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
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European Unity and the Transatlantic Gulf in 1973

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In the summer of 1973, the European Community (EC) decided to initiate a transatlantic dialogue. Josephine W. S. Communities, demanding a change in US-European relations, urging Europe to speed up the process. A declaration on European unity was described their general approach. This document was published in November. Initial discussions on transatlantic relations were held in the European Political Cooperation (EPC).

The conference in The Hague was a failure. The Conference of State or Government Ministers was in near paralysis. The lack of cooperation. In 1973, the relationship was in its infancy, limited primarily to a common position.

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“I have always welcomed the movement toward European unity but I never conceived of it—and certainly its founders did not—in terms of the gulf that the Europeans have chosen to open between themselves and us. ”

Henry Kissinger to Helmut Schmidt,

26 November 1973¹

In the summer of 1973, the nine member states of the European Communities (EC) decided to formulate a European identity as the basis for transatlantic dialogue. Joseph Greenwald, head of the US Mission to the European Communities, depicted this decision as “perhaps the single most dramatic change in US-European relations, namely, the declared desire of an emerging Europe to speak with one voice.”² The project resulted eventually in the declaration on European identity on 14 December, in which the EC Nine described their general approach to foreign relations. But their decision to publish this document as a formal declaration had only been taken in mid-November. Initially, however, the document had been primarily focused on transatlantic relations and was only produced for internal use as part of European Political Cooperation (EPC).

The origins of this European political cooperation lay in the conference in The Hague in December 1969, a historical summit of the Heads of State or Government of the then six EC members following a period of near paralysis. They decided in favour of a further deepening of European cooperation. In 1973, the common foreign policy of the Nine was still in its infancy, limited principally to an exchange of views and a search for a possible common position.

¹ Reel 13, President Richard M. Nixon Security Files 1969-1974 (hereafter RNSF), microfilm edition, Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg (hereafter RSC).

² Greenwald to Secretary of State, “Copenhagen draft outline on US-EC relations,” 20 September 1973, Reel 2, RNSF, RSC.

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But 1973 promised to be challenging, especially when Henry Kissinger named it the "Year of Europe". On 23 April, during the annual lunch of the Associated Press in New York, he spoke about "Atlantic partnership," identifying several problems in the relationship, mainly in the fields of economics, defence and diplomacy. In order to overcome these problems, he proposed the renewal of the Atlantic charter and a visit of the President to the EC at the end of 1973.³ In Europe there was hardly any doubt that the speech had to be understood against the background of US domestic politics, including the Watergate scandal and the rising demand to withdraw American military forces from European soil. Instead the Nixon administration emphasised that they wanted to revitalise the transatlantic partnership, similar to what President Kennedy had stated in July 1963. In fact, Nixon had already touched upon the subject in a report on foreign relations in February 1970, without receiving any response from Europe.⁴

However, the Year of Europe did not develop the way the Americans had hoped for. Not only did the European leaders react in a more critical way than Kissinger had expected, they also decided to respond in a unified manner as the Nine, giving it a more adversarial touch. Their first joint action in response to Kissinger's speech was the development of a text on European identity.

³ Henry Kissinger, "The Year of Europe," 23 April 1973, in G. Mally (ed), *The New Europe and the United States: Partners or Rivals*, Lexington, Lexington Books, 1974, pp. 29-37.

⁴ For a detailed summary of the American motives for the "Year of Europe", see P. Winand, "Loaded words and disputed meanings: the Year of Europe speech and its genesis from an American perspective," in J. van der Harst (ed.), *Beyond the Customs Union: The European Community's quest for Deepening, Widening and Completion, 1969-1975*, Brussels, Bruylant, 2007, pp. 297-315; P. Mélandri, *Une incertaine alliance. Les États-Unis et l'Europe 1973-1983*, Paris, Publications de la Sorbonne, 1988, 71-72.

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A European Response to the "Year of Europe" Initiative

The Europeans reacted with mixed feelings to Kissinger's address.⁵ In the first meeting of the EPC Political Committee after the "Year of Europe" speech, most of the representatives reacted positively and agreed that their response should not be delayed.⁶ Only the French opposed a joint response of the Nine. They thought that the diverse issues referred to in the speech could be dealt with in the relevant institutional frameworks such as NATO or the GATT.⁷ In the following months, the French President Georges Pompidou dismissed various aspects of Kissinger's address. He feared that writing the Atlantic agreement would lay bare the diversity of European perspectives on transatlantic relations and might force difficult choices.⁸ He also opposed the inclusion of Canada and Japan in the discussions. Pompidou, along with the German Chancellor Willy Brandt and the British Prime Minister Edward Heath, preferred that Europe would maintain individual relations with these states.⁹

⁵ The term "Europe" in this chapter refers to the Nine state members of the EC in 1973.

⁶ This committee consisted of the Political Directors of the Foreign Relations departments of the nine member states. It was established by the Report by the Foreign Ministers of the Member States on the Problems of Political Unification. *Bulletin of the European Communities* (hereafter BEC), 11, 1970, pp. 9-14.

⁷ I. Megens, "The December 1973 declaration on European identity as the result of team spirit among European diplomats," in Van der Harst (ed.), *op.cit.*, pp. 317-338, 320-321.

⁸ Second entretien entre Pompidou et Brandt, Bonn, 22 June 1973, 5AG2/1012, Fonds Georges Pompidou, Archives Nationales, Paris (hereafter AN); Premier tête-à-tête entre Pompidou et Heath, 21 May 1973, 5AG2/1015, AN.

⁹ Premier tête-à-tête entre Pompidou et Leone, 1 October 1973, 5AG2/1016, AN; Rencontre à Chequers: 18-19 March 1972, note préparatoire, confidentielle, 27 January 1972, 5AG2/1014, AN; Troisième entretien entre Pompidou et Brandt, 27 November 1973, 5AG2/1012, AN. See also P. Mélandri, "Une relation très spéciale: la France, les États-Unis et l'Année de l'Europe, 1973-1974," in Association Georges Pompidou (ed.), *Georges Pompidou et l'Europe: Colloque 25-26 novembre 1993*, Bruxelles, Editions Complexe, pp. 89-130, 97.

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Other European criticism concerned somewhat reckless remarks by Kissinger, which he tried to hastily repair afterwards. For example, Brandt was obviously not enchanted with the reference to the Atlantic charter of 1941, and following his (already planned) visit to the United States during 1-2 May this reference was changed into "Declaration of Principles".¹⁰ Moreover, the Europeans and especially Heath disapproved of the reference in the speech to the EC as a regional power, next to a United States with global responsibilities. Kissinger quickly realised his error and apologised by saying that he had written the speech rapidly.¹¹

Furthermore, the Europeans opposed the American approach "to deal with the Atlantic problems comprehensively."¹² Kissinger had explicitly stated that the political, military and economic issues were all linked, but the European leaders were afraid of a situation in which their security would be connected to, for example, monetary or trade issues. The Foreign Ministers agreed during their meeting of 5 June to reject this comprehensive approach.¹³ During the EPC ministerial meeting of 23 July the Nine decided to respond jointly to the American initiative.

This was not a straight-forward decision. Firstly, although the member states had presented themselves as being united during the preparations for and the first phase of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) at the beginning of July, this unity had hardly fed through

¹⁰ Mélandri (1993), op.cit., p. 111; C. Hiepel, "The EC's identity, the Year of Europe and the United States," in Van der Harst (ed.), op.cit., pp. 277-296, 285.

¹¹ Heath gave his opinion to Georges Pompidou during their first meeting on 21 May 1973, 5AG2/1015, AN; Hiepel, op.cit., p. 286; Mélandri (1993), op.cit., p. 102-103.

¹² "The Year of Europe," op.cit. first section.

¹³ Hiepel, op.cit., p. 10; Pompidou et Heath, 21 May 1973, 5AG2/1015, AN; Lettre de la part de Pompidou à Brandt, Paris, 22 May 1973, 5AG2/1009, AN.

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into policy.¹⁴ Secondly, because the French government had preferred not to give any response to this “année américaine de l’Europe,”¹⁵ and would do so if necessary only bilaterally or through NATO.¹⁶

In the three months before the ministerial meeting of 23 July, Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) had promoted a genuine European response to the “Year of Europe” speech. Their governments feared a deterioration in transatlantic relations with potentially disastrous consequences for trade relations and European security.¹⁷ As Kissinger would describe later in his memoirs, Heath had informed President Richard Nixon in February 1973 that he preferred a common European position in the transatlantic dialogue. But Heath did not reserve a similar role for all Nine member states. On 21 May Heath asked Pompidou: “Do you have the intention to prepare a proposal to serve as the basis for the agreement as you have done for the European summit? We will never arrive at a suitable declaration if the proposal is prepared within the Community.”¹⁸ Two and a half months later, he proposed a tripartite summit with France, the FRG and Britain “to try to cement a common European line.”¹⁹ The other states did not welcome being set aside, but the main discussions on the future Declaration of Principles were carried out between the United States, France, the FRG and Britain. In

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¹⁴ M.-T. Bitsch, *Histoire de la construction européenne*, Paris, éditions complexe, 2004, pp. 203-205.

¹⁵ Expression made by Burin des Roziers, *Entretien de l'Association Georges Pompidou avec Etienne Burin des Roziers*, 3e entretien, 30 November 1994, 1AV197, Association Georges Pompidou.

¹⁶ “Meeting with Jobert,” Kissinger to Nixon, 11am, 29 June 1973, Reel 10, RNSE, RSC; Hillenbrand (Bonn) to Secretary of State Rogers, 2 July 1973, Section 14, Reel 13, RNSE, RSC; E. Roussel, *Georges Pompidou 1911-1974*, Paris, Perrin, 2004, pp. 555-556.

¹⁷ Hiepel, *op.cit.*, pp. 286-287.

¹⁸ Pompidou et Heath, 21 May 1973, 5AG2/1015, AN.

¹⁹ A. Noble, “Kissinger’s Year of Europe, Britain’s Year of Choice”, in M. Schultz, T.A. Schwartz (eds), *The Strained Alliance: US-European relations from Nixon to Carter*, Publications of the German Historical Institute, Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 221-236.

Noble cites a telegram with a message from Heath to Pompidou and Brandt.

June 1973 Kissinger sent two drafts of the Declaration to these states alone. It is therefore not surprising that the remaining six EC states advocated a common European position in the transatlantic dialogue.²⁰

Thus, Kissinger's address was followed by an impasse in European cooperation. While the French government preferred not to respond to the American proposition at all and especially not on a joint European basis, its partners refused to give any substantial reaction without France. However, in July 1973 the French government finally agreed to a common European approach. During the CSCE meeting in Helsinki in the first week of July the British representative Sir Thomas Brimelow, Deputy Under Secretary at the Foreign Office, proposed formulating a European identity in relation to the United States.²¹ This idea responded to the French call for a collective identity in European political cooperation.

While the initial move came from Brimelow, it is evident that similar ideas were already circulating within the French government. In a note dated 21 June 1973 the French Department of Foreign Affairs proposed discussing the issue of transatlantic relations as part of the development of political cooperation. There was no unity on the structure of political cooperation, as the Nine were divided mainly between France and the other eight on this matter, especially concerning the role of the European institutions. With this note the Quay d'Orsay effectively allowed the European institutions to take part in the political cooperation process in exchange for a reconfirmation of European identity by all Nine members. This would give France the opportunity to "test the intention of our partners to take common positions that

²⁰ This subject has been further elaborated in: M.C.Beers, "The dichotomy of large and small states in the European communities; A challenge for historians," in M. Affinito, G. Migani, C. Wenkel (eds) *Les deux Europes/The Two Europes*, Bruxelles, PIE-Peter Lang, 2009, pp.225-236.

²¹ Megens, *op.cit.*, p. 324; Noble, *loc.cit.*

are truly European negotiations is not on European identity.

The formulation of a European identity in relation to the American initiative in the transatlantic project at the CSCE meeting of July 1973 was mainly assisted by a so-called 'Nine Department' which gave written questions

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Meanwhile, the American government wanted to hear the views of the European states on plans for the visit of the President. The consultations were conducted during the speech of Kissinger in the United States.

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are truly European."²² Although the role of the document in the European negotiations is not clear, it illustrates the importance of a common position on European identity for the French government.

The French Foreign Minister, Michel Jobert, now demanded the formulation of a European identity as a prerequisite for a joint response to the American initiative. This would then lay the basis for the joint European stance in the transatlantic dialogue. The Foreign Ministers of the Nine launched the project at the Council of Ministers on 23 July in Copenhagen. The drafting of the text was mainly performed by the EPC Political Committee, which was assisted by a so-called Group of "correspondents", formed by officials of the nine Departments of Foreign Affairs. This group prepared discussions and gave written questions.²³

The United States and Uniting Europe²⁴

Meanwhile, the Americans were impatient for the results of the meeting in July and wanted to hear about European progress on the Declaration of Principles and plans for the visit of Richard Nixon to Europe. The pace of the EC Nine's political consultations was considered by Kissinger and his team to be very slow. Following the speech of Kissinger on 24 April several bilateral talks between European countries and the United States had taken place, and in June the Americans had already

²² Note du Secrétariat d'État auprès du Ministère des Affaires étrangères, "Coopération politique," 19 June 1973, 5AG2/1035, AN.

²³ This group was established by the "Second Report on European political cooperation on Foreign policy (Copenhagen, 23 July 1973)." Next to preparational work for the EPC political committee, it was entrusted with "the task of following the implementation of political cooperation and of studying problems of organization and problems of a general nature." *BEC*, 9, 1973, pp. 14-21; Megens, *op.cit.*, p. 333.

²⁴ Quote from Hillenbrand in "US/European relations: FRG Fonoff reaction to the week in New York," US Embassy Bonn to Dept. of State, 3 October 1973, Section 2, Reel 13, RNSE, RSC.

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produced a draft of the Atlantic agreement. But there had not been any concrete response from either Germany, France or Britain.²⁵ On 11 July the US ambassador in Brussels Robert Strausz-Hupé sent a telegram to Kissinger notifying him of the change in the French position. He had been informed by Etienne Davignon, the Belgian acting chairman of the Political Committee, that the French had agreed to the "possibility of a multilateral preparatory meeting with the United States if progress were made within the Nine on definition of their common position."²⁶ The Political Directors were now elaborating a list of questions in preparation for the ministerial meeting of 23 July wherein political decisions would be made and procedures would be formulated. For the Americans there was now hope for a rapid development of the Declaration of Principles. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, senior staff member of the National Security Council, advised Kissinger to stress again the urgency during his upcoming meeting with the German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel, while at the same time positively emphasising that the internal organisation of the Nine was up to the Europeans.²⁷

However, after the Council of Ministers meeting of 23 July Kissinger learned that there had not been substantial progress either on the text or on the procedures for Nixon's visit. Instead, the main achievement of the meeting had been the decision to formulate a European identity as a basis for the transatlantic dialogue. In a memorandum to Kissinger dated 25 July Sonnenfeldt stressed the danger of the "sequential view" as maintained by certain European member states such as France and, possibly, Britain and the FRG, referring to the view that the issue of a European identity should be settled before embarking on further developments in transatlantic relations.

25 Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, 1 August 1973, Declassified Documents Reference System, RSC. See also "Strausz-Hupé talk with Belgian Ambassador," 31 July 1973, Reel 2, RNSF, RSC; Megens, *op.cit.*, pp. 326-328; Mélandri (1993), *op.cit.*, pp. 114-115; Noble, *op.cit.*, pp. 7-8.

26 Strausz-Hupé to Kissinger, 11 July 1973, Reel 13, RNSF, RSC.

27 *Ibid.*; "Additional Points for Scheel - Message from Davignon," memorandum for Kissinger from Sonnenfeldt, 11 July 1973. *ibid.*

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Sonnenfeldt advised Kissinger to make clear that the Americans supported a European identity "as long as this is not simply a pretext for inaction."²⁸ Indeed, although Kissinger did not hide his irritation with the slow pace of the European response, in autumn 1973 he and his staff explicitly encouraged the unifying efforts of the Nine, emphasising that this was an interactive, mutually reinforcing process within US-European relations.²⁹

Kissinger and his staff would have been happier if the European identity issue and the drafting of a Declaration of Principles had progressed simultaneously and not sequentially. Both documents were in development during autumn 1973, but the gradual progress in defining a European identity did have an impact on the Declaration of Principles and on transatlantic relations in general. After the decision to formulate a European identity, three drafts were written in preparation for the Council of Ministers on 10 September by the French, the British, and the Irish. The British draft, emphasising the transatlantic context, was entitled "The identity of the Nine vis-à-vis the United States." There were some paragraphs on the common heritage and culture of the member states, but the largest part of the document focused on the "practical approach" towards European identity. This essentially hoped for a common position between the Nine and the US, and the document contained a thorough analysis of existing approaches to transatlantic relations and a call for a reconciliation of views.³⁰

Britain had already sent its version to the other member states on 10 August. Apparently, some countries did not agree with the tone of the draft. For example, the Belgians, Dutch and Danes travelled on 20 August to

²⁸ "First reports on Copenhagen meeting of the Nine," Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, 25 July 1973, Reel 4, RNSF, RSC.

²⁹ See for instance "Memorandum of Conversation between Kissinger and Andersen," 10.25-11.30am, 25 September 1973, US Mission to the UN, *ibid.*; "US-EC Nine meeting on draft declaration," Crowe (Copenhagen) to Dept. of State, 19 October 1973, Sections B, C, D, *ibid.*

³⁰ Megens, *op.cit.*, pp. 328-329.

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discuss the matter in London. The British draft was intended to win French support, but it was actually more outspoken on the transatlantic relationship and the differences between the Nine and the United States than the French version.³¹ The latter, which had the more simple name "De l'identité européenne", was a relatively short document of five pages, compared to the twenty or so of the British version. It accentuated more the internal development of a common identity and the general international relations of Europe.

Concerning the transatlantic dialogue, the authors had nevertheless been very precise in describing the procedures to follow by the Nine. Actually, they stated that the Europeans should observe four "rules" ("règle") in their contact with the US. Firstly, the Nine should ascertain their unity by defining their common position before transatlantic negotiations. Secondly, the development towards a European union should not be jeopardised or influenced by external factors. Thirdly, the different issues should be negotiated in their respective forums. Thus the dialogue might facilitate bridge-building, but should not replace existing formal channels. Lastly, there was a need to define common targets before the negotiations.³² In short, the accent was on the search of the Nine for a common position in world affairs, the development of a genuine European unity, and the need to ward off any external factor that could jeopardise this process.

This French paper became the basis for the transatlantic dialogue as decided by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs at their meeting on 10 September. The emphasis on the development and maintenance of European unity as written in the French draft would govern the proceedings in the making of the Atlantic agreement, the Declaration of Principles. The Nine first decided to jointly draft, without the United States, a first version of this Declaration. Then,

31 "European Identity," Blodgett (The Hague) to Dept. of State, 17 August 1973, Reel 19, RNSE RSC.

32 "De l'identité européenne," 4-10 September 1973, 5AG2/1035, AN.

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having achieved consensus, the then president of the Council of Ministers, the Danish Foreign Minister Knud Andersen, transmitted this version to Henry Kissinger on 25 September. Negotiations followed. After a first meeting on 29 September, there were two large negotiation rounds in October and November between the EPC Political Committee and an American delegation led by Walter J. Stoessel, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. During all three occasions the Europeans presented a united front.

Kissinger and his staff were not very enthusiastic about the proceedings. The Europeans had, without counselling the Americans, transformed the process of the transatlantic dialogue into a matter between two entities, instead of between the four larger states or between all ten states. In a certain way, they had imposed their way of proceeding on their American counterparts. The Secretary of State wasn't the least pleased to receive the European draft for the Declaration of Principles from, what he called, "a messenger boy,"³³ the Danish Foreign Minister, who was not empowered to negotiate but could only gather comments. "We seem to be talking to those who can't negotiate," he said to Andersen, "and those who can negotiate won't talk to us."³⁴

Moreover, apart from the procedure, the European quest for a common identity also found its way into the content of the Declaration of Principles. In several telegrams from Brussels, both Robert Strausz-Hupé and Joseph Greenwald commented on the first European drafts for the Declaration. Strausz-Hupé remarked that "the Nine are asking for a solid US blessing on their efforts to establish the community as a "distinct entity" (and potential rival) in world affairs."³⁵ He also complained that the draft did not

33 "Memorandum of Conversation between Kissinger and Jobert," New York, 26 September 1973, Reel 10, RNSE, RSC.

34 "Memorandum of Conversation between Kissinger and Andersen," *op.cit.*

35 "Atlantic relations - US/EC declaration," Strausz-Hupé (Brussels) to the Secretary and Stoessel,

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refer to any American contribution to the unity and prosperity of Europe. Moreover, although the draft mentioned a need to intensify the existing level of transatlantic cooperation and maintain a constructive dialogue, no way forward was included for preparatory US-European talks on either relevant issues or important American interests in world affairs.³⁶

The emphasis on a differentiation between Europe and the United States was not exactly what Kissinger had had in mind when he asked for an Atlantic partnership. Greenwald wrote in a telegram on 20 September that "one of our main objectives should be to convince the Europeans that their identity need not be characterized only by efforts to differentiate themselves as "European" versus "Atlantic", as the French appear to desire, but also by acting jointly among themselves as well as in cooperation with us in pursuit of certain common interests."³⁷ One of the means to establish such cooperation would be via the creation of a so-called "joint commission" of both American and European members. On a long-term basis, this commission could facilitate a continuing process of policy consultation and coordination. This idea to institutionalise the Euro-American relationship was not new. Already during the Council meeting of 6 March 1970, Walter Scheel had proposed such a commission to the other Foreign Ministers. But while at the time the Dutch and Italians had immediately responded positively, the French objected to the creation of yet another institution next to the OECD, the IMF or the GATT. A joint commission could imply the linking of economic and political subjects, something which they also rejected.³⁸

21 September 1973, Section 4, Reel 2, RNSF, RSC. The draft for the Declaration of Principles was published as "Text of the European Economic Community's Proposal on Relations With US," *New York Times*, 24 September 1973.

36 Ibid.

37 "Copenhagen draft outline on US-EC relations," Greenwald (Brussels) to acting Secretary of State, 3.45pm, 20 September 1973, Section 9, Reel 2, RNSF, RSC.

38 "Proposition de création d'une Commission mixte États-Unis-CEE," 5AG2/1010, AN.

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However, the renewed proposal for a joint commission now had more chance of success, especially as the European draft for the Declaration of Principles accentuated the need for an intensification of the US-EC relationship in several areas. As Greenwald wrote to Washington on 20 September: “The thrust of the whole draft is toward a new special US-EC relationship [...] This is consistent with the basic concept that the US-European relationship is such that consultation and coordination (not negotiation in the traditional sense) is the way we should deal with each other. We believe this close relationship could be highlighted in an agreement to set up a US-EC joint commission [...]”³⁹”

Simultaneously, this idea for a joint commission would help the United States to “capitalize”⁴⁰ on the European identity project. Thus, as added Strausz-Hupé, the commission would allow the Americans “to express their views to the Nine on pending issues before a bloc view was formed.”⁴¹

Following the large negotiation round on 18-19 October, Kissinger’s staff members reported that they had “run into quite a solid stone wall.”⁴² Their European counterparts had rejected any notion of possible new forms of consultation or cooperation in the Declaration. They had also rejected other American proposals such as the notion of “partnership” which Kissinger had called for in his Year of Europe speech. In their reaction, the Europeans emphasised their aim for a common European identity.

One of the members of the US delegation recorded in a telegram that on 18 October they had received “advise” from the French political director François Puaux “not to smother tender young EC plant with our far-reaching propositions.”⁴³ Although the European political directors had avoided an

³⁹ “Copenhagen draft outline on US-EC relations,” *op.cit.*, Sections 4, 5.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, Section 7.

⁴¹ “Atlantic relations –US/EC declaration,” *op.cit.*, Section 4.

⁴² “US-EC Nine meeting,” Stoessel and Sonnenfeldt (Copenhagen) to Secretary of State, 18 October 1973, Section 2, Reel 4, RNSF, RSC.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, Section 3.

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impression of separateness between the EC and the US, they had nevertheless stressed that the Nine's unity "must not be clouded by becoming ten,"⁴⁴ as the Danish director Oldenburg had said. Moreover, not only Puaux, but also the Belgian political director Davignon and his Dutch colleague Van Lynden had stressed that the Nine were still "in a nascent stage" and "at the beginning of a process of self-realization."⁴⁵ Apparently, the recognition of a separate identity was crucial for the Europeans, as they refused to include a reference to cooperation with the United States in the same section which referred to the creation of the EC.⁴⁶

The Primacy of a Common European Stance

The French led the resistance to the American proposals. On 8 October Étienne Burin de Roziers, the French permanent representative in Brussels, informed Pompidou of the proposed amendments. According to the diplomat, they showed both the American intention to push forward their ideas on, for instance, the reform of the GATT and international monetary problems, and "the American attempt to get a grip on the community and its member-states." Pompidou responded determinedly: "We have to be very firm: the amendments—in general—are unacceptable and we don't accept them."⁴⁷ But the French were not isolated during the formal negotiations. They were supported by the other member states, although some of these "separately and privately"⁴⁸ informed the Americans that they had tried to persuade the French to change their position.

44 "US-EC nine meeting on draft declaration," Crowe (Copenhagen) to Stoessel, 19 October 1973, Section 2a, Reel 4, RNSF, RSC.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid, Section F; "US-EC Nine meeting," Copenhagen, 18 October 1973, op.cit.

47 "Relations Europe/États-Unis," 8 October 1973, 5AG2/1035, AN.

Pompidou wrote this reply by hand on the telegram. See also Mélandri (1993), op.cit., pp. 117-118.

48 "Our discussion with EC Nine," Stoessel (Paris) to Secretary of State, 20 October 1973, Section

Thus, even if the amendments, the Hillenbrand, American a meeting with W go further than the relationship but was important."⁴⁹ had made this embassy that "the of development developed persuas only be defined i Nine."⁵⁰ Hillenbr been struck by the European develop In re conscious of a br regularly insisted 1969. The themes speaking with on larly the Davigno Paris Summit in

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Thus, even if the other Europeans were less dismissive towards the American amendments, they still continued to form a united front. As Martin Hillenbrand, American ambassador in Bonn, transmitted on 31 October after a meeting with Walter Scheel: "the Germans would be prepared obviously to go further than the French in setting forth the nature of the US-European relationship but the necessity of retaining a common European position was important."⁴⁹ A week before, an official from the German foreign office had made this even more clear when stating to a member of the American embassy that "the scope of declaration must be restricted by the current stage of development in EC-9 competencies and by common EC policies so far developed pursuant to those competencies. In turn, this EC position could only be defined in terms of the maximum consensus attainable among the Nine."⁵⁰ Hillenbrand informed Washington that his embassy colleague had been struck by the continued emphasis made by the German on current European developments when discussing the Declaration of Principles.⁵¹

In relation to the transatlantic dialogue, the Europeans were conscious of a broader project of European unity. The member states had regularly insisted on their cohesion since the EC conference in The Hague of 1969. The themes of internal cohesion, being a distinct entity, and a Europe speaking with one voice had recurred in diverse official reports, particularly the Davignon report of 27 October 1970 and the Statement from the Paris Summit in 1972.⁵² Although the American Year of Europe initiative

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2, Reel 10, RNSE, RSC.

49 Section 7, Reel 13, RNSE, RSC.

50 "US/European relations: FRG Fonoff views following oct 18-19 Copenhagen meeting," Hillenbrand to Secretary of State, 24 October 1973, Section 3, Reel 13, RNSE, RSC.

51 Ibid, Section 6.

52 M.C. Beers, "L'identité européenne déclarée en 1973," *Richie Newsletter*, 4, Spring 2007, pp. 5-19, available online: <http://www.europe-richie.org/REN/index-fr.html>.

unintentionally played a substantial role in the development of the European identification process, the latter was already in progress before Kissinger's speech. Nor did it only confine itself to relations with the US.

The Italian Foreign Minister Aldo Moro gave a lengthy address during the Council on 10 September 1973 in which he said: "it is no doubt essential to define Europe if we want to build a European unity [...] This first document on "European identity" shall be a useful basis for the various international negotiations that will take place in the coming months: the Conference on Security and Cooperation, the negotiations on trade and monetary questions."⁵³ Indeed, during the CSCE in Helsinki the member states closely cooperated. As agreed in the first week of July, the president of the Council of Ministers would act as spokesperson transmitting the common position reached in the EPC ministerial meetings.⁵⁴

The Nine also closed ranks in their official statement of 6 November on the situation in the Middle East. With this declaration they expressed a point of view that differed from the American position. While the US had proposed an exchange of views just the day before, the Nine declared openly that they were searching for a solution to the conflict. Moreover, a peace agreement should include among other things the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the areas occupied since 1967, as well as the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. These points of view were contested among the Nine, but nevertheless all member states signed the declaration.⁵⁵ This act worsened transatlantic relations, which had been tense for several months. In

⁵³ "Foreign Minister Moro's speech at the E.E.C. Conference at Copenhagen," Reel 16, RNSF, RSC.

⁵⁴ A. Romano, "The Nine and the conference of Helsinki: a challenging game with the Soviets," in Van der Harst (ed.), *op.cit.*, pp. 83-104.

⁵⁵ "Declaration of the Nine Foreign Ministers of 6 November 1973, in Brussels, on the Situation in the Middle East," available online at <http://www.ena.lu>. For differences between the Nine (especially between the Dutch and the other member states) see: D. Hellema, C. Wiebes, and T. Witter *The Netherlands and the Oil Crisis*, Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 2004, pp. 88-92.

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the summer of 1973 the Nine accused the Americans of a lack of consultation on the Brezhnev-Nixon agreement on the prevention of nuclear war in June and of transporting weapons to Israel via Germany during the Yom Kippur war. During the negotiations on the Declaration of Principles on 14 November Puaux objected once again to the idea of a joint commission. According to him the Middle East crisis had proved that the US did not stand by the need for consultations when it was really needed. Thus the "prior consultation concept would violate EC identity and would block development of European Union."⁵⁶ Two weeks later Kissinger replied to Jobert that there had certainly been briefings and conversations on these subjects. However, he added, "there have been no consultations of any kind with the US [...] on the objectives with respect to the evolution of European unity or a European identity despite the fact that this is of critical importance to the shape and future of the alliance."⁵⁷

Later, Kissinger would write in his memoirs that the Year of Europe ended in autumn 1973.⁵⁸ Maybe he was right. After the negotiations of 14 November the drafting of the Declaration was halted and would never be finalised. Instead, in June 1974 an Atlantic Declaration, written by the 15 members of NATO, was officially announced during Nixon's visit to Europe. This declaration had been written simultaneously with the Declaration of Principles in autumn 1973, but it was limited to the context of NATO and only concerned the 15 members of the Alliance.⁵⁹

When the negotiations for the Declaration of Principles ground to a halt, the document on European identity had actually not been finished. Various member states continued to propose amendments to the text, giving

⁵⁶ "US/European relations: FRG views following Nov 14 Copenhagen meeting," Hillenbrand to Secretary of State, 19 November 1973, Section 11, Reel 13, RNSE, RSC.

⁵⁷ "US-French Consultations, from Washington to Paris," 30 November 1973, Section 6, Reel 10, RNSE, RSC.

⁵⁸ H. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, Boston, Little, Brown and company, 1982, pp. 700-706.

⁵⁹ Megens, op.cit., pp. 336-338; Hiepel, op.cit., p.290.

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cause for ongoing discussions. Every five or six weeks the EPC's Political Directors and the Correspondents came together to discuss the drafts.⁶⁰ Through November 1973 the document on European identity changed fundamentally. The Italian and Belgian delegates proposed in the Group of Correspondents to have the text publicly adopted as a formal declaration in order to have an impact on public opinion.⁶¹ As a result, after approval by the EPC Ministers on 19 and 20 November,⁶² the document became an official declaration to be adopted in Copenhagen on 14 December. Instead of laying the basis for the future of dialogue with the US, the document became autonomous in its own right. The theme of transatlantic relations had moved to the background and was now just another item on the list of the Nine's foreign relations. Any deep-seated analysis of the Atlantic cooperation had disappeared.

Conclusion

1973 was after all not the pivotal year in transatlantic relations it could have been. Instead of a reinforcement of the Atlantic partnership, the Year of Europe speech instead instigated stiff negotiations and the drawn-out process surrounding the Declaration of Principles.

A major role in transatlantic relations during that year was played by the identity project of the EC Nine. Initially it opened the way for a European response to Kissinger's address on the Year of Europe, but thereafter

⁶⁰ Megens, *op.cit.*, p. 333; Hiepel, *op.cit.*, pp.287-289; Note sur l'Allemagne et la coopération politique des Neuf de la part du Ministère des Affaires étrangères, 19 November 1973, 5AG2/92, AN; Note de la part du Ministère des Affaires étrangères, 22 November 1973, 5AG2/1012, AN.

⁶¹ Note pour Pompidou de la part de Raimond, 14 November 1973, 5AG2/1015, AN.

⁶² Note pour Pompidou de la part de Raimond, 23 November 1973, *ibid.*

it hindered the need for a European identity. Principles. On the of the American an involvement would instrument to defend identity project itself joint identity, they als, even when these is interesting that the document on a project of working itself was ultimately

The political relations in the crisis following the Year of Europe. The Nine member states domestic energy policy when the Declaration of Principles was adopted in Copenhagen summit than energy issues. agreement. Just before the negotiation between the member states was planned nine months later to assembling the consensus of the nine EC member states. Therefore, the primary objective of economic survival

it hindered the negotiations. Frequently, references were made to the search for a European identity during the process of drafting the Declaration of Principles. On the one hand, the Europeans used it to justify their rejection of the American amendments to their draft Declaration of Principles, as if US involvement would endanger the identity project. It was thus a convenient instrument to defend their (mainly French) position. On the other hand, the identity project itself was the main objective of the Nine. For the sake of their joint identity, they formed a common position to resist the American proposals, even when these proposals were relatively acceptable for most of them. It is interesting that the Europeans never seemed to refer to the actual text of the document on a common identity, instead often making references to the project of working together towards it. The document on European identity itself was ultimately less important than the process that created it.

The project on European identity left its mark on transatlantic relations in the summer and autumn of 1973, but it was the oil crisis following the Yom Kippur war that had a more dramatic impact. The Nine member states of the EC seem to be more preoccupied with their domestic energy problems than with maintaining European unity. Even when the Declaration on European identity was formally adopted at the Copenhagen summit of 14-15 December 1973, it received far less attention than energy issues. Interestingly, Kissinger played a role in this development. Just before the summit, he called for greater international cooperation between the main oil-consuming countries. An international conference was planned in Washington for February 1974, which would lead nine months later to the formation of the International Energy Agency. In assembling the consumer countries, Kissinger gained support from eight of the nine EC member states, with only France being excluded. In the end, therefore, the primacy of European unity had to give way for the planning of economic survival ■

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