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**PERCEIVING THE BODY 'FROM THE INSIDE'?  
BODILY AWARENESS, PERCEPTION, INTROSPECTION**

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## **Abstract**

This paper addresses the question: should one conceptualise bodily awareness in terms of perception or should one conceptualise it as an autonomous capacity? This question is answered by examining the works of two philosophers whose responses to this question differ fundamentally: Sydney Shoemaker argues that bodily awareness is not to be conceptualised as perception, whereas Michael Martin argues the opposite. To see which view is preferable, their accounts of bodily awareness are compared. In doing so, their general outlook on the nature of perception and the role of qualia and the account for qualia therein, are discussed. Based on an intentional theory of perception, Shoemaker sketches a stereotypical account of perception which he calls the 'object-perception model'. He argues that bodily awareness does not fit into that model. Martin defends a naïve realist theory of perception. On basis of that theory, it might be possible to defend the object-perception model for bodily awareness, and thereby to defend a perceptual account of bodily awareness. This, however, depends on the hotly debated plausibility and adequacy of the naïve realist conception of perception.

## Table of contents

Introduction.....	3
I. Different conceptualisations of bodily awareness.....	6
I.1 Martin’s spatial account of bodily awareness as perception .....	6
I.2 Criticism of a perceptual account of bodily awareness.....	9
I.3 Shoemaker vs. Martin .....	12
II. Intentionalism vs. naïve realism of perceptual experience.....	14
II.1 The ordinary conception of perceptual experience .....	14
II.2 Shoemaker’s intentionalist account of perceptual experience .....	14
II.3 The intentionalist’s reply to the argument from hallucination .....	17
II.4 Disjunctivism and a naïve realist’s reply to the argument from hallucination.....	19
II.5 Metaphysical disjunctivism to defend naïve realism.....	21
II.6 Naïve realism as an alternative? .....	25
III. A naïve realist object-perception model? .....	27
III.1 An object-perception model for bodily awareness?.....	27
III.2 The naïve realist’s account of the phenomenal character of experiences .....	28
III.3 Defending the object-perception model of bodily awareness.....	31
III.4 Concluding remarks on the naïve realist’s object perception model.....	32
Conclusion .....	34
Bibliography.....	36

## Introduction

Bodily awareness, and the body in general, have for a long time been almost ignored by philosophers, with the exception of some phenomenologists. Partly because of influences coming from scientific domains such as neuropsychology and psychiatry, the body started to get more attention from philosophers as well (de Vignemont, 2016). David Armstrong (1962) was one of the first non-phenomenologist philosophers who extensively wrote about bodily awareness and its conceptualisation:

When we have a bodily sensation it feels to us as if something were going on in our body or as if something were in contact with our body: impressions that may or may not correspond to reality. We can give an account of bodily sensation in terms of the concepts involved in perception: no unique, irreducible, concepts are required. (p. 127)<sup>1</sup>

In this quote, Armstrong summarises the main conclusion of his book on bodily sensations, arguing that bodily sensations are perceptions of our body. However, Armstrong did not have the last word on this matter, but rather stirred up the discussion of how to conceptualise bodily awareness.

Michael Martin (1993, 1995) is a philosopher who more recently defended the view that bodily awareness is a form of perception, therefore arguing (in a different way) for the same conclusion as Armstrong. Martin (1995) does agree with Armstrong in that he also accounts for bodily awareness in terms of perception. However, he disagrees with Armstrong because, according to him, Armstrong wishes “to deny that there are any subjective qualities or qualia belonging to sensations, or to any sensory experience” (p. 268). Martin does not agree with Armstrong on this point and distances himself from that view by saying that “[a]ll that is being claimed here is that the objects to which such qualities are attributed in experiences appear to the subject to be *body parts* [italics NK] and not mere mental objects” (p. 269).

That bodily awareness is conceptualised in terms of perception is far from obvious. There are a couple of well known arguments not to account for bodily awareness in terms of perception: first, there is not one organ that perceives the body; secondly, it is argued that one is only aware of

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<sup>1</sup> In a nutshell, Armstrong's (1962) account goes as follows: he holds that bodily sensations are sense-impressions. Sense-impressions are what we articulate as ‘it seems to me as if...’. Seeing bodily sensations as bodily sense-impressions makes it possible to account for mistakes in bodily awareness, such as mislocation or pain in phantom limbs: “We cannot say ‘My hand feels sore, but is it really sore?’; but we could say ‘It feels as if there is a disturbance going on in my hand (a bodily impression that arouses certain attitudes in me), but is there really any disturbance going on in my hand?’” (p. 106). Talking of the location of pain in the body in terms of bodily sense-impressions creates space to check what one perceives via the sense-impressions against reality: “To locate a pain in a portion of our body is to feel as if there were a disturbance in that portion of our body (...). Such a bodily impression may correspond or fail to correspond to physical reality” (p. 108).

one object, namely one's own body<sup>2</sup>; thirdly the access that one has to this one object (i.e. the body) is very different than the access one has to other objects of perception (i.e. the body feels to be accessed 'from the inside') (see for an overview and discussion of these arguments Armstrong, 1962; de Vignemont, 2016, §3.1; Martin, 1995; Shoemaker, 1994a). One philosopher who vehemently denies that bodily awareness (which we gain via bodily sensations and sense experiences) can be thought of as perception, is Sydney Shoemaker (1994a,b,c). He adds other arguments to the three arguments already mentioned. As will be shown below, the dispute surrounding the status of qualia is central to his arguments for the conclusion that bodily awareness should be denied the status of perception.

Focussing on the positions held by Martin and Shoemaker (who hold opposing and mutually excluding positions with respect to this issue), the question that I address in this paper is the following: should one conceptualise bodily awareness in terms of perception or should it be conceptualised as an autonomous capacity? To answer this question, another question needs consideration, namely the question of how one should conceptualise perception? Therefore, this paper embeds the discussion of bodily awareness in the wider accounts of the nature of perception. In doing so, the argument from hallucination<sup>3</sup> as well as the status of qualia are discussed. These discussions, however, are restricted to aspects relevant for answering the main question of this paper, namely whether bodily awareness can and should be thought of as perception.

This main body of this paper is divided in three chapters. To start with, I lay out Martin's notion of conceptualising bodily awareness as a form of perception and examine his view in the light of Shoemaker's criticisms of accounts that construe bodily awareness in terms of perception. I proceed by explicating Martin's naïve realist and Shoemaker's intentional theory of perception. Subsequently, I evaluate both accounts by evaluating their response to the argument from hallucination. In the last chapter I return to Shoemaker's argument for the view that denies that bodily awareness has the status of perception. From a naïve realist point of view, I argue that there is a possibility to counter the main points of Shoemaker's criticism, and I claim that a naïve realist account of bodily awareness as perception could be defended. I end this paper by considering some

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<sup>2</sup> This argument might need some more elucidation. It is often argued that bodily awareness is not to be conceptualised as perception, because in what one intuitively calls perception, one is able to perceive a multitude of objects, not just one (see de Vignemont, 2016, §3.1). Chapter I.1 address this argument and how it might be countered.

<sup>3</sup> I only discuss the argument of hallucination because Martin (2004) discusses the argument from hallucination excessively, and because it makes the most important point sufficiently clear: namely how to treat experiences that seem to be veridical perceptions, but lack the object that seems to be perceived. Considering motivations for disjunctivism and which form of disjunctivism to hold, a distinction between the argument from illusion and the argument from hallucination is necessary. One can make a distinction between disjunctivists that oppose veridical perception on the one hand to hallucination and illusion on the other (VvIH), and disjunctivists that oppose veridical perception and illusion on the one hand to hallucination on the other (VIvH) (Logue, 2015). Martin is of the kind VvIH. Because of that and because my main concern doesn't lie with discussing different forms of disjunctivism, I decided not to address both arguments separately, but only to focus on the argument from hallucination.

Nora Kindermann (5552338)  
Perceiving the body 'from the inside'?

limitations of my discussion of the question whether bodily awareness can and should be conceptualised in terms of perception.

## I. Different conceptualisations of bodily awareness

### I.1 Martin's spatial account of bodily awareness as perception

Martin's (1995) general account of bodily awareness as perception goes as follows: if we consider the naïve phenomenology of experiences of our body, we feel that sensations are located in our body and that our body is an object located in the world, a world which contains other objects as well. From that Martin concludes that "bodily sensation is no less concerned with aspects of the physical world – in this case one's body – than are the experiences associated with the traditional five senses" (p. 268). This phenomenological fact serves as the motivation for maintaining that bodily awareness is to be thought of as perception. Furthermore, it is characteristic for the phenomenology of bodily experiences that we have an intimate experience of our body. That is: we seem to perceive our body as "from the inside" (p. 267) and not as any other object in objective space.

Martin (1995) takes phenomenological qualities as basic and accordingly as a starting point for his analysis. Therefore, the question he is facing is: how can the fact that via the bodily senses we only are aware our own body be combined with a perceptual account of one's body, when in perception through the five senses one perceives many objects? In holding on to the perceptual account of bodily awareness, Martin formulates the following answer: "[I]n having bodily sensations, it appears to one as if whatever one is aware of through having such sensations is part of one's body" (p. 269). That means that, if one takes this 'as if' seriously, bodily sensations such as pain are perceptions by which one becomes directly aware of a bodily condition.<sup>4</sup> To ground such a perceptual account of bodily awareness, Martin needs to explain the phenomenological quality that "the body part appears to be part of one's body" (p. 269). Martin calls this phenomenological quality the 'sense of ownership'.

How can the sense of ownership be accounted for? In a first step, Martin (1995) anchors the sense of ownership in the spatiality of the body. He starts by claiming that bodily sensations are a form of perception. To pay attention to one's bodily sensations one is paying attention to what is happening within the boundaries of the body. Thus, whether a perception has the phenomenological quality called 'sense of ownership' is determined by its location; either within or outside the boundaries of one's body. A perception has the quality of a bodily sensation if its felt location is inside the boundaries of one's body. At the same time "[t]he sense one has of the location of sensation brings with it the sense that the location in question falls within one of one's

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<sup>4</sup> Shoemaker (1994a) distinguishes two ways of thinking about bodily sensations: on the one hand, bodily sensations being non-mental bodily condition and, on the other hand, bodily sensations being sense-experiences of bodily condition. In that second case when one is attending to the sense experience one is attending to its intentional object.

apparent boundaries” (p. 271). In other words: whenever a perception has a felt location, the perception carries the sense that the location is within the body-boundaries.

In a second step, Martin (1995) analyses the spatial content of bodily sensations. What does it mean for a bodily sensation to carry the sense that its location is within the boundaries of the body? To answer that question Martin first analyses what it means to fall within a boundary: “[T]he sense of falling within a boundary may be no more than the sense that the location in question is within a space that seems to extend into regions that one could not currently be aware of in this way” (p. 271). From that follows that ‘to fall within the boundaries of the body’ means that it would be possible to feel the sensations that fall within that boundaries in an identical manner. That is to say that the sensations that fall within these boundaries share some phenomenological qualities that can only be attached to sensations located within these boundaries. As this is not the case for sensations that fall outside these boundaries, the phenomenological qualities attached to sensations that fall within the boundaries of the own body are phenomenological different and clearly distinguishable from sensations that do not fall within that boundary<sup>5</sup>. Again, Martin strongly appeals to the phenomenological character of an experience. This way of defining ‘a boundary’ also implies that one is aware of a space in which sensations cannot be felt. That is: “[O]ne has the sense that there are locations outside of one’s boundaries, whatever these happen to be, since the space one feels these locations to be part of feels as if it extends beyond whatever one does feel” (p. 271). Summarizing this second step one can say that having a sense of being bodily bound means that one has a sense of how body parts are located in a space, whereas one also has a sense that the space the body parts are located in is surrounded by a space in which one cannot feel sensations the same way.

In a third step, Martin (1995) analyses how the awareness of the boundaries between those two spaces, that is: the awareness of the boundaries of one’s body, is constituted “within the content of the bodily experiences themselves” (p. 272). The contrast between the bodily space (i.e. the space in which one can feel sensations to be located), and the space extending beyond the bodily space, is necessary to become aware of the boundaries of the body. One becomes aware of the spaces beyond the bodily boundaries via other sense-experiences with a different phenomenological quality, for example via vision or touch.

After having given an account of the sense of ownership, it becomes possible to explain how bodily sensations, kinaesthesia, proprioception and the vestibular sense only perceive one object whereas other sense experiences (such as those of vision or touch) are perceptions of

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<sup>5</sup> One could counter here that there are hallucinations of bodily sensations that bear the same phenomenological properties, but are not located within the boundaries of the own body. This topic will be shortly discussed a little further in the text. In chapter II Martin’s account of hallucination in general will be outlined.

manifold objects. Martin (1995) calls his view, the view that all those bodily sense modalities are perceiving only one object, the sole-object view and contrasts it with the multiple-object view.

The multiple object view treats the fact that we only perceive our own body as merely contingent; we could also perceive other bodies, or parts of them, the same way. The sole object view, on the other hand, must treat bodily perceptions that seem to make us perceive other bodies or that locates perceptions beyond the actual boundaries of our body (e.g. in the case of phantom limbs the actual and the apparent limits of the body do not coincide), as illusions or hallucinations. Therefore, the sole object view claims that “experiences can only be genuine perceptual and count as awareness of some body part, rather than cases of illusion or hallucination, if the body part in question is actually part of one’s own body” (Martin, 1995, p.275). This claim entails that the own body perception differs from, for example, visual perception.<sup>6</sup> Would one apply the paradigm of visual perception to bodily awareness, one could speak of bodily awareness as soon as the objects one perceives are body-parts (not necessarily of one’s own body) and the link between the objects of perception and the subject’s experience is a sufficient causal and informational link. The problem with such an account (i.e. an account in terms of visual perception) is that it does not exclude the multiple-object view.<sup>7</sup> The sole-object view must be established to account for the fact that the bodily awareness can be understood as perception even though one only perceives one object.

According to the sole-object view, the body part one perceives must actually belong to one’s own body. If that is not the case the experience of a body part must be classified as hallucinatory or illusionary. By considering the phenomenal quality of bodily sensations, namely, that they are felt to fall within the boundaries of the own body, Martin (1995) can establish that the perception of body parts belonging to other bodies, is an hallucination: it feels as if the body part in which one feels and locates sensations is part of one’s own body. But the apparent (felt) boundaries of the body do not coincide with the actual ones and, because of that, having sensations in body parts that do not belong to one’s own body, is a case of hallucination and not of perception.

With this account of bodily awareness as perception, Martin (1995) is able to counter two of the arguments brought up against the perceptual view of bodily awareness. Martin can account for the fact that (1) there is only one object we perceive, namely our body, and that (2) we have a very specific access to that object, an access that differs from the perceptual access one has to other objects. It is still not clear, how Martin can accommodate the fact that there is not one sense organ by which the body is perceived.

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<sup>6</sup> In ‘Sense modalities and spatial properties’, Martin (1993, pp. 214-217) works out the difference between the paradigm of perception, namely vision, and bodily awareness as perception. In there he already develops an account of boundedness that is essential in bodily awareness and makes it different from visual perception.

<sup>7</sup> One could think of examples where a sufficient informational and causal link can be established between one’s own body and some body part belonging to some other body. See for an example Martin (1995, pp. 275-277).

As has already been said in the introduction, other accounts of bodily awareness that deny bodily awareness the status of perception, are available. Such an account is the topic of the next section.

## **I.2 Criticism of a perceptual account of bodily awareness**

As already mentioned before, one philosopher who argues against an account of bodily awareness in terms of perception, is Shoemaker (1994a,b,c). Generally, Shoemaker argues that one gains bodily awareness via introspection and that introspective self-knowledge is not a kind of perception. On the one hand, introspective self-knowledge comprises knowledge of mental states such as of beliefs, desires etc.; on the other hand, it comprises feelings, sensations and sense-experiences (thus also bodily sensations that constitute bodily awareness, according to Martin (1995)).

To see why introspective self-knowledge is not a form of perception, and to see why bodily awareness is a kind of introspective self-knowledge, one must understand how Shoemaker (1994a,b,c) thinks of perception. He distinguished two prototypical ways to model perception, namely the object-perception model and the broad perception model, and rejects that either model fits introspection. According to Shoemaker (1994c), in the case of sensations, feelings and sensory experiences, it is quite natural to think that it is adequate to analyse them in terms of perceiving, because one is confronted with a phenomenal character that seems “closely related to the perceived properties of objects” (p. 309). As will be shown below, according to Shoemaker such a view is mistaken.

In what follows, I only discuss the object perception model of perception for I believe, in line with Shoemaker (1994a), that it is the most adequate description of perception and also the most relevant one for discussing bodily awareness. In the rest of this section, I lay out Shoemaker's rejection of thinking of introspective knowledge in terms of the object perception model, focussing on the parts relevant for the discussion of bodily awareness.

To characterize the object-perception model, Shoemaker (1994a) sketches the stereotype of sense perception. It consists of eight conditions that must be fulfilled if one were to talk about perception in terms of the object-perception model:

- (1) The relation of the sense-organ to the object of perception: to gain perceptual knowledge is to get the “appropriate organs into an appropriate relation to the objects of perception” (p. 252).
- (2) The occurrence of sense-experience or sense-impression: they must be distinct from the object of perception.

- (3) The feature that in perception we become aware of facts and "[o]ne's awareness of the facts is explained by one's awareness of the objects involved in these facts" (p. 252).
- (4) Perception provides identification information about the perceived objects, which means that one must be able to pick out the object and distinguish it from others on the basis of the information gained through perception.
- (5) In perception one is perceiving intrinsic, non-relational properties such as colours<sup>8</sup> or shapes.
- (6) In perception one is confronted with objects that form possible objects of attention.
- (7) The causal production of perceptual beliefs: "Perceptual beliefs are causally produced by the objects or states of affairs perceived, via a causal mechanism that normally produces beliefs that are true" (p.253). That means that in the production of perceptual beliefs, the organs of perception guarantee a "correspondence between the contents of belief and what the sense-organ is directed towards" (p.254).
- (8) The object of perception exists independently of being perceived.

According to Shoemaker (1994a), of all those conditions, (3) - (6)<sup>9</sup> are the important ones. Most interesting for the discussion of bodily awareness is Shoemaker's discussion of sensations and sense experiences, the most 'object-like' mental entities as he calls them.<sup>10</sup> According to Shoemaker, concerning sensations and sense experiences, "it is most plausible to say that we are introspectively aware of mental facts *by* being aware of nonfactual entities that are constituents of those facts" (p.

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<sup>8</sup> Shoemaker (1994, p.253) classifies colour as non-relational property. Whether colour should be classified as such, is a matter of discussion. This discussion exceeds the scope of this paper, for more information see Maund (2012).

<sup>9</sup> It should be noted that Shoemaker (1994a) does not consider the relation of appropriate sense-organs to the object of perception as fundamental. I agree with Shoemaker and thereby also take it that Martin's account of conceptualising bodily awareness as perception does not have to worry about the fact that there is not one organ to perceive the body. For an extended discussion of the bodily senses, see 'The Bodily Senses' by Brendan Ritchie and Peter Carruthers (2015).

<sup>10</sup> Shoemaker (1994a) also argues that the self and other nonfactual mental entities such as beliefs and thoughts are not perceived. In rebutting (3) and (4), he argues against perceiving the self, that which we address by 'I'. Considering condition (3), Shoemaker specifies what it means to become aware of an object through perceptions: it means (a) that one has a relation to that object that one can have with other objects as well, and (b) the relation one has to the object causally explains that one knows facts about the object. If this specification is justified, then introspective awareness of the self does not satisfy (3), because "[t]he obvious fact that there is no organ of introspection is in part the fact that there is no such thing as getting oneself in a position (...) for making oneself the object of one's awareness" (p. 257). (This also shows that (1) is not present in the case of introspection.) Considering (4) there obviously is no need for and no room to identify oneself in introspective self-knowledge, neither is there room for misidentification. Furthermore, to identify oneself via the word 'I' presupposes that one has first-person information: "[I]dentification-based first-person knowledge must be grounded in first-person knowledge that is not identification-based; and the making of introspective judgements is one of the main cases in which this occurs" (p. 268). So to have the knowledge about oneself presupposes that one can have different access to it than to the knowledge one gains according to the object perception model.

In rebutting (5) and (6), Shoemaker turns to other nonfactual objects of introspection such as sensations, feelings, thoughts, beliefs etc. Considering (5) Shoemaker sees the following problem for introspection as it is framed as the object-perception model: "[I]ntentional states are standardly individuated by their contents" (p. 259). Differently put: we know our thought by thinking it, there is no intrinsic property in a thought to be known by perception. In the case of belief, the same point becomes clear in that one cannot be aware of a belief and misidentify it as something different.

261). So if our awareness of sense experiences and sensations satisfy conditions (3) - (6), it can be accounted for in terms of perception.<sup>11</sup>

At first sight, our awareness of sensations and sense experiences seems to satisfy (3) – (5). Let us first have a look at sensations and sense experiences in relation to condition (4). Considering sensations, Shoemaker (1994a) gives the following example: one can distinguish two pains by taking into account the intensity and the location of each pain and state that (e.g.) the pain in the elbow is more intense than (e.g.) the pain in the foot. The same example can be used to show that sensations and sense experiences satisfy (3) and (5): “The awareness provides identification information, which enables one to pick out such objects, discriminate them from one another, and track them over time” (p. 261). However, speaking of sensations and sense impressions as mental facts brought about by nonfactual objects (such as in the object-model of perception one speaks of a book as the nonfactual object bringing about the awareness of a fact, namely that the book is present) one faces the same problems that led to the rejection of the sense-datum theory.<sup>12</sup>

Instead of treating the awareness of sensations and sense experiences as awareness of a nonfactual object, one can treat it as awareness of an intentional object or an intentional content that is determined by “factors ‘outside the head’ of the subject of such state” (Shoemaker, 1994a, p. 264). But then “what we are aware of in being aware of such states will not be ‘intrinsic’ features of them, and this awareness will not satisfy condition (5) of the stereotype underlying the object-perception model” (p. 264). That is to say that for example in feeling pain in my elbow because I bumped it, the intentional content of the sensation, namely the representation of the elbow with the phenomenal character of ‘hurting’, is determined by the bumping of the elbow. The property of hurting that constitutes pain (its intensity, whether it is stinging or dull, etc.) is determined by the factual object, the elbow, and is therefore not intrinsic to the pain but to the factual object.<sup>13</sup> Therefore, Shoemaker concludes, (5) is not fulfilled.

Shoemaker (1994a) does not work out whether conditions (3) and (4) are fulfilled or not when one treats the awareness of sensations and sense experiences as awareness of an intentional content. (3), however, does not seem to be fulfilled: being aware of sensations and sense experiences is being aware of an intentional content. Therefore, the only relevant nonfactual and existent objects are the ones constituting and determining that content (e.g. the elbow); the

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<sup>11</sup> Our awareness of sensations and sense experiences does not fulfil condition (1) and (2): there is no organ by which we become introspectively aware of sensations and sense experiences. Furthermore, we *have* sensations and sense experiences, we do not sense them or have experiences of them. (Shoemaker, 1994a)

<sup>12</sup> I do not discuss the objections to sense-datum theory here as they are of no direct relevance for this paper. It is relevant that Shoemaker rejects the sense datum theory. It is furthermore relevant that he seems to be convinced that there is no adequate relational alternative to the sense-datum theory. Whether this is the case will be a matter of discussion below. For an overview of objections against sense-datum theory, see Michael Huemer (2017, §3). Some of the objections are that sense-data do not seem compatible with physicalism, that they face the problem of external world scepticism and that it is hard for them to account for our conception of physical objects.

<sup>13</sup> More is said about this in chapter II.2.

intentional object is not an *existent* object that contributes directly to the awareness of the sensations and sense experiences. The same counts for (4): in having a sense experience (such as the sensation of the keyboard on my fingertips) we do not perceive an intentional object in the way that perception provides identification information about that intentional object. This is because the intentional object (i.e. the sensation one is aware of) is not existent in the required way, but is determined by factors 'outside the head' of the subject of the state 'having a sense experience', to use Shoemaker's own words. So the relevant information is given by the existent object, not by the intentional object.

The last essential condition of the object-perception model that has to be discussed is condition (6), which is that in perception one is confronted with objects that form possible objects of attention. Shoemaker (1994a) states that, again at first sight, it seems as if sensations and sense-experiences could fulfil (6). In taking a closer look, however, it turns out that condition (6) is neither fulfilled in the case of sense experiences, nor in the case of after-images or bodily sensations. I only discuss the case of bodily sensations, because it is the most relevant one for the purpose of this paper. Shoemaker writes:

If, as some have suggested, [bodily sensations] should be thought of sense-experiences of bodily conditions, the attending to these can be thought of as proprioceptive attending to their intentional objects, which may or may not exist, and not as introspective attending to mental entities. (p. 266)

Again there is the problem that if bodily sensations are sense-experiences of bodily conditions, the object of the sense-experience is the intentional object and the intentional object is not an adequate object to be perceived, for reasons discussed above. The second way of thinking of bodily sensations circumnavigates the problem of an inner sense: "If, as others have suggested, pains are themselves bodily conditions that are non-mental, then perceptual attending to pains does not require *inner* sense" (p. 266). This said, it can be concluded that according to Shoemaker's view, bodily awareness is not to be accounted for in terms of perception.

### **I.3 Shoemaker vs. Martin**

In this chapter, I have shown that Martin and Shoemaker hold opposing conceptualisations of bodily awareness. Martin's understands bodily awareness as a form of perception and bases his view on the naïve phenomenology of experiences of our body. That is to say that we feel (1) that sensations are located in our body and that our body is an object located in the world; (2) that we perceive our body 'from the inside.' This second phenomenological feature is called 'the sense of ownership', and grounded by the spatiality of the body. Via the spatiality of the body that grounds the sense of ownership, Martin can account for the fact that via bodily awareness, one only

perceives one object: one's own body. He calls this the sole object view. Thus: in terms of the sense of ownership Martin can account for the fact that the access we have to our bodies differs from other perceptual access. In terms of the sense of ownership, he can account for the fact that there is only one object we perceive via bodily awareness. The only remaining problem seems to be that there is not one sense organ by which the body is perceived, a feature that seems to distinguish bodily awareness from stereotypical perception. However, it has been argued in footnote 9 that the lack of one sense organ does not have to be problematic for a perceptual account of bodily awareness.

Shoemaker, however, confronts Martin's conceptualisation of bodily awareness as perception with even more arguments that bodily awareness *cannot* be conceptualised as perception. The main arguments were that, in perception, we become aware of facts, the awareness of which are explained by the awareness of objects involves; that perception provides identification about the perceived objects; that one is perceiving intrinsic, non-relational properties; and that one is confronted with objects that form possible objects of attention. According to Shoemaker, non of these four characteristics of perception can be fulfilled by bodily awareness, a fact that disqualifies bodily awareness to be conceptualised as perception.

To judge whether Shoemaker or Martin have the more adequate conception of bodily awareness, it is useful to compare their overall account of perception and perceptual experiences. Martin and Shoemaker assess the importance of certain phenomenal aspects that we encounter in 'normal' perception, but also in sense-experiences, feelings and sensations, differently. As will be shown below, this difference can be explained in terms of the different accounts of perception they hold. In the next chapter, I discuss their opposing theories of perception and embed their disagreement on how to conceptualise bodily awareness in the opposing accounts of perception held by them.

## II. Intentionalism vs. naïve realism of perceptual experience

### II.1 The ordinary conception of perceptual experience

To properly discuss intentionalism and naïve realism, one has to understand what those theories account for. Tim Crane and Craig French (2017) describe perceptual experience, and point out characteristics of perceptual experience that any theory of perception should be able to accommodate.

In general, perceptual experience is characterized by alleged openness and *awareness*.<sup>14</sup> (Alleged) Openness means that we are aware (or at least seem to be) of mind-independent objects. That is to say that we are aware (or at least seem to be) of “perceptible entities in mind-independent reality” (Crane & French, 2017, §1.1). These objects are “part of common sense ontology” (Crane & French, 2017, §1.1) and, in perceptual experience, these objects are (or at least seem to be) presented to us in an immediate response to the existing, real world objects. Furthermore, experiences are transparent which means that in having an experience, we are not “aware of experiences themselves, but only of their mind-independent objects” (Crane & French, 2017, §1.1).

*Awareness* is characterized as follows: “[P]erceptual experience *sometimes* [italics NK] gives us perceptual *awareness* [italics NK] of ordinary mind-independent objects” (Crane & French, 2017, §1.2). By adding the word ‘sometimes’, it is possible to account for the fact that not all perceptual experiences actually are in contact with the world (for example in cases of illusion or hallucination).

The characterization of perceptual experience in terms of openness and *awareness* is called ‘the ordinary conception of perceptual experience’. There are several ways to account for the ordinary conception of perceptual experience. Two of the ways, the intentional and the naïve realist theory of perception, are discussed in this chapter.

### II.2 Shoemaker’s intentionalist account of perceptual experience

In a nutshell, the intentional theory holds that perceptual experience is non-relational and represents ordinary objects. That is to say that the mental state one has when experiencing “is about, or represents, something in the world” (Crane & French, 2017, §3.3). That the intentional theory is non-relational, comes down to the following: a relational conception of experience distinguishes the act of experiencing from the object experienced, and thus ascribes an act-object structure to perceptual experience. The intentional theory does not accept such an act-object distinction; instead it understands perceptual experiences as fundamentally representational rather than relational (Crane & French, 2017, §3.3). This seems to challenge the ordinary conception of

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<sup>14</sup> To avoid confusion, whenever the words ‘*awareness*’ or ‘*aware*’ are used in the sense intended by Crane & French (2017, §1.1) they are written in italics.

perceptual experience in that the representational character seems to conflict with *awareness*. However, this seeming conflict can be circumvented by stating that the representations represent ordinary objects:

In their very character they [i.e. the representations] are about, directed on, the mind-independent world (...). We come to have (direct) perceptual *awareness* [italics NK] by having such experiences when the world also plays its part: when things in the world are as they are represented to be in the experience, and when the world is hooked up to the experience in an appropriate way. (Crane & French, 2017, §3.3)

Shoemaker's (1994c) account of perception fits that description. As we have seen in the preceding chapter, Shoemaker's (1994a) primary motivation for arguing that bodily awareness cannot be accounted for by the object-perception model, is his rejection of the relational act-object conception of perceptual experiences. Holding an intentional theory of perception, the content of an experience is its representational content, and it is that content we are introspectively aware of. (The representational content in the case of intentionalist theories of perception is called intentional content. For the purpose of this paper, I use these two names synonymously and stick to the name 'intentional content' from now on.)

Because of the fact that perceptual experiences, feelings and (bodily) sensations have an intentional content as well as a phenomenal character, they seem to fit the object-perception model. Take the case of pains, itches and tickles as an example example: Martin (1995, see above) and Shoemaker (1994c) both agree that these items, due to their phenomenological character, are felt "as being in one place or another in our bodies" (p. 293). That is: they seem to be perceptions of an object, i.e. the body. This phenomenal character suggests a fundamentally relational act-object theory of pains, itches and tickles, and suggests that the object perception model is true for those items: we perceive (act) the itching body-part (object). The intentional theory, however, rejects a relational conception and is fundamentally representational. The question arises, whether the phenomenal character of these items inevitably leads to a theory of perception that is fundamentally relational: Can Shoemaker account for that phenomenological character without the intentional theory of perception being fundamentally relational? In the rest of this section, I first explain how Shoemaker accounts for the phenomenal character of genuine veridical perceptions. Then I lay out why, according to Shoemaker, the cases of pains, itches and tickles are not to be accounted for in terms of perception.

In the case of a veridical perception, an ordinary object is represented by the intentional content. The intentional content has a phenomenal character, which is consisting of phenomenal properties and which is fixed by that very intentional content. In an experience a quale is instantiated – a quale being a non-intentional, and therefore non-representational, feature of experience. A quale, at least partly, influences the intentional content of the experience by being

constitutive for the phenomenal character. According to Shoemaker (1994c), some relational feature is introduced in experience, because qualia are directly constitutive for phenomenal properties. That is to say that some of the phenomenal properties become relational properties. That way, *awareness* is saved: what is represented in perceptual experiences are ordinary world objects of which we are *aware* via the intentional content of experiences. That the intentional content also consists of phenomenal properties that constitute its phenomenal character and seem to be mind-dependent, does not threaten *awareness*. In other words, the representational content does not represent relational properties, but the phenomenal properties (that the phenomenal character consists of) are relational properties. So because the phenomenal character is fixed by the representational content and consists of relational properties, “we focus on the phenomenal character by focusing on what the experience is *of*” (Shoemaker, 1994c, p. 296). By describing how our experience is *of* the world in these intentional terms, it becomes clear that there are relational elements according to the intentional theory. They are, however, not essential; the crucial and defining aspect of this view is that it is *representational*; in an experience we become aware of a representational content which represents the worldly objects the experience is of.

From what has just been said it follows that we do not perceive qualia, nor “do we in any sense *perceive* the representational content, and the phenomenal character, of the experience” (Shoemaker, 1994c, p. 299). Instead, according to Shoemaker (1994c), we access the representational content not through perception, but by being introspectively aware of it.

How can this be translated to the case of, for example, pain? Shoemaker (1994c) writes the following: when I have pain in my foot,

my experience represents my foot as having a certain property. (...) The best available name for it is ‘hurting’. This is really a property of my foot. But what it is for my foot to have this property is for it to cause me to have an experience having certain qualia. It is therefore a relational property. But I am not aware of it *as* a relational property. (Shoemaker, 1994c, p. 302)

Feeling pain is not a case of perception, for pain is a quale instantiated in the perception of the foot. This quale makes some of the phenomenal properties relational. However, we do not experience these properties as being relational. That is: we do not experience them as being properties that are defined in relation to a quale instantiated in an experience Shoemaker (1994c). So while we perceive our foot, we are introspectively aware of the pain for the property ‘hurting’ is relationally brought about by a quale that in part determines the representational content and shapes the phenomenal character of the representational content.

Now some more light can be shed on why Shoemaker (1994a) rejects the object-perception model. According to his intentional theory of perception (a theory that is non-relational and representational), what we are aware of is the representational content with its phenomenal

character. By viewing representations as that which we are aware of (although this awareness is linked to world by being an *awareness* of ordinary objects), framing bodily awareness in terms of perception would objectify a mental representation and lead to a sense-datum theory which, in turn, leads to the problems pointed out above (see footnote 12).

As illustrated above, according to Shoemaker (1994a), one way to make the object-perception model work is by treating mental facts as nonfactual objects. This is the path that sense-datum theory of perceptual experience took. This means that when treating mental facts as nonfactual objects, one faces the same problems as the sense-datum theorists (see footnote 12 for an incomplete overview of the problems). The alternative Shoemaker gives, is to treat the awareness of mental facts as awareness of an intentional object, or intentional state. In embracing the second option, the object-perception model applied to bodily awareness is rejected, because the objectification of a mental state is problematic.

In this section, it has also become clear that Shoemaker thinks of perception in terms of the intentional theory of perception. There is, however, an alternative relational conception of perception (i.e. a theory which holds on to the act-object distinction, as explained above) according to which bodily awareness could potentially fit the object-perception model: naïve realism. Before discussing whether a naïve realist conception of bodily awareness, such as the conception of Martin (1995), does fit the object-perception model, naïve realism shall be explained briefly. Furthermore, to see whether naïve realism is a desirable and adequate alternative to Shoemaker's intentionalist theory, the (dis)advantages of holding either naïve realism or intentionalism shall be discussed. One way to point out the (dis)advantages of holding either the intentional theory of perception or naïve realism, and to explain what naïve realism consists of, is by having a look at the theories' responses to the argument from hallucination.

### **II.3 The intentionalist's reply to the argument from hallucination**

The argument from hallucination is one of the central problems in the philosophy of perception. One way of formulating the argument from hallucination is the following:

A state which is one of genuine *awareness* [italics NK] of a world may be indistinguishable from one which is a mere appearance. One cannot tell from the phenomenology of one's *awareness* [italics NK] which it is – an illusion [or hallucination] or *awareness* [italics NK] of an external reality. (Dancy, 1995, p. 421)

According to Mike Thau (2004), the argument from hallucination first asks us to conclude that non-veridical perceptions have some strange non-material object, for there is no material thing corresponding to them. In a second step one is asked to conclude that not even veridical perceptions have a material object, because they are indistinguishable from non-veridical ones. So

the argument from hallucination asks us to conclude that perception never has material objects as its objects.

Heather Logue (2015) formulates the same worry in terms of kinds by saying that it is possible for a veridical experience not to be distinguishable from hallucination brought about by a scientist stimulating "my brain so as to produce a subjectively indistinguishable experience, i.e. one that I couldn't tell apart from the veridical experience by introspection alone" (p. 198). From this one is tempted to conclude that the veridical experience is of the same kind as a hallucination, even though they are not causally brought about in the same way.

To fully understand what is at stake, it must be clarified what is meant by 'veridical' and 'non-veridical experience'. Logue (2015) defines 'veridical' and 'non-veridical experience' as follows:

Veridical experiences are those in which (i) the subject perceives things in her environment, (ii) her environment is as it appears to her to be; and (iii) for all properties F, if something the subject perceives appears to be F, this is because the subject perceives its being F. (...) By contrast, non-veridical experiences are experiences in which at least one of these three conditions fails to obtain. (p. 199)

According to Logue (2015), non-veridical experiences can be further divided in at least two categories: illusions and hallucinations. Illusions do satisfy condition (i): things in the environment are perceived. But they don't satisfy condition (iii): the property F is perceived even though there is nothing that the subject perceives that is F (or the other way around). The category of hallucination can further be subdivided in total and partial hallucinations. For partial hallucinations the same holds as for illusions. (Logue gives the example that we can hallucinate a pink stain on the wall whereby the wall is actually there, so we perceive something in the environment, but the pink stain is hallucinated. Thus condition (iii) fails, F being the property pink is perceived even though it is not appearing in the environment.) For total hallucinations it is also defining that condition (iii) does not hold, but, contrary to illusions and partial hallucinations, condition (i) fails, nothing in the environment is perceived.<sup>15</sup>

Now how does the intentionalist response to the argument from hallucination? He does so by embracing what Martin (1997; 2004) calls 'Common Kind Assumption' (CKA), and by holding a principle called IND. Martin (1997) formulates IND as follows: "If two perceptual experiences are indistinguishable for the subject of them then the two experiences are of the same kind" (p.

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<sup>15</sup> "This is because what makes an experience hallucinatory is that some aspect of how things appear is generated without the appropriate stimulation of the relevant organs (which is plausibly a necessary condition on perceiving a thing's being F)" (Logue, 2015, p. 200). Furthermore, the question might arise on what distinguishes partial hallucinations from illusion. There is much discussion about how to treat partial hallucinations and illusions. Logue (2015) further specifies illusions: they are "generated by complicated interactions between properties of things perceived, the circumstances in which they're perceived, and the way the subject's perceptual system normally functions in those circumstances" (p. 209).

91). CKA says that “whatever mental kind of event occurs when one is veridically perceiving some scene, such as the street scene outside my window, that kind of event could occur whether or not one is perceiving” (Martin, 2004, p. 40). By embracing the CKA, the argument of hallucination can be answered in the following manner: Take as an example the veridical perception of the street scene:

The experience involved in this perception, the intentionalist thinks, is fundamentally a matter of experientially representing the presence of a [street scene]. And this fundamental kind of mental event is exactly what is present in the subjectively indistinguishable hallucinatory case, for such hallucinatory experiences have the same representational nature as their veridical counterparts. (Crane & French, 2017, §3.3)

In embracing CKA to solve the problem the argument from hallucination confronts us with, the intentionalist offers a theory by which he can accommodate cases of veridical experiences, hallucinations and illusions, as well the intentions that go with them: in veridical experience the object is perceived because we are aware of representation of them (as was explained before). Hallucinations can occur because the same state of mind occurring in veridical perception, the state of mind accounting for a representation, can occur without the object the representation is of needing to be present.

#### **II.4 Disjunctivism and a naïve realist’s reply to the argument from hallucination**

Martin’s naïve realist’s response is entirely different. To save naïve realism, he chooses a disjunctivist account in responding to the argument from hallucination. A detailed version of Martin's (2004) response to the argument of hallucination is discussed in the next chapter. Before I turn to that, some general words on disjunctivism and naïve realism shall be said.

Disjunctivism is a way of responding to the argument from hallucination that denies its conclusion. Instead it tries to establish the view that perceptions, hallucinations and illusions are fundamentally different. A disjunctivist does so by holding that “*either* an experience is of one kind (including veridical experiences), *or* of another radically different kind (including at least some non-veridical experiences)” (Logue, 2015, p. 198). Logue (2015) classifies disjunctivist theories in 4 categories: (1) direct realist's disjunctivism, (2) the intentionalist's disjunctivism, (3) the anti-sceptic's disjunctivism, and (4) the naïve realist's disjunctivism. For now, I only summarize shortly what Logue writes about (1) and (4), because these categories are essential for understanding the kind of disjunctivism Martin is holding. The most common and uncontested form of the direct realist’s disjunctivism is disjunctivism about the objects of experience. The direct realist disjunctivist holds that “when I perceive a banana, there's nothing I perceive more direct than the banana” (p. 201). Hallucinations and veridical experience differ fundamentally, because they have different objects of experience. By taking this view, the direct realist lets mind-independent material

objects play a direct role in veridical perception. Furthermore, the direct realist has to answer the question about what is perceived in total hallucinations where there is no external thing matching that which seems to be perceived (Logue, 2015). There are different ways of answering this question, but discussing the multitude of options exceeds the ambitions of this paper. Yet, an account of the naïve realist's perspective will be given below.

(4), the naïve realist's disjunctivism, builds forth on the commitment to direct realism. Naïve realism holds on to the idea that in veridical experience one directly perceives the things in one's environment. The naïve realist formulates this "in terms of the experience fundamentally consisting in the subject (directly) perceiving such things"<sup>16</sup> (Logue, 2015, p. 208) and holds that "veridical experience fundamentally consists in the subject bearing the perceptual relation to things in her environment" (p. 207). Naïve realism defends a stronger claim than direct realism in that

[i]t is a claim about the metaphysical structure of veridical experience, i.e. about the ultimate psychological facts in virtue of which facts about experience obtain. To say that an experience fundamentally consists in x is to say that x is the most basic psychological characterization of the experience, in the sense that all of its other psychological features (e.g. its phenomenal character, its epistemological role) are grounded in x. (p. 208)

To be a disjunctivist in order to hold on to the metaphysical claims of Naïve Realism, one makes a claim about the metaphysical structure of perceptual experience in that it is distinct from the metaphysical structure of hallucinations (and/or illusions<sup>17</sup>). This claim – that, as Martin (1997) formulates it, in having a veridical perception the world is *literally* included – also influences Martin's account of the phenomenal character of experiences: because real objects in the world partly (literally) constitute the conscious experience one has of those objects, the objects themselves and their qualities also determine its phenomenal character. As a consequence, Martin remarks, "one could not be having the very experience one has, were the objects perceived not to exist, or were they to lack the features they are perceived to have" (p. 93).

One reason to embrace a naïve realist theory of perception is that it takes very seriously how one experiences one's experiences (Martin, 1997; 1998; 2004). The merit of naïve realism is that it expresses best how our experiences appear to us when introspectively reflecting on them. That is to say, when reflecting on our perceptual experiences they seem to give us access to and be constituted by the external world. In having an experience, I am not directed to some representation inside my mind, but I am actually and directly reflecting about the object my

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<sup>16</sup> Not only naïve realism but also the intentionalist's disjunctivism are compatible with direct realism: "For the idea that the subject of a veridical experience directly perceives things in her environment can be elaborate in two different ways: in terms of the experience fundamentally consisting in the subject (directly) perceiving such things, or in terms of the experience fundamentally consisting in the subject representing such things" (Logue, 2015, p. 208).

<sup>17</sup> Naïve realist disjunctivists can be divided into two groups: the ones who state that is veridical experiences and illusions are part of the same disjunct (VI v H), and the ones that see hallucinations and illusions standing on the side of one disjunct (V v IH) (Logue, 2015, p. 210).

perception is of. This is only possible if we are directly *aware* of the object. And being directly *aware* of an object in having an experience of it means that we are *related* to that object, that “[m]ind-independent matter can form the subject-matter of sensuous experience” (Martin, 2004, p. 39), that a sensuous experience is directly constituted by real world objects.

So compared to intentionalist theories of perception, the link with the real world objects is more direct; instead of there being a representation of that object, there is a relation to an object in perception by which the object itself can become constitutive of the perceptual experience and directly determines the phenomenal character of the perceptual experience with its own qualities. To summarize that in Martin's (2004) own words: “[T]he objects are part of the relational state of affairs which comprises perceptual experiences” (p. 94). According to Susanna Siegel (2004), what therefore characterizes Martin's conception of perceptual experience is that its phenomenal character, namely that perceptual experience always seems to be a veridical experience (as shall be shown later that implies that what we conceptualise as perceptual experience is indiscriminable to us from veridical experience), is a conceptual truth of being a perceptual experience.

So far it has become clear how a naïve realist such as Martin can account for veridical experiences and their phenomenological character of being *of* the world. Naïve realism turns out to be appealing, because it takes very seriously the fact that in experience we seem to be directly in contact with and related to the objects of experience. This, however, is not a sufficient reason to prefer naïve realism over intentionalism, since intentionalism can also accommodate this phenomenological fact of experience. Furthermore, nothing has been said about how to account for hallucinations that seem to be perceptions of the world as well, but fail to relate us to the world. How can a naïve realist account for hallucinations or illusions? In what follows, Martin's response to the argument from hallucination is explained. If his response is more convincing than the intentionalist's response, this might provide a ground on which to decide whether intentionalism or naïve realism is the more adequate account of perceptual experience. This in turn, could help us to answer the question whether bodily awareness should be conceptualized as perception or not.

## **II.5 Metaphysical disjunctivism to defend naïve realism**

As has been shown above, Martin's main reason to endorse disjunctivism is that it allows one to embrace naïve realism. In 'The Limits of Self-awareness,' Martin (2004) argues that to be a disjunctivist about veridical and hallucinatory experience is the only viable position to take and tries to establish it as a default position (Siegel, 2004). Martin (2004) describes his disjunctivist approach to perception as follows: “Statements about how things appear to a perceiver [are] equivalent to statements of a disjunction that either one is perceiving such and such or one is suffering an illusion (or hallucination)” (p. 37). However, Martin is dissatisfied with disjunctivist accounts so far and

develops his own account while, at the same time, discussing the nature of perception. In what follows, I sketch the main lines of Martin's disjunctivist account by which he aims to show that the intentionalist theory of perception is less viable than naïve realism.

As has been indicated above, holding on to naïve realism is difficult for it seems to conflict with two general assumptions in philosophy of perception, both of which seem plausible. The first assumption Martin (2004) calls experiential naturalism (EN). EN says that sense experience is brought about by a causal order, that is: by physical causes and psychological causes. That in combination with the possibility of hallucination says that perception primarily is a relation to mind-dependent objects: the object of *awareness* is dependent on the occurrence of an experience and not primarily on the object of which the experience is of (Martin, 2004, p. 42). The second assumption, already discussed above, is the CKA.<sup>18</sup>

The CKA blocks the most direct way to save naïve realism by avoiding the result of combining EN with naïve realism (i.e. the result that in perceiving one is primarily related to a mind-dependent object). One could try to avoid that result by saying that, in hallucination, one is not *aware* of anything: "we treat [some experiences] as if they are the presentations of such objects [i.e. real objects], but they don't need any such object to exist in order for them to occur" (Martin, 2004, p. 41). Arguing this way would circumvent any ontological commitment to mind-dependent entities, but, here we face the problem CKA confronts us with, the same must count for veridical perception, for veridical perception and hallucination are of the same kind according to the CKA (Martin, 2004, p. 42). This way of countering the result of EN combined with naïve realism would lead to a rejection of naïve realism.

Instead, Martin (2004) chooses to reject CKA by which he commits himself to a disjunctivist approach to solve the problem of illusion and hallucination.<sup>19</sup> He does so in the course of arguing for a modest conception of sense experience. The modest conception is contrasted with the immodest conception, the conception one holds if one is embracing the CKA. An immodest conception holds that we have introspectible access to the features that make up a sense experience. These kinds of theories are "immodest in their attribution of epistemological powers that subjects have when they give an explanation of how we come to have a conception of sensory experiences which can be employed from the first person perspective" (Martin, 2004, p. 47). A modest conception only claims that the fact that a veridical experience is indiscriminable from hallucination

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<sup>18</sup> To remind the reader: CKA says that "whatever mental kind of event occurs when one is veridically perceiving some scene, such as the street scene outside my window, that kind of event could occur whether or not one is perceiving" (Martin, 2004, p. 40).

<sup>19</sup> According to Martin (2004), disjunctivism can be characterized as "a cluster of approaches all of which have in common just a negative thesis: the thesis that we should not think that perceptual experience is to be analysed as a common factor of perception and either illusion or hallucination" (p.44). That is to say that disjunctivism can be characterised negatively as the rejection of the common kind assumption. In this light, the text 'The Limits of Self-awareness' can be read as an attempt to formulate disjunctivism positively.

or illusion, is the central characteristic of sense experience. By making this claim, one is confronted with and has to accept “the limits of our powers of discrimination and the limits of self-awareness” (Martin, 2004, p. 48). The modest conception can be criticised by the immodest conception by the following conclusion from the causal argument: “[W]hatever kind of experience does occur in situations like [hallucinatory experiences], it is possible that such a kind of experience occurs when one is veridically perceiving” (Martin, 2004, p. 54).<sup>20</sup>

Martin (2004) accepts the argument and its conclusion and elaborates a way of accepting it and, at the same time, rejecting the CKA. He does so by giving the condition of indiscriminability central explanatory power. The condition of indiscriminability is fulfilled, if it is impossible by reflection to discriminate between veridical perception and hallucination and if no property is present in a situation of indiscriminability that would be accessible by reflection and incompatible with a situation of veridical perception (Martin, 2004, p. 65). The claim of indiscriminability regarding veridical perception and hallucination can then be formulated as follows:

if any property of a veridical perception is introspectible – i.e. is recognisably present in perception through reflection – then such a property will either be present in all matching experiences, or will at least seem to be present, i.e. will not be knowably absent. (Martin, 2004, p. 67)

On the basis of this claim it is possible to figure out what features veridical perception and hallucination have in common. Having the property of indiscriminability can then explain why we cannot distinguish between veridical perception and hallucination: hallucination and perception share all the features that follow from the property of being indiscriminable, which is to say that all that can be said about hallucination, can also be (generally) said about perception (Martin, 2004). On first sight, this seems to bring about some embarrassment for the disjunctivist. If the feature of indiscriminability, which is common to veridical perception and hallucination, is sufficient to explain hallucination as well as veridical perception, then the feature of being a veridical experience is explanatory redundant (Martin, 2004). From what was said so far, the only explanatory power

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<sup>20</sup> Martin's (2004) formulates the full argument as follows:

- (1) When S sees a pine tree at *t*, call this situation *v*, there is in S's body some complete causal condition just prior to *t* which determined the chance of this event of seeing occurring in *v*, call this condition *N*;
- (2) It is nomologically possible that *N* should occur in *S* even if no candidate object of perception is present and conditions necessary for the occurrence of a perception are not met, and an hallucinatory experience instead occurs; call one such situation *b*;
- (3) Where two situations involve the same proximal causal conditions, *and* do not differ in any non-causal conditions for the occurrence of some kind of effect, then the chances for the occurrence of such an effect are the same in both situations;
- (4) No non-causal condition required for the occurrence of the effects of *N* is present in *b* but absent in *v*;
- (5) Whatever kind of experience occurs in *b*, there is the same chance of such an experience occurring in *v*;
- (6) Hence whatever kind of experience does occur in situations like *b*, it is possible that such a kind of experience occurs when one is veridically perceiving. (pp. 53-54)

seems to stem from the feature of being indistinguishable, which would make the disjunctivist's claim redundant as well.

This conclusion is avoided by Martin in the following manner: although in many cases, common features absorb the explanatory power of specific features, this does not have to be the case (Martin, 2004, p. 70). Consider two examples: (1) There is a machine sorting cloths. It is presented with scarlet cloths and cloths in non-red colours. It sorts the cloths in two piles: one with scarlet, the other with non-red cloths. One assumes that the machine sorts scarlet from other colours. When the same machine is presented with scarlet, crimson and vermillion coloured cloths and non-red cloths, then it piles scarlet, crimson and vermillion cloths on another pile than the non-red cloths. Now it seems more plausible to explain the separating by the machine in terms of red – non-red and not in terms of scarlet – non-red colours. So the common feature absorbs the specific features in terms of explanatory power (Martin, 2004, p. 62). But now compare this with example (2) which is a case of pre-emption: A and B shoot at a victim. A's bullet reaches the victim first and causes death. In another situation, only B shoots at the victim and B's bullet causes death. In both situations, B's bullet is present, but that does not imply the feature of being present in the situation has the same explanatory power. By considering this second example, Martin concludes that "cases of inherited or dependent explanatory potential offer us exceptions to the general model of common properties screening off special ones" (p. 70). He thereby states that, even though the property of being indiscriminable is present in all situations of sense experience (that is in veridical perception, illusion and hallucination), there might be another property, namely that of being a veridical perception, that nevertheless has explanatory power.

To summarize what has been said so far: Martin (2004) is successful in holding on to EN and rejecting CKA, thereby in holding on to naïve realism, by making a disjunctivist argument: what explains that we cannot tell apart veridical experience from hallucination is that they share the property of being indistinguishable, which is to say that everything that can be said of hallucination by reflection, can also be said about veridical perception; hallucination "is nothing but a situation which could not be told apart from veridical perception" (p. 72).<sup>21</sup>

This leads to the following question: "how could it be that the veridical perception is fundamentally of one kind and yet also of some other kind which it shares with hallucination, where hallucination must fundamentally be of that kind" (Martin, 2004, p. 72). From this follows, that there are two kinds that compete for being the fundamental kind of veridical perception: namely, the kind that is made up by the property of being indistinguishable (and all the specific features

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<sup>21</sup> In relation to this quote, Martin (2004) goes on by saying: "[T]here are certain mental events, at least those hallucinations brought about through causal conditions matching those of veridical perceptions, whose only positive mental characteristics are negative epistemological ones – that they cannot be told apart by the subject from veridical perception" (p. 74).

that are subsumed in that property), and the kind of being a veridical perception. Martin concludes that, “for a veridical perception, being a veridical perception of [e.g.] a tree is a better candidate than being indiscriminable from being such a veridical perception” (p. 72). In other words, Martin’s rejection of the CKA has the following form: hallucination is of the kind “being indistinguishable of veridical perception”, and veridical experience is also of the kind “being indistinguishable of veridical perception.” But the latter also is (more fundamentally) of the kind “being a veridical perception”. However, the features of which the kind “being a veridical perception” consist of are not accessible by reflection: they constitute the limits of self-awareness.

## II.6 Naïve realism as an alternative?

I started the discussion of intentionalism and naïve realism by pointing out what any theory of perception should be able to satisfactorily explain: alleged openness and *awareness*, and why one cannot tell apart hallucination from veridical experience.

Shoemakers intentionalism rejects act-object theories of perception, and instead holds a representationalist theory: the intentional content of a veridical perception is the representations of ordinary objects. However, that the experiences intentional content of experiences is representing ordinary objects, does not mean that we are experiencing a representation. Rather it is because this representation is a representation of ordinary objects, that we are *aware* of these objects. That way, *awareness* is saved. To accommodate the phenomenological character of bodily sensations (namely that they seem to be located in our bodies), Shoemaker develops a theory of qualia which accounts for qualia in relational terms. Meanwhile, at the heart of any experience lies its representational content. It is important to stress the fact that we do not *perceive* qualia nor the representational content but access both *introspectively*. In answering to the argument of hallucination, the intentionalist embraced the CKA which is to say that in hallucinations and in veridical experience, they are fundamentally the same mental event.

Martin, being a naïve realist, rejects the representational account of perceptual experience. He instead holds an act-object theory of perception, arguing that in veridical experience one directly perceives the ordinary objects in one’s environment. That way, openness and *awareness* are easily saved. The argument of hallucination, however, is much harder to respond to. As has been shown in this chapter, holding on to disjunctivism, naïve realism can formulate a conclusive response to the argument from hallucination by rejecting the CKA. This is done by arguing that a veridical perception and hallucination are of fundamentally different kind, but that this difference in kinds is not accessible by reflection.

Martin’s argument is built on the rejection of the CKA: he argues that his disjunctivist theory is epistemically less demanding than the intentionalist’s account that holds on to the CKA.

If he is indeed right, and if his argument is conclusive, it seems that naïve realism is in the end the more adequate theory of perception, and that Martin's conceptualisation of bodily awareness (which is based on naïve realist assumptions) as perception might stand a chance after all. Whether this is the case, is the question to be answered in the next chapter.

### III. A naïve realist object-perception model?

#### III.1 An object-perception model for bodily awareness?

To link this to the discussion about whether it is adequate to account for bodily awareness in terms of perception, the reader must remember the following: Shoemaker's (1994a) rejection of the object-perception model was based on the rejection of a relational conception of perception, the sense-datum conception. His alternative was to account for perception in intentionalist, non-relational terms. However, Shoemaker has not yet rejected the second form of relational theory of perception, namely naïve realism.

To answer the question whether Martin has the means to counter Shoemaker's rejection to account for bodily awareness in terms of the object-perception model, we must first look at whether Martin was successful in countering Shoemaker's intentionalist theory of perception. To do so, it must be asked whether Shoemaker holds the two general assumption that Martin ascribes to most philosophers of perception. That is: does Shoemaker hold EN and CKA?

Shoemaker seems to embrace both assumptions. That he embraces CKA has clearly been shown above. Whether he embraces EN is not so clear. If by 'mind-dependent object' an objectified mental state is meant, then Shoemaker seems not to embrace EN. However, if the intentional object is meant to be the mental representation a real world object causes in cases of veridical perception, then Shoemaker seems to accept EN. I think that Martin should accept not-objectified intentional objects to fall under what he calls 'mind-dependent objects', because otherwise he would not reject intentionalism but only a sense-datum theory of perception.

If what I just have said is correct, then Martin's argument is a serious attack also on Shoemaker's intentionalist account of perception and Martin's naïve realist account of perception seems to be more plausible than Shoemaker's intentionalist account that relies on the CKA (see the preceding chapter). In what follows, I investigate whether it is possible to develop an (eventually modified) object-perception model of bodily awareness on the basis of naïve realism.

If we want the object-perception model to work for bodily awareness, we have to see if it is possible to avoid Shoemaker's disqualification of features (3)-(6) in the case of (bodily) sensations and sense experiences. The conditions were:

- (3) The feature that in perception we become aware of facts and "[o]ne's awareness of the facts is explained by one's *awareness* [italics NK] of the objects involved in these facts" (p. 252).
- (4) Perception provides identification information about the perceived objects, that is: one must be able to pick out the object and distinguish it from others on the basis of the information gained in perception.

- (5) In perception one is perceiving intrinsic, non-relational properties such as colours or shapes.
- (6) In perception one is confronted with objects that form possible objects of attention.

The strongest argument against the object-perception model was Shoemaker's (1994a) claim that condition (5) is not fulfilled in the case of sensations and sense-experiences. To remind the reader, the argument roughly went as follows: the intentional content (or intentional object as it can be called as well) is determined by "factors 'outside the head' of the subject of such state" (p. 264). Because of that the intrinsic features do not *form part* of the intentional content one is aware of in being aware of sensations and sense experiences. Instead the intentional content is determined by what Shoemaker calls 'factor's outside the head.' That is: objects that have intrinsic, non-relational properties, and which are perceived. One therefore does not *perceive* bodily sensations and sense-experience: what one is aware of when being aware of sensations and sense experiences, is an intentional content that cannot be objectified for, in doing so, one faces all the problems of the sense-datum theory. Shoemaker understands the intentional character as consisting of representational and phenomenal properties. Bodily sensations and sense-experiences are part of the phenomenal properties which constitute the phenomenal character of an experience. The phenomenal character is constituted by qualia, and is realized in/as part of the intentional content.

The question whether this argument can be countered by Martin comes down to the question whether naïve realism can respond satisfactorily to the question as to where the phenomenal character of an experience is realized, if not in the representational (i.e. intentional) content. If naïve realism can do so, then it seems that Shoemaker's argument is countered and condition (5), and therefore also the closely connected conditions (3) and (4), hold. How can the naïve realist account for the phenomenal character of experience?

### **III.2 The naïve realist's account of the phenomenal character of experiences**

According to Michael Tye (2016), a naïve realist mostly appeals to a relational view of qualia. Naïve realism is relational in that the objects of an experience directly (and not via a representation) constitute the content of an experience. Parallel to that, a naïve realist's relational view of qualia states that "the phenomenal character is constituted by the objects that the perceiver sees, some of their properties and how they are arranged relative to the viewer" (§9). To understand what that means, I now shortly turn to Martin's (1998) text 'Setting things before the mind' in which he describes in more detail how a naïve realist can accommodate what often has been called 'qualia'. He starts his elaboration by criticising the vague use of the word 'qualia' and distinguishing two senses of how 'qualia' has been used. According to Martin, 'qualia' can signify (a) the properties of

the experience which are “the properties of what is appeared to”<sup>22</sup> (p. 162), or (b) the properties of the objects we experience which are “the properties of what appears” (p. 162). Those two meanings of ‘qualia’ are mostly mixed up which gives ‘qualia’ the problematic status it has nowadays. In differing between those two meanings of ‘qualia’, the question becomes salient of how those two uses are connected. According to Martin, (a) is dependent on (b). This answer becomes comprehensible when one considers the answer to a related question, namely the question of how we gain “knowledge of what experience is like” (p. 166). The answer to this second question is formulated by Martin in reflection on a description of an experience of a white wall, by Michael Baxandall. From this description Martin concludes that “the way in which we learn what our experiences are like is by attending first to the objects and features which are presented to us in perception” (p. 170).<sup>23</sup> This dependency could lead to problems considering the fact that experiences of hallucination and illusion have what we call ‘qualia’ in the ambiguous sense, but lack an object with features to which to attend to. However, this puzzle can be solved by returning to Martin's (2004) naïve realist solution to the problem of perception (i.e. that hallucinations are dependent on veridical experiences by the indistinguishability relation), and by highlighting the differences between Martin's account of the phenomenal properties of veridical experiences and Martin's account of the phenomenal properties of hallucinations. According to his view, veridical perception and cases of hallucinations do not actually have, but only seem to have the same phenomenal properties. The same asymmetrical dependence as described above holds (i.e. that ‘seeming to be a veridical perception’ is dependent on ‘being a veridical perception’).

After having laid out how the two senses of the term ‘qualia’ in the end depend on the object of perception (because (a) depends on (b), and because hallucinations depend on veridical perception), Martin (1998) dismisses the term ‘qualia’ and uses “*phenomenal character* of the experience” for the (a)-meaning of the term and “*presented elements* of an experience” (p. 174) for the (b)-meaning of the term. So to conclude it can be said that the phenomenal character of an experience is dependent on the presented elements of an experience. That way, according to Martin, the phenomena that mistakenly were called ‘qualia’ can be accounted for without an intentionalist theory of perception, that is: without needing the mediation of a representation.

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<sup>22</sup> This formulation may, at first, sound somewhat cryptic. I think what is meant by ‘properties of what is appeared to’ are the properties that are attached to the experience itself and therefore to the person who has the experience (versus the properties that belong to the objects of experience).

<sup>23</sup> This conclusion is backed up by various sub-conclusions, namely that “Baxandall indicates that he learns things about what it is like for him to view his study by paying careful attention in the way that he does to various features,” that “learning about one's experience can involve active exploration, primarily of the experienced world around one, but in doing so of one's experience as well,” and that “attending to what one's experience is like cannot be separated from exploring and attending to features of the world as perceived” (p. 170). For the detail argument I refer the reader to the original text.

Martin's treatment of qualia, however, is much more problematic than it might seem at first. So far, it has been described how Martin accounts for perceptual and hallucinatory experiences in terms of the objects they are related to and in terms of their metaphysical kinds. However, he carefully avoids to specify *how* experiences are realised by defining the fundamental kind in terms of the relation to real-world objects. In fact, he has avoided talking about (perceptual or hallucinatory) sensory experiences in terms of the mental realisation which brings the content of experience to the experiencer's awareness. In the case of the phenomenal character this seems problematic, for it remains utterly unclear what exactly is meant when Martin talks about 'presented elements of an experience'. Presented were, and how? Shoemaker's account of perception provides a detailed discussion of the nature of mental representations, which can easily accommodate qualia as shown in chapter 3.

A distinction made by Ned Block (2006) might be helpful to shed light on this specific difference between Martin and Shoemaker: Block (2006) writes that theories in the philosophy of mind "have been concerned both with (1) what there is, and (2) what gives each type of mental state its own identity" (p. 758). He continues to say that "(1) is a matter of ontology and (2) a matter of metaphysics" (p. 758). Martin's (2004) ontological claim is that there are states of veridical perception that differ from hallucinatory states. He explicates the nature of this difference, claiming that they are fundamentally different kinds that are asymmetrically related to each other. This second claim is metaphysical. Yet, when asking *what exactly* a mental state is, Martin (2004; 1998) remains silent. This is especially visible in Martin's (1998) discussion of the phenomenal character of experience, where the reader is left to wonder what 'the properties of what is appeared to' are. Shoemaker (1994c), on the other hand, makes a much stronger metaphysical claim: he describes the nature and constitution of mental states in a detailed manner.<sup>24</sup>

Whether it is problematic or advantageous that Martin provides less detail, or that Shoemaker provides more, depends on issues that exceed the scope of this paper. This difference, however, is relevant when discussing how a naïve realist like Martin (if he can convincingly account for the phenomenal character of an experience) could make the object-perception model work for bodily awareness, thereby making it possible to account for bodily awareness in terms of perception. This question is addressed in the next section.

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<sup>24</sup> A related issue that exceeds the scope of this paper, but that must be further discussed to decide whether Martin's theory of perception is viable, is the following: How can Martin accommodate the fact "that how things appear to us in our colour experience (and our experience of 'secondary qualities') is determined at least in part by the nature of our perceptual mechanisms, where the role of these mechanisms in determining this is not merely that of selecting which properties of external things we are sensitive to, but involve determining, or contribution to, what the experiencing of these properties is like" (Shoemaker, 1998, p. 673). Martin (2004) does accept the causality of our perceptual mechanisms by accepting EN. However, it is not clear how he accommodates the intuition that this causality contributes to the phenomenal character of experiences.

### III.3 Defending the object-perception model of bodily awareness

To defend the object-perception model of bodily awareness from a naïve realist's view, the naïve realist has to account for the features (3)-(6) as characterized by Shoemaker (1994a). Shoemaker rejects (5) because in his intentionalist theory phenomenal properties are realized as non-representational parts of the intentional content. In having a sense experience, one is aware of the intentional content and, if being aware of this intentional content fits the object-perception model, then the intentional content has to be objectified.

Martin, however, holds an alternative view in rejecting the representational character of (perceptual or hallucinatory) sensory experience. Based on his disjunctivist account laid out above, also a sense experience one has in cases of e.g. hallucinations has real world entities as its constitutive parts, since a hallucination is dependent on cases of veridical perception by being indistinguishable from them. As a veridical perception and its phenomenal properties are not possible without the real world entities it is of, a hallucination in a way is also dependent on the real world, because the essence of the kind 'being a hallucination' is being phenomenally indistinguishable of the kind 'being a veridical perception'. That means that its phenomenal properties *seem* to be the same as those of a veridical perception (but of course are not because there are no real world entities that could constitute them). That, furthermore, means that the relation of 'seeming to be the same as a veridical perception' or 'being indistinguishable from veridical perception' is dependent on being a veridical perception. Veridical perception in turn is constituted by relational properties to the real world.

Building forth on that argument, one might be able to counter Shoemaker's (1994a) argument and save condition (5) in the case of sensations and sensory experiences: One is not aware of an intentional content for, according to Martin's view, there is no such content. Instead, in being aware of a sense experience, one is *aware* of the entities that are the constituents of the sense experience (and as has been shown above, also cases of hallucinatory sense experiences can be accommodated on this naïve realist view). By appealing to a different account of perception and therefore of sense experiences, following Martin's (2004) view one can embrace that 'in perception one is perceiving intrinsic, non-relational properties such as colours or shapes'.

Let us apply this to the example of pain: Shoemaker understands pain quale that as constituting the phenomenal character that is attached to a representational content. By rejecting the existence of quale, however, Martin could argue that pain is (in the (b) sense of what qualia can signify) 'the property of what appears', that is: pain is a property of the damaged foot. And pain is (in the (a) sense of what qualia can signify) a 'property of what is appeared to'. In the case of pain, this obscure formulation might be understood as follows: the perception of damage in the foot

also carries the property of falling within the boundaries of the body (i.e. the sense of ownership, see chapter II.I).

In Martin's (1998) account, there seems to be no objectification of the sensation of pain: the sensation of pain seems to be nothing else than one's attending to a perceived damaged entity within the boundaries of the body (see the discussion above of the dependency of the two senses of qualia: 'the properties of what is appeared to' being dependent on 'the properties of what appears'). Even hallucinations such as phantom pain can be accounted for by the naïve realist account of feeling pain: the hallucination of pain is in its kind dependent (by 'being indiscriminable from') on the veridical experience of pain (the perception of a damage in the foot). That way the naïve realist can argue that, in cases of sense experiences and sensations, one is perceiving actual, non-intentional objects. If such an argumentation is sound, condition (5) is satisfied.

Conditions (3) and (4) could also be interpreted in a way that they hold. To show how that is possible for (3), (3) is made concrete in the case of pain: my awareness of the fact that I have pain in my foot is constituted by my *awareness* that my foot is damaged (or in the case of hallucination, my awareness that I have pain in my foot is indistinguishable from a case in which I am being *aware* of damage in my foot). (4) holds because pain in the naïve realist view provides information about the foot, namely that it is damaged. It therefore provides identification information about the perceived object, namely that the foot damaged.

It seems that condition (6) could also be accommodated by the naïve realist. In footnote 4 I have already mentioned that Shoemaker (1994a) distinguishes two ways of thinking about bodily sensations: as (a) being non-mental bodily condition, or as (b) being sense-experiences of bodily condition. I think that Martin would agree with Shoemaker that (b) is the adequate description of bodily sensations. Shoemaker says that (b) being the case, when one pays attention to the sense experience one is attending to its intentional object and can therefore not speak of perception, because one would objectify the intentional object. Martin, however, offers a different way of accounting for sensory experiences, as has been shown above, a way that can do without falling back on intentional contents. On that account, in paying attention to sense experiences, one is directly paying attention to the entities one is perceiving. In that way, also condition (6) can be accommodated by a naïve realist account of the object perception model.

#### **III.4 Concluding remarks on the naïve realist's object perception model**

At the beginning of this chapter, I argued that Martin's naïve realist argument against intentionalist accounts of perception also applies to Shoemaker's intentional theory of perception. That way, a relational theory which is not the sense-datum theory became a viable alternative to Shoemaker. Furthermore, it has been recapitulated that Shoemaker's rejection of the object-perception model

to account for bodily awareness was based on the rejection of the relational sense-datum theory: where one to conceptualise awareness of bodily sensations and sense-experiences as perception, one would have to objectify them. (I.e. were one to *perceive* pain, one would have to objectify pain.) This objectification is the problematic path that sense-datum theory took and which has been rejected (see footnote 12). To avoid these problems, Shoemaker rejects accounting for bodily sensations and sense-experience in terms of the object-perception model and instead argues that we are introspectively aware of bodily sensations and sense-experiences.

However, as I have argued that naïve realism is a relational theory of perception that is a viable alternative to the intentional theory, it might become possible to apply the object-perception model to bodily awareness without objectifying bodily sensations and sense-experiences. This can be done by arguing that one *perceives* the body in having bodily sensations and sense-experiences. Yet, to do so, Martin has to account for qualia. He tackles this problem by dissolving qualia in properties of the experience and in properties of the object experienced. Martin argues that the phenomenal character of an experience are the properties of 'what is appeared to', and these properties are constituted by the relation the experiencer has to the things one experiences. It has been noted that Martin does not provide detail nor explanation what precisely is meant by that. This shows that he holds a much coarser metaphysical claim than Shoemaker, the (dis)advantages of which were not discussed.

Assuming that Martin's (on some levels coarser) theory of perception is sufficient, it has been argued that on the ground of his naïve realism, Martin could counter Shoemakers rejection of the object-perception model for bodily awareness. Of central importance for this to be possible, is the fact that no objectification of bodily sensations is needed.

To conclude this chapter, I want to emphasise that the object-perception model for bodily awareness could work for Martin only because his theory is non-representational. Whether one should want to hold a non-representational theory of perception is a matter of debate as much research in other scientific domains (such as cognitive science and psychology) employ with theories of mind that involve mental representations (see Pitt, 2017). The decision between a representational and a non-representational theory of perception seems at least partly to involve meta-philosophical considerations such as how philosophy relates to science.

## Conclusion

I started out with the question whether or not bodily awareness should be conceptualised in terms of perception. To argue for a perceptual account of bodily awareness one has to account for the facts that (1) in bodily awareness one is only *aware* of one's own body (whereas in perception generally one is of manifold objects), (2) that the access one has to one's own body differs from the access one has to other objects of perception (one accesses the body 'from the inside') and (3) that there is not one sense-organ by which one perceives one's own body. It has been shown that Martin can account for (1) by what he calls the sole-object view, and for (2) by what he calls the sense of ownership.

Building forth on some of these arguments, Shoemaker argues that there is no plausible account of perception which can accommodate the case of bodily awareness. His main argument is that in bodily awareness, which is constituted by sense experiences and bodily sensations, there is no *object* one perceives in the way one (visually) perceives objects like trees. According to his view of perception, to make bodily awareness fit into the paradigm of perception one must objectify the intentional content that constitutes a sensation or sense experience. However, point (3) above is of marginal importance, according to him.

As has been shown, Shoemaker's argument stems forth from an intentional account of the nature of perception. On the level of the dispute about the nature of perception, it has been argued that naïve realism offers an alternative to the intentional account of the nature of perception. One a naïve realist view of perception such as formulated by Martin, one can frame sense experiences and bodily sensations as perceptions of one's own body, because they are directly constituted by the body. So the only object there is, is the body which one is directly and relational *aware* of. There is no intentional or representational content that has to function as mediator and that is what one is aware of in having a sense experience or bodily sensation. Via the direct role objects play in the naïve realists relational account of perception, Shoemaker's arguments for denying a perceptual conception of bodily awareness could be countered. This has been shown by sketching the possibility of a naïve realist object-perception model of bodily awareness.

To end this paper, it needs to be emphasised that the perceptual account of bodily awareness stands or falls with the plausibility of the naïve realist conception of perception. And the plausibility of naïve realism is hotly debated. Some criticism has already been touched upon above: how convincing is Martin's account of the phenomenal character when he does not explicate what exactly it 'the properties of what is appeared to' are and how they are realized. It has also been noted that a non-representational theory of mind seems not to accord well with many theories in scientific domains such as cognitive science or psychology. A strong criticism of Martin's (2004) naïve realist reply to the argument from hallucination which has not been discussed in this paper,

comes from Siegel (2004).<sup>25</sup> If her criticism holds, naïve realism might not form an alternative to intentionalism after all. An alternative to Martin's naïve realism, the plausibility of which should be further discussed, is Benj Hellie's (2010; 2013) direct realist disjunctivism that was developed in a critical discussion of Martin's naïve realism. Both these criticisms and plausible alternatives have to be evaluated and could lead to the rejection of naïve realism, and could thereby render the possibility of a perceptual account of bodily awareness, such as laid out in this paper, impossible.

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<sup>25</sup> Martin's (2004) view and method is not uncontested. Siegel (2004) critically responds to 'The Limits of Self-Awareness'. She analyses that what is at stake in Martin's rejection of what he calls the 'CKA' is the status of the property 'being indiscriminable from a veridical perception'. According to Siegel (2004), Martin (2004) does not pay attention to the fact that the claims the CKA makes, can also be interpreted in an externalist manner. Because of this failure his argument fails to reject CKA and therefore also to establish disjunctivism as the default position. His arguments seem only to be directed against the internalist interpretation of CKA.

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Perceiving the body 'from the inside'?

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