

tial ethical themes. Omissions and occasional distortions are inevitable given the sheer number of specimens. A more serious disadvantage lies in the way reading and viewing notes on hundreds of plots and characters end up treating some of the most brilliant, subtle, and witty novels, plays, and films as a sequence of predictable moral dilemmas and stark oppositions, examples of their authors' optimism or pessimism or their oscillation between these poles. This makes reading the book (rather than consulting it piecemeal, as a compendium or encyclopedia in tandem with other studies) a difficult proposition.

And yet the outcome has its own benefits. Haynes makes accessible an archive of works, ideas, and creative personalities, famous and obscure. Although she is clear from the start that her intention is not to focus primarily on science fiction (p. 8), the book's chief appeal will probably lie in its impressively vast summary of British, American, German, French, and Russian science fiction or science-oriented novels, plays, and films spanning the last four centuries. Haynes produces all this with a scholarly energy that generates its own optimism—one that continues to the final page, where she announces a forthcoming volume that will carry her literary and film studies into the twenty-first century.

Ronald Levao

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**Cathy Gere.** *Pain, Pleasure, and the Greater Good: From Panopticon to the Skimmer Box and Beyond.* viii + 292 pp., figs., notes, bibl., index. Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press, 2017. \$30 (cloth). ISBN 9780226501857.

The title does not give it away immediately, but this book tells the story of utilitarianism and its role in the history of medical ethics. Utilitarianism is the idea that an act is morally right if that act maximizes the good, even if at the expense of one or more individuals for whom it is bad. In *Pain, Pleasure, and the Greater Good* Cathy Gere brings into focus the consequences for those who were negatively affected by utilitarian ethics in medicine: the victims of human experimentation. As accustomed as we are to the idea of informed consent, this book reminds us that it has only recently relegated utilitarianism to second place.

The story of utilitarianism has been told before, but not as intelligently and compassionately as Gere has done. Gere's thought-provoking argument is that the science of pain and pleasure (that is, theories of human motivation) was thoroughly intertwined with a system of ethical reasoning and decision making. In Gere's words, "Utilitarianism did not just sit, so to speak, 'on top' of medical ethics, as a guide to action that had little to do with the actual object of inquiry. Rather, it arose out of a scientific view of the fundamental psychological makeup of the human animal" (pp. 19–20).

Gere begins the book with the human experiment controversies that followed World War II. In the first and best chapter, she brings together the Nuremberg Medical Trial (1946–1947) and American research on human subjects such as the Tuskegee Syphilis Study (1932–1972). During the Nuremberg Medical Trial, American investigators soon realized that human experimentation in the United States differed from Nazi practices only in degree. But when Andrew Ivy, a representative of the American Medical Association, testified at the trial and was asked whether any experiments without informed consent were conducted in the United States, he answered, "Not to my knowledge." This was an outright lie. It was also the beginning of the fall of utilitarianism in medical ethics, even though it would take another two decades and the exposure of several breaches of ethical conduct for informed consent to take hold.

The following chapters move back in time to trace the intertwined history of utilitarianism and the human sciences through a series of thinkers and scientists such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, and many others. Gere portrays each of them vividly, including life stories, his-

torical context, and fun facts. The second chapter starts and ends with Jeremy Bentham, the founder of utilitarianism, who dismissed as nonsense all other ethical considerations, such as human motivations or the idea of individual rights. In contrast to the rhetoric of rights, the balance of pleasure and pain was, for Bentham, a better, measurable way to decide which actions are good. Bentham also developed the idea of a physiological system that guided behavior, thus combining politics, medicine, and utilitarianism.

Chapters 4 and 5 link Bentham with the utilitarian psychology of American behaviorism, following his legacy in the work of Alexander Bain, David Ferrier, John B. Watson—“surely one of the most unlikable characters ever to make his mark on science” (p. 169)—and B. F. Skinner. Watson’s and Skinner’s research on animals suggested that scientists should “stop being anthropomorphic about *humans*” (p. 170) because humans followed the same laws of pleasure and pain as animals did. Although behaviorism was heavily criticized in the second half of the twentieth century, this did not mean the end of utilitarian thinking, which Gere sees returning in neuroeconomics and behavioral economics. Human experimentation in the United States was dealt a final blow in the 1970s with, among others, the publication of Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress’s *Principles of Biomedical Ethics* (Oxford, 1979), a book that, according to Gere, willfully sanitized the historical narrative “to the point of falsehood” (p. 203) by omitting or downplaying the seriousness of the experiments on human test subjects. Of course, it is her own book that has now set the story right.

The central argument works better at some points than at others. Sometimes we see clearly how pain/pleasure thinking and utilitarian medical ethics went hand in hand, as in behaviorist brain research on psychiatric patients. But at other times the link is less direct. There is also another book to be written about the philosophical genealogy of individual autonomy in medical ethics, which is now almost taken for granted.

In her narrative, Gere hardly mentions other historians and how she relates to their work. This makes the argument harder to pinpoint but probably makes the book a better read. Moreover, Gere is not a distanced historian but an author fully involved in the project. She introduces herself as a convert from utilitarianism, and it is clear that this history is also interwoven with her personal history and beliefs. That only serves to make the book more engaging, a very well written and historically informed call for humanism in science and ethics that deserves a wider readership than specialists alone.

Fenneke Sysling

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**Fernando Vidal; Francisco Ortega.** *Being Brains: Making the Cerebral Subject.* 318 pp., bibl., index. New York: Fordham University Press, 2017. \$59.99 (cloth). ISBN 9780823276073.

Fernando Vidal and Francisco Ortega have been writing about the “cerebralization of the self,” both collaboratively and individually, for almost two decades. Their book is a welcome addition to the recent flurry of works that critically examine the rise to prominence of the *neuro*-sciences in neoliberal democracies.

From the outset of *Being Brains*, the authors argue that they are not criticizing the “neurofication” of the human and social sciences but, rather, critiquing a certain *kind* of essentialism that reduces personhood and selfhood to a crude form of “brainhood” (p. 25). Being at pains to convince their readers that they are not merely denouncing this modern creed, they succeed in thoroughly laying out its history as well as unveiling its implicit assumptions and various pitfalls.

The first chapter provides a breathtaking *longue durée* genealogy of the “brain-personhood nexus.” The authors show how this nexus has been sustained and sanctified since at least the seventeenth century and even more significantly with the popular rise of phrenology in the nineteenth century. By examining more closely technologies of brain fitness and the self-care literature, they establish the “ideological continuity”