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
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Philosophy Without Intuitions CAPPELEN **HERMAN** Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, xii + 242 pp. £25.00 Hardback

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is eminently plausible. However, one may question some of his assumptions in the first section. In particular, one may wonder if it is fair to describe Strawson as a Kantian and a merit-based theorist, given that Strawson himself would reject these classifications. Strawson, in fact, intended his theory to be an essentially sentimentalist approach which could not be reduced to either Kantian or consequentialist terms. He is famous for arguing that the reactive attitudes neither call for nor admit any rational explanation, including a Kantian one.

Moreover, one might wonder whether Strawson's theory (as well as other accountabilist ones) is not, in fact, compatible with Aristotelian ethical ascription. According to Echenique, Strawson's view excludes children and incontinents from the domain of moral responsibility because these individuals are not full-fledged moral agents. This is based on the assumption that these agents are not capable of responding to the reactive attitudes. However, if Echenique is right and children and incontinents are partly reason-responsive—and so, by implication, partly able to acknowledge and respond to the reactive attitudes—then a Strawsonian ought to be able to admit that these agents are *pro tanto* morally responsible. This would require a revision to Strawson's original view of children's rational capacities, but it is not an inadmissible move. What one might want to do to the Strawsonian view, as well as the Aristotelian view, is introduce an explicitly scalar component to moral responsibility ascriptions that would permit them to lie on a spectrum.

These considerations do not impugn the eligibility of Echenique's Aristotelian account; they merely suggest that Aristotle's theory of ethical ascription may not be as distinct from Strawson's theory of the reactive attitudes as Echenique would like to think. However, Aristotle's theory still differs from the accountability approach in virtue of its distinctive emphasis on the moral character of the agent as opposed to the agent's answerability to others, and in its explicit focus on the importance of non-instrumental moral education. Overall, then, Echenique presents a coherent and compelling virtue-based account of moral responsibility which contributes to the debate and may permit us to make headway by avoiding the traditional binaries.

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Philosophy Without Intuitions

HERMAN CAPPELEN

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Herman Cappelen's main purpose in *Philosophy Without Intuitions* is to make it clear that philosophers do not rely on intuitions as evidence, notwithstanding the claims of some.

Part I of the book deals with the Argument from 'Intuition', indicating that philosophers themselves maintain that their evidence is based on 'intuitions'; the Argument from Philosophical Practice is presented in Part II. The problems emerging from the Argument from 'Intuition' appear to undermine the position of those who defend the inclusion of intuitions in the justification process, since it is argued, *inter alia*, that terms such as 'intuitive' add nothing substantial to an argument but merely express the speaker's commitment to what he says [pp. 36-39], and have no clear meaning [pp. 47, 52]. The

author ends this part of the book with three strategies to salvage philosophers' discourse by working around the intuition claims, which all fail, supporting his view that Centrality, i.e., the position that "[c]ontemporary analytic philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence (or as a source of evidence) for philosophical theories" [p. 3], cannot be supported [pp. 81, 82]. In the Argument from Philosophical Practice, philosophers' implicit resorting to intuitions is discussed. Chapters 7 and 8, which are considered the most important chapters of Part II [p. 24], culminate in an illustration of Cappelen's view by indicating how some landmark philosophical cases are supported, in each situation arguing that intuitions do not contribute anything substantial.

Cappelen manages to present his arguments clearly and compellingly, convincingly pointing out the problems involved with resorting to intuitions, thus prompting a critical (re)evaluation of the reader's own starting points. This is an accessible book for non-specialists as long as they are familiar with recent developments in analytical philosophy. They should be able to follow the line of reasoning, particularly since one does not need to know the cases in chapter 8 beforehand, although the final chapters (9-11) may prove more challenging.

The crucial issue is: what is the relevance of this work? What does it contribute to the discussions in (meta)philosophy? It is clear that Cappelen's approach is descriptive rather than normative, as he himself states in various places [e.g., pp. 14, 96, 116, 198]. Still, his analysis is not without consequences for normative matters (which is good, since its normative implications contribute to its relevance). The following quote illustrates the author's evasive approach towards normativity:

I'm just saying that paradigmatic philosophical cases don't involve judgments that are rock-bottom. In order to make that claim I don't need to take a stand on the larger question of how chains of justification eventually end. Maybe there are judgments with the Rock feature and maybe those are needed in order for chains of reasoning to be properly grounded. All I am saying is that the place to look for such starting points is not in philosophical appeal to cases – those judgments are, as we have seen, typically puzzling and rely on a range of empirical data embedded in theorizing. If there is a rock-bottom point of justification, philosophers who discuss cases don't operate at that level. [p. 196].

It is correct that no such stand is needed in this work, given its objective, but the relevance of this work will presumably be demonstrated by the implications for philosophy, particularly epistemology, which means that a normative stance will eventually have to make its appearance. In addition, one wonders what judgments that are rock-bottom (the possibility of which the author apparently leaves open) might be like. According to Cappelen, philosophers don't seek *a priori* knowledge [p. 192], and he proceeds from the "working assumption ... that any general claim about philosophy and philosophers is in need of empirical backing." [p. 97]. He also thinks that intuitive judgments have no added value, which is expressed in his non-acceptance of (or at least hesitation towards) 'Rock', viz., the idea that "intuitive judgments serve as a kind of rock bottom justificatory point in philosophical argumentation. *Intuitive judgments justify, but they need no justification.*" [p. 112]. Together these positions suggest that a foundationalist account would be unacceptable to Cappelen. This conclusion is confirmed by the following remark: "philosophical questions ... come with a justification requirement.

Any interesting answer has to be accompanied by an explanation of *why* this is the right answer.” [p. 135]. One does not have to embrace foundationalism (in any form), of course, but in that case it must be clear what the alternative is (as an infinite regress is, presumably, unacceptable); might coherentism, e.g., be considered a viable approach? One may appeal to the intersection of philosophical and scientific issues [pp. 196, 197], but that raises the question: which matters are specifically philosophical? Perhaps Cappelen is drawn to a position such as naturalized epistemology.

In addition, if no appeal may be made to intuitions, it is unclear how Cappelen would deal with cases in philosophy that resemble axioms in mathematics. At present, few cases are generally accepted to have such a status compared to previous periods in (Western) philosophy, when it was attempted to resolve epistemological (and metaphysical) issues by appealing to self-evident starting points, but a proposition such as ‘ $\neg(p \wedge \neg p)$ ’ (the principle of contradiction) is still considered by some to have such a quality; would Cappelen support it by arguments and thus avoid an appeal to an intuition? He does appear to suggest that logic may have to be considered to be something separate from philosophy [p. 229], but this seems to be an *argumentum ad consequentiam*: ‘if something needs to be supported by an intuition, it cannot be qualified as philosophy’. It is of course unacceptable (or at least unproductive) to operate from one’s own private notion of what constitutes ‘philosophy’, especially if no arguments to use that private notion are offered.

To conclude, Cappelen has shown that intuitions are not decisive elements in a number of cases, but he has failed to efface their role in the justification process. On the basis of the foregoing, I would answer the question of what the relevance of this work is as follows. Apart from the merit that it presents a forceful criticism of those who too easily resort to intuitions, or who don’t even reflect on their position, it must be considered a propaedeutic work in the sense that it primarily serves as a springboard for the crucial questions to come to the fore. This observation in no way derogates from the author’s meticulous and elucidative analysis, which is impressive and must be commended, but merely indicates what the next step must be, whether to be undertaken by the author or others.

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Husserl’s Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction

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Edmund Husserl’s last and unfinished book, *The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* (1936/1954, hereafter referred to as the *Crisis*), represents a key moment in the phenomenological tradition.¹ In his late 70s and suffering under the oppression of the National Socialist regime, Husserl realized that his work would remain largely unfinished, and he felt misunderstood or abandoned by many whom he had foreseen as the future of his movement, “phenomenology.” He found himself in a world engulfed in moral, spiritual, and philosophical crises, a world dizzied by the success of science and technology. The moment thus called for a defense of transcendental philosophy and for an expansion of phenomenology, and Husserl