Knowledge Platform Security & Rule of Law

# What the New Deal can learn from the human security approach

## Scoping study on human security: a multi-level grounded approach towards the New Deal

# What the New Deal can learn from the human security approach

author: Niels Terpstra, Rens Willems, Georg Frerks and Tomás Chang Pico
date: 14 April 2014


University for Peace
UPEACE Centre The Hague

# Table of contents

# Executive Summary

The first chapter of this report investigates the development of two decades of human security. The human security debate significantly changed the discourse and thinking on security. Human security emphasizes a shift from state-centric military approaches to people-centered approaches, focusing on multi-dimensional root causes of violence and instability, and on development, local capacity building and empowerment. In the human security approach the referent object of security analysis and policy is the individual. Broad interpretations of human security also include issues that were traditionally considered development or humanitarian. Human security has advocated a comprehensive and inclusive approach towards issues of security and development in conflict-affected situations. Despite severe criticisms on human security, this working paper finds that the concept continues to be relevant.

In recent years an increasing demand for linking top-down protection to bottom-up empowerment and capacity building has emerged in debates on international engagement in fragile states, in order to better connect peacebuilding interventions with local contexts and to improve the legitimacy of foreign engagement. The human security approach may open in-roads for engagement in hybrid contexts, moving away from the liberal peace approach. In the emancipatory human security approach, a re-emphasis on the human subject and its agency can be identified. This approach prioritizes individuals' and communities' perspectives on and actions for their own security, and seeks to empower them and strengthen their capacities for the self-provision of security. This approach is first and foremost contextually driven instead of being based on pre-fixed institutional blueprints. The engagement with local understandings and practices of security recognizes difference, enables agency and respects autonomy as far as possible.

The second chapter investigates the development of the New Deal: a cornerstone for new ways of engagement in fragile and conflict-affected states. The declaration reflects a larger process of changes in aid architecture, peacebuilding and statebuilding practices. The self-declared g7+ countries have, through their association, been able to let their voices be heard in the international community and the New Deal supports a change towards more inclusive ownership- and leadership for the global South. Although not all of the issues that had come up throughout the preparative process have been fully incorporated in the New Deal, the declaration itself reflects its initial purpose: putting fragile and conflict-affected countries in the lead of their own paths out of fragility with a shared and unified vision and a focus on building a relationship of mutual trust and accountability between both donors and fragile states. Five peacebuilding and statebuilding goals are guiding here: legitimate politics; security; justice; economic foundations; revenues and services. The main instruments of

monitoring and implementation are 'fragility assessments', which include both common/shared indicators and country-specific indicators, and 'country compacts'. However, other initiatives that support the larger vision of the New Deal vision are also supported.

The third chapter analyses the New Deal as a continuation of the human security discourse, which allows drawing lessons and formulating recommendations. One of the goals in the New Deal is to improve 'people's security', which correlates with the human security discourse and practices. Similar to the emancipatory human security approach, the New Deal aims to overcome previous flaws in top-down liberal peacebuilding and statebuilding. The main flaws of previous engagements identified in the New Deal are the overly technocratic external support, the underestimation of the importance of harmonizing local and national contexts, and the focus on short-term results. In order to improve these flaws, the framework of the New Deal brings together local, national and international actors to formulate and follow one comprehensive vision and plan, embedded in the particularities of each specific fragile context.

The shift in rhetoric presented in the New Deal is a necessary first step, but whether the New Deal is really 'new' depends to a large degree on the way it will evolve and the type of results it will achieve. The New Deal emphasizes that fragile and conflict affected states lead their own paths out of fragility, but a pertinent question that remains is what this leadership and ownership constitutes in practice. An important issue here is that of civilian space and the role of civil society. The human security approach had already advocated the importance of people's security and the need to include civil society actors in the response to human security issues. The New Deal also aims at involving civil society, and at reaching context-specific, inclusive and locally relevant solutions. Yet, the actual participation and inclusion of civil society in the pilots is mixed: an independent, let alone critical, role of civil society actors is not guaranteed in all countries involved. At the same time, one should remain cautious with assuming that civil society participation automatically translates into local representation, as civil society actors may face problems of coordination and legitimacy too.

An important step of the New Deal has been to bring international actors, state actors and civil society actors together into a dialogue as partners on equal footing. Within these dialogues the actors involved may, however, not necessarily agree on priorities and directions to take. Human rights and gender issues, for example, are among the top priorities for donors, but they are not necessarily first priorities of governments that struggle to control a fragile and conflict-affected country. In the implementation of the New Deal these will continue to be contested issues. This is inherent to a dialogue between different actors with different interests. The question remains how such issues will be negotiated in the implementation phase. Sensitive issues may not receive enough attention or may simply be discarded. Effective engagement and successful New Deal implementation therefore requires further reflection on different norms and values as well as further operationalization of how to deal with non-state actors and parallel structures of governance. An increased requirement to connect to local realities implies an increased relevance of local actors. At the same time, however, there is a need – especially on the donor side – to develop universal standards and indicators. This tension between context-specificity and universality will continue to affect the implementation of the New Deal in the years to come.

Early experience of New Deal implementation learns that country-owned and country-led processes do not automatically translate in country-wide and society-wide ownership and participation. While the New Deal aims to promote people's security, states still have a tendency to prioritize state security. The fact that the state government is the first point of contact does not guarantee the internal legitimacy, especially when various non-state actors have assumed state-like functions in particular regions of a state or particular spheres of state governance. The New Deal should therefore increase its efforts to stimulate dialogue at national and local levels, with these actors and the hybrid structures that may be operational. This includes actively engaging with local understandings, practices and norms, recognizing difference, enabling agency and respecting autonomy as far as possible. For constructive engagement and advancement of the New Deal and human security in practice, the various conceptual, theoretical, political, policy, practical and institutional disconnects therefore need to be understood. Further research is needed to enhance our understanding of these disconnects. Analyzing their underlying causes and finding ways to bridge them where possible, can support and promote dialogue between different actors involved.

In the New Deal several crosscutting issues are reflected, except for an important one: the regional and global context that affects state fragility. The problems of, and solutions to state fragility are identified within the boundaries of fragile contexts. Yet, the focus on 'local solutions to local problems' may distract from structural sources of conflict and fragility situated outside the realm and/or reach of fragile and conflict affected states themselves, including struggles for resources, transnational organized crime, global trade, economic inequalities and exploitative relationships.

In sum, the New Deal can learn three main lessons from the human security approach. First, to address the variety of security issues threatening human security and development, the inclusion and participation of a range of actors from different fields and sectors is indeed crucial, particularly civil society. This, however, does not automatically lead to the desired results and may require greater attention. Second, establishing people's security requires an enhanced understanding of local security issues and the particularities of each fragile context. Bridging the various disconnects between donors, national governments and other local stakeholders involved, will allow more effective New Deal implementation. Third, in addition to the New Deal, the human security approach highlights the interconnections between a great variety of threats, including global factors that contribute to conflict and fragility. Addressing these threats may require policy changes outside the boundaries of g7+ countries.

# Introduction

Discussions on human security emerged in the mid-1990s following the seminal UNDP report of 1994. Since that moment the topic has gained steam both in academia and policy circles. The concept was both embraced and criticized. At present it is recognized that human security is subject to varying dynamics, depending on the institutional context (fragile states and hybrid institutions) and where in the specter local-global the human security *problematique* manifests itself. It is influenced by societal and policy dynamics at different levels. There is a concern that despite all good intentions, the practical value and benefits of the human security approach (HSA) lag behind on original expectations. It is therefore rewarding to scrutinize the implementation of the HSA, investigate what constraints have emerged in the process and where the HSA can be strengthened.

This question is of particular relevance in view of the recently adopted 'New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States'.[1] An issue is how the notion of human security and the experiences of implementing human security interventions relate to the New Deal agenda as adopted in Busan in 2011. Building upon the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008), the New Deal comprises the use of Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs) to enable progress towards the MDGs in 2015 and beyond. It also is based on inclusive country-led and country-owned transitions out of fragility and a commitment to build mutual trust by improved aid and resource management. Currently, there is no clear insight into what the exact implications of the New Deal are for the human security agenda and approach. There is also limited insight into whether the human security perspective is sufficiently incorporated in the New Deal and how previous experiences with the HSA could potentially strengthen New Deal implementation.

In the framework of the Knowledge Platform Security and the Rule of Law it was decided to carry out a scoping study with the following aims:

1 To provide a summary insight into the dynamics of multi-level human security in a context defined by institutional hybridity and fragility;
2 To analyze the relation between the human security (intervention) approach and the New Deal Agenda and its implementation;
3 To strengthen the New Deal with a Human Security perspective, if lacking, and make recommendations accordingly.

By connecting the HSA and the New Deal, it is possible to assess if the complex reality of human security in a hybrid context allows the adoption of the New Deal agenda, and if extra measures are needed to attain the envisioned results. This can serve as an input for further

[1] Referred to hereafter in brief as the 'New Deal'

research, and more broadly inform the work of the Knowledge Platform and the associated Working Groups as well as partners involved in the New Deal and the HSA. The scoping study has resulted into this research paper, a policy brief[2], and a presentation to the Platform and its Working Groups.

The research was supervised by Professor. Georg Frerks from the Centre for Conflict Studies (CCS) of Utrecht University. Dr. Rens Willems and Tomás Chang Pico from UPEACE Centre The Hague carried out the research on the HSA (chapter 1). Niels Terpstra and Georg Frerks worked on the section on the New Deal (chapter 2) and the whole team collaboratively developed the comparison in chapter 3. The Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) contributed a "civil society review" containing suggestions and recommendations from practitioners working in conflict-affected contexts as well as from civil society participants in the New Deal process, coordinated by Gabriella Vogelaar. We would like to mention in particular Edward Jombla (WANEP Sierra Leone), Shafeek Seddiq (Afghanistan Justice Organisation), Antero da Silva (Lecturer at University of Timor) and the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies for their contributions in this regard. The authors also thank Frauke de Weijer (ECPDM) and Ronald Wormgoor (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs) for their inputs and comments.

[2] *What the New Deal can learn from Human Security Approach, policy brief* (forthcoming April 2014).

Chapter 1

# Two decades of human security

## 1.1 Human security: the development of a discourse

Traditionally, security has been considered synonymous to national security and it was closely related to the 'security dilemma' of nation states (Herz, 1950).[3] It was only after the Cold War that the referent objects of security – what needs to be secured? – became subject for discussion (Krause and Williams, 1997). This rethinking of security also led to the development of the concept of 'human security', shifting the focus of what it is that needed to be secured from the state to individuals and groups of human beings, and also broadening and diversifying the possible threats to security.[4] Below, we look at the way the concept of human security developed over the past two decades. We consider the human security discourse, as the ways in which knowledge and social practice on human security are structured and debated. Derived from the discourse are human security approaches, which aim to implement human security in practice. Human security is then, as will become clear, also about relations of governance and power.

The first major manifestation of the human security concept was the 1994 Human Development Report. The report defined human security as "first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities" (UNDP, 1994: 23). The report further listed seven categories of threats: economic security (an assured basic income), food security (ready access to food), health security (prevention of disease and access to health care), environmental security (safety from environmental threats), political security (upholding human rights), personal security, and community security. Personal security entails being protected from physical violence carried out by governments, wars, crime, or domestic violence (ibid. 24-25).

Since the concept was coined, there has been a lot of discussion about its scope and purpose. The UNDP's conceptualization of human security laid the foundations for a broad

[3] The first three paragraphs draw on an earlier drafted internal working paper on human security (Willems, 2013a).

[4] Scholars also started to think about how threats are defined and constructed, which led to the development of the concept of 'securitization'. Threats are not only objectively identifiable, but are also subjective and can be partially constructed through discourse. Something may become a security issue when particular actors state it is a security issue and a public accepts this.

interpretation of human security, which has been promoted by amongst others the UN-appointed Commission on Human Security and the Japanese government (CHS, 2003; Liotta and Owen, 2006: 41). Others favored a more narrow interpretation of human security that limits the definition of human security to violent threats to the individual, and leaving wider issues to the human development domain. One of the arguments is that immensely broadening the possible threats to security makes it much more difficult to apply the concept for both the formulation and analysis of policy. The Human Security Report of the Centre for Human Security uses such a narrow definition, which has also been adopted by the Canadian government (Human Security Centre, 2005).

In its first decade, the debate on human security made a number of significant changes to discourse and thinking on security. While there is no agreement on the exact threats and what means should be employed to ensure this protection, "all approaches agree that the referent object of security policy and analysis should be the individual" (Newman, 2011: 1749). More broad interpretations of human security also bring issues that have traditionally been considered 'development' or 'humanitarian' into the security discourse (Liotta and Owen, 2006: 42). As noted by Thérien (2012: 199-200), the first decade of human security discourse is also primarily constructed around the goal of protection, and that the empowerment of citizens has taken on importance after the publication of the *Human Security Now* report of the Commission on Human Security in 2003. This report argued that, "people's ability to act on their own behalf—and on behalf of others—is the second key to human security" (CHS, 2003: 11). The importance of agency was also considered vital for the furtherance of the human security agenda by Frerks and Klein Goldewijk (2007). In its first decade, in line with liberal thinking, the human security discourse focused mainly on the protection of basic human freedoms – freedom from fear and freedom from want. Furthermore, while human security is not necessarily in conflict with state security and the state remains the primary responsible for the provision of security, "international security traditionally defined—as territorial integrity—does not necessarily correlate with human security" (Newman, 2011: 1749).

## 1.2 Criticisms and fading interest

In its second decade the human security concept has lost some ground. During the 'war on terror' after 11 September 2001, many states and actors began to abandon the concept, "arguing that it was too ambitious and had become somewhat 'hollow', and that what was needed in general terms was not a focus on HS [human security] but on statebuilding" (Richmond, 2010: 45). Canada, for instance, one of the initial proponents of the human security agenda, started to withdraw from the concept after a conservative government was elected, and the term was even blacklisted in government parlance (Martin and Owen, 2010: 211). Also in academia, the human security concept, itself originating from critical studies on security, has been attacked by critical scholars. Criticisms include that the concept "has itself become a new orthodoxy" (Christie, 2010: 170). It is argued that "the (ab)use of the human security discourse serves to reinforce dominant power relations and structures within the international system" (Peterson, 2013: 319, see also Richmond, 2010: 2013). With the argument of addressing a broad array of human security threats holistically, the human

security discourse has justified the expansion of the roles of dominant traditional security actors. This without necessarily real inclusion and participation of those on whose behalf such interventions are supposed to take place or clear accountability between interveners and those being intervened upon. As argued by Richmond:

> "The definitions, associated rights, needs, and limits of HS [human security] are constructed according to an external liberal consensus with the automatic assumption that what translates into a merging of military security and humanitarian provisions conforms to local expectations and needs, while serving as a universally liberal normative regime." (Richmond, 2010: 45)

Some have therefore critiqued human security "as a rhetorical device used by dominant Western liberal powers to impose, sometimes violently, a narrow vision of peace" (Peterson, 2013: 320). The human security discourse on protection of citizens from threats has also been linked to the development of the 'responsibility to protect' as a normative approach to protect citizens against mass atrocity crimes. As a result, there have been concerns, particularly in the global South, that the concept of human security is used to legitimize external intervention, as made clear by the discussions on human security in the UN General Assembly in 2008 and 2010 (Koehler, 2012: 12). The subsequent resolution (A66/290) by the General Assembly adopting a common understanding on human security therefore emphasizes that "the notion of human security is distinct from the responsibility to protect and its implementation", that it "does not entail the threat of the use of force or coercive measures", that it "does not replace state security", that it "is based on national ownership" and that "governments retain the primary role and responsibility" (UN, 2012: 2a).

The concept has also been taken up in feminist and gender studies.[5] Debates include whether the notion of human security implicitly includes a focus on gender violence, inequality and discrimination as part of the vast scope of threats to security, whether human security should be applied specifically to women, how gender can be applied to human security, and how human security its itself a gendered construct (see also Christie, 2010: 178-81). But it is clear that men and women experience security in different ways, and that they are affected by different types of threats. The inclusion of a gender perspective in the human security can, in this sense, contribute to an understanding of the causes of structural inequalities and power disparities, and to create new channels of empowerment and participation (Chenoy, 2009; Moussa, 2008; Svensson, 2007; Taylor, 2004).

Perhaps unexpectedly at first sight, the concept has been criticized by human rights scholars. The human security discourse proponents have stated the necessity to strengthen human rights as a tool to protect individuals from state abuses. Hence, it has been assumed that human rights are necessarily complementary to human security. However, Howard-Hassmann (2012) has for instance argued that the human security discourse poses a challenge to the international human rights law regime. First, because both notions became competitors in a race to achieve the same goal: the protection of human dignity. Second, because the human

[5] See among others, the Institute for Inclusive Security (http://www.inclusivesecurity.org/) and the Security Project of the Center for Women's Global Leadership at Rutgers University (http://www.cwgl.rutgers.edu/program-areas-151/gender-based-violence/security-project)

security implicitly fosters a language of 'national emergency' and perceived 'threats' to security that might justify the derogation of a state's international legal obligations. Third, because the human rights regime – that has been developing since the approval of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Bill of Human Rights decades ago – has constructed a myriad of global and regional institutional structures, agreements and mechanisms, that already propose solutions to many of the 'vague' and broad threats identified by human security. And finally, a potential subsumption of human rights as just another of the components of the human security discourse might turn their fulfilment into 'policy options' rather than legal obligations. However, advocates of human security generally do not consider human security as a substitute and stress the importance of human rights. For instance, the Madrid Report of the EU's Human Security Study Group identified six principles of a human security approach, of which the first is "the primacy of human rights" (Albrecht et al, 2007: p.4). Similarly, the UN Human Security Unit refers to human rights, arguing that "human security underscores the universality and primacy of a set of rights and freedoms that are fundamental for human life." (UN OCHA, 2009: 9)

It is also worthwhile to point out that the concept is not always adopted or translated in the same way. For example in Latin America practitioners refer to citizens' security, whereas 'human security' is perceived as a concept imposed by external actors. They also sometimes use the term multi-dimensional security. In Asia human security is sometimes a preferable term politically as it is seen as not including on human rights. This makes it less sensitive, but also confers one of the criticisms referred to above.

### 1.3 Continuing relevance and new opportunities for human security

Despite the criticisms discussed above, the concept of human security continues to be relevant. It is adopted by local civil society organizations (CSOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), using it to advocate for people-centered security at all levels, including the community/grassroots. It also enables more coordinated approaches to conflict prevention, peacebuilding and development. Just as the human security concept brought development and humanitarian issues into the security realm of traditional state security actors, it also brought security into the realm of non-state development and humanitarian actors. Human security emphasizes a shift from state-centric military approaches to people-centered approaches focusing on root causes of violence and instability, development, local capacity building and empowerment (see, for instance, Schirch, 2012; GPPAC et al, 2013). As such, the human security concept provides NGOs and CSOs with a useful tool to advocate people's security needs, and place individuals and communities at the center of analysis and interventions. And despite having lost some of its ground, the concept is also still widely used in international policy circles and remains a recognized concept in the UN system. In addition, the OECD-DAC has incorporated human security principles into its work, such as its guidelines on Security Sector Reform (OECD, 2007a). And while a fading interest in the implementation of human security approaches was in part caused by an increasing focus on statebuilding after 9/11, and the human security discourse has been used subsequently to legitimize liberal statebuilding interventions, it is exactly the failure of the liberal peace project that now opens up space for new approaches to human security. Drawing on the belief that democracy

and free trade reduce the incidence of war, the liberal peace project aims to build democratic state institutions and promote privatization and free trade. As argued by Newman, the liberal institutionalist approach to peacebuilding tends to rely on top-down mediation and building state institution, and "often neglects the welfare needs of local populations and fails to engage with indigenous traditional institutions" (Newman, 2011: 1745). As a result of the inability to grasp or address the everyday factors – social, economic and political exclusion and grievances – that may be the drivers of conflict, Newman finds that statebuilding efforts have neglected human security as an approach in practice. This has resulted in what Martin and Owen refer to as "the crisis of interventionism", where "legitimacy is no longer necessarily guaranteed by a norm of effective multilateralism" (Martin and Owen, 2010: 233). Human security can provide an answer to this crisis through the revitalization of the emancipatory and empowering potential of the concept that has entered the discourse since the 2003 report of the Commission on Human Security (CHS, 2003).

> "…a human security narrative has to make explicit how it can deliver a 'post-liberal peace' which privileges the protection of individuals over national or bloc security as the ultimate goal of security policy, and how it can do this via a new methodology of intervention, which also privileges the capacity of people to decide their own future."(Martin and Owen, 2010: 223)

And several scholars of human security have made suggestions to do so. According to Newman, a human security approach can be distilled from the human security discourse, which is not so fundamentally different from current policies, but mainly shifts the focus to prioritize certain public goods and uses different indicators and benchmarks. A human security approach to peacebuilding would then include the following:

- It is focused on enhancing "the physical and material security of individuals and communities, through poverty alleviation, employment creation, and public service delivery" (Newman, 2011: 1749).
- Rather than focusing on aggregate indicators of growth or "preconceived benchmarks relating to state institutions, democracy or the market" it focusses on the security of citizens and the experiences of individuals and communities (ibid. 1750).
- It "places emphasis on addressing the underlying sources of conflict, rather than merely containing conflict through a negative peace" (ibid.).
- Finally, "it also seeks to endow individuals with the agency required to bring about positive change in their lives" (ibid.).

Another alternative is provided by Richmond (2010; 2013), who distinguishes three different approaches to human security. The first two are considered to be part of the institutional approach, and have been discussed in this paper above. These focus either on the shaping of state institutions according to the liberal peace model to provide (human) security, or more narrowly on immediate security concerns during conflict and the responsibility to protect. He proposes to further a third model of human security, which is post-liberal and post-colonial in character, derived from emancipatory conceptualizations of human security. An emancipatory human security approach to peace would then imply the following:

> "… first, that HS [human security] will be in accordance with contextual notions of legitimacy and consent; second, that HS [human security] will liberate insecure subjects from the systems and structures of conflict; and third, the international provision or enablement of HS [human security] will be commensurate with advanced pluralist systems of representation, accountability, and equality." (Richmond, 2013: 213)

There are some questions surrounding an emancipatory approach to human security in practice. As Peterson notes, there is no clear defined endpoint or moment where a group can be considered to be 'emancipated' and the approach may best be defined as a process without a clear end state. She also questions how one can emancipate 'the other', and whether the emancipatory process is even possible in situations where providing basic physical security already proves to be a major challenge (Peterson, 2013: 321). Also Richmond notes himself that a true emancipatory approach is somewhat an illusion, as it would imply support from intervening actors but no interference as to how this support is used (Richmond, 2010: 50).

But despite these concerns, the emancipatory approach remains valuable for renewing the human security debate and the ways in which human security is operationalized in fragile and conflict affected contexts. What can be derived from the emancipatory approach is a re-emphasis of the focus of human security on the human subject and its agency. It prioritizes individuals' and communities' perspectives on and actions for their own security, and seeks to empower them and strengthen their capacities for self-provision of security. This approach, which Richmond calls 'post-liberal and post-colonial', is first and foremost contextually driven rather than based on pre-fixed institutional blueprints. This means that intervening actors should not only engage with local actors, but also engage with local understandings and practices of security in a way that recognizes difference, enables agency and respects autonomy as far as possible (Richmond, 2010: 44). Yet, this does not imply discarding the liberal norms and practices regarding democracy, human rights, etc. At the same time, these local contexts will also be presented with such norms and the associated frameworks of liberal democratic states. Human security then becomes a process of negotiation over what exactly constitutes human security and how this should be attained.

> "HS [human security] becomes in these terms, not a concept which is fixed and predetermined, but a process of negotiation between local and liberal, between internationals and context over what exactly constitutes HS [human security]. This will be uncomfortable but it is likely to have more durability in the shorter term than imagining that HS [human security] provides a platform to convert local actors to political liberalism, or liberal internationalism, or neoliberalism-framed modernization strategies, and to emancipate them from themselves." (Richmond, 2010: 53)

Clearly, such an approach to human security will not always be easy. As Peterson notes, this human security agenda will have multiple trajectories with different outcomes, depending on the ways in which structures of power are challenged or negotiated. And it not only opens up

discussions between actors on security and the different perspectives these actors have on norms, values, needs and priorities regarding security. It also opens up discussions about the power relations between these actors, possibly challenging existing asymmetries of power (Peterson, 2013: 321). Thus, this approach to human security includes allowing non-liberal interpretations and the opening up of political space to accommodate difference, and critically reflecting on ideologies and power structures.

But while such discussions may at times be uneasy and uncomfortable for all practitioners and policy-makers involved (international, national *and* local), it also represents the strength of this approach to human security. It opens new ways of engaging in fragile and conflict affected contexts, which – without abandoning the underlying ideals of human rights, democracy, etc. – move beyond the much criticized institutional and liberal statebuilding approach. As such, it could provide an answer to the above discussed crisis of legitimacy of interventions. At the same time, this approach to human security also provides inroads for intervention in and engagement with hybrid political contexts, sometimes also referred to as 'hybrid political orders' (Boege et al, 2008; 2009a; 2009b). Indeed, Richmond describes this form of human security "as a basis for the emergence of hybrid agencies for peacebuilding, both local and international, and point towards self and mutual emancipations, which are representative of fairly autonomous localized agencies as well as -and not just- international agencies" (Richmond, 2010: 44). And Peterson similarly makes a short reference to the concept of hybridity (Peterson, 2013: 321). The contexts in which interventions take place have been described as 'hybrid political orders' (Boege et al, 2008; 2009a; 2009b), or related concepts such as the 'mediated state' (Menkhaus, 2006; 2007a; 2007b; 2008), 'negotiated statehood' (Hagmann and Péclard, 2010), 'twilight institutions' (Lund, 2007), and the different logics of functioning of 'natural states' vis-à-vis 'open access orders' (North, Wallis and Weingast, 2009). "State and society interact in different ways than assumed in western state models, violence is dispersed rather than monopolized, and actors and institutions both within and outside 'the state' intertwine, cooperate and compete" (Willems, 2013b). It is also increasingly argued that intervening actors should more actively engage with the hybrid contexts in which they operate, rather than trying to implement pre-fab state models on top of it. For instance, the OECD (2010: 54) has stressed that donors should,

> "(a) pay much more attention to state legitimacy, especially in fragile situations, and to aspects of legitimacy that derive from people's beliefs and perceptions, not just from a Western state model; (b) focus on relations between state and society in a given context, and the scope for making these more constructive; and (c) recognize the diversity of interests, perceptions, shared beliefs and political orders in play in any given context." (OECD, 2010: 54)

The human security approach discussed above provides opportunities to do this, and to actively engage with hybrid contexts. More importantly, this human security approach adds to the discussion on hybridity by emphasizing that the hybrid forms of security or hybrid agencies for peacebuilding are the result of discussions between local, national as well as international actors. Thus, hybridity not only is a characteristic of the context in which intervening actors operate, but hybridity is also something that intervening actors inevitably become part of and something which they partly give shape themselves.

## 1.4 Some thoughts on the operationalization of human security

Lessons for the New Deal can also be learned from the operationalization of human security. For Richmond, the operationalization includes organizing a discussion on what contextual meanings human security has, and how this can be provided. Human security is then a process, rather than a predefined type of security with associated measures: "the peace to be created protects the individual, and a mixture of international, local, official, and unofficial actors can take part in its provision" (Richmond, 2010: 47). Similarly, Schirch argues that human security can be understood as "a theory of change; a way of thinking that appreciates the interrelationship between human development, human dignity, and peace and security issues" (Shirch, 2012: 2).

Yet, operationalization of human security for policy and practice benefits from more clarity on definitions and approaches to human security. Martin and Owen draw a number of lessons from the experiences of the UN and the EU with human security. The primary lessons they distil from the UN is that "institutionalization cannot compensate for poor conceptualization" as the UN usage of the concept was considered too ambiguous as well as overstretched, and lacked a clear distinction between human rights and human security (Martin and Owen, 2010: 220).[6] Clarifying the distinction between human rights and human security may also help situations where international and local actors differ on norms, values, needs and priorities regarding security and how to define and approach human security in a particular context, but where basic human rights cannot be sacrificed. Leading in such discussions between local, national and international actors on the appropriate priorities and measures to human security, should also be the main characteristic of human security approaches and analyses as identified by Koehler and her colleagues, i.e. "and explicit concern for the wellbeing of fellow humans" and a "focus on threats to basic human values" (Koehler et al, 2012: 14).

To further the operationalization of human security as an approach, the UN's Human Security Unit (HSU), which manages the UN Trust fund for Human Security, identifies five principles of human security: 1) people-centered, 2) multi-sectoral, 3) comprehensive, 4) context-specific, and 5) prevention-oriented (UN OCHA, 2009). Each of these principles should inform a human security approach, and must be integrated in the design of a human security programme (see table 1).

[6] The UN has in the meantime advanced its conceptualization, and the Secretary-General proposed in 2012 a common understanding to the General Assembly (UN, 2012b). The discussion led to the adoption of resolution A/66/290 by the General Assembly in October 2012 (UN, 2012a).

### 1. Human Security Principles and Approach

| Human Security Principle | Human Security Approach |
|---|---|
| People-centered | • Inclusive and participatory;<br>• Considers individuals and communities in defining their needs/vulnerabilities and in acting as active agents of change;<br>• Collectively determines which insecurities to address and identifies the available resources including local assets and indigenous coping mechanisms. |
| Multi-sectoral | • Address multi-sectorality by promoting dialogue among key actors from different sectors/fields;<br>• Helps to ensure coherence and coordination across traditionally separate sectors/fields;<br>• Assesses positive and negative externalities of each response on the overall human security situation of the affected community (ies). |
| Comprehensive | • Holistic analysis: the seven security components of human security;<br>• Addresses the wide spectrum of threats, vulnerabilities and capacities;<br>• Analysis of actors and sectors not previously considered relevant to the success of a policy/programme/project;<br>• Develop multi-sectoral/multi-actor responses. |
| Context-specific | • Requires in-depth analysis of the targeted situation;<br>• Focuses on a core set of freedoms and rights under threat in a given situation;<br>• Identifies the concrete needs of the affected community (ies) and enables the development of more appropriate solutions that are embedded in local realities, capacities and coping mechanisms; takes into account local, national, regional and global dimensions and their impact on the targeted situation. |
| Prevention-oriented | • Identifies risks, threats and hazards, and addresses their root causes;<br>• Focuses on preventative responses through a protection and empowerment framework. |

*Source: UN OCHA (2009: 12)*

Additionally to these principles underlying a human security approach, the HSU emphasizes that, "the analysis, mapping and planning phase of a human security programme also requires employing *the "protection and empowerment" framework* by designing strategies that address both top-down and bottom-up measures (UN OCHA, 2009: 18, original emphasis). This

point is further underscored in a later report by the HSU, in which protection and empowerment has become one of the main principles a human security approach:

> "Through a framework of protection and empowerment, human security promotes people-centered, comprehensive, context-specific and prevention-oriented measures that seek to reduce the likelihood of conflicts help overcome the obstacles to development and promote human rights for all. (…) By combining top-down norms, processes and institutions, including the establishment of early-warning mechanisms, good governance and social protection instruments, with a bottom-up focus in which participatory processes highlight individuals' roles in defining and implementing their essential freedoms and responsibilities, human security improves local capacities, strengthens social networks, and ensures coherence in the allocation of resources and policies." (UN OCHA, 2013: 3)

Several NGOs and CSOs have adopted similar approaches to the operationalization of human security. For instance, the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) – a member-led network of CSOs active in the field of conflict prevention and peacebuilding across the world – uses four principles to define a human security approach. These are 1) people-centered security, 2) interdependent threats, 3) multi-stakeholder approaches, and 4) participation and empowerment (Shirch, 2012: 17-18). A human security approach then "requires analyzing root causes, mapping existing local capacities for peace, and designing coordinated strategies for civil society and governmental preventive action as part of a long-term commitment to peace" (GPPAC et al, 2013: 1). Some concrete examples from practice include the development of "Human Security Guiding Practices to Countering Violent Extremism" by the Civil Society Network on Human Security (ibid. 3-4) and the explicit section on human security in the DCAF manual for introductory training on SSR (DCAF: 2011).

## 1.5 Conclusions

This chapter looked at two decades of human security, and discussed how the human security discourse has evolved. Human security has shifted the focus to as opposed to states as referent objects of security. This leads to the identification of new threats, and the observation that multitudes of threats to security are interlinked.

The human security discourse also constituted a tool for empowerment, as security of humans. What it is and how it is achieved then depends on the agency of people and communities. Rather than just top-down security provision by state actors, the human security discourse opened up the security realm to a new set of actors, such as NGOs, CSOs, and communities and citizens themselves. Yet, at the same time, the human security discourse was arguably used to reinforce existing power-relations. State actors have been reinforced as primary responsible for security, and new spheres – e.g. development and humanitarian issues – were brought into the realm of traditional security actors.

New additions to the human security debate attempt to revitalize the concept, re-emphasizing the emancipating and empowering potential of human security. As such, it has been promoted as an answer to failures in peace and statebuilding in fragile and conflict

affected states. Human security approaches, it is argued, are grounded in local contexts, people-centered, and as such should link top-down protection with increased bottom-up empowerment and capacity-building. This is also articulated in the ways in which human security is currently being operationalized, both by international organizations and agencies such as the UN, the OECD and by more local CSOs and NGOs.

So what does this mean for the New Deal? What can be learned from these developments in human security, and how can this strengthen the New Deal? To what degree can the New Deal be seen as a continuation of the human security discourse? Where does it add or is it reforming the earlier experiences? And can the New Deal process help make the human security discourse and approach more acceptable to governments and 'mainstream' it in conflict-affected countries? To answer these questions, the following chapter first looks into the New Deal, how it developed and what it aspires to.

Chapter 2

# A new deal for engagement in fragile states

## 2.1 Introduction

Since its adaptation at the Fourth High-level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan (29 November – 1 December 2011) the *New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States* has become the new framework for engagement of both local and international actors in so-called 'fragile and conflict-affected situations'.[7] Despite substantial dedication of official and unofficial development assistance, many of these countries lag considerably behind on achieving the Millennium Development Goals as targeted in 2015 (OECD, 2011; 2013). With the New Deal, a group of self-declared fragile and conflict-affected countries referred to as the g7+, in cooperation with donors and other stakeholders essentially stated that five particular statebuilding and peacebuilding goals are now prerequisites in country-owned and country-led transitions out of fragility, together with commitments to mutual trust and measurable results. Currently, seven pilot countries – Afghanistan, Central African Republic, DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Sudan and Timor Leste – are at varying stages of implementing the New Deal. This chapter focuses on how the New Deal came into being and presents a description of its current main contents. Section 2.2 addresses the genesis of the New Deal. Subsequently, section 2.3 presents its main vision. Section 2.4 deals with the main concepts and issues. In section 2.5 we compare the New Deal with previous influential declarations, and in section 2.6 the practical instruments of implementation are described.

## 2.2 Genesis

For the full emergence of the New Deal it would arbitrary to choose one particular point in time, but considering the scope of this paper, the first logical reference point is the Second High-level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Paris, 2005. The commitments expressed during this forum were reiterated in the *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness*. Key shared issues of focus here were: ownership, harmonization, alignment, managing for results and mutual accountability.[8] The participants to this forum - Ministers of developed and developing

[7] 35 countries and 6 international organizations have currently endorsed the New Deal. See Annex I for a full overview of endorsing countries and organizations.

[8] Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 2005

countries and the Heads of multilateral and bilateral development institutions - committed to take far-reaching actions in reforming the ways in which aid was delivered and managed. During this forum, there was already specific mention of, and increased attention for the challenges of international engagement in fragile states. The participants ensured that the principles agreed upon would have to be *adapted to environments of weak governance and capacity*.[9] To put it differently, with this declaration, the international community recognized particular challenges that engagement in fragile states entails, and the need for a tailored framework.

For the Third High-level Forum in Accra 2008, a specific Roundtable (number 7) was scheduled in order to review progress in implementing the Paris Declaration within the challenging contexts of fragility and conflict. Previous to the High-level Forum, the participants of that Roundtable came together to negotiate, this resulted in the adoption of the Kinshasa Statement, 2 July 2008. The members of this Kinshasa meeting re-emphasized the need for an adapted development partnership in situations of fragility and conflict.[10] It was further added that the members of this roundtable wanted to establish and develop a strong and inclusive partnership beyond the forum in Accra, with the inclusion of civil society.[11] During the Third High-level Forum, roundtable 7 took the Kinshasa Statement one stage further by setting out jointly agreed next steps to deliver the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) tailored to the implementation in situations of fragility and conflict.[12] The roundtable members recognized that while the MDGs are a central concern in fragile situations, the basic foundations for development are not in place. Particularly, it was acknowledged that, therefore, more work is needed on the *preconditions* for achieving the MDGs through addressing statebuilding and peacebuilding needs.[13] In order to put into practice the exercise of defining specific statebuilding and peacebuilding objectives – as set out in the Accra Agenda for Action – the roundtable launched an international forum, which would formally be known as the *International Dialogue for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding*.[14] The Dialogue functioned as the institutional vehicle behind the adaptation of the New Deal, and continues to confer up until today.[15]

The Dialogue could be seen as a first forum that facilitates direct political dialogue between conflict-affected and fragile countries, international partners and civil society actors, following a cooperative agenda of facilitating transitions out of fragility.[16] It gives voice to fragile states, in particular the group of g7+ countries[17] and emphasizes solutions based on real country-ownership and country-leadership.[18] Following the objectives set out in the AAA,

---

[9] Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 2005: §7.

[10] Kinshasa Statement, 2 July 2008

[11] This call would later become reflected in the New Deal.

[12] Chair's summary - Third High-level forum on Aid Effectiveness Accra, 2–4 September 2008.

[13] This observation would become reflected in the New Deal: the prerequisite of security needs for development. The Monrovia Roadmap (2011), for example, states: "without security for the people there can be little development".

[14] In the remainder of this document referred to as "the Dialogue". For background information on the organizational structure see Annex II.

[15] Chair's summary - Third High-level forum on Aid Effectiveness Accra, 2–4 September 2008.

[16] Particularly the inclusion of civil society actors as key stakeholders could be seen as a change with the past.

[17] A group of self-declared fragile and conflict-affected countries have united themselves in the g7+. See Annex I for a full list of countries.

[18] See: http://www.pbsbdialogue.org

the Dialogue members came to further agreement with the Dili Declaration in 2010. With this declaration the Dialogue members specified their concerns and introduced an action plan for the future focusing on: governance; economic development; human and social development and security.[19] By national consultations in fragile countries, the main challenges to achieving peacebuilding and statebuilding goals were identified: a lack of a shared vision; a lack of trust between developing countries and development partners; too many overlapping plans; too much focus on central state actors; insufficient attention to the protection of women and children; insufficient attention to economic growth.[20] Following up on these challenges, and the AAA, the members of the Dialogue finally presented the Monrovia Roadmap in July 2011, which included the eventual five Peacebuilding and Statebuilding goals of the New Deal. The New Deal itself came into being during the Fourth High-level Forum on Aid effectiveness in Busan late 2011.

To sum up, all of these steps, from the Paris Declaration, the Accra Agenda for Action, the Kinshasa Statement, the establishment of the Dialogue, the Dili Declaration to the Monrovia Roadmap, formed the building blocks of the eventual formulation and adaptation of the New Deal. Although not all of the issues that had come up throughout the process[21] are fully incorporated in the New Deal, the eventual declaration reflects its initial purpose of putting fragile and conflict-affected countries in lead of their own paths out of fragility with a shared and unified vision and a focus on building a relationship of mutual trust and accountability between both donors and fragile states.

Then what is the character of this New Deal exactly? One could argue that the goals formulated in the New Deal are principles for cooperation, for pathways out of fragility and mutual commitments for better results (Baxmann et al., 2012). Or, as a Dutch government official similarly pointed out: “the New Deal declaration could be seen as an agreement, a mutual agenda of well willing countries”.[22] Faria describes the New Deal as “a shared commitment to correct the trajectories of national and international efforts for peacebuilding and statebuilding in fragile states. It includes a commitment by the governments of these countries to be responsible and responsive to their own societies and a commitment by donors to respect and support them in that process” (2011: 1). So, overall we could state that the New Deal presents us with a set of principles that are endorsed by a group of well-willing countries and organizations, and aimed to *correct* the current trajectories of peacebuilding and statebuilding in fragile and conflict-affected countries.

With regard to the participants in the New Deal, it is important to understand that the New Deal currently serves as an agreement between 35 endorsing countries, 6 international organizations and several civil society partners. As such, the participants consist of a far smaller group of stakeholders than the participants of the High-level Forums on Aid Effectiveness in Paris and Accra. The AAA was adhered by about 164 countries and 28 international organizations. So the scope for the New Deal is quite different, due to its specific focus on fragile contexts.

---

[19] Dili Declaration, 10 April 2010.

[20] Dili Declaration, 10 April 2010.

[21] Gender issues are less prominent in the New Deal than they were in previous agreements for example.

[22] Dutch governmental official, interview by two of the authors, 10 December 2013, The Hague.

On a final note, it is necessary to acknowledge that the New Deal (process) and implementation is evolving: it is work in progress.[23] The declaration and the endorsements are the starting point for further implementation, and clarification of, for example, the specific indicators for measuring success. In the Washington Communiqué on 19 April 2013, the members of the Dialogue reiterate the value of the New Deal, and urge g7+ governments, bilateral and lateral development partners, civil society and the broader international community to step up their efforts to translate New Deal commitments into concrete changes in behavior and practice.[24] In other words, the declaration is a starting point, but the implementation, change, and specification is still underway.

## 2.3 The vision of the New Deal

The overall vision of the New Deal presents a focus on *new* ways of working in fragile contexts. According to the agreement, a new architecture and ways of working are necessary, as international engagement has delivered limited results. It identifies key flaws in previous engagements and how this needs to be changed. As explained earlier, we could say that the purpose of the New Deal is to correct previous ways of international engagement and aid deliveries. The New Deal identifies a number of flaws, aims to address these and works towards better engagement and functioning pathways out of fragility. Three flaws and new directions seem particularly relevant for its vision.

Firstly, the New Deal points out that international partners have often "bypassed the national interests and actors, providing aid in overly technocratic ways that underestimate the importance of harmonizing with the national and local context"[25]. The main vision therefore is formulated as following:

> "We, the members of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding ("the Dialogue"), comprised of the g7+ group of 19 fragile and conflict-affected countries, development partners, and international organizations, believe that a new development architecture and new ways of working, better tailored to the situation and challenges of fragile contexts, are necessary to build peaceful states and societies."[26]

In other words, international engagement should now, with the New Deal in place, tailor its aid architecture to the specific needs of the different fragile countries, with the specific contexts as its starting point.

Secondly, the New Deal states that international partners have too often supported "short-term results at the expense of medium- to long-term sustainable results brought about by

---

[23] Ibid.

[24] The Washington Communiqué on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, 19 April 2013

[25] The New Deal, 2011: §1

[26] The New Deal, 2011: §1

building capacity and systems"[27]. In order to turn this flaw into new and better ways of engagement, the New Deal underlines "commitments to build mutual trust and achieve better results". With better mutual trust between the stakeholders involved, and a focus on the right results international engagement should be able to improve. Starting from better mutual trust the endorsing countries also pledge to cooperatively improve the speed and predictability of funding enabling the fragile states to work short-term *and* long-term on their own pathways out of fragility. [28] This would require active involvement of CSOs, people's organizations, and local communities through proper mechanisms at the community level.

A third flaw of engagement that should be improved with the New Deal is the alignment of donor support. Similar to the Dili Declaration earlier, the New Deal states that too often donors and developing countries have worked on different duplicating projects at the same time with differing benchmarks. The New Deal proposes *one plan* for each of the fragile states in order to make the different sorts of dedicated resources and projects work cooperatively transitioning out of fragility[29]. This plan should be inclusive: developed in consultation with civil society and based on inputs from the country fragility assessments.[30]

## 2.4 The main concepts and issues

The New Deal framework consists of three main pillars:

- Peacebuilding and Statebuilding goals;
- FOCUS - Engagement to support country-owned and -led pathways out of fragility;
- TRUST - Commitments for results.

We will now address these pillars, and where necessary, use the Monrovia Roadmap and the documents provided by the Working Group on Indicators[31] for further specification.

### *2.4.1 The Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals*

The first PSG identified in the New Deal is *legitimate politics*. The objective is to "foster inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution"[32]. It is recognized here, that peacefully resolving and managing conflicts, as well as rebuilding the state, require inclusive political settlements and able leadership.[33] The Working Group on Indicators differentiates the objective into three dimensions: (1) political settlement (2) political processes and institutions (3) societal relationships (IDPS, 2012a: 11). The degree of *political settlement* is measured by "the diversity in representation (by gender, region and social groups) in key-decision-making bodies" (2012a: 11). *Political processes and institutions* are measured

[27] The New Deal, 2011: §1

[28] The New Deal, 2011: §1

[29] This very much resembles the comprehensive, integrated, or 3-D approach as propagated in several peace- and statebuilding interventions.

[30] The New Deal, 2011: section II §1

[31] The Steering Group of the Dialogue established the Working group on Indicators in January 2012. The Working Group compromises 15-20 Dialogue members and is co-chaired by the DRC and the UN Peacebuilding Support Office.

[32] The New Deal, 2011: section I

[33] Monrovia Roadmap - Annex A: Monrovia Objectives for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding.

according to the level of participation in elections and the satisfaction of the public with the quality of these. *Societal relationships* are measured according to the "number of intergroup disputes resolved by various dialogue and/or mediation mechanisms" and the level of trust between people and formerly conflicting groups (2012a: 11). In other words, the New Deal and its supporting documents set out that the political processes should be as inclusive as possible. It also recognizes that able leadership and pathways out of fragility are only possible when there is inclusion of all groups in society. It can be questioned whether institutions of formal democracy are sufficient or that other participatory means need to be included.

The second PSG identified in the New Deal is *security*. The objective is to "establish and strengthen people's security"[34]. The Monrovia Roadmap specifies this concept: with regard to a broad range of security actors – formal or informal – behavior, effectiveness and accountability should be improved.[35] The point of departure as explained in the Monrovia Roadmap, is responding to "people's rights and needs". The Working Group on Indicators has established a number of shared indicators. It identifies three dimensions of indicators to measure progress with regard to the security PSG: (1) security conditions (2) capacity and accountability (3) performance and responsiveness (IDPS, 2012a: 12). The *conditions* are measured by incidences of violent deaths, assaults, rape and sexual violence, cross-border violence, internal displacements and perceptions of the security conditions (2012a: 12). *Capacity and accountability* are measured on the basis of a ratio on prosecution of police misconduct. *Performance and responsiveness* is measured along the level of public confidence in police/security, the average response time to distress calls, and public perceptions of corruption among security forces (2012a: 12). In other words, the principle of security includes formal and informal security providers and is formulated as "people's security", not national or state security.

The third PSG is *justice*. The objective here is to "address injustices and increase people's access to justice"[36]. With more specification than the New Deal, the Monrovia Roadmap stresses that where possible, traditional non-state and informal means for dispute resolution and adjudication should be strengthened and gradually aligned with international human rights standards. These "international human rights standards", however, are not mentioned or referred to in the New Deal itself, but are mentioned in the indicators. The Working Group on indicators has proposed similar indicators to the ones mentioned in the previous PSG on security: (1) justice conditions; capacity and accountability of justice institutions; and (3) performance and responsiveness of justice institutions. *Justice conditions* are measured by the ratio of lawyers and people's trust in customary and formal systems. *Capacity and accountability* is measured by the ratio of public officials being tried, the percentage of government budget allocated for the justice sector, the percentage of the public that perceives to have access to justice and the number of judges. *Performance and responsiveness* is measured by people's perceptions of performance in the justice sector, and the percentage of the population that is aware of legal and human rights (IDPS, 2012a: 14-15).

---

[34] The New Deal, 2011: section I

[35] Monrovia Roadmap - Annex A: Monrovia Objectives for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding.

[36] The New Deal, 2011: section I

The fourth PSG is *economic foundations*. The objective here is to "generate employment and improve livelihoods"[37]. The Monrovia Roadmap specifies that within fragile states "priority needs to be given to labor-intensive public and community works, increased agricultural productivity and domestic private sector development"[38]. The purpose should be to generate meaningful income opportunities, including opportunities for (previously) marginalized groups. The Working group on indicators differentiates this objective into three dimensions: (1) productive resources and prospects for growth; (2) jobs, livelihoods and private sector development; and (3) natural resource management (IDPS, 2012a: 15-16).

The fifth PSG is *revenues and services*. The objective is to "manage revenues and build capacity for accountable and fair social service delivery"[39]. The Monrovia Roadmap specifies that the state must gradually ensure fair access to social services to key groups in society, including the most vulnerable and marginalized. The state should coordinate the delivery of services, including those of non-state actors, and should build a transparent system of public financial management. The Working group on indicators differentiates this objective into three dimensions: (1) revenues; (2) administration; and (3) services delivery (IDPS, 2012a: 16-18).

### 2.4.2 *FOCUS - country-owned and -led pathways out of fragility*

Country-owned and country-led transitions out of fragility constitute the second main pillar of the New Deal. The g7+ has put itself in lead of monitoring their own fragility and leading their paths out of fragility. With regard to ownership, the AAA already mentioned: "developing countries determine and implement their development policies to achieve their own economic, social and environmental goals"[40]. This direction of ownership seems to be taken into the second main pillar of the New Deal. Three commitments are mentioned here with regard to country-leadership and –ownership. Firstly, the member states commit to conducting country-led assessments on the causes and features of fragility and sources of resilience. These assessments include key national stakeholders and non-state actors. Secondly, these assessments form the building blocks for what is called "one vision, one plan" to transition out of fragility. The vision is committed to be developed in consultation with civil society actors. Thirdly, the members commit to create a "compact" which will be tailored to the national context, as to ensure harmonization and donor co-ordination according to country-led priorities.[41] As such, the g7+ countries commit to conduct their own fragility assessments, and to initiate a country compact. The donor countries at the other hand, commit to let the g7+ countries take lead on these matters.

The second concept that stands out in this pillar is the pathways out of 'state fragility'. It is beyond the scope of this paper to give a comprehensive account of the different conceptualizations of state fragility[42], but we can recognize that this is the shared character

---

[37] The New Deal, 2011: section I

[38] Monrovia Roadmap - Annex A: Monrovia Objectives for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding.

[39] The New Deal, 2011: section I

[40] Accra Agenda for Action, 2008: §12

[41] The New Deal, 2011: section II §4

[42] Several attempts have been made to give overviews and clarifications. See for example: OECD, 2009; Overbeek et al., 2009.

of the g7+ countries involved in the New Deal. The g7+ countries declared themselves as "countries that are or have been affected by conflict and are now in transition to the next stage of development".[43] The state fragility debate in academia and policy has been on-going and different conceptualizations have been used. As Overbeek and colleagues point out: "similar to the notion of 'the state', there is a lack of common agreement on what 'state fragility' entails and how to measure it. Depending from which background a donor defines state fragility; different indicators are formulated to measure state fragility (…)" (2009: 6). As the OECD has played a major role in the development of the New Deal, let us shortly consider the OECD's most recent definition:

> "A fragile region or state has weak capacity to carry out basic governance functions, and lacks the ability to develop mutually constructive relations with society. Fragile states are also more vulnerable to internal or external shocks such as economic crises or natural disasters. More resilient states exhibit the capacity and legitimacy of governing a population and its territory. They can manage and adapt to changing social needs and expectations, shifts in elite and on the political agreements, and growing institutional complexity. Fragility and resilience should be seen as shifting points along a spectrum." (OECD, 2012)

In this second definition there seems to be a couple of similarities to the New Deal formulations if we look at: "constructive relations with society", "internal and external shocks" and the fragility-resilience "spectrum". How 'state fragility' is defined in the New Deal remains implicit, but the whole endeavor of the New Deal is to promote pathways *out* of state fragility by addressing the five PSGs.

### 2.4.3 *TRUST - commitments for results*

The third main pillar of the New Deal emphasizes the importance of mutual trust between societies, the state and international partners in order to achieve results. The endorsing stakeholders commit to manage resources more effectively, and align these resources for better results.[44] Five main directions are formulated here: (1) more transparency; (2) better risk-management; (3) strengthening of country systems; (4) strengthening of country capacities; (5) timely and predictable aid flows. *Transparency* is formulated for both donors and aid receiving countries. *Better risk-management* is aimed to improve country specific risk mitigation strategies. *The country systems* and *country capacities* should be improved by enhancing mutual confidence in oversight systems. Donors should establish *timely and predictable aid flows* in order to have better long-term expectations and results on the side of the fragile countries.[45]

### 2.4.4 *The development of indicators*

In order to strengthen and promote the three main pillars described above, it was agreed in the New Deal to develop a set of simple and practical indicators to track progress at the

---

[43] See for example: http://www.g7plus.org

[44] The New Deal, 2011: section III

[45] The New Deal, 2011: section III

country and at the global level. The New Deal specifically states that: "these indicators will combine objective measures with measures to understand the views of people on results achieved"[46]. The Working Group on Indicators was mandated to develop 'country-level indicators' and a list of 'shared/common' indicators. The country-level indicators allow for measurement of changes within specific countries. These indicators are not necessarily comparable to other countries - as shown in figure 1. The shared/common indicators on the contrary, allow for comparison across countries (IDPS, 2012a). As such the shared/common indicators are used internationally *and* nationally, while country-level indicators are *only* applied nationally.

The Working Group on indicators expresses that it is a *key* expectation that the shared/common indicators will inform the post-2015 agenda. At the same time, the Working Group also notes: "common indicators should always be used alongside other country-specific indicators and fragility assessments. The common indicators should be seen as necessary but not sufficient in explaining countries' progress out of fragility" (2013: 4). As such, both of the sets of indicators explained here are used to measure the progress 'out of fragility'. Currently, the Working Group on Indicators is still developing a menu of indicators as a practical tool to support other g7+ countries and development partners in the identification of their own relevant country-level indicators (IDPS, 2013: 5).




Figure 1. Overlap of indicator categories: country-level indicators, menu of indicators and common indicators. Source: IDPS, 2012a:9.

[46] The New Deal, 2011

### 2.4.5 *Crosscutting issues*

A number of crosscutting issues were, previous to the New Deal, presented and affirmed in the Monrovia Roadmap (2011). First of all, the recognition of *constructive state-society relations* being at the heart of successful peacebuilding and statebuilding. Secondly, the recognition that *underlying stress factors* which can lead to violence have to be addressed. Thirdly, it is recognized that an essential pre-condition for progress in all of the formulated objectives is to foster *confidence between people and the state and between communities*. Fourthly, building institutions that are *legitimate in the eyes of the people* is considered essential and it is recognized that such transformations can take a generation or more. Fifthly, a crosscutting issue is the particular attention that is needed for the participation of *women and youth* in the peacebuilding and statebuilding processes. Sixthly, it is recognized that the *regional and global context* affects the states in consideration and therefore it is necessary to build resilience against external shocks and establish regional cooperation. In the New Deal itself most of these crosscutting issues are reflected, or at least mentioned in between the lines, except for the last one: the regional and global context.

## 2.5 What is new about the New Deal

The New Deal on itself is a new document and a new agreement. However, if we trace back the previous steps from 2005 to 2011 - as described in the Genesis section of this chapter - we see that the New Deal itself is rather the final document of these processes and negotiations than a 'sudden' new agreement. Nevertheless, if we investigate the declaration more closely and in comparative perspective, it becomes clear that several directions do reflect a change from previous agreements.

Comparing the New Deal with the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations (2007) and the AAA (2008), we notice that the leading subject of reference has shifted from the international actors to the national actors. As Locke (2012) points out, much like the Washington consensus, the early discourse on aid effectiveness largely consisted of outsiders diagnosing the problem, prescribing the solution, and assuming responsibility for carrying out treatment (2012: 1). Even in the Principles for Good Engagement in 2007 this was still the assumption. With the New Deal this seems to be changed fundamentally. Whereas the Principles of 2007 are formulated as guiding for the donor countries, the New Deal is formulated as a set of principles guiding *both* fragile and conflict-affected states and the donor countries. To illustrate, in 2007 the Principles were "intended to help international actor's foster constructive engagement (…)". The New Deal, on the contrary, states: "we, the members of the Dialogue [including the g7+] agree to use the Peacebuilding and Statebuilding goals (…)"[47]. If we compare the New Deal to the AAA (2008), we are able identify a similar shift. In the AAA it is agreed that donors would conduct "joint assessments of governance and capacity and examine the causes of conflict, fragility and insecurity, engaging developing country authorities and other relevant stakeholders to the maximum extent possible". The New Deal, however, states that: "we will conduct a periodic country-led assessment on the causes and features of fragility and sources of

[47] The New Deal, 2011

resilience (…)"[48]. In other words, 'engagement to the maximum extent' - which still assumes a first and leading role from outside - shifted to a role of shared leadership on equal footing between donors and fragile states.

Not only does the New Deal reflect a change in the leading role from international to national, it also increases involvement of civil society. As initiated in the AAA in 2008, where the participants declared to deepen "engagement with CSOs as independent development actors in their own right"[49], the New Deal puts CSOs in an even more prominent role. Civil society participation in the Dialogue is coordinated and supported through the Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (CSPPS). As Van Sluijs, Coordinator CSPPS Secretariat, and others have pointed out: "what makes the vision of the New Deal different and unique is less its content but the element of mutual accountably and the national ownership approach building on joint processes and commitments" (Van Sluijs et al., 2013: 2). They further explain that CSOs have been involved from the very beginning of the Dialogue in 2008. CSOs have closely monitored the process and have been able to bring important issues into the New Deal document, such as the recognitions that (1) "constructive state-society relations (…) are at the heart of successful peacebuilding and statebuilding"[50]; (2) "an engaged public and civil society, which constructively monitors decision-making, is important to ensure accountability"[51]. As such, CSOs have found the recognition of their position as stakeholder in the peacebuilding and statebuilding processes, next to their more traditional role of monitoring the government.

## 2.6 How to put the New Deal into practice

Several ways of *implementation* are suggested in the (concept) Guide to Implementing the New Deal. Most importantly, the Guide sets out that implementation should be grounded in broader acceptance for the New Deal across governments. To begin with it should establish appropriate co-ordination mechanisms to allow further implementation, and it should create agreements on how existing initiatives fit with, and support the New Deal. The first practical steps then, are focused on briefing (potential) stakeholders, building coalitions, reviewing existing plans and projects, identifying gaps in each of the areas, and the establishment of workgroups and taskforces (IDPS, 2012b).

A key aspect of New Deal implementation is to start reviewing the status of the current PSGs through a fragility assessment. The Guide to Implementing the New Deal sets out that these assessments are developed and conducted by key national stakeholders in order to identify the causes, features and drivers of fragility and conflict and the sources of resilience within the particular country (IDPS, 2012b). As explained earlier, the country-specific indicators of fragility are still in the process of being developed. As such, this is still part of the implementation process. Nevertheless, South Sudan for example, had in 2012 already

[48] The New Deal, 2011

[49] Accra Agenda for Action, 2008: §20.

[50] The New Deal, 2011

[51] The New Deal, 2011

conducted a country fragility assessment on the basis of shared/common indicators.[52] Measuring along the shared indicators South Sudan identified their status with regard each of the five PSGs, and defined its particular peacebuilding and statebuilding needs accordingly.[53]

A second key instrument to start implementing the New Deal is the country "compact". In the New Deal compacts are defined as frameworks that "can take different forms at different points in transition out of fragility, [...] ensure harmonization and donor co-ordination, [...] guide the choice of aid modalities" and allow resources to be "aligned to country-led national priorities".[54] Building further from the fragility assessments, the purpose is to identify what requires urgent and joint attention. Secondly, the purpose is to identify a strategy for how the PSGs will be best supported by drawing from both national and international resources. Thirdly, the compact includes a country monitoring system to keep track of the developments (IDPS, 2012b). As such, the country compact serves to form one vision and practice, avoiding the duplication of efforts. A recent example is the "Somali Compact". As explained in this compact, it is a "living document that reflects the ongoing process of transition and defines priority interventions to ensure the country stays on the path to long-term peace and statebuilding"[55]. The compact provides for a new political security and development architecture, framing the relations between Somalia, its people and the international community.

### 2.6.1 *Some early experiences reported by the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies*

Some early experiences are documented by the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies of the University of Notre Dame, providing an insight into the first achievements and challenges with the implementation of the New Deal. In the report ***Assessing Civil Society Engagement with the New Deal: Opportunities and Challenges***[56], Wall & Fairhust (2014) point out that the New Deal achieved to galvanize new and existing civil society networks of hundreds of organizations around the issues of peacebuilding and statebuilding. The coalitions are cross-sector and bring together multiple perspectives, including statebuilding, peacebuilding, human rights, gender and development. They further point out that in countries such as Burundi, Togo, DRC, Somalia and Sierra Leone, new relationships have been formed between civil society actors and other relevant stakeholders. In Somalia, for example, civil society organizations of previously warring groups were brought together through the formation of the Somali Civil Society Alliance. In Togo the New Deal has enabled civil society actors to mobilize different, and even antagonistic, religious groups to advocate peace cooperatively. The New Deal has also facilitated relationships between different civil society actors transnationally and encouraged the emergence of new civil society leaders in

[52] Fragility Assessment South Sudan, 2012

[53] It has to be noted however, that recent developments have seriously challenged further progress in this regard.

[54] New Deal, section II §4

[55] The Somali Compact, Brussels, 16 September 2013.

[56] The report is part of the project 'Strengthening Peacebuilding Policy through Civil Society Empowerment', a collaborative partnership between the Alliance for Peacebuilding (AfP), the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC), 3P Human Security (3P) and the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies.

the global South. The inclusion of perception-based indicators into the New Deal framework has been an achievement praised by most civil society actors as these allow for more inclusive assessments of the developments in peacebuilding and statebuilding (Wall & Fairhust, 2014).

Early experiences with the New Deal, however, also show severe challenges. Wall & Fairhust point out that, despite new networks that have been established, civil society organizations are often not as unified as they potentially could be, both on the national and the transnational level. Moreover, civil society actors continue to face a lack of political will and commitment of g7+ governments to the New Deal implementation process. National governments may see civil society as potential threat to their authority. Governments that struggle with remaining in power may feel threatened by the inclusiveness advocated in the New Deal. Another challenge reported is the widespread corruption in aid, which poses fundamental threats to the comprehensive implementation of the New Deal. Moreover, the isolation of the New Deal within one ministry makes the process vulnerable to internal conflicts and sudden re-organizations within ministries. Several civil society activists from the global South also point out that donors do not sufficiently prioritize New Deal implementation. According to these actors there have been significant logistical and resource barriers for their inclusion into the New Deal process. Due to these logistical barriers, such as visas and traveling resources, the global North still seems over-represented in the whole process (Wall & Fairhust, 2014).

## 2.7 Conclusions

If we look at the New Deal, we see a declaration that reflects a larger process of changing aid architecture, peacebuilding and statebuilding practices. It is a cornerstone of new ways of engaging. The g7+ countries have, through their association, been able to let their voices be heard and change the discourse on aid effectiveness. The New Deal supports a change towards more ownership- and leadership from national governments in fragile and conflict-affected countries themselves. Findings of the Kroc Institute for International Peace studies have indicated that there are some encouraging results emerging so far. At the same time, several questions remain unresolved. The balance between common/shared indicators and country-indicators is still pending: how specific or universal can the new framework be? And does the New Deal induce *de facto* change in behaviors? How will the new role of civil society actors work out? The next chapter will investigate whether the experiences with the human security approach can be of use for the current New Deal processes that have remained unresolved or challenging.

Chapter 3

# Human security and the New Deal

## 3.1 A discourse continued…

We argue that the New Deal can be considered a continuity of discourse. While not explicitly focusing on human security or making specific reference to human security discourses and approaches, there is considerable overlap between human security and the discourse and approach promoted by the New Deal.

Since the concept took root two decades ago, human security has slowly gained ground as an alternative to a state-centric focus of security and development programming and policy. By placing an emphasis on people-centered security, it raised awareness regarding the diversity of threats to people's security, and of the different ways in which different people experience security. Furthermore, the concept brought to the attention the ways in which different threats to security are interdependent. As a result, approaches to human security need to take note of the broad spectrum of security threats and their interconnections. Hence, approaches to human security need to be comprehensive and include different stakeholders and sectors. The human security discourse also underlined the importance of the context, and the need for local grounding of interventions. Consequently, the human security discourse has led to an increasing demand to link top-down 'protection' to more bottom-up empowerment and capacity-building. The latest developments in the human security debate are aimed at re-emphasizing the need to focus on 'the local' and the emancipatory potential of the human security concept. This is considered necessary to overcome the current crisis in peacebuilding interventions, where the lacking connections of these interventions with the local contexts and failure to achieve locally relevant results have led to a deterioration of the perceived legitimacy of these interventions.

The New Deal has developed based on similar motivations. Indeed, as argued by Richmond, "The New Deal at Busan […] could not have been developed without the earlier debates on HS [human security] occurring in academia and in the policy world since the 1990s" (Richmond, 2013: 221). The New Deal does not explicitly refer to human security, but one of its five PSGs is to achieve "people's security," which arguably correlates to human security. Indeed, to measure progress on this PSG, "people's rights and needs" are taken as point of departure, and indicators look at conditions of people's physical security as well their perceptions. But more importantly, the New Deal emphasizes a new way of working in fragile contexts,

drawing on a number of flaws in past international engagement in fragile contexts.[57] Amongst others, these flaws include overly technocratic external support, underestimating the importance of harmonizing local and national contexts, and a focus on short-term results. These coincide with criticisms on the institutionalist approaches to peace- and statebuilding associated with the liberal peace discourse. Therefore, the New Deal could be considered an attempt to move away from the liberal peace approach. Like the latest developments in the debates on human security, the New Deal therefore seems to have similar aspirations. The New Deal's ambitions to tailor aid to the specific needs of different countries mirrors the call for context-specific approaches in human security debates. And as with the approaches to human security brought forward by Richmond (2010; 2013) and Peterson (2013) discussed in chapter 1, the New Deal aims to bring local, national and international actors to the same table to discuss issues of security and development. Furthermore, the New Deal emphasizes country-owned and country-led transitions out of fragility, which coincides with the focus on empowerment and emancipation promoted through the human security discourse.

## 3.2 Commonalities: problems, pitfalls, opportunities and lessons learned?

The New Deal is not only a recent development, but it is also a work in progress. As a result, it is early to analyses the actual practices of the New Deal and the ways in which it is implemented. But the analysis of the New Deal as a continuation of the human security discourse enables the observation of potential pitfalls and opportunities, and allows us to draw lessons and practical recommendations for policy makers and practitioners involved in the New Deal. Below, we look at a number of crucial issues, drawing on the analyses of the human security discourse and the New Deal in the previous two chapters.

### *3.2.1 A 'new' approach?*

The first issue is whether the New Deal indeed results in a new way of engagement in fragile contexts. It cannot be denied that the New Deal promotes a shift in policy and practice, aiming to correct a number of flaws in peace- and statebuilding interventions. Therefore, the New Deal could be viewed as the policy answer to critiques on the liberal peace model, and a move away from the institutionalist liberal peace approach to peace- and statebuilding. Indeed, the New Deal proposes a significantly different relationship between fragile and conflict affected states, civil society and donors. No longer are donors supposed to be in the driver's seat, but fragile and conflict affected states are to own and lead their own transitions out of fragility. Fragile and conflict affected states and their donors are, in the framework of the New Deal presented as equal partners. A lesson from the human security discourse, however, is that a shift in rhetoric does not guarantee a change in behavior and actions. The human security concept has from its beginning emphasized a focus on security as defined by people, and shortly after also promoted people's abilities to provide in their own security needs. Yet, the empowering rhetoric of the human security discourse could not prevent that it also justified the expansion of the roles of dominant traditional state security actors. As Richmond observes:

---

[57] The New Deal, 2011

> "While it is odd that HS [human security] can be framed in this way, without any real engagement with 'local' issues, needs, sources of identity, or authority, HS [human security] has also provided a basis by which these have increasingly become a factor in top-down versions of liberal peacebuilding." (Richmond, 2010: 45)

Thus, while a shift in rhetoric is a necessary first step, it cannot be considered to be sufficient for an actual change of policy and practice. Whether the New Deal is really 'new' depends to a large degree on the way it will evolve and the type of results it will achieve.

### *3.2.2 Ownership*

A related issue is that of ownership. The New Deal emphasizes that fragile and conflict affected states own and lead their own paths out of fragility. The question then is what this ownership constitutes in practice. First of all, it can be questioned to what extent one can speak of genuine country-ownership considering the a-symmetric power-relationships between the donors who dedicate resources and the governments of states who receive them. The rhetoric of 'country-owned and country-led' implies that while donors still pay, they will not have the final word on how fragile and conflict affected states design their paths out of fragility. Attempts to enhance local ownership may be a welcome trend, but at the same time budget cuts put donor governments under increasing pressure by their constituencies to limit their development budgets, minimize risks, and show quick results. Notwithstanding the good intentions of actors involved in the New Deal, and the real need for the changes in power-relations promoted by the New Deal, it can therefore be questioned to what extent the New Deal will be able to enable and enhance local ownership.

To enhance national ownership, support capacity building and to prevent the creation of parallel structures, the New Deal is frequently implemented through national departments of finance and planning. There is a direct link between these departments and donors, and continuing dialogue on policies and programmes concerning the New Deal. A consequence is that these departments are required to be accountable to donors, next to the accountability to their parliaments and civil society.[58] Furthermore, other departments in government are not as much involved in the New Deal process. Departments that are vital for achieving the PSGs – e.g. the presidency, the department of Defence, and the department of justice and security – may not necessarily be willing to support implementation. The policies and programmes developed under the New Deal are therefore not necessarily widely supported within the fragile and conflict affected states themselves, as actual evidence in some pilot's shows.[59]

Taking the state as the first point of reference, and placing an emphasis on working through state structures, tends to underline the position that the state government can be considered the legitimate governance actor. The first PSG, 'legitimate politics', then implicitly implies a focus on strengthening state structures and promoting good governance; a continuation of past international engagements in fragile contexts. Yet, as Van Sluijs and his colleagues point out, if the starting point of the New Deal is that transitions out of fragility should be an

[58] New Deal Expert, telephone interview by one of the authors, 23 January 2014

[59] See for example: Douma & Frerks, 2013; Van Sluijs et al. 2013.

endogenous process led by local actors, what is deemed legitimate politics can be very different in different contexts.

> "This raises the question about legitimate political actors in these contexts and how their legitimacy is defined. Ideally, the identification of legitimate actors is only a by-product of the New Deal process as it is intended to be open, people-centric and development-oriented. Nonetheless, in reality the question is a pertinent one: is a country's government automatically a legitimate actor? How should one deal with other actors assuming state-like functions on parts of a territory? Are political parties legitimate actors? What about the legitimacy of Civil Society: does the fact that they are Civil Society organizations automatically make them legitimate actors? What do they stand for and who are they representing?" (Van Sluijs et al, 2013: 6)

### *3.2.3 Civilian space and the role of civil society*

A third important issue is that of civilian space and the role of civil society in the New Deal process. The human security debate emphasized the importance of people's agency, and the need to include civil society actors in the identification of and response to human security issues. The New Deal similarly aims to include non-state and civil society actors in the process, and there has been civil society involvement in the development of indicators and the first pilot fragility assessments. Nonetheless, the emphasis of the New Deal is on processes that are country-led and country-owned, and on using and strengthening a country's governance systems. Furthermore, many of the proposed indicators are aimed at measuring the performance of state institutions. Of course, this is not necessarily bad. Improvements in the functioning of state institutions can lead to better service provision to the state's citizens, and working through state institutions prevents setting up parallel structures of governance that further weaken the state. Yet, the implicit focus on strengthening state institutions results, or may result, in a neglect of the strengthening of civil society actors and widening the civilian space. There is a risk that the focus on country ownership becomes a pretext for the *de facto* exclusion of other, particularly non-state actors. As emphasized by a number of international civil society organizations, "state-centric strategies that intentionally or unintentionally exclude civil society are still the norm" (GPPAC et al, 2013: 2). While at the level of the international dialogues there has indeed been an emphasis on civil society involvement, the extent to which civil society is at the moment participating in national processes is mixed (Van Sluijs et al, 2013: 4). Civil society in the DRC and South Sudan, for example, has gained some attention from the government during national New Deal events, with the DRC as the most promising country towards inclusive future policy-making. Other governments, such as those of Afghanistan, Liberia, Guinea or Nepal have shown less space, particularly during later stages New Deal implementation (Van Sluijs et al, 2013: 4). In several countries civilian space is reported shrinking and under threat. A recent study showed that in South Sudan, Uganda and Burundi civilian space is regularly threatened by the government. Critical actors are being seriously intimidated or worse (Douma & Frerks, 2013: 53-54). Also in Sierra Leone there is less space for CSO engagement in the New Deal implementation process. In fact, the Sierra Leone

government has dominated the process and little information on the process is available publicly.[60]

In principle, civil society has a vital role in national processes to monitor these processes and connect local needs to national policies, but in many fragile and conflict affected states the capacity of civil society is limited. The conflict has often weakened civil society, and the state is often limiting civilian space. This raises the question of what the focus on country ownership means for representation of a variety of local needs and perceptions in national processes. To assess the congruency of the New Deal document with realities on the ground, several questions remain important. First, do governments show willingness to implement the inclusiveness principle of the New Deal with regard to civil society? Second, is there sufficient civilian space left in societies? Third, is there capacity among civil society to engage and is there good quality of engagement? And fourth, when state's capacity is limited and the civil society's capacity is limited, how are the perceptions of the public included in the proposed country's fragility assessments? Civil society in Sierra Leone, for example, requests to be included in the process and that its capacities are built to support peacebuilding objectives in the longer-term.[61]

### *3.2.4 Context-specificity versus universality*

The pressure and need to include local civil society, and the emphasis on finding context-specific and locally relevant solutions also brings to the surface the tension between context-specificity and universality. The need to tailor to specific contexts has been promoted in the human security discourse, and was picked up by the New Deal. The lack of harmonization between national and local contexts was recognized as a key flaw of past peace- and statebuilding efforts. The importance of linking to local contexts has also been emphasized by both state and civil society actors in fragile and conflict affected states. Not only does it allow the development of locally relevant solutions, it also strengthens the positions of national and local actor's vis-à-vis international actors. In other words, an increased requirement to connect to local realities implies an increased relevance of local actors. At the same time, however, there is a need – especially on the donor side – to develop universal standards and indicators. Indeed, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the New Deal itself stem from a need to organize and coordinate aid and assess effectiveness along a set of universal principles. This tension between universality and context-specificity became clear in the process of the development of indicators of the PSGs, where members of the g7+ resisted indicators developed by international actors and experts (McCandless, 2013: 237-40). This tension is not solved yet and may continue to affect the implementation of the New Deal in the years to come, as well as the framing of the post-2015 development agenda.

### *3.2.5 Different priorities*

This issue relates also to tensions and disconnects between different needs, priorities, interpretations, norms and values. The interpretation of what the problem is and what should be done about it may (and most likely will) differ, depending on who you ask. The New Deal

[60] Communication by civil society representative Sierra Leone

[61] Communication by civil society representative Sierra Leone

sets an important step by bringing international actors, state actors and civil society actors together around the table as equal partners. Yet, these actors may not necessarily agree on what direction to take and what the priorities are. Human rights and gender issues are among the top priorities for donors, but they are not necessarily first priorities of governments that struggle to control a fragile and conflict affected country. Indeed, gender proved to be a contested issue during the negotiations of the New Deal, and as a result there is less emphasis on gender issues in the final document.[62] The processes of negotiating contested issues can be viewed through the framework of Richmond's post-liberal human security approach discussed in chapter one. Engagement with local actors then implies engaging with local understandings and practices of security and development, recognizing difference, enabling agency and respecting autonomy as far as possible (Richmond, 2010: 44). At the same time, however, this engagement would include presenting local actors and contexts with norms and practices regarding, for instance, human rights and gender. Lotz (2010) discusses the role of international norms in statebuilding and how these can conflict with entrenched local customs. He states:

> "A pragmatic approach to statebuilding demands a discussion and rethinking of current concepts and practices. We need to understand better what the sources of international norms are, what dilemmas and trade-offs are involved in their application and how mechanisms for engaging national statebuilding actors work." (2010: 220)

In further implementation of the New Deal there will continue to be contested issues. Indeed, coming across contested issues is inherent to a dialogue between different actors with different interests. The question is how such issues are discussed and negotiated.

### 3.2.6 *Engagement in hybrid political orders*

As mentioned in chapter one, the human security approach may provide inroads for engagement with hybrid political orders. As indicated, hybridity is not only a characteristic of the context in which intervening actors operate. Hybridity is also something that intervening actors inevitably become part of and something they partly give shape themselves. The New Deal mentions the involvement of non-state actors with regard to security and justice provision, it seems, however, not to be specified how exactly engagements are channeled into these hybrid forms of government, or how aid will be directed accordingly. Questions remain on which non-state actors are regarded legitimate actors to work with. Effective engagement and successful New Deal implementation therefore requires further reflection as well as further operationalization of how to deal with non-state actors and parallel structures of governance.

### 3.2.7 *Local versus global*

So far, many of the points discussed above concern the inclusion of local and national actors. And both the human security discourse and the New Deal emphasize the need for improved connections to local contexts and realities. This is also something that is being advocated by

[62] Dutch government official, interview by two of the authors, 10 December 2013, The Hague

both national actors and civil society actors in fragile and conflict-affected states. The points mentioned above therefore also discussed issues of ownership and inclusion. Yet, the emphasis on the local also risks neglecting regional or global issues that can contribute to fragility and conflict. As argued by Demmers, the discourse of state fragility creates a division between failed and successful states, which is linked to matters of containment and control. "Such a division tends to create a 'geopolitical disconnect' that situates the sources of disorder and violence as endemic and inherently local" (Demmers, 2014). In other words, the problem of state fragility is to be found and tackled within the boundaries of fragile contexts. Yet, the focus on 'local solutions to local problems' may distract from structural sources of conflict and fragility situated outside the realm or reach of fragile and conflict affected states. These may include struggles for resources, transnational organized crime, global trade and economic inequalities and exploitative relationships. The question is then to what extent national and local actors in fragile states are able to place such global issues on the agenda, and what leverage they have to push for action. Similarly, it is interesting in what ways and on what issues the g7+ is able to exert influence. During the process of developing indicators for the PSGs, the g7+ was able to resist the initial international-led process, and force international partners to accept "their role as one of listening, and facilitating the sharing of experiences and building of consensus across national settings" (McCandless, 2013: 239).

## 3.3 Implications and steps ahead

In the section above, we discussed a number of issues that emerged from the analysis of the human security discourse and the New Deal. In this section we will look at the implications of our analysis, and draw a number of lessons and practical recommendations. With the New Deal still being a debated work in progress, it is too early to judge the implementation of its policies and programmes. But it is clear that the rhetoric of New Deal advocates a shift from past peace- and statebuilding policies and interventions. Yet, at the same time the New Deal represents a continuation of discourse, and several of its ambitions can be traced back to the human security discourse. The question is therefore what lessons can be learned from the human security discourse and human security approaches. And, relatedly, to what extent human security can strengthen the New Deal.

The human security discourse suggests that to address the variety of security issues threatening human security and development, the inclusion and participation of a range of actors from different fields and sectors is necessary. This relates to the above discussed issues of ownership, participation and inclusion in the New Deal. What actors are involved in the New Deal and how? It is clear that a country-owned and country-led process does not automatically translate in country-wide and society-wide ownership and participation. Furthermore, the fact that the state government is the first point of contact does not guarantee the internal legitimacy, and various non-state actors may have assumed state-like functions in particular regions of a state or particular spheres of state governance. We argue that the New Deal should follow its spirit of dialogue, and draw on the latest developments in the human security debate discussed in chapter 1. This includes actively engaging with local understandings, practices and norms, recognizing difference, enabling agency and respecting autonomy as far as possible (Richmond 2010: 44). Yet, this does not only count for

international actors engaging in the institutional hybridity of fragile and conflict affected contexts, but also for state actors engaging with the variety of non-state actors within their country. Drawing on the human security discourse, the New Deal should therefore strengthen its engagement with a wider variety of actors, both within the state (different departments) and outside the state. The New Deal has set an important step in creating a dialogue at the international level between international donors, governments of fragile and conflict affected states and civil society as equal partners. The New Deal should increase its efforts to stimulate a similar dialogue at national levels.

This engagement and promotion of dialogue is not only a task of the governments of fragile and conflict affected states. The human security discourse emphasizes that security is people-centered, inclusive and participatory, and one of the PSGs of the New Deal is to establish and strengthen people's security. The engagement and participation of the people is therefore vital. This can be stimulated through the above mentioned increased dialogue between international actors, state actors, civil society, non-state actors and communities. To enable such dialogues on the basis of equality, an open civilian space and a strong civil society are of the essence. If the main goal of the New Deal is to strengthen fragile and conflict affected states towards resilience, it also needs to strengthen civil society and promote civilian space more energetically as these are in fact threatened in a number of fragile contexts. It would therefore be recommendable to include investigations of local participation and the openness of civilian space in national processes. Questions then include: what kind of civil society actors are participating in the process, what kind of role they have, whom do they represent, to what extent can they criticize state and society, etc.

As mentioned above, engaging with such a variety of actors in dialogue will invariably bring to the fore the differences in understanding on what the goals for security and development are, and how to achieve them. Different actors have different interpretations, narratives, experiences, interests, priorities, norms, values, etc. For constructive engagement and advancement of the New Deal and human security in practice, the various conceptual, theoretical, political, policy, practical and institutional disconnects therefore need to be understood. Further research is needed to enhance our understanding of these disconnects. Analyzing their underlying causes, and finding ways to bridge them where possible, can support and promote dialogue between different actors.

The New Deal could be strengthened by including a more explicit focus on human security. The New Deal aims to promote people's security, and to address the underlying everyday factors that contribute to conflict. Approaches to human security that have been developed over the last two decades provide practical inroads for attaining these goals. While human security approaches like the New Deal emphasize context-specificity, human security also highlights the interconnections between a great variety of threats. This allows opening up discussions on global factors contributing to conflict and fragility. Furthermore, human security can provide tools to strengthen the role of civil society actors in fragile and conflict affected states. Civil society actors have generally adopted the concept of human security more keenly than governments, as its focus on people's security needs and empowerment.

# Literature


Albrecht, U. et al. (2007) *A European Way of Security*. Madrid Report of the EU's Human Security Study Group.

Baxmann, M., Hamacher, J. and A. Wittkowsky (eds.) (2012) Report FriEnt-Workshop, 19 January 2012 in Berlin: *A New Deal for Fragile States International Engagement after Busan*. Bonn: FriEnt Imprint.

Boege, V., A. Brown, K. Clements and A. Nolan (2009a) ''Undressing the Emperor: A reply to Our Discussants.''' in: M. Fisher and B. Schmelzle (eds.) *Building Peace in the Absence of States: Challenging the Discourse on State Failure*. Berghof Handbook Dialogue, No. 8. Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management.

Boege, V., A. Brown and K. Clements (2009b) "Hybrid Political Orders, Not Fragile States." in: *Peace* Review 21(1): 13-21.

Boege, V., A. Brown, K. Clements and A. Nolan (2008) ''On Hybrid Political Orders and Emerging States: State Formation in the Context of 'Fragility.''' *Berghof Handbook Dialogue*, No. 8., Online Version. Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management.

Chenoy, Anuradha M. (2009) "The Gender and Human Security Debate." in: *Institute of Development Studies Bulletin*. 40(2): 44-49.

Christie, R. (2010) "Critical Voices and Human Security: To Endure, To Engage or To Critique?" in: *Security Dialogue*. 41(2): 169-190.

CHS (Commission on Human Security) (2003) *Human Security Now: Protecting and Empowering People*. New York: Commission on Human Security.

DCAF (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces) (2011) *SSR in a Nutshell: Manual for Introductory Training on Security Sector Reform*. Geneva: DCAF.

Demmers, J. (2014) "Naming the failed state: a politics of judgment." *Online Debate: Foreign Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Contexts*. Knowledge Platform Security & Rule of Law. 9 January 2014. <http://www.kpsrl.org/online-debate/online-debate_discussion/t/naming-the-failed-state-a-politics-of-judgment> [Accessed on 29 January 2014]

Douma, Pyt and Georg Frerks (2013) *Fragility by Choice, a scoping study in Burundi, South Sudan and Uganda, a synthesis report on research commissioned by the Dutch Consortium for Rehabilitation* (DCR) (p. 1-80).

Faria, F. (2011) *What's in the "New Deal" for engagement in fragile states?* Published online on 9 December. European Centre for Policy Development, talking points publication. http://www.ecdpm-talkingpoints.org [Accessed on 13 December 2013].

Frerks, G. & B. Klein Goldewijk (eds.) (2007) *Human Security and International Insecurity*. Wageningen: Wageningen Academic Publishers.

Gómez, O.S., D. Gasper and Y. Mine (2013) *Good practices in addressing human security through Human Development Reports*. Human Development Report Office. Occasional Paper. New York: UNDP

GPPAC, The Civil Society Network for Human Security and IKV Pax Christi (2013) *The Human Security Approach in Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding*. A Civil Society Position Paper

Government of the Republic of South-Sudan (2012). *Fragility Assessment*.

Government of the Somali Republic. (2013). *The Somali Compact*. 16 September. Brussels. http://www.pbsbdialogue.org/The%20Somali%20Compact.pdf [Accessed on: 20 January 2014]

Hagmann, T. and D. Péclard (2010) "Negotiating Statehood: dynamics of power and domination in Africa." in: *Development and Change* 41(4): 539-562.

Howard-Hassmann, Rhoda E. (2012) "Human Security: Undermining Human Rights?" in: *Human Rights Quarterly*. 34(1): 88-112.

Human Security Centre. (2005) *Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21st Century*. New York: Oxford University Press.

IDPS (2013a) *Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Indicators - Progress, Interim List and next steps*. Third International Dialogue Global Meeting "The New Deal: Achieving Better Results and Shaping the Global Agenda" 19 April 2013, Washington, D.C. (document for discussion). http://www.pbsbdialogue.org/newsandevents/specialevents/idgm3.html [Accessed on 30 December 2013].

IDPS (2013b) *Washington Communiqué on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding*. Third International Dialogue Global Meeting "The New Deal: Achieving Better Results and Shaping the Global Agenda" 19 April 2013, Washington, D.C. Online available: http://www.post2015hlp.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/The-Washington-Communique%CC%81-19-April-2013.pdf [Accessed on 10 January 2014].

IDPS (2012a) *Progress Report on Fragility Assessments and Indicators*. Working Group on Indicators. Published on 4 December. http://www.newdeal4peace.org/resources-and-links/ [Accessed on 20 December 2013].

IDPS (2012b) *A guide to implementing the New Deal*. 1 August. http://www.newdeal4peace.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/a-guide-to-implementing-the-new-deal-final-18092012.pdf http://www.newdeal4peace.org/resources-and-links/[Accessed on 20 December 2013]

IDPS (2011) *Monrovia Roadmap*. July. http://www.pbsbdialogue.org/ [Accessed on 8 December 2013].

IDPS (2011) *A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States*. Endorsed by the IDPS members during the Fourth High-level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan (29 November – 1 December) http://www.newdeal4peace.org [Accessed on 8 December 2013].

IDPS (International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding) (2010). *Dili Declaration*. 10 April. http://www.pbsbdialogue.org/ [Accessed on 8 December 2013].

Koehler, G., D. Gasper, R. Jolly and M. Simane (2012) *Human Security and the Next Generation of Comprehensive Human Development Goals*. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies.

Krause, K. and M. Williams (eds.) (1997) Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases. London: UCL Press.

Liotta, P.H and T. Owen (2006) "Why Human Security?" *Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*. Vol. VII, No. 1: 37-55.

Lotz C. (2010). "International Norms in Statebuilding: Finding a Pragmatic Approach", *Global Governance*, Apr-Jun 2010; 16, 2, 219-236.

Lund, C. (ed.) (2007) *Twilight Institutions. Public Authority and Local Politics in Africa*. Malden: Blackwell Publishing.

Martin, M. and T. Owen (2010) "The second generation of human security: lessons from the UN and EU experience." in: *International Affairs*. 86(1): 211-224.

Members of Roundtable 7 Third High-level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, Accra. (2008). *Kinshasa Statement*. 2 July. http://www.pbsbdialogue.org [Accessed on 30 December 2013].

Members of the Third High-level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, Accra. (2008). *Accra Agenda for Action*. 2 – 4 September. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ACCRAEXT/Resources/4700790-1217425866038/AAA-4-SEPTEMBER-FINAL-16h00.pdf [Accessed on 4 January 2014].

Menkhaus, K. (2008) "The rise of a mediated state in northern Kenya: the Wajir story and its implications for state-building." in: *Africa Focus* 21(2): 23-38.

Menkhaus, K. (2007a) "Governance without government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping." in: *International Security* 31(3): 74-106.

Menkhaus, K. (2007b) "Security Systems in Somali East Africa." in: L. Anderson, B. Møller and F. Stepputat, *Fragile States and Insecure People? Violence, Security and Statehood in the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Palgrave.

Menkhaus, K. (2006) *Governance in the Hinterland of Africa's Weak States: Toward a Theory of the Mediated State*. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott, Loews Philadelphia, and the Pennsylvania Convention Center, Philadelphia.

Moussa, Ghada (2008) "Gender Aspects of Human Security." in: *International Social Science Journal*. 59(s1): 81-100.

Newman, E. (2011) "A Human Security Peace-Building Agenda." in: *Third World Quarterly*. 32(10): 1737-1756.

North, D.C., J.J. Wallis and B.R. Weingast (2009) *Violence and Social Orders. A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History*. New York: Cambridge University Press

OECD (2013) *Fragile States 2013: Resource flows and trends in a shifting world*. OECD publishing.

OECD (2012) *Development: Aid to developing countries falls because of global recession*. OECD Development Co-operation Directorate (DCD-DAC) website, https://www.oecd.org/dac/developmentaidtodevelopingcountriesfallsbecauseofglobalrecession.htm [Accessed on 8 December 2013].

OECD. (2011) *International Engagement in Fragile States: Can't we do better?* OECD publishing.

OECD (2009) *Concepts and dilemmas of State building in fragile situations: From fragility to resilience. OECD Journal on Development*. 9(3).

OECD (2007a) *Handbook on Security System Reform (SSR): Supporting Security and Justice*. OECD: Paris.

OECD (2007b) *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States & Situations*. OECD: Paris.

Peterson, J.H. (2013) "Creating Space for Emancipatory Human Security: Liberal Obstructions and the Potential of Agonism." in: *International Studies Quarterly*. 57(2): 318-328

Richmond, O.P. (2013) "Human Security and its subjects." in: *International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis*. 68(1): 205-225.

Richmond, O.P. (2010) "Post-colonial hybridity and the return of human security." in: D. Chandler and N. Hynek (ed.) *Critical Perspectives on Human Security: Rethinking Emancipation and Power in International Relations*. London/New York: Routledge.

Schirch, L. (2012) *From Protection of Civilians to Human Security. Comparing and contrasting principles, distinctions, and institutionalization*. 3P Human Security.

Svensson, Katja (2007) "Human security as inclusive security—gender, epistemology and equality." in: *African Security Review*, 16:2, 1-13

Taylor, Viviene (2004) "From State Security to Human Security and Gender Justice." in: *Agenda*. 59: 65-70.

Thérien, J.-P. (2012) "Human Security: The Making of a UN Ideology." in: *Global Society*. 26(2): 191-213

UN (2012a) *Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 10 September 2012* (A/66/290)

UN (2012b) *Follow-up to General Assembly resolution 64/291 on human security. Report of the Secretary-General*. (A/66/763).

UN (2008) *Third High-level Forum on Aid Effectiveness Accra, 2-4 September: Chair's summary*. http://www.undg.org/docs/10447/Chair-summary23Oct08.pdf [Accessed on: 2 January 2014]

UNDP (1994) *Human Development Report 1994*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

UN OCHA (2013) *Applying the Human Security Approach through the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security*. Human Security Unit. New York: UN OCHA.

UN OCHA (2009) *Human Security in Theory and Practice. Application of the Human Security Concept and the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security*. Human Security Unit. New York: UN OCHA.

Van Overbeek, F., Hollander, T. B. M., Van der Molen, I., Willems, R. C., Frerks, G. E., & Anten, L. (2009) *The fragile states discourse unveiled.* 28 May, working paper: Peace Security and Development Network.

Van Sluijs, P., U. Keller, S. Bachtold (2013) *The New Deal and the Role of Civil Society*. Swiss Centre for Peace-building. http://www.swisspeace.ch [Accessed on 30 December 2013].

Wall, K. and R. Fairhust. (2014). *Assessing Civil Society Engagement with the New Deal: Opportunities and Challenges.* Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame.

Willems, R.C. (2013a) *Discussion paper: Security, for whom and by whom?* Working group Comprehensive Approach for Human Security. The Hague: Knowledge Platform Security and Rule of Law.

Willems, R.C. (2013b) *The Dynamics of Security Provision in the Aftermath of War*. Doctoral dissertation. Utrecht University.

3P Human Security (2011) *Defining Human Security*. Policy Brief.

# Annex 1

## Participants

| Dialogue participants (countries) | New Deal endorsements (countries) |
|---|---|
| Afghanistan | Afghanistan |
| Australia | Australia |
| Austria | Austria |
| Belgium | Belgium |
| Brazil | Burundi |
| Burundi | Canada |
| Canada | Central African Republic |
| Central African Republic | Chad |
| Chad | Democratic Republic of Congo |
| Chile | Denmark |
| China | Finland |
| Côte d'Ivoire | France |
| Democratic Republic of the Congo | Germany |
| Denmark | Guinea-Bissau |
| Ethiopia | Haiti |
| Finland | Ireland |
| France | Japan |
| Germany | Liberia |
| Greece | Luxembourg |
| Guinea-Bissau | Netherlands |
| Guinea | New Zealand |
| Haiti | Norway |
| Ireland | Portugal |
| Italy | Republic of Korea |
| Japan | Sierra Leone |
| Korea | Solomon Islands |
| Liberia | Somalia |
| Luxembourg | South Sudan |
| Nepal | Sweden |
| Netherlands | Switzerland |
| New Zealand | Timor-Leste |
| Norway | |
| Papua New Guinea | |
| Portugal | |
| Sierra Leone | |

| Dialogue participants (countries) | New Deal endorsements (countries) |
|---|---|
| Somalia | Togo |
| South Sudan | United Kingdom |
| Spain | United States |
| Sweden | |
| Switzerland | |
| Timor-Leste | |
| Togo | |
| United Kingdom | |
| United States | |

| Dialogue participants (International organizations) | New Deal endorsements (International organizations) |
|---|---|
| African Development Bank | African Development Bank |
| African Union | Asian Development Bank |
| Asian Development Bank | European Union |
| European Union | Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) |
| International Monetary Fund | UN Development Group |
| Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) | World Bank |
| United Nations | |
| World Bank | |

## G7+ countries

Afghanistan
Burundi
Central African
Republic
Chad
Comoros
Cote d'Ivoire
DRC
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Haiti
Liberia
Papua New Guinea
Sierra Leone
Solomon Islands
Somalia
South Sudan
Timor-Leste
Togo

# Annex 2

At the ministerial, senior level, meetings of the Dialogue take place every year. These meetings are the principal forum for political dialogue and decision-making by the members of the Dialogue. There are two co-chairs that represent the fragile states and the development partners. These co-chairs also provide leadership and strategic direction for the Dialogue. Currently, early 2014, the Dialogue is co-chaired by Emilia Pires (Timor-Leste) and Christian Friis Bach (Denmark). There is a steering group, which provides guidance, coordination and oversight in order to achieve and deliver the Dialogue's work program. The secretariat, hosted by the OECD, works in close cooperation with the g7+, the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) and civil society secretariats. Under name of the Dialogue also three operating working groups have been installed:

- A working group on New Deal implementation;
- A working group to develop indicators for the Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals;
- A strategic team dedicated to promoting the Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals.

The mandate and the progress in the implementation of the agreed work programme are reviewed at the yearly Dialogue meetings and at steering group meetings. The Dialogue further allows setting up additional ad-hoc teams at the request of the steering group to work on specific issues with tight deadlines.


Sophialaan 10
2514 JR The Hague
The Netherlands

T +31 (0)70 302 8130
info@kpsrl.org
www.kpsrl.org