or partnerships may choose to act for themselves, or for a certain group of their own, and not for the community as a whole. Commitment may well be based more on self-interest than on the good of the neighbourhood. Also, increasingly heterogeneous population compositions bring a greater diversity in needs (Raco and Flint, 2001).

In the Netherlands there is a long tradition of residents' participation. The residents are organised in groups, which are subsidised by the city and used as spokesmen for the residents. But for active residents this becomes more and more difficult, as the co-ordinator of 'Hard/Zacht' [Hard/Soft] in The Hague South West points out:

*'There are a couple of active residents in the neighbourhood; you can hear them all the time. Always the same people (...). Usually the old Dutch residents who have lived here since the beginning <1950s, KD and RvK>, who see the change in the neighbourhood; they put a lot of energy into it, but at a certain moment they can't cope and lose concentration.'*

The respondent is referring to the needs of the elderly residents, which are different from those of the new, mostly foreign population groups with young children. The new population groups are more difficult to mobilise. The real issue here is representation, as the city-district coordinator explains:

*'I wonder if they <the original residents of the neighbourhood, KD and RvK> can still translate the needs. Because you do put a heavy burden on the shoulders of the residents' organisation (...) you see ten residents and that is not representative of the whole neighbourhood.'*

This finding corresponds to other research that shows that the changing composition of residents can cause problems in representation (Taylor, 2000).

#### *General impression*

In The Hague, the current distribution of responsibilities seems to satisfy all those who have something to say on the matter, but parties with less input (either financial or political) are still left standing on the sidelines. Less local government influence is favoured by many working at district level, their main criticism being that people working in the town hall are insufficiently well informed about the specific aspects of a local situation. It is evident that it is not only power which is at stake. The anticipated integration of different sectors of government (especially the 'hard' and 'soft' sectors) is not easy to bring about. A collection of different goals, different people, different traditions and cultures does not make cooperation any easier. But, despite these

difficulties, many of the actors interviewed reported that they had undergone a learning process, and they perceive cooperation with other departments more positively. They intend to maintain the contacts made, even if there is no longer a Big Cities Policy. Such an attitude is an indication of success, at least for some of the people concerned.

The residents' role needs special attention, not only because of the failure to agree on the influence residents should have in restructuring the neighbourhoods where they live, but also because of the lack of organising capacity, with few people interested in participating in neighbourhood organisations. The empowerment of vulnerable groups in society remains as important and necessary as it was before the start of the Big Cities Policy.

### 3.7 Conclusions

This paper describes an evaluation of the Big Cities Policy, the major current urban policy in the Netherlands. The focus of this qualitative evaluation is on urban governance, one of the most significant aspects of current urban policies in Europe as well as in the Netherlands. We commenced with some problematic issues identified in the literature on urban governance and sought empirical substance related to these issues on the basis of our fieldwork in The Hague. There, we found that the city is actively working on a more effective and integrated approach, organising itself and involving other parties. Some problems have, however, been encountered. The conclusions drawn and reported here are accompanied by an account of some lessons learnt.

First, the aspect of accountability: problems are observed within public-private partnerships. The private sector currently takes the lead on topics that should be the responsibility of the local government, again with confusion about responsibilities as a result. It is far from clear whether these problems are temporary or inherent in cooperation. A major lesson to be learnt from the practical application in The Hague is that a policy needs time before it can work smoothly. This point might seem trivial, but in our opinion stakeholders often expect short-term results inappropriately. It should be recognized that considerable effort had to be put into organisational issues before networks became productive. Defining clear tasks and responsibilities beforehand may help, but does not guarantee good results.

Second, conflicting goals were found, not only externally between the civil service and the housing associations, but also internally between the municipal Department of Housing and the Department of Social Affairs versus the Department of Economic Affairs. It should be noted from this that all the organisations involved must feel that they are gaining something by joining the partnership. Processes must aim at creating situations in which everyone is a winner. However trivial this point may sound, it is essential in creating partnerships that work well. Openness, the ability to listen to each other, being prepared to make concessions are some basic strategies needed when parties with conflicting goals have to work together.

Third is the issue of representation. The members of a partnership are rarely elected democratically and a weak partner with little political or financial power can easily be overlooked. In 'Hard/Zacht' [Hard/Soft], for example, the government paid for the manager, so there was a concentration on administrative issues and the exclusion of the non-paying partners. Sometimes a partner's cooperation is valued highly, but a lack of organising capacity within the group results in little input. In this case, the organisational structure fails to match the partner's capacities. These kinds of situation are particularly likely to exclude migrants and youngsters. The

involvement of all partners may clearly be difficult to achieve, but openness should nevertheless be striven for. Openness can be achieved by involving all the necessary and useful partners, using a method that is attainable by all and, if necessary, paying extra attention to the weaker partners.

Fourth is the issue of community participation. The more diversified and excluded a population, the more difficult it is to speak for them all and the easier it becomes to let individual interests come first. In The Hague, for example, people are easily tempted to worry about issues such as being able to park in front of one's house. People's own interests then generally prevail over the communal interests of the neighbourhood. Those who shout loudest are the most easily heard, which sums up the danger of quiet, excluded people not being heard.

The achievement of short-term results in an integrated manner is basically a question of good governance. Within the partnerships created, certain principles must always be adhered to:

- Create clear goals and a long-term vision which all partners can share.
- Ensure that all relevant partners are present and remain present by using a method that all partners can follow.
- Pay attention to communication.
- Create clarity about the distribution of responsibilities.
- Empower groups that are not strong enough to take part in the process without creating false expectations.
- Civil servants, private partners, and residents alike find nothing more frustrating or discouraging than deception.

Finally, the remaining question: if all these governance aspects work well, is the success of the policy as a whole guaranteed? The answer has to be in the negative. Urban governance is primarily a means, not an end. If urban governance works well, that is not to say that more specific measures such as restructuring, employment projects or social plans will also work well. Moreover, it should always be kept in mind that other factors impinge on situations in neighbourhoods and cities. Economic, demographic, and socio-cultural factors may be as important for neighbourhood development as urban policy, let alone urban governance aspects within that policy. On the other hand, however, there are several reasons why the inclusion of governance aspects should be stimulated within urban policy. Greater commitment, more governance capacity, and better contacts between departments are all invaluable, positive aspects of urban governance that are all the more important in countries, cities and neighbourhoods that suffer from negative developments.

## Notes

- 1 This paper is based on a research project within the European Fifth Framework. The UGIS programme (Urban Governance, Social Inclusion and Sustainability) focuses on the relationships between urban policies, urban governance, and social cohesion.
- 2 This does not automatically mean that social inclusion and social cohesion are regarded as key issues by policymakers and politicians (see Dekker et al., 2002).
- 3 Former co-ordinator of the social pillar of the Big Cities Policy, now an alderman in Utrecht.



## 4 Social cohesion in post-war estates in the Netherlands: differences between socioeconomic and ethnic groups

Dekker, K. and Bolt, G. (2005), Social cohesion in post-war estates in the Netherlands: differences between socioeconomic and ethnic groups. In: *Urban Studies*, 42 (12), p. 2447-2470. Copyright © Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group.

### Abstract

In the Netherlands, the post-war housing estates are increasingly experiencing problems. Some of these relate to the concentration of households with a low socioeconomic status on these estates. The Big Cities Policy aims to improve liveability in deprived urban areas by increasing the number of high-income households and thereby decreasing the share of problem-causing households in the neighbourhood. The increased differentiation in education, ethnicity, income, homeownership structure, and lifestyle present a challenge to social cohesion. This paper demonstrates how differences between socioeconomic and ethnic groups relate to different dimensions of social cohesion: social networks, common values, and neighbourhood attachment and identity. The issue is interesting, since social cohesion can help enhance liveability and increase the tolerance between groups that is so often lacking in multi-ethnic neighbourhoods with residents from many different socioeconomic backgrounds. The paper is based on a fieldwork study undertaken on two estates in the cities of Utrecht and The Hague in the Netherlands. As expected, quantitative analyses show clear differences between native Dutch people and members of other ethnic groups. Contrary to our expectations, socioeconomic characteristics do not lead on all dimensions of social cohesion to differences in the degree of social cohesion. The conclusion drawn is that increasing the diversity of socioeconomic or ethnic groups in deprived urban areas is likely to lead to less social cohesion.

### 4.1 Introduction

Both pessimistic and optimistic views are put forward in the discussion of social cohesion. Some authors detect some crumbling in the social cement that keeps society together (Putnam, 2000). Others are more optimistic and believe that modern society is just looking for the new balance that will surely be found (Pahl, 1991; Fukuyama, 1999). Kearns and Forrest (2000; Forrest and Kearns, 2001) do not take a position in the discussion, but concentrate on how urban dynamics and urban governance relate to social cohesion and can influence it positively.

Social cohesion is often regarded as a bottom-up process in which the quality of social integration at the local level determines social cohesion at higher scale levels (Forrest and Kearns, 2001; Morrisson, 2003). The discussion therefore focuses on urban neighbourhoods where problems associated with a lack of cohesion are geographically concentrated, and where the inhabitants run the risk of drifting further away from mainstream society (Wilson, 1987; Madanipour et al., 1998). In order to counteract this drift, promoting social cohesion in urban neighbourhoods is an important policy goal for national and local authorities. The neighbourhood level is also the focus of this paper.

One of the challenges to social cohesion in many urban neighbourhoods is the heterogeneity of the population. Whereas Gans (1961) argued over 40 years ago that homogeneity is a prerequisite for extensive ties between neighbours, many authorities nowadays see the creation of a social mix, or 'social balance', as a good strategy to strengthen social cohesion in urban neighbourhoods (Jupp, 1999; Veldboer et al., 2002). This 'balance' will supposedly have a positive impact on the liveability of the neighbourhood and will increase the mutual tolerance of groups. Although social mix is seldom defined, it usually refers to heterogeneity in socioeconomic and/or ethnic terms. The central question in this paper is the analysis of the interrelatedness of the different dimensions of social cohesion and the extent to which each of these dimensions is related to the socioeconomic and ethnic characteristics of neighbourhood residents. We have addressed the question on the basis of a survey in two Dutch neighbourhoods which are both characterised by a population whose composition is heterogeneous in ethnic and socioeconomic terms.

Many studies have already paid attention to social cohesion at the neighbourhood level. Qualitative methods are often used to analyse the relationship between social cohesion and neighbourhood regeneration (see for example Kearns and Forrest, 1999; Ögdül, 2000), but quantitative approaches are also found (see for example Buckner, 1988; Berger-Schmitt, 2002). There is, however, reason enough to analyse social cohesion and the differences between ethnic and socioeconomic groups in this respect. Frequently, social cohesion is seen as the equivalent of social networks, or the term remains ill-defined because it is assumed that everybody knows what is being referred to. In this paper we consider three different dimensions of social cohesion (social networks, common values, attachment) and examine the extent to which these dimension are interconnected. We have investigated separately for each dimension the extent to which it is related to socioeconomic and ethnic characteristics.

## 4.2 Social cohesion in the literature

Social cohesion can be seen as the glue that keeps the members of a social system together (a family, an organisation, a neighbourhood, or society as a whole). In the literature about social cohesion there are several dimensions that relate the individual to a wider social structure. The individual is seen as the basis of the group process that generates social cohesion. In their review of the relevant literature, Kearns and Forrest (2000) distinguish as many as five different dimensions of social cohesion:

1. Social networks and social capital, based on a high degree of social interaction within communities and families.

2. Common values and a civic culture, based in more common moral principles and codes of behaviour.
3. Place attachment and an intertwining of personal and place identity.
4. Social order and social control, based on an absence of general conflicts between groups at large (that is, Muslims versus Christians).
5. Social solidarity and reductions in wealth disparities, based on equal access to services and welfare benefits, the redistribution of public finances and opportunities, and the ready acknowledgement of social obligations.

Whereas the last two dimensions are clearly matters for national policy, the first three are relevant in neighbourhood level strategies (Amin, 2002, p. 972). We therefore concentrate here on these first three dimensions; the last two dimensions are not dealt with in this paper, since they are less relevant at the neighbourhood level, although we are aware that there are mutual connections between social cohesion at the neighbourhood level and social cohesion at higher scale levels<sup>1</sup>.

#### *Interconnected dimensions of cohesion*

The dimensions of social cohesion are interconnected: social cohesion in one dimension often goes hand in hand with social cohesion in another dimension. To begin with, the relationship between social ties within the neighbourhood and feelings of attachment has often been mentioned and they are seen as mutually reinforcing (Gerson et al., 1977; Woolever, 1992; Henning and Lieberg, 1996). In some cases, however, the relationship is reversed. In a study of mixed neighbourhoods in Scotland, precisely those people whose networks were to a large extent restricted to their own neighbourhood appeared to feel the least attached to it (Atkinson and Kintrea, 2000). Van Beckhoven and Van Kempen (2003) also find that people who often leave the neighbourhood for their social activities are not always less attached to it than are other residents.

Most researchers see the level of attachment as a consequence of the local ties, but Gerson and colleagues (1977) argue that the relationship is probably mutually reinforcing: people who like the place where they have chosen to live may actively seek out their neighbours. Neighbourhood attachment contributes not only to the willingness to participate in social networks, but also to the adherence to common values and norms (Massey, 1991): the second dimension of social cohesion.

It should be mentioned, however, that strong social cohesion on a lower spatial scale might be attained at the expense of social cohesion on a higher scale level (Pahl, 1991). People may feel very strongly attached to their neighbourhood, but at the same time they may not share the values of the wider society (Kearns and Forrest, 2000). As studies in the US on separate dimensions of social cohesion have shown (see for example Ross et al., 2001; Itztaky and York, 2000), the interaction between person and place results in a certain level of, for example, common values that tolerate deviant behaviour or a lack of social order.

Furthermore, the relationship between the social network dimension and the common values dimension is not straightforward. Some say that these dimensions are positively related. Putnam (2000), for example, reports that many studies have shown a positive correlation between social participation and tolerance, despite the classic liberal objection that community ties restrict freedom and discourage tolerance. Portes (1998) also points out the positive function of social

networks, especially in the context of tightly knit communities. Social networks are useful to parents and teachers in their quest to maintain discipline and promote compliance among those in their charge.

The other side of the coin is that, in certain neighbourhoods, social ties may induce people to socialize in a subculture that is characterised by a strained relationship with the mainstream society. Wilson (1987) posits that living in a poor neighbourhood reduces the disciplined habits of residents. In deprived neighbourhoods, relatively large numbers of people exhibit behaviour and norms that deviate from the mainstream society and so people will be less inclined to perceive such nonconformity as deviant. People living in deprived neighbourhoods will be less inclined to reject deviant behaviour. This tendency will be even more marked when the social network of a resident is restricted to the neighbourhood (see also Friedrichs, 1998)<sup>2</sup>.

Friedrichs and Blasius (2003) applied Wilson’s ideas (1987), which were based on the situation in American ghettos, to a research study of several Cologne neighbourhoods. They indeed found a negative impact of living in a distressed neighbourhood on the acceptance of deviant behaviour. The acceptance of deviant behaviour was also related to the social networks dimension. They

*Table 4.1* Overview of the expected impact of individual- and household characteristics on three dimensions of social cohesion

<b>Individual- and household characteristics</b>	<b>Social networks dimension</b>	<b>Common values dimension</b>	<b>Neighbourhood attachment and identity dimension</b>
<i>Socioeconomic</i>			
Education	↑ Education = ↓ social networks in neighbourhood	↑ Education = ↓ tolerance	↑ Education = ↑ attachment
Daily occupation	Yes = ↓ social networks in neighbourhood	Yes = ↓ tolerance	Yes = ↑ attachment
Income	↑ Income = ↓ social networks in neighbourhood	↑ Income = ↓ tolerance	↑ Income = ↑ attachment
Ethnicity	BME groups = ↑ social networks in neighbourhood	BME groups = ↓ tolerance than native Dutch	BME groups = ↑ attachment (in mixed neighbourhoods)
<i>Social-demographic</i>			
Age	↑ Age = ↑ social networks in neighbourhood	↑ Age = ↓ tolerance	↑ Age = ↑ attachment
Gender	Female = ↑ social networks in neighbourhood	?	Female = ↑ attachment
Children in household	Yes = ↑ social networks in neighbourhood	?	Yes = ↑ attachment
<i>Home-related</i>			
Time lived in the neighbourhood	↑ Time = ↑ social networks in neighbourhood	↑ Time = ↑ tolerance	↑ Time = ↑ attachment
Ownership structure	Homeowners = ↑ social networks in neighbourhood	Homeowners = ↓ tolerance	Homeowners = ↑ attachment

concluded that the more contacts a resident had with persons outside the neighbourhood, the lower was the level of acceptance of deviant behaviour.

The brief discussion above makes it clear that the different dimensions of social cohesion are interconnected, but that they cannot be considered as interchangeable. In the next section, we look at the expected impact of socioeconomic status and ethnicity on each of these dimensions separately. We also pay brief attention to other variables that may affect social cohesion. For convenience, Table 4.1 summarises schematically all the relationships found in the literature.

### 4.3 Social cohesion, socioeconomic status, and ethnicity

#### *Social networks*

With respect to *social networks*, social cohesion refers essentially to the ties between persons within society, or within a city or a neighbourhood (Friedrichs and Vranken, 2001). Social networks are not easily evaluated in qualitative terms. The same factors that can lead to a cohesive group can also lead to less external solidarity and the exclusion of outsiders; there can even be repressive internal social control and a strong limitation on the liberty to choose for the members of the group, leading to fewer opportunities for individual development (Portes and Landholt, 1998). What is decisive here is the kind of contact between people; a distinction is often drawn between *bonding capital* and *bridging capital* (Putnam, 2000). Bonding capital refers to strong relationships that do not give much new information (*strong ties*). The disadvantage of bonding capital is that these contacts and networks can be hostile to the 'outer world'. Bridging capital, on the other hand, refers to *weak ties* that do give other people new information about the wider society, such as the availability of jobs (Granovetter, 1973).

In the influential study "To dwell among friends", Fischer (1982) found that education is the most important factor affecting the size and characteristics of social networks. The more education people have, the larger the network size and the wider the geographical range of their ties. Highly educated people are mostly oriented towards the whole city or region for their activities and networks (see also Guest and Wierzbicki, 1999; Blokland, 2000).

Professional status is another indicator of socioeconomic status that is relevant for the way people relate to their neighbourhood. The unemployed, the disabled, and pensioners do not have a regular need to leave the neighbourhood or are restricted to do so because of lack of income, public transport and the like, and are therefore likely to concentrate on the neighbourhood for their social contacts (Fischer, 1982; Guest and Wierzbicki, 1999).

Income is also a relevant determinant for the social relationships within the neighbourhood, even after education, job status, and other factors have been taken into account (Fischer, 1982; Campbell and Lee, 1992). Income provides resources that assist the building of a wide network. Affluent people are less constrained by travel and communication costs and can afford to go out more often (see also Musterd and Ostendorf, 1998). Consequently, low-income residents are more dependent on their neighbourhoods for their social contacts, while high-income residents have much wider networks. In terms of absolute numbers of contacts, however, lower income groups tend to have fewer acquaintances, but more friends and relatives in the neighbourhood than do higher income groups (Gerson et al., 1977; Campbell and Lee, 1992; Lee and Campbell, 1999).

Closely related to socioeconomic status is tenure. Homeowners have more social connections within the neighbourhood than do tenants (Campbell and Lee, 1992; DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1999). This difference can partly be explained by the tendency of homeowners to stay longer than tenants in the same house, which gives homeowners more time to build a local network.

Ethnicity is also important. Non-western immigrant groups often have low incomes and consequently their social networks are spatially limited (Lee and Campbell, 1999; Flint and Rowlands, 2003). However, not only restrictions, but also preferences may play a part here. Migrants of the first generation are particularly strongly oriented towards their own group with respect to their social networks and so they prefer to live in an area alongside many people like themselves (Bolt, 2001).

In assessing the impact of socioeconomic status and ethnicity on social cohesion, other variables also have to be taken into account, notably age, gender, the presence of children, and length of residence. Length of residence is to some extent correlated with age and both are found to have a positive effect on social networking. Being a woman or having children come next in importance as factors stimulating social interaction (Gerson et al., 1977; Campbell and Lee, 1992; Fischer, 1982; Guest and Wierzbicki, 1999).

#### *Common values*

With respect to the second dimension, social cohesion refers to *common values*; a group of people tends to have a common set of values and goals and a general idea about social order and social control. Having a common set of values can be seen as one of the prerequisites of social cohesion that lead to mutual respect and understanding. A socially-cohesive neighbourhood is not necessarily characterised by a homogeneous set of norms (Kearns and Forrest, 2000). When there is a diversity of groups within a neighbourhood, too much cohesion within a group may come at the cost of tolerance for 'others'. According to Giddens (1994), this diversity involves the very difficult question of how dissimilar groups can be integrated into societal order while simultaneously respecting cultural differences. Social cohesion comprises inter-group cooperation, respect for differences, and an absence of hostility and prejudice, for example between different ethnic groups or between generations.

In comparison with the other two dimensions of social cohesion, there are fewer studies that link the common values dimension to socioeconomic and ethnic categories. With Friedrichs and Blasius (2003), we concentrate on the tolerance of deviant behaviour as an indicator of common norms. In general, people are not tolerant towards severe deviant behaviour (for example, the use of force to resolve conflicts), while tolerating smaller deviance (such as children stealing chewing gum). With regard to the level of education (the first indicator of socioeconomic status), people with a higher educational level are likely to be more tolerant towards deviant behaviour. In comparison with the poorly educated, the highly educated are less likely to accept the rules of behaviour unquestioningly, since they will tend to see that rules are merely 'agreements' and as such are subject to change (Houtman, 1994). However, Friedrichs and Blasius (2003) failed to find any effect of education on the acceptance of deviant behaviour in their research in a Cologne neighbourhood.

Job status may also be linked to the tolerance of deviant behaviour. People who regularly have to leave the neighbourhood for school or work are less susceptible to deviant behaviour in their neighbourhood. Those people without a regular job are more likely to adapt their behaviour to what is considered 'normal' in the area; that might mean in some deprived neighbourhoods

that they develop a set of norms that does not match with that of the wider community (Wilson, 1987; Gowricharn, 2002). The same may apply to the (partially overlapping) low-income groups. Rosenbaum and colleagues (2002) found in a study of a mixed-income housing project in Chicago that the higher-income groups were much more inclined to support rules guiding residents' conduct than were the lower-income groups.

Then, ethnicity can be expected to have a large impact on this dimension. When their networks are restricted to their own neighbourhood or group, migrants are highly dependent on their own community for securing social prestige (Portes and Landholt, 1998). Some ethnic communities are therefore characterised by strong social control, which is likely to have a negative effect on tolerance of deviant behaviour.

With respect to the other variables, homeowners can be expected to be less tolerant of deviant behaviour, since they are more inclined than tenants are to invest in their direct surroundings, and homeowners have an interest in maintaining the value of their houses (Gerson et al., 1977). We also hypothesised that age would have a negative influence on the acceptance of deviant behaviour (see Dekker, et al., 2004) while length of residence would have a positive influence, since the longer people live in a neighbourhood the more accustomed they may become to deviant behaviour.

#### *Neighbourhood attachment and identity*

With respect to *neighbourhood attachment and identity*, the last dimension that we identify encapsulates the idea that people have ties not only with other people, but also with their immediate living environment (Blokland, 2000). Neighbourhood attachment leads to a feeling of security, builds self-esteem and self-image, provides a bond between people, cultures, and experiences, and maintains group identity (Taylor, 1988; Altman and Low, 1992; Crow, 1994).

Identification with a neighbourhood can be fed by the experience of being part of 'something bigger'. Blokland (2003) speaks of 'imagined communities', meaning that the social value residents attach to their neighbourhood is not usually based on real contacts, but rather on perceived feelings of belonging to the street or the neighbourhood. According to Hortulanus (1995), a homogenous composition of residents in a neighbourhood is assumed to be a prerequisite for identification with the neighbourhood, since homogeneity enables people to associate in a spatial sense with some and dissociate from others.

Neighbourhood attachment has received almost as much research attention as the social network dimension. Whereas the effect of level of education on social networks within the neighbourhood was found to be negative, the impact on neighbourhood attachment was positive (Woolever, 1992). The better housing conditions of the more highly-educated residents may explain this at least in part. Comparison of highly- and less-well-educated people from the same neighbourhood reveals no significant difference between the groups in this respect (Brodsky et al., 1999). The same study also showed no effect from whether one has a job or not.

With regard to income, higher-income groups are likely to feel more attached to the neighbourhood than are lower-income groups, since they have more resources to satisfy their housing needs (Gerson et al., 1977; Woolever, 1992). However, when higher- and lower-income groups within the same neighbourhood are compared (that is to say, the quality of the neighbourhood is controlled for), people with higher incomes are more likely to feel less attached to the neighbourhood, since they may be more inclined to think that they will find another dwelling in a more suitable neighbourhood in due course (Gerson et al., 1977).

With regard to ethnicity, it was argued above that identification with the neighbourhood is enhanced by a homogeneous composition of residents. However, this finding may not apply equally to all ethnic groups. Several studies in USA have shown that Whites generally prefer a neighbourhood where Whites predominate, while other groups, such as Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians prefer mixed neighbourhoods, albeit with a substantial co-ethnic presence (see Charles, 2003 for an overview). This preference indicates that ethnic minorities feel more comfortable about living in a mixed neighbourhood and are therefore more likely to feel more attached to their neighbourhood in mixed areas than are Whites.

Then, several studies show that the elderly are more likely to have a strong neighbourhood attachment than are younger people, because of their physical limitations and because they may well have spent a long time in the area and usually do not expect to move in the short term (Woolever, 1992). Length of residence (Gerson et al., 1977; Lee and Campbell, 1999) and owner-occupation (Woolever, 1992) are also found to have a positive effect on neighbourhood attachment. Brodsky and colleagues (1999) found that the presence of children had a negative influence on neighbourhood attachment. This effect may be explained by the fact that the study was carried out in several poor neighbourhoods that were not considered suitable environments for children.

In conclusion, we chose to analyse the different dimensions separately to give a complete picture of the relationship between social cohesion and socioeconomic status and ethnicity. Although the dimensions of social cohesion are interconnected, they may not always be strongly associated and they may even be inversely related. In addition, the overview of the literature reveals that ethnicity and socioeconomic indicators do not have the same kind of impact on each of the dimensions of social cohesion.

#### **4.4 Research areas and methods**

The analyses reported in this paper are based on empirical research conducted in two post-WWII housing estates in the Netherlands: Hoograven (Utrecht) and Bouwlust (The Hague). The research areas are typical early post-war estates: large green public areas, multi-family housing blocks interspersed with small single-family homes, built in the 1950s.

These neighbourhoods were selected because they have an above-average share of BME (Black and Minority Ethnic) communities and a variety in socioeconomic status. Until recently, the trend was towards increasing homogeneity in socioeconomic terms, since the number of low-income residents grew during the 1980s and 1990s. However, both cities have tried to reverse the trend by means of a tenure-diversification strategy; this is part of the Big Cities Policy, which aims to improve the situation in deteriorated neighbourhoods through an integrated approach of physical, social, and economic measures. One of the main goals of the diversification strategy is to promote a social mix of lower and higher income groups, which is supposed to enhance the social cohesion in the neighbourhood (Bolt and Torrance, 2005). To create this social mix, social-rented dwellings are demolished to be replaced by more expensive dwellings, mainly in the owner-occupied sector. Nevertheless, more than 60 percent of the dwellings in both neighbourhoods are still in the social-rented sector. Although the diversification strategy has led to an increase in the number of people with a higher socioeconomic status, the average income

*Table 4.2* Characteristics of Hoograven and Bouwlust, compared with the cities of Utrecht and The Hague as a whole

	Hoograven	Utrecht	Bouwlust	The Hague
% social-rented dwellings	60	43	81	38
% owner-occupied dwellings	29	42	13	37
% multi-family dwellings	78	57	89	81
Total number of dwellings (x 1000)	4.3	114.1	8.5	221.7
% low incomes	45	38	47	40
% high incomes	11	20	9	19
% age group ≤ 25 years	15	11	32	30
% age group ≥ 65 years	32	31	16	14
% ethnic minorities	44	31	48	45
Total number of inhabitants (x1000)	9.9	265.2	15.6	463.8

Note: % low incomes = % of persons in the two lowest income quintiles; % high incomes = % of persons in the highest income quintile.

Source: Leefbaarheidsmonitor The Hague, 2004; Wijkmonitor Utrecht, 2004

in both neighbourhoods is still substantially lower than in Utrecht or The Hague as a whole (see Table 4.2 for an overview of the characteristics of both neighbourhoods).

The research area Hoograven (in Utrecht) is one of the worst neighbourhoods of the city with relatively high unemployment, high dependency on social benefits (10 percent), many low income and poorly educated people. The majority of the houses are multi-family homes within the social-rented sector. Only 29 percent of the people live in a home they own themselves. Almost half the residents belong to a BME-group, of which Moroccans form the largest portion.

The other research area, Bouwlust (in the Hague) is certainly not among the worst neighbourhoods, although the share of social housing is much larger with 81 percent in Bouwlust compared with 38 percent in the Hague. Many of the homes are multi-family homes, in the city and also in Bouwlust. Most of these do not have an elevator.

With respect to the population characteristics, Bouwlust is also among the average neighbourhoods: the age structure is similar to the rest of the city, although there are more elderly people. The population is getting younger, and the share of BME-groups is rising as it was 33 percent in 1995 and 48 percent in 2002, only about 3 percent higher than in the rest of the city. The main immigrant groups are Surinamese, Turks, and Moroccans. The relatively large and cheap rental apartments attract many new migrants from abroad.

The survey was held in the spring of 2003. In order to get a balanced variation in the sample in terms of tenure and income groups, two strata were distinguished in each neighbourhood: one for the new dwellings and one for the old dwellings. A random sample in each of the strata was drawn; altogether 907 addresses were selected. At each address the head of the household or his/her partner was asked to complete a questionnaire. A personal approach to the respondents was chosen to raise the response level: the questionnaires were distributed and collected in person. Where appropriate, some of the questionnaires were completed with the aid of an interviewer

fluent in Arabic or Turkish. This approach yielded a final overall response of 51 per cent: 54 percent in Hoograven and 48 percent in Bouwlust (a total of 465 respondents).

If a weighting factor is used to correct for the overrepresentation of the residents of the new parts of the neighbourhoods, the sample is representative of all households in the neighbourhood. This conclusion is based on a comparison of the sample and the population on three aspects: age, ethnicity, and tenure. In the regression analyses, the weighting factor is not used since the stratifying variable (old/new dwellings) is included as an independent variable. Using case weights would have had the disadvantage that the standard errors of the parameters would be less accurate.

#### *Composition of the measures of social cohesion*

In this paper, social cohesion is represented in three dimensions: social networks, common values, and neighbourhood attachment and identity, as explained in the theoretical section. The method used here to measure social cohesion is a quantitative representation of the feelings and actions of individuals. Several measures were composed to represent the three dimensions of social cohesion. The composition of the measures is explained below.

The *social networks* dimension of social cohesion is measured using three indicators; the first two refer to strong ties and the third chatting with the neighbours:

1. The importance of the neighbourhood for the circle of friends. For the analysis, people with half or more of their friends living in the neighbourhood are considered to have a strong social focus on the neighbourhood.
2. Having family members in the neighbourhood.
3. Chatting with neighbours. Those who talk to their neighbours must be interested in the people living around them at least on a superficial level and chatting can be considered an indication of good neighbouring behaviour. Chatting is therefore the third indicator of social networks.

The measures for the other two dimensions of social cohesion are less straightforward. For the *common values* dimension of social cohesion, two indicators were composed from the respondents' reactions to eight descriptions of deviant behaviour (Table 4.3). Friedrichs and Blasius (2003) used comparable statements in their research. The statements indicate attitudes towards social behaviour, childrearing, respect for generally agreed rules, and feelings towards the social welfare system. The respondents were asked how they would assess a certain form of deviant behaviour in their neighbourhood. The answers were measured on a four-point scale, from (1) 'very bad' to (4) 'I really don't mind' (categorical data). The reactions per statement were somewhat different. The respondents almost unanimously condemned calling a woman abusive names (98 per cent) or beating children. There was no consensus on any of the other statements; between 60 and 74 percent of the respondents condemn the situations described. An exception is social security fraud; that is only judged as (very) bad by 25 percent of the residents.

One statement on its own says little about the overall ethos of the respondents, so this is represented by two uncorrelated components. These were chosen through categorical principal components analysis (CATCPA). This kind of analysis is similar to 'normal' principal components analysis, but allows the use of categorical data, while being able to preserve the order

Table 4.3 Judgment “Yes this is bad or very bad” of respondents on statements (percentages), and component loadings of the statements on the dimensions in CATPCA

The statements are:	Judgement “this is (very) bad” %	Dimension*	
		1	2
Somebody puts the garbage outside on the street on the wrong day.	63	0.528	0.249
Your children play outside with other children. An elderly neighbour is irritated by the noise they make and hits one of the children, because they do not quieten down in time. If you do not have children of your own, imagine that you do.	91	-0.102	0.656
You are in a supermarket and you witness an elderly lady putting a package of cheese in her handbag.	75	0.712	0.057
The corner of the street is a meeting point for youngsters. You see the youngsters calling women names.	98	0.286	0.601
You often hear a neighbour beating his children.	93	0.035	0.756
Imagine that you frequently see a person drunk on the street.	66	0.534	-0.147
Your television set is old and nearly broken. Somebody offers you a television set which has probably been stolen for half the normal price.	73	0.633	0.015
An acquaintance who is a single mother with three children depends on social benefits. She is offered a cleaning job in the black economy, which she accepts without reporting it to the social services.	25	0.662	-0.147

\* The Cronbach's Alpha of this model is 0.855, which indicates that the model indeed represents the input variables  
Source: Survey, 2003

of the categories when the observed variables are measured on an ordinal scale (Gifi, 1990). The component loadings and the statements are given in Table 4.3.

The first dimension, which is denoted as ‘acceptance of deviant behaviour’, accounts for 21.2 percent of the total variation. The component loadings score higher than 0.5 on at least five of the eight dimensions. Accepting deviant behaviour gives a positive overall score of the respondent on this component; rejecting deviant behaviour gives a negative overall score.

The second dimension accounts for 14.2 percent of the total variance and scores high on the other three statements, which all refer to a situation in which force is used. Respondents with high scores on the ‘acceptance of force’ components are more tolerant of the use of force than are those with low scores. Respondents’ scores are estimated for both dimensions in order to be able to include them both in a regression analysis.

The last indicator of social cohesion to be distinguished in this paper is *neighbourhood attachment and identity*. This indicator was measured by presenting respondents with 15 statements to which they were asked to react on a Likert scale of 1 (I do not agree at all) to 5 (I completely agree). The statements all refer to feelings related to the neighbourhood and the extent to which the respondents derive part of their identity from the area in which they live. In order to raise the reliability and the validity of the attachment measure, two new variables were constructed with the aid of Principal Components Analysis (PCA). The goal of this PCA is to reduce the original set of 15 statements to a smaller set of uncorrelated components that cover most

Table 4.4 Judgement “Yes, I (completely) agree” of respondents on statements (percentages) and Principal Components Analysis of statements related to neighbourhood attachment and identity

The statements are:	“Yes, I (completely) agree” %	Component	
		1	2
I feel at home in this neighbourhood.	48	0.670	0.336
Most people can be trusted.	36	0.668	0.058
In this neighbourhood we take care of each other.	14	0.687	0.065
I feel that I am a real Hoogravenaar/Bouwlustenaar (“Londoner”).	16	0.375	0.688
I feel attached to this neighbourhood.	26	0.456	0.632
I feel proud of this neighbourhood.	16	0.676	0.469
People outside this neighbourhood think that this is a good area.	13	0.659	0.129
This is a cosy neighbourhood.	28	0.736	0.369
I feel responsible for the liveability in this neighbourhood.	47	0.047	0.567
This neighbourhood suits my taste.	25	0.592	0.498
I feel involved in this neighbourhood.	30	0.231	0.720
This neighbourhood is special.	21	0.274	0.531
It hurts when people say something negative about this neighbourhood.	27	0.081	0.688
This neighbourhood has a lively radiation.	20	0.571	0.353
This neighbourhood is better than others.	18	0.676	0.288

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis; Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation; Rotation converged in 3 iterations

of the information found in the original statements. By reducing the dimensions, only a few components have to be interpreted rather than a large number of variables. The additional value of using a component based on several statements is that a more complete picture of the feeling of belonging and identity is given. In comparison, the scores on one or two of the separate statements are more sensitive to topic-related reactions and are less clearly related to the socioeconomic or ethnic characteristics of the respondent.

Table 4.4 gives an overview of the original statements and their loadings on the two components that were identified, as well as the percentage of respondents who reacted positively to the statements<sup>3</sup>.

The first component was called “social belonging” and the second component was “spatial emotional belonging”. A high loading on these components indicates a high feeling of belonging. For example, a person with a loading of -3 on component one has no social feeling of belonging, while a person with a loading of +2 on the second component will have a strong feeling of spatial emotional belonging.

The first component, “social belonging”, is strongly related to what Van der Land (2004) refers to as “the social aspect of urban connections”. The communal patterns of how to act, feel, and think within a certain setting explain to a large extent the way in which people feel attached to the urban society (Zijderveld, 1988).

“Spatial-emotional belonging”, the second component, shows to what extent a place is given a symbolic value. Feelings of pride about a neighbourhood result from a sense of belonging. Part

of a person's identity may well be derived from this place (Massey, 1991). The feeling of belonging is partially based on the ideas of others about the place and the reputation it has in the eyes of people from outside the neighbourhood.

*Independent variables*

Table 4.5 illustrates the variables included in the regression models and provides descriptive statistics for each variable. The first rows give the means and standard deviations (only of the covariates) of the dependent variables. The other rows display the descriptive statistics for the independent variables. Three socioeconomic indicators are included in the table as predictors of social cohesion: level of education, professional status, and income. We distinguish between higher education (university and higher vocational training) and other levels of education. Furthermore, professional status distinguishes between those with a daily occupation (work or

Table 4.5 Descriptive statistics for variables used in regressions models

	Mean	SD
<i>Dependent variables</i>		
family in the neighbourhood	.026	
most friends within the neighbourhood	.032	
chat with neighbours	.084	
acceptance of deviant behaviour	.008	1.03
acceptance of force	-.021	1.04
social belonging component	0	1
spatial-emotional belonging component	0	1
<i>Independent variables</i>		
net monthly income (x 100 €)	19.350	7.20
lower-average education	.056	
higher education	.045	
no daily activity (unemployed, housewife, disabled, pensioner)	.027	
daily activity (work or school)	.073	
Dutch	.078	
non-Dutch	.022	
age: lg10(age)	1.620	0.14
household with children	.045	
household without children	.055	
female	.056	
male	.044	
old house	.053	
new house and new in neighbourhood	.035	
new house and lived in neighbourhood before	.012	
owner-occupier	.047	
tenant	.053	

Notes: Lower-average education: max. middle professional education or advanced secondary education; high education: higher professional education or university.

Division Dutch-non Dutch is a response to the question: "In terms of ethnicity, how would you call yourself?" (Self-categorisation).

Source: Survey, 2003

school) and those who spend most of their time in the neighbourhood (the unemployed, the disabled, housewives, pensioners). Income was recalculated as a ratio variable for the analyses. Ethnicity was split into two categories (Native Dutch versus non-Western immigrants), since the numbers did not allow us to make a further subdivision.

The other independent variables included in the analyses are age, household composition, gender, tenure, and housing category. Age is used as a ratio variable in the analyses; we have used the log-function to take away the effect of outliers. Household composition distinguishes between households with children and those without. Gender makes the obvious distinction.

In the analyses, home-ownership distinguishes between tenants and homeowners. Housing category is added to the variables listed in Table 4.1.<sup>4</sup> This variable is included, because the sample was stratified into two categories: households living in the old dwellings and households living in the new dwellings (built as part of the social-mix strategy). This last category can be split into a further two groups: those who moved in from outside the neighbourhood and those who were already living in the neighbourhood. Since the people in this last category will in most cases have made a deliberate choice to stay in the neighbourhood, the neighbourhood may be expected to have a greater than average (social) function for them.

#### *Analytic strategy*

In order to discern the extent to which social-economic and ethnic characteristics are related to the level of social cohesion in the neighbourhood, a series of regression equations was estimated, on each occasion with a different indicator of social cohesion as the dependent variable and the variables in Table 4.5 described in the previous section as the independent variables. Since the variables for the social network dimension were measured on a binary scale, a logistic regression was chosen here. The other indicators were measured on a ratio scale, which makes multiple regression analysis possible.

In each analysis, the following variables were entered in the regression equation: age, income, education, professional status, home ownership structure, ethnicity, gender, household composition, housing category (see Table 4.5 for an overview).

The aim of the paper is to describe not only the effect of individual and dwelling characteristics on the level of social cohesion, but also the interrelationships between the three dimensions of social cohesion. For this analysis a multitude of statistical methods was used, based on the scale on which the variables were measured. Relationships between variables measured on a ratio scale were analysed with the help of bivariate correlation tables. Where one variable was measured on a binary scale and the other on a ratio scale, the t-test for independent samples was used. And finally, where both variables were measured on a binary scale, a Chi-square test was used.

## **4.5 Social cohesion in the research areas: the impact of social-economic status and ethnicity**

### *Social cohesion as an interrelated concept*

As mentioned in the theoretical section, the dimensions of social cohesion are interrelated, and social cohesion in one dimension does not automatically go hand in hand with social cohesion

Table 4.6 Relations between the elements of social cohesion

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Family in the neighbourhood (1)		***	0	0	0	+	***
Friends in the neighbourhood (2)	***		***	0	0	***	***
Chat with neighbours (3)	0	***		0	-*	0	0
Acceptance of deviant behaviour (4)	0	0	0		0	***	-**
Acceptance of force (5)	0	0	-*	0		0	0
Social belonging (6)	+	***	0	***	0		0
Spatial-emotional belonging (7)	***	***	0	-**	0	0	

0 = not a significant relationship.  
 \* =  $p < 0.10$ ; \*\* =  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* =  $p < 0.01$   
 Source: Survey, 2003

in another dimension. The question addressed here is how the elements of social cohesion are correlated.

It is clear from the analysis that the indicators used to measure the dimensions of social cohesion are indeed interrelated (Table 4.6). First, the indicators *within* the first dimension of social cohesion (social networks) are interrelated. Social networks are measured on the basis of the extent to which people’s social networks concentrate on the neighbourhood. People whose friends mostly live in the same neighbourhood also tend to have family members in the neighbourhood. And people who rely on the neighbourhood for their strong ties also tend to have more contact with their neighbours for non-committing activities such as an informal chat. The other two dimensions of social cohesion, common values and feelings of belonging, are both separated into two independent components that do not (and should not) interrelate, because they measure two different dimensions of tolerance towards deviant behaviour and the feelings of belonging.

With respect to the relationship *between* the dimensions of social cohesion, there appears to be hardly any connection between the social networks and the common values dimension. We only found the tolerance towards the use of force to solve conflicts to be negatively related to chatting with neighbours. People who regularly chat with their neighbours less easily accept the use of force than people who do not chat. Thus, chatting with the neighbours leads the residents of an urban area to be less tolerant towards deviant behaviour.

There are more connections between the second and the third dimensions of social cohesion. There is a positive relationship between the acceptance of deviant behaviour and social belonging. Apparently, people who identify strongly with their surroundings are less disturbed by people whose behaviour differs from what is commonly accepted in society. The reverse can also be true: because their values are so deviant from what is normally accepted, they can feel part of this area with a concentration of people who behave differently from mainstream society. Conversely, there is a negative relationship between the acceptance of deviant behaviour and spatial-emotional belonging. Thus, people who have a strong emotional attachment to the neighbourhood are less likely to accept behaviour that may harm the local environment.

Most interrelationships can be found between the social network and the attachment dimension of social cohesion. People with strong social networks in the neighbourhood do

indeed have stronger feelings of spatial-emotional belonging and social belonging. Chatting with neighbours does not appear to have the same positive effect on neighbourhood attachment.

*Social cohesion: social networks*

Although the general impression given in the literature is that the neighbourhood has lost its role as the focal point of the social life of its residents, there is hardly anyone who has no social contacts within the neighbourhood. The empirical findings here show that most people have at least a regular chat with their neighbours (Table 4.7), but when it comes to more extensive contacts, or the exchange of small favours, the numbers are much smaller.

We concentrate here on the contacts between people. Most respondents have to leave the neighbourhood to visit family or friends. For two-thirds of the respondents their circle of friends is mainly to be found outside the neighbourhood and only one-third of them have one family member or more in the neighbourhood. Most people therefore have relatively few strong ties within the neighbourhood. This pattern is hardly surprising, however. Having a chat with the neighbours is not committing and usually rather superficial; it is pleasant enough so long as people's expectations are not raised. And if people chat informally together, less significance would be attached to common characteristics than were they to become friends.

The question we consider next is the extent to which social-economic and ethnic characteristics account for the degree of social networking within the neighbourhood. Surprisingly, the analysis shows that income and professional status are not related to any of the three indicators of social networks. On the other hand, the level of education is a very strong predictor of social networks (Table 4.8). As expected, highly-educated people are less likely than less-well-educated people to have close friends and family members in the neighbourhood. With regard to contacts with neighbours, these two education categories do not differ.

Ethnicity also has an ambiguous effect on the social ties within the neighbourhood. Whereas BME groups are more likely to have most of their friends or relatives in the neighbourhood,<sup>5</sup> they have fewer social contacts with their neighbours. This tendency can be explained by the fact that, depending on the degree of integration into mainstream society, BME groups mainly focus on their own ethnic group for their social contacts. Social interaction is therefore not stimulated when the neighbours are of another ethnic origin. That is not to say that the social networks of native Dutch residents are more ethnically mixed. The opposite may even be true: native Dutch residents have fewer friends of another ethnic origin in the neighbourhood than do BME groups

Table 4.7 Social networks in the neighbourhood (percentages)

	% of respondents
> 50 % of friends live in same neighbourhood	26.2
Family in the neighbourhood	31.6
Chat with neighbours	83.5
Drink coffee with neighbours	37.8
Take care of plants when neighbours are on holiday	32.7
DIY together with neighbours	33.8

Source: Survey, 2003

Table 4.8 Logistic regression-analysis of social contacts in the neighbourhood: family, friends and neighbours

	Family		Friends		Chatting with neighbours	
	B	Significance	B	Significance	B	Significance
Constant	-1.538	0.353	-2.886	0.111	-1.083	0.571
income	0.000	0.988	-0.025	0.260	-0.002	0.944
higher education	-1.185	0.000 ***	-0.982	0.001 ***	-0.370	0.241
non-active professional status	0.174	0.565	0.364	0.253	-0.106	0.783
BME-groups	0.295	0.315	0.471	0.138	-0.831	0.016 **
age	0.411	0.682	1.464	0.181	2.106	0.068 *
household without children	-0.452	0.066 *	-0.140	0.607	-0.455	0.152
male	-0.001	0.998	-0.082	0.750	-0.293	0.297
new house, moved into the area	0.639	0.045 **	-0.228	0.513	0.999	0.017 **
new house, lived in the area before	0.811	0.027 **	0.685	0.072 *	-0.105	0.815
tenant	0.503	0.084 *	0.158	0.606	-0.129	0.717
N	426		412		428	
-2LL	470.178		406.942		350.397	
model chi-square	52.296		51.976		30.962	
df	10		10		10	
p	0.000		0.000		0.001	
Nagelkerke R square	0.163		0.176		0.118	

Family: 0 = no, I don't have family in the neighbourhood; 1 = yes, I do have family in the neighbourhood  
 Friends: 0= most friends outside the neighbourhood; 1= most friends inside the neighbourhood, or as many within the neighbourhood as outside it  
 Neighbours: 0 = no, I don't chat with the neighbours, 1 = yes, I do chat with the neighbours  
 \* = p <0.10; \*\* = p <0.05; \*\*\* = p <0.01  
 Method: enter  
 Source: Survey, 2003

and also much less interaction with neighbours of a different background (Bolt and Torrance, 2005). Again, that is not to say that native Dutch residents are more ethnocentric in their social networking; it may simply be the result of the large number of native Dutch residents. Since in both neighbourhoods the native Dutch are still the largest groups, they have a much greater chance of having at least one neighbour of the same ethnic origin.

In addition, the degree of neighbouring is higher in areas of new dwellings than of old dwellings, especially among residents who have not lived in the neighbourhood previously; one possible explanation is that the shared experience of the 'newness' of the neighbourhood has led to more energy being put into getting to know the neighbours (Henning and Lieberg, 1996). The difference between the old and the new parts of the neighbourhood may be explained by the diversity of the neighbours. The older parts are more diverse than the newer parts, particularly in terms of ethnicity and income. As was stated above, people tend to form networks with people having similar characteristics so that the newer areas are more likely to form a seedbed for social interaction than the older areas. Residents in the new houses more often have family members in the neighbourhood than those in the old houses, a finding which implies that family ties could well have been a reason for staying in the area, or moving into it.

*Social cohesion: tolerance of deviant behaviour*

Earlier research has revealed the many conflicting norms and values in the research neighbourhoods. The behaviour of youngsters in particular has led to conflicts in both neighbourhoods. These conflicts are either between groups of youngsters of different ethnicity or between youngsters hanging about on the streets and making other residents, especially the elderly, feel unsafe as a result. Many policy efforts are aimed at increasing understanding between groups and providing social programmes for the youngsters (Aalbers et al., 2004). Related to the problems with some youngsters in the research neighbourhoods is the animosity between the native Dutch and the ethnic minorities. Many native Dutch residents resent the presence in their neighbourhood of a large proportion of ethnic minorities, since they are held responsible for the neighbourhood's deterioration. When asked why they see the ethnic minorities as the cause of the degeneration process, many native Dutch respondents point out the deviant behaviour of BME communities (Bolt and Torrance, 2005). It would therefore be interesting to discover whether there are indeed any differences with regard to the acceptance of deviant behaviour.

As was made clear in the methods section, two dimensions of tolerance towards deviant behaviour are distinguished: the acceptance of deviant behaviour and the acceptance of force. There is one regression equation for each dimension in which the impact of socioeconomic and ethnic characteristics on the acceptance of deviant behaviour is estimated.

Table 4.9 Multiple regression-analysis 'acceptance of deviant behaviour' and 'acceptance of force'

	Acceptance of deviant behaviour			Acceptance of the use of force		
	B	Significance	Beta	B	Significance	Beta
(Constant)	2.305	0.002		-0.599	0.430	
income	-0.006	0.481	-0.043	-0.005	0.548	-0.037
higher education	-0.088	0.423	-0.045	0.141	0.204	0.071
non-active professional status	0.026	0.848	0.011	-0.032	0.815	-0.014
BME-groups	-0.296	0.025 **	-0.122	0.062	0.639	0.026
age	-1.316	0.002 ***	-0.183	0.309	0.469	0.043
household without children	0.092	0.385	0.046	-0.229	0.032 **	-0.114
male	-0.069	0.485	-0.035	0.337	0.001 ***	0.168
new house, moved into the area	-0.144	0.278	-0.070	0.081	0.542	0.039
new house, lived in the area before	-0.056	0.733	-0.019	-0.075	0.652	-0.025
tenant	0.179	0.145	0.090	0.111	0.371	0.056
N	406			406		
F	2.680			2.413		
Df	10			10		
Sign F	0.003			0.009		
R square	0.063			0.057		

Re acceptance of deviant behaviour: A positive loading means that deviant behaviour is accepted, a negative loading means that deviant behaviour is rejected.

Re acceptance of the use of force: A positive loading means that the use of force is accepted; a negative loading means that the use of force is rejected.

\* = p < 0.10; \*\* = p < 0.05; \*\*\* = p < 0.01

Method: enter; Source: Survey, 2003

In the empirical analysis, the respondents show more variation on the acceptance of deviant behaviour than on the acceptance of force. On the whole, when a hypothetical event in which force is used is presented to them, people judge the situation to be bad (Table 4.3). It is therefore not surprising that there is no differentiation on the basis of ethnicity or socioeconomic status with regard to the acceptance of the use of force (Table 4.9). Only being a female or having children appears to have an effect on the acceptance of force, which may be explained by the fact that the two statements that score high on the indicator involve the use of violence against children.

In contrast with the almost unanimous rejection of force, there is more variation when statements concerning other forms of deviant behaviour are presented (Table 4.3). Acceptance of deviant behaviour can only be associated with two independent variables: age and ethnicity. That means that socioeconomic status is not relevant to the common values dimension of social cohesion, which is contrary to our expectations. Interestingly, ethnic minorities appear to be less tolerant of deviant behaviour than are the native Dutch. This finding is in contrast with the opinion of many native Dutch respondents, but in line with our expectations based on the idea that social control in several ethnic groups is stricter than among the native Dutch. The influence of age is also in the expected direction. Older age is associated with lower tolerance towards deviant behaviour.

#### *Social cohesion: neighbourhood attachment and identity*

The third component of social cohesion relates to the feelings the residents themselves have about the neighbourhood. As with the first two dimensions of social cohesion, in this study the extent to which socioeconomic and ethnic characteristics are related to neighbourhood attachment and identity is analysed. There are two dimensions of neighbourhood attachment: “social belonging”, which refers to the social significance attached to the neighbourhood; and “spatial-emotional belonging”, which refers to the symbolic value given to the place (see the Methods section).

In Table 4.10, three models are shown: two for social belonging and one for spatial-emotional belonging. The first model estimates the relationship between the feeling of social belonging and the individual and household characteristics. In the second model, satisfaction with the composition of the population is also included<sup>6</sup>. This last variable was incorporated since neighbourhood attachment was expected to be lower when one does not live in a neighbourhood that matches one’s preferences with regard to the composition of the residents. Indeed, satisfaction with the composition of the population turns out to be a very strong predictor for social belonging.

Earlier research has shown that socioeconomic status is negatively correlated with social networks in the neighbourhood, but positively associated with neighbourhood attachment (see the literature review). This difference is explained by the fact that people with higher status have a stronger position on the housing market; they are therefore able to move to more desirable neighbourhoods. However, when socioeconomic groups within the same neighbourhoods are compared (which means that the difference in neighbourhood quality is controlled for), it is more likely that people with a higher social status feel less attached to the neighbourhood, since they may be more inclined to think that they will find another dwelling in a more suitable neighbourhood in due course (Gerson et al., 1977). In this study, the level of education does indeed have a negative effect on the indicator of spatial emotional belonging. However, relatively

Table 4.10 Multiple regression-analysis of the feeling of social belonging, and spatial-emotional belonging

	social belonging model A			social belonging model B			spatial-emotional belonging A		
	B	Significance	Beta	B	Significance	Beta	B	Significance	Beta
(Constant)	0.047	0.948		-1.699	0.012		-1.067	0.133	
income	-0.009	0.265	-0.066	-0.007	0.329	-0.052	0.016	0.036 **	0.120
higher education	-0.091	0.387	-0.046	-0.117	0.218	-0.060	-0.345	0.001 ***	-0.174
non-active professional status	-0.112	0.388	-0.050	-0.123	0.298	-0.055	-0.184	0.153	-0.082
BME-groups	0.248	0.045 **	0.105	0.141	0.211	0.060	0.415	0.001 ***	0.174
age	0.168	0.678	0.024	0.245	0.504	0.035	0.719	0.072 *	0.101
household without children	-0.084	0.404	-0.043	-0.031	0.738	-0.016	-0.010	0.917	-0.005
male	0.090	0.343	0.046	0.093	0.279	0.048	0.048	0.607	0.024
new house, moved into the area	-0.273	0.032 **	-0.135	-0.176	0.126	-0.087	-0.284	0.024 **	-0.139
new house, lived in the area before	0.046	0.771	0.015	0.112	0.431	0.038	0.166	0.287	0.055
tenant	0.029	0.805	0.015	0.005	0.962	0.003	-0.302	0.010 **	-0.153
satisfaction with residents' composition				0.920	0.000 ***	0.431			
N	431		425				431		
F	3.087		12.008				5.258		
Df	10		11				10		
Sign F	0.001		0.000				0.000		
R square	0.068		0.242				0.111		

Variables entered in the models A: age, income, education (low/medium – high), professional status (active – non active), home ownership structure (home owner/tenant), ethnicity (native Dutch/BME group), gender (male/female), children (yes/no children in the household), new house and new neighbourhood/new house in same neighbourhood/old house

Variables entered in the model B are the same as in model A but with added satisfaction with residents' composition (dummy)

\* = p < 0.10, \*\* = p < 0.05; \*\*\* = p < 0.01

Method: enter Source: Survey, 2003

many of the highly-educated people in these neighbourhoods are still students, and students tend to identify more with other parts of the city than their own neighbourhood. At the same time, having a job has a positive impact on spatial-emotional belonging. As other studies have found (Brodsky et al., 1999; Atkinson and Kintrea, 2000), having no daily activity outside the neighbourhood is certainly no guarantee of a positive attachment to it.

We also found that the role of income differs for the two aspects of belonging. While income has no impact on social belonging, spatial-emotional belonging is positively affected by income. On the one hand, this is as expected, since people on higher incomes tend to be more inclined to attach importance to the symbolic value of their neighbourhood (Hortulanus, 1995). On the other hand, people with higher incomes have more opportunities on the housing market and could therefore be inclined to think that they could find something better than their present neighbourhood. It might be the case here that the research neighbourhoods are attractive for some segments of the higher income groups, namely those who prefer a neighbourhood that suits their urban lifestyle and has a non-bourgeois, multi-ethnic character.

Furthermore, it was found here that native Dutch people have fewer feelings of spatial-emotional belonging than BME communities. The literature indicates that this difference might be explained by the difference in point of reference. While members of ethnic minorities are no less critical than are the native Dutch residents about their housing situation (Bolt and van Kempen, 2002), the quality of their neighbourhood is not (much) worse than that of their friends and family members. Native Dutch residents in Hoograven and Bouwlust, on the other hand, have a less attractive housing situation in comparison with the 'average' native Dutch inhabitant of the city. They are therefore more likely to be annoyed by the modest social status of the neighbourhood and more likely to aspire to a neighbourhood with a higher social status and a substantially lower presence of BME groups (Permentier and Bolt, 2004).

Differences with respect to social belonging between BME groups and native Dutch no longer show up in the models when satisfaction with the composition of the residents is included in the model as a predictor of social belonging. That implies that the higher level of social belonging of BME groups can be explained by the fact that they are more satisfied with the population composition. This finding is in line with reports in the American literature that ethnically-mixed neighbourhoods meet the preference of ethnic minorities much more than the preferences of non-Hispanic whites (Charles, 2003).

As expected, homeowners were found to have stronger feelings of spatial-emotional belonging than were tenants. Moreover, it is clear that people living in a new house and who have lived in this area previously are more attached to the neighbourhood than those who are new to the area. This finding shows clearly that, for social cohesion, offering the opportunity to make a housing career within the neighbourhood pays off, because social cohesion allows those who feel attached to the area to stay in their familiar environment and fulfil their housing aspirations at the same time.

## 4.6 Conclusions

The aim of this study was to analyse the interrelatedness of the different dimensions of social cohesion and to analyse the extent to which each of these dimensions is related to the socioeconomic and ethnic characteristics of neighbourhood residents. We distinguished three

dimensions of social cohesion: social networks, tolerance of deviant behaviour, and feelings of belonging. The third dimension was found to be strongly connected to the other two dimensions. Feelings of belonging are positively affected by social networks in the neighbourhood and by the degree of acceptance of deviant behaviour.

On the other hand, there is hardly any relationship between the social networks and the common values dimension. Strong ties as well as chatting with neighbours have no significant impact on the acceptance of deviant behaviour. This finding is inconsistent with the findings of Wilson (1987) and Friedrichs and Blasius (2003) who argued that spatially restricted social networks make people more susceptible to norms that are deviant from mainstream society. The probably crucial difference here is that their work refers to a distressed neighbourhood, while our neighbourhoods, although clearly less affluent than the average for the city, are relatively prosperous in comparison with the American and German research areas.

Since not all the indicators of social cohesion are strongly interrelated, the conclusion must be drawn that the various dimensions of social cohesion cannot be considered to be interchangeable. This relative independence is also illustrated by the fact that several factors do not have the same impact on each of the dimensions. A high level of education for instance has a negative influence on the spatial-emotional belonging and the presence of family and friends in the neighbourhood, but is not related to the other indicators of social cohesion. Members of an ethnic minority group are more likely to have most of their friends in the neighbourhood, but less likely to chat with their neighbours. Finally, tenants have a lower level of spatial-emotional attachment than owner occupiers, but are more likely to have family in their neighbourhood.

Strikingly, socioeconomic status did not appear to be relevant for every dimension of social cohesion. In contrast with our expectations, the common values dimension of social cohesion was not related to socioeconomic status; income turned out to be unrelated to the social networks dimension.

Ethnicity, in contrast with socioeconomic status, is associated with all three dimensions of social cohesion. Ethnic minorities were found to have stronger ties than native Dutch people in the neighbourhood, to be less tolerant towards deviant behaviour, and to have stronger feelings of attachment. In other words, ethnic minorities have a higher level of social cohesion within the neighbourhood. Of course, this conclusion should not be generalised to all urban neighbourhoods, since the neighbourhoods in our research are characterised as an ethnic mix. For those BME people who are strongly oriented towards their own ethnic group for their social contacts, the presence of a substantial number of co-ethnics makes it possible to maintain strong networks that may in some cases go hand in hand with strong social control. In addition, BME people tend to feel more comfortable with a degree of ethnic mix that many native Dutch residents would not find acceptable; the latter often complain about the large proportion of ethnic minorities in their neighbourhood (Bolt and Torrance, 2005). This dissatisfaction with the population composition turned out to be a very powerful predictor of the feeling of social belonging.

The assessment of the policy implications of the findings in this paper is not easy. Whether the enhancement of the social cohesion in a neighbourhood is a good idea depends on the circumstances. But if the goal is to enhance social cohesion, it would be wise to promote homeownership, since homeowners have higher scores than do tenants on (spatial-emotional) feelings of belonging. Offering residents the opportunity to make a housing career within the neighbourhood also stimulates social cohesion, since people who move to a new dwelling within

the same neighbourhood also have relatively high scores on all three dimensions. Unfortunately, there is some tension between these policy options, since owner-occupied dwellings are beyond the reach of most residents (Bolt and Torrance, 2005; cf. McArthur, 2000). Also, as experience in the United Kingdom has shown, enhancing homeownership only has positive effects on the neighbourhood if people also have the means to maintain their dwellings.

Striving for a social mix seems to be a counterintuitive strategy to strengthen social cohesion. A successful mixing strategy means an increase in the categories (such as native Dutch, highly educated) which are not associated with strong levels of social cohesion, certainly as far as the social network dimension of cohesion is concerned. Of course, one could argue that a massive influx of native Dutch would change the population composition dramatically and consequently the opportunities for building new forms of social cohesion, but that strategy would not be tenable or realistic for all distressed neighbourhoods. In order to enhance the social cohesion in a mixed neighbourhood, the accommodation of the diversity in the neighbourhoods and investment in respect of the differences between groups, inter group communication and cooperation is therefore important.

## Notes

- 1 Furthermore, we limit the first dimension of *social networks and social capital* to the first aspect only. We do so because social capital is a form of capital that is *derived from* networks (Portes, 1998). Social capital has a clear functional meaning, allowing for a certain activity to take place within networks. Social cohesion, on the other hand, refers to the network *itself*. High levels of social cohesion can characterize a neighbourhood without any form of social capital, which allows the residents to reach an objective (such as participation in decision-making).
- 2 Wilson's ideas of have sparked a heated debate on what is referred to as the 'underclass'. Many commentators and researchers (while borrowing only certain aspects of Wilson's work) have blamed inner-city problems on the alleged 'social pathology' of the poor (Wacquant, 1997). The underclass debate is beyond the scope of this article, but we would like to stress that we do not argue here that a possible lower inclination to reject deviant behaviour should be seen as one of the main causes of social problems in deprived neighbourhoods.
- 3 We checked for the possible influence of outliers on the principal factors by doing an analysis on the basis of a reduced sample excluding these outliers. A comparison between the solution from the complete sample and the solution from the reduced sample revealed that the outliers did not have a substantial influence on the determination of the factors. Since the two dimensions seem to be robust on the basis of this analysis, we calculated respondents scores for both components, a procedure that produces a factor score with a mean=0 and a standard deviation = 1.
- 4 Length of residence is not included in the regression analysis as it is strongly associated with housing category. Residents in the new dwellings have a short length of residence by definition.
- 5 The effect of ethnicity on having relatives in the neighbourhood only shows up in a bivariate analysis. When the level of education is controlled for, ethnicity no longer has an independent effect.
- 6 Only one model is included for spatial-emotional belonging, since this indicator of neighbourhood attachment is not related to satisfaction with the composition of the residents.



# 5 Social capital, neighbourhood attachment, and participation in distressed urban areas. A case study in The Hague and Utrecht, the Netherlands<sup>1</sup>

Dekker, K., Social capital, neighbourhood attachment and participation in distressed urban areas. A case study in The Hague and Utrecht, the Netherlands. Manuscript submitted for review.

## Abstract

In the last decade, academic interest in residents' participation in maintaining the quality of life in distressed urban areas has risen. Many articles seeking to explain why people participate relate the social networks dimension of social capital to participation. However, according to Putnam's definition of social capital, not only social networks, but also norms and trust give people the tools they need for participation. Other authors concentrate on the relationship between neighbourhood attachment and participation. However, an empirical analysis in which both factors are combined is lacking. This paper describes the combined effect of social capital together with neighbourhood attachment in explaining participation. The findings show that participation is greater for residents with social networks in the neighbourhood, who reject deviant behaviour, and have a stronger neighbourhood attachment. Trust in authorities was not found to have any statistically significant impact on participation. The conclusions underline the theoretical assumption that social capital and neighbourhood attachment form a useful pair of concepts in explaining participation, because they focus not only on what people have, but also on their mindsets.

## 5.1 Introduction

Pollution, neglect of maintenance, vandalism, crime, drug abuse, child neglect, and social isolation are just a few of the problems that lead to a poor quality of life in distressed urban neighbourhoods (Musterd and Van Kempen, 2005). These problems can lead to dissatisfied residents who aim to leave the neighbourhood as soon as they can, leaving behind those without the option to do so (often the low-income households). As a result, in Northwest Europe the low-income households are increasingly concentrated in areas where the social-rented sector prevails (Van Kempen and Van Weesep, 1998; Musterd and De Winter, 2005). The concentration

of low-income households and the ageing of certain parts of the housing stock exacerbate the social, economic, and physical problems in urban areas (Dekker and Van Kempen, 2004a).

Many of the governments in Europe concentrate their urban policies on these distressed urban areas. In present-day urban policies in Europe, much attention is paid to the participation of residents (see, for example, Belmessous et al., 2004; Droste and Knorr-Siedow, 2004; Öresjö et al., 2004). This emphasis is also the case in the Netherlands. The Big Cities Policy, which is the major urban policy focusing on distressed urban areas, initially addressed these problems with a change in the housing stock. Housing for the lower-income groups is replaced by owner-occupied homes, which bring in middle class households. This 'social mix' is supposed to be good for the mutual tolerance between groups, and enhance live-ability in the neighbourhood (Jupp, 1999; Veldboer et al., 2002). Later, the change in the housing stock was augmented with integrated social, economic, and safety policies. Within the approach, much is expected from the participation of the residents in their neighbourhood. The Dutch National government aims to achieve safety, liveability, integration, and social cohesion by *“facilitating them (the residents, KD) (...) to take responsibility for ‘their’ neighbourhood”* (Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal, 2001, p. 1).

The policy discussion on participation is embedded in the academic governance debate. Local institutions increasingly work alongside other local institutions, such as community groups, and use their powers to enable rather than direct (Taylor, 2000). Participation is one of the key areas in which the delegation of power evolves (Docherty et al., 2001; Raco and Flint, 2001). In order to give communities a voice in policymaking, local governments invest in community capacity building. However, distressed urban areas accommodate concentrations of people with low socioeconomic status (education, work, income) and of non-native origin. It is assumed that these people lack the necessary tools for participation (Purdue, 2001; Subramanian et al., 2003).

The aim of the study reported in this article is to identify and describe the factors that foster participation in distressed urban areas. To this end, social capital and neighbourhood attachment are related to participation. Following other research, the social networks dimension of social capital is related to participation. In addition, two further dimensions of social capital have been analysed for their explanatory value for participation: trust in other people, and authorities (Purdue, 2001; Subramanian et al., 2003; O’Laughlin, 2004) and norms (Kilpatrick et al., 2001). Common norms lead people to trust each other, and this mutual trust generates informal governance as well as the feeling of responsibility.

Not only social capital, but also neighbourhood attachment is related to participation. When people identify with a neighbourhood and feel part of it they are more inclined to participate (Brodsky et al., 1999; Minkler and Wallerstein, 2003; Galster, 2003). To date, most research has focused on the impact on participation of either social capital or neighbourhood attachment. Through combining these two separate lines of thought, our understanding of the causes of participation can be enhanced. In this article, the following question is addressed: To what extent can social capital and neighbourhood attachment help to explain the participation of residents in their neighbourhood?

The structure of the article is as follows. First, there is a brief review of the literature on social capital and neighbourhood attachment. Here the concept of participation is also defined more precisely. This review is followed by a description of the data collection and methods used. Then the outcome of the fieldwork is presented. Finally, the conclusions give an evaluation of the usefulness of using both social capital and neighbourhood attachment as factors capable of fostering participation in distressed urban areas.

## 5.2 Defining participation

What is participation? Policymakers and scientists alike tend to focus on various modes of participation in formal policymaking structures. *Formal* participation refers to people taking part in the decision-making processes that influence their neighbourhood positively (Verba and Nie, 1972). The degree to which communities can influence these processes depends on the degree of openness of government and the way in which decisions are taken. Participation requires the capacity to influence the final decision. As Arnstein (1969) has shown, different levels of power relate to different levels of participation. Only where citizens have decision-making power in issues that concern them do we refer to their actions as formal participation. For the sake of clarity, we have limited the analyses to participation in neighbourhood-related issues. At this level, formal participation refers to such activities as being a member of the neighbourhood council, or having a say in decision-making or in drawing up a plan. In these cases participation is a form of mutual exchange and dialogue between authorities (both public and private parties like housing corporations) and residents.

*Informal* participation can also be an important source of aid in neighbourhood regeneration (Lelieveldt, 2004). For example, a resident can become a member of a street committee that organises events, checks the undesirable behaviour of loitering teenagers, and so on. This is what Crenson (1983) once named ‘informal governance’: all those activities that do not fit the ‘normal’ definition of political participation, but which are essential in neighbourhood governance. Informal activities may enhance residents’ opportunities of participating in formal processes (see, for example, Verba and Nie, 1972).

Of course, it is not a *sine qua non* for all residents to participate. Feeling part of a neighbourhood is different from being actively involved in its management. It may very well be that residents feel attached to their neighbourhood, but are not interested in participation in neighbourhood-oriented activities. Some people may not want to participate because they find other things in life more important. In that case there is no real problem. However, the situation becomes more problematic if residents want to be involved in either formal or informal activities in the neighbourhood, but are not able to do so for various reasons. It is thus useful to gain more insight into the variables that may help to explain who participates.

In this article, participation is defined as activities undertaken by residents with the aim of positively influencing the social and physical situation of the neighbourhood. These activities can be either formal or informal. Other authors have used a definition of participation which focuses on more than just formal participation. Examples are: being active in school activities (Marschall, 2001); working to bring about change (Kang and Kwak, 2003); or being a volunteer in the neighbourhood (Shirlow and Murtagh, 2004). Non-formal activities often take place at the very low-scale level of the apartment block or the street, because this is part of the resident’s daily environment and is therefore the most relevant. Formal activities often refer to participation in policymaking processes within the neighbourhood. The focus is on the elements that may be related to participation, and can therefore either stimulate or limit participation. The variables that relate to participation are described in Figure 5.1.

While the starting point here is that social capital and neighbourhood attachment indeed affect participation, it should be acknowledged that the converse is also possible (as indicated by the dotted lines in Figure 5.1). In fact, it is likely that there is a continuous, dynamic interplay between participation, social capital, and neighbourhood attachment. The analyses should thus




Figure 5.1 Explanatory variables for participation

be interpreted with care. One might argue that a structural model in which participation, social capital, and neighbourhood attachment affect one another might be preferable to the one-way causal analysis presented in this paper. We chose not to construct this type of model here for the following reason: the way in which social capital and neighbourhood attachment influence participation is an essential part of the process that is being studied. The aim is to analyse to what extent different kinds of characteristics of the residents add to their activation. By focusing on the mutual relationship between social capital, neighbourhood attachment, and participation we would rule out the option of identifying which factors specifically influence the participation of residents. The consequence of this choice is that, strictly speaking, the regression models cannot be regarded as causal models. They should be interpreted as what Mulder and Van Ham (2005) call ‘sophisticated descriptive statistics’. This is not necessarily a disadvantage of the analyses. The aim is to establish whether the action of participation is associated with social capital and neighbourhood attachment, not whether a similar level of participation would have been reached had exactly the same persons not had any social capital or neighbourhood attachment.

**5.3 Influences on participation**

In this section, the variables that are related to participation are presented: first, the more generally known variables related to socioeconomic status, ethnicity, socio-demographic situation, and housing characteristics. Then the focus is on the possible relationship between social capital and neighbourhood attachment with participation.

The individual and household characteristics of people who do or do not show a high rate of participation are already familiar. First, people with a low socioeconomic status (income, work, education) are less likely to participate in formal situations because they have less well-developed interpersonal skills, fewer social interactions, and less access to institutions and participation activities. These factors lead to less involvement in local activities (Verba and Nie, 1972), political work, work in organisations, and communication with local authorities (Staeheli and Clarke, 2003).

Second, when the negative impact of low socioeconomic status is controlled for, ethnic minorities are often found to have higher shares of participation. This is the consequence of psychological attitudes and higher group identity among ethnic minority groups. As Verba and Nie (1972) have pointed out, participation among African-Americans in US is often found to

be related to group consciousness; those who frequently mention race in their conversation are more politically conscious than those who do not. More recently, Marschall (2001) found that African-Americans in inner-city New York have developed a sense of self-pride and trust in the local government that is positively related to participation.

Having a considerable share of the same ethnic group in a neighbourhood is considered an asset for participation. On the one hand, people associate more easily with others who have a similar income, education, ethnicity, and lifestyle (Gerson et al., 1977). If people can readily identify with a group in the neighbourhood, their capacity to participate in that group will be enhanced. The availability of facilities such as a mosque also enables ethnic minorities to participate. In Europe, for example, Peleman (2002) found that, through the available facilities, women of North-African origin living in areas of concentration in Belgium participate more than their counterparts in non-concentration areas.

Third, sociodemographic characteristics indicate a resident's stake in the neighbourhood. Women in particular play a key part in community participation (Gittell et al., 2000). The neighbourhood is very much their concern, since women tend to work less outside the home and spend more time in the neighbourhood, shopping and so forth, than men do. People with children tend to have more contacts in the neighbourhood, which in turn facilitates participation. Age is also related to participation, since older people tend to spend more time in the neighbourhood and so attach greater importance to it (Gerson et al., 1977; Fischer, 1982; Campbell and Lee, 1992; Guest and Wierzbicki, 1999).

A resident's stake in the neighbourhood is also related to the housing situation (Gerson et al., 1977). Homeowners invest more in the locality, hence the higher participation rates of homeowners compared with tenants (Kang and Kwak, 2003; Lelieveldt, 2004). Furthermore, people who have chosen to make a housing career within the neighbourhood participate more because they have made a positive choice to live there (Bolt and Torrance, 2005). Of course, this positive choice can be the result of a positive attachment to the neighbourhood.

### *Social capital*

From the above, it should be clear which socioeconomic, ethnic, and socio-demographic characteristics affect people's propensity to participate. It is less clear, however, what reasons people have for participating. When discussing reasons for participation, social capital is often mentioned as being helpful in giving people not only the tools, but also the will to act. Social capital theory starts from the principle of rational theory, in which individuals maximise their own benefits within a particular social network (cf. Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 1993; Portes, 1998).

Most empirical analyses of neighbourhood participation concentrate on the impact of the social networks dimension of social capital. Increasingly, trust is receiving consideration as an element capable of explaining participation (Arrow, 2000; Purdue 2001; Subramanian et al., 2003; O'Laughlin, 2004). The awareness is spreading that trust, but also norms, tell people what to do. Not only what people *have*, but also what they *feel* plays an important part in explaining participation (Bowles and Gintis, 2002, Van Deth, 2003).

Although existing research has certainly provided insight into the issue why some people participate while others do not, empirical evidence of the combined impact of the three elements of social capital on participation is lacking. Often only one or two of the dimensions are taken into consideration, while social capital is a construct of the related concepts of social

networks, trust, and the rejection of deviant behaviour. The decomposition of the concept into its constituent elements is crucial. Subsequently, it is important to specify the mechanisms through which each of the three elements of the social capital definition may affect participation in the neighbourhood.

The academic discussion of the concept of social capital as defined by Putnam has been extensive (see, for example, Portes and Landolt (1998) and DeFillipis (2001)). One of the most profound criticisms is that Putnam's argument is a virtual circle: Putnam states that, in places with good co-operation, there is good governance (1995). Although there may truly be a mutual relationship between the co-operation of diverse networks and governance, for the purpose of analysis it is better to separate the concept (social capital) from the effect (action/co-operation). In addition, many negative consequences of social capital have been mentioned: examples include the exclusion of outsiders, excess claims on group members, restrictions on individual freedom, and downward levelling norms (Portes, 1998). However, the positive results of social capital are emphasised most. One aim here is to assess the extent to which these expectations can be supported by empirical evidence.

#### *Social networks related to participation*

Social networks reflect the degree of social interaction within communities (and families). When social networks are related to participation, they are often found to be helpful in facilitating participation by bundling individual needs and capacities; in other words, networks allow communal action to take place (Kearns and Forrest, 2000).

People who are socially involved with each other are more integrated into their community and feel more positive about it, which may stimulate them to take a more active role in social and political affairs. Strong, dense, neighbourhood-based networks are assumed to provide support (Granovetter, 1973), while weak ties within a neighbourhood can provide the feeling of home, a sense of security and identity (Henning and Lieberg, 1996), and give people a sense of social order and social control.

Empirical research has revealed that active involvement in society is positively related to social networks in certain situations. In Wisconsin (USA), Kang and Kwak (2003) found that interpersonal networks constitute the most important explanatory variable for civic participation when residential variables, socioeconomic status, and demographic variables are controlled for. Marschall (2001) also found that, in the context of New York inner-city neighbourhoods, involvement in the local school increases with the number of social ties. Thus, those with social networks in the neighbourhood may be expected to participate more.

Social interaction can take place in different settings, such as neighbourhoods, groups of friends, professional and business networks, gangs, and sports organisations. All these networks facilitate participation in their own particular way and so lead to different results. An important restriction of social networks is that not everybody is free to choose which group to belong to. In general terms, people with a low socioeconomic status have more difficulty entering their network of choice than do people with a high socioeconomic status (Bowles and Gintis, 2002).

#### *Trust related to participation*

Trust is the second element of social capital that has been found to have a positive relationship with participation. The accumulation of the capability to act is an outcome of networks based on trust and commonalities and can be used in participation (Gittel et al., 2000). Two types of trust

can be discerned: personal trust in co-residents, and in authorities. First, people who trust each other will do so on the basis of common norms and group identification. Marschall (2001), for example, found in inner-city New York that community involvement is positively related to these feelings of trust. A lack of trust between individuals or groups in communities and partnerships can lead to difficulties in generating communal action (Purdue, 2001).

Second, participation is positively related to trust in authorities. Some authors stress the negative impact on participation of the lack of trust in authorities in an area with a concentration of low-income households and ethnic minorities. Shirlow and Murtagh (2004) reported great differences in how people feel about community authorities in a community in North Belfast. Despite a common set of norms about how to behave, the authors found that feelings of mistrust and a negative attitude towards the neighbourhood authorities work against participation in voluntary associations. Similarly, Ross and colleagues (2001) and also Subramanian and colleagues (2003) found that the level of trust is lower in distressed than in average neighbourhoods. The findings show that specific local circumstances can lead to lower levels of trust, with lower participation rates. The low levels of trust found in distressed areas often have a long history with deep roots in the community. This entrenchment makes speedy change difficult.

#### *Norms related to participation*

Norms make up the third element of social capital that is related to participation. Norms are the rules specifying appropriate and desirable behaviour and forbidding non desirable behaviour (Elissetche, 2005). In comparison with the other two dimensions of social capital, there are fewer studies that link the norms dimension to participation. Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that perceptions of favourable behaviour influence participation. Together with Friedrichs and Blasius (2003), we concentrate on how one evaluates deviant behaviour as an indicator of norms. A person's attitude towards deviant behaviour leads to action. Such attitudes urge a person to do something about a problem; participation then offers a means of making a meaningful contribution to society (Lelieveldt, 2004; Westheimer and Kahne, 2004). Davis Smith and Gay (2005) call this intrinsic motivation an *ethical legacy*. It is based on religious and humanistic impulses to contribute positively to society; these impulses are formed during a life-long experience of forms of voluntary participation based on family and other social networks.

People who reject deviant behaviour are thus more likely to participate; conversely, accepting deviant behaviour can have a negative effect on participation, especially when many people in the same group accept such behaviour. When the majority in an area accepts deviant behaviour, such prevalence can lead to a lack of work ethos, irresponsibility, fatalism (what's the point of education?), a lack of ambition, social immobility, restricted social and geographical horizons, and underachievement within the context of economic change and employment<sup>2</sup> (Wilson, 1987; Atkinson and Kintrea, 2000). The fear of 'being different' from the rest of the neighbourhood is stronger than the urge to improve the situation.

#### *Participation related to neighbourhood attachment*

In the initial set of propositions it was mentioned that the feeling of attachment to the neighbourhood also relates to participation (see Figure 5.1). Neighbourhood attachment can lead to a feeling of security, build self-esteem and self-image, give a bond to people, cultures, and experience, and maintain group identity (Taylor, 1988; Altman and Low, 1992; Crow, 1994). The idea is that people not only have ties with others, but also feel attracted to and identify with their

immediate living environment (Blokland, 2000). Participation is encouraged when people feel that they are attached to a neighbourhood and that they identify with it: what belongs to them needs to be protected, taken care of, and influenced.

The positive effect of neighbourhood attachment on participation has been shown in earlier research. Individuals who identify with their neighbours and the community (social neighbourhood attachment (Zijderveld, 1988)) become empowered and willing to change their social and political environment to improve the quality of the lives they live there (Minkler and Wallerstein, 2003). People who identify with the people around them score higher on various forms of participation, such as attending religious services, being registered to vote, and involvement in a neighbourhood organisation (Brodsky et al., 1999). Thus this social kind of neighbourhood attachment is positively related to participation. Social attachment is different from social networks, since a person can have a strong feeling of social attachment without having any real social contacts in the neighbourhood.

Another positive effect of neighbourhood attachment on participation involves spatial-emotional neighbourhood attachment. This concept refers to the connection people feel with their home area and their sense of belonging to that place (Forrest and Kearns, 2001). A general feeling of pride about the neighbourhood makes people feel part of it (Massey, 1991). In USA, one of the causes of the problems of distressed urban areas is seen to be a lack of neighbourhood pride. An increase in such pride makes people change their behaviour in the neighbourhood (Kaplan, 1934). It is their positive attachment (both social and spatial-emotional) to the neighbourhood that will encourage people to take action towards improving the situation there.

#### **5.4 Description of the neighbourhoods**

The research questions as stated in the introduction have been addressed on the basis of empirical research in two post-WWII areas in the Netherlands: Hoograven in Utrecht and Bouwlust in The Hague. Together with Rotterdam and Amsterdam, these cities and their surrounding areas form the densely-populated Randstad. The two neighbourhoods were selected for the purposes of this research on the basis of their involvement in the Big Cities Policy and their relatively high share of ethnic minorities and low-income households. The housing composition and the population composition in these two research areas are comparable with many other post-WWII areas in the Netherlands and Northwest Europe (see Dekker and Van Kempen, 2004a for an overview of the characteristics of post WWII neighbourhoods in Europe).

The research area Bouwlust (in The Hague) has a large share of social housing (81 percent in Bouwlust compared with 38 percent in The Hague as a whole), mostly multi-family buildings without an elevator. The population is getting younger, and the share of ethnic minority groups is rising: it was 33 percent in 1995 and 48 percent in 2002. The main immigrant groups are Surinamese, Turks, and Moroccans (see Table 5.1 for an overview of the characteristics of both neighbourhoods).

Hoograven (in Utrecht), the other research area, also has relatively high unemployment, high dependency on social benefits (10 per cent), and many poorly-educated people on low incomes. The majority of the houses are multi-family buildings within the social-rented sector. Only 29 percent of the residents live in a home they themselves own; most people live in a social-rented

*Table 5.1* Selected characteristics of Hoograven and Bouwlust compared with the cities of Utrecht and The Hague

	Hoograven	Utrecht	Bouwlust	The Hague
% social-rented dwellings	60	43	81	38
% owner-occupied dwellings	29	42	13	37
% multi-family dwellings	78	57	89	81
Total number of dwellings (x 1000)	4.3	114.1	8.5	221.7
% low incomes	45	38	47	40
% high incomes	11	20	9	19
% age group ≤ 25 years	15	11	32	30
% age group ≥ 65 years	32	31	16	14
% ethnic minorities	44	31	48	45
Total number of inhabitants (x1000)	9.9	265.2	15.6	463.8

Note: percentage of low incomes = percentage of persons in the two lowest income quintiles; percentage of high incomes = percentage of persons in the highest income quintile.

Source: Leefbaarheidsmonitor The Hague, 2004; Wijkmonitor Utrecht, 2004.

apartment. Almost half the residents belong to an ethnic minority group; the largest share of this group is of Moroccan descent.

Physical decline and changing population structures have led to restructuring processes in these neighbourhoods in the context of the Big Cities Policy. In both research areas, multi-family dwellings in the rental sector have been replaced by single-family owner-occupied houses. Residents' participation is seen on the one hand as a prerequisite for more effective and sustainable policy results and on the other for an improved quality of life in the neighbourhood. The aim of the Big Cities Policy has been to increase variation in the housing stock and offer the more prosperous local residents the opportunity to make a housing career in their own neighbourhood and at the same time attract new high-income families (Bolt and Torrance, 2005). This process has taken place on a larger scale in Bouwlust than in Hoograven. Most of the dwellings in the research areas are, however, still in the social-rented sector. The restructuring process is leading to greater diversity of the population in socioeconomic terms, since high-income families are replacing low-income households. This process also means that native Dutch are replacing ethnic minority groups, who are overrepresented in the lower income groups.

The restructuring process has led to many changes in the area. The demolition of the old dwellings inevitably leads to parts of the area looking shabby for a considerable time, residents become uncertain about the future, services are temporarily closed down, and so the quality of life is threatened.

From the above, people in both research areas could be expected to be highly involved in their neighbourhoods, because of the turbulent developments surrounding them and the impact these have on their daily lives. There are, however, some factors that diminish participation. First, a lack of communication and poor management during the current restructuring processes may lead to a lack of trust in the local government authority. Second, the high mobility rates and short-stay perspectives of many residents are a threat to participation rates in these restructuring areas (Aalbers et al., 2004).

Table 5.2 Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analyses

	Mean	SD
<i>Dependent variable</i>		
Participation	.30	
<i>Independent variables</i>		
Net monthly income (x 100 €)	19.35	7.20
Education		
Lower-average education	.56	
Higher education	.45	
Professional status		
No daily activity (unemployed, housewife, disabled, pensioner)	.27	
Daily activity (work or school)	.73	
Ethnicity		
Dutch	.78	
Non-Dutch	.22	
Age		
Age: lg10 (age)	1.62	0.14
Household composition		
Household with children	.45	
Household without children	.55	
Gender		
Female	.56	
Male	.44	
Housing category		
Old house	.53	
New house and new in neighbourhood	.35	
New house and lived in neighbourhood before	.12	
Tenure		
Owner-occupier	.47	
Tenant	.53	
Social networks		
Family in the neighbourhood	.26	
Most friends within the neighbourhood	.32	
Chat with neighbours	.84	
Trust		
Trust in authorities	.12	
Trust in co-residents	.36	
Tolerance towards deviant behaviour		
Acceptance of deviant behaviour	.0075	1.03
Acceptance of force	-.0210	1.04
Neighbourhood attachment		
Social attachment	0	1
Spatial-emotional attachment	0	1

Notes: Lower-average education level: upper secondary vocational education or less; high education: professional education or university. Division Dutch-non Dutch is a response to the question: "In terms of ethnicity, what would you call yourself?" (Self-categorisation).

Source: Survey, 2003

## 5.5 Data collection and methods

In the empirical part of the article, the testing of the hypothesis that social capital and neighbourhood attachment can help explain participation is described. The hypothesis was based on the theories reviewed in the theoretical part of this paper. The aim here is to clarify who participates and which factors can help explain the variance in participation.

The empirical data were collected in spring 2003. Two strata were distinguished in each neighbourhood in order to obtain a balanced variation in terms of socioeconomic status and tenure: one for the new dwellings and the other for the old dwellings. The total sample comprised 907 households; at each address, the head of the household or his/her partner completed the questionnaire. Distributing and collecting the questionnaires in person raised the response levels. The residents who could not speak Dutch were approached by an Arabic- or Turkish-speaking interviewer. As a result of this approach, the response level reached 51 per cent: 54 percent in Hoograven and 48 percent in Bouwlust (a total of 465 respondents).

The sample is representative of all households in the neighbourhood if a weighting factor is used to correct for the overrepresentation of the residents in the newly-built areas. A comparison of the sample and the population on three aspects (age, ethnicity, tenure) shows this. The weighting factor has not been used in the logistic regression analysis (see Table 5.2) since the stratifying variable (old/new dwellings) is included as an independent variable. The standard errors of the parameters would be less accurate if case weights were used.

### *Measuring participation*

To measure participation, both formal and informal activities were included such as being actively involved in the local school and other types of voluntary work. The more official activities included were membership of the neighbourhood committee or a neighbourhood organisation. All these activities refer to various forms of participation with the aim of positively influencing the neighbourhood, and include those people who are actively involved in governance processes or (in)formal organisations. The people who participate in any of these activities form one category (participation = 1) and those who are not active in any way form the other category (0).

### *Independent variables*

Table 5.2 displays the variables included in the analysis and provides descriptive statistics for each variable. The means and standard deviations are given for the ratio variables; the percentages of the respondents per category are given for the nominal and ordinal variables.

The independent variables in the models include three indicators of *socioeconomic status*: first, income was recalculated as a ratio variable. Second, a dichotomous variable for the respondents' level of education (low/medium and high) ( $1$ =high) and a dichotomous variable which represents the degree of social inclusion (those who go to school or work versus fulltime housewives, the unemployed, the disabled, and pensioners) ( $=1$ ). The models also include *ethnicity* as a dichotomous variable (native Dutch and ethnic minority groups) ( $1$ =ethnic minority groups). Of the respondents, 7 percent stated that they were Surinamese, 5 percent Moroccan, and 5 percent Turkish, while smaller proportions came from Iraq and Southern Europe. Their numbers were too small to allow analyses of the differences between these ethnic groups.

The *housing situation* is reflected in another dichotomous variable measuring homeownership (homeowners and tenants) ( $1$ =tenants). A variable with three classes corresponds

with the housing career: people living in a new home and are newcomers to this neighbourhood; people living in a new home but have been residents of the neighbourhood for a longer time; people living in the old houses. The residents in the old houses are the reference category. The housing career variable corresponds to the time lived in the neighbourhood, since the people who are living in a new house and are newcomers to this neighbourhood have per definition a short time of residence in the neighbourhood (not longer than three years). The time of residence has not been included in the model because of this strong correlation.

There is also a set of *social-demographic* variables containing three measures: dichotomous variables for gender (1=male) and household composition (with or without children) (1=without children), and a continuous variable for the respondent's age (in years). The log function of age in years is taken to avoid the possible impact of outliers. Many of the variables above correspond with those which have been used in other recent research on participation (Marschall, 2001; Kang and Kwak, 2003; Lelieveldt, 2004).

To measure the impact of social capital, three dimensions are specified here. The *social networks* dimension of social capital is reflected in three dichotomous variables; having family members in the neighbourhood (1=yes); having at least half your friends in the neighbourhood (1=yes); and chatting regularly with the neighbours (1=yes). These variables reflect both strong ties in the neighbourhood (family and friends) and neighbourly behaviour (chatting with neighbours) (Friedrichs and Vranken, 2001).

The *trust* dimension of social capital is reflected in two dichotomous variables. The trust dimension refers to personal trust placed in authorities and in co-residents, which can lead to communal action (Purdue, 2001). The first reflects the feelings of trust in authorities and is an answer to the question "Do you believe that the opinions of the residents are taken seriously in the development of restructuring plans for Bouwlust/Hoograven?" (1=yes). This variable shows whether people feel that the local government takes them seriously. The other dichotomous variable reflects the trust in co-residents: "Most people can be trusted" (1=yes).

Then, the *tolerance of deviant behaviour* dimension of social capital is reflected in two continuous variables. These measures were composed in an earlier stage of this research; for a full discussion and account of the composition of these measures see Dekker and Bolt (2005). One variable reflects the tolerance of deviant behaviour in the neighbourhood, indicating perceptions of support, legal issues, and public behaviour. The other reflects the acceptance of force as a way of resolving problems between community members. People who reject behaviour that is deviant from that of mainstream society can be expected to participate more (Wilson, 1987; Atkinson and Kintrea, 2000). The variables are based on eight descriptions of deviant behaviour presented to the respondents and to which they were asked to react on a scale of 1 to 4 (1=very bad; 2=bad; 3=not very bad; 4=not bad at all). Friedrichs and Blasius (2003) used comparable statements in their research. One statement on its own says little about the overall ethos of the respondents, so this is represented by two uncorrelated components. The component loadings and the statements are given in Table 5.3.

The first dimension is called *acceptance of deviant behaviour*. Accepting deviant behaviour gives the respondent a positive overall score on this component; rejecting deviant behaviour gives a negative overall score. The second dimension is called *acceptance of force*. A high score indicates more tolerance of the use of force. The respondents' scores were estimated for both dimensions to enable them to be used in further analysis.

Table 5.3 Response “Yes, this is bad or very bad” of respondents to statements (percentages), and component loadings of the statements on the dimensions in CATPCA

The statements are:	Judgement “this is (very) bad” %	Dimension*	
		1	2
Your children play outside with other children. An elderly neighbour is irritated by the noise they make and hits one of the children, because they do not quieten down in time. If you do not have children of your own, imagine that you do.	91	-0.080	0.669
You are in a supermarket and you witness an elderly lady putting a package of cheese in her handbag.	75	0.696	0.061
The corner of the street is a meeting point for youngsters. You see the youngsters calling women names.	98	0.346	0.575
You often hear a neighbour beating his children.	93	0.029	0.768
Imagine that you frequently see a person drunk on the street.	66	0.551	.321
Your television set is old and nearly broken. Somebody offers you a television set which has probably been stolen for half the normal price.	73	0.635	.018
An acquaintance who is a single mother with three children depends on 25 social benefits. She is offered a cleaning job in the black economy, which she accepts without reporting it to the social services.		0.653	-.208
An acquaintance who is a single mother with three children depends on social benefits. She is offered a cleaning job in the black economy, which she accepts without reporting it to the social services.	25	0.662	-0.147

\* The Cronbach’s Alpha of this model is 0.895, which indicates that the model indeed represents the input variables  
Source: Dekker and Bolt, 2005

Finally, feelings of *neighbourhood attachment* are reflected in two continuous variables. One variable reflects social neighbourhood attachment; the other reflects spatial-emotional neighbourhood attachment. The variables are based on 12 statements presented to the respondents and to which they were asked to react according to a Likert scale of 1 (I do not agree at all) to 5 (I completely agree). All statements refer to feelings related to the neighbourhood and the extent to which the respondents derive part of their identity from the area in which they live. In order to raise the reliability and validity of the measurement of attachment, two new variables were constructed with the aid of principal components analysis (PCA) (Table 5.4). For a full discussion and account of the composition of these variables see Dekker and Bolt (2005).

The first indicator, *social attachment*, refers to communal feelings on how to act, feel, and think within a certain social setting (Zijderveld, 1988). The second indicator, *spatial-emotional attachment*, refers to feelings of pride about the neighbourhood and identification with its physical aspects (Massey, 1991). Respondents with a high score on either of the components have a strong feeling of attachment to the neighbourhood. A person with a loading of +1 on component one, for example, would have a strong social feeling of attachment, while a person with a loading of -1 on the second component would have a low feeling of spatial-emotional belonging.

Table 5.4 Response “Yes, I (completely) agree” of respondents to statements (percentages) and Principal Components Analysis of statements related to neighbourhood attachment and identity

The statements are:	“Yes, I (completely) agree” %	Component	
		1	2
I feel at home in this neighbourhood.	48	0.641	0.366
In this neighbourhood we take care of each other.	14	0.637	0.107
I feel that I am a real Hoogravenaar/Bouwlustenaar (“Londoner”).	16	0.332	0.767
I feel attached to this neighbourhood.	26	0.435	0.664
I feel proud of this neighbourhood.	16	0.678	0.477
People outside this neighbourhood think that this is a good area.	13	0.731	0.041
This is a cosy neighbourhood.	28	0.773	0.333
This neighbourhood suits my taste.	25	0.641	0.452
This neighbourhood is special.	21	0.284	0.535
It hurts when people say something negative about this neighbourhood.	27	0.004	0.801
This neighbourhood has a lively radiation.	20	0.573	0.374
This neighbourhood is better than others.	18	0.691	0.284

The Cronbach’s Alpha of this model is 0.79, which indicates that the model indeed represents the input variables. Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. Rotation converged in 3 iterations. Source: Dekker and Bolt, 2005

*Analytical strategy*

To test the hypothesis, bivariate analyses were first used to analyse the impact of the dimensions of social capital and neighbourhood attachment on participation. For this analysis a multitude of statistical methods was used, based on the scale on which the variables were measured. Relationships between variables measured on a ratio scale were analysed with the help of bivariate correlation tables. Where one variable was measured on a dichotomous scale and the other on a ratio scale, the t-test for independent samples was used. In the case where both variables were measured on a nominal or ordinal scale, a chi-square test was performed. To test the added value of the concepts of social capital and neighbourhood attachment to explain participation, the independent variables were entered into four logistic regression models.

**5.6 Findings**

Nearly a third of the respondents in the sample participate actively in one or more activities (Table 5.5). The categories overlap, since residents who are involved in more demanding activities such as being a member of the neighbourhood committee usually also perform less demanding activities. The participation rates in the two neighbourhoods do not differ from one another.

Most participating residents do some form of voluntary work that is not directly related to the situation in the neighbourhood, such as activities in a football club, a religious centre, and so forth. A little more than ten percent of the residents are active members of a neighbourhood committee or neighbourhood organisation. These residents contribute substantially to the

Table 5.5 Types of participation of the respondents (percentages)

	N	%
Member of neighbourhood committee	23	4.9
Member of a neighbourhood organisation	28	6.0
Active in local school activities	20	4.3
Voluntary work	99	21.3
Total participants all mentioned above	139	29.9
Non-participating	326	70.1
Total abs (=100%)	465	100

Source: Survey 2003

Table 5.6 Characteristics of the residents related to participation (percentages)

Characteristic (ratio variables)	Participation	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Age: Lg10 (age) ***	No	326	1,61	0,14
	Yes	139	1,65	0,14
Net monthly income (x 100€)	No	326	19,54	7,21
	Yes	139	18,89	7,19

Characteristics (nominal/ordinal variables)	Does not participate %	Does participate %
Low education	67.7	32.3
Medium education	70.3	29.7
Higher education	70.8	29.2
No daily activity (unemployed, housewife, disabled, pensioner)	71.8	28.2
Daily activity (work or school)	64.8	35.2
Native Dutch	69.9	30.1
Ethnic minorities	69.9	30.1
Household with children	70.8	29.2
Household without children	69.7	30.3
Male	70.2	29.8
Female	69.8	30.2
New house & new in neighbourhood	73.0	27.0
New house & lived in neighbourhood before	63.2	36.8
Old house in neighbourhood	69.8	30.2
Tenant	73.0	27.0
Owner-occupier	66.8	33.2
Hoograven	70.6	29.4
Bouwlust	69.4	30.6
Total abs (100%)	326	139

Notes: Lower-average education level: upper secondary vocational education or less; high education: professional education or university. Division Dutch-non Dutch is a response to the question: "In terms of ethnicity, how would you call yourself?" (Self-categorisation). Statistically significant difference: \*\*\* =  $p < 0.01$

Source: Survey 2003

neighbourhood: they organise street parties, manage the housing block, and two residents in the survey are members of the neighbourhood council and so take part in the formal governance process. Finally, strongly related to having children of course, just over four percent of the residents are active in school activities.

As explained in the literature review, socioeconomic status was expected to be positively related to participation. However, when socioeconomic groups within the research neighbourhoods were compared, it was found that socioeconomic status by itself had no positive or negative effect on participation (Table 5.6). This is an important finding, because both researchers and policymakers assume that residents with a low socioeconomic status living in distressed urban areas would lack the necessary tools for participation (Purdue, 2001; Subramanian et al., 2003). Probably this is related to the level of deprivation in these Dutch neighbourhoods, which may be not as bad as in the other neighbourhoods. Possibly, factors other than socioeconomic status are related to lower levels of participation.

It was expected that ethnic minorities in concentration areas, such as the research areas investigated here, would participate more than native Dutch residents. The findings in Table 5.6 show that ethnicity is not related to participation. The neighbourhoods are characterised not only by high shares of ethnic minorities, but also by increasing numbers of young people. In the analyses, it was found that the elderly in the neighbourhood participate significantly more than the young (Table 5.6). Other research has shown that older residents tend to spend more time in the neighbourhood, but they also tend to have had a longer time of residence there (Fischer, 1982; Campbell and Lee, 1992; Guest and Wierzbicki, 1999). None of the other indicators of a person's social-demographic situation (having children, gender) were found to be related to participation, contrary to our expectations.

Relatively large shares of the housing stock are multi-family dwellings in the social-rented sector. The literature review suggested that this social-rented housing would be related to low levels of participation. However, in these bivariate analyses the impact of home-ownership and housing career has not been found to be significant. But, as is shown below, there is a significant relationship between home-ownership and participation when socioeconomic, ethnic, and socio-demographic variables are controlled for.

The relationship between socioeconomic, ethnic, and socio-demographic characteristics of the residents and participation as described above is very limited. Perhaps the three dimensions of social capital can help explain who participates? Indeed, as the data in Table 5.7 reveal, both good neighbourly behaviour (chatting with neighbours) and strong ties (having most of one's friends in the neighbourhood) are positively related to participation, supporting the expectations formulated in the theoretical part of this paper.

Some care is needed, however, as we did not analyse here who has these social networks. Separate analyses (not shown here) indicate that the more highly educated in particular have a smaller share of their friends in the neighbourhood, whereas ethnic minorities tend to chat less with their neighbours (Dekker and Bolt, 2005). The impact of social networks on participation is thus not the same for all residents.

In addition to the social networks dimension, the feelings of trust in authorities and co-residents were related to participation. The feelings of trust in the local government authority were operationalised as the feeling of being taken seriously by the local government authority.

Table 5.7 Characteristics of the residents related to participation: social networks and trust

Characteristic	Does not participate %	Does participate %
I have family within the neighbourhood		
No	70.8	29.2
Yes	68.7	31.3
At least half of my friends live in this neighbourhood ***		
No	74.1	25.9
Yes	59.1	40.9
I regularly chat with my neighbours *		
No	78.9	21.1
Yes	68.2	31.8
In feel taken seriously with the local government		
No	71.1	28.9
Yes	63.2	36.8
Most people can be trusted **		
No	74.0	26.0
Yes	63.3	36.7
Total abs (100%)	297	168

Statistically significant different participation between categories \*\* =  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* =  $p < 0.01$   
 Source: survey 2003

These analyses do not suggest that residents who feel that the local authorities take them seriously also participate more. Only a small share of residents report that they feel they are taken seriously by the local government (12 per cent), which may be an indication of a poorly-performing local authority in an area where major urban restructuring activities are taking place.

The lack of trust in authorities is somewhat compensated by higher levels of trust in co-residents (38 per cent of the residents states “yes, most people can be trusted”). This indicator of trust is positively related to participation, since a larger share of the residents who trust their co-residents participates (Table 5.7). It could very well be that the lack of trust in the local authorities generates a new bond between the residents, a negative form of cohesion (see also Van Marissing et al., 2005). If this is the case – which is difficult to confirm on the basis of these data – it remains to be seen how long this kind of trust lives on after the restructuring operation has finished.

The literature review showed that little is known as yet about the relationship between rejecting deviant behaviour and participation, but that rejecting deviant behaviour was expected to enhance participation. To test this hypothesis, two dimensions of common values were distinguished (see previous section): acceptance of deviant behaviour (stealing, alcohol abuse, and fraud, for example) and acceptance of force (happyslapping, abusive name-calling, for example). The bivariate analysis in Table 5.8 shows that residents who are against the use of violence to resolve problems, or who readily reject deviant behaviour, participate more.

In addition to social capital, residents’ positive feelings about their neighbourhood were expected to lead to more participation in their neighbourhood. When residents feel attached to their neighbourhood they take care of it (Brodsky et al., 1999; Minkler and Wallerstein, 2003). Two dimensions of neighbourhood attachment were identified: *social attachment*, which refers to

Table 5.8 Characteristics of the residents related to participation: common values and feelings of belonging

	Participation	N	Mean <sup>1</sup>	Std. Deviation
Acceptance of deviant behaviour *	No	300	0,054	1,030
	Yes	131	-0,125	0,921
Acceptance of force **	No	300	0,065	1,077
	Yes	131	-0,150	0,780
Social belonging component **	No	326	-0,077	0,941
	Yes	139	0,180	1,109
Spatial-emotional belonging component ***	No	326	-0,121	0,895
	Yes	139	0,284	1,166

Statistically significant difference between yes/no participation: \* = p < 0.1; \*\* = p < 0.05; \*\*\* = p < 0.01  
 1. Low acceptance of deviant behaviour or force = low mean. High feelings of social- and spatial-emotional belonging = high mean.  
 Source: Survey 2003

the social significance that is attached to the neighbourhood; and *spatial-emotional attachment*, which refers to the symbolic value that is given to a place (see the section on data collection and methods). Indeed, in the bivariate analysis reported in Table 5.8, social attachment is positively related to participation, as is spatial emotional attachment, but more strongly.

The findings of the positive relationship between neighbourhood attachment and participation may also operate the other way around. For example, it has been reported elsewhere that residents who were involved in the design of the public space around their social-rented apartment blocks felt much more strongly attached to their home and the neighbourhood, and as a result became active in maintaining the quality of the public space (Dekker and Van Kempen, forthcoming).

The findings above, based on bivariate analyses, show that age, social networks, the rejection of deviant behaviour, trust in other residents, and neighbourhood attachment are all positively related to participation. A shortcoming of these bivariate analyses is that they do not show the relative importance of each of these variables in accounting for participation. Some of these variables were expected to be more important than others in explaining participation; for this reason, four logistic regression models were estimated. As explained in the theoretical part of this paper, this is an exploratory model, which should strictly speaking, be seen as advanced descriptive statistics rather than as causal models. The models are:

- A. (participation) =  $\alpha + \beta_1(\text{SES}) + \beta_2(\text{ethnicity}) + \beta_3(\text{sociodemographic variables}) + \beta_4(\text{home-related variables})$
- B. (participation) = Model A +  $\beta_5(\text{social capital})$
- C. (participation) = Model A +  $\beta_6(\text{neighbourhood attachment})$
- D. (participation) = Model A +  $\beta_7(\text{social capital}) + \beta_8(\text{neighbourhood attachment})$

The findings in Table 5.9 show that, on some of the indicators of social capital and neighbourhood attachment, positive scores raise the chances of participation, whereas on other indicators of social capital and neighbourhood attachment they do not. In short, the residents

Table 5.9 Logistic regression analysis of participation

	Model A Social economic status, ethnicity, home-related, sociodemographic		Model B = model A + social capital		Model C = model A + neighbourhood attachment		Model D = model A + social capital + neighbourhood attachment	
	B	Significance	B	Significance	B	Significance	B	Significance
Income	-0,020	0,301	-0,019	0,342	-0,025	0,202	-0,023	0,275
Higher education	0,114	0,644	0,300	0,282	0,303	0,238	0,432	0,131
No daily activity	-0,262	0,418	-0,458	0,193	-0,370	0,263	-0,537	0,134
Ethnic minorities	0,295	0,317	0,320	0,319	0,050	0,871	0,122	0,712
Age	0,038	0,000 ***	0,035	0,002 ***	0,036	0,001 ***	0,034	0,004 ***
Household without children	0,152	0,532	0,186	0,470	0,128	0,607	0,149	0,570
Male	-0,167	0,457	-0,065	0,788	-0,200	0,382	-0,069	0,780
Housing career		0,146		0,251		0,534		0,511
New house, new in neighbourhood	-0,499	0,100	-0,505	0,122	-0,308	0,326	-0,378	0,260
New house, lived in neighbourhood before	0,101	0,784	-0,044	0,911	0,031	0,934	-0,094	0,813
Tenants	-0,807	0,005 ***	-0,771	0,011 **	-0,688	0,018 **	-0,633	0,039 **
Hoograven	0,058	0,813	-0,061	0,821	0,082	0,743	0,009	0,973
Family in the neighbourhood			0,067	0,812			-0,019	0,948
Most friends in the neighbourhood			0,811	0,005 ***			0,663	0,026 **
Chat to neighbours			0,314	0,370			0,236	0,507
Trust in local authorities			0,481	0,173			0,362	0,315
Trust in other residents			-0,231	0,350			0,025	0,929
Acceptance of deviant behaviour			-0,128	0,310			-0,186	0,165
Acceptance of force			-0,319	0,020 **			-0,327	0,018 **
Social neighbourhood attachment					0,263	0,031 **	0,320	0,037 **
Spatial-emotional neighbourhood attachment					0,444	0,000 ***	0,387	0,003 ***
Constant	-1,653	0,012	-1,950	0,020	-1,600	0,017	-2,006	0,019
N	429		390		429		390	
Nagelkerke R Square	0,087		0,141		0,139		0,179	
df	11		18		13		20	
Significance	0,004		0,001		0,000		0,000	

Source: Survey 2003

who have higher chances of participation are: the elderly, those who own their homes, those with the largest share of their friends in the neighbourhood, residents who reject the use of force, and residents with strong feelings of social and spatial-emotional attachment to the neighbourhood.

Other indicators of social capital are no longer significant in this logistic regression model, despite the positive relationship in the bi-variate analyses. These are: chatting with neighbours, trust in other residents, and rejecting deviant behaviour. The relationship between these indicators of social capital and participation clearly runs *via* other indicators of social capital or individual and household characteristics. That is not to say that these dimensions of social capital can be ignored if one wants to explain who participates, and who does not. It is more likely that trust in other people, as well as a common idea on how to behave, is derived from social networks or the feeling of belonging to the neighbourhood. Indeed, separate analyses (not shown here) point into this direction.

The logistic regression models indicate that an increased share of participation can be explained if the indicators of social capital or neighbourhood attachment are added as explanatory variables (Nagelkerke's R rises from 0.087 in model A to nearly 0.141 in model B; and 0.139 in model C). Using the indicators of social capital and neighbourhood attachment in one model (Table 5.9, model D) causes Nagelkerke's R to rise further to nearly 0.18. These analyses confirm the hypothesis that social capital and neighbourhood attachment together can be used to help explain who participates. However, the dimension of trust as an indicator of social capital to explain participation has not been shown to be relevant.

## 5.7 Conclusions

The aim of the study reported in this paper was to gain insight into the importance of social capital and neighbourhood attachment in explaining participation in the neighbourhood. To perform this analysis, participation was defined in a broad manner, including both formal and informal activities, rather than the more commonly analysed involvement in formal neighbourhood governance. Three dimensions of social capital were distinguished: social networks, trust, and acceptance of deviant behaviour. In addition, neighbourhood attachment was measured by two indicators: social attachment and spatial-emotional attachment.

The findings show that nearly a third of the residents participate in formal and informal activities in the neighbourhood. The first hypothesis was that social capital is related to participation. The results show that this is indeed the case, although with some qualifications. It has become clear that residents participate more when they have most of their friends in the neighbourhood or when they reject deviant behaviour.

The social capital dimension of trust generates ambiguous results in the different analyses, indicating that the findings should be interpreted with care. Trust in co-residents is positively related to participation when analysed separately, but in the logistic regression model this relationship is no longer significant. The implication is that, although important, this impact of this dimension of social capital on participation is derived from social networks and shared ideas on tolerant behaviour rather than a direct relationship. Using multiple indicators of social capital has thus informed us about the relative importance of each of the dimensions.

We do not wish to suggest, of course, that the work of other authors such as Purdue (2001), Shirlow and Murtagh (2004), and Subramanian and colleagues (2003) is useless. They argue

that, particularly in deprived areas, residents may have low levels of trust, which they found influenced negatively the degree to which residents were willing to take action to improve the situation in their neighbourhood. One of the additional reasons why the findings reported in these earlier studies and the findings reported here differ may be the level of deprivation of the neighbourhoods. Although the neighbourhoods in this study are among the most deprived in the country, they are relatively prosperous in comparison with American and Irish research areas.

The second hypothesis was that neighbourhood attachment leads to participation. Neighbourhood attachment was measured in two ways: social attachment and spatial-emotional attachment. Indeed, residents' internal views about their neighbourhood; identification with the neighbourhood, and taking pride in it relate to participation. From these findings we may conclude that residents who identify with their neighbourhood have a higher probability than others of becoming active in the neighbourhood.

Finally, the aim was to know what the combined effect of social capital and neighbourhood attachment on participation was. When the indicators of social capital and neighbourhood attachment are both incorporated in the model, it is clear that together they help explain who participates, not only on the basis of individual and household characteristics, but also on residents' social networks, tolerance of deviant behaviour, and their feelings towards the social and spatial characteristics of the neighbourhood.

The findings in these two neighbourhoods cannot simply be transferred to the situation in every Dutch distressed urban area, let alone other European neighbourhoods with similar problems. Nevertheless, with this limitation in mind, some ideas can be put forward on how to improve participation in urban areas. This article started with the notion that problems accumulate in some urban areas as a result of the concentration of low-income households and ageing housing stock. It was also asserted that these problems are often approached area-wise and that much is expected from the participation of residents to enhance the quality of life in these distressed areas.

Whether participation is the answer to these problems cannot be concluded on the basis of the empirical evidence presented here, because another type of data would have been required for that purpose. The findings do, however, set out some ideas on what may influence participation and some preliminary suggestions can be given for policies that address it.

With respect to housing, there is an indication that the ownership structure of deprived neighbourhoods in the Netherlands, with a concentration of social-rented apartment blocks, does seem to be an impediment to participation, since the scores for homeowners are higher than for tenants. This finding would support the current Dutch housing policy of replacing the social-rented housing stock by owner-occupied homes. So, if people buy a home there is an expectation of their increase participation. This would probably be the result of individual needs, such as maintaining the value of the home, but would nevertheless have positive effects on the overall quality of the neighbourhood, which would benefit all residents.

As a result of this finding, the advice could be justified to continue the current policy of the demolition of social-rented dwellings and increase the share of owner-occupied homes. This solution is not a simple one, however, because buying a house is not an option for most tenants in the social-rented sector (Bolt and Torrance, 2005). In addition, this policy would mean that new residents would move into the neighbourhood. These new residents are likely to have lower scores on the indicators of social capital and neighbourhood attachment than the more highly educated and native Dutch. Consequently, social networks and neighbourhood attachment need

to be rebuilt, with negative consequences for the level of participation. Additionally, as experience in the United Kingdom has shown, enhancing homeownership only has positive effects on the neighbourhood if people also have the means to maintain their dwellings.

It may be more sustainable to develop activities that support social networks in the neighbourhood and which create an idea about what constitutes good behaviour. This kind of action may also be helpful to create the kind of social capital and neighbourhood attention that are inclusive rather than exclusive. For example, networks of youngsters who organise meetings and invite others to join in generate a more positive type of social capital than a network of youngsters who hang about on the street. Still, some caution is needed; social capital is not the silver bullet that residents can easily acquire and thereby resolve all the problems in their neighbourhood.

## Notes

- 1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Nethur School “Social Cohesion and Social Capital in an Urban and Neighbourhood Context” with Prof. A. Kearns as visiting professor. I wish to thank Prof. R. van Kempen and Dr G. Bolt for their comments on earlier versions of this paper.
- 2 Following the publication of Wilson’s work in 1987 a heated debate on the ‘underclass’ arose. Some of the discussants in this debate blamed inner-city problems on the alleged ‘social pathology’ of the poor (Wacquant, 1997). I wish to make it clear that I do not agree with the assumption that stronger repression of deviant behaviour affords a solution to the social problems in deprived urban areas.

## 6 Participation, social cohesion and the limitations of the governance process. An analysis of a post-WWII neighbourhood in the Netherlands

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### Abstract

In the past five years, several scientific articles have been written on the theme of social cohesion in urban neighbourhoods. Another set of articles has increased our knowledge on urban governance. While this work adds considerably to our general understanding of the changing role of the organisation of urban policy, there has been little attempt to date to analyse how policymakers experience the relationship between the organisation of policies, the role of residents, and the effect on social cohesion. This experience of policy makers is crucial, because it is the basis of policy practice and action. The first aim here is therefore to analyse to what extent policymakers experience an effect of participation on social cohesion. The empirical findings show that policymakers do experience a positive effect of participation on the various dimensions of social cohesion. The second aim of the paper is to explain the level of participation by looking at the kind of party (public, private, voluntary) allowed in the networks and partnerships, and the way in which discussion in policymaking processes takes place. The findings indicate that the policymakers struggle with the diversity of the population within official participation structures.

### 6.1 Introduction

Over the past decade, issues such as poverty, unemployment, marginalisation, social and economic exclusion, safety and crime, health, neighbourhood bonding, the state of the built environment (including housing and public spaces) have become increasingly problematic, complex, and interrelated. These problems seem to concentrate in particular in urban neighbourhoods (Dekker and Van Kempen, 2005). Individualisation, emancipation, the increased diversity of ethnic and cultural origins and concerns, and a new economic crisis all seem to lead to a crisis of social cohesion at neighbourhood level, which needs to be counteracted (Vranken, 2005).

The result is a broad focus on social cohesion literature, which is accompanied by an sharp focus on urban governance (Imrie and Raco, 1999; LeGalès, 2003). The role of professionals and

voluntary organisations at the city and neighbourhood level has increased. Local communities demand a greater say in decision-making (Hambleton, 2000) and in many cases they now have this opportunity (Lelieveldt, 2004; Van Beckhoven et al., 2005). Consequently, there is a large body of literature that focuses on the constraints and difficulties encountered in the participation of members of communities or inhabitants of cities and neighbourhoods in policymaking (see for example Chavis and Wandersman, 1990; Docherty et al., 2001).

The official rhetoric both in academic literature and among policymakers is that participation is good, and that it has a positive effect on social cohesion. Despite the persistent coupling of the goals of social cohesion and more responsive forms of governance in current policy initiatives and the existence of a copious body of academic literature on each of the concepts, there has been little attempt to date to analyse how policymakers experience this relationship. This is a crucial topic, because the experiences of policymakers influence the degree of institutionalisation of new practices and policy actions (Coaffee and Healey, 2003; Healey, 2006). The first aim here is therefore to analyse to what extent policymakers experience an effect of participation on social cohesion. The second aim of the paper then is to analyse which factors can explain the involvement of the residents in policymaking processes. It can be expected that the experiences of the policymakers with respect to the effect of participation on social cohesion influence the degree to which residents are actively involved in policymaking processes. The focus is on the kind of party allowed in the networks and partnerships, and the way in which discussion in policymaking processes takes place.

An empirical research study has been carried out in the Bouwlust neighbourhood in the Dutch city of The Hague, where the governance arrangements have been analysed from the point of view of the professionals involved. These professionals have a gate-keeping function; their attitude and motives are thus decisive for the extent to which residents are involved in decision-making processes.

To address these issues, we first present a short theoretical overview of the notions of social cohesion, urban governance, and participation. Then we present the experiences of the policymakers in the case study area Bouwlust with respect to the effect of participation on social cohesion. We then present an account of the factors capable of explaining the involvement of residents in policymaking processes. In the conclusions, we comment on the themes raised in this paper and how we can understand the relationship between the experiences of policymakers and the practices and policy actions they undertake.

## **6.2 Social cohesion, urban governance, and participation**

### *Social cohesion*

Although they did not refer to it as such, the notion of social cohesion was introduced into the scientific literature by early sociologists such as Durkheim (1893), Simmel (1904), and Tönnies (1912 [1957]). They focused on the division of labour in society, which led to economic interdependency and social order. The concept of social cohesion was referred to in research and policy alike throughout the 20th century.

More recently social cohesion has gained political significance, referring to ideas of what is 'good' in modern society<sup>1</sup>. Such values as openness, tolerance, prosperity, equality, creativity, security, and solidarity may result from, but should not be confused with, social cohesion

(Buck, 2005). Social cohesion can be seen as the glue that keeps the members of a social system together. We have used the definition of Kearns and Forrest because it represents the underlying dimensions of the concept:

*“A cohesive society ‘hangs together’; all the component parts fit in and attribute to society’s collective project and well being; and conflict between societal goals and groups, and disruptive behaviour, are largely absent or minimal” (Kearns and Forrest, 2000, p. 996).*

At neighbourhood level, this definition means that social cohesion is concerned with the interactions between residents and the extent to which their lives can exist first in harmony and second with a growing level of feelings of togetherness (Amin, 2002). We identify three dimensions of social cohesion at this level<sup>2</sup>: (1) social networks; (2) common values and a civic culture; (3) neighbourhood attachment. These dimensions of social cohesion may be interconnected: social cohesion in one dimension can be expected to go hand in hand with social cohesion in another dimension.

The different dimensions of social cohesion are interconnected, but are not interchangeable: each dimension represents a different aspect of social cohesion. Although we are considering cohesion at neighbourhood level, we are aware of the mutual connections between social cohesion at the neighbourhood level and social cohesion at higher scale levels.

### *Urban governance*

Since the 1990s, cities in Western Europe have faced many changes in the ways in which they are governed. In the last decade of the 20th century, budgets for local governments were cut, while at the same time more responsibilities were passed on from the national to lower levels. Local governments had to change their ways of working, which often meant privatising certain government functions and involving other parties in policymaking processes (Elander, 2002). *Urban governance* became the new catchphrase, replacing *urban government*.

The reasons for the rise of governance are diverse. Some hypothesise that the decline of Fordism in the post-war period generated a crisis of regulation and governance in western capitalist economies at different scales (Jessop, 1993; Tickell and Peck, 1992). Others assert that the rise of governance is related to the increasing differentiation in society; globalisation has led to more social and spatial inequality as a consequence of economic growth and urban competition. Within the context of increasing globalisation there has been a consequent ‘hollowing out of the nation state’, which means that certain functions are being directed towards levels higher than the national government, and other functions to a city-regional scale (Giddens, 1994; Fainstein, 2001; Salet et al., 2003).

In contrast with more traditional forms of government, one of the key aspects of urban governance is that not only the public sector, but also the voluntary and especially the private sectors are included in policymaking processes (Jessop, 1993; Stoker, 1995; Coaffee and Healey, 2003). Urban governance is therefore characterised by diversity in the range of stakeholders, the fragmentation of political power between individuals and institutions, and an increased uncertainty regarding the social, economic, and political situation (Hall and Rowlands, 2005).

From the above it may be clear that governance is characterised by the development of policies at different spatial levels (from global to neighbourhood level) and by different types of party involved (public, private, and voluntary). In most governance approaches there is

some mention of the extent to which residents play a part in the decision-making process, and how this extent has changed over time. The importance that is attached to governance differs per interpretation of it. For example, residents are seen as passive 'customers' who need to be empowered as receivers of services provided by the local government (Barzelay, 2001). Others, like Rhodes (1996), indicate that the voluntary sector is one of the partners in governance, although how this should be organised is not specified. More emphasis is put on the participation of residents by Healey (1996), who asserts that the residents play a crucial part and should be actively involved in all stages of the policymaking process.

Second, governance is characterised by the new ways in which the policy-goals are discussed. Within governance, the role of the local government becomes less important and other parties have become involved; the way in which these parties communicate has received attention. Often the emphasis is on more efficiency and accountability with the main goal: better results. Rhodes (1996) speaks of game-like interactions, rooted in trust, and regulated by rules of the game negotiated and agreed by network participants. Within the negotiation process, power differences between the partners influence the degree to which each is listened to. Other partners are more serious and concentrate on the management of the public sector in a businesslike way. There is a strong emphasis on the openness of information, integrity, accountability, and clarity about responsibility and roles (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992).

An even stronger focus on the process rather than the outcome can be found in Healey's work on collaborative planning. She puts a strong emphasis on the process by means of which the main goal to involve all relevant stakeholders and create a common vision is achieved. In this body of knowledge, the way in which the discussion takes place is considered more important than the actual outcome of this process. She asserts that there is a clear connection between the policy discussion and the ideal image that people have of the neighbourhood, the city or the region. The policy or plan of what the neighbourhood should be like is adjusted according to who has the power to govern. In an ideal collaborative planning process, the different images of the city or neighbourhood are respected, while at the same time a common vision is developed.

#### *Urban governance and social cohesion: participation as an intermediating factor*

Some authors have linked urban governance and social cohesion in theory, and some have provided empirical evidence of relationships between the two concepts. Forrest and Kearns (2001) drew up a table that traces how social networks, common values and a civic culture, and neighbourhood attachment are linked to various kinds of activity at the local neighbourhood level. Although Forrest and Kearns' list is helpful in evaluating which *measures* may have a positive impact, which *governance arrangements* may have a positive effect on social cohesion remains unclear. In addition, Lowndes and Wilson (2001) explicitly linked social networks and common values and a civic culture on the one hand, and local governance on the other. Their analysis of New Labour's programme shows how institutional design shapes the development of these two dimensions.

In our opinion, urban governance and social cohesion are linked via participation. By participation, we mean that people take part in the decision-making processes that influence their neighbourhood positively. The degree to which communities can influence these processes depends on the degree of openness of government and the way in which decisions are made. Participation requires the capacity to influence the final decision. We have limited the analyses to participation in neighbourhood-related issues. At this level, participation refers to such

activities as being a member of the neighbourhood council or having a say in decision-making or in drawing up a plan. Participation is then a form of mutual exchange and dialogue between authorities (both public and private parties) and residents.

We expected participation to have a positive influence on social cohesion. The *social networks* dimension of social cohesion refers to the structured multiplicity of social links between individuals or their positions (Vranken, 2005). Often a distinction is drawn between strong and weak ties. Strong ties connect family members, close friends, and business associates. Weak ties, on the other hand, connect individuals from different ethnic and occupational backgrounds. Residents with weak ties are exposed to political information, have wider networks, and are empowered because they gain organisational and communication skills (Forrest and Kearns, 2001; Dekker, 2002; Goodlad and Meegan, 2005). If the social links between individuals consist of both strong and weak ties, then these social networks are not only supportive and help people to 'get by'; they also give people new opportunities.

In some research studies, social networks are seen as the equivalent of social capital: people with extensive networks are also deemed to have acquired social capital. We consider, however, that social capital is a form of capital that is *derived from* networks (Portes, 1998), and can *lead to* participation. For the purpose of our analysis here we need to discern the benefits of the social interactions between residents from the interactions themselves. Social capital has a clear functional meaning, allowing a certain activity to take place within networks. Social cohesion, on the other hand, refers to the network itself.

The *common values and a civic culture* dimension of social cohesion is based on a common moral principle and code of behaviour according to which people conduct their relationships with one another. A mutually respected moral code is implied, expressed through recognition of one's societal responsibility, the democratic resolution of conflict, and tolerant behaviour towards differences (Kearns and Forrest, 2000; Vranken, 2005). As a result there is a social order which "coexists with, and influences and is influenced by, individual deviance, group conflict, social change and cultural innovation" (Wrong, 1994, p.13). The interest of participating residents in the collective project and wellbeing can consequently be expected to rise, together with respect for the opinion and rights of others, reliability, and openness to reasonable arguments through the interaction and the balancing of arguments (Madanipour et al., 1998; Lowndes and Wilson, 2001). Of course, the current conflicts between social groups cannot be expected to disappear suddenly, but an attitude of negotiation rather than conflict should arise which could lead to "conflictive co-operation" (Jacquier, 2005).

The last dimension of social cohesion is the *attachment to the neighbourhood*, which refers to people's identification with a certain neighbourhood (Blokland, 2003), either because they are attached to its physical appearance or because they feel part of the social networks there. Neighbourhood attachment results in a feeling of being part of local society and a willingness to cooperate with others to reach a common goal (Woolever, 1992; Itzhaky and York, 2000; Gittel et al., 2000).

In the empirical part of this paper we assess the extent to which policymakers experience the positive effect of participation on social cohesion. We do so on the basis of interviews with key actors, mostly policymakers, in Bouwlust in the Hague. This case is representative of attempted changes in the governance process, while focusing on the neighbourhood level. This is the level on which many urban policies focus, such as the Big Cities Policy, and is therefore a relevant level of analysis.

### 6.3 The Bouwlust study: description of the neighbourhood and methods

The research area Bouwlust was built in the early post-WWII period (1945-1960). Like many other post-WWII neighbourhoods, Bouwlust is characterised by monotonous four-storey-high apartment blocks and small single family houses, mostly in the social rented sector (Table 6.1). Many new residents arriving in the neighbourhood in the last 5 to 10 years are of non-native origin and have low incomes. The Hague is the most segregated city in the Netherlands and Bouwlust is one of the city’s most deprived neighbourhoods, although it is not the worst. Notorious neighbourhoods like Schilderswijk or Transvaal in the inner city have much higher shares of unemployment and ethnic minorities.

The Bouwlust neighbourhood faces problems with social cohesion, safety, unemployment, and quality of life. Local policy documents relate these problems to the monotonous physical design, the increased heterogeneity of ethnic groups, and a concentration of low-income families (Gemeente Den Haag, 1999). Table 6.2 shows that the residents of Bouwlust score lower on several indicators of social cohesion at neighbourhood level than do residents of The Hague as a whole. Unfortunately there are no longitudinal data available that represent the dimensions of social cohesion as they are defined here, but these data present at least the general picture. These indicators of social cohesion are based on unidimensional questions in a biannual survey by the local municipality. On the basis of these data, it becomes clear that the evaluation of the residents in Bouwlust is rapidly becoming less positive, which is not in line with development in The Hague as a whole. It is often suggested that a negative development of post-WWII neighbourhoods is caused by the ageing housing stock, which increasingly attracts lower income households who have little choice on the housing market (Murie et al., 2003).

The Big Cities Policy, which is the main urban policy in the Netherlands, aims to turn this negative development of the neighbourhood around (Dekker and Van Kempen, 2004). Participation is seen as a key asset in the Big Cities Policy. The eventual aim is for Bouwlust

Table 6.1 Characteristics of Bouwlust compared with the city of The Hague (2004)

	Bouwlust	The Hague
% social-rented dwellings	81	38
% owner-occupied dwellings	13	37
% multi-family dwellings	89	81
Total number of dwellings (x 1000)	8.5	221.7
% low incomes	47	40
% high incomes	9	19
% age group ≤ 25 years	32	30
% age group ≥ 65 years	16	14
% ethnic minorities	48	45
% of the respondents that does voluntary work	10	13
Total number of inhabitants (x1000)	15.6	463.8

Note: % low incomes = % of persons in the two lowest income quintiles; % high incomes = % of persons in the highest income quintile.  
Source: Leefbaarheidsmonitor The Hague, 2004

to become a stable neighbourhood where socioeconomic differences are reduced and social cohesion enhanced (Gemeente The Hague, 1999). The case of Bouwlust presents a clear example of a situation in which a lack of social cohesion is related to the problems of that neighbourhood in the perspective of the policymakers and the policy actions taken to improve social cohesion. Bouwlust also represents many other post-WWII neighbourhoods in the Netherlands where the population is rapidly becoming multi-ethnic and where urban restructuring activities are taking place.

The administrative structure in The Hague can be characterised as *deconcentrated*. This term implies that the local government is very decisive in a sense that it develops policies within the boundaries set by the national government. The policies developed at the local level are implemented at the urban district level, which consists of several neighbourhoods. The city council itself is a multifunctional organisation, with several departments working on urban development in different sectors (economic, social, and housing development). There are some tensions between the different spatial levels of this municipal organisation as well as between the departments. The urban districts are managed by a district manager, who also brings together all the parties in that district in a partnership called the 'Management Team'. One problem is that the responsibilities of the partners within the Management Team are not always clear (Dekker and Van Kempen, 2004). Another is that the role of residents in this Management Team is not clear. The representatives of the community have an advisory role; they can be invited to join the Management Team when needed. Other official routes for residents to have a say in decisions include writing to the district office, making an appointment with the district manager, and putting a question to the city council (Van Marissing et al., 2004).

The empirical section of this paper is largely based on fieldwork that was carried out in 2001 in the neighbourhood of Bouwlust in The Hague (the Netherlands) as part of the European UGIS programme<sup>3</sup>. During this fieldwork, 23 in-depth interviews were held with policymakers. Most of these informants work in Bouwlust or in the city administration of The Hague on social, physical, safety, cultural or economic topics. Some additional interviews were held in Schilderswijk, an old urban-renewal area in the inner city. Many current residents of Bouwlust originally lived in Schilderswijk and the policymakers have worked and implemented policies there. Professionals involved in both the design and the implementation

*Table 6.2* Indicators of social cohesion in Bouwlust compared with the city of The Hague (1996-2002)

	Bouwlust				The Hague			
	1996	1998	2000	2002	1996	1998	2000	2002
Perception of the social quality of the neighbourhood	5.8	5.9	5.1	5	6.0	5.6	5.6	5.8
General evaluation of the neighbourhood	7	7.6	6.3	6.2	7.3	7.0	7.0	6.9
% who feel responsible for the neighbourhood	83	na	81	83	85	84	84	88
% who feel attached to the neighbourhood	71	73	62	63	72	70	71	72
Degree of social cohesion <sup>a</sup>	5.8	5.9	5.1	5.0	6.0	5.6	5.6	5.8

a. score: 1=very poor, 5 = nearly sufficient, 6 = just sufficient, 10=excellent  
Source: Leefbaarheidsmonitor The Hague, 2004

of policies were interviewed, as were representatives of non-governmental organisations such as welfare organisations, housing associations, police, and educational institutions working in the neighbourhood. The interviewees were selected in the first place because of their position or role in the process; they had to be key actors. They were asked for advice on who else to interview (snowball method). In this way several, often overlapping, networks were researched. We continued to add new interviews until the saturation point was reached: that is, when it was judged that further interviews would not yield any additional information.

#### **6.4 Experiences of policymakers: the effect of participation on social cohesion**

In the theoretical part of this paper, the most important theoretical notions on social cohesion are presented. Social cohesion is often seen as something ‘good’; it has therefore gained political significance (Buck, 2005). We identified three dimensions of social cohesion: social networks, common values and a civic culture, and neighbourhood attachment (see also Dekker and Bolt, 2005). We also noted that, on the basis of other findings, participation in policymaking processes could be expected to have a positive impact on the social cohesion of residents. The focus in this section is on the experiences of the policymakers: to what extent do they experience an effect of residents’ participation in policymaking processes on social cohesion in the neighbourhood? This case reflects that there is a discursive frame in which participation is seen as something good, with positive effects on the level of social cohesion.

##### *Participation and social networks*

The first dimension of social cohesion, *social networks*, can be defined in terms of the degree of social interaction within communities and families. These networks can provide support and give information on work and other opportunities and help people to ‘get by and get on’ (Arrow, 2000; Scheepers and Janssen, 2001). These networks are then seen on the one hand as the basis of social capital, associational activity, and community organisations (Putnam, 1995; Portes and Landholt, 1998; Taylor, 2000); and on the other hand, they are the result of such participation and community organisations (Dekker, 2002).

The analysis concentrates first on the impact of participation on social networks. The interviews with the policymakers show that residents indeed participate in neighbourhood-based organisations, because this participation generates social contacts, as this social worker explains:

*“People come to the community centre for a cup of coffee and a chat. It’s all about personal contact. People say that they like the atmosphere here. They are active in the neighbourhood committee because it gives them acquaintances, maybe even friends.” (Social worker)*

Clearly, participation in formal structures helps build informal contacts with friends and acquaintances. The interviews also make it clear that formal participation structures are positively influenced by the informal social networks that can be generated in hobby clubs and the like:

*“There is this group of elderly men who call themselves ‘The History Club’. They collect old pictures of the neighbourhood and have this archive they are working on. They chat all the time about all sorts of*

*things. One of these men has now become active in the neighbourhood committee as well.” (Director of social work organisation 1)*

We can learn from the above quotation that informal organisations have an important mobilising role. Involvement in voluntary, special-interest, nonpolitical associations thus activates individuals more formally as well. Our interpretation of the process in Bouwlust is that, through their participation in voluntary associations, the residents come into contact with many different new people, and their relationships with them give them new information, new skills and other resources that may push them, or enable them, to become more active in formal decision-making processes as well. This is what Olsen calls the *mobilising role* of voluntary associations (Olsen, 1972).

Our findings indicate that policymakers also observe that informal social networks may help to generate more formal participation. The quotation below indicates that social networks of family and friends are indeed the basis of participation in decision-making structures, which is in line with the argument that social activity has a mobilising role:

*“I see in other neighbourhoods, that is not Bouwlust, but neighbourhoods like Rustenburg Oostbroek, we had some rather intensive participation projects on what to do with a square, that there is this rather broad group of people who are active, and who remain active because they feel socially involved.” (Civil servant, central city level, Department of Urban Development).*

An important detail in the quotation above is that the respondent explicitly states that this mobilising role is noted in other neighbourhoods, but not in Bouwlust. Indeed, our findings indicate how policymakers encounter a general lack of social networks among the residents in the area owing to the increasing diversity of the socioeconomic and ethnic characteristics of the population. The new ethnic communities have hesitantly started to organise themselves, and the old organisations of white residents are in decline, because of their increased age and falling numbers.

So, all in all, the policymakers do experience a positive relationship between participation and social networks. They note, however, that a certain degree of social interaction is very helpful in generating the interest and capacity among the residents to participate. Informal networks based on a communal, non-political activity can help generate awareness about the neighbourhood and may activate residents. The Bouwlust neighbourhood is, in comparison with other neighbourhoods, characterised by low levels of social activity.

#### *Participation and common values and a civic culture*

The interviews in our research area have made it clear that much is expected from the second dimension of social cohesion. A civic culture consists of: *“the psychological attitudes amongst citizens that support the development of an active role for them in governance”* (Docherty et al., 2001, p. 2227). Or, as Almond and Verba state: *“a set of beliefs, attitudes, norms, perceptions and the like that support participation”* (1963, p. 178). A residents’ collective set of values and norms means that residents have approximately the same ideas about certain issues, such as how to raise children, or how to relate to neighbours, and that action is taken to maintain the resulting order. The everyday form of social solidarity implies the recognition of and interest in the wellbeing of other residents (Davoudi and Atkinson, 1999; Blokland, 2003).

Many of the interviewees believe that shared values are crucial for maintaining the quality of life in the neighbourhood. By shared values, most respondents mean that there is a common understanding of housing behaviour; most apartment blocks are densely populated and noise, pollution, and smells can easily lead to conflicts. Some kind of agreement on how to deal with this diversity is found to be useful for the quality of life, without demanding that everybody lives the same life. Establishing common values with respect to housing behaviour is not easy. In line with other research (Amin, 2002), the diversity of ethnic backgrounds, individualisation, high population density, the common use of portals, and the anonymous character of public space are all found to lead to conflicts. The housing associations are particularly concerned about this issue, as this excerpt bears out:

*"We are the ones who experience the problems first. When people have problems with each other, our property is damaged or at least badly handled." (Manager, housing corporation 1)*

The managers of the housing associations see the clear effect of participation on common values, especially in small-scale projects. One of the managers had experienced many problems with playgrounds, which were wrecked time and time again. So he decided to make the children feel responsible for their playground:

*"So I made an agreement with the children who live in the surrounding apartment blocks. We set up a children's art project. And it worked! The art that the children made has not been demolished yet (...). We were astonished!" (Manager, housing corporation 1).*

Clearly, in this case the idea that participation leads to common values of acceptable behaviour ("you shouldn't wreck the playground") has been validated. The participation of youngsters in small-scale projects has proven to be highly important in raising common values of behaviour, with positive outcomes on vandalism and feelings of safety in the neighbourhood.

Another essential element of this dimension of social cohesion is trust in local policymakers. One way in which public authorities can create positive conditions that foster trust is by keeping residents informed and being clear about the extent of influence that the residents can have (Maloney et al., 2000; Forrest and Kearns, 2001). In spite of good intentions, delivery on policy promises has proven to be difficult in Bouwlust. An example is the Hard/Soft project, in which physical and social measures are supposedly integrated and civil servants, a residents' organisation, housing associations, the police, welfare workers, schools and religious groups were mobilised. The promise that attracted all these people was that they would work together with equal input; but in the end, only the interests of the local government were taken care of, since it was they who paid the manager. This disappointment resulted in a loss of participants, as these quotations accurately reflect:

*"I don't know what they want anymore, so I stopped going to the meetings." (Community leader).*  
*"We have now organised our own meeting with the managers of the housing associations." (Manager, housing corporation 2)*

So, the policymakers notice the positive relationship between a civic culture and participation to some extent, especially in the context of small and practical projects. The initiatives that

involve the residents in the design have been successful in generating common values about acceptable behaviour in public space. Difficulties between groups in the areas were dealt with through participation in small-scale projects, and although the problems have not been resolved, the policymakers do perceive some positive outcomes of their actions. Less successful was the participation in bigger governance processes; promises not kept and a lack of discussion of values in the governance process have had a negative effect on this dimension of social cohesion.

#### *Participation and neighbourhood attachment*

The third dimension of social cohesion is *neighbourhood attachment*; this term refers to people's feelings of being linked to their co-residents and to the area in which they live: feeling that they have a sense of belonging to the place and its people. Neighbourhood attachment can lead to a feeling of security, build self-esteem and self-image, bond people, cultures and experiences, and maintain a group identity (Taylor, 1988; Altman and Low, 1992; Crow, 1994). The idea is that people have ties not only with other people, but also with their immediate environment (Blokland, 2000). There are many positive consequences of these feelings: people are better adjusted, feel supported, relate more fully to other people, aspire to goals beyond their own personal interests, and have stronger levels of social support and social connectedness. Participation can be encouraged when people feel that they are attached to a neighbourhood and identify with it; what belongs to you needs to be protected, taken care of, and influenced.

This dimension of social cohesion was often mentioned in a very positive sense in Bouwlust. When asking the policymakers whether there was a relationship between participation and neighbourhood attachment, most of them mentioned the strong interrelatedness of both concepts. This comes to the fore in this vignette:

*“Well... if people are involved in the neighbourhood (...) they will help each other, and there will be more social control. If the neighbourhood looks good, and it is clean, you want it to stay that way. They may become a member of a residents' organisation or something like that, to fight for it. They feel, we have to keep this, I want to stay here, and I want to take on my responsibility for that.” (District coordinator)*

This quotation shows how, as a result of their attachment to the neighbourhood, people will act to improve it, but also that once people participate they may identify with it more strongly. At the same time, a feeling of attachment to a neighbourhood is expected to lead to reciprocity and agreement on values, the second dimension of social cohesion. This practical, street-level relationship between participation, attachment, and feelings of responsibility has also been found in the Square Project. This project aims to enhance the liveability of public areas in urban neighbourhoods. The practical relationship between participation, attachment, and feelings of responsibility is borne out in this excerpt:

*“A square needs a function, a vision that is based on the needs of the users. With fountains, with characteristics that... eh...enhance the bond with the residents. Ensure that the people know that it's theirs.” (District coordinator)*

The quotation below aptly shows a similar relationship between participation in informal activities and neighbourhood attachment:

*“(...) also for the social cohesion. Because if the neighbourhood is in severe decline, everyone will see the space outside their front door as a nondescript piece of land. Nobody feels involved in the neighbourhood anymore. We therefore organise a party now and then. Not so long ago we organised the Escampioenschappen [Escamp Championship]. It is really fantastic to see a big party, and instead of the usual mess and fighting, one big happy family.” (External project manager)*

This positive interrelationship between participation and attachment was also shown in the quotation above on the children’s playground: policymakers feel that, once people identify with something, they will take care of it. Certainly for the housing association, who fear for the value of their property, this positive outcome of social cohesion is something they notice. For this practical reason they will include residents in the design phase of (semi-) public space and organise low-threshold activities.

Concluding, most policymakers experience positive effects of the participation of residents on neighbourhood attachment, and on the common values and a civic culture. The participation of residents in policymaking processes is perceived to be relatively slight, because of a lack of mobilising social associations that can help generate the willingness and capacities of residents for more formal forms of participation. Policymakers assert that residents who have been able to make decisions concerning their living surroundings identify more closely with the place and the people who live there. As a result, these residents also become more active in maintaining the quality of their surroundings; they participate more. One of the reasons for doing so is that they have created a more communal idea of what they would like the environment to be, because they will have talked about this while they were involved in the design. All in all, there is a reciprocal relationship between common values and neighbourhood attachment as well as between participation and neighbourhood attachment.

## **6.5 Governance factors that can explain the involvement of the residents in policymaking processes**

The quotes in the section above show that residents are mainly involved in small and practical projects organised by the policymakers rather than in fundamental decision-making processes. This deduction is not in line with the expectations that, in an urban governance process, residents are active citizens who take an active part in neighbourhood restructuring processes (Parkinson, 1997; Hambleton, 2000). It is also not in line with the official policy rhetoric that participation is ‘good’. Participation is an essential part of the Big Cities Policy: residents should be involved “as much as possible” in the decision-making process.

How can this difference be explained? The second aim of the paper stands to the fore in this section. We report our analysis of the factors that are capable of explaining the involvement of the residents in policymaking processes. We looked at the kind of party allowed into the networks and partnerships and the way in which discussion in the decision-making process took place. These two characteristics of the governance process were introduced in the theoretical section. They are relevant issues, because they are the practical outcome of the degree and the way in which the principle (‘participation is good’) results in policy action. This section is based

on our interpretation of the governance process, based upon the interviews with policymakers at the neighbourhood- and city level.

First, with respect to *the kind of party allowed in the networks and partnerships*, it is clear that most networks and partnerships in the neighbourhood are closed to residents. There are several examples to illustrate this: First, residents are invited to the meetings by the neighbourhood Management Team when it feels the need to do so. In this case the exclusion of certain partners is clear, as this vignette shows:

*“First residents were also part of the Management Team, but for the last two years we have stopped that, because the level of interest was very different.” (Manager, housing corporation 3)*

Exclusion is not always so obvious or openly discussed. The second example is the prestigious project ‘Hard/Soft’, which aims to integrate all physical and social actions in the neighbourhood. The project is paid for by the local authority, but aims to bring together all the parties that are involved in the neighbourhood management. The residents were first invited to join the meetings, and the manager of the project spoke very positively about the effect of their attendance:

*“Can you imagine that? This is such an old neighbourhood, and still there were many residents who did not know each other. The meetings were very valuable.” (Manager, Hard/Soft project)*

Unfortunately, the open invitation to the residents did not mean that the way in which the discussion took place was also adapted. The discussion during the meetings concentrated on the division of responsibilities between the departments of the city administration, and was not relevant to the residents. In this case, the way in which the discussion took place excluded the residents; the residents did not feel welcome and were no longer participating in the meetings. Not only the residents, but also the housing corporations have ceased to attend the meetings of the Hard/Soft project, as this housing manager explained with some understatement:

*“I went there a couple of times, and before me several other colleagues. But we decided that, well, we cannot achieve our goals there.” (Manager, housing corporation 1)*

Not only this housing corporation, but also the others were disappointed by the process and the results of the Hard/Soft process, and set up their own partnership. As a result of the poor performance of the public authorities within the neighbourhood, and the need to maintain the value of their property the housing corporations took the lead. They have created the ‘Platform The Hague South West’, and invited the responsible alderman, high-ranking civil servants, thereby bypassing the neighbourhood-based Hard/Soft project. This is the third example of a partnership where the residents are not actively involved. The exclusion of the residents is the consequence of the enormous scale of the restructuring operation in Bouwlust in which the housing associations and the local council state that they need each other, and their willingness to work together has increased over the years. They have found a process in which they both aim for quick results in the urban restructuring process, and residents are regarded as potential slowcoaches who are to be excluded to keep up the pace, as is aptly brought out by this manager of a housing association:

*"We don't listen to them (the residents) very much anymore, because we think that we have our own responsibility. Also, we agree with the view of the city council (on the development of the neighbourhood) and we can develop more action there." (Manager, housing corporation 2).*

Clearly, the community representatives are thus deliberately left out of this high-profile governance arrangement, because they have goals that differ from those of the public and private organisations. In this closed group, the parties communicate according to clear rules, as this excerpt accurately shows:

*"We don't quarrel with each other, but listen carefully to the arguments of the other party and realise that we have to get an agreement to get some results." (Manager, housing corporation 2).*

Clearly, the co-operation between the public and the private sectors has reached a stage in which the participants listen to and learn from each other, and conflicting goals do not lead to management problems. This is what Healey refers to as a 'good' governance process. However, to reach this situation, the public and private partners exclude from this process the needs and aspirations of the communities within the neighbourhood, and that is less positive.

Our impression is that *the way in which the discussion takes place* is based on a general need for visible results rather than the process of negotiation itself. The focus is mostly on 'counting the beans' instead of the process (Power, 1997). A focus on results rather than process means that decision-making is structured in such a way that the conditions for successful outcomes are optimised. Difficult-to-handle groups are thus excluded from the discussion. None of the policymakers says so in so many words, because it would be politically incorrect to do so, but reading between the lines it seems that the policymakers find 'the' resident difficult to identify. The residents' organisations are often organised along ethnic lines, which would imply that representatives of each group would have to be involved in the policymaking process in order to represent all residents' groups. It is considered highly unlikely that all these different groups of residents would formulate the same goals or the same ideas about the ideal solution. The opinions of residents are highly divergent and potentially conflicting. Probably policymakers find the diversity of the residents difficult to manage.

Second, again in the eyes of the policymakers, residents' representatives lack the necessary capacities to participate as equal partners in the partnership. The policymakers experience most problems in the policymaking process in the capacities of ethnic groups. Newly-organised groups of residents are often unacquainted with the generally accepted values in the process, and policymakers find it difficult to discuss and seek to change their values, as this excerpt makes clear:

*"The ethnic communities are slowly organising themselves. Maybe in a few years time they will have become used to the culture of meetings that we have, and they can join us." (District manager 1)*

Moreover, most of the residents who have been active since the neighbourhood was built are now elderly and have lost the energy to stay actively involved. The existing social cement is crumbling. Those who shout loudest are the most likely to be heard, so that the quiet, excluded people fail to get attention (Taylor, 2000; Martin, 2004).

Recapitulating, the limited scope of participation is related to a need for quick results. As a result, residents are excluded from partnerships. The participation of residents would only slow down this process. The findings here indicate that residents are mainly seen as passive partners in a governance process that is led by the private and public parties and residents have little power. The residents' role resembles that in the New Public Management approach (Barzelay, 2001). In practice, private parties have gained more power, public parties have retained their power, and residents have lost power in comparison with ten years ago. Clearly, the policymaking process did not reach the ideal in which all relevant stakeholders were involved and the range and variety of their cultural backgrounds and social networks recognised (Healey, 1997). Instead, the organisation of the governance process satisfies the needs and interests of those who had something to say on the matter, but parties with less power (either financial or political) are left standing on the sideline.

## 6.6 Conclusions

The aim of this paper was first to analyse to what extent policymakers experience an effect of participation on social cohesion. Social cohesion was operationalised in three dimensions: social networks, common values and a civic culture, and neighbourhood attachment. The second aim of the paper was to explain the level of participation by looking at the kind of party allowed in the networks and partnerships and the way in which discussion takes place. The research was carried out in a post-war neighbourhood in the city of The Hague in the Netherlands, where governance arrangements were analysed from the point of view of the professionals. These professionals have had a gate-keeping function and their attitudes and motives are thus decisive for the extent to which residents are involved in the governance process.

Our research has shown that policymakers see a positive effect of participation on the first dimension of social cohesion: social networks. They also note that participation in social organisations (hobby clubs, for example) mobilises the residents to become active in decision-making as well. Social organisations thus have a mobilising role. This is in line with the findings of Olsen (1972). Despite the perceived positive effect of participation, the level of participation is generally not so high in the case study area as in other neighbourhoods in the city. This is at least partly the result of the difficulties that policymakers show in dealing with the increasing diversity of the residents in the area in terms of ethnicity and lifestyles. Some of the new inhabitants may not have the required skills for participation, but at the same time hardly any thought has been given to the question of how to involve the new groups in significant neighbourhood activities. The policymakers are reluctant to say so publicly, but they still find it difficult to value the contribution of ethnic minorities and lower income families.

In the eyes of the policymakers, participation also has a positive influence on the second dimension of social cohesion: common values and a civic culture. In particular, participation in small-scale projects based on discussions of the future use of the place is seen to lead to more common values on acceptable behaviour. When participants in the policy process are also the present or future users of a place (a square, a playground), there is almost automatic agreement on how to use the place (for example: no vandalism). In bigger projects, the emergence of common values and a civic culture as a consequence of the policy process is not observed. The policymakers notice the increased number of diverse opinions in bigger processes and clearly

find these difficult to manage. Although the policymakers do not say so explicitly, they expect consensus among the residents, but instead they have to deal with open conflicts. And these make a consensus hard to reach.

The last dimension of social cohesion, neighbourhood attachment, is positively related to participation by all respondents. People who identify with the space in which they live will also take care of it, and *vice versa*; their identification can be enhanced by their involvement in the design of the space and in low-threshold activities. Clearly, there is considerable overlap with the two other dimensions of social cohesion. A greater degree of neighbourhood attachment can be reached when social networks are better and when there is a clear consensus on how to live in an area and how to use specific places.

The second aim of the paper was to explain this limited level of participation by looking at the governance factors in the research neighbourhood, focusing especially on the role of residents and the way in which discussion takes place. We found that the residents are often excluded from networks and partnerships and the public or private authorities take the lead. In line with what Barzelay (2001) describes as 'passive customers' the residents are served by the local authorities and the housing corporation, who aim to reach the ideal of a restructured neighbourhood as quickly as possible. As Healey (1996) indicates, in the process of negotiation the public and private partners have similar ideas on how the discussion should take place, and they listen to each others arguments. The policymakers feel that involving the residents in this process may diminish the chance of quick results. One of the reasons for this is that policymakers struggle with the diversity of the population. The participation of so many different groups, with different backgrounds and capacities, is new to this formerly white neighbourhood.

Additionally, a lack of confidence in the capacities and networks of the residents leads to little delegation of power, responsibilities or funding. This conclusion corresponds with other research on this topic (Taylor, 2000; Martin, 2004). Furthermore, there are problems with representation in the decision-making process, since not all residents are properly represented. In the Bouwlust case study, women and immigrants are clearly underrepresented in participatory processes. So, where policymakers observe a positive effect of participation on social cohesion, women and immigrants are clearly not included. Participation of only a few groups in the neighbourhood thus adds to the social exclusion of the vulnerable rather than promote the social cohesion of the different groups in the neighbourhood.

In conclusion, it should be recognised that there is no such person as 'The Resident'. All people have their own aspirations and goals, and their own restrictions in achieving them. These restrictions can partly be found within the individual residents themselves, but it should never be overlooked that the policy process itself may contain all kinds of hidden mechanisms that, possibly unwittingly, exclude people from the policy process and from governance structures. This exclusion certainly also holds true in distressed urban areas, where the diversity of the population, with respect to ethnicity and lifestyle in particular, is wide and in many cases becoming wider. Without doubt, the differences will in some, possibly many cases lead to conflicts between people and groups or between residents and policymakers. These policymakers should see that managing participation should not always aim to *avoid* conflicts, for example by excluding different kinds of groups and striving for consensus and cohesion between all people in the neighbourhood. An emphasis on the management of the conflicts themselves would probably be a more successful path to cope with such problems as marginalisation, safety and crime, and liveability in urban neighbourhoods.

## Notes

- 1 Social cohesion also has its downside, such as the exclusion of others. See for example Maloutas and Pentelidou Malouta (2004) for an overview of the downside of social cohesion in relation to urban governance.
- 2 These dimensions are derived from the classification of the dimensions of social cohesion drawn up by Kearns and Forrest (2000). They identify five dimensions of social cohesion: (1) common values and a civic culture; (2) social order and social control; (3) social solidarity and reductions in wealth disparities; (4) social networks and social capital; (5) place attachment and identity. The dimensions of 'social order and social control' and 'social solidarity and reductions in wealth disparities' are matters of national policy, while the others are relevant in neighbourhood-level strategies (Amin, 2002). We therefore concentrate on the neighbourhood-level dimensions, although we are aware that there are mutual connections between social cohesion at the neighbourhood level and social cohesion at higher scale levels.
- 3 UGIS, *Urban Development Programmes, Urban Governance, Social Inclusion and Sustainability*, has been financed within the 5th-Framework Programme on Targeted Socio-Economic Research of the European Union.



# 7 Conclusions

## 7.1 Introduction

The aim of this study is to gain insight into the relationship between urban governance and social cohesion within the context of post-WWII neighbourhoods. These once attractive neighbourhoods now face a multitude of problems such as physical decay, high unemployment, vacant housing units, criminal activity, social and racial tensions, and a lack of services and educational facilities. Much good is expected from social cohesion to improve urban neighbourhoods. Both policymakers and researchers are interested to know which factors enable social cohesion to flourish at neighbourhood level. Policymakers are of the opinion that a lack of social cohesion may be one of the causes of the problems listed above.

Simultaneously with the focus on social cohesion, there has been a sharp focus on urban governance, which has important consequences for the role of the residents in decision-making processes in the neighbourhood. Stakeholders in the neighbourhood are expected to have a much larger say in these decision-making processes as a result of the shift from government to governance. Not only are the local authorities and private partners such as the housing associations among the stakeholders; so are the residents. In the introduction to this book we explained that residents who participate in the management of their neighbourhood could be expected to develop higher levels of social cohesion. And conversely, higher levels of social cohesion in urban neighbourhoods may be helpful in generating more involved residents who participate in their neighbourhood.

In the academic literature, the attention the concepts of social cohesion and urban governance have received has been considerable, but very little has been paid to the relationship between these concepts. The study reported in this dissertation has sought to enhance our insight into the factors that generate social cohesion, provide an evaluation of the governance process, and generate knowledge on the relationship between urban governance and social cohesion. All this has been studied within the context of post-WWII neighbourhoods in the Netherlands. The following general research question has been addressed:

*How are urban governance processes related to social cohesion in post-WWII neighbourhoods?*

This central research question has been split into four more detailed research questions:

1. *What types and combinations of social, economic, and physical problems can be identified in post-WWII neighbourhoods in Europe?*
2. *What is the present Big Cities Policy response to the problems in the research area? How is this policy organised? Who participates in the policy and who has decided on this participation? How can the governance process be evaluated?*

3. *To what extent is social cohesion related to the socioeconomic and ethnic characteristics of the residents in the research areas?*
4. *To what extent does social cohesion influence the participation of residents in the governance process? How does participation in governance arrangements relate to social cohesion?*

The preceding five chapters each contained a separate paper with empirical findings. This final chapter gives answers to the general and more detailed research questions, and includes some critical reflections on the findings, the concepts of social cohesion and urban governance, and how these two concepts are related. We end with some suggestions for better policy practice in post-WWII neighbourhoods on how to stimulate positive forms of social cohesion.

## 7.2 Answering the research questions

The first more detailed research question focused on the situation in post-WWII neighbourhoods:

1. *What types and combinations of social, economic and physical problems can be identified in post-WWII neighbourhoods in Europe?*

This question was addressed on the basis of an inventory of developments and problems in 29 post-WWII neighbourhoods in 10 European countries. The inventory concentrated on five issues that are of importance in explaining the current situation of post-WWII neighbourhoods in Europe: issues related to physical, economic, demographic, and social-cultural developments, to liveability, and to safety. It was shown that the position of post-WWII neighbourhoods in Europe is very diverse, and that by no means all of them are deprived areas. Clearly, the post-WWII neighbourhoods in Europe have not all developed similarly, while the original ideas with which the neighbourhoods were built show high levels of similarity. The main problems that were found were (see chapter two):

- Physical problems resulting from poor construction work or neglected maintenance. Public spaces were sometimes badly maintained, the separation of function minimises the possibilities of social control, and there is a lack of parking areas.
- A concentration of households with low incomes, the unemployed, and ethnic minorities that may lead to a concentration of social and economic problems.
- An unpopular position on the housing market that may result in high turnover rates.
- High levels of antisocial and criminal activity, such as disorderly behaviour, vandalism, drugs, alcoholism, young people loitering, burglaries in cars and houses, may lead to feelings of lack of safety.
- There may be social and racial tensions and conflicts among residents.
- In some neighbourhoods there has been a decline in services, or services have not changed while the demographic and social composition of the neighbourhood has generated new demands.

We have found that in some cases problems were linked to the design and structure that was typical of the neighbourhood from the beginning (high share of social-rented sector housing

and consequent population composition), while in other cases they were linked to the processes that followed (high mobility, an increased share of immigrants) and the natural ageing of the neighbourhood. Some of the problems in post-WWII neighbourhoods were found to be related to the low levels of social cohesion, which are reflected in a higher share of conflicts, higher crime rates, vandalism, and/or problems with the maintenance of public spaces. These are common problems in post-WWII neighbourhoods all over Europe (Aalbers et al., 2003; Andersson et al., 2003; Černič Mali et al., 2003; Chignier-Riboulon et al., 2003; Erdósi et al., 2003; Hall et al., 2003; Knorr-Siedow and Droste, 2003; Mezzetti et al., 2003; Pareja Eastaway et al., 2003; Węclawowicz et al., 2003).

The general picture that was sketched is that many developments and problems seem to be typical of only a few neighbourhoods, and that there is no single factor that can be held responsible for the path a post-WWII neighbourhood takes. We found that post-WWII neighbourhoods do not always develop negatively, despite the focus on problems in the academic literature. In fact, many people living in these neighbourhoods are still relatively satisfied. The implication must be that policies or actions aiming to improve the situation, or prevent the setting in of the 'spiral of decline' (Prak and Priemus, 1985), need to take into account the specific local situation.

Any policy solution formulated in response to the situation in post-WWII neighbourhoods should be preceded by an analysis of the problem and then formulated as an appropriate answer. In the Netherlands, the policies developed in these neighbourhoods fall under the area-based Big Cities Policy. The findings above have raised the question of the extent to which this policy can actually deliver actions that respond effectively to the issues at stake in these specific neighbourhoods. The second research question that was addressed focused on the organisation of the Big Cities Policy:

2. *What is the present Big Cities Policy response to the problems in the research areas? How is this policy organised? Who participates in the policy and who has decided on this participation? How can the governance process be evaluated?*

The question of how the policy is organised was investigated using a qualitative approach, focusing on the process of the participation of residents in urban governance processes in Bouwlust, The Hague. A key aspect of *urban governance* was described in chapter one: in contrast with more traditional forms of government, *urban governance* includes not only the public sector, but also the private and voluntary sectors in policymaking processes (Jessop, 1995; Stoker, 1995; Coaffee and Healey, 2003). Three interpretations of governance were briefly presented in chapter one, with emphases on different dimensions of governance: the kinds of party who are allowed in the networks and partnerships; the extent to which residents play a part in decision-making processes; the way in which the discussion takes place; the extent to which there is a spatial aspect to the governance process. The question we answered in the empirical section was how governance has been implemented in Bouwlust in The Hague: has there been a change from government to governance as described in the international literature? If so, how can the governance process in Bouwlust be evaluated?

The results reported for Bouwlust indicate that, within the Big Cities Policy, the shift towards governance has taken place, but not in all the ways that were expected (see chapter three). The Big Cities Policy was formulated at the city level, while it was officially an area-based integrated

approach focusing on distressed neighbourhoods. The question was raised: Which needs have been considered more important, those of the city or those of the neighbourhood? Indeed, one of the main policy aims has been to make the city 'complete' rather than serve the needs of the neighbourhood. The policy documents stated that a city was considered to be complete if it had a strong economic, physical, and social structure. Interestingly, only the physical policies were aimed at specific neighbourhoods, whereas the economic and social policies were formulated at the city level without distinguishing between the special needs that may exist in certain neighbourhoods. This division indicated that a true integration of these three fields had not taken place. In this sense, the Big Cities Policy in The Hague was not primarily an area-based, integrated approach at the neighbourhood level.

That is not to say, however, that The Hague was unique in this respect. The institutional arrangements made at the national level demanded customised programmes for each city, with special attention for distressed neighbourhoods. In addition, traditionally distressed neighbourhoods received funding for physical interventions whereas the social policies were targeted at people rather than places. Also, economic developments were generally stimulated at the city-regional scale, although some efforts were made to stimulate small-scale economic development in urban neighbourhoods.

Another characteristic of governance identified in chapter one was the devolution of responsibilities to lower administrative levels. How has this taken place? The results show that The Hague was more centrally organised than other big cities in the Netherlands. Whereas the urban districts in cities such as Amsterdam and Rotterdam could formulate their own policies, they could not do so in The Hague. We have found two reasons for this. First, The Hague is smaller in size than Amsterdam or Rotterdam, which makes the need for decentralisation less urgent. Second, it has been a political choice not to decentralise completely, a choice that has been supported by the public authorities at city level. In practice, the Big Cities Policy in The Hague has been organised in such a way that the policies were prepared by middle-level urban policymakers, while the top-level of directors and politicians made the final decisions. At the neighbourhood level the policies formulated at the local level were merely implemented rather than designed. In the eyes of both the policymakers and the residents in Bouwlust, this top-down approach has created a feeling of powerlessness.

In the introduction to this study we argued that power is an important factor in the decision-making process in partnerships. The findings have shown that the parties who had more power (financial power, legislative power, or knowledge) were indeed the ones who decided what would happen. In the case of Bouwlust, a Management Team chaired by the district coordinator undertook most of the day-to-day management. In the Management Team all local departments were represented, together with the housing associations and the police. So, in line with the definition of urban governance given above, not only the public sector, but also the private sector has become involved in the governance of urban issues. This inclusion was less generous for the voluntary sectors: welfare institutions and commercial organisations (shopkeepers for example) had an advisory function and were only involved when the topic was related to their interests. The regular members of the Management Team decided when this was the case. As a result, those who did not have the power, such as the residents and voluntary organisations, felt frustrated and did not perceive the partnership as a democratic body.

The findings have shown that residents were mainly involved in small-scale, short-term projects organised by the policymakers rather than in fundamental decision-making processes

(see chapter three and six). This was not in line with the expectations that, in an urban governance process, residents are active citizens who take an active part in neighbourhood restructuring processes (Parkinson, 1997; Hambleton, 2000).

The official policy rhetoric was that participation was 'good', and an essential part of the Big Cities Policy. So how on the one hand could policymakers say that they wanted to involve residents as much as possible, but at the same time fail to change their own actions and even actively form partnerships in which only the public and private sector were involved? We argued that this was the result of a fundamental problem of limited management capacities. Conflicts were feared rather than managed, which has restricted the participation of residents in the governance process to short-term, small-scale issues. There were three reasons for this restriction.

First, in the opinion of the policymakers, residents found it increasingly difficult to organise themselves in such a way that they represented the heterogeneous population of the neighbourhood. The residents' organisations were often organised along ethnic lines, which made it difficult for policymakers to speak with 'the' resident: there would have been an implication that representatives of each group were to be involved in the policymaking process. It was considered highly unlikely that all these different groups of residents would formulate the same goals or the same ideas about the ideal solution. Consequently, the residents' organisations were left out of the decision-making because conflict might have arisen, and that would have been difficult to manage.

Second, again in the eyes of the policymakers, those residents who did participate did so with very different capacities. This variation was also found difficult to deal with. The policymakers experienced most problems in the policymaking process in the capacities of ethnic groups. Newly-organised groups of residents were often unacquainted with the generally accepted values in the process, and policymakers found it difficult to discuss and seek to change their values. Moreover, the residents who had been active since the neighbourhoods were built were now often elderly, and were losing the energy to stay actively involved. Those who shouted loudest were the most likely to be heard, so that the quiet, excluded people probably failed to get attention.

The third reason why residents were not involved in large-scale, long-term processes was that the participation of residents may have slowed down decision-making processes. This is the consequence of the enormous scale of the restructuring operation in Bouwlust in which the housing associations and the local council had realised that they needed each other, and their willingness to work together had increased over the years. They had found a process in which they both aimed for quick results in the urban restructuring process, and residents were regarded as potential slowcoaches who were to be excluded to keep up the pace. Clearly, the co-operation between the public and the private sectors had reached a stage in which the participants listened to and learnt from each other, and conflicting goals did not lead to management problems. However, they had to exclude the needs and aspirations of the communities within the neighbourhood from this process to reach this situation.

Recapitulating, in the end the policymaking process did not reach the ideal in which all relevant stakeholders were involved, recognising the range and variety of their cultural backgrounds and their social networks (Healey, 1997). Instead, the organisation of the governance process satisfied the needs and interests of those who had something to say on the matter, but parties with less power (either financial or political) were left standing on the sideline.

Taking all this into account, how can the governance process in The Hague be evaluated? Table 7.1 presents an overview of the three approaches to governance presented in chapter one:

Table 7.1 Key aspects of three governance approaches and the characteristics of the governance process in Bouwlust, The Hague (2001)

	<b>Governance as self-organising, inter-organisational networks</b>	<b>New public management (NPM)</b>	<b>Collaborative planning</b>	<b>Fieldwork in The Hague</b>
Partnerships	Inter-organisational networks between the public and private sectors.	Public sector: budgeting agencies, accounting, civil services.	All stakeholders are involved: public, private and voluntary sector.	Close to governance-as-self-organising, inter-organisational - networks: Only public and private parties are involved.
Role of residents	Unspecified	Citizens are customers of policies and need to be empowered as such.	Residents are stakeholders and are thus important partners in decision-making.	Close to NPM: Limited to small scale projects with limited time spans. Residents have limited power.
How does the discussion take place?	Game-like interactions, rooted in trust, and regulated by rules of the game negotiated and agreed by networks participants. Unbalanced power relations.	The public sector is managed in a business way: openness of information, integrity, accountability, clarity about responsibility and roles.	Strong focus on dialogue: Respect for mutual difference, cultural specificity of the message is recognised, discussion on values in the process.	Close to NPM: Discussion takes place based on power, and mutual interdependence. Little focus on discussing the rules of the game.
Focus on areas?	Not primarily, the focus is on public-private networks. These can be area-based and integrating different sectors.	Not primarily, but if this generates more efficiency area-based policies may be a result.	Yes, 'place making' means that the area is central, integrating all ideas on its development.	Close to governance as self-organising, inter-organisational networks and NPM: The discussion takes place at city level, policies are not integrated at neighbourhood level.

governance as self-organising, inter-organisational networks, new public management, and collaborative planning. The situation in the research area is also outlined. Clearly, the situation in The Hague cannot be clarified by just one of the governance frameworks.

As summarised in the table, the governance process in Bouwlust resembled a mixture of governance as self-organising, inter-organisational networks and new public management. We note the characteristics of the governance process in Bouwlust to illustrate this. First, the partnerships focused mainly on public-private partnerships that included the partners with power in terms of financial means, knowledge, or legislative power. Second, the involvement of the residents was only called upon when the policymakers felt the need for it. Structural empowerment took place on the basis of rational choices, but it seemed to be little more than lip service to the current orthodoxy of empowerment. There was no real devolution of power or

resources to the residents. Third, the discussion within the partnerships concentrated on integrity and accountability, and clarity about responsibility and roles, just as is described under new public management. Finally, there was no primary focus on an area-based approach in which different policies were integrated. Decisions were mainly made at the city level and only to a lesser extent within the neighbourhood. Some attempts to integrate the social, economic, and physical aspects were taking place, but with very limited legislative power. Clearly, practice in Bouwlust was far removed from the normative model that Healey has sketched, since none of the practices resembles the process described in collaborative planning theory.

Within the governance process, many problems were met at the neighbourhood level, especially in relation to the management of the increasingly heterogeneous population and opening up of gated partnerships to new partners. Certainly in areas with a high diversity in socioeconomic and ethnic terms, the representation in decision-making processes of some of these groups has become problematic. As we formulated in the introduction, a prevailing idea of policymakers is that people with low socioeconomic status and of non-native ethnic origin more often live in deprivation and poverty, have less capacity to participate, and have lower levels of social cohesion. We concentrated on the relationship between the social cohesion and the socioeconomic and ethnic characteristics of the residents in the next research question:

3. *To what extent is social cohesion related to the socioeconomic and ethnic characteristics of the residents in the research areas?*

This research question has taken into account actual and potential factors that may lead to differences in social cohesion, especially ethnicity, and socioeconomic variables. In post-WWII neighbourhoods a relatively large share of the population has a low socioeconomic status and/or is of ethnic origin. The literature has shown that there is a relationship between ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and certain aspects of social cohesion. Another reason for researching this question was related to the policy aim to create a socially-mixed neighbourhood (mixing lower and higher income and ethnic groups) through urban restructuring measures. The policy idea is that households in the neighbourhood with medium or higher socioeconomic status would serve as an example in behaviour to groups with a lower socioeconomic status, that the different types of people would build 'bridging' networks, and that a lower concentration of problematic households would enhance the quality of the neighbourhood.

In chapter one, we have identified three dimensions of *social cohesion* at neighbourhood level: social networks, common values and a civic culture, and neighbourhood attachment, all of which were considered to be interrelated. We have first analysed how these dimensions were interrelated, using survey data from two post-WWII neighbourhoods: Bouwlust in The Hague and Hoograven in Utrecht.

The results of the analyses, as reported in chapter four, have indicated that the dimensions of social cohesion were indeed interrelated, but not always in the same direction. More cohesion in one dimension did not always mean more cohesion in another dimension. As was expected, neighbourhood attachment was strongly interrelated to the other two dimensions of social cohesion. However, the evidence suggested that the social networks and the common values dimension (here operationalised as tolerance of deviant behaviour) were hardly interrelated, which was not in line with the expectations. The idea was that spatially-restricted social networks made people more susceptible to norms that are deviant from mainstream society (Wilson, 1987;

Friedrichs and Blasius, 2003). We found no effects comparable to those found by Wilson in USA and Friedrichs and Blasius in Germany. This absence could probably be explained by the fact that the research areas in the Netherlands are less deprived and less segregated than those in Germany and USA.

To obtain a better picture of the mechanisms that influence social cohesion at the neighbourhood level, the extent to which the socioeconomic status and ethnic characteristics of the residents influence each dimension of social cohesion was analysed. The multivariate analyses indicated that differences in the social cohesion of the residents are only partially related to the socioeconomic status of these residents. The analyses show that the social-networks and common-values dimensions of social cohesion were hardly related to socioeconomic status. This finding was not in line with our expectation that households with a higher income could more easily build networks and give a 'good example' in behaviour to the lower income groups.

Furthermore, the analyses also indicated that ethnicity is a strong predictor of social cohesion: ethnic minorities had a higher level of social cohesion in our research neighbourhoods than did native Dutch people. This finding was in line with the expectations. The presence of a substantial number of co-ethnics enabled these people to find social contacts with people who are similar, and this might in turn go hand in hand with social control within the group. Moreover, the ethnic minorities accepted a higher degree of ethnic mix in a neighbourhood than did native Dutch people, who tend to feel less attached to the neighbourhood when the proportion of ethnic minorities in the neighbourhood rises.

As our analyses have indicated, home-ownership and a housing career within the neighbourhood lead to higher scores on neighbourhood attachment. This finding emphasised that, within urban restructuring, affordable homes should be built for the sitting residents rather than attract new people to the neighbourhood. In this way the residents with high levels of social cohesion may be kept in the neighbourhood.

The outcomes of these analyses may be an important contribution to the understanding of social cohesion. The findings in this and previous research (Kleinhans et al., 2000; Van Beckhoven and Van Kempen, 2003; Bolt and Torrance, 2005; Kleinhans, 2005) raise the question of the effectiveness of social mixing policies on social cohesion that prevail in neighbourhood management in the Netherlands<sup>1</sup>. The change in population that is aimed for did not seem beneficial for social cohesion in our analyses, since socioeconomic status did not lead to strong social networks or the rejection of deviant behaviour. Instead, the effect of social mixing on social cohesion may even be a counter-intuitive strategy to strengthen social cohesion, since the people with higher scores on social cohesion (ethnic minorities and poorly educated people) are pushed out of the neighbourhood.

4. *To what extent does social cohesion influence the participation of residents in the governance process? How does participation in governance arrangements relate to social cohesion?*

In the first chapter of this thesis we argued that participation in governance is a crucial element in the relationship between social cohesion and urban governance. As we have seen throughout the book, there were problems with this idea, since none of these concepts were as simple as they at first seemed: each one involved multiple elements that were linked with each other, and each had an associated ideological notion. Nevertheless, this research can be considered capable of adding to the understanding of how and to whom social cohesion seems to matter.

First, the analyses reported in chapter five have indicated that there is no relationship between socioeconomic status and participation, or between ethnicity and participation. Thus, despite the expectations, those with a higher socioeconomic status did not participate more than did people with a low socioeconomic status as indicated by their education, income, and work status. This result probably derives from the fact that participation, as measured here, included both formal and informal activities. The findings might have been different had *only* formal participation been taken into account, which we were not able to do because of data restrictions. Our findings supported the idea that homeowners participate more than tenants do.

To analyse to what extent social cohesion explains participation, we have had to adapt the theoretical framework slightly to make it build on earlier findings. There is very little quantitative work on the relationship between social cohesion and participation. Instead, in most quantitative research the focus is on social capital when discussing the relationship with participation (cf. Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 1993; Portes, 1998). In line with this body of work, we operationalised social capital as social networks, trust, and tolerance of deviant behaviour and analysed the impact of these dimensions on participation. In fact, this definition of social capital might be equated to social cohesion as we defined it plus trust and minus neighbourhood attachment. Additionally, we analysed the impact of neighbourhood attachment on participation (cf. Brodsky et al., 1999; Minkler and Wallerstein, 2003). In the multivariate models, we controlled for socioeconomic and ethnic characteristics as well as the tenure and housing career of the respondents<sup>2</sup>.

The findings showed that some, but not all the indicators of social capital were positively related to participation. As expected, the indicators of neighbourhood attachment also had a positive impact on participation. The question then arose of what would be the effect of combining the indicators of social networks, trust, common values *and* neighbourhood attachment together on participation. In fact, we wanted to know what the effect of social cohesion was on participation. Our idea was that these indicators of social cohesion relate positively to participation. Indeed, the explanatory value of the logistic regression model improved dramatically when social networks, trust, common values, *and* neighbourhood attachment were combined in the explanatory model of participation. In short, the residents with the highest chances of participation are: the elderly, those who own their homes, those with the largest share of their friends in the neighbourhood, residents who reject the use of force, and residents with strong feelings of social and spatial-emotional attachment to the neighbourhood.

Other indicators of social capital are no longer significant in this logistic regression model, despite the positive relationship in the bi-variate analyses. These are: chatting with neighbours, trust in other residents, and rejecting deviant behaviour. The relationship between these indicators of social capital and participation clearly runs *via* other indicators of social capital or individual- and household characteristics. These results have contributed to our understanding of the impact of social cohesion on participation.

Now that we have answered the first part of this research question, we can move on to the second part: How does participation in governance arrangements relate to social cohesion? To answer this question we chose a qualitative approach that gave us additional insight into the motivations and perceptions of those with power (the policymakers) on the topic of residents' participation and how they perceived the relationship between participation and social cohesion (see chapter six). The interviews took place in Bouwlust, The Hague.

The interviews with policymakers indicated that participation in small-scale, short-term formal processes as well as informal activities had a positive effect on the three dimensions of social cohesion. The policymakers saw strong and unambiguous evidence of the positive outcomes of participation on these three dimensions of social cohesion. The policymakers pointed out that participation in social events mobilises the residents to become active in more formal participation processes as well. The policymakers pointed out that those residents who participated more did indeed create common ideas on how to use the communal space, and what kind of behaviour was acceptable. As a result of participation, people cared more for the environment, for example by cleaning activities and through the correction of deviant behaviour. In addition, those residents who participate identify more with the neighbourhood, which also positively influences caring behaviour towards this space.

In conclusion, important empirical evidence has been offered that supported the theoretical assumptions formulated in chapter one, where we stated that participation relates the activities in the governance process to social cohesion in three ways (chapter one, section 5):

- “Governance structures can either motivate or discourage people from participating.” We have found very little evidence that the achievement of participation (with more than just ‘warm words’) has been the primary goal of the organisations that were involved in neighbourhood development, except perhaps the welfare organisation. Clearly, the public and private partners in Bouwlust were willing to generate participation, but did not seem capable of it. The main reasons for this are that the managers in the neighbourhood find it difficult to handle the diverse population, to hand over power, and to manage potentially conflicting goals. The governance structures thus limited residents’ participation in this case.
- “Social cohesion positively influences participation.” The empirical findings pointed out that this was the case for all dimensions of social cohesion. The findings showed that social networks, common values, and neighbourhood attachment positively influenced participation in the research areas.
- “Participation positively influences social cohesion.” This statement was found to be true in the empirical part of this research, since the interviews with policymakers showed that if and when residents participated in policymaking processes they built new networks, developed common values on desirable behaviour, and generated feelings of neighbourhood attachment. However, this relationship needs to be considered in a relative perspective, as the findings are not based on a random sample of residents, but on the opinion of residents that are active stakeholders in the decision-making process, the public authorities, and the relevant private partners.

As expected, we can conclude that participation of the residents in decision-making processes has an important intermediary role in the relationship between social cohesion and urban governance. It is important to keep in mind, however, that the degree of inclusiveness of the participation of the residents in governance processes can be of either a virtuous or a vicious character. The local public and private partners (that is, local government bodies and housing associations) have an important gate-keeping position, and the degree to which they actively motivate residents to take part in these processes is decisive for the effect on social cohesion.

### 7.3 Reflections

In this section we pay attention to some issues that are of importance in our interpretation of the outcomes of the research. We also outline some ideas for further research. We discuss each of the central concepts (social cohesion and urban governance) and their interaction below.

#### *Social cohesion*

In the past few decades social cohesion has gained in popularity, because it is a concept that can be used for many spatial scales and comprises a number of features with positive connotations. However, the coverage of the concept in policy documents, but also in much research, is only partial and rather uncritical. Some critical remarks on the rather random use of the concept of social cohesion are therefore apposite.

First, social cohesion is now a popular concept, but the issues to which it refers are not new to sociologists. We started the section on social cohesion in chapter one by noting that the great classics of sociology were written to describe the shift in social networks and norms that took place as society experienced a shift in the division of labour from agriculture towards industry. This shift was captured in the dichotomy between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* (Tönnies, 1912). In the beginning of the twentieth century problems in society were rising with respect to increased unemployment and problematic behaviour such as the abuse of alcohol. The current interest in concepts like social cohesion, but also social capital, is part of a conservative trend towards more restrictive norms and a renewed interest in the importance of social networks and values in determining social outcomes (see for example Fukuyama, 1999). The attention paid by today's policymakers and researchers to social cohesion is thus not a new phenomenon, but one that dates back to past times.

Second, it is important to note that social cohesion is not always 'good'; cohesion can have negative consequences. As indicated in the introduction, a downside of social cohesion can be the exclusion of 'outsiders' from a group through strong internal group cohesion. The second big problem is that too much cohesion among residents with deviant behaviour may generate cultures that are deviant from mainstream society. Granovetter (1973) talks about strong ties: ties and contacts between people who do not give new beneficial information. Too many strong ties may limit the opportunities to develop weak ties with the rest of urban society. A form of cohesion in which strong ties create situations that might even resemble cultures of poverty is equally inadvisable. As a result, it is important to clarify what kind of, and whose cohesion is aimed at, especially within the context of heterogeneous neighbourhoods. We have added to the understanding of whose cohesion we are talking about by identifying the chance that people within socioeconomic and ethnic groups experience a certain level of social cohesion.

The empirical findings have indicated that ethnic minorities have higher scores on the indicators of social cohesion than natives do. The explanation given in the relevant chapters was that, perhaps as a result of the relatively high share of co-ethnics, ethnic minorities can maintain strong networks in the neighbourhood. Although this statement may seem positive, care should be taken not to interpret it too hastily as a good thing, since strong networks may be accompanied by strong social control, which may result in a negative attitude towards behaviour that is different, even if it concerns positive action. For example, strong social control may restrain people from developing activities that could improve their personal situation, such as an educational course or a career. These findings can thus be interpreted as being positive, but also

as negative. Unfortunately, the data collected in the survey did not allow us to analyse in more detail what the effects of social cohesion were, and whether these were positive or not. Further research could analyse in more detail the positive and negative outcomes of social cohesion in relation to the level of (ethnic) segregation.

Social cohesion is thus not always positive, and it is not new, but it is still of interest. It can be claimed that this study has contributed to the understanding of the concept in today's society. Nevertheless, there are some issues that deserve further attention.

The first question is whether social cohesion varies in neighbourhoods where the share of ethnic minorities differs. The findings in this study suggest that there is an ethnic component to social cohesion. A limitation of the research performed here is that the data did not allow for differentiation between ethnic groups, nor between neighbourhoods with various concentrations of ethnic groups. What kind of social cohesion occurs in truly mixed areas with many different kinds of ethnic minorities, as in the Schilderswijk in The Hague, or the Bijlmermeer in Amsterdam? There is clearly more research to be done in establishing how far ethnic concentration has general and demonstrable effects on the components of social cohesion.

Another remark is that it would be interesting to be able to analyse the impact of context more fully. A comparative study (Dekker and Filipović, forthcoming) of apparently similar neighbourhoods in Slovenia and the Netherlands showed differences in the level of social cohesion between these two countries. These differences can probably be related to different positions on the regional housing market of the neighbourhoods, national economic circumstances, and cultural aspects. To gain further insights into the role and importance of the city-region and national context of which the social developments are part, we will have to extend our theoretical reasoning about the potential impact of the urban, regional and national context on social processes in urban neighbourhoods.

Finally, other research has pointed out that the supply of commercial services and the design and maintenance of public spaces are important policy areas with respect to social cohesion (Talen, 2003; Boddy and Parkinson, 2004; Dekker and Filipović, forthcoming). Clearly, the quality of the physical environment influences social cohesion in urban neighbourhoods. It would be rewarding if future analyses of social cohesion could take into consideration the quality of the physical environment in the neighbourhood as an explanatory variable. This would enable the identification of the most effective policy fields in which to take action.

### *Urban governance*

The theory of governance suggests that new, more complex, and more responsive forms of governance – as opposed to government – emerged in the 1990s. These changes have displaced more traditional forms of urban policy and local government. We had to make several choices in the research design of this thesis with respect to the use of the concept of governance. Here we reflect on these choices, and indicate ideas for further research.

First, we studied governance at the neighbourhood level within the city context. We have discussed the development of the neighbourhood with people who work in the neighbourhood, but also with people who work at the city level. The research findings have indicated that not only the neighbourhood, but also the city is an important level at which decisions with respect to neighbourhood development are taken. This finding confirms that in this study we have been quite right to take into account not only the neighbourhood level, but also the city level in explaining neighbourhood development. However, the findings would gain significance if

the governance process of higher spatial scale levels had also been taken into consideration. As indicated by Salet and colleagues (2003), large cities are increasingly organising themselves in metropolitan regions that are mainly concerned about their competitive position *vis-à-vis* other metropolitan regions. At the moment, it is not clear what the impact will be of new regional-scale structures on city-scale strategy and strategic planning. New research would be needed to point out the effects of further shifts in responsibilities away from the neighbourhood and even away from the city on the developments of these neighbourhoods.

Second, we have used three theoretical interpretations that are based on the situation in Anglo-Saxon countries as a framework for our study of a situation in the Netherlands. We consider here the extent to which the use of Anglo-Saxon-based governance interpretations is useful in the Dutch situation. Before doing so, we first have to indicate the differences between the UK and the Netherlands in state forms and civil society. At the risk of oversimplification, something can be said briefly about this matter on the basis of comparative studies performed by others. Hendriks (1996) shows in his comparative study that the policy, culture, and institutions in Birmingham (UK) are characterised by two types of policymaking: conservatism and the accommodation of existing processes on the one hand, and active decision-making strategies focusing on results on the other hand. In comparison, the Dutch policymaking process is based on a social democratic, conservative, state-oriented approach. Beaumont (1999) has argued on the basis of his comparison of local anti-poverty strategies in North Tyneside (UK) and Rotterdam (The Netherlands) that a generally accepted perception is growing among British policymakers that the Dutch urban and social policy has a positive value that could be transferred to the British situation. Our study in The Hague indeed finds a strong social rhetoric among policymakers, although this is not always reflected in actions that focus on social issues<sup>3</sup>.

These studies make it clear that Dutch policies have a stronger focus on social issues than British policies do. This emphasis would explain why so little of the (predominantly Anglo-Saxon-based) governance literature says relatively little about the social effects of governance processes.

Taking this into account, we return to the question whether Anglo-Saxon-based governance interpretations are useful in the Dutch situation. We think that the governance interpretations have some clarifying power. In the first chapter of this thesis we presented three interpretations: governance as self-organising inter-organisational networks; new public management; and collaborative planning. The first two interpretations of governance were found to be partially applicable to our case study. However, the interpretations are weak in their normative idealistic ideas since they do not have a social focus, which makes them less attractive to use in evaluating governance in the Dutch context. Collaborative planning, conversely, was found to be weak with respect to its applicability in practice, but reflects well-developed political ideals. The interpretation embodies the ideal of a society that is free from domination, which is democratic and in which there is a strong civil society. In the search for an explanatory interpretation for Dutch governance Healey's concept has great attraction, but some adaptations are needed to make it more useful as an analytical tool.

A number of critics of the collaborative planning theory have indicated that one of the most important omissions of the interpretation is that it does not recognise the reality of power in human relationships (Allmendinger and Tewdwr Jones, 2002; Flyvbjerg and Richardson, 2002; Hall and Rowlands, 2005). Power seems to be acknowledged in the interpretation, but is regarded as a negative, distorting influence whose effects can be removed by constructing an

idealised debate. These critics indicated that questions of domination, control, and hierarchy play important parts in determining how actors choose or are able to co-operate with one another. The original collaborative planning model does not feature this<sup>4</sup>.

The different notions of power in these approaches have not yet been fully related to the collaborative planning theory of Patsy Healey. Planning theory would gain in explanatory value if a clear notion could be added of what power is and how it is generated, while not losing sight of the social ideology of an inclusive governance process.

#### *Linking these concepts*

One of the goals of this thesis was to understand the relationship between social cohesion and urban governance. In chapter one, we indicated that the participation of residents is an intermediary factor in this relationship. The empirical findings have indicated that residents who participate formally or informally in neighbourhood management did indeed build social cohesion, and conversely that high scores on the indicators of social cohesion predict higher levels of participation. So the choice of participation as an intermediary factor seems to have been the correct one. However, some remarks need to be made.

First, it is not a *sine qua non* for all residents to take part in the policymaking process. Being involved and feeling part of a neighbourhood is different from being actively involved in its management. It may very well be the case that residents feel strongly attached to their neighbourhood, but are not interested in participation in neighbourhood-oriented activities. Some people may not want to participate because they find other things in life more important. In that case there is no real problem. However, the situation becomes more problematic if, as shown in this thesis, the governance process is not open to new partners, does not actively involve residents, or even excludes them. In that case the legitimacy of the policymaking process may be questioned.

Second, the method of data gathering has probably influenced the findings. In our study the policymakers ventilate their opinion that participation positively influences social cohesion. Future research may ask the residents themselves how they see this, because it is feasible that there are differences between policymakers and residents in the evaluation of participation. The objective aim of a policy to stimulate participation may be experienced differently by the residents. They may, for example, have the feeling that everything is still arranged 'from above', despite the official rhetoric. Our findings indicate that there is some degree of 'paying lip service' to the positive effects of participation on social cohesion by our respondents. It would be beneficial if future research could include the opinions of residents, both those who participate and those who do not, on how they experience participation practices in the neighbourhood and the effect on social cohesion.

Third, it would be fruitful to understand in which specific local circumstances participation is the result of the capacity of the residents, and how neighbourhood professionals and private partners can best contribute to this. The residents in our research areas did not actively demand a say in decision-making, but in other cases residents may be actively involved in the management of their neighbourhood. Sometimes this is a response to problems experienced, but there may be other reasons. Future research could focus on the question why participation in some neighbourhoods is a bottom-up process, while in other situations participation is the result of a top-down process.

Then, there is the problem of the direction of the relationship: Does social cohesion influence participation, or is it the other way around? In line with existing research we have modelled participation as the dependent variable of social cohesion in the quantitative analyses. Strictly speaking, this may be seen as sophisticated descriptive statistics rather than a (logistic) regression model with a causal relationship (see chapter five). However, the qualitative findings indicate that there is a mutually-dependent relationship between participation and social cohesion. Future research may aim to model the interrelated character of the relationship between participation and social cohesion while still controlling for socioeconomic and ethnic characteristics of the respondents.

There is another issue that deserves attention here. Recent research in the UK (Boddy and Parkinson, 2004; Buck et al., 2005) emphasises that long-term structural factors, including industrial structure and economic forces external to any particular urban area, play a crucial part in the relationship between urban governance and social cohesion. Macro economic developments directly influence the availability of jobs within reach of the residents of urban neighbourhoods. If many people in a neighbourhood become unemployed or have low-paid jobs, a concentration of poverty may be the result. The converse may also apply: strong social cohesion in a neighbourhood with high unemployment levels may reinforce a concentration of increased levels of poverty in the area. To gain more insight into the potential or the capacity of governance to have a positive impact on economic development and social cohesion, more information is needed on the effects of employment- and education policies, for example. They may be powerful tools to improve the competitive position of the city-region and its neighbourhoods, and positively influence social cohesion.

#### **7.4 Ideas for better practice: creating social cohesion in urban neighbourhoods**

In this final section, we put forward some ideas for better practice to create social cohesion in urban neighbourhoods. Those who want to enhance social cohesion in urban neighbourhoods should first consider whose cohesion is aimed at. Is it the social cohesion of certain groups in the neighbourhood; or is it social cohesion within the overall neighbourhood; or perhaps a form of social cohesion that makes the residents of the neighbourhood part of the urban or national society? It is useful to think about this matter, because social cohesion can have negative consequences, despite its many positive results<sup>5</sup>. Pinning down the objective would make it easier to reduce the negative consequences of social cohesion.

Moreover, different levels of social cohesion may imply different policy measures. Fostering social cohesion at the neighbourhood level may imply that the focus should mainly be on the dimension of neighbourhood attachment as well as social networks. Neighbourhood attachment may be encouraged through physical measures such as the refurbishment of public space, as suggested by Forrest and Kearns (2001). This measure would probably enhance the spatial-emotional kind of neighbourhood attachment. However, through their active participation in neighbourhood activities, residents will also build social neighbourhood attachment: that is, the feeling that they are part of the social fabric of the area. That is not to say that people will develop close contact, which would be difficult in today's society with virtual and/or mobile lifestyles and increased shares of the population with strong ties abroad. Encouraging participation is also a

profitable way of creating a common set of common values and norms of acceptable behaviour (see Rowlands and Dekker, 2006, for more detailed information and examples of how to enhance social cohesion at neighbourhood level).

To make residents feel part of the city or country, it may be wise to focus on common values and norms as well. Ideas that are accepted in mainstream society can be stimulated at neighbourhood level, while they enable the *“attribution of individuals to society’s collective project and well-being”* (Kearns and Forrest, 2000, p. 996). Values that cherish deriving a living from work rather than from social benefits or even criminal activities are one example. Moreover, common values about acceptable behaviour at neighbourhood level may generate tolerance between ethnic groups. If different ethnicities can live together without too many conflicts in a neighbourhood, a mutual understanding will be generated that could be mirrored at higher spatial levels.

Social cohesion is often a policy goal that is aimed for, because of its expected positive effects. One of the methods used to reach more social cohesion in urban neighbourhoods is the creation of a social mix. In socially-mixed neighbourhoods low- and high income households are placed together. Implicitly, this mix means putting together people with different educational backgrounds and ethnic groups. However, the findings in this and other studies show that an increase in the numbers of highly-educated natives is not associated with high scores on the indicators of social cohesion (see for example Atkinson et al., 2005; Bolt and Torrance, 2005). Different households may mix the characteristics of the populations, but it does not follow that these households will also interact socially. The increased diversity of the population may even lead to increased animosity in neighbourhoods or hide underlying social and economic problems. Clearly, mixing housing tenures should not be seen as a solution in itself, nor is it sufficient on its own to provide social cohesion.

Instead, paying proper attention to the accommodation of a diverse population may lead to more positive forms of social cohesion. As indicated by the economic geographer Ash Amin, one should not be afraid of conflicts in co-operation: *“... the problems of interaction – and therefore also their resolution – are fundamentally related to the political culture of the public domain, more specifically, to the scope there is for vigorous but democratic disagreement between citizens constituted as equals”* (Amin, 2002, p. 976). He goes on to state: *“... living with diversity is a matter of constant negotiation, trial and error, and sustained effort...”* (Amin, 2002, p. 976). We turn to this topic now.

In many West European urban neighbourhoods, including the post-WWII housing estates, the variety among residents is growing in terms of ethnic background and socioeconomic status. If all these different types of people are to live together in reasonable harmony, the diversity must be dealt with effectively by those who have the capabilities to do so: the residents themselves, as well as the local public and private parties.

The residents are of course the most important actors who generate neighbourhood cohesion. We paid attention to the relationship between changing institutional arrangements and social cohesion. The shift from *government* to *governance* implies that residents have a stronger say in decision-making processes in their neighbourhood. We have found that residents who participate in their neighbourhood have ideas in common on how to behave and express stronger feelings of belonging to the neighbourhood. The participation of residents in decision-making processes thus generally leads to more social cohesion, which in turn leads to higher levels of participation. This virtuous circle can reinforce itself over time, and the attitude and actions of

the local authorities and private partners – like the housing association – can have a positive influence on this process.

The local private and public parties can foster social cohesion in their neighbourhoods by including the residents in decision-making processes. Clearly, in the case of a diverse population composition this inclusion implies that all these different kinds of groups need to be incorporated in the decision-making process. The participation of residents in neighbourhoods with many different groups requires sensitivity to difference on the side of local governments and housing associations. This sensitivity to difference can be generated by thinking about the values that are adhered to in a process and discussing these values with other people. In addition, local governments and housing corporations may ask themselves questions about the representation of groups that are difficult to reach, the devolution of responsibilities, the openness of the process to the general public, accessibility to the partnership for outsiders, information provision to outsiders, and discussion of the values that shape decisions (see Van Kempen and Dekker (2006) for more information and examples of dealing with multi-ethnic communities).

Not only the local authorities, but also the national government may take action to facilitate diversity in the governance process in urban neighbourhoods. The national government may facilitate longer time spans for submitting proposals, and could even set guidelines for the diversity of participation during the planning phase. In this phase, decisions on the ideal image of the neighbourhood that is aimed for are made and funds are divided. In this way residents who do not speak the language, who have different ways of communicating, or have deviant ideas about what the neighbourhood should look like will also be included. The short time spans during the planning phase and the need for short-term visible results is now an important barrier to the participation of groups that are difficult to reach. Poor participation may lead to an inappropriate division of funds, or projects that aim at issues that is not in line with the needs of the population.

This may be the way to the process dream of a democratic society (that Patsy Healey mentions in the quote in the beginning of this book), in which collaboration instead of conflict between individuals prevails. If all the people who have an interest in the neighbourhood can be involved in its management (if they want to be involved), there is a chance that not only the young student couple of the narrative in chapter one, but also their co-residents may live ‘happily ever after’.

## Notes

- 1 Of course, there are more reasons for the creation of a social mix, which were not studied here.
- 2 We acknowledge that there is a mutual relationship between participation and social cohesion. Strictly speaking, it is therefore not possible to speak of a one-way causal influence from the indicators of social capital and neighbourhood attachment on participation. An explanation and account of the methodological issues can be found in chapter five.
- 3 Within Dutch urban restructuring processes, for example, much more money is spent on physical than on social issues (Van Kempen and Bolt, 2003).
- 4 The critics formulate their argument on the basis of different ideas about what it is that generates power: different forms of capital (Bourdieu, 1986), the influence of space on the operation of discourse, and hence on power (Foucault, 1979), control over economic resources, control over the service and administrative infrastructures of an urban area, and control over the formal political system (Mann, 1986).

- 5 For example, social cohesion within groups can be a very helpful support to these groups, but can lead to the exclusion of others within the neighbourhood. In practice, a cohesive native Dutch community can make non-natives like Moroccans feel excluded from the neighbourhood and *vice versa*. In this case, social cohesion may even lead to problems with respect to racism or clashes of different values. Another negative aspect of social cohesion within a neighbourhood can be that the residents of this neighbourhood do not identify with the rest of the urban or national society. They may even drift away from mainstream society and become excluded from work and education. These kinds of social cohesion will not be what is aimed for.

# Samenvatting in het Nederlands

## Samenwerkend beleid als bindende factor

*Stedelijk samenwerkend beleid en sociale cohesie in na-oorlogse wijken in Nederland*

### *Inleiding*

Vlak na de tweede wereldoorlog waren na-oorlogse wijken gewilde woonlocaties, maar momenteel kampt dit type wijk met een veelheid aan problemen: Fysiek verval, werkloosheid, leegstaande woningen, criminaliteit, sociale en etnische spanningen, en een tekort aan diensten (winkels, openbare instellingen) en opleidingsmogelijkheden. Er wordt veel goeds verwacht van sociale cohesie om de situatie in deze wijken te verbeteren. Zowel beleidsmakers als onderzoekers willen graag weten welke factoren bij kunnen dragen aan meer en betere vormen van sociale cohesie in buurten. Vooral beleidsmakers zijn van mening dat een tekort aan sociale cohesie één van de oorzaken van bovengenoemde problemen zou kunnen zijn.

De aandacht voor sociale cohesie gaat gepaard met een focus op samenwerkend beleid, wat belangrijke consequenties heeft voor de rol van de inwoners van na-oorlogse gebieden in beleidsvormingsprocessen in die buurt. In samenwerkend beleid worden alle belangenbehartigers geacht zeggenschap te hebben in deze processen, in tegenstelling tot vroeger toen vooral de overheid bepaalde wat er gebeurde. Nu zijn het de lokale overheden, private partijen, zoals de corporaties, maar ook de bewoners die deelnemen aan beleidsvormingsprocessen.

Het doel van dit onderzoek is om inzicht te krijgen in de relatie tussen samenwerkend beleid en sociale cohesie in na-oorlogse wijken. Op basis van eerder onderzoek kan worden verwacht dat bewoners die deelnemen aan beleidsvormingsprocessen een hogere mate van sociale cohesie kennen. Ook omgekeerd kan worden verwacht dat bewoners in een wijk met veel sociale cohesie meer geneigd zullen zijn zich in te zetten en zullen participeren in beleidsvormingsprocessen.

In de academische literatuur is er veel bekend over zowel sociale cohesie als over samenwerkend beleid, maar we weten niet hoe deze twee concepten aan elkaar gerelateerd zijn. Dit onderzoek heeft als doel het inzicht te vergroten in de factoren die sociale cohesie genereren, een evaluatie te geven van het samenwerkend beleid, en kennis te creëren over de relatie tussen sociale cohesie en samenwerkend beleid. Dat alles is bestudeerd in na-oorlogse wijken in Nederland. Om dit doel te bereiken is de volgende onderzoeksvraag beantwoord:

*Hoe zijn stedelijke samenwerkende beleidsprocessen gerelateerd aan sociale cohesie in na-oorlogse wijken?*

Deze onderzoeksvraag is opgesplitst in vier deelvragen:

1. *Welke soort, en welke combinaties van sociale, economische en fysieke problemen kunnen er worden onderscheiden in na-oorlogse wijken in Europa?*

2. *Wat is de reactie van het huidige Grotestedenbeleid op deze problemen in na-oorlogse wijken? Hoe is dit beleid georganiseerd? Wie participeert in het beleidsvormingsproces en wie heeft de beslissingen genomen over deze participatie? Hoe kan het samenwerkend beleid worden geëvalueerd?*
3. *In welke mate is sociale cohesie gerelateerd aan sociaal-economische en etnische kenmerken van de bewoners in de onderzoekswijken?*
4. *In welke mate beïnvloedt sociale cohesie de participatie van bewoners in samenwerkend beleid? Hoe is participatie in samenwerkende beleidsprocessen gerelateerd aan sociale cohesie?*

Naast de inleiding en de conclusie bestaat dit onderzoek uit 5 empirische hoofdstukken die ieder bestaan uit een afzonderlijk artikel. De eerste onderzoeksvraag wordt beantwoord in hoofdstuk 2. De tweede onderzoeksvraag wordt niet alleen beantwoord in hoofdstuk 3, maar ook in hoofdstuk 6. De derde onderzoeksvraag wordt beantwoord in hoofdstuk 4. De laatste onderzoeksvraag wordt beantwoord in hoofdstuk 5 en 6.

### *Samenvatting van de resultaten*

De beschrijving van de soort en combinatie van problemen in na-oorlogse wijken (vraag 1) is gebaseerd op een inventarisatie van ontwikkelingen en problemen in 29 na-oorlogse wijken in 10 Europese landen, waarvan verslag in hoofdstuk 2. Het is duidelijk geworden dat de situatie in diverse na-oorlogse wijken in Europa heel verschillend is, en dat lang niet alle wijken zich in een achterstandssituatie bevinden. Het blijkt dat niet alle wijken zich op vergelijkbare wijze hebben ontwikkeld, terwijl het idee waarmee de wijken zijn neergezet grote overeenkomsten vertonen.

Er is een overzicht gegeven van de belangrijkste problemen, zoals slecht onderhoud, een concentratie van lage inkomens, een slechte positie op de woningmarkt, conflicten en slechte dienstverlening. Een aantal van de problemen zijn gerelateerd aan een lage mate van sociale cohesie, zoals de aanwezigheid van conflicten, hogere criminaliteitscijfers, vandalisme en/of problemen met het onderhoud van de openbare ruimte. De variatie in problemen tussen de verschillende wijken in Europa geeft aan dat er niet één beleidsoplossing is die tot verbetering kan leiden in iedere situatie.

Vervolgens is in de hoofdstukken 3 en 6 op basis van kwalitatieve gegevens het beleidsvormingsproces van het Grotestedenbeleid geanalyseerd, waarbij speciale aandacht is besteed aan de participatie van bewoners. Het theoretische uitgangspunt is dat van samenwerkend beleid ('governance'). In tegenstelling tot meer traditionele vormen van beleidsvorming, zijn er bij samenwerkende beleidsprocessen behalve de publieke sector ook de private en maatschappelijke partijen betrokken (Jessop, 1995; Stoker, 1995; Coaffee en Healey, 2003).

Uit de interviews met beleidsmakers in Den Haag blijkt dat bewoners vooral betrokken zijn in kleinschalige, korte termijn processen, georganiseerd door beleidsmakers, en minder in grootschalige, lange termijn processen. De samenwerkingsverbanden richten zich voornamelijk op publiek-private samenwerking tussen partijen die beschikken over macht in de zin van geld, kennis of representatieve macht. Bewoners worden alleen uitgenodigd als de beleidsmakers daar een directe aanleiding voor zien. Veel beleidsmakers ervaren problemen ervaren met de participatie van de lagere sociaal-economische groepen en etnische minderheden. De bewoners die wél deelnemen aan beleidsprocessen vormen geen afspiegeling van de bevolking; het is vaak de blanke, gepensioneerde chef van de Edah die deel kan nemen aan overlegmomenten.

Sommige beleidsmakers zijn van mening dat mensen met een lage sociaal-economische status, en mensen met een niet-Nederlandse achtergrond vaker in armoede leven, minder

capaciteiten hebben om te participeren, en minder sociale cohesie kennen dan mensen met een hogere sociaal-economische status en autochtone Nederlanders. De derde onderzoeksvraag richt zich op de mate waarin sociale cohesie gerelateerd is aan de sociaal-economisch en etnische kenmerken van de bewoners in de onderzoeksgebieden.

Er zijn drie dimensies van sociale cohesie op buurtniveau onderscheiden: sociale netwerken, gemeenschappelijke waarden en een 'civic culture', en buurtgebondenheid. Deze dimensies zijn afgeleid van de in het Verenigd Koninkrijk veel gebruikte definitie van sociale cohesie van Kearns en Forrest (2000). In hoofdstuk 4 is geanalyseerd hoe deze dimensies met elkaar samenhangen. De analyse op basis van enquête gegevens in twee na-oorlogse wijken geven aan dat buurtgebondenheid sterk samenhangt met de andere twee dimensies, maar dat sociale netwerken en de gemeenschappelijke waarden dimensie nauwelijks gecorreleerd zijn. De multivariate analyses geven aan dat sociaal-economische status slechts in geringe mate gerelateerd is aan de indicatoren van sociale cohesie. Daarnaast geven de analyses aan dat mensen met een niet-Nederlandse achtergrond hoger scoren op de indicatoren van sociale cohesie. Ook blijkt dat huiseigenaren en mensen die binnen de wijk een wooncarrière hebben gemaakt hoger scoren op de dimensie buurtgebondenheid.

De laatste onderzoeksvraag tenslotte, buigt zich over de vraag hoe sociale cohesie, participatie en samenwerkend beleid met elkaar samenhangen. In hoofdstuk 5 is op basis van dezelfde enquête als in hoofdstuk 4 onderzocht in welke mate de dimensies van sociale cohesie invloed hebben op de kans dat iemand participeert in de wijk. Participatie is daarbij gedefinieerd als zowel formele als informele activiteiten die het doel hebben de situatie in de wijk te verbeteren (Arnstein, 1969; Lelieveldt, 2004). De multivariate modellen controleren voor de invloed van sociaal-economische status en etniciteit, alsmede de woonkenmerken van de respondenten.

De analyses tonen aan dat vooral mensen met een hoge mate van buurtgebondenheid de neiging hebben te participeren dan mensen met minder buurtgebondenheid. Ook bewoners met veel vrienden in de buurt, zij die het gebruik van geweld afkeuren, zullen vaker participeren. Het maakt minder uit of je met de buren praat, vertrouwen hebt in de andere bewoners, of afwijkend gedrag goedkeurt.

Hoofdstuk 6 geeft op basis van interviews met beleidsmakers aan wat het effect is van deelname door bewoners aan samenwerkende beleidsvormingsprocessen op de dimensies van sociale cohesie, en hoe 'governance' factoren daarop van invloed zijn. De beleidsmakers zien zoals verwacht een positief effect van participatie op de sociale netwerken, de gemeenschappelijke waarden en de buurtgebondenheid. Ondanks deze positieve effecten die beleidsmakers ervaren, worden bewoners niet altijd betrokken in belangrijke netwerken. Het beleidsproces is zodanig ingericht dat bewoners uitgesloten worden van de netwerken waarin de belangrijkste beslissingen worden genomen. Ook de manier waarop het overleg plaats vindt is niet toegankelijk voor bewoners, onder andere omdat beleidsmakers weinig vertrouwen hebben in de kennis en kunde van de nieuwkomers (waaronder migranten) in het proces.

Al met al heeft dit onderzoek belangrijk empirisch materiaal geleverd waarmee de theoretische aannamen kunnen worden onderbouwd. Participatie relateert inderdaad op drie manieren de activiteiten in het samenwerkend beleidsproces aan de dimensies van sociale cohesie:

1. Samenwerkend beleid kan mensen zowel motiveren als ontmoedigen om te participeren;
2. Participatie is positief gerelateerd aan sociale cohesie;
3. Sociale cohesie heeft een positief effect op participatie.

De relatie tussen samenwerkende beleidsprocessen en sociale cohesie is wederzijds, waarbij de participatie van bewoners in beleidsvormingsprocessen een belangrijke tussenliggend element is.

#### *Enkele slotopmerkingen*

Hoewel dit onderzoek een reeks theoretische inzichten empirisch heeft onderbouwd over de relatie tussen samenwerkend beleid en sociale cohesie, moeten ook enkele kanttekeningen worden gemaakt. Allereerst moet worden genoemd dat sociale cohesie vaak positief is, maar ook negatieve kanten kent. Eén van de negatieve kanten van sterke cohesie tussen een aantal mensen is dat anderen uitgesloten kunnen worden van deze groep. Een ander negatief effect van sociale cohesie kan zijn dat er binnen een groep afwijkende normen als 'normaal' gezien worden. Cohesie is dus niet altijd positief. Het is aan te bevelen in de toekomst meer aandacht te hebben voor de negatieve effecten van sociale cohesie, en hoe dat gerelateerd is aan de bevolkingssamenstelling. Zo is het nog onbekend wat het effect is van een concentratie van etnische minderheden op de vorm van sociale cohesie.

Ook het tweede concept dat centraal heeft gestaan in dit onderzoek verdient enige aanvulling. De theoretische uitgangspunten over samenwerkend beleid zijn grotendeels gebaseerd op Angelsaksische situaties, terwijl het hier natuurlijk gaat over de Nederlandse situatie. In Nederland is er, in vergelijking met die in het Verenigd Koninkrijk, meer aandacht voor de sociale gevolgen van beleidsvormingsprocessen waarvoor weinig oog is in de Angelsaksische theorie. De Angelsaksische modellen hebben dus wel veel verklarende kracht in de Nederlandse situatie, maar deze kracht zou verder verbeterd kunnen worden als er ook aandacht zou zijn voor de sociale effecten van samenwerkend beleid. Hier zou in de toekomst meer aandacht aan kunnen worden besteed.

Dit onderzoek heeft participatie gekozen als verbindend concept tussen sociale cohesie en samenwerkend beleid. Uit de empirische bevindingen blijkt dat de keuze voor participatie als interveniërend concept gerechtvaardigd is. Dit betekent echter niet dat iedereen moet participeren in zijn of haar wijk. Veel mensen hebben daar helemaal geen behoefte aan en dat is ook geen probleem. Het wordt echter wel problematisch als mensen wel willen participeren maar dat niet kunnen omdat ze daar zelf de kennis en kunde niet voor hebben, of omdat de organisaties waar de beslissingen genomen worden (zoals in de case study in Den Haag) voor hen gesloten blijven. In dat geval is er sprake van uitsluiting van bepaalde groepen uit het beleidsproces, waarvan verwacht kan worden dat dit een negatief effect heeft op de mate van vertrouwen in de lokale overheid, het accepteren van gedeelde normen, en de gehechtheid aan de buurt.

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# Appendix A: List of interviewed persons in The Hague

## *City level*

- Program secretary URBAN programme
- Policy employee Bureau URBAN Department liveability
- Senior advisor, Department of Urban Development
- Account manager Morgenstond/South West, Department of Urban Development
- Senior policy employee responsible for social pillar Big Cities Policy, Department of Urban Studies
- Senior policy employee responsible for the making of ‘Mensenwerk’, social pillar Big Cities Policy, Department of Social Affairs
- External project manager “Hard/Soft”
- Former head of Department of Urban Maintenance Schilderswijk
- Coordinator economic pillar Big Cities Policy
- Senior policy employee economic pillar Big Cities Policy
- Senior policy employee Big Cities Policy in general
- Senior policy employee social cohesion URBAN
- Senior manager police Haaglanden, coordinator safety policy

## *Neighbourhood level*

- District coordinator Bouwlust (Escamp)
- District coordinator Schilderswijk (Centre)
- District coordinator Segbroek
- Manager welfare organisation Schilderswijk
- Team manager welfare organisation Bouwlust-Vrederust
- Bureauchef Police Bureau Beresteinlaan
- Bureauchef Police Bureau de Heemstraat
- Social worker welfare organisation Bouwlust
- Inhabitants organisation Schilderswijk
- Editorial board of De Nieuwe Schilderswijker, local newspaper made by volunteers
- Chair of the inhabitants organisation Bouwlust
- Housing corporation Vestia The Hague South West, Senior district manager The Hague South West
- Housing corporation Haagwonen, Senior district manager Schilderswijk
- Housing corporation Haagwonen, Junior district manager The Hague South West

# Curriculum Vitae

Karien Dekker was born in Schagen (Noord-Holland) on the 10th of May, 1972. After she graduated in 1996 as a geographer specialised in poverty issues in developing countries, she worked on two short term research projects at the Department of Urban Geography at Utrecht University, but she wanted to know more about the daily practice of urban planning before continuing her academic career. First she worked for the local administration in Utrecht. As a project manager she was responsible for several projects in urban areas. Later she specialised in liveability issues in distressed neighbourhoods, employed by a commercial company as a project manager. However, her interest in research urged her to go back to university in 2001, and she became involved in the European 5th-Framework project UGIS (Urban Governance, Social Inclusion and Sustainability) as a researcher. She has been the programme manager of the European 5th Framework project RESTATE (Restructuring Large Housing Estates in Europe) from 2002-2005. Simultaneously, she worked on her PhD thesis at the Department of Urban Geography, Faculty of Geosciences, Utrecht University. She is now a post-doctorate researcher at the Department of Sociology, Faculty of Social Sciences at the same university.