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Integrity & sport events

Position paper

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Management summary¹

Sport events are appreciated as important sources of inspiration and positive energy. Yet, for a growing number of people, the negative aspects of sport events have come to cast a shadow over sport events as a positive experience. Questions and doubts have been raised about the transparency and good governance of the different processes surrounding sport events as well as the integrity of the actors involved.

During The Netherlands presidency of the European Union, the Dutch Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sports put integrity in sport at the centre of their agenda. The aim of this report, commissioned by the Dutch Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sports, is to shed light on integrity developments; to show how issues of integrity have altered people's attitudes towards sport events; and to address how governments and the EU can use their resources to restore faith in the integrity of major and mega sport events. In order to do so, the authors reviewed the scientific literature on integrity and sport events and analysed a number of recent cases.

Integrity

Fostering integrity and preventing corruption in the public and private sector supports a level playing field and is essential to maintaining trust in these sectors and their institutions. The call for integrity and good governance seems to have reached the sport movement later than other sectors.

Related to sport events, organisational integrity is defined as the basic social obligations that organisers and stakeholders of sport events (in particular, international sport federations and governments) have to meet in order to be regarded by many people as honest, truthful and accurate.

Good governance can be seen as one of the cornerstones of organisational integrity and refers to the institutional design, rules and regulations (e.g. an effective legal framework, efficient accountability mechanisms, an ethics coordinating body and workable codes of conduct). In addition, integrity is achieved through behavioural and cultural norms (applying rules and adhering to them).

To date, there are no academically-founded guidelines or standards with regards to the governance and organisational integrity of sport events. Four dimensions appear to be relevant to the organisational integrity of sport events:

- *Public value*: achieving a positive social and economic legacy and contributing valuable solutions to major societal challenges such as health, social cohesion, sustainable growth and security.
- *Transparency*: disclosure of requirements for bids, contracts and of decision-making procedures.
- *Democratic processes*: stakeholder participation, democratic procedures and support from the broader public.
- *Checks and balances*: control procedures, opportunities for whistle-blowers to step forward, independent monitoring and evaluation.

¹ An extended version of this management summary was published separately in preparation for a meeting of the EU sport-directors, alongside the EU Sportforum take took place in The Hague, 9–10 March 2016. See Hover et al., 2016.

Sport events

The emerging market for sport events has given rise to an economy of event-organisers and consultancy companies. The driving forces behind this ‘eventisation of elite-sports’ are threefold: cultural, technological/economic and political. As sport events have come to play a more central role in society, issues of integrity have become more important.

Over the past forty years, the market share of the EU for world championships has been stable at approximately 50 per cent - seven times higher than Europe’s share of the global population, and double its share of the global economy. In three of the leading world championships (football, athletics and swimming), the market share of the EU has dropped from 60 per cent between 1976 and 1985, to 31 per cent during 2005-2015 and an expected 29 per cent in the period 2016-2025. As for the Summer Olympic Games and Winter Olympic Games, the market share of the EU varies between 17 per cent and 40 per cent (1-2 Games per decade).

Sport events vary in terms of size and impact. A common academic categorisation is: local sport events (national championships); major sport events (European or world championships aside from football and athletics); hallmark sport events (e.g. Wimbledon); and mega sport events (FIFA World Cup, IAAF World Championships, Olympic Games). It is not uncommon to see the last three categories grouped together under the heading ‘major sport events’.

Organisational integrity and sport events

The ‘event life cycle’ consists of four phases: bid process (including feasibility studies); event preparation; event organisation; and legacy. Issues of integrity, good governance and transparency play a key role in all four phases, though different actors are involved in the different phases.

In the bidding phase, from the side of rights owners, lack of transparency over awarding criteria and voting-procedures, and claims that they are making exorbitant demands have appeared to be causes for concern. From the side of the bidding entities, corruption, lack of possibilities to get or be involved in bidding, lack of trust in intentions of the event planners, disbelief in the overpromised effects of the event, and worries over costs getting out of hand, have played a role in the public’s increasingly critical standpoint towards sport events.

In the planning and organisation phase, the violation of human and workers’ rights have been reported on different continents and have added to the concerns of the broader public (particularly in the EU) over the desirability of hosting sport events. Other issues in this phase appear to elicit fewer questions from the broader public (e.g. issues of sustainability and accessibility of the event, or the influence of sponsors).

In the legacy phase, there are worries over the infrastructural legacy of events and over a disappointing legacy as regards increasing sport participation. In addition, economists have started to contest claims of economic gains of hosting events. An uneven distribution of costs and revenues is starting to raise eyebrows. Legacies that were promised during bidding phases often fail to materialise, partly because of a lack of proper legacy management. Legacies appear to rarely be subjected to objective and independent evaluation.

Conclusion

There appears to be an increasing discrepancy between what society expects of sport events in terms of integrity, and what these parties currently offer in this respect. The transparency and principles of

governance as demanded today are as yet ill-embedded in the international sport sector. The world of sport events needs to adapt to a position in the centre of the public debate.

Recently, the sport sector has begun to act upon these changes. IOC, FIFA, and other international federations have started adapting their policies. These are much needed first steps, but more action is called for.

Responsibility for enhancing integrity in sport events does not reside solely with one single party. It resides with the total supply chain: rights owners (international sport federations and other licensees); host cities/countries and national federations; and media, suppliers and sponsors.

Enhancing integrity in sport events encompasses all four phases of the event life cycle. It involves introducing principles of good governance, but also - especially - a change in behaviours and organisational cultures.

Governments need to play a role in enhancing integrity. National governments can use their influence to warrant that the four dimensions for organisational integrity described in this report are being met. Governments need to support their national federations, and need to be explicit on their own criteria for becoming involved. The EU needs to use its resources to establish common ground among nations and the international sport movement; to exchange best practices; to initiate research; and to formulate guidelines. These are the actions that are needed to restore faith in the integrity of major and mega sport events.

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1. Sport events and integrity issues

1.1 The advent of sport event policies

Over the past few decades, grassroots sports and elite sports have been the cornerstones of sport policies in virtually any given country. Though countries differ according to the emphasis they put on either grassroots or elite sports, in most countries sport policy would be a mixture of stimulating mass-participation in grassroots sports and enhancing the achievements of their elite athletes.

At the grassroots level, the norm is set by the ‘sports for all’ ideal that has been dominating the sport-policy scene since the 1960s. The goal of ‘sports for all’ still has relevance today, even though we may now speak of ‘raising physical activity levels’, ‘healthy lifestyles’ or ‘social inclusion’. In the end, the aim for grassroots policies remains quite the same: to make more people be physically active through engagement in grassroots sports.

In elite sports, programmes to enhance the state’s achievements has been part-and-parcel of most sport-policies as well, whether that be Eastern Germany in the 1970 and 1980s, the Australian and UK elite sport programmes that followed the disappointing results at the Olympic Games of 1976 and 1996, respectively,² or Canada’s “Own the Podium” programme for the Vancouver 2010 Winter Olympics. Thus, at some point in time and depending upon the available budgets and political context, virtually any country has, to some degree, set up programmes to help their national athletes become successful.

Less widespread has been policies to host international sport events. Until recently, sport events did not appear to raise much attention. They were simply there, because some city and sport organisation rooted for them, or not. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, competition to host large sport events began to emerge as a reaction to deindustrialisation and the need for urban restructuring. At that point in time though, hosting sport events were mainly ad-hoc projects. Such projects were not often integrated in a broader and more structured national sport policy.

How different the current situation is. Over these past years, cities and countries have come to see international sport events, especially the larger ones, as meaningful vehicles for both their sport-policies and for related policies (e.g. tourism, economy, infrastructure, social cohesion). Bidding procedures to host the most attractive events have become fierce competitions, requiring considerable investment of both money and manpower. Between 2010 and 2018, the average bid for the Olympic Games cost nearly 20 million euros.³ Zimbalist (2015) argues that spending USD 100 million on bidding for mega events is not unusual. Being awarded the chance to host the event leads to outbursts of enthusiasm and happiness among the winning team - much as if a gold medal had been won. This is understandable as people carry high hopes of what good comes out of hosting a sport event. A sport

² In 1976 in Montreal, the Australian team won 11 medals of which 0 were gold, earning the Aussies a 27th place in the medal table, an all-time low in its history. Likewise, in 1996 in Atlanta, Team UK won 15 medals of which 1 was gold, resulting in the 36th place in the medal table and causing embarrassment across the nation. For both countries, these embarrassing moments spurred the interest in elite sport programmes leading eventually to Sydney hosting the 2000 Olympic Games and London the 2012 Olympic Games.

³ According to the collective of the Austrian Olympic Committee, the German Olympic Sports Confederation, the Swedish Olympic Committee and the Swiss Olympic Association (2014). It is not clear which bidding costs are taken into account, and it is anticipated that the average costs are more likely an underestimation than an overestimation.

event, especially a ‘sport mega-event’ is expected to draw in visitors from abroad, create media exposure, increase private spending and jobs, offer an opportunity to showcase the city and the country, create a possibility to revamp the sport-sector, stimulate citizens to take up sports and become physically active, get inspired, restore national pride and cohesion, and last but not least speed up investments in sporting and non-sporting infrastructure and facilities that were long called for. In short, a successful event offers excitement: the promise of adding life and energy to the host city, its citizens and its economy (see also European Commission, 2016b).

1.2 And yet...

And yet, for an increasing number of people, the purpose of organising sport events seems to have become a little less self-evident; the societal benefits that are supposed to accrue from sport events not as clear-cut; the advantages a little less obvious as some policymakers and spokesmen for the event picture them. Somehow, these last years, the deep-rooted faith in what Houlihan calls the ‘magic dust of sport’ (Houlihan & Lindsey, 2013) seems to have given way to a sense of ill-trust and scepticism (Foley et al., 2015; European Commission 2016a).

Examples of this shift in perspective are abundant: in the modern era, resistance can be seen in the public’s concerns over China’s human rights records as Beijing was set to host the 2008 Summer Olympics; in outcries against the budgetary transgressions of the London 2012 Games and of legacy plans being cut back; in concern over the poor working conditions and larger-than-life investments for Sochi 2014; in the populations of Munich (Garmisch Partenkirchen) and Krakow voting against hosting the 2022 Winter Games, and Hamburg voting against the 2024 Summer Games; in Boston stepping down from bidding for the 2024 Summer Games; in complaints by smaller cities and countries that they feel that they are no longer in a position to bid for hosting larger championships (e.g. the Swedish city of Östersund); and in the political outrage against the malpractices of FIFA, for example, with protests ongoing and sponsors pulling out. People have started to question the integrity of sport governors, and demand more transparency and better governance, casting a negative light on sports and sport events.

1.3 Aim of the report

Clearly, these outcomes are alarming. Cities, countries and sport federations invest in sport events because they believe in the power of sports: in the capacity of events to fuel new energy in citizens and the organisations they form. What then causes this breach of faith in the power of sport and of sport events? How should we understand these processes? What might they mean for future sport event policies? And what kind of actions is called for if we wish to restore faith in sport events as vehicles for positive social change?

These are not simple questions to answer. Many of these answers should come not from researchers but rather from politicians, sport federations and companies in and associated with the sport industry. Some organisations have indeed started to address these questions, e.g. the IOC in its Agenda 2020 (IOC, 2014; see also Transparency International, 2015). Two of the European Commission’s expert groups, on good governance and on the economic dimension of sport (XG GG and XG ECO, European Commission, 2016 a/b), have recently touched upon the subject of sport events as well. Still it is clear that much more will be needed to restore faith in sport events, and that what has been established so far can only be considered first steps on a long and challenging road (Arcioni, 2016; Van den Auweele et al., 2016).

To further facilitate the debate on the integrity of sport events, the Dutch Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sports ('VWS'), in its preparations for the first half of 2016 EU presidency, requested a 'position paper' on the changing context of sport events, and how that might affect sport event policies. During The Netherlands presidency of the European Union, the Dutch Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sports put integrity in sport at the centre of their agenda. The aim of the position paper meets the focus of current and future EU policy. Aspects of integrity, like corruption, are seen as developments that affect the sport sector at an international level and, therefore, need to be tackled at a European level (European Commission, 2007). The council of the European Union and the Member States agreed that the integrity of sport should be given priority by Member States and the Commission (European Union, 2014).

The present paper intends to bring the existing scientific literature on the integrity of sport events to the fore, help understand what is going on in the field of sport events, raise the quality of the debate and help steer actions and decisions. The main questions guiding this paper, therefore, are:

- What are background factors that can explain why 'integrity' became an issue in the current debates over sport events?; what definitions, dimensions and aspects can be distinguished when one speaks of sport events?;
- How can one define integrity in terms of sport events and what are relevant dimensions of aspects that can be fruitfully distinguished?;
- What are examples of how the integrity of sport events has been doubted or questioned in the different dimensions just distinguished?;
- What is the significance of these examples, and the apparent lack of trust in the integrity of the actors involved, for future sport event policies?

The aim of the paper is not to develop a strategy for EU members to maximise their individual or collective competitive position on the market for sport events. It is not our aim to develop a plan for the EU to play a greater role on the global sport-event-market. Rather, our ambition is to analyse why faith in the good of sport events has fallen, why doubts over the integrity of sport events have risen, and what is needed (in terms of transparency and governance) to restore the public's confidence and support for sport events. In addition, we hope to contribute to creating a level playing field between EU Member States while achieving their own goals as regards sport events.

The paper focusses on breaches of integrity and trust that came from the organisation of sport events. This includes preparatory phases such as the bidding phase, and the post-event legacy phase that extends well beyond the event itself. As such, the paper does not take other integrity issues into consideration, such as:

- The use of doping;
- Match fixing;
- The creation of an international market of athletes;
- Misuse of trust of young athletes (sexual abuse, poor talent development programmes).

Even though we feel these are important matters that deserve the full attention of both scientists and policymakers, we will not go into these issues here.

Neither do we touch upon the subject of state aid in detail (for building sport infrastructures, etc.). Although we sense that this might become an issue in the future, we feel that currently not enough work has been done in this area to warrant full attention to this subject at this stage.

1.4 Working methods

The core of the work for this paper was undertaken between January 2016 and March 2016. Important sources for the study were:

- Desk research: we analysed the scientific literature that was available in international scientific databases, the IOC, journals like *Annals of Leisure Research* and the *European Sport Management Quarterly*, presentations given at conferences like the European Association for Sociology of Sport Conference, newspaper clippings, and books and reports being issued and could be found on the websites of organisations like FIFA, London 2012 and the organising committee of the 2014 Commonwealth Games;
- Some additional requests for information by mail and telephone to a selected number of experts on specific cases;
- The input from an expert group that was established to help steer the work in this project. The names of these ‘national expert group’ can be found in appendix 1;
- The feedback from academics in 17 EU countries on a draft of the paper. The names of these ‘international reviewers’ can be found in appendix 2.

1.5 Report structure

In the next chapters, 2 and 3, we will focus on establishing common ground when speaking of integrity and sport events. We will make clear what is to be understood when we speak of integrity, and how this is a concept related to other concepts, such as good governance or trust (chapter 2). Next, we will define more precisely what we mean when we speak of different sorts of sport events; briefly highlight some general developments in the market for sport events; and define phases and discern roles (chapter 3).

In chapter 4, we will analyse the literature to search for concrete examples when trust in sport events was breached and the integrity of the organisations involved was seriously doubted. In so doing we will loosely follow the framework of the dimensions that we distinguished earlier in chapters 2 and 3. Additional information that is relevant to chapter 4 is described in greater detail in four specific case-studies that are put together in appendix 3;⁴ and in two appendices, one on sustainability (appendix 4) and one on human and workers’ rights (appendix 5).

In chapter 5, we will use the concepts established in chapters 2 and 3 and the outcomes of the more empirical studies in chapter 4, to discuss the implications for sport event policies of Member States and the EU, and what is needed to restore faith in sport events.

⁴ Bids Olympic Winter Games 2022; Bids Olympic Summer Games 2024; Olympic and Paralympic Games 2012 in London; Glasgow 2014 Commonwealth Games. Selection criteria for these cases were: recent cases, a mixture of bid processes and actual events, a mixture of relatively large and small events and events which were relatively well studied by academic researchers.

2. Integrity

In recent decades, in many societies, especially in the Western world, we can see an increasingly louder call for ‘integrity’ (Amman, 2012). Whether it concerns the integrity of public administration, large corporations or non-governmental organisations, as soon as there is (rumours about) corruption, bribery or fraud, the public loses confidence in its executives, directors and managers, and in the end in its institutions. Fostering integrity and preventing corruption in the public sector, private sector and the sport sector supports a level playing field and is essential to maintaining trust in these sectors and its institutions (OECD, 2009).

Over several decades, serious questions about the integrity standards of sport have surfaced in the public with irregular intervals as well. In the past couple of years, however, the accumulations of scandals in sport has grown so intensely that the credibility of sport and its organisations is fundamentally shaken, threatening the public trust in sport as a lever of positive social and cultural values in sport (Alm, 2013).

As governments hold ties with international sports organisations, and as sports organisations often depend at least partly on public subsidies, governments can and often will be affected or associated with the declining confidence in sports organisations - shaking confidence in government itself. At the same time, the integrity of governments can become topic of debate when the governmental investments in mega and major sport events’ inflate and negative social and ecological impacts appear. Questions can arise about the honesty and moral principles of governments that overpromise the impacts and underestimate the costs of mega or major sport events.

Not surprisingly, a chorus of voices has been urging governments to heed higher standards of integrity and good governance, including democratic representation, accountability and transparency, when it comes to bidding and organising sport events. All too often complaints can be heard about - for example - shadowy or undemocratic processes of nominating candidate cities, pre-made promises that are not fulfilled and runaway government investments (cf. Baade and Matheson, 2002, Black, 2007, Gammon, 2015).

However, before turning to the more empirical chapters, we will define integrity more precisely. What do we mean when we speak of integrity, what do we imply when we say that someone, or some organisation, acts with integrity? How does the concept of integrity relate to concepts often referred to in the literature on public administration, such as good governance and trust? And how can we apply these concepts to the field of mega and major sport events?⁵

2.1 What is integrity?

According to the Cambridge English Dictionary, ‘integrity’ means ‘the quality of being honest and having strong moral principles that you refuse to change’. Integrity is regarded by many people as the honesty and truthfulness or accuracy of one’s actions and/or the adherence to moral and ethical principles or a strict moral or ethical code (cf. Lucaites et al., 1999, Karssing, 2011). Paine (1994) distinguishes

⁵ See paragraph 3.1 for a typology of sport events.

‘integrity’, which is related to basic social obligations, such as respect for the rights of others, honesty, fair dealing and obedience to the law; and ‘integrity aspirations’, which are values that are ethically desirable but not necessarily morally obligatory, such as commitment to diversity, and involvement in the community.

Integrity in sports has various meanings. Often it is referred to as issues of fair play and (in the negative sense) to doping, match fixing, sexual harassment, etc. Here, we will not focus on these sport specific elements of integrity. Instead, we will focus on the integrity of the governance and organisation of sport events from the perspective of sports organisations and governments.

Governance and organisational integrity is aimed at incorruptibility. While compliance is rooted in avoiding legal sanctions, governance and organisational integrity is based on the concept of self-governance in accordance with a set of guiding principles (Buchanan & Keohane, 2006). It is considered the task of management to give life to guiding values, to create an environment that supports ethically sound behaviour, and to instil a sense of shared accountability (Paine, 1994).

With regards to public administration, the OECD (2009) argues that governance and organisation integrity refers to the application of values, principles and norms in the daily operations of public sector organisations. Evans (2011) adds that integrity stands for the crafting of accountable, transparent, competent and responsive public administration underpinned by the concept of public value. This means that governments and other public sector organisation add value to the public sphere that goes beyond market economic considerations (Moore 1995, Bennington 2011). Major sports events are increasingly linked to creating public value(s) by enhancing public health through physical activity; contributing to integration, and economic and social cohesion; and to providing recreation (European Commission, 2007). It has been argued that those important sociocultural values of sport are seriously undermined by corruption (Schenk, 2011, p. 1).


In this paper, we will take the former notions about governance and organisational integrity into account while focusing on the governance and organisational integrity related to major sport events. We define governance and organisational integrity as the basic social obligations that organisers and stakeholders of major sport events (in particular international sport federations and governments) have to meet in order to be regarded by many people as honest, truthful and accurate. We argue that major sport events must have integrity to avoid corruption and maintain (or restore) the trust in international sport federations and governments involved.

2.2 Governance and organisational integrity

Governance and organisational integrity needs to be safeguarded by integrity systems. The relevant aspects of an integrity system are efficient accountability mechanisms and workable codes of conduct (OECD, 2009). The integrity debate in general and the increasing integrity debate about major sport events, in particular, has been leading up to the current global quest for so-called ‘good governance’, as part of an integrity system. Good governance can be seen as one of the corner stones of governance and organisational integrity and refers to institutional design, rules and regulations (e.g. an effective legal framework, efficient accountability mechanisms, an ethics co-ordinating body and workable codes of conduct). It also refers to the capacity to adapt and change course to respond to notable challenges (Hoye et al., 2009). Governments, for instance, are under the growing pressure from the public to use information, resources, and authority for intended purposes (Bovens, 1996, Huberts, 2005).

At the same time, the achievement of integrity is as much a behavioural and cultural challenge: Political commitment to integrity, professional socialisation of staff, supportive public service conditions and an active society performing a watchdog role are also important aspects of an ‘ethics infrastructure’ (OECD, 2009). Although we recognise the importance of culture and behaviour as aspects of governance and organisational integrity, in this document we will not be able to focus on these aspects. At this point, there is too little known about the culture and behaviour within and between organisations as regards to the governance and organisation of major sport events. Therefore, this document will focus on good governance (and thereby we mean; integrity as a system, rather than a culture of integrity). In scheme:

Figure 2.1 Aspects of integrity and good governance



2.3 Good governance of major sport events

Good governance is increasingly applied to modern nation states to find new (multi-actor and multi-level) approaches to governance. Questions around good governance touch on the effectiveness and efficiency of governance, as well as aspects of ethics, democracy and legitimacy (Bovens et al., 2007). The term has become common in the public sector, but is also pursued in the corporate world, where it is usually referred to as ‘corporate governance’ or ‘good governance’.

The call for good governance has reached the sporting world later than other sectors. International non-governmental sports organisations have exercised almost complete self-governance since public authorities have had very little impact on their functioning. Moreover, like many multinational corporations operating on a global playing field, sport governing bodies are able to choose the optimal regulatory context for their operations. As such, they pick a favourable environment as the home base for their international activities (Alm, 2013). However, a long list of rule or norm transgressions and scandals in the sports world has prompted the debate for more public oversight and control over the world of sports (e.g. IOC, 2008; Pieth, 2011; Council of Europe, 2012; European Commission, 2012). Eventually, the significant autonomy, the global dimension of sport, and the scandals, together with the ever more visible and explicit linkages between sports and other policy domains, have laid the basis for the calls for good governance in the world of sport, including major sport events. In addition, Lowther et al. (2016) argue that funding bodies are increasingly seeking a convincing case for financial support

and clearer evidence that investment has impacted on wider community objectives and successful elite performance (Bramham et al., 2007; Houlihan & Green, 2008). Sports organisations also increasingly operate in a competitive and commercial landscape that requires more businesslike practices and quicker decision-making (Beech & Chadwick, 2012).

When it comes to bidding procedures and the organisation of major sport events, the calls for integrity and good governance in the public sector, private sector, as well as in the sports sector meet and reinforce each other. The bidding procedure and organisation of major sport events face a continuous potential conflict between governing with integrity and governing efficiently and effectively. Bovens et al. (2007) distinguish a difference between morality (governing good) and effectiveness and efficiency (governing well). Governing good and governing well are not the same and can even undermine each other. For example, the pressure of commercial stakeholders, such as sponsors and broadcasting corporations may cause sports organisations to take decisions that are more efficient, but not necessarily 'good' in Bovens' sense. The same can be said for the influence of the state, which may constrain the choices available to sport policymakers. When the various stakeholders (public or private) give different meanings to lawfulness (for instance because they operate under different law systems) and democracy, the execution of good governance is complicated.

To cope with the ongoing commercialisation, professionalisation and globalisation around major sport events, international sports organisations, commercial partners and governments have to shift towards new, horizontal forms of networked governance, which demands new standards for good (and well) governance.

2.4 Dimensions of good governance of major sport events

Over the past decades, many standards for good governance and organisational integrity have been developed, especially in the development sector, the sustainability sector and the financial sector. Also guidelines for sustainable reporting by event organisers have been published (Global Report Initiative, 2012), but only recently have academics made attempts to design guidelines to inspire and improve governance in international sport federations (Geeraert, 2015, Gauthier, 2015, Chappelet & Mrkonjic, 2013). This is critical since achieving a culture of integrity requires coherent efforts to update standards, provide guidance, and monitor and enforce them in daily practice. It also requires stakeholders to anticipate risks and apply tailored counter-measures.

Nevertheless, the available general literature about organisational integrity and good governance as well as specific research into these issues in the field of sport can be reduced to a set of dimensions that are relevant for the organisational integrity of major sport events. These dimensions are: public value, transparency, democratic processes, and checks and balances.

Public value

The first dimension is the responsibility to deliver 'public value'. A public intervention such as bidding for and organising major sport events should be circumscribed by the need to achieve positive social and economic outcomes for citizenry.⁶ International sport federations and governments are expected to be

⁶ This is in alignment with what the Expert Group on the Economic Dimension of sport refers to as a positive legacy or 'sustainability' (European Commission 2016b).

socially responsible in collaboration with government and/or each other with regards to their major sport events. International federations' and governments' stakeholders - such as sponsors, media and sports fans - increasingly expect them to contribute valuable solutions to major societal challenges, such as health, social cohesion and security. This implies that international federations and governments are expected to create 'value for money' in cooperation with enterprises and third sector organisations - value that is expressed not only in economic terms, but also in terms of public value (Van Eekeren, 2015).

The concept of public value refers to the value that an organisation contributes to society. Public value goes beyond market economic considerations and adds value to the public sphere (Moore, 1995, Bennington, 2011). Examples of public value(s) are: social cohesion, quality of life, happiness, participation and sustainability. What is and what is not public value should be determined collectively through involving key stakeholders and the public (Evans, 2012; Van Eekeren, 2015). Public value depends on the prevailing view in society of what is valuable, and is defined in the dialogue between stakeholders (Talbot, 2011).

Transparency⁷

Transparency can be defined as the availability of information about an organisation or actor that enables external actors to monitor the internal functioning or performance of that organisation or actor. It can be considered as a value in itself, but also as a means to combat the concentration of power, financial mismanagement and corruption, and to increase democracy and effectiveness by increasing accountability.

Transparency is widely regarded as a key part of good governance (e.g. Geeraert, 2015). Seen the other way around, failures of governance are often linked to the failure to disclose the whole picture. In order to be transparent, stakeholders of major sport events should adhere to disclosure requirements (such as financial reporting), and adequately communicate their activities to the general public.

Democratic processes

Democracy and democratic legitimacy is also crucial. Basic democratic principles and procedures in decision-making with regard to major sport events ensure that those who govern can be held accountable by their primary stakeholders. This is often achieved by enabling public participation in processes. Public participation itself may take on many forms, such as providing information to the public, allowing the public to comment on decisions, or allowing the public to have a say in the decision itself (e.g. through a plebiscite or a referendum) (e.g. Mostert, 2003).

It is widely accepted that this leads to more long-term effectiveness and to sustainable solutions for policy issues on the one hand, and a reduced likelihood of corruption and concentration of power on the other. Therefore, principles of integrity should also include concepts usually applicable to the political

⁷ The dimensions of 'transparency', 'democracy' and 'checks and balances' have been determined by a working group of representatives of 6 European Universities, called Action for Good Governance in International Sport federations (AGGIS). They have compromised the available theory in the field into four crucial dimensions of good governance of international sport federations. These dimensions are applicable for governance and organisational integrity of major sport events as well. The descriptions of the three dimensions are derived from the Play the Game report 'International Sport Governance Observer (2014) and Alm (2013). The fourth dimension distinguished by AGGIS, i.e. 'solidarity' is left out here and integrated in the dimension of 'public value'.

sphere, such as stakeholder participation (including the direct involvement of multiple groups of targeted communities, decision-makers, and experts in decision-making and concrete action in regards to the organisation, the management, etc. of major sport events) and democratisation. Democratic processes can also be seen as accountability arrangements.

Checks and balances

One of the cornerstones of democracy is the system of ‘checks and balances’, which limits the powers of the legislative, executive and judiciary branches. A checks and balances system is paramount to preventing the concentration of power in an organisation and ensuring that decision making is robust, independent and free from improper influence. Checks and balances include mutual control procedures that ensure that no manager, board member or department has absolute control over decisions, and clear definition of assigned duties of any particular actor.

One particularly valuable check and balance is the possibility of review of decisions by a third party. Review may be in a judicial sense (e.g. a court, or an arbitration panel), or may be non-judicial (e.g. investigations, audits). Review can also serve the elements of transparency (by making information available through a review process), and democratic processes (by enabling those who are affected by decisions to participate in the review of those decisions). The presence of review mechanisms is becoming more prevalent in discussions on good governance, particularly when it comes to international actors.

The notions of public value, transparency, democracy and check and balances are relevant in various stages of major sport events, to which we will turn in the next chapter.

3. Sport events

Now that we've explained what we mean by integrity, we now turn to sport events. What kind of categorisations is being used in the literature when one speaks of sport events? Why has there been such a rise in the market for sport events? What has been the position of the EU in that increasingly global and still expanding market for organising sport events? What qualifies a sporting activity as a sport event: does that depend on the competitive level of the players, on the media attention, or on the number of spectators? What phases can be discerned in the process from bidding, towards opening and closing ceremonies, and that endless period after the event when it is time to evaluate the event and look towards its economic and social outcomes? And what issues play a role in each of these different phases when we speak of the integrity of sport events?

3.1 Sport events in all sorts and sizes

Sport events vary in terms of type of sport, level of sport (e.g., elite sport versus grassroots sports), size, and impact. In order to get a better grip on the broad spectrum of sport events, they are categorised by their scale below. In the academic sports literature one can find four categories (e.g. Bowdin et al., 2006; Getz et al., 2012).

1. Local sport events;
2. Major sport events;
3. Hallmark sport events;
4. Mega sport events.

In their recommendations on sport events the EU Expert Group on the Economic Dimension of Sport focusses on major sport events. By that, the XG captures what we label here as major sport events, hallmark sport events and mega sport events (European Commission, 2016b).⁸

What are the differences between the four clusters of events and which examples can be given per category? Local sport events are primarily aimed at a local audience, they are fun-oriented and they offer predominantly recreational sport activities. Local sport events are also referred to as 'minor events' (Van der Wagen, 2001). One can think of all kinds of local sport tournaments, including various national championships.

Major sport events are international sporting championships where the best athletes in the world compete. World championships in volleyball or judo are examples of major sport events. Although these events bring together elite sport athletes and attract substantial attention from visitors in the media, their meaning and impact is limited compared to hallmark and mega sport events.

⁸ The EU Expert Group on the Economic Dimension of Sport defines a "major sporting event" as an event organised by one or several host countries, regions or cities and attended by different international delegations with the aim of practising one or several sports. Such events are often characterised by major technical and logistic challenges (the construction and development of venues, public transport, safety and security, etc.). Major sporting events have a high international media profile, welcome several thousands of people including supporters, journalists, technical teams and officials, and are often organised over several consecutive days (European Commission, 2016b).

Hallmark sport events are, from the viewpoint of the host, developed largely to enhance awareness for a sport organisation, city or country and to create positive effects for its organising entity (recognition, prestige, income). The annual Wimbledon Championships in London, regarded as the premier tennis tournament in the world, is an example of a hallmark event. Other examples of hallmark sport events are professional cycling races like Paris-Roubaix, or the 'Vierschanzentournee' in ski-jumping. As hallmark events do not move around (like the other events), and typically reuse the same facilities time and time again, hallmark sport events are quite different from major (and mega) events. They generally not employ bidding procedures, nor do their hosts change from year to year. That is why debates over integrity at hallmark events are not the same as in other types of events.

Mega sport events are the largest events, both in terms of size, investments and impacts. These events are so large that they can affect whole economies and resonate in global media. The Olympic and Paralympic Games, the FIFA World Cup and the IAAF World Championships are considered mega sport events. Mega events attract much more attention from public authorities, commercial organisations, the media and citizens than their smaller equivalents. Much of the academic research has focussed on these mega events much more than on smaller events leading to a substantially larger evidence base as regards integrity for mega events - although in recent years local, major and hallmark events are getting more attention (e.g. Taks, 2013). Interestingly, Black (2014) argues that precisely because what he labels as 'second-order events' are not subject to the same degree of attention and celebrity, particularly in the run up to the event, there is a heightened risk of systematic corruption and abuse of the special authority and regulatory privileges enjoyed by event organisers.

3.2 Explaining the rise in sport events

In 1977, the IOC was in need for a host city to host the 1984 Olympics. However, there was little interest among countries and cities to jump to the occasion - not after the negative experiences of Mexico City (1968) and Munich (1972) and the soon-to-come-to-the-fore financial deficits of Montreal (1976). International federations in need for a city or country to host their tournaments would just wait for candidate countries to step forward or might put out bid procedures. The number of countries reacting was limited though, and the policies and procedures followed would hardly justify the label 'event-policy', neither from the international federations that owned the rights nor from bidding cities or countries. Only rarely would the process of selecting a host city or country arouse any interest from the media or the general public.

In such a context, it should not come as a surprise then that Los Angeles was the only bidder for the 1984 Olympics, after Tehran (capital of Iran) decided not to continue their bidding activities. The Los Angeles (LA) Games followed the Moscow Games - which were boycotted by some Western countries because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. In return, the LA Games of 1984 were boycotted by the Soviet Union and several Eastern Bloc countries. Los Angeles, however, also marked a turning point in hosting mega sport events. The USD 215 million in profit generated by the Games (Zimbalist, 2015), as well as the positive reception of the Games overall (with pop singer Lionel Richie performing live at the closing ceremony), gave public officials hope that mega sport events could once again benefit their cities and countries.

Nowadays, governments go to considerable lengths create an environment (investments in sport or supporting infrastructure, preferential tax-treatment, broadcasting facilities, 'enabling' legislation etc.) that will help win sport events contracts and attract 'mega sport events'. Meanwhile, other, often smaller, cities and countries find themselves defeated by larger competitors due to a lack of budget or

capacity (e.g. stadiums not big enough). The emerging market for hosting events has given rise to a whole new economy of event-organisers, broadcasting companies, consultancy companies advising either rights owners (federations) or bidding cities, and sports marketing- and media-companies in search of exposure for their clients.

How can we explain the rise of this new market, the market of hosting sport events? Roughly, the driving forces behind this ‘eventisation of elite-sports’ are threefold: cultural, economic and political.


Culture

Culture-wise, one clear reason for the increased significance of sport events must be sought in the rise of what is often labelled an experience economy (Berridge, 2007). Though sport events have always been applauded for their capacity to generate large audiences (live or through mass media), never before in history have sports been so closely affiliated with a deep-felt and wide-spread desire to witness a spectacle, to experience the excitement and emotion of a close battle, to undergo and express the sense of belonging and identity that comes from rooting for a home-team. The precise origins of this need for experiences are complex and juggle the minds of sociologists and philosophers - individualisation, disenchantment with daily life and its processes being standardised and automated, a civilisation process that has shut out physical violence and the accompanying thrill from much of today’s social life (see the classical text of Elias & Dunning, 1986).

Economy

Given that the ancient Romans established ‘bread-and-circuses’ policies, creating an experience of excitement among the masses can hardly be called a novelty. What is new though is the scale to which this need for experiences has penetrated social life and the technology and economy that it has brought forward and leans upon. Thus, technological change and the accompanying information economy are the second driving force behind the increased interest in sport events. Through airplanes and the Internet, access to events (the venue, tickets, programmes) has been greatly enhanced. Opportunities for cities and countries to attract new crowds globally, thereby heightening its visibility and incoming revenues, have been greatly improved. At the same time, the increased interest in watching sport has turned broadcasting an event into a much bigger business than ever before (see figure 3.1). More crowds watching and more journalists and media-companies reporting locally on the event typically heighten the economic and social significance of any event. In return, sponsors associate themselves with events more readily, raising budgets for elite sportsmen and women while at the same time ‘exploiting’ those athletes and using the event for their commercial interests. As such, a whole media industry has been set up around elite sport events, helping to spread the message and turn the event into something special and not be missed.

Figure 3.1 Broadcast revenue IOC and number of countries broadcasting for the Olympic Summer Games, in USD (x 1 mln) and numbers



Source: IOC (2015a)

Politics

The third driving force behind the rising significance and visibility of sport events has to do with changing geopolitics. Over these past decades, the global economy has undergone significant changes. Ignoring for a moment the economic downturn as of 2008, over the long-term, global wealth has increased at an impressive rate. This global growth has given rise to new economic powers. The ‘BRICS’ (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) are but a few of the countries that have experienced tremendous boosts in national income, and now seek to leverage their newly gained economic status by playing a leading role in the leading theatres of the world: politics, economics, sport and culture. Building cultural and sport venues (museums, theatres, stadiums) and hosting major cultural and sports events provides prestige and esteem alongside the chance to act as hosts for the world (which are indicative of increasing ‘soft power’). At the same time, governments in the ‘old economy’ face the necessity to shake off outdated industrial legacies and recreate physical spaces such as harbour areas or inner cities (Barcelona 1992, London 2012), or seek arguments to legitimise and speed up infrastructural investments (Greece 2004, Amsterdam’s 1992 bid). In both the old and the new economies, political leaders turn to sport events to boost their prestige and help raise national pride and cohesion (Black and van der Westhuizen, 2004). Alongside the quickly expanding event-economy, demands and budgets have increased. This in turn facilitated governments getting involved and committing themselves to expenditures, facilities and programmes, thereby luring sport events into the political arena.⁹ While politicians started to utter legitimisations of their involvement (increase health, inspire sport-participation, attract tourists, boost the economy), scientists have started to search for evidence behind

⁹ To just briefly cite an example: when in 1928 the Dutch organised the 8th Olympics, its national government was not involved; when in 1985 it bid for the 1992 Olympics, it was involved, but half-heartedly; but when in 2012 the Dutch decided to drop their ‘Olympic Plan 2028’, it was the elimination of the support of the Dutch government that gave the plan its final blow.

the legitimations. In turn, critics have started to question the assumptions behind the legitimations. Also laypeople, in whose backyards events are to be held or whose tax money is to be invested, have started raising their voices. All this is enhanced by today's information technologies, which make information more easily available and help individuals and groups voice opinions and raise debates.

Even though it is always difficult to pinpoint the birth of a line of reasoning to a certain period, it appears that the financially successful 1984 LA Games were something of a catalyst for this new, rather positive view on sport events (e.g. Dejonghe, 2004). After LA, there have not been any major political boycotts or social upheavals that seriously damaged or hindered the Olympic Games.¹⁰ Instead, the Games have generally taken place smoothly. Even Beijing 2008 - which had every potential to become a source for political tensions and conflict - were successful and mostly elicited international applause. And so, for a number of reasons, cultural, economic and political, sport events have become much more of a market and a policy arena than ever before.

3.3 Position of the EU in the market for sport events

What is the position of the EU, in this increasing market for major and mega sport events? Sport sociologists generally refer to Europe as the continent where sports - as we know it today - was invented (Van Bottenburg, 1994). While many editions of the Olympic Games and World Cup were held in Europe, sport has become more globalised, especially in the past decade. Examples of this 'opening-up' of the sports market include the hosting of the FIFA World Cup in South Africa in 2010 (the first time that a World Cup was hosted on the African continent), the Olympic and Paralympic Games in Rio de Janeiro in 2016 (the first time the Games were hosted on the Southern American continent) and the FIFA World Cup in 2022 in Qatar (the first time a country in the Middle East had been selected to host the event).

Against the background of these developments, how has the market share of the European Union in the market of sport events developed?¹¹ According to Eurostat (2014) in 2012 7.3 per cent of the world population lived in the European Union. In the same year, the European Union accounted for nearly 22.9 per cent of the world's GDP. In order to calculate the market share of the European Union in major/mega sport events, we analysed two groups of events: World Championships in 25 types of sport and the Olympic Games.

¹⁰ With the exception of the international boycott of South Africa at Olympic Games from 1964 to 1988 as a result of the Apartheid era. Other problems at the Games include, for instance, the 1988 Seoul doping affairs (Ben Johnson) and the corruption of figure skating judges that was part of the 2002 Salt Lake City Winter Games. These latter incidents were, however, setbacks from within sports itself, and not from the economy or politics interfering with sports.


¹¹ The 28 EU countries are (in 2015): Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, The Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. A sport event is seen as an event in the EU when it took/takes place in a country which is an EU country in 2015 (one of the 28 member states). The events in the Russian Federation are adjudged to Asia.

For World Championships and the Olympic Games, we looked at a time frame of 1976-2025¹².

Looking first at the 692 World Championships that were held between 1976 and 2015, we see that over the past forty years the market share of the European Union in the market of World Championships remained fairly stable (figure 3.2). In the ten years to come the market share for the European Union is - for the moment - stable around 52 per cent.¹³ That market share is seven times higher than Europe’s share of the world population and 2.3 times its share in the world economy.

As for the case of the Olympic Summer and Winter Games, the proportion of the Games which takes place in the European Union fluctuates over the years. For the ten years to come, the market share of the European Union so far is 0 per cent (figure 3.2). In 2017 the IOC will decide where the 2024 Games will take place. Four cities (of which three European cities) are in the race at the moment, namely Budapest, Paris, Rome and Los Angeles. If any of three European cities would win the right to host the 2024 Summer Olympics, the market share of the European Union in the period of 2016-2025 will be 25 per cent.

Figure 3.2 Share of European Union in market of World Championships (25 types of sport) and Olympic Summer and Winter Games, 1976–2025, in percentages



¹² Between 1976 and 2015, this concerns 692 World Championships and 21 Olympic Games (respectively 65 and 4 between 2016–2025). Paralympic Games as a separate event are disregarded (since 1998 on the same location as the Olympic Games). The following world championships (25 types of sport) are included: IAAF World Championships in Athletics, BWF World Championships, FIBA Basketball World Cup, FIBA Women’s Basketball World Cup, World Amateur Boxing Championships Men, World Amateur Boxing Championships Women, World Archery Championships Outdoor, World Weightlifting Championships Men, World Weightlifting Championships Women, World Artistic Gymnastics Championships, IHF World Men’s Handball Championship, IHF World Women’s Handball Championship, Hockey World Cup, Women’s Hockey World Cup, World Judo Championships Men, World Judo Championships Women, ICF Canoe Slalom World Championships, ICF Canoe Sprint World Championships, FEI World Equestrian Games, World Rowing Championships, Rugby World Cup, World Allround Speed Skating Championships, World Allround Speed Skating Championships, World Fencing Championships, ISSF World Shooting Championships, World Taekwondo Championship, World Table Tennis Championships Team & Individual, FIFA World Cup, FIFA Women’s World Cup, FIVB Volleyball World Championship Men, FIVB Volleyball World Championship Women, UCI Road World Championships, UWW United World Wrestling, ISAF Sailing World Championships, FINA World Aquatics Championships. In the case of separate events for men and women these championships are considered as different events. When one event was held in two separate countries, of which one is an EU Member State, the event is counted as half of an event for the EU.


¹³ Between 2016 and 2025, this concerns 65 World Championships and 4 Olympic Games. In this, we solely looked at organisation rights have already been formally awarded by the awarding entity, disregarding outstanding bids.

A new development regarding the bidding for and organisation of sport events is that some cities have withdrawn from already-awarded events and that other cities, which initially would not had been competitive in the bidding procedures, step in and take over the organisation within a short period. An example is the 2012 European Aquatics Championships dropped by Antwerp (Belgium) and taken by the city of Debrecen (Hungary) 90 days prior to the event. Antwerp had actually taken over organisation of the event from Vienna, which was originally awarded the event, but backed out due to the 2008 financial crisis. Other examples include the 3X3 Basketball World Championship and the 2017 FINA World Championships hosted by Budapest (Hungary), instead of Mexico, which had originally been awarded the event.

Market shares globally

Although the market share of the European Union has been relatively stable during the past in regards to hosting sport events, there are significant developments in other parts of the world. Most pointedly is the upswing in Asia (figure 3.3). The share of North America appears to be slightly weakening while that of South America is marginally growing.


Figure 3.3 Share of World Championships (25 types of sport), 1976–2025, in percentages



For the Olympic Games as well, we can see an even more significant Asian upswing (figure 3.4). The share of the Asian continent in the Olympic Games increased from 17 per cent in 1976-1985 to - currently - 75 per cent in 2016-2025, with three out of five Olympic Games taking place in Asia during

this time. The first Olympic Games in South America are of importance as well. However, there has been no edition of the Olympic Games that has been hosted on the African continent.¹⁴

Figure 3.4 Share of Olympic Summer and Winter Games, 1976–2025, in percentages




Football, athletics and swimming

Not all World Championships carry the same impact. Therefore, we performed an additional analysis on these World Championships with a relatively high impact and exposure: football, athletics and swimming.¹⁵ Over the same 50 year period we studied so far, we can see Europe’s position in this segment is shrinking, from 60 per cent between 1976 and 1985 to 55 per cent between 1996 and 2005 and an expected 29 per cent in 2016-2025 (figure 3.5).

¹⁴ There were African bids in the past. Cape Town (South Africa) was a candidate city for the 2004 Olympics and Cairo (Egypt) was an applicant city for the 2008 Games.
¹⁵ A total of 46 events. When rugby and gymnastics are taken into account as well, the proportions for the five periods are: 50, 58, 45, 50 and 27 per cent.

Figure 3.5 Share of European Union in market of World Championships athletics, football and swimming, 1976–2025, in percentages



In short

To summarise: from 1976 on the market share of the European Union as regards World Championships in 25 types of sport was above average as well as relatively stable (average 51 per cent). The market share for Olympic Games fluctuates. The rise of Asian countries is remarkable, as well as the weak position of African countries. The diminishing position of the European Union in the world championships of football, athletics and swimming is significant: 60 per cent of these championships took place in the European Union between 1976 and 1985, 55 per cent between 1996 and 2005, and an expected 29 per cent in 2016-2025.

3.4 Sport events: from bid to legacy

What phases can be discerned in the process from bidding to the endless period after the event? The opening ceremony marks the start of the actual event. That is the moment when preparations stop and translate into matches running, athletes peaking, spectators inhabiting the venues, and media focussing on the event. During this period, which goes on right until the closing ceremony, all focus is on enabling the event to run smoothly. This is what is labelled as the ‘core period’ of an event (European Commission, 2016b). However, especially in the case of major and mega sport events, a lot of work has already been done beforehand, and much still needs to be done afterwards. When the whole ‘event life cycle’ is taken into account, four phases can be identified (e.g. RAND Europe, 2007):¹⁶

1. Bid process;
2. Event preparation;
3. Event organisation;
4. Legacy.

¹⁶ The phases here distinguished are quite comparable to the phases that the Expert Group on the Economic dimension of sport distinguishes (European Commission, 2016b).

The first phase is the bidding phase. In this phase, sport federations specify the conditions under which they like to see their events organised, and invite cities/countries and/or national sport federations to put forward their interest. In the first phase four groups of entities can be identified who produce or organise a sport event, although not every entity is present in every event. First, there is an awarding entity/rights holder. This may be an international organisation like the IOC, or may be international sports federations like the Ligue Européenne de Natation (LEN) and European Athletics. Second, for each city/state, there is a bidding entity, of which the composition differs from event to event. Frequently this is a mixture of leading public and private organisations and this entity is the (forerunner of) the event organisation when the organisation rights are awarded. Third, national sport federations (who unite the clubs in a country) frequently fulfil a key role, when they receive the formal right to organise the event. Finally, the NOCs, the territorial representatives of the IOC, could be involved. The bidding phase itself can be broken down into two processes. First, interested bidders engage in 'internal' actions, where organisations, like the NOC or the (national) government, explore opportunities and support for a bid. A complex process might involve consultation with the local population, and relevant stakeholders like business enterprises, policy makers and the (elite) sports sector, or even an internal competition amongst interested cities. The second process of the bid phase involves submitting the bid to the rights holder. These bids are usually competing against other potential hosts. This process differs amongst rights holders, but often involves a technical evaluation of a bid, and culminates in a vote by the rights holder.

The second phase, event preparation, covers the time frame from the moment the hosting rights are awarded until the launch of the event. In this time frame, the local organising committee (LOC) is unfolding its plans, teaming up with governments, federations, and contractors (building companies, marketing companies) to prepare for the event. The objective is to meet or exceed the promises and expectations raised in the bid phase, all within the budget.

The third phase refers to the organisation of the event. During this 'delivery' phase all plans and preparations should come together. It is no surprise that participants, visitors, sponsors and VIPs are central during this period. However, it is the LOC that is ultimately responsible for organising the event. In recent years, more event organisers are striving to reach out to more target groups (e.g. by organising side-events), such as the population of the event region, to make them feel part of the event and to create a festive atmosphere.

The fourth phase, the legacy phase, starts after the event (although planning for legacies begins much earlier - often during the bidding phase). Legacy refers to the planned and unplanned, positive and negative, intangible ('soft') and tangible ('hard') structures created through a sport event that remain after the event (Gratton & Preuss, 2008; Barget & Gouget, 2007).¹⁷ What is meant by intangible and tangible legacy is not self-evident. The most obvious type of hard legacy is a sport stadium and sporting facilities. These types of legacy are relatively easy to put in monetary terms and therefore easier to integrate in impact studies. Soft legacy refers to people's experiences, attitudes and behaviour as a result of the event (e.g. Holt & Ruta, 2015). For example, a sport event can result in feelings of happiness or annoyance, or encourage behaviours such as increased physical exercise.

¹⁷ See also European Commission (2016b) for how a positive legacy is closely related to 'sustainability'.

Important to notice is that these positive and negative structures or effects are not per definition distributed evenly among stakeholders. For example, during a sport event one group of local entrepreneurs can experience positive effects (more customers, higher turnover) while at the same time another group can encounter the opposite effect (less customers, lower turnover). Moreover, legacy also differs per period and per region (e.g. city versus nation). When one speaks of the economic and social impact of events, this phase is crucial. As numerous sport events are not only organised for the effect of the events itself (providing athletes a podium to compete and excel, to offer attendants a sporting experience and sponsors commercial opportunities) conversations about the effect of sport events habitually occur.

The terms ‘legacy’ and ‘leverage’ are central in these discussions. Whether some form of legacy is generated depends upon the application of event leveraging (using the power of event to reach a certain goal). The application of event leveraging recognises that the event itself is not the intervention, but an opportunity to implement policies which are aimed at creating legacy-impacts (Chalip, 2002). Taks et al. (2014) puts it in these words: “Events are most effective, not as an intervention itself, but as an opportunity to enable (read: empower) other interventions and/or strategic tools in a broader overall campaign”.

One of the key-issues at stake when speaking of legacy is with whom the responsibility for creating legacy resides, once the event is over.

3.5 Issues and concerns over sport events

As mentioned in the introductory chapter, it appears that the public opinion towards sport events seems to have shifted these last years. More than before, sport events now elicit questions over their legitimacy, over procedures followed, over costs and public funding involved and the benefits created (namely, who benefits, financially and otherwise, from hosting an event?). The background of this growing criticism and scepticism seems to have come from the changing context of sport events. As sport events gain in political and financial significance, so have demands for transparency and accountability.

However, what is it that causes concern among the public over sport events? In chapter 2, we noted that from an ‘integrity’ perspective four dimensions can be distinguished: public value, transparency, democratic processes, and checks and balances. Do these concerns arise in all phases of the sport event process? Are concerns perhaps limited to a specific phase, such as the bidding phase, or do they reoccur as well during any of the other phases? Before turning to the empirical parts of this position paper, we will now highlight the different issues that may cause concern in each of the four phases of a sport event.

Issues and concerns in phase 1 (bidding phase)

During the bidding phase, issues and concerns may arise from actions by either of the parties involved, both by the awarding entity/the rights holder (usually an international sport-federation with a championship/tournament), and by the bidding entity (city, country, national sport federation, possibly supported by commercial companies) (see also European Commission 2016b). Although issues frequently arise at the intersection of both entities, the issues in the bidding phase can be grouped by entity.

Issues facing the awarding entity

In regards to the awarding entity, two issues appear to be at stake:

1. Exorbitant demands being imposed upon the bidding entities. Examples are special treatments for its representatives, evasion of local taxes, procurement law issues and demands for non-sustainable investments in infrastructure.
2. Lack of transparency and democracy in the host selection process. This involves lack of transparency in criteria, subjective criteria, secret voting or no voting at all.

Issues facing the bidding entity

For the bidding entity, concerns that may compromise integrity are:

1. Lack of support and involvement of the local population: an authoritarian and influential group of (business or governmental) people taking the initiative without meaningful interaction or consulting with other stakeholders, including the local population. This may also be reflected in a lack of connection between the event and local or national sport policy (e.g. money being spent on a sport event without sport policies profiting or being taking into account).
2. Inadequate attention for (inter)national rules and regulation, for example violating state aid rules, procurement law rules (sub-contracting), competition law and human rights laws.
3. Misleading estimations of costs and revenues, and overestimation of the potential private share of investments (wishful thinking, window dressing).
4. Improper and immoral conduct in the process of acquiring support (buying of votes, excessive gifts).

Issues and concerns in phases 2 and 3 (preparation and organisation)

A sport event stands out both in time and space: it occurs between the opening ceremony and the closing ceremony. This is what we call the 'core-period' of the event (European Commission 2016b). Even though preparation may start well before the event and athletes might arrive sooner or depart later, the 'buzz' that the event generates lasts roughly from the opening to the closing ceremony. That is where the media attention is focussed upon, that is what draws in the crowds. In terms of space, the action usually occurs within a stadium, or a track. That is where the competition is being held, and where the audience gathers. Outside these boundaries, miles away from the stadium, and days before or after, the impact of the event gradually fades away.

During phases 2 and 3, the decision of who will host the sport event has been taken, and the local organising committee is in charge of preparing for the event and eventually of organising the event. During these phases, causes of concern might be:

1. Transparency of the governance of the local organising committee: subcontracting may not be as transparent as one might wish, with contracts being awarded to friends and families of those on the organising committee; there may not be room for whistle-blowers to utter critique; there may not be independent evaluation of the preparation and organising process; there may little room for local parties to get involved and play a role in the event and the legal structure of the local organising committee and contracts with stakeholders might be at issue.
2. Human rights (including workers' rights): construction companies may not apply correct safety procedures, impose extended working hours, take advantage of foreign workers, or underpay staff; house eviction may occur due to gentrification projects; child labour may be part of the production process; male and female competitors may not be treated equally (no differences in media attention and in price money); disabled sportsmen and - women and disabled visitors may experience difficulties in participating.

3. Accessibility: tickets may not be affordable for the local population; time schedules might be adapted to the needs of overseas broadcasting audiences (mostly Europe and/or the U.S.), ignoring local social and biological rhythms; venues, crowds and traffic (congestion, roadblocks and free lanes) might hinder local population in their daily life; local companies may be pushed out and not allowed to make business.
4. Responsible financing: major sponsors of the event may sell products that are less conducive to a healthy lifestyle (alcohol, fast food, smoking); imbalance between public spending and private revenue.
5. Environmentally sustainable event organisation: construction of sporting venues; large-scale infrastructure construction; leaving large ecological footprints by creating waste; high consumption of resources (paper, water, energy).

Issues and concerns at phase 4: legacy

After the event the noise dies, crowds disperse, smells evaporate, flags and other signs that something is going on disappear out of public area, and people get back to their normal lives. And yet, beyond the stadium and before and after the opening and closing ceremonies, lives of citizens are touched upon by the sport event. Or at least, promises are made, and goals are set, that the event will generate some sort of lasting impression (a legacy). When these promises are not met, when there is not a positive legacy or even a negative legacy, this may be a source of public concern and colour how citizens view sport events. Generally spoken, in the literature on event legacy, four different aspects of event legacy are distinguished:

1. Economic legacy: boosting the economy by bringing in additional jobs and spending by participants and visitors, in the short term as well as in the long term; opportunities to attract new international business; lasting city marketing effects; and sustainable increases in incoming tourist and business opportunities due to the event. Negative effects can arise as well, for example crowding-out of local businesses, or local consumers.
2. Infrastructural legacy: new or better sport facilities that are still of use for the local population after the event; broader infrastructural investments, such as transport (airports, roads, public transport) and housing.
3. Social legacy: has to do with feeling connected, experiencing a sense of collectiveness, with a sense of liveability and wellbeing, with opportunities for personal development. Hence, the social legacies of sport events imply, for example, enhanced feelings of local and national pride and cohesion, programmes to participate and develop skills as volunteers, and programmes to affect the quality of life in underprivileged areas of the city.
4. Sport legacy: the degree to which the event inspires people to become active in sports or increase their sport participation. In addition, a sport legacy may refer to the strengthening of the local sport infrastructure, due to budgets and media attention being raised, or because of cooperation and self-esteem within a sport being strengthened.

Legacy, as described above, is formulated mostly as an outcome. That outcome will however never be reached if not a process is organised to create it. Legacy does not just come about automatically, but is the end-product of a series of activities often involving multiple actors. Legacy needs to be managed and developed over time (European Commission 2016b) and as such, needs to be governed as much as the other phases in the event life cycle.

In short

In each phase of a sport event, different issues and concerns warrant attention. In any of the four phases, the basic dimensions of integrity appear to be at play, though differently and involving different actors in each of the phases. In the next chapter, we will turn to the literature on sport events, to see what developments in what phases have caused people to lose faith in the integrity of major and mega sport events.

4. Integrity and sport events: the state of research

In this chapter we analyse the scientific literature to search for the grounds for questioning the integrity of organisations involved in sport events and demanding greater transparency and better governance. The implication is that a substantial number of the examples refer to undesirable aspects of sport events. With this, we do not want to give off the impression that we are blind to the fact that sport events have a great power to bring about beneficial outcomes for all involved (see chapter 1). However, it is because sport events carry such great potential to do good, that it is indeed a waste to not allow this potential to be realised by letting bad governance and lack of transparency stand in the way.

Much attention is given to mega events simply because there is more evidence available for these events, as opposed to major and hallmark events (see Taks et al., 2015). We believe this does not limit our case since we assume that how people view mega events colours their view on sport events in general. Many (but not all) of the issues that are at play for mega events are also relevant to smaller events. Nevertheless, we attempt to present a balanced narrative.

The framework of the dimensions as described in chapter 3 is used as a guidance. First, we go into issues during the bidding phase. Thereafter, we focus on the preparation and organisation phase. Subsequently, issues in the legacy phase are described. At the end of the chapter, a brief summary is provided. The four case studies in appendix 3 and the appendices 4 (on sustainability) and 5 (on human rights) offer more in-depth knowledge to the issues described in this chapter.

4.1 Phase 1: bidding


In the previous chapter two groups of issues were distinguished. First, there are issues facing the awarding entity, namely exorbitant demands of hosts, and a lack of accountability (namely transparency and democracy) in the host selection process. Second, there are issues facing the bidding entity, such as lack of public participation, misleading estimations of costs and benefits and improper and immoral conduct. This section examines the evidence surrounding these issues.

Issues facing the awarding entity

Exorbitant demands

Entities bidding for the rights to organise sport events might find themselves in a highly contested arena. For years cities and countries lined up for the organisation of mega events like the Olympics and FIFA World Cup. Between 1992 and 2004 there was a growth in the number of Olympic Summer Games applicant cities, from 5 for 1992 to 11 for 2004. Since the 2004 bidding process, the interest in hosting the Olympics has decreased, as shown in figure 4.1 (2004: 11 cities, 2020: 5 cities). For many cities, the demands of mega events like the Olympic Games are too high and they feel they do not have a real opportunity to organise the event (Chappelet, 2014). The number of applicant cities to host the Winter Games has decreased as well, with the number falling from 9 for the 2002 Games to 3 for the 2018 Games (and only 2 for 2024, as discussed above) (Zimbalist, 2015).

Figure 4.1 Olympic applicant cities, in numbers



Source: Chappelet (2014)

In some cases, rights holders do not experience a large demand for the organisation of their event. This occurs even for larger events like world championships. Federations who have few cities seeking to host their event cannot establish a long list of wishes and demands, and may have very few selection criteria or limited processes. In the case of one interested entity, a host selection process could be lacking entirely. For example, for the first European Olympic Games in 2015 there was in fact only one country which made a bid (Baku, in Azerbaijan).¹⁸

In the cases where several competing bidders are seeking to organise an event, awarding entities sometimes pose excessive demands. These demands can be explicit, for example when they are formulated in a formal document. They can be more implicit as well, when event organisers set the bar in terms of capacity or quality in previous editions of an event. According to Zimbalist the economic structure of the World Cup Football (and Olympics) encourages excess and extravagance (Florida, 2015). There is one seller (the IOC, FIFA, etc.) and multiple potential buyers (the bidders). The competing bidding entities have to outbid their rivals to be appointed as host. This is a standard winner's curse situation that is only exacerbated by the fact that the bidding interests (e.g. construction company executives) in each city/country usually are the ones that stand to gain the most from hosting.

In terms of facilities, the requirement for the organisation of the FIFA World Cup is one stadium with 80,000 seats, two stadiums with 60,000 seats and nine stadiums with 40,000 seats. As for the European Football Championships this is one stadium with 60,000 seats and seven stadiums with 30,000 seats (see appendix 4 for additional information). The IOC desires a stadium with a capacity of 80,000 for the Olympic Games. However, there are other infrastructural and protocol demands made by the rights holders. These protocol demands include hosting officials in high-class hotels, and the creation of specific roadway lanes for officials. These demands have recently been an issue in Norway, when the city of Oslo bid for the 2022 Winter Games. The list of demands of the IOC (described in 7,000 pages and including things such as the 'fast lanes' for officials and athletes, and exemption from taxes) was poorly received by the public of Oslo, and contributed to negative public opinion in regards the IOC and a decrease in support to organise the 2022 Winter Games in Oslo (Grimsby, 2015). Oslo learned that the

¹⁸ There was also interest in Russia and Turkey, not leading to a formal bid.

image of the IOC influences the level of support for the Olympic Games (see also appendix 3 for more information about the Oslo bid).

Even when the event is successfully held, it is difficult to imagine how many of these large stadiums can be used on a regular basis and on a sound financial basis. Since substantial amounts of public money are frequently involved in building the infrastructure for the event (e.g., Preuss, 2004), especially for stadiums, a lack of use afterwards results in low public value. Rights holders, to their credit, do recognise these problems, and have attempted to address them beforehand. For example, some rights holders value the use of already-existing or temporary infrastructure to reduce costs. For example, the IOC, through Agenda 2020, now allows (in exceptional cases) a host to organise some events outside of the host city (IOC, 2014a).

Besides demands for facilities there are demands for more general infrastructure. Large-scale sport events generate a great demand for transportation which, for the main part, must be met by public transport. Larger sport events attract great numbers of visitors that may generate peaks of tens of thousands of travellers per hour. This extended demand only rises during the event itself, and the investment in this infrastructure is only worth it if it is used by the local population afterwards. Generally, for smaller cities that host events, these investments are less risky than the investments in large stadiums because the transportation infrastructure can more easily be adjusted to the needs of local population after the event. Infrastructure for accommodation (Olympic Village, hotels) also runs the risk of being under-used after the event. Appendix 4 offers additional information about the demands regarding accommodation and transportation infrastructure.

Some rights holders, like the IOC, demand that the laws of the host country are (temporarily) adjusted in the case of hosting a sport event (e.g. IOC, 2015). One example is the tax exemptions that are often made for the competitors, sponsors, and rights holders. Another is the added protection of various trademarks and IP of the rights holders (e.g. anti-‘ambush marketing’ legislation). These requirements are not universal, as small events may require commercial protection, but may not require tax exemptions. However, these regulations may not contribute to the public value of the host city or country as the freedom of their citizens to advertise and do business is restricted.

There are requirements without a significant financial impact, but which can affect the perception of the citizens in the host country negatively. For example, the IOC required extraordinary services during the 2022 Games, like alcoholic drinks on certain occasions and a meeting with the King. These kinds of demands do not always sync with the way of thinking and living of the population of the host country, and as already mentioned, were a significant factor in the decline of public support for the Games in 2022 in Oslo (Grimsby, 2015) (described in more depth in appendix 3).

Hereinafter, we focus on issues in four examples:¹⁹ the European Youth Olympic Festival, the European Championships in athletics, the World Championships of swimming and the start of the Tour de France.

The demands of the EOC for the European Youth Olympic Festival as described in the host city contract are not insignificant, but may be seen as relatively reasonable compared to the IOC’s demands

¹⁹ Currently, a monitor on the different tenders that international sport federations issue for hosting their championships does not exist. We undertook an effort to study a small subset of championships, of which information was readily available.

(although the scale of the events differs).²⁰ For example, for the Olympic family and other VIP's the EOC only requests hotels of a three- or four-star level (EOC, 2013). Still it is formalised that the EOC cannot be held responsible for damages and other omissions and all facilities used during the event are the exclusive property of the EOC. The EOC owns all rights concerning, for example, broadcasting, marketing, and advertising.

The demands in regards to stadiums for smaller events are also lower. For example, when organising the European Championships in athletics, European Athletics requires a stadium with a capacity of 25,000 seats. Contrary to mega events, stadiums with this capacity are available on a wide scale in many cities, thereby not shutting out possible host cities in advance.

The technical demands for the world championship of swimming are loosely formulated. FINA demands a training pool, a warm-up pool and a competition pool. For the competition pool a minimum of 8,000 seats is required as well as accommodations for other types of swimming sports, like water polo and synchronised swimming. This seating may be permanent or temporary. However, if temporary seating is used, the organising committee is responsible for obtaining all the necessary approvals for their safety and security. The organising committee must supply FINA with copies of all such approvals at least seven days before the start of the Championships (FINA, 2012a).

The hosting contracts of Amaury Sport Organisation (ASO), the rights holder of the Tour de France, are notable. In the host city contract for organising 'Le Grand Départ' one can find the agreements between the local municipality and the ASO. One obligation is that the local municipality is not allowed to ask for an entry fee for event visitors. This implicates that the investments cannot be financed with income generated with the selling tickets. On the one hand, this lowers a possible financial threshold for visitors, which makes the event accessible for a large group of people and as a result a higher public value. On the other hand, this obligation also has a commercial aspect in favour of the ASO: using no entrance fees contributes positively to the number of event visitors which makes the event more valuable for sponsors.

Lack of transparency and democracy in the host selection process

When there are several bids, the awarding entity has to select the host. To what extent is this decision process transparent and are choices being made democratically? We will first look at the issue of transparency and democracy as used in the FIFA World Cup and the Olympic and Paralympic Games. Then we shift the attention to (somewhat) smaller events: the World Championships of swimming and the European Championships of athletics.

The current process to select a host country for the World Cup is not very clearly laid out in FIFA governing documents (Gauthier, 2011). Although it would appear to be more formalised, the regulations that are issued for a particular World Cup have no permanent basis in the FIFA Statutes or Regulations. Briefly put, bidders submit their bids to FIFA, FIFA conducts site visits, and then the Executive Committee votes for the host country (FIFA, 2009). However, FIFA has stated that for future World Cups, the entire FIFA Congress will vote on the host. In the past, when voting was not often actually resorted to, a reliance on negotiation between the parties to settle on a host appears to have been the

²⁰ The European Youth Olympic Festival (EYOF) is the top multisport event open to young athletes between 14 and under 18 years of age of the European National Olympic Committees associated in the European Olympic Committees (EOC).

norm (Gauthier, 2011). FIFA's strategy to use the World Cup to open or expand markets for the sport explains the selection of some countries without notable football traditions, like the United States, Japan and Qatar (Matheson & Baade, no date). In line with the opening or expanding from emerging markets, FIFA also looks for the optimal financial gain for itself.

The candidature process for the Olympic and Paralympic Games is launched about ten years beforehand and lasts for a period of three years. The election of the host takes place seven years before the event. The current host selection process includes two stages: the invitation phase and the candidature process. The philosophy behind the bidding procedure of the Olympic and Paralympic Games changed following the implementation of Agenda 2020 (IOC, 2014a). Compared to the previous selection process the new approach is characterised by a greater dialogue between candidate cities and the IOC, more degrees of freedom as regards the concept of the Games, and a more central position of the long-term legacy of the host city and region. From an integrity perspective, this new approach of the IOC could be a step in the right direction. However, during the creation of this new approach, the IOC itself lacked optimal transparency. The ideas of stakeholders for this new road map were not made public, while the new host selection process itself was only made public the day after the cities were required to submit their guarantee (including their financial guarantee) to participate in the host selection process.

FINA is the sole worldwide sports organisation that is responsible for the sport of swimming and has organised the FINA World Swimming Championships (25m) since 1993. The conditions of FINA for organising the World Cup in swimming are well-defined and consists of business conditions (marketing rights, sponsor deals, ticketing) and technical conditions (number of pools, size of the pools, capacity of the stadium) (see appendix 4 for additional information). According to the bidding information procedures manual for the event in 2016 and 2018, the interested organising committees should first present a formal bid. After that, FINA should forward a host city agreement to each bidding candidate. In the same phase of the bidding procedure a delegation of FINA arranges a visit to each candidate's city, and the venue(s) proposed by the candidate. One month later the organising committee executes the host city agreement and return it to FINA. Two weeks later, the formal bids, together with the supporting host city agreements duly signed by the candidates, will be presented to the FINA bureau (FINA, 2016). After the presentation, there is an open procedure of voting for the host city of the World Cup Swimming by the board of FINA. Interestingly, the bidding information procedure manual also mentions the possibility of an additional offer by the candidate city. In the final bid, the candidate may support its formal bid with cash consideration or "value in kind" (products and/or services that are budget-relieving). Any offer of cash consideration or value in kind is incorporated into the host city agreement as an "Additional Offer" (FINA, 2012b). This possibility is not appreciated by all (potential) bidders as it may lead to leading to the exclusion of less-wealthy countries.

The procedure described above shows many similarities with the selection of the host city of the European Championships in athletics. In 2011, three cities presented their bids for the organisation of the event in 2016 (Amsterdam, Istanbul and Split). The presentations of the bids took place in a private setting: only council members and staff of European Athletics were able to attend the presentations. Press attendance was not allowed. Moreover, a bidding team was not allowed to attend the bid presentation of the other bidders. The debate of the council members, leading to a choice for the host city, took place in a private setting as well. Council members voted secretly. Another point of attention was that the selected host was obliged to sign the organiser contract immediately after the selection process. From the bidding party perspective this gave insufficient opportunities to discuss and negotiate certain issues with the rights holder.

Host city/country contracts have generally not been available to the public. As a result, citizens may not be aware of the obligations that their governments have made to the rights holders. However, as part of Agenda 2020, the IOC has begun to make the host city contract public. However, the contract itself still appears to be non-negotiable, and is required to be signed immediately after the selection of the host by the IOC.

Issues facing the bidding entity

Lack of support and involvement of the local population

Sufficient public support for the organisation of sport event is crucial as citizens will act as ‘hosts’ and taxpayers’ money is spent on the event (e.g., facilities, infrastructure, promotional campaigns). For this reason, the level of support is occasionally measured among the potential host community. Aside from the IOC, these studies are seldom an obligation for a bidding organisation, although showing evidence for support of the population for the event might improve the chance to win the hosting rights (Elling & Van Rens, 2012). The IOC requests consulting both the citizens of the potential host city and the country, but does not define a minimum support (although 70 per cent is regarded as an informal minimum by the IOC). Bidding cities generally conduct a survey of about 2,000 people in the case of the Olympic Games. Though this is statistically valid, it is not a broad scope of public participation. Other sport federations request the consultation of the population as well, like European Athletics did for the organisation of the European Championships. Interestingly, this federation asks the organiser to consult the population as regards awareness and intention to visit *after* the organisation rights are awarded. These results are primarily used by the event organiser as input for marketing and communication campaigns.

Recent years have seen increasing examples of cities and countries that are suggesting interest in hosting an event, then prematurely withdrawing their bid. Gaining public support for hosting a mega-event like the Olympic Games is of growing importance for acceptance or indeed a ‘welcome’ in a crowded city or urban environment. This need was illustrated by recent referenda in European democracies (Hamburg, Munich, Krakow, Graubünden and Oslo (Bennet, 2014; Grimsby, 2015)), that all failed to report the necessary support - the majority - for justifying an Olympic bid. There are three main reasons opponents generally mention: the (excessive) use of taxpayer’s money, unneeded facilities, and (the presumption of) an aversion against the ‘demanding’ IOC (see also appendix 4). Yet, research into the role of local residents in the Olympic process, and their opinions on and experience of a mega-event is still rare (Hippke and Krieger, 2015).

Before there is a bid, the first sparks of the idea are usually seen in a dominant group of business elites that initiate the push for hosting events. This scenario creates a feeling of circumvention of normal democratic processes, because it has implications for the degree of involvement of the residents in the decision making process (Misener & Mason, 2006). Boston’s bid for the 2024 Olympics is an example (see appendix 3 for additional information). These events are often imposed on the local residents, leaving the community to react to prepared plans, rather than being involved in creating them. It is expected that getting public support for an event is easier to create when citizens and local organisations are involved in the process. More and more we see that the local bidding entity is organised like a public-private partnership where local government works closely together with local business, sports and cultural federations to establish a bid and play a role in the organisation of the event.

Inadequate attention for (inter)national rules and regulation

European state aid laws might play a role when governments finance sports infrastructure and event organisers in cases that impact trade between Member States. This is, for example, the case with mega sports events that attract consumers from other Member States. Public support benefitting certain undertakings might be considered state aid, because public funding can have a significant potential to distort competition between undertakings. In case infrastructural aid is also beneficial to the general public, this type of aid can be found compatible with the common market under Article 107(3) TFEU. Public intervention in undertakings can be considered free of state aid when they are made of terms that private undertakings operating under market conditions would have accepted, so called 'market economy investor principle'. If public authorities do not respect this principle, public intervention may, in general, be said to constitute state aid. See also appendix 5.


Misleading estimations

In order to maximise the support for hosting a sport event among stakeholders (citizens, private and public organisations), proponents tend to underestimate the costs and overestimate positive effects. They assume too often that positive effects occur automatically and endure for a long time. A 'fever of expectations' frequently arises among proponents (Mean et al., 2004).

A crucial element in this is the cost-benefit ratio. On the 'cost' side - or investments as proponents tend to refer to it - budgets set out for the event are less a 'hard cap', but more a soft guideline. In 2007, the British government announced that the public budget for the 2012 Games, including the regeneration of East London, would be GBP 9.325 billion (NAO, 2010). This amount was nearly four times higher than the investment which was initially mentioned in the bid phase. However, London 2012 is not the sole event where a substantial underestimation of public investments occurred. Montreal's Games cost 9.2 times more than initially budgeted (and yielded a debt that took the city 30 years to pay down) (Zimbalist, 2015). According to Flyvbjerg & Stewart (2012) the sports-related costs for the Olympics Games are overrun with 100 per cent consistency (see also Bickley & Tomlin, 2012; Zimbalist, 2015).

According to Flyvbjerg & Stewart (2012) these overruns are higher than in other types of mega projects. For example, the cost overrun of Lillehammer was the result of major changes in the concept for the Games after the organisation rights were awarded. These adjustments were the result of changes in power balances among the domestic and international players who had conflicting interests. The second plan involved new venues for most of the main events. This Norwegian case suggests that the ideas that win in an Olympic bid can change radically and can lead to cost explosions (Lesjø, 2000). In recent years, the increased costs are partly the result of additional investment in security budgets (e.g. Baade & Matheson, 2004; Graham, 2010; Giulianotti & Klauser, 2006; Spaaij, 2016).

Figure 4.2 Sports-related cost overruns, Olympics 1992–2012, in percentages



Source: Flyvbjerg & Stewart (2012)

Proponents of the event strive to promote their events using simple, media-friendly and eye-catching slogans, addressing to a desirable outcome of the event. Examples are ‘One World, One Dream’ (Beijing, 2008), ‘KeNako: Celebrate Africa’s Humanity’ (2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa), ‘Share the Spirit’ (Sydney, 2000) and ‘Inspire a Generation’ (London, 2012). From an event marketing perspective the usage of a catchy slogan is understandable, but it risks promising too much as the event is presented as a solution to economic or social challenges. This not only results in extremely high expectations among stakeholders (Miah & García, 2012, Holt & Ruta, 2015), but it might also lead to feelings of disappointment when evidence for positive results is lacking or points in an unintended direction. An example is that a significant increase in sport participation in the UK, the most important legacy that was envisioned for the 2012 Olympics, and their hope to ‘Inspire a Generation’, has not occurred to date (see appendix 3).

Improper and immoral conduct

Improper and immoral conduct refers to undesirable processes of acquiring support for a bid. Examples include excessive gift-giving and the buying of votes. This kind of conduct takes place in an informal setting, away from cameras and microphones. According to Emery (2002), key decisions regarding bids are often made during informal processes. Successful applications were considered to be dependent upon in-depth knowledge of networks, processes and people - in other words, external political support at the very highest levels of government and the commercial sector.

As stakes are high for those involved in the bidding process, for some there is a temptation to go beyond of what is perceived as fair lobbying. Here is where buying votes and excessive gifts show up. However, it is not always easy to draw a straight line between what is right and wrong. Some actions are regarded as clearly illegal (e.g. racketeering and money laundering), while the acceptance of many other actions depend on the local cultures.

Perhaps the best-known examples of improper conduct include the 1998/2002 Winter Olympic Games, the FIFA World Cup, and the recent IAAF World Championships.

The day of the host city election of the Games is the last opportunity to influence members of the IOC. For the 1998 Winter Games there were five candidates, Nagano (Japan), Salt Lake City (United States), Östersund (Sweden), Jaca (Spain) and Aosta (Italy). On the day of the host city election for the 1998 Winter Games, in June 1991 in Birmingham, a consortium of Japanese companies offered the IOC fifteen million USD for the realisation of the IOC museum in Lausanne, an important and iconic project for IOC president Samaranch (Van den Heuvel, 2002). Though the IOC president is not allowed to vote himself, it cannot be ruled out that this exorbitant gift influenced IOC members. Nagano won the bid.

In the run up to the 1998 host city selection, Salt Lake City experienced the forces that surround the bidding processes. For example, during the evening before the host city election the president of the Salt Lake Bid Committee was approached with an offer to buy votes from IOC-members. Salt Lake City decided to bid again, for the 2002 Winter Games. The host city election took place in Budapest in 1995, and Salt Lake City won. Three years after the election, IOC members were accused of taking bribes from the Salt Lake Organising Committee during the bidding process. After an investigation, several IOC members either resigned or were dismissed. These bribes included cash, but also medical care, university education, and other gifts. The “Salt Lake City Scandal” prompted the IOC to take action, adopting new rules for bidding cities, and establishing an Ethics Commission. It also led to investigations in other bidding processes and it became clear that the bribery surrounding the 2002 Games were anything but an exception. For example, the Sydney bid team used a booklet with personal details of IOC members to tailor gifts, bribes and other forms of persuasion (Milton-Smith, 2002).

More recently, in 2015, US authorities indicted fourteen officials on racketeering and money laundering charges. FIFA officials were arrested by the Swiss authorities at the request of the US Department of Justice on suspicion of receiving US\$150 million in bribes in return for media and marketing rights during FIFA-related events in North and South America. Swiss authorities also initiated investigations into the awarding of the organisation rights to Russia (2018) and Qatar (2022) (Geeraert, 2015). All eligible members of the FIFA Executive Committee had one vote in the selection process. There were twenty-four members on the Committee, but at the time of the vote two were suspended due to accusations of selling votes. Later, two journalists of The Sunday Times got hold of documents from a whistle-blower and they were able to build up a devastating picture of what happened behind the scenes: both Qatari officials and FIFA Committee members were involved in selling and buying votes (Blake and Calvert, 2015). The selection procedure of the 2022 FIFA World Cup and the procedures of the 2010 and 2018 FIFA World Cup are currently under the investigation of the FBI. The case of Germany’s successful bid to host the 2006 World Cup is under investigation as well because of the possibility of corruption.

At the end of 2015, an independent commission, set up by the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), reported about possible corruption and money laundering among IAAF members. These issues could have consequences for the World Championships to be held in London in 2017. There are fears that these championships could become a financial black hole amid a dispute between the IAAF and UK Athletics. London 2017 has in recent weeks approached Sebastian Coe, the president of the IAAF, for financial help amid fears that the negative headlines surrounding the sport have affected its ability to generate sponsorship income. But the organising committee is believed to have been told that, without reform of the London 2017 board, removing the UK Athletics chairman, Ed Warner, and chief executive, Niels de Vos, it is unlikely it could receive money from the world governing body (The Guardian, 2016). Meanwhile, the IAAF is also under public pressure for granting the 2021 World Championships to Eugene, Oregon. Eugene was granted the rights to host the event by bypassing the standard bidding process (a fact which was trumpeted on the IAAF’s own website), despite interest by other cities in hosting that

edition of the Championships. Eugene also happens to be very close to the headquarters of Nike, which was paying President Lord Coe (then Vice-President) £100,000 per year to be a brand ambassador, a position Coe only stepped down from in November 2015.

In short

Over the years, we have seen a decrease in interest in for the organisation of the Olympic Games. This development cannot be separated from the high demands rights holders ask from hosts, the structural overrun of sport-related investments and sometimes also a loss of faith in the IOC as an institution. Bid processes and the selection of the host can be made more transparent and more democratic. Local residents are frequently merely in the position to react on the plan for a sport event, rather than being involved in the process. Lastly, it happens frequently that proponents assume that there is a positive social outcome as an automatic result of a sport event, but repeatedly there is a lack of time and money to utilise the opportunity an event offers (see also paragraph 4.3).

4.2 Phase 2/3: preparation and organisation

In the previous chapter, the possible issues in the preparation and organisation phase were identified, and we labelled five issues: transparency of the governance of the local organising committee, human rights (including workers' rights), accessibility, responsible financing, and environmentally sustainable event-organisation. We will now go into each of these issues.

Transparency of the governance of the local organising committee

This issue refers to, for example, transparent subcontracting, opportunities for whistle-blowers to express critique, and the possibilities for local parties to get involved and play a role in the event. Compared to other issues, the empirical evidence about this aspect is relatively poor. When a sport event is substantially financed with public money, as is habitually the case (see figure 4.3), local private companies should have equal opportunities to get event related contracts. To what extent this is the case is not clear. One initiative that attempted to resolve this tension was CompeteFor in the UK. This project was an online opportunity portal, designed to open up competition at all levels (especially including small- and medium-sized enterprises) of the Olympic Delivery Authority (a national public body responsible for the delivery of venues and infrastructure) supply chain. This resulted in a well-balanced distribution of work in the UK (Grant Thornton et al., 2012). The project still exists as an online window for business opportunities and can be seen as a legacy of the 2012 Olympics.

Sometimes, sport events are regarded more as a tool of public policy intervention and political communication (Foley et al., 2015). For example, Chinese journalists were told that if there were any incidents involving foreign tourists they could only report the official line, and if there was no official line, they were not to report anything. As regards foreign negative reports, the Chinese media were instructed to contradict foreign negative reports on China's human rights situation and religious policies by promoting "the achievements of the construction of a harmonious society." They were told they should write about the important role of the Olympics in China's economic reforms and how the whole nation was preparing for the Olympics. They should also continually note the superiority of the socialist system in organising important events (Brady, 2009).

Human rights (including workers' rights)

Sport events can attract negative attention and become a battlefield for campaigners, activists and politicians to highlight human rights concerns. In recent years, fundamental questions have been raised about the role of human rights in selecting the host city. Sports governing bodies have faced increased

pressure to consider human rights issues in host selection, and to set standards in rules, regulations, contracts and other instruments (for a more in-depth treatment of this subject, see appendix 5).

In principle, the state has the duty to protect civilians against human rights violations. Ideally, human rights standards would be universally applicable to people throughout the world. However, this is not the case. States may refuse to actively protect human rights, or even ratify international human rights treaties or conventions. The human rights regime reflects the moral justification to take action, and how individuals and states perceive and interpret human rights depends largely on the local political and cultural perspective.

While non-state actors, such as corporations, are increasingly expected to ensure that human rights are not violated as a result of their activities, international sports organisations have not necessarily been included in the international human rights regime. While national sports organisations operate within the hierarchy of the state, and are bound by its laws, this is not the same for international sports organisations. However, international sports organisations often set lofty human rights intentions. Private organisations, like sports organisations, need to build trust and respect. Therefore, it is important that sports organisations align with the principles of human rights. As such, sports organisations have established various human rights aspirations as part of their own internal regulations.

The most mentioned human rights issues when it comes to sport events are: 1) human rights issues related to the construction of the facilities and infrastructure (loss of houses for locals, workers' conditions); 2) human rights issues related to hosting the event (restrictions on freedom of speech, discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation); and, 3) human rights issues related to the sports organisation organising the event (gender equality, equal rights for disabled athletes). Additional information about these issues can be found in appendix 5.

It has been argued that sport events can serve as a catalyst for significant change in this area, with proponents often citing the case of the fall of the apartheid regime in South Africa, or democratisation in South Korea. However, this is not always the case. The heightened attention can make things worse for the people that experience human rights violations, as a government seeks to maintain an image of order. Sports organisations simply do not have the authority to impose human rights improvements on states. However, sports organisations need to have a form of corporate responsibility to prevent human rights violations in relation to their events.

Migrant workers in Sochi said that employers subjected them to a range of abuses and exploitation, including: failing to pay full wages, excessively delaying payment of wages, and in some cases failing to pay any wages at all; withholding identity documents such as passports and work permits; failing to provide employment contracts, or failing to respect terms of a contract; and requiring excessive working hours and providing little time off. In many cases, employer-provided housing was overcrowded, and employer-provided meals were inadequate. These abuses and exploitation of workers suggest an inability or unwillingness on the part of the Russian authorities and private companies to guarantee basic rights for migrant workers on Olympic construction sites and other sites in Sochi (Human Rights Watch, 2013).

Sochi can hardly be seen as an exception in this regard. There was an exploitation of Mexican workers in the preparation for the Games in Salt Lake City. The local construction industry was suffering a labour shortage and undocumented Mexican workers were recruited to fill the gap. There were labour abuses,

failures to pay overtime, cuts in pay, inadequate safety equipment and racial insults from supervisors (Lenskyi, 2010). There were comparable incidents in the Athens (2004) and Beijing (2008) Games.

'Undesirable' residents may also be frequent target of state intervention in the years prior to the Games. This was the case in Athens where prostitutes, Roma, homeless people, and asylum seekers were forced to move to different parts of the city, out of sight of the event. In some areas, the Olympics were used as a pretext for forcible evictions of thousands of people (Lenskyi, 2010). The Centre on Housing Rights and Eviction estimates that by 2004, 300,000 citizens had been uprooted and saw their homes demolished to make way for Olympic facilities and infrastructure projects in Beijing. Residents in Beijing were given a month's notice to leave and received compensation at a fraction of their property's value (Wan, in Broudehoux, 2007).

Sex trafficking and sport events is an under researched topic in scientific research. The rationale is that the temporarily increased population (event participants, visitors, etc.) may contribute to heightened demand for sexual services which could be met, in part, by trafficked women. The 2004 Games were the first sports mega-event where human trafficking for sex work was first examined (Hennig et al., 2007). Prior to the Athens Games, concerns were raised about an influx of 2,000 sex workers, most of who would be trafficked from outside of Greece. Both the 2006 (Germany) and 2010 (South Africa) World Cups faced fears of massive human trafficking, with the press suggesting that 40,000 sex workers would be trafficked to each of those events (Henning et al., 2007; Gould, 2010). However, these fears have not been realised. The International Organization for Migration assisted seven victims of human trafficking in Greece in 2004, none of whom were trafficked in relation to the Games. Research following the German and South African World Cups found little to no increase in trafficking patterns from those prior to the event (Hayes, 2010; Gould, 2010). Matheson and Finkel (2013) interviewed people involved with anti-trafficking movements in Vancouver, and found that some frontline workers perceived that the Games would be a catalyst for sex trafficking, while sex workers believed that the Games would not lead to a spike in trafficking for sex work. Strategic planning to prevent sex trafficking and protecting human rights lacked a centralised approach.

Accessibility

The issue of accessibility refers to for example affordable tickets for the local population, time-schedules which meet the wishes of the local population and opportunities for local companies to make business.

Event organisers develop strategies to protect their sponsors to increase the attractiveness of the investment of private money. This is a result of high expectations of sponsors of event organisers to take increasingly aggressive measures to protect their financial investments and maximise return on their investment (McKelvey & Grady, 2008). Examples of protection are the use of the name of the event, the logo and other trademarks, and the creation of 'clean zones' where official sponsors have the exclusive right to roll out their marketing activities. For example, the European Olympic Committees have rules regarding the commercial matters of the European Youth Olympic Festival (EOC, 2012): "No form of publicity or propaganda, commercial or otherwise, may appear on sportswear, accessories or, more generally, on any article of clothing or equipment whatsoever worn by the delegations in the EYOF except for the manufacturer's logo or trademark as foreseen in the rules. Any violation of the provisions of the current clause shall result in disqualification and withdrawal of accreditation."

The development of these strategies is understandable from the point of view of the event organiser and its sponsors, but this has implications for domestic and local business. Although some companies

make a sport of ambush marketing, these protection strategies could damage local and national business and interfere with free enterprise rights.²¹ For example, in the case of the 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany, ‘official provider’ licences meant that German beer or sausage would not be available in stadia as beer and fast food rights were held by Anheuser Busch (Budweiser) and McDonald’s. This led to protests from German companies as the bid for the Cup was partly justified by the supposed economic benefits it would bring to Germany and host cities (Hall, 2006). These strategies may also damage the interests of sports governing bodies and local authorities as they are frequently closely linked to the event (O’Sullivan & Murphy, 1998) and it might even influence the attitude of event visitors negatively as event sponsors could experience it as an aggressive or uncompromising approach. Ideally, event organisers find a balance between the protection of their interests versus those of local business community, its citizens and other stakeholders.

Another issue of access is that the competition schedule may favour corporate sponsors and a foreign audience over domestic spectators. The timing of events is often tuned so that European or North American primetime audiences are reached. This may not be in line with the best interests of spectators in the host city or country. For example, the 1988 Games were called ‘the breakfast games’ in South Korea, as almost half the event finals were held before 2 pm Seoul time to accommodate American ‘prime time’ audiences (Real, 2010). For the upcoming Games in Rio de Janeiro, similar issues arise when the IOC decided to host the swimming finals after midnight, four hours later than swimmers are used to. This has led to negative reactions from FINA, coaches and swimmers.

In the case of mega events, tickets are divided over different markets, so that only some of the tickets are available for the citizens in the host country. Evidence shows that this distribution does not always meet the wishes and (financial) possibilities of local citizens. For example, referring to the 2012 Games, the House of Commons (2013) mentions that “it is a shame that so few tickets for popular events were available to the UK public. For example, only 51 per cent of tickets for the men’s 100 metres final were available to the UK public and only 47 per cent of tickets for the track cycling”. In addition, the Greater London Authority (2013) argued that the price of the tickets was too high, which was not seen as an appropriate gesture to the local and national citizens. This suggests that the Games, largely paid with taxpayers’ money, should have offered more visiting opportunities for the people in Britain in order to create a higher public value.

Apart from the integration of disability, access, and inclusion within organisational practice, the plethora of disability-specific events does require an accessible venue, an investment in staff training to provide an appropriate level of customer service, and networks within the disability and not-for-profit sectors to capitalise on the potential opportunities. This becomes evident when considering bidding for or hosting major world disability events in the sporting sector, namely the Paralympic games organised on behalf of the International Paralympic Committee in conjunction with the Winter and Summer Olympic Games.

Yet, the inclusiveness of sport events for abled and disabled athletes does not always come naturally. An example of this is the organisation of the World Swimming Championship for Olympic and Paralympic disciplines. The International Paralympic Committee is (financially) responsible for the organisation of

²¹ Ambush marketing is a strategic alternative to formal association through the purchase of legitimate sponsorship rights.

the Paralympic World Swimming Championship and is holder of the commercial and media rights of the event. By owning all the commercial and media rights of the event, the IPC secures the media coverage of their main sport event. From FINA's perspective, integrating the Paralympic disciplines of swimming into an event for Olympic disciplines means a scattered focus on both events. According to them, there will be less (media/commercial) attention for both events if they take place at the same moment, in the same city. In the end, IPC and FINA are content with the situation where the World Swimming Championship for Olympic and Paralympic athletes are not developed in an inclusive manner.


As to the European Championships in athletics, European Athletics is the rights holder of the event. In principle, the event does not include disabled athletes. It appears that the possibility of the inclusion of disabled athletes in these European Championships is limited. European Athletics sees downsides of a para-athletics event to be held within the championships: this inclusion may lead to a reduced focus of the event itself. Moreover, inclusion of para-athletes also comes with the wish for branding opportunities by the IPC in the stadium. However, this wish of the IPC does not meet the agreements with rights holder European Athletics. In 2016, disabled athletes will compete during the period of the European Championships and the IPC endorsement is obtained. However, the IPC does not have branding opportunities in the stadium as this is the domain of European Athletics. The best disabled athletes receive medals, their records will be recognised, but disabled winners are not allowed to call themselves a formal 'European Champion'.

The 'accessibility' of the event experience increases when fan parks or live sites which are free of charge around events are set up. Fan parks provide a platform where one can experience the event, frequently in a celebratory atmosphere (e.g. Frew & McGillivray, 2008). These parks create additional opportunities to involve the local population, including those of lower socio-economic status.

Responsible financing

The public share of the costs associated with a sport event is a major topic, especially when the organisation and their stakeholders aim for a legacy for society as a whole. As to the Olympics, the public share differs per Olympic Games (figure 4.3).

Figure 4.3 Public share of financing of the Olympic Games, in percentages



Source: Preuss (2004)

The financing model of the Munich and Montreal Games was public; those of Seoul, Barcelona, and Sydney were mixed; and the Games of Los Angeles and Atlanta were mainly private (and both were criticised for their hyper-commercialism). These proportions vary as a result of the objectives of the individual parties involved and the set-up of the event. For example, the 1984 Games were the first in the history of the Games to be funded from mainly private sources because very little money was needed for sports facilities and traffic infrastructure, which are typically expenditures to be financed with public sources (Preuss, 2004; Real, 2010).

The public-private investment ratio in itself is not meaningful as it should be seen from a legacy point of view: to which extent does a legacy occur wherein it can be seen as a return on investment for taxpayers? When it comes to private sponsorship, the type of sponsors may also raise issues of integrity. While sponsorship by tobacco companies of sporting events are banned by many countries, this is not the case for (sugared) soft drinks, (fatty and salty) fast food, and alcoholic drinks. On a wide scale, companies in these industries sign partnerships with organisations in the sport sector, including sport event organisers, ultimately aimed at reaching large audiences, improving their image and eventually increasing sales and profit is anticipated (and at the same time supporting their partner with money and services). On the one hand, one could argue that these partnerships are not desirable as the association between a company which produces unhealthy products and a sport event can be regarded as a mismatch. On the other hand, one sees that a part these companies who associate themselves with a sport event set up additional interventions to compensate for negative effects (in the case of overconsumption). These interventions arise in the promotional sphere (advertising moderate intake) and in the product sphere (offering healthy alternatives). This conflict was brought to the fore during the 2012 Games. Although London had initially planned to offer free tap water, Coca-Cola (an Olympic sponsor since 1928) pressured London to abandon that plan. Another example was the appointment of Cadbury, producer of confectionery products, as sponsor of the 2012 Olympics. In the light of the

obesity problems in the United Kingdom this led to critical questions whether the association of a confectionery company should be associated with a sport event.

Environmentally sustainable event organisation

Against the background of the growing scarcity of renewable sources for fuel and (construction) materials as well as climate change, sustainability undoubtedly forms part of good governance of sport events. The IOC adopted environmental sustainability as the ‘third pillar’ of the Olympic Movement (alongside sport and culture) following the 1992 Albertville Games. While Lillehammer was known for being environmentally sustainable, the 2000 Sydney Games were arguably the first Games that made environmental sustainability a part of the overall plan. The realisation of the Olympic Park and Village formed the vehicle to clean up Homebush Bay’s waste. Solar energy was applied where possible, as was the reduction of energy consumption by specifically positioning buildings relative to the sun, proper isolation, separate water systems, natural purification of wastewater, and the reuse of rinse water. Parks and landscapes were designed ecologically. Cars were banned from the main area of the Games. As for the accessibility of venues located elsewhere, considerable investments were made in public transport (see appendix 4 for additional information).

The Sydney Games were the beginning of environmental sustainability being a component of hosting the Games more generally. The improvement of the air quality was to be a strict condition in Beijing in 2008. New standards for the organisation of environment-friendly, large-scale events that include a sustainable legacy were set for the Vancouver Games and the London Games. London raised the bar somewhat for, among other things, sustainable energy (energy-friendly construction and at least 20 per cent energy from sustainable resources), CO₂ reduction (at least 50 per cent), and recycling (90 per cent less waste). It also pursued ambitious objectives in areas such as urban renewal, civil participation, and improving healthier lifestyles. Both Vancouver and London focused on multifunctional and temporary facilities. The London 2012 approach was subsequently developed into an international standard for the organisation of environment-friendly events (management standard ISO 20121). The Olympic Games in London were the first to set up an independent commission that was to define, supervise and evaluate the Games’ sustainability before, during and after the event: the Commission for a Sustainable London 2012. The evaluation of this commission’s ins and outs reveals as to where they made headway or fell short (for additional information, see appendix).

However, environmental sustainability has also proved to be a problem for sports events. Several of the venues for the Sochi Olympics were built on what were UNESCO World Heritage Sites, while the golf course for the Rio Games is being built on previously protected wetlands. In other cases, the host simply does not have the capacity to carry out their promises to host an environmentally-sustainable event (Müller, 2014).

In short

Sponsor protection strategies of rights holders may disadvantage local business. Human rights violations are violated on a substantial scale and the state has a duty to protect citizens against these violations. There is evidence that the distribution and the price of tickets and the programme of the event do not always meet the expectations of citizens of the host country, which is especially dubious when substantial public money is involved. Finally, the event may not be held in an environmentally-sustainable manner.

4.3 Phase 4: legacy

In chapter 3, we presented four types of event legacy: economic legacy, infrastructural legacy, social legacy and sport legacy. Given the fact that a lot of public money is invested in mega sport events, there is a growing interest in examining the legacies of these events (Cornelissen et al., 2011). According to Gratton & Preuss (2008) and MacAloon (2008) one of the main interests of the IOC (and other governing bodies) is a positive 'legacy' of the event. This is because a positive legacy justifies the use of public resources for permanent or temporary event infrastructure. Moreover, a positive legacy motivates other cities/nations to bid for future events. High demand increases the power of the IOC and secures the continuance of the Olympic Games.

Scientific evidence to evaluate the legacy of hosting major sports events, such as the Olympic Games, is challenging. A major issue is the assessment of the isolated event effect. There is also the political position that host governments may not welcome a scientific assessment of the true legacy benefits of hosting the Olympic Games (Gratton & Preuss, 2008). Even the Olympic Games Impact Reports, the IOC-required reporting requirements of host cities, only measure a year or two beyond the end of the Games.

Besides the practical problem of carrying out research over a longer period of time, and its political approval, it is not easy to evaluate the legacy effect over time (Preuss, 2007). Mega sport event legacies indirectly stimulate the economy and other developmental activities in the host city. In the long term, the legacy effect may not be able to be isolated from the general development of the city. For example, it is hard to determine today what percentage of inbound participants to meetings of international organisations to Barcelona are visiting due to the hosting of the Olympic Games in 1992 (Preuss, 2007).

Some authors make a case that when speaking of legacy, non-mega events are forgotten too easily. Pointing to the greater possibilities to involve local populations and profit from tighter social networks, certain authors favour local events over major and mega events (Taks et al., 2015).

A somewhat worrying development is the negative connotation of the word legacy, which is the result of the fact that the word is mentioned (too) often, especially by proponents of sport events and mostly in a positive way. There is a danger that it becomes an overused word, pregnant of promises, without the possibility to make it explicit or tangible. For example, a representative of UK Athletics said about the World Championships athletics in London in 2017: "I've banned the word legacy from London 2017 ... It's overused" (Harris, 2015).

We will now turn to the empirical evidence on how the different forms of 'legacy' shape people's faith in the integrity of sport events.

Economic legacy

An important motor behind the current interest in sport events is the promise of economic gains (Baade & Matheson, 2004). Sport events trigger investments and consumption. However, comprehensive evidence to which extent sport events generate a positive economic legacy is limited. With economic legacy we refer to all economic effects that stem from the event and that would not have occurred without the event (Preuss, 2004). Indicators for an economic legacy are for example changes in GDP, in employment, in incoming tourism (visitors and spending), and in new business opportunities and investments from outside the event region.

Economic legacies can be positive as well as negative. For example, an eyesore were the 1976 Olympics in Montreal, with an end-debt of US\$ 2.8 million (Preuss, 2010), leaving the city of Montreal with a long-lasting financial burden. A positive example is the influx of event visitors in a city or country who spend their money as a result of the sport event taking place. According to Oldenboom (2006) the 2000 UEFA European Football Championship, also known as Euro 2000, led to additional expenditures of Dutch and foreign visitors of nearly 113 million euro in The Netherlands.

When talking of economic legacies, it is important to distinguish between expenditures and income which are associated directly with the organisation of the event (payment of hosting fees to a rights holder, hotel costs, food and beverages, logistics, advertising, price money, broadcasting, security; and on the other hand revenues from sponsors, media rights and ticketing), investments in sport facilities and infrastructure and income that is generated elsewhere in the economy (like tourist spending). In the case of the Olympic Summer Games, nearly all organisation committees made a modest profit (Preuss, 2004). For example, the operational expenditures and income of the local organising committee for the London Games in 2012 were 2.38 and 2.41 billion GBP respectively (LOCOG, 2013a). This shows that the operational organisation of a major sport events can be profitable. However, it is not solely the financial result of the operational organisation which determinates the economic legacy of the event.

Commonly, the economic impact are is performed assessed to capture the economic legacy of a sport event. Such studies may be performed before the event (to help raise interest and support) or after the event (to legitimise investments). An economic impact study measures the growth of the economy as a result of additional expenditures, the 'new money' that is invested and spent in the local economy (Oldenboom, 2006).

The problem with economic impact studies is that they is that they are promotional in nature and tend to overestimate positive results. These studies focus on additional expenditures, and often do not take into account 'hidden costs' (police, security), alternative ways of spending money (education, health) and crowding out effects. In addition, as economic impact studies often rely on (rough and subjective) estimations of numbers of visitors and their spending, their outcomes may vary greatly and are subject to subjective interpretation. For example, organisers of the 2010 World Cup Football in South Africa projected that 400,000 international tourists would come to the event, whereas academic research found that the numbers were between 40,000 and 220,000 (Zimbalist, 2015). Whether or not deliberately done, numerous economic impact studies have been reported to produce inaccurate results (e.g. Crompton 1995; Crompton 2006; Preuss, 2004; Késenne, 2005). As Zimbalist (2015, p. 33) states: "Rather than looking at the economic results of the event and comparing them to pre-existing trends, these studies make assumptions, or predictions, about the number of visitors and the amount of spending connected to the Games." This statement is in line with Preuss (2004; p. 290) who argues that "the economic benefit of the Games (...) is often overestimated in both publications and economic analyses produced by of for the OCOG".

There is more evidence for the overestimation of an economic legacy in certain cases. For example, Baade & Matheson (2004) argue that the four billion dollar economic impact of the FIFA World Cup in the U.S. in 1994 that were projected by the event-organisers, did not materialise. According to the authors, the event had an overall negative economic impact on the average host city or the national economy as a whole. According to Zimbalist (2015, p. 6) “The problem for the IOC and FIFA is that rising popular protests are alerting politicians to the fact that hosting the Olympics and World Cup may not be such a good deal economically or politically.” In a meta-analysis of 23 Olympics and World Cup Football, Zimbalist found 16 cases that did not have any significant economic effect, seven cases with a modest positive effect and three cases that had a negative effect.

In this respect the Olympic Games Impact (OGI) study is significant. This study was born from the IOC’s desire to develop an objective and scientific analysis of the impact of each edition of the Games. In a post-Games OGI-report, covering a twelve year period including the run-up to the Games and three years of legacy, the University of East London (2015) studied the London 2012 Games. 23 economic indicators were part of this study. Of these 23 economic indicators, 7 were found to have a positive impact and 16 had a small or indeterminate impact. Although these results are meaningful and fairly positive, it was often not possible to attribute the impact to the Games itself. For example, even though visits to United Kingdom from the European Union have seen substantial growth, the authors claim that this reflects other economic trends including the position of sterling vis-à-vis other major currencies rather than any discernible Games effect (University of East London, 2015). Still, the National Audit Office reported the Games to have delivered ‘value for money’ (NAO, 2012) .

A decent methodology of evaluating the economic legacy is a cost-benefit analysis (Preuss, 2004; Oldenboom 2006; European Commission, 2016b). A cost-benefit analysis quantifies the net benefits of an investment in a sport event and offers partial (sector) results. What cost-benefit analyses tell us is that the direct beneficiaries of hosting sport events are generally construction companies, engineers and architects, local security firms, and those in the land development and real estate businesses (Whitson & Horne, 2006). The costs of the Olympics and other mega sport events, both social and financial, are generally borne by lower social economic strata, who may endure tax increases, inflation, rising rents and possible cuts on other social programmes (education, health) (e.g., Broudehoux, 2007; Lenskyi, 2010; Taks, 2013; Zimbalist, 2015). As such, a cost-benefit-analysis takes into account the fact that one sector may profit more from the event than another sector. Or, in the words of some experts: ‘profits privatised, costs socialised’ (European Commission 2016b). This too may result in a lower degree of faith in the public value of mega sport events.

Another strength of a thorough cost-benefit analysis is that it is not restricted to the financial costs and benefits, and offers the possibility to include non-financial (intangible) effects. Then one speaks of a social cost-benefit analysis. These intangibles are repeatedly referred to as a potential positive result of a sport event, but are seldom measured. According to Késenne (2005) a positive economic impact study can never be enough reason for a public organisation to invest public money. For this consideration, a social cost-benefit analysis is required. A challenging issue is that these analyses require a relatively large sum of time, money and data. One of these three is often absent.

Whether or not it may pay off to host sport events depends largely on the investments that are needed in a city, region or country on the long term. Or as Preuss puts it: “For Olympic cities, the investments necessary to stage the Olympic Games are higher than their financial surplus driven from staging the games. From an economic and urban development perspective it only makes sense to bid for Olympic

Games if the long term city development plans are in line with those of the needed Olympic structure.” (Preuss, 2004; p. 265). Therefore, one of the key aspects of sport events having a positive economic legacy is their infrastructural legacy.

Infrastructural legacy

The popularity of a sport in a region determines the degree of support after the event and the possibilities to organise other major events for this (and other) sports in the remaining venue - and thereby the chance of its effective operation. Furthermore, the better the venue can be reached by various modes of transportation, the more favourable the chances for its ongoing use. Multifunctionality of venues is also valuable. The risks of a venue not being used after the event are higher for a World Championship are greater than for a European Championship due to the size of the venue required. Naturally, the Olympic Games come with the highest risks. Not surprisingly, it was after these events that the greatest vacancy in stadiums and centres (the so-called “white elephants”) was found.

New construction is justified if the need for new infrastructure already existed for other reasons (e.g., Solberg & Preuss, 2007). Barcelona had already been in need of a new public transport system in order to bring the city to an economically mature level before it organised the Games of 1992 (see also appendix 4). In Athens (2004), the Olympic Games were a good reason to finally construct the major traffic ring that now contributes to the reduction of the permanent traffic jams and smog. Vancouver’s Games spurred the creation of the Canada Line, a rapid-transit system linking downtown Vancouver to the airport, and an upgrade to Highway 99 (the “Sea-to-Sky Highway”), a once-dangerous highway from Vancouver to Whistler. London (2012) took into account the existing plans for new public transport lines when it chose the location for its Olympic Park.

Temporary facilities are a newer trend and they are being used on a rapidly increasing scale. At the time of the Olympic Games in Athens (2004), less than 10 per cent of the sport venues were temporary. In Beijing (2008), this had grown to over 15 per cent and, by 2012, in London, it was 20 per cent. The London Games had a total of 140 temporary venues, with almost 200,000 temporary seats, 10,000 portable toilets and 230,000 square metres of tents. The ‘temporary’ share will reach 25 per cent in Rio in 2016 (see appendix 4). Glasgow argues that 70 per cent of its facilities for the Commonwealth Games were pre-existing (see appendix 3).

In recent decades, major sport events quite often acted as a catalyst for the renewal of (inner-)city structures. In Barcelona (1992), they were part of a plan for the transition from a manufacturing economy to a service economy - including, for instance, a transformation of the industrial coast line, an upgrade of housing and business accommodations, and improved accessibility. In Sydney (2000), the Games led to a transformation of the polluted Homebush Bay into a high-quality city district. Bolstered by its already-existing accessibility, this district was better integrated into Sydney’s surrounding urban area. It took Sydneysiders several years after the Games before they embraced the new Olympic park, partly because of deficient public transport to the park (Cashman, 2011). The 2004 Games in Athens were part of a Master plan drafted together with the EU, which was to steer growth in the right direction and used the improvement in accessibility to help reduce heavy air pollution (see appendix 4). The 2012 London Games did speed up the regeneration of East London, also by better embedding this district in the transport systems and adding an urban park (the Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park). Good legacy of sport events emerges when it is fitted in with developments that are likely to be successful even without these events. Sport events are not the drivers of urban development, but they can accelerate it.

However, there are also negative outcomes from urban renewal. Consider, for example, the Olympic Village of Barcelona. Although the Barcelona city council had promised to include subsidised housing in the post-Games Olympic Village, it gave in to pressure from real estate developers, and ultimately all except 76 of the 6,000 units had been sold at market value to middle-income professionals. Overall, from 1986 to 1992, new house prices in Barcelona had risen by 250 per cent (Lenskyi, 2010; Muñoz, 2006). The same issue might arise in Glasgow. As to the Glasgow 2014 Commonwealth Games, Matheson (2010) point out that the new residential development is likely to be too expensive for low-income East Enders and redevelopment has already resulted in the displacement of families, and disputes over compensation.

Social legacy

Weighty legitimations for the investment in (elite) sport events is the aspiration that sport events and national success raise national pride, social cohesion and international prestige. This social legacy of sport events is recently getting more attention from academics. Measuring the different types of social legacies is challenging because the effects are soft (intangible) and, therefore, not easy to put in monetary terms. Compared with an economic legacy, social legacy gets less emphasis from proponents of sport events to legitimise investments as today's society is predominantly economic-orientated (Taks et al., 2015).

Evidence shows that social effects do occur to a certain extent (e.g., Taks et al. 2015; Breedveld and Hover 2015, Frawley, 2013). Elling et al. (2014) found support for the belief that international sporting success of Dutch athletes contributes to the testimony and expression of national pride and belonging. The data also showed that national performances in international sport events may lead to small, short-term eruptions in feelings of national sporting pride and well-being, especially among people who participate in sports, men, and non-immigrants. The Glasgow 2014 Commonwealth Games also led to feelings of pride among citizens, in the year the event was held. Eighty-six per cent of residents felt proud of the city (see appendix 3). Nevertheless, the results indicate that national pride is a rather stable characteristic of national identification that cannot easily be increased by improving national sporting success and winning more Olympic medals.

There is also support for an increased social cohesion as a result of the organisation of a sport event. Two-thirds of the British people reported in November 2012 that they were surprised about the degree to which the Games united the country (Ipsos MORI, 2012). According to Legacy Trust UK (2013), negative associations with the Games were practically absent among British youth in February 2013. Furthermore, the UK Government and the Mayor of London (2014) report nearly two years after the extinguishing of the Olympic Flame that many social ambitions have been realised, for example the registration of 34,000 volunteers on the Team London website. Additionally, the Inspire project, launched four years before the Games, aimed to give the British population the chance to be 'part of the London 2012 Games'. The Inspire programme has awarded more than 2,700 extraordinary, non-commercial projects with an Inspire mark as an acknowledgment of their excellence and as a promotional tool to allow them to connect with the Games and reach out to new audiences. One in six people in the UK has been involved in an Inspire project. A total of 39 per cent of the Inspire projects contact persons claimed their project would not have taken place if London had not been chosen to host the Games. They also declare that 69 per cent of projects have got young people involved in sport for the first time (LOCOG, 2012).

The successful organisation of the London Games was not possible without the 74,000 volunteers (Games Makers). Their contribution is valued and for many Games Makers it will be a memorable experience for

the rest of their life. Lessons have been learnt as well. It has been admitted that too many Games Makers were recruited (University of East London, 2015), it is questionable whether the government is doing all it can to learn and disseminate lessons and to encourage volunteering opportunities (House of Commons, 2013), and planning for the volunteering legacy should have started earlier as the momentum for volunteering was lost (House of Lords, 2013).

A social legacy also refers to the inclusion of disabled people in sport events. This inclusion can take many forms, for example participants, volunteers, and event visitors. Globally there are over 650 million people with disabilities, equating to about 10 per cent of humanity (United Nations, 2009). In 2006 the United Nations' Convention for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities was introduced and has been adopted by over 150 states by 2011. Article 30 of the Convention specifically identifies the rights of people with disabilities to culture life, recreation, leisure, sport, and tourism, which has direct implications for the event industry. Further, the articles in the Convention in principle guarantee that people with a disability will be treated equally before the law in all areas of citizenship and that they should also expect an equality of experience beyond just getting in the front door. In this part of the paper, we will discuss the contribution of sport events to social inclusion of disabled people.

Sport is one context that has been recognised as promising for the promotion of social inclusion (Inoue & Forneris, 2015). Emerging evidence suggests that it provides the same benefits as for people without disabilities (Harada et al., 2011). The principal provider of sport programming for individuals with an intellectual disability is the Special Olympics. The Special Olympics is a global organisation with approximately 4.2 million athletes in over 180 countries. The Special Olympics provides a variety of programmes that range from local community-level programming to world-level competition. A study to how the Special Olympics can facilitate social inclusion for individuals with intellectual disabilities reveals stakeholders perceive Special Olympics as facilitating social inclusion within and beyond the context of sport. The study also indicated that stakeholders perceive the Special Olympics as fostering social inclusion for individuals with an intellectual disability.

Since the Games of 2012 were awarded to the city of London on 6 July 2005, there has been extensive policy discussion about the potential to develop a 'legacy' from the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games. London 2012 was the first Olympic Games and Paralympic Games to be planned together from the very start (University of East London, 2015). Much legacy planning, however, makes no explicit mention of specific opportunities relating to the Paralympic Games, although this could be implied from statements about leaving legacies for 'disadvantaged' or 'socially excluded' groups from 'the 2012 Games' (Weed, 2009). This is in line with findings from Dickson et al. (2011) that there is in fact little consideration of legacies of sport events related to attitudinal change and opportunities for people with disabilities.

However, a post-event 'Olympic Games Impact Study' (University of East London, 2015) reveals that between 2008 and 2012 there was a vast increase (from 53 to 77 per cent) of disabled respondents that found it easy to travel day to day. The House of Lords (2013) specifically assessed the effect of the Paralympic Games on attitudes towards and prospects of those with disabilities and concluded hesitantly: "The wider claims for the Paralympics having caused a sea change in broad public perceptions of those with disabilities seem to us to be unproven. There is however strong evidence of the effect which the Games, Team GB's success, and the media coverage have had on broader public perceptions of disability sport. This in itself is important and can have a real benefit in the longer term."

What the social legacy of the Olympic and Paralympic Games in Rio de Janeiro for disabled people would be is still uncertain. On the eve of the Olympic and Paralympic Games in Rio de Janeiro, the situation seems similar to London's. The City Council promotes the investments made in infrastructure in the name of the Games and the benefits that these bring. However, they do this without any connection to people with disabilities. Although there is dissemination of information about the Olympic legacy, during the analysis period (FIFA World Cup 2014 in Brazil), these did not create a positive legacy for disabled people (Range et al., 2015).

Weed (2009) suggests there is a need for national policy makers to consider whether their 'inclusive' terminological shorthand ('the 2012 Games') actually contributes to the invisibility of the Paralympic Games in legacy planning; a need for legacy planners to overtly consider potential Paralympic legacies in their own right; and a need to extend Paralympic legacy thinking beyond sport development.

Sport legacy

Proponents of sport events recurrently refer to the manifestation of a 'demonstration effect'. The demonstration effect, or the trickle-down effect, is a process by which people are inspired by elite sport, sports people, or sports events to participate themselves (Weed, 2009; Taks et al., 2014). However, the empirical evidence for the creation of this effect is at best mixed (e.g. Frawley, 2013). A study of Weed (2009) suggests that the demonstration effect may lead to re-engaging lapsed participants, increased participation of frequency among participants, and changing the practiced type of sports (activity switching). This implicates that demonstration effects rarely occur among inactive people, possibly caused by a competence gap.

Exemplary is the ambition for a sport legacy in the UK as a result of the 2012 Olympics and supplemental interventions. At the heart of the legacy of the Olympic and Paralympic Games in London in 2012 was increasing grassroots sport participation. The starting point for the realisation of this objective was excellent as there was national elite sport success (with British Olympians and Paralympians finishing 3rd in the medal ranking). Probably even more important was that there were many voluminous and large investments in supplemental projects, aimed at providing new sport facilities in the country. However, it was a struggle to stimulate grassroots sport participation nationwide. In order to leverage the momentum of the Games to increase grassroots sport participation, the National Governing Bodies played a key role, which was questioned by academics (The Centre for Social Justice, 2011; Hughes, 2013). Furthermore, sports clubs were sceptical about the 'Olympic opportunities'. According to the Sport and Recreation Alliance (2013) prior to the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games few clubs (14 per cent) saw the upcoming Games as representing an opportunity for them. Afterwards 73 per cent of the clubs suggest that the Government is not doing enough to help community sport create a legacy of sport participation.

Where has this led to, in terms of levels of sport participation? According to Sport England's Active People Survey, the level of sport participation (at least once a week) among adults nationwide was 35.8 per cent in 2014/15 against 36.6 per cent in 2007/08 (and 34.6 per cent in 2005/6). Therefore, the Games do not seem to have had a positive impact on national sport participation (with the possible exception of the 2005/06-2007/08 period). As for London, sport participation seems to increase a bit in the period prior and after the Games (2005/06 35.3 per cent, 2007/08 37 per cent, 2014/15 38 per cent). This does not seem to be a satisfactory Olympic grassroots sport participation legacy. Looking at this 'return on investment', Jeremy Hunt, Secretary of State for Culture, Olympics Media and Sport, admitted that "There can be no plug and play sporting legacy from the games, (...) the challenge is not simply to build sports facilities but to fill them." (DCMS, 2012). Still, the experience of leveraging

opportunities of the Olympics to increase grassroots sport participation has been a learning process for policy makers, sport marketers and other sports professionals and has led to a growing body of knowledge and experience of which it is expected to contribute positively to British sports (marketing) in the future (Breedveld & Hover, 2015).

As regards the Glasgow 2014 Commonwealth Games, the Scottish Government Social Research (2015) points out that there is some evidence of a 'demonstration effect' of increased interest in sport and exercise. Membership of sports governing bodies represented in the Commonwealth Games has increased, particularly for Netball Scotland, Triathlon Scotland, and Scottish Gymnastics. Nevertheless, the isolated effect of the event on the development of memberships is not shown.

In short

The problem with several economic impact studies is that they are promotional in nature and tend to overestimate positive results. In the case of mega events, the most direct beneficiaries are frequently private companies, while the economic and social costs are borne by citizens at in the lower socio-economic status groups. Although promises are made to include subsidised housing in the post-Games buildings (Olympic Village) this does not always occur in practice. Feelings of pride and belonging frequently arise as a result of a sport event, but there are missed opportunities as well. For example, a potential positive legacy of volunteers is (partly) missed and the claim that the Paralympics cause a change in public perceptions of those with disabilities seems to be unproven.

Events are most effective as an opportunity to enable other interventions in a broader overall campaign, but time, money, energy, and a person who is responsible for these outcomes is generally lacking. Although the following statement refers to the 1992 Games in Barcelona, it also applicable to other mega events: "Finding the equilibrium between success in the global arena and solutions for local social problems is (...) the main challenge for the city." (Muñoz, 2006).

5. Conclusion: opportunities, challenges and dilemmas

Over the past decades, we have seen a heightened interest in sport events of all sorts - major and mega events in particular. In general, sport events are seen as an occasion to bring about national pride, enthusiasm, opportunities for city-marketing and social and economic revitalisation. In short: sport events are appreciated as sources of inspiration and energy, both by policymakers and politicians, and by large parts of the broader public.

Smaller, less popular events may still need to actively seduce cities and federations to act as hosts, and may experience difficulties getting their event broadcast. As for the larger, more popular events, media companies fight over the right to broadcast these, and cities, countries and federations increasingly find themselves in global competition to host the event. Expenditures to bid for and host these events have gone up, as competition has become fiercer and because of higher demands by rights holders. This has implied a demand for a higher level of professionalism at sport federations as well as a demand for more involvement by both governments and sponsors. As a consequence, mega and major sport events have attracted more attention from politicians, the media and the broader public, asking questions on budgets spent and revenues generated. Bidding for events has increasingly become a political issue, requiring greater support from political allies and the general public (political debates, referenda).

As a consequence, decisions and procedures on sport events are put underneath a magnifying glass. As the IOC states in its Agenda 2020: 'this world takes much less on faith' (IOC 2014). From that closer scrutiny, processes around bidding for and the organisation of sport events have started to raise questions and doubts over the transparency and good governance of the diverse processes and as such, over the integrity of the actors involved. Even though the large number of people buying tickets or watching the event on television is witness of the enthusiasm and positive experiences that sport events still elicit, questions are being raised over use and misuse of powers.

The scientific reports and examples cited in this study show that such malpractices may occur within every phase in the life-cycle of a sport event, whether that be the bidding phase, the phase of planning for and organising the event, and the legacy phase after the closing of the event (see also Transparency International, 2015).

In the bidding phase, lack of transparency over awarding criteria and voting-procedures and exorbitant demands from the rights owners have caused concern from politicians and/or the broader public. From the side of bidders, participation in corruption, lack of possibilities to get or be involved, lack of trust in intentions of the planners, over-promised effects of the event, and worries over costs getting out-of-hand, have played a role in the public's increasingly critical standpoint towards sport events.

In the planning and organisation phase, violations of human and workers' rights have been reported across different continents and have added to the concerns of the broader public (particularly in the EU) over the desirability of hosting sport events. Some issues that may be deemed equally important appear to elicit fewer questions from the broader public (issues of sustainability and accessibility of the event, or the way that the event is financed).

In the legacy phase, worries over the infrastructural legacy of events, of a lack of legacy as regards increasing sport-participation, doubts over the economic gains of hosting events over the long term as well as over the uneven distribution of costs and revenues, have raised scepticism over the desirability of hosting sport events. In part, this scepticism appears justified, as legacies that were promised during

bidding phases fail to materialise. This is due to a lack of proper legacy management, or because the legacy programmes have not been subjected to objective and independent evaluation.

This is not to say that there is no positive power from hosting sport events. Our study and those of others have shown numerous examples of good practices and of positive effects of organising major and mega sport events. What the study does show, is that there is more than enough ground for people - politicians, journalists, the broader public - to not believe all that is being said about sport events; to remain critical as to promises being made, processes that are going on, misuse of power, and unworthy investments. In short, to be cautious and hesitant when speaking of sport events and to start questioning the integrity of the actors involved and the reliability of the governance structures that were set in place.

Apparently, the organisational structures for sport events have not kept up - partly perhaps deliberately, partly unintendedly - with the changing economic and political circumstances. There appears to be an increasing discrepancy between what 'society' expects of sport events in terms of good governance and transparency, and what those who hold the rights to and organise sports events currently have to offer in this respect. This discrepancy leads to tensions, questions being asked, issues being raised, and sometimes downright resistance. Clearly, the transparency and principles of governance demanded today are as yet ill-embedded in the international sport sector (Geeraert, 2015). The sport sector does not stand alone in this. In other sectors as well, there appears to be a greater call for integrity, transparency and good governance.

From an optimistic viewpoint, one could label what seems to be happening in the field of sport events as a transitional phase. The world of sport events needs to adapt to its new position in the centre of the public debate. International sport events have stopped being the domain of a small, isolated and rather insignificant microcosm of sportsmen and -women, and the organisations and policymakers that surround them. As stated in Agenda 2020: 'sport today is too important in society to ignore the rest of society' (IOC 2014a). Sport events enjoy high social visibility; high economic, ecological and spatial impact; and real impact on people's lives and attitudes towards sports. This reality leads to rightfully being judged by high standards - and those who organise sports events are supposed to act with a high level of integrity towards their stakeholders, including the broader public.

It is not that the sport sector has not acted upon these changes. The IOC has had an ethics commission for nearly two decades, and has adopted Agenda 2020 to update its mission and structures (IOC, 2014a). FIFA's ethics commission has investigated and banned FIFA's former President Sepp Blatter over the payments he made to UEFA chairman Michel Platini, and FIFA has made reforms to its host selection process. The IAAF has started to reconsider their bidding procedures and its chairman Lord Sebastian Coe was made to give up some of his commercial activities.

Still, these are first steps to clean up the worst transgressions. It would appear that a lot still needs to be done to turn around the present unfavourable climate for sport events. Integrity, we have stated, is about meeting the social obligations in order to be regarded as honest, truthful and accurate. This demands:

- Delivering public value (accepting a responsibility for creating legacies, honouring of human and working rights, cost-control);
- Transparency (open decision-making);
- Democratic processes (chance to be heard, to get involved);
- Checks and balances (independent monitoring and evaluation).

The obligation to meet these standards does not reside solely with any of the parties involved, but with the total ‘supply chain’: rights owners (international sport federations); host cities/countries; national federations; local organising committees; private suppliers like construction companies and deliverers of services; sponsors; and the public at large. It starts with how the bidding process is organised, demands that are formulated in the call for bids, promises being made, and ends with delegating and accepting responsibility for creating a lasting legacy after the event is over. It will involve aspects of good governance within all the parties involved (rules, procedures) but also - especially - behavioural and cultural change (adoption of, and adherence to, appropriate standards by all persons involved).

Clearly, governments have a role to play in this and need to play a role in further addressing the issue of integrity and sport events. First, because there is public spending involved and use of public resources (police, infrastructure); second, because (sometimes) legislation is involved (e.g., taxes, violation or protection of human rights); and third, because based on previous experiences, change in the sport sector cannot be expected to come about without outside pressure.

National governments can use their financial and political influence to warrant that the four dimensions for integrity as discussed above are being met. They need to be explicit on their criteria for becoming involved. When asked for (financial) support, they can demand independent monitoring and evaluation, second opinions on estimates of costs, consultation of stakeholders and the general public, human rights and workers’ rights to be safeguarded in contracts, tickets being available to the local public at decent pricing, a legacy plan and a sustainability plan to be installed, and request and safeguard that the overall investments add public value. In their decision to support the event, national governments should take into account whether the practices of right owners live up to national standards for transparency and good governance. In addition, national governments can support their national federations by sharing experiences and best practices, and developing models to inform the organisation of future events.

Supra-national and intergovernmental governments, such as the EU, can use their resources to establish common ground among nations and the sport movement (Geeraert 2016), to exchange best practices, to initiate further research²² and to formulate models and guidelines. These are the actions that are needed to restore faith in the integrity of major and mega sport events.

²² Clearly, the subject of integrity and sport events is a very young and new area of public interest, one that warrants further research. There are still noticeable blanks in what we know of sport events, and how this influences people’s views on sport events. Most research conducted today is on major sport events; not enough has been carried out on smaller events. To date, not enough scientific effort has gone into how organisational cultures and behaviours shape managerial practices and decisions, and so contribute to organisational integrity. In addition: no overview or monitor exists of how the current developments have started to influence bidding-processes, and have started to translate into greater democracy and transparency, lower demands, realistic estimates of costs and benefits, and more attention being paid to human and worker’s rights and to creating public value, in bidding documents and –contracts.

Appendix 1: National expert group

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Appendix 3: Case studies

In this appendix, we shine greater light on four case studies, following the phases and dimensions which are defined and portrayed in the previous chapters. These cases are the bids for the 2022 Winter Games and the 2024 Summer Games; the Olympic and Paralympic Games 2012 in London; and the Glasgow 2014 Commonwealth Games.

Case study 1: bidding for the 2022 Winter Games

Bidding cities pulling out of race for 2022 Winter Games

At the end of 2013, the IOC was satisfied with the level of interest for the 2022 Winter Games: there were five applicant cities: Beijing (China), Almaty (Kazakhstan), Oslo (Norway), Lviv (Ukraine), and Krakow (Poland). However, there were some concerns over bidding, as two cities dropped out of bidding in 2013 after expressing their interest: St. Moritz/Davos (Switzerland) and Munich/Garmisch Partenkirchen (Germany). These bids were cancelled due to public referenda showing low levels of support. Opponents in both countries referred to the risk of escalation of costs, and the impact of Olympic facilities and infrastructure was regarded environmentally unsound. Stockholm (Sweden) also indicated interest, but withdrew in January 2014 after the government suggested that the investments would be too high for facilities that were not necessary.

Three months later, things began to become grim for the IOC. In May 2014, Krakow withdrew its bid after a referendum with 70 per cent of the population voting against hosting the Games. Reasons for the votes against the Games were the headwind which the Polish economy faced - there should be other priorities - and the investments in infrastructure and sport accommodations were believed to be too expensive. Citizens living in the Tatra Mountains (in the south of Poland) also feared ecological devastation. Lviv, a city 250 kilometres east from Krakow, retracted their bid one month after Krakow, in June 2014. Obvious reasons for the Ukrainian city were the political, security and economic crisis in Ukraine (government forces were battling an insurgency by pro-Russian separatists). The bid team mentioned that they would bid for the 2026 Winter Games as an alternative. The retractions were a concern for the IOC, but the worst was yet to come.

Withdrawal of 'front runner' Oslo tragedy for the IOC

In 2010, four Norwegian cities showed an interest in organising the 2022 Winter Olympics: Lillehammer (host of the 1994 Winter Olympics), Stavanger, Tromsø and Oslo. Two years later, and after a competition - namely between Lillehammer and Oslo - the proposition of Oslo was chosen as the best Norwegian candidate.

The Norwegian capital of Oslo considered the 2022 Games as an opportunity to develop the city for the future, but in the way that more can be done with than without the Games (Oslo2022, 2014). The Oslo Games concept was characterised by its ultra-compact set up, use of existing facilities and realisation of future proof new facilities. Additionally, winter sports is part of the country's national identity, the motivation for the bid derives from the value that sports play in society, and the country has a lot of experience with organising large winter sport events. The year 2022 also marked 70 years since the 1952 Oslo games, where the Olympic flame was lit for the first time during Winter Games, and marked 28 years since IOC-president Samaranch declared the 1994 'the best games ever'. Based on the IOC's evaluation of the three Applicant Cities (Oslo, Almaty and Beijing), the Norwegian capital was the front-runner (IOC, 2014b).

The Oslo bid faced a referendum in the meantime, and 55 per cent of residents who voted supported hosting the Olympic Games. However, in October 2014, the Norwegian parliament decided that it would not provide a government guarantee, and as a result the IOC lost its best candidate. The protocol and excessive demands of the IOC, were not well-received by the public in Norway. Moreover, during the Games in Sochi, the IOC warned against wearing black armbands and other symbols of mourning during the competitions after Norwegian cross country skiers wore black bands to remember the late brother of a teammate. This was also not well received in Norway.

The Oslo plans for investment in facilities, transport and urban development were conceived as part of a possible Games continuance but at a slower pace. The retraction of Oslo as a bidder was a tragedy for the IOC, not only because of its strong bid concept, but also for the reason that it is an Western democracy which has set a high bar for increased transparency during a time when the IOC sought to burnish its credentials as a transparent organisation (such as announcing its intentions to make the host city contract public) (City of Oslo, 2014). An Olympic and Paralympic Games in Oslo in 2022 would give the IOC the opportunity to demonstrate that a developed democratic European country believes in the opportunities of the Games.

The IOC did not hide its displeasure in its statement for the abandoning of the Oslo bid and called it a “missed opportunity” for the City of Oslo, for the people of Norway and for the Norwegian athletes (IOC, 2014c). On the same day that the Norwegian Prime Minister announced the withdraw of the support for the campaign a Norwegian newspaper ran a story with the title “IOC requires free liquor at the stadium and a cocktail party with the king”. For many opponents this must have felt as a confirmation of the withdrawal as the excessive demands of the IOC do not harmonise with the Norwegian way of thinking and living (Time, 2014).

Choice between two less than ideal candidates

After the retraction of Oslo, two options remained: Beijing and Almaty - both cities in countries which are not democracies and with a dubious reputation regarding the respect of human rights. Moreover, whatever the choice would be, the 2022 Games would become the third Games in Asia in a row (Pyeongchang in 2018 and Tokyo in 2020), whilst an Olympic Games on another continent would be preferred (continental rotation is not formally prescribed, but is informally preferred). Almaty is the oil-rich commercial capital of Kazakhstan, a winter sport destination, and host of the Asian 2011 Winter Games. Strong aspects of the Almaty bid were its compact set up and that many facilities already existed. Beijing wanted to become the first city to organise both the Summer and Winter Games. In July 2015 the IOC made their choice and decided to award the organisation rights of the 2022 Winter Games to the Chinese capital, situated in a country without a winter sport tradition and where it barely snows.

Case study 2: bidding for 2024: Boston and Hamburg

For the Olympic Games of 2024, the original bidding cities were: Hamburg, Boston, Paris, Rome and Budapest. Hamburg and Boston have already withdrawn their bids due to a lack of support from the residents. On the hand of these cases: the Boston 2024 bid and the Hamburg 2024 bid, the withdrawing cities make clear that a transparent and democratically-supported bid process is getting more and more important to successfully submit a bid.

Boston 2024

In an email conversation with Evan Falchuk (chairman and founder of the United Independent Party in Boston) and Christopher Dempsey (co-chair of No Boston Olympics) the timetable and decision process

of bid phase becomes clear. The United States Olympic Committee (USOC) conducted a process from early 2013 through January 2015 to narrow the list of potential U.S. cities for organising the 2024 Games from 35 to four (Washington, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Boston), and then to one: Boston. As part of that process the USOC wrote a letter to the Mayor of Boston gauging interest. In 2013, the Mayor designated "Boston 2024" as the entity that could negotiate with the USOC on behalf of the city. Boston 2024 was technically a private entity - a non-profit entity that was not funded with public dollars, but the organisation was very closely tied to the city (e.g. one of the Mayor's top staffers left the Mayor's office to join Boston 2024 as an employee). In December 2014, the USOC accepted the bid documents that were jointly signed by Boston 2024 and the Mayor of Boston. The USOC chose Boston in January of 2015 to be in race for organising the 2024 Games. In this case the USOC is the main negotiator/bidder with the IOC, but they do that in conjunction with the host city and the bidding group (Boston 2024). The Boston government was involved in this process early on, but with very little public awareness of the extent of the involvement. The mayor of Boston (Walsh) was actively involved in Boston 2024, as were a number of employees of the state government and employees of the city of Boston. There were also a number of former elected officials and people who had run the political campaigns of state and local officials. One of the major problems with Boston 2024 was the degree of overlap between this private endeavour and government - this was very unusual. Many large corporations and wealthy individuals contributed to Boston 2024. For example, the CEO of a large construction company (John Fish) was also the chair of the bidding entity Boston 2024.

The first thing that most people in Boston heard about the submission of a bid for hosting the Olympic Games was the day Boston was selected by the USOC, which was in early January 2015 (although this information was publicly available). At that point, Boston 2024 had been working on the project - with government support - for almost two years. The public knew very little about it, besides some awareness-raising campaigns from Boston2024, though the organisation 'No Boston Olympics' drawing attention to the issue in meaningful ways.

Boston 2024 framed their plan as being about economic development and the opportunity to create thousands of jobs and billions of dollars in economic activity. The CEO of Boston 2024 stated (Fish, 2014): "The 2024 Olympics and Paralympics would offer us a rare opportunity to shine the spotlight of the world on our story, ideals, and people. However, more importantly, it would provide an opportunity to improve our city and create a new Boston for the 21st Century. And it would strengthen our economy, reconnect the neighbourhoods of our city and regions of our Commonwealth, and instil pride in our people."

At the beginning, Boston 2024 talked some about the "power of sport" and the prestige of hosting the Games, but eventually it turned into a story of how it would create jobs, rebuild the infrastructure, and turn Boston into a "world-class" city. The aim of Boston 2024 was also that they wanted to create a new model for running Olympics that was entirely privately-funded, with no money from taxpayers.

What eventually killed the Boston bid was that voters in Boston never believed that no taxpayer money would be spent. A coalition of people organised voters in a number of ways across the political spectrum. 'No Boston Olympics' was educating the public on what the real economic consequences of the Games would be. Another group organised a binding referendum that would have guaranteed that no taxpayer money would be spent. The mayor of Boston did not sign a guarantee required by the USOC. As such, the USOC decided to avoid the possibility of a referendum defeat, and further negotiations with the city of Boston by pulling the bid, and the Mayor used the opportunity to present himself as the protector of taxpayers who wanted to stop Boston from participating.

Part of the problem, according to Evan Falchuk and Christopher Dempsey, was that the bid organisers from Boston 2024 were very much connected to local and state officials and policymakers. The public perception was that these business and political leaders were collaborating in bringing this project to Boston and that the result would be that the connected business groups would earn a lot of money at taxpayer expense, that the public interest would be subsumed to the business motives of the bid organisers, and that the political leaders (many of whom had received quite a lot of campaign funding from these business leaders) would further solidify their standing with these connected groups.

The case of Boston shows that lacking transparency during the creation of a bid and the absence of a democratic process in forming the bid-organisation, will in the end kill the process of submitting a bid for a mega sport event.

Hamburg 2024

Compared to Boston, the public in Hamburg was earlier involved in the bid process. In April 2014, the German National Olympic Committee (DOSB) proposed a new bid with either Hamburg or Berlin as candidate city (DOSB, 2014a). Both cities put forward detailed plans for a possible staging of the Olympic Games with the DOSB Executive Committee deciding on Hamburg in early 2015 (Hippke and Krieger, 2015). It was also made public that the DOSB would only enter the race if the 'Olympic Agenda 2020', the reform programme that the IOC decided upon in December 2014, would pave the way for considerable changes within the Olympic movement.

The Hamburg bid planned to host sustainable, environment-friendly, and modest Games, to counter the 'gigantism' and environmental damage that raised so much public criticism regarding the 2014 Olympic Winter Games held in Sochi (Hippke and Krieger, 2015). The Bidding Committee was formed in July 2015 as a joint venture between the DOSB (51 per cent), the city of Hamburg (26 per cent), the federal government of Germany (18 per cent), the Federal State of Schleswig-Holstein and the city of Kiel (each 2 per cent (Hartmann, in Hippke and Krieger, 2015). The estimated bidding budget is €50 million, of which the federal government had already secured €30 million, and an additional €25 million would be raised by the German economy (Hartmann in Hippke and Krieger, 2015).

So the bidding committee was known by the public, and the plans were clear for the public, but some of the plans were quite expansive and had got many people wondering whether they were in fact possible (DW, 2015). And, as we also saw in Boston, in Hamburg an organisation was formed to gather the opponents for the bid. In June 2014, 'Nolympia Hamburg' published its own website (Nolympia, 2014a). The organisation had various concerns, ranging from the need for investment in other public areas (e.g. grassroots sports and education) to the fear of terrorism (Nolympia, 2014b).

Eventually a clear majority of 51.6 per cent of Hamburgers voted to pull out of the race in Sunday's referendum, with only 48.4 per cent in favour of staying in (The Telegraph, 2015). On the other hand almost two-thirds of voters in nearby Kiel, where sailing events would have been held, backed the Olympic proposal in the referendum. But turnout in the relatively small city of Kiel was under 32 per cent, while 651,000 voters in Hamburg took part - half of the electorate (BBC, 2015).

Florian Kasiske from the No campaign 'Nolympia' said to the BBC (2015) people could see that the money could be better spent. He saw a change in mood in Hamburg, suggesting that the vote was linked to the large numbers of migrants and refugees arriving in the city. "It's really about city politics. Many people are just arriving in this city and have to sleep in tents - and there has to be money for that," he said. Others said that the Paris attacks have played a part in the 'no' vote, and that the continuing

corruption scandal involving FIFA and the doping cover-up in world athletics have persuaded people to vote against hosting the Games.

These developments in Germany should be looked at from a historical perspective: there seems to be a problematic relationship between Germany and the Olympic Movement. In total, Germany unsuccessfully bid to host the Olympic Games six times since the 1980s (Summer: Hamburg 2024, Leipzig 2012, Berlin 2000; Winter: Munich 2022, Munich 2018, Berchtesgaden 1992). In addition, it is likely that the DFB (German Football Association) scandal in regards to the 2006 FIFA World Cup has influenced the public opinion on bidding for the 2024 Olympic Games in a negative way.

Referenda have thus far been an overseen field in mega-event research. However, due to their growing importance they deserve scientific scrutiny. According to Könecke et al. (2015) it has to be kept in mind that Olympic bids seem to be special situations possibly enabling autonomous publics to place their differing opinions in the meaning circle, thus influencing general interpretations and beliefs, eventually resulting in changing public opinions.

The case of the Hamburg 2024 bid is a clear example of how local residents' support and opposition does not solely decide over the success or failure of a mega-sport event. However nowadays it is even regarded as a precondition for a potential candidate's eligibility to bid. The 'nein' from the Hamburgers, as well as the critical bid situations in other Western countries, all raised the question if the current Olympic format is still feasible in Western democracies (Hippke and Krieger, 2015). Isn't the potential public value of an event more important than the organisation of the event alone?

In the wake of the disbanded Boston and Hamburg bids, some of the remaining bidders have made it clear that the bids would not be subject to a referendum. Hungary's Supreme Court blocked a proposed referendum on Budapest's bid in January 2016, while governments in both Rome and Paris have stated that there will be no public referendum on the Games. The concern raised by the defeats of Boston and Hamburg is that cities will avoid public participation altogether, to avoid giving any room for dissent against hosting the Games.

Case study 3: London 2012

Bid process

In 2007 the national government announced that the public budget for the 2012 Games, including the regeneration of East-London, would be GBP 9.325 billion (NAO, 2010). This amount was nearly four times higher than the investment which was initially mentioned in the bid phase. London 2012 is not the sole event where a substantial underestimation of public investments occurred; this is also the case for other Olympics (Flyvbjerg & Stewart, 2012; Bickley & Tomlin, 2012). The amount of public investment of GBP 9.325 billion is widely used when referring to the 2012 Games investments. However, according to the National Audit Office (2010), there are substantial costs which are outside of this budget, in particular the GBP 1.949 billion of LOCOG for staging the games and the purchase of the land of the Olympic park. The case of London 2012 shows that proponents of mega sport events face the challenge to make realistic forecasts as regards investments for mega sport events and to integrate all relevant costs.

The public support for the Games fluctuated in the run up to the Games. Between 2003 and 2005, part of the bid phase, the national support for a bid fluctuated between 69 per cent in 2003 to 79 per cent in 2005. After London was awarded the organisation rights in 2005 the support changed from 74 per cent

(2006), 57 per cent (2009) and 66 per cent (2010) (University of East London, 2015). Escalation of the Games budget (see above), the economic recession and cuts in government spending probably influenced public enthusiasm around 2009. Nevertheless, after the event the overall public was pleased that the London 2012 Games took place in London and there was genuine interest in the Games.

Event preparation and organisation

According to the House of Commons (2013), the Games were a great triumph for London and the whole country. The opening and closing ceremonies were widely praised and athletes excelled. The UK Sport medal targets were exceeded for both Olympics and Paralympics. GBP 290 million of the total public budget of the Games, GBP 9.3 billion, was invested in support for both elite and community sport (NAO, 2011). As a result of the targeted sport legacy, an increase in sport participation, is was also community sport that profited from the Games investments. These financial resources for community sports would not exist at this level without the Games.

LOCOG, the local organising committee, sold 8.2 million tickets for the Olympic Games and 2.8 million for the Paralympic Games. 2.5 million Olympics tickets and 2.1 Paralympics tickets were available at GBP 20 or less (NAO, 2012). These price levels seem to offer sufficient opportunities for the UK public to visit the Games. Nevertheless, the House of Commons (2013) mentions that “it is a shame that so few tickets for popular events were available to the UK public. For example, only 51 per cent of tickets for the men’s 100 metres final were available to the UK public and only 47 per cent of tickets for the track cycling”. This suggests that the Games, largely paid with taxpayers’ money, should have offered more visiting opportunities for the people in Britain.

Leverage and legacy

Public and private organisations stressed the necessity to build on the success of the Games. The realisation of social goals was at the hearth of the organisation of the event. As far as legacy was concerned, the 2012 Games focused on four areas: increasing grassroots sport participation, exploiting opportunities for economic growth, promoting community engagement and social participation and making sure that the Olympic park area meets the needs for post event use (DCMS, 2010).

The Games were a success and the big picture is that they have delivered value for money (NAO, 2012). Two-thirds of the British people reported in November 2012 that they were surprised about the degree to which the Games united the country (Ipsos MORI, 2012). Nearly a year after the Games, 61 per cent of the national population said the event was value for money and 70 per cent said the event still influenced the mood of the British public positively (University of East London, 2015).

In the first couple of weeks of the Olympics, key central London attractions experienced a huge fall of up to 61 per cent in visitor numbers compared to the same weeks the previous year. Overseas visitors stayed away from London during the Olympic period and Londoners avoided the city, leading to media headlines of London being described as ‘a ghost town’ (ALVA, 2012). It is possible, but uncertain, that these attractions have benefitted from the Games from 2013 onwards.

The area in and around the Olympic Park has undergone extensive transformation and regeneration, fulfilling a key legacy promise. The athletes’ village has been converted successfully to residential properties and there is expanding commercial and residential development in and around the park. The Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park is well used by the public, while the ecological and environmental functions of the site are well established. All permanent, new Olympic venues are in secure ownership, management and popular use. London, especially eastern London, has gained an exemplary rail

transport infrastructure. Although white elephants are absent (University of East London, 2015), the costs for the post Games transformation of the Olympic Stadium and the complexity of securing new ownership of the stadium were underestimated.

Sebastian Coe's speech to the IOC in 2005, which has been cited as a major factor in convincing the IOC's Session to award the Games to London, strongly emphasised the potential of the Games to increase sport participation. By promising to use the Games to deliver an increase in participation the organisers of London 2012 were not only promising to achieve something which no previous host city had experienced (significant increase in sport participation as a result of holding as mega-event), but something to which there were significant barriers as well (Sports Working Group, 2011).²³ According to Sport England's Active People Survey, the level of sport participation (at least once a week) among adults nationwide was 36.1 per cent in 2013/14 against 36.6 per cent in 2007/08 (and 34.6 per cent in 2005/6). Therefore, the Games do not seem to have had a positive impact on national sport participation (with the possible exception of the 2005/06-2007/08 period). Still, the experience of leveraging opportunities of the Olympics to increase grassroots sport participation has been a learning process for policymakers, sport marketers and other sports professionals and has led to a growing body of knowledge and experience of which it is expected to contribute positively to British sports (marketing) in the future, although continued investment is required to maintain momentum.

In the year after the 2012 Olympics a decrease of participation in school sport was reported. A third of primary and secondary school teachers (34 per cent and 35 per cent, respectively) reported that there had been a decrease in participation (The Smith Institute, 2013). This was largely the result of the loss of Olympic-related funding for school sports and, as a consequence, a lack of time. Nearly all teachers agreed that schools should have a minimum target of two hours PE and Sport and that physical activity improves educational attainment.

The successful organisation of the Games was not possible without the 74,000 volunteers (Games Makers). Their contribution is valued, and for many Games Makers it will be a memorable experience for the rest of their life. Lessons have been learnt as well. It has been admitted that too many Games Makers were recruited (University of East London, 2015), it is questionable whether the government is doing all it can to learn and disseminate lessons and to encourage volunteering opportunities (House of Commons, 2013) and planning for the volunteering legacy should have started earlier as the momentum for volunteering was lost (House of Lords, 2013).

Case study 4: Glasgow 2014 Commonwealth Games

Bid process

The local and national government justified their decision to bid for the Glasgow 2014 Commonwealth Games by suggesting it would generate a positive legacy for health and the socio-economic determinants of health for the deprived community in the east of Glasgow (Matheson, 2010; McCartney

²³ Academics questioned the central role for the National Governing Bodies (Sport Working Group, 2011; Hughes, 2013), prior to the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games very few clubs (14 per cent) saw the upcoming Games as representing an opportunity for them (Sports and Recreation Alliance, 2013) and many Olympic sports are minority sports with limited popular appeal (the more popular Olympic sports often do not regard the Olympic Games as their primary showWorld Cupase, prime examples being football and tennis) (Sport Working Group, 2011).

et al., 2012). These impacts would arise through increased physical activity, volunteering, new sports infrastructure and economic growth. A major theme within legacy planning has also been the urban regeneration of the East End.²⁴ Glasgow's bid strategy emphasised their competence and capacity. Specifically, Glasgow argued that it already had 70 per cent of the facilities built so the financial outlay would not be as much as other bidders.

In 2007, the city of Glasgow was chosen by the General Assembly of the Commonwealth Games Federation (CGF) to stage the 2014 Commonwealth Games, following a bid by a consortium of Games partners, namely the Scottish Government, the City Council and Commonwealth Games Scotland. In 2012, 74 per cent of citizens in East-Glasgow were supportive of the Games coming to Glasgow. Looking at the report of the evaluation commission for the 2014 Commonwealth Games the preference for the Scottish city was not a surprise as Glasgow was better evaluated than Abuja (CGF Evaluation Commission, 2007).²⁵

Event preparation and organisation

The 2014 Commonwealth Games were held in East-Glasgow between 23 July and 3 August. The Games were organised under the auspices of the Commonwealth Games Federation. Four partners led the delivery of the Games: Glasgow 2014 Ltd, Commonwealth Games Scotland, Glasgow City Council, and the Scottish Government. The sunny weather during these days and the diverse cultural activities, alongside the sports programme, contributed to the positive vibe in the city centre and the East End.

According to Commonwealth Games Scotland (2014), the Games were delivered within a budget of £576 million (767 million euros) which included a target of £113 million (151 million euros) to be raised by Glasgow 2014 Ltd through commercial income. The strategy of the Games was embedded into broader regeneration strategies for East Glasgow. Clyde Gateway was the principal regeneration body that worked alongside the Games organisers to leverage the Games.

Underprivileged groups were given special attention by creating opportunities to visit the event. 25,000 so-called "Goodwill Tickets" were available to enable disadvantaged groups from across Scotland to attend the Games. This intervention might also be a method to create enough filled seats in the stadiums, as avoiding empty seats is a recurrent challenge for event organisers. The Games not only were successful for the Scottish team, many event spectators evaluated the event positively: 91 per cent of the spectators at ticketed events were satisfied with their overall event experience and 86 per cent said they were likely to recommend attendance at future events in Glasgow and Scotland (Commonwealth Games Scotland, 2014).

²⁴ The event was located throughout the city and further afield, but a cluster of venues was situated in East Glasgow.

²⁵ More than ten cities considered to bid for the 2014 Commonwealth Games. Eventually bids were made by Glasgow, Abuja (Nigeria) and Halifax (Canada). From an integrity perspective, the withdrawal of Halifax is worth mentioning. This bid process ended in March 2007, when the Province of Nova Scotia and the Halifax Regional Municipality announced their decision to withdraw funding for the bid because they could not close the gap between the estimated costs and the funding committed by the federal government, expecting contributions from private partners and Games revenue. The failure of the Halifax bid for the Commonwealth Games demonstrated the importance of realistic timelines, a balanced governing body, a robust early warning system, understanding political currents, building public support and securing financial commitment, among other lessons learned about the bidding process (Commonwealth Games Canada, 2008).

Leverage and legacy

For the first time in a Commonwealth Games, legacy was an official part of the organising committee's responsibility. In every phase, legacy was integral to the planning, investment and strategic decision making it required to deliver the event. With a ten-year time frame from 2009 to 2019, it was set around four themes: 1. using the Games to contribute to the growth of the Scottish economy; 2. using the Games to help Scots be more physically active; 3. using the Games to strengthen connections at home and internationally through culture and learning; and, 4. using the Games to demonstrate environmental responsibility and help communities live more sustainably. There were more than 50 national legacy programmes and 80 supporting legacy projects.

The Games programme also featured the biggest ever number of parasport medal events (22) in the history of the Games. To a certain degree this was combined with investments in parasport at grassroots level. Additional funding has been provided by Education Scotland to ensure that children with disabilities are fully included in physical education at school (Scottish Government, 2012).

It is still early to give a comprehensive overview of the legacy of the event, but several interesting developments are already visible. Scottish Government Social Research (2015) points out that there is some evidence of a 'demonstration effect' of increased interest in sport and exercise. Membership of sports governing bodies represented in the Commonwealth Games has increased, particularly for Netball Scotland, Triathlon Scotland, and Scottish Gymnastics.

Evidence from the Nations Brand Index - which measures the image and reputation of nations according to people in 20 countries worldwide - shows that international awareness of Scotland increased from 62 per cent in 2012 to 65 per cent in 2014. This is the first time there has been an improvement in the Scottish data since it was first collected in 2008. The Glasgow Household Survey conducted in 2014 showed that 86 per cent of residents felt proud of the city. Just after the Games, 81 per cent of citizens in East-Glasgow were supportive of the Games coming to Glasgow (up from 74 per cent in 2012).

The East End of Glasgow is home to Scotland's (and the UK's) most deprived communities (Paton et al., 2012). The communities in the East End of Glasgow are situated closest to the main Commonwealth Games sites and it is expected that in particular these residents are affected by the physical area changes (house building, road construction and upgraded sports facilities), as well as associated social and economic changes linked to the Games. Targeting this area as the heart of a large sport event with its new and improved accommodations and infrastructure is understandable as there are good opportunities to improve infrastructural and social structures. The Athlete's Village will be converted into a new mixed-tenure residential community with over 10,000 new homes, thereby transforming the area's housing market, which is currently dominated by social housing (Paton et al., 2012).

There is evidence to which extent and in which way the East End has developed six months after the Games, compared with the 2012 situation (Cleland et al., 2015). Firstly, there is an indication that the Games appear to have had some behavioural influence, mostly for those already participating in sport rather than for new participants. Residents have noticed an improvement in the quality of local sports facilities. Secondly, one-in-twenty households experienced an employment gain from regeneration projects in the area over the two-year period up to the end of 2014, and one-in-ten experienced an additional employment effect from the Games itself, either gaining employment or working extra hours at Games time. Thirdly, the changes brought about by regeneration led to a certain reduction in the identification of vacant and derelict land as a problem, a marked increase in feelings of neighbourhood safety, and a rise in perceptions of a positive neighbourhood change.

Besides the interventions and actions to praise, there are lessons learned as well. It seemed challenging to involve the whole city, as the event was relatively invisible in northern parts of the city. Furthermore, it is debatable whether one should refer to a demonstration effect as a result of an increase in memberships of three governing bodies, out of a total of 68 in Scotland, besides the fact that the isolated effect of the event on membership levels is uncertain. It also appeared to be difficult to raise interest for volunteering among the targeted groups (young people, minorities), resulting in not meeting this target by Glasgow 2014 Ltd. (Cleland et al., 2015). As regards parasport, at a strategic level there was evidence of an integrated parasport policy approach, but this was not always accompanied by clear projects that are likely to lead to impacts beyond the normal temporality of the event (Misener et al., 2015). Lastly, the new residential development is likely to be too expensive for low-income East Enders and redevelopment has already resulted in the displacement of families, and disputes over compensation (Matheson, 2010).

Notwithstanding various downsides and challenges ahead, the Glasgow 2014 Commonwealth Games can be judged positively from several perspectives. There are no indications known for questionable integrity issues during the bid phase. The event was delivered within budget, legacy was integrated in the organising committee's responsibilities and the programme included parasport and investments in parasport at grassroots level. Perhaps most importantly, the transformation of the East End as part of the delivery of the Games fit the broader policy agenda aimed to improve the physical area and social and economic conditions and developments in the East End and are being structurally measured by an independent team of researchers from the University of Glasgow.

Appendix 4: A sustainable legacy

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In chapter 3 of this position paper, the legacy of sport events is defined as "the planned and unplanned, positive and negative, intangible and tangible structures created through a sport event that remains after the event". This is a broad definition, even more so because the term "structures" refers to both to material infrastructure as well as social, economic, cultural and organisational structures (Gratton & Preuss, 2008). In this section, we will focus on the material infrastructure (sport venues, traffic infrastructure, spatial structures; first paragraph) and the sustainability (environmental damage; second paragraph) as regards sport events. These aspects of types of legacy come with great costs for societies and have been found to be important in the public debate as well as in the decision-making process concerning major sport events (Abend, 2014). Most of the evidence for these issues stem from the larger sport events, like World Championships and Olympic Games. Still, many of these issues are relevant for smaller-scale events as well.

Material legacy

Dutch television recently aired a documentary about Sochi, one year after the Olympic Winter Games. Derelict sport centres, a plundered Olympic village and eroded roads made for a sorry sight. Similar images as silent reminders of the 2010 World Football Championship in South Africa and the Athens 2004 Olympic Games also pop up regularly. For the potential organisers of major sport events, they are a true spectre. What causes all this costly lack of occupancy and what are the focal issues for good governance in the realisation of legacy? These are central to this part.

Great numbers

Many countries have sufficient sport facilities (fields, courts, halls) suitable for international matches. The fact that a major sport event requires so much extra is due to the great numbers of spectators and the demands that may be set by international sports organisations. A European Football Championship, for instance, requires at least 1 stadium with 60,000 seats and 7 stadiums with 30,000 seats; a World Football Championship raises this to 1 stadium with 80,000 seats, 2 stadiums with 60,000 seats, and 9 stadiums with 40,000 seats (Nieuwe Gracht, 2011). A European or World Athletics Championship must be held in a stadium with at least 40,000 seats, the European Swimming Championship in a swimming centre with 4,500 seats, and its world counterpart should provide seats for 10,000 to 15,000 spectators. It is these huge numbers that clarify why international championships so often require investments in new or refurbished venues. This applies even more so for the Olympic Games, which essentially comprise 36 simultaneous championships in one single city over the course of three weeks. The number of spectators per sport can also turn out to be up to 100 per cent greater than for a European Championship. On balance, it boils down to millions of visitors wanting a seat in the stadium, needing transportation and requiring some type of temporary lodgings somewhere.

New construction

If a major sport event comes with new construction, any operational or financial problems afterwards should be avoided. The local region usually provides too little post-event support for the new venue since its dimensions are based on many visitors from elsewhere.

The popularity of a sport in a region determines the degree of support after the event and the possibilities to organise other major events for this (and other) sports in the remaining venue - and

thereby the chance of its effective operation. Furthermore, the better the venue can be reached by various forms of transportation, the more favourable its utilisation. The potential market also increases according to its multifunctionality. Due to the higher numbers of spectators, the risks involved in a World Championship are greater than for a European Championship. Naturally, Olympic Games come with the highest risks. Not surprisingly, it was after these events that the greatest vacancy in stadiums and centres ("white elephants") was found (Nieuwe Gracht & Twijnstra Gudde & NOC*NSF, 2008).

A desired legacy

One possibility for the aversion or limitation of the risks involved in (too great or too many) new facilities is collaboration with other cities or countries, whereby the wider range of existing venues reduces the need for new ones. The collaborative partnership between Poland and the Ukraine in the 2012 European Football Championship is an example. This is becoming available for the Olympic Games, through Agenda 2020 (IOC 2014a). However, a major part of the event must still take place in a single host city, leading to questions as to how flexible hosting the Games truly is. Other methods that are frequently applied in order to avert or reduce (financial and legacy) risks for built facilities are (Nieuwe Gracht & Twijnstra Gudde, NOC*NSF, 2008):

- The usage of existing buildings for sports (such as table tennis, martial arts, and fencing in the ExCeL Exhibition Centre, London 2012);
- The temporary adaptation of existing sport venues to suit another sport (such as the Rod Laver Arena for swimming, Melbourne 2007);
- The inclusion or addition of a detachable ring in new or existing stadiums (such as the Olympic Stadium, London 2012);
- The use of temporary, demountable facilities.

Temporary facilities

Temporary facilities are clearly a trend and they are becoming available on a rapidly increasing scale. At the time of the Olympic Games in Athens (2004), less than 10 per cent of the sport venues were temporary. In Beijing (2008), this had grown to over 15 per cent and, by 2012, in London, it was 20 per cent. The London Games had a total of 140 temporary venues, with almost 200,000 temporary seats, 10,000 portable toilets and 230,000 square metres of tents. The 'temporary' share will reach 25 per cent in Rio in 2016 (Nieuwe Gracht, 2012). Temporary facilities must adhere to the same technical demands as their permanent counterparts and are, therefore, usually hardly any cheaper when it comes to investments. However, they can be reused in different settings and, therefore, have a greater cost recovery capacity. The land on which they have been erected will also become available again for other use.

The rental market for temporary facilities for major events is growing dramatically. A number of years ago, a 4,000 seat tent was at the high end of the market, whereas in this day and age tents and arenas with more than 10,000 seats (or more) can easily be rented. This also applies to other facilities that major events require, such as media centres, great numbers of comfortable lodging and accommodation units, etc. Temporariness and reuse are favourable in terms of sustainability, whereas their flexibility allows for unusual, photogenic locations (beach volleyball at the Horse Guards Parade, London Olympic Games, 2012). Last but not least: temporary facilities certainly do not exclude spectacular architectural design, as evidenced by the London Aquatics Centre in 2012.

Transportation infrastructure

Large-scale sport events generate a great demand for transportation which, for the main part, must be met by public transport. Larger sport events attracting several millions of visitors may generate peaks of tens of thousands of travellers per hour. This extended demand only rises during the event itself, which makes it risky to lay a permanent infrastructure just for this purpose. New construction is justified though if the need for a new infrastructure already existed for other reasons. Barcelona had already been in need of a new public transport system in order to bring the city to an economically responsible level before it organised the Games of 1992. In Athens (2004), the Olympic Games were a good reason to finally construct the major traffic ring that now contributes to the reduction of the permanent traffic jams and smog. London (2012) took into account the existing plans for new public transport lines when it chose the location for its Olympic Park.

The limitation of the need for investments in new traffic infrastructure begins with plans for new, or the usage of existing, sport venues nearby traffic junctions in existing transport networks. If these networks together form a good mainframe (as in London 2012 by the optimisation and linkage of existing railroads), a city can make do with a limited amount of extra measures. The proximity of an (existing) airport is a requirement for all major international events (Preuss, 2004).

Urban structures

In recent decades, major sport events quite often acted as a catalyst for the renewal of (inner-)city structures. In Barcelona (1992), they were part of a plan for the transition from a manufacturing and industrial economy to a service economy - including, for instance, a transformation of the industrial coast line, an upgrade of housing and business accommodations, and improved accessibility. In Sydney (2000), the Games led to a transformation of the polluted Homebush Bay into a high-quality city district. Bolstered by its already existing accessibility, this district was better integrated in Sydney's surrounding urban area. The 2004 Games in Athens were part of a Master plan drafted together with the EU, which was to steer growth in the right direction and used the improvement in accessibility to help reduce heavy air pollution. The 2012 London Games were to speed up the regeneration of East London, also by better embedding this district in the transport systems and adding an urban park (the Queen Elisabeth Olympic Park). Good legacy of sport events emerges when it is fitted in with developments that are likely to be successful even without these events. Sport events are not the sole engine of urban development, but they can accelerate them.

Sustainability

Against the background of the growing scarcity of renewable sources for fuel and (construction) materials as well as climate change, sustainability undoubtedly forms part of good governance of sport events. The foundations for the application of good governance to sport events were laid in the Sydney Olympic Games. Sydney was the first to label the Olympic Games as 'Green Games'. The realisation of the Olympic Park and Village formed the vehicle to clean up the Homebush Bay's heavily polluted waste tip. Solar energy was applied where possible, as was the reduction of energy consumption by specifically positioning buildings relative to the sun, proper isolation, separate water systems, natural purification of wastewater, and the reuse of rinse water. Parks and landscapes were designed ecologically. Cars were banned from the main area of the Games. As for the accessibility of the venues located elsewhere, considerable investments were made in public transport (Nieuwe Gracht & Twijnstra Gudde, NOC*NSF 2008).

Sydney's course proved not to be a one-off. The improvement of the air quality was to be a strict condition in Beijing in 2008. New standards for the organisation of environment-friendly, large-scale events that include a sustainable legacy were set in the Vancouver Winter Olympics (2010) and the London Summer Olympics (2012) (AISTS, Vancouver 2008). London raised the bar somewhat for, among other things, sustainable energy (energy-friendly construction and at least 20 per cent energy from sustainable resources), CO₂ reduction (at least 50 per cent), and recycling (90 per cent less waste). It also pursued ambitious objectives in areas such as urban renewal, civil participation, and improving healthier lifestyles (Commission for a Sustainable London, 2007, 2010, 2012, 2013). Its high focus on the multifunctional use of existing and, where possible, temporary venues was mentioned before. The London 2012 approach was subsequently developed into an international standard for the organisation of environment-friendly events (management standard ISO 20121²⁶) (see also the recommendations of the Expert Group on the Economic dimension of sport, European Commission 2016B).

The Olympic Games in London were the first to set up an independent commission that was to define, supervise and evaluate the Games' sustainability before, during and after the event: the Commission for a Sustainable London 2012 (CSL; Commission for a Sustainable London 2012 and CAG consultants, 2013). The evaluation of this commission's ins-and-outs reveals as to where they made great headway or only partially. Among others, CSL concluded that:

- A 'learning legacy' as the point of departure should start at the time of bidding; collaborative consideration and early consultation are more important than strictly adhering to standards;
- Sustainability ambitions and standards should be clear at an early stage, but the physical and cultural context should also be taken into account; over-reaching is a factor for failure;
- The London 2012 Food Vision and Waste Strategy taught quite a lot, especially in respect of the major sponsors (who not only keep a close watch on their commercial interests, but are also very sensitive to their public image). Free taps for drinking water took considerable effort; serving healthy, regional produce and fair trade products, on the other hand, could count on support. A difficult issue was the easy availability of unhealthy snacks and junk food in London beyond the regular sponsor channels;
- As for sustainability in the contracting, execution, and inspection in the construction of facilities ('cradle to cradle' stadiums, centres, buildings, infrastructure), London was faced with quite some mishaps. The interests of the construction companies still appeared to play a major role, sometimes at the expense of sustainability (Zimbalist, 2015).

Conclusion: towards sustainable sport events

From the literature reviewed, it becomes clear that the first lesson for a sustainable sport event and (sport event legacy) is that it should fit in with more encompassing plans for urban and economic development. New construction should only be undertaken given that support and future use are warranted. Multi-functional venues with good access and that allow for the exchange of knowledge and cultures, and a proper blending of living, working, and recreation are preferred. For the rest, maximising temporary solutions appears to be key.

²⁶ See <http://www.iso.org/iso/news.htm?refid=Ref1598>

A second, equally important lesson is that the sustainability ambitions and standards should be clearly formulated and communicated right from the start and be safeguarded and persevered by an independent organisation. International committees like FIFA and IOC now have “sustainability” high on their agendas by, for example, setting high requirements in this respect in the bidding process. Yet, this does not guarantee ambitious sustainability in the actual practice. Far too often the support for sustainability founders due to financial interests and time pressure. This can be avoided if social groups and market parties are involved in the development of the plans at an early stage (at the time of bidding) and the objectives in this area are formulated clearly and specifically. Thus, a community emerges which slowly but surely works on ambitious but feasible conditions for sustainability (for these cost time) and their execution and adherence (‘supply chain’). The Games can so function as flagships of sustainability right from the start and can thereby help muster public support and raise awareness. Refillable and recognisable free water bottles, making waste ‘visible’ through compost and art, car-free public areas and (comfortable and reliable) public transport generate goodwill and free publicity (NG&TG, 2008; LOCOG, 2013b; AISTS, 2008; Hover, 2015).

A great part of the European countries’ national environmental legislation follows from European regulations. Since 1973, Environmental Action Programmes (EAPs) set the direction for the EU’s environmental policy. The most recent programme is the Seventh EAP.²⁷ Projects with considerable environmental consequences (which can easily be said for a large-scale event), should be subjected to an environmental impact assessment prior to the decision, with the active involvement of the general public (see also European Commission 2016b). Embedding in (inter)national legislation and regulations is an important step forward in the governance of sustainable sport events.

²⁷ The 7th EAP applies for the period of 2012–2020 and focuses on sustainable development; regulations and assurance, such as through environmental impact assessments; climatic change (mainly measures and standards in regard of the emission of greenhouse gases); reduction of waste products and management of waste streams; air and noise pollution; water management and safety; nature conservation and biodiversity; and soil protection.

Appendix 5: Sport for all, human rights for all

Marjan Olfers (VU Amsterdam)

Most events attract attention in a ‘sportive way’: who will win the title? Sometimes events attract negative attention and become a battlefield for campaigners, activists and politicians to highlight human rights-concerns and human rights-violations. In some occasions there is a call to boycott the event, or to (symbolic forms) of protest, like showing the rainbow flag as a symbol of Lesbian, Bisexual, Gay, Transgender (LGBT-pride) in reaction to ‘anti-gay propaganda’ legislation in Russia during the Olympic Games in Sochi.²⁸

In recent years fundamental questions have been raised about the responsibility for human rights in bidding for, preparing for, and during sport events. Sports governing bodies experience increasing demands to set standards in rules, regulations, contracts and other instruments. The international community watches and acts like an independent supervisory body. In the end, the question is who is responsible for what and what can be - effectively - done to safeguard human rights?

This appendix addresses some of the humanitarian challenges on sport events in greater length and gives an overview of the legal perspective (human rights and public and private rules and regulations) and of sport events and human rights violations. We conclude the appendix with a short conclusion and some recommendations.

Legal perspective

According to the United Nations (UN), “Human rights are rights inherent to all human beings, whatever our nationality, place of residence, sex, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, language, or any other status. We are all equally entitled to our human rights without discrimination. These rights are all interrelated, interdependent and indivisible”.²⁹ The main source of international law concerns the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).³⁰ The UDHR is not a legally binding instrument as such. States have a responsibility to implement the provisions of the Declaration and are deemed to act, or refrain from acts, to safeguard and promote human rights. Together with UDHR the other two Covenants; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)³¹ and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),³² make up the International Bill of Human Rights.³³ The ICCPR refers to rights like the inherent right to life (art. 6), freedom of religion (art. 18), the freedom of expression (art. 19), etc. The ICESCR refers to rights like, the right of all people to self-determination including the right to freely determine their political status (art. 1), equal right of men and women (art. 3), just and favourable conditions of work (art. 7).

²⁸ <https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/08/01/dispatches-every-color-flag-rainbow-sochi-olympics>

²⁹ <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Pages/WhatAreHumanRights.aspx>

³⁰ <http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/>

³¹ <http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx>

³² <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/ICESCR.aspx>

³³ <http://www.cfr.org/human-rights/international-bill-human-rights/p27020>

Within Europe, there are arguments to support the view that the EU is bound by the human rights obligations from the UN.³⁴ Just like the UN, the EU shares the same values and human rights are viewed to be universal. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)³⁵ refers to human rights treaties like the UDHR but also to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which is made up of human rights in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Next to this, individuals and institutions largely accept these rules and as such these rules form a part of the legal system as so called customary international law. Human rights are found in all sorts of other conventions, declarations, agreements and other instruments. Labour- and employment-related human rights can for example also be found in the ILO conventions and declarations,³⁶ the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,³⁷ the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) guidelines,³⁸ but also in other agreements. The offense of human trafficking, involves women, men and children being brought into a situation of exploitation through the use of violence, force, etc. against their will. This can have the form of forced prostitution or forced labour, and is prohibited through the United Nations Palermo Protocol, which defines the offense of ‘trafficking in persons’.³⁹

The state has the duty to protect civilians against human rights violations. Human rights are standards that are universally applicable to all people throughout the world, but not all states are willing to ratify all International Treaties or Conventions that explicitly refer to these rights and are willing to actively safeguard human rights. The UN calls for states to implement human rights obligations in their regulatory-framework and to protect against human rights violations (Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework, 2011).⁴⁰ The UN also calls on private organisations to respect human rights, and point at the need for victims to have greater access to judicial and non-judicial remedies. Although human rights reflect the moral justification to take action, how individuals and states perceive and interpret human rights, depends largely on their political and cultural perspective.

Sports organisations operate within the hierarchy of the state and are bound by the rules of the state. Private organisations, like sports organisations, need to build trust and respect. Therefore, it is important that sports organisations align their missions and actions with the principles of human rights.

Private regulations of sports organisations

Sports organisations - and their members - are also bound by their own private rules and regulations. Private sports associations tend to set high ideals. The protection of human rights is not only public international law, but is addressed via the private regulations of sports associations as well. As stated in the Olympic Charter (Charter), Fundamental Principles of Olympism, art. 1 and 2 (IOC, 2015a), the goal of Olympism is “... respect for universal fundamental ethical principles” and “to place sport at the service of the harmonious development of humankind, with a view to promoting a peaceful society

³⁴ <https://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/17/4/771.full.pdf+html>

³⁵ <http://curia.europa.eu/>

³⁶ <http://www.ilo.org/>

³⁷ <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CESCR.aspx>

³⁸ <http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/>

³⁹ <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/ProtocolTraffickingInPersons.aspx>

⁴⁰ <http://business-humanrights.org/en/un-secretary-generals-special-representative-on-business-human-rights/un-protect-respect-and-remedy-framework-and-guiding-principles>

concerned with the preservation of human dignity.”⁴¹ As such, there is a private voluntary basis for self-imposed universal fundamental ethical principles within the world of sports. The IOC states in its Charter for example “the practice of sport is a human right. Every individual must have the possibility of practising sport, without discrimination of any kind and in the Olympic spirit, which requires according to art. 4, mutual understanding with a spirit of friendship, solidarity and fair play” and art. 6 “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Olympic Charter shall be secured without discrimination of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, sexual orientation, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status”. Any form of discrimination, including gender-discrimination, is incompatible with “belonging to the Olympic Movement.” Comparable idealistic regulations can also be found in the rules and regulations of international sports federations.⁴² Although the rules are binding to its members only, the rules and regulations suggest that sports organisations also carry a social responsibility as regards nations that violate human rights (and that may want to participate in or host sport events).

In 2014, the IOC announced that more needs to be done in among others the areas of child protection and codes of conduct for sports organisations, and created an Agenda 2020 reform programme. Human rights issues were explicitly mentioned in this Agenda. The IOC recommends (Olympic Agenda, Recommendation 1 sub 5) with regard to the bidding process to include in the host city contract clauses with regard to Fundamental Principle 6 which states that IOC’s role is “to act against any form of discrimination affecting the Olympic Movement as well as to environmental and labour-related matters.”⁴³

Sports and politics

Though the IOC and other sport associations strive to meet their fundamental principles, sports federations have a clear aim of keeping sport and politics separate. In art. 2.10 of the Olympic Charter (2015), it is stated that the IOC’s role is to oppose any political abuse of sport and athletes. In art. 27 of the Charter, it is stated explicitly that the National Olympic Committees must preserve their autonomy and resist political pressures. In art. 50.2 it is stated that no kind of political demonstration is permitted in any Olympic sites, venues or other sports grounds. Still, there have been exceptions in the past.⁴⁴

Still, sports and politics can go and sometimes do go hand-in-hand to make a positive change in the field of human rights. During the Apartheid regime in South Africa, a strong lobby led to growing international protest against apartheid (Alegi & Bolsmann, 2010). The fall of apartheid was partly instigated by sport boycotts (Cornelissen, 2010). By shaking hands with the team captain and wearing a springbok jersey during the 1995 World Cup rugby, Nelson Mandela showed that South Africa did overcome apartheid. Clearly, using sports to promote human rights has proven successful in the past.

⁴¹ http://www.olympic.org/Documents/olympic_charter_en.pdf

⁴² See for example article 3 of the statutes (2016) of the International Handball Federation Sport, “The IHF tolerates no discrimination of any kind against a country, private person or groups of people on the grounds of racial origin, gender, language, religion or politics”
http://ihf.info/files/Uploads/NewsAttachments/0_01_per_cent20-per_cent20Statutes_GB.pdf

⁴³ http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Olympic_Agenda_2020/Olympic_Agenda_2020-20-20_Recommendations-ENG.pdf

⁴⁴ Think of the famous “human rights” salute of the athletes in 1968, all three wearing Olympic Project for Human Rights (OPHR) badges, and two of them raising their hand wearing a black sock, as a racial protest (T. Smith and D. Steele, 2007).

However, history also shows that other human rights violations do not always attract the same attention and political involvement (e.g. the Berlin Games in 1936). Today, host countries still use mega events as an opportunity to convey a positive image, despite a particular regime's track record of human rights violations and oppression.

Events: an overview of human rights issues

As sports events are concerned, concerns over human rights that are most mentioned, are:

- Security of housing;
- Employment and quality of working life;
- Freedom of speech and expression;
- LBGT-discrimination;
- Human trafficking;
- Women's rights;
- Racial discrimination;
- The rights of the child.

Human rights issues related to the construction of infrastructure

- a) (Security) of housing in preparation for the event. The loss of homes for local people to make room for sports infrastructure is a much-debated major human rights issue. According to human rights observers, thousands of families lost their homes in Russia prior to the 2014 Olympic Games in Sochi. In Brazil, the FIFA World Cup was held in 2014 and Brazil is preparing for the 2016 Olympics. Before both events, families have lost their homes because the families were forcibly displaced. According to Gomes and Wroblewski displacement takes many forms, "including mechanisms such as expropriation, or denial of official and formal recognition of the customary rights of existing communities and home ownership" (Gomes and Wroblewski, 2014).⁴⁵ In Turkmenistan, many families were also forced to leave their houses in Ashgabat, to make way for the Asian Games in 2017.⁴⁶ The Asian Coalition of Housing Rights mentions many other violations in this respect, and reports, for example, in 2009 that one of the big slums in Gopalganj, Bangladesh "was quite suddenly and brutally demolished, to make way for a sports complex ... But there was a lot of sympathy for the 346 evicted families, who were now scattered all over the city and living in extreme difficulty" (Asian Coalition of Housing, 2014).⁴⁷
- b) Employment right and the quality of working life. Workers' rights in preparation for the event. During the construction process, workers might experience severe working conditions like extended working hours or underpayment, at the event-construction sites.⁴⁸ This was and is an issue in Brazil in preparation for the World Championship Football 2014 and the Olympic Games in 2016, (National Coalition of Local Committees for a people's world cup Olympics, 2012).⁴⁹ The Guardian reported

⁴⁵ [http://www.megasportingevents.org/pdf/Reporter-Brasil-MSEs-Human rights-Risk-Areas.pdf](http://www.megasportingevents.org/pdf/Reporter-Brasil-MSEs-Human%20rights-Risk-Areas.pdf)

⁴⁶ <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/06/01/sport/sport-freedom-azerbaijan-kazakhstan-turkmenistan/>

⁴⁷ See the website of The Asian Coalition of Housing and f.e. <http://www.achr.net/countries-de.php?ic=1> and http://www.achr.net/upload/downloads/file_11022014140514.pdf

⁴⁸ <http://www.reuters.com/article/uk-olympics-russia-homes-idUSLNE8A400H20121105>

⁴⁹ <http://rioonwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/2012-World-Cup-Olympics-Dossier-English.pdf>

eight deaths of construction workers.⁵⁰ A report made clear “there were 18 registered work stoppages in 8 of the 12 stadiums that will be used for the World Cup: Belo Horizonte, Brasília, Cuiabá, Fortaleza, Recife, Rio de Janeiro and a threat of strike in Salvador.” The workers demanded higher wages, better/safer working conditions, etc.⁵¹ (National Report from the national coalition of local committees for a people’s world cup Olympics, 2012). The violation of workers’ rights has also attracted a lot of attention for the Olympic Games in Qatar (Molitor, 2014).⁵² Amnesty International reports exploitative practices in contravention of Qatari laws and standards like excessive work hours/days and not providing safety equipment (Amnesty International, 2013).⁵³ Qatar promised significant changes to improve the rights and conditions of expatriate workers, but according to Amnesty, in practice “there have been no significant advances in the protection of rights” (Aljazeera, 2015).⁵⁴

Human rights issues related to the country hosting the event

- c) Freedom of speech, freedom of expression. Before the European Games in Azerbaijan, human rights activists, politicians, journalists and others were silenced, by being taken into custody. This has also happened in other countries. Before and during the Olympic Games in China, Tibet campaigners paid attention to “the repression of Tibet”, while others paid attention to the situation of human rights activists in China.⁵⁵ According to news agencies, demonstrators were arrested just before the opening of the Beijing Olympics.⁵⁶
- d) Home eviction. In an attempt to generate good publicity and good press, municipalities take sometimes-brutal actions, such as ‘cleaning’ venue of homeless people and forcing street vendors to leave the place. In 2006, during the Super Bowl, homeless people were warned by local officers to stay away from the event (Giulianotti, Klausner). The Atlanta Task Force for the Homeless reported that around 9,000 homeless people were arrested in relation to the Olympic Games in Atlanta (Atlanta Task Force for the Homeless, 1993). This pattern is quite common, seen in Barcelona (1992), where newspapers reported the dispersal of homeless people and prostitutes (Cox, 1998). The same goes for the World Cup in South Africa, where the media reported removal from street vendors and police harassment of the homeless and squatters (Institute for Human Rights and Business, 2013).⁵⁷
- e) Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation. During the 2014 Winter Olympics in Russia protests arose because of “anti-gay propaganda” legislation in Russia that was implemented on a federal level in 2013 just before the Winter Olympics in Sochi. (Van Rheeën, 2014) The law aims to protect children from ‘non-traditional’ sexual relations. The law prohibits, for example, supportive statements about gay, lesbian, bisexual or transgender persons (Thoreson, 2015). The protests and campaigns raised awareness about the climate of homophobia in Russia.

⁵⁰ <http://www.theguardian.com/football/2014/may/09/world-cup-2014-eighth-construction-worker-killed-in-brazil>

⁵¹ <http://riononwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/2012-World-Cup-Olympics-Dossier-English.pdf>

⁵² https://www.etui.org/.../Hesamag_09_EN-47-51.pdf

https://www.amnesty.nl/sites/default/files/public/the_dark_side_of_migration_with_cover.pdf

⁵³ https://www.amnesty.nl/sites/default/files/public/the_dark_side_of_migration_with_cover.pdf, p. 87.

⁵⁴ <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/05/amnesty-criticises-qatar-migrant-labour-rights-150521062250964.html> May 2015.

⁵⁵ http://www.tibet.at/beitragen/Losing-The-Bet-on-Human-rights-Tibet_Beijing-Olympic-Bid-2022.pdf

<https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/08/22/china-hosting-olympics-catalyst-human-rights-abuses>

⁵⁶ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk/7332942.stm>

⁵⁷ http://www.ihrb.org/pdf/2013-10-21_IHRB_Mega-Sporting-Events-Paper_Web.pdf

- f) Human trafficking may be done for the purposes of sexual exploitation. In 2006 awareness was raised about this topic. Concrete data about this topic is scarce. The rationale is that, during big events, women are imported and exploited (Hayes, 2010).
- g) Children's' rights (David, 2004): Child labour during sports events was an issue that was raised during the FIFA World Cup in Brazil, 2014.

Human rights issues related to the sports-organisation, organising the event

Sports associations are bound by their own rules of non-discrimination. Only rules that relate to the basic principles of sport are in general accepted under the rule of law. All kinds of discriminatory rules, like a distinction between abled and disabled athletes, will be weighed against the unique characteristics of sport. All rules that are not objectively justifiable can be challenged. Most of the human rights issues within the structure itself relate to the right of non-discrimination. Examples are listed below:

- h) Gender equality. Sports organisations are coping with gender quality issues such as equal pay. Since 2007, female champions earn same as male winners when it comes to Wimbledon and Roland Garros. Some male players though will argue that they play longer and should be paid accordingly. Serena Williams answered that every female athlete is willing to play five sets as well and doesn't think it's a fair argument. Still there are many sports where there is a gap between the prize money for men and women. (Thomson & Lewis, 2014). In addition, access to competition is important, and it is notable that for the first time women athletes competed for Saudi Arabia during the Olympic Games in 2012.
- i) Paralympics. Double amputee Oscar Pistorius, also known as 'Blade Runner', fought a legal battle to run in the Olympic Games. He won, and was the first disabled athlete to participate in the Games (CAS 2008/A/1840 Pistorius vs IAAF, 2008). The discussion about disabled athletes participating in or during the competition(s) for athletes that are not disabled is ongoing (Howe & Jones, 2006).
- j) Sex Testing. Caster Semanya won the 800 metres at the 2009 World Championship, and was forced to take a sex test by the IAAF, because of a public discussion about her sex.⁵⁸ This case largely contributed to the discussion about sex in sports. In the more recent case of Dutee Chand,⁵⁹ a young female athlete from India with female hyperandrogenism, the CAS had find an answer to the question "How to strike a right balance between the core principle of 'fair play' and norms of non-discrimination, in cases where a determination of who qualifies as a 'woman' for the purposes of sport has to be made?"⁶⁰

Sport for all in Europe

The academic literature focuses on mega events and human rights violations mainly outside Europe. This does not mean that Europe is free from human rights violations. There are many examples in Europe of racism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism in, e.g. football. However, there are also other challenges like

⁵⁸ <http://www.bbc.com/sport/athletics/32805695>, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/article-3213502/Caster-Semenya-left-trailing-800m-semi-final-South-African-s-return-big-stage-World-Championships-Beijing.html>

⁵⁹ http://www.tas-cas.org/fileadmin/user_upload/award_internet.pdf

⁶⁰ <http://www.asser.nl/SportsLaw/Blog/post/should-the-cas-let-dutee-run-gender-policies-in-sport-under-legal-scrutiny-by-thalia-diathesopoulou>

the treatment of minorities. Most concerns relate to these minorities and equal access to sport. There are a lot of initiatives to ensure participation in sports for minorities. The European Charter on the Participation of Young People in Local and Regional Life calls for local and regional authorities to "support organised socio-cultural activities."⁶¹ The Homeless World Cup is a good example of an international tournament to inspire homeless people to change their lives, and to raise awareness of homeless persons.⁶² Another human rights violation that comes to mind is the import of sportswear and sports-equipment made by children.⁶³

Sport can also function in Europe as an instrument for human rights and tolerance. Within Europe, 'sport for all' is a much-appreciated concept to create a healthy and safe environment (Council of Europe, 1997). Article 167 of the TFEU expressly refers to sports as voluntary activity and its social and educational function. Although the main responsibility for human rights lies within the sports-organisation, European institutions, together with sports-organisations are increasingly active combating racism and discrimination, through policy initiatives, projects etc. (FRA, 2013).

Conclusion

On the one hand, a debate about human rights before or during the event is viewed as "good". Violations of human rights in countries or region that are that moment full in the spotlight, might - at least - lead to a fruitful dialogue. It has been argued that major events can serve as a catalyst for significant change in this area, with reference to the fall of apartheid. The heightened attention can, however, also make things worse for the people that experience human rights violations (van Rheenen, 2014).

With regard to the above, the national government is primarily responsible for violations of human rights - irrespective of the fact that violations may be the acts of private actors. The state is also responsible for construction companies violating human rights in their territory, amongst other actions. Yet, as it is hard to influence states and to 'punish' states, most people look at the sports organisations. However, sports organisations are not and will never be public entities. They have a limited impact on the violation of human rights within the state itself. These sports organisations need to have a corporate responsibility to prevent human rights violations in relation to their events. Recently, sports organisations have stopped limiting their interference to discriminatory issues with regard to their own athletes. They are treating environmental concerns more seriously and intervene in cases of serious abuse, like the abuse of migrant workers, by raising awareness about serious human rights violations (Human Rights Watch, 2014).

⁶¹ <http://www.coe.int/en/web/compass/culture-and-sport>

⁶² <https://www.homelessworldcup.org/about/faqs/>

⁶³ http://www.judesfairtrade.ca/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Sports-Balls-Case-Study_FT-A-Better-Deal.pdf

Overview: recommendations

It might help to address the human rights violations in relation to sports events more systematically. A distinction can be made between recommendations for sports governing bodies, host countries, local organising committees, sponsors and other partners (Institute for Human Rights and Business, 2013).

Sports organisations might implement core human rights principles in the statutes of sports organisations. Most recommendations aim at the reform of the host city selection process and plea for minimum objective standards for fundamental rights in the bidding process, host-cities need to meet.⁶⁴ One of the proposed recommendations is a social impact assessment with regard to human rights issues. Other recommendations aim at the monitoring of human rights before and during the events. Ryan Gauthier puts forward: “having a monitoring or investigatory mechanism can at least provide an avenue for complaint in states where expression is limited. It can also open an organisation to being accountable for their actions, and increasing the credibility of sports organisations, which have suffered from recent, poorly-executed events” (Gauthier, 2015).

When it comes to sponsors and other partners, recommendations concern greater stakeholder involvement. Require these stakeholders to respect human rights. Sponsors can express their concerns and also can withdraw from sponsorship deals in case there are serious concerns about human rights violations. Stakeholder involvement is also important for Transparency International. As Transparency International stated: “Civil society, both international and national organisations and citizens must have a greater say in how major sport events are awarded and delivered from the beginning to end.” (Transparency International, 2014).⁶⁵ The approaches towards migrant workers’ rights will, for instance, be successful only in case of stakeholder involvement in civil society and the government. Within Europe there is a common ground in all aspects. All sports stakeholders, including national sports federations and sports governing bodies, professional and amateur sports clubs, sportspersons, fans, governmental institutions, municipalities, media, civil society organisations and sponsors need to take human rights in consideration.⁶⁶ Next to this there is support for anti-human rights violation campaigns (like campaign against racism), audits, developing standards and procedures, support of relevant initiatives to engage minorities in active sport participation (FRA, 2013).

Last but not least, everyone involved should stick to their promises and should respect and safeguard all human rights. Human rights need to be in the top of our mind, so that we will more easily act accordingly.

⁶⁴ http://www.ihrb.org/pdf/2013-10-21_IHRB_Mega-Sporting-Events-Paper_Web.pdf

⁶⁵ http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/major_games_let_sport_triumph_not_corruption

⁶⁶ https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/guide-tackling-racism-in-sport_en.pdf

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