



# POLITICAL CULTURE ON THE NATIONAL WEB

THE ROLE OF POLITICAL CULTURE IN ONLINE POLITICAL ACTIVITY  
AND THE CASE OF HUNGARIAN POLITICS ON FACEBOOK

Linda Kata Börzsei

3893057

Utrecht University

MA New Media and Digital Culture

22 September 2013

Tutor: Joost Raessens

Second reader: René Glas

# table of contents.

<i>Abstract</i>	<i>iii</i>
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	<i>iv</i>
<i>Introduction</i>	1
Research questions and goals	3
Research outline: theories and methods	4
<i>I. Political culture on the national web</i>	7
Studying the national web	7
The political culture approach	10
The effect of political culture on the national web	11
Recontextualizing political culture	13
<i>II. Hungarian political culture on the Hungarian web</i>	20
The political culture of Hungary	20
The Hungarian web	24
The case of Facebook and Hungarian political culture	27
<i>Conclusion</i>	39
<i>Bibliography</i>	42
<i>Appendix</i>	47

## **abstract.**

The emerging field of national web studies aims to offer new perspectives on studying the internet: it calls for framing the internet not as a global and virtual entity but one which comprises multiple heterogeneous layers embedded in social contexts. The national web as an object of study describes layers of this sort, focusing on web spaces that are demarcated by national lines. In this thesis, I propose an approach to analyse national webs as well as demonstrate this approach's usefulness. I argue that national identity and other political beliefs and values have a considerable impact on the formation and workings of the national web, and therefore the political culture approach can be a great asset in investigating political activity online. After conceptualizing the role of political culture in the national web as well as the influence of the internet on different political beliefs, I show how Hungarian political culture in particular shapes and is shaped by political activity on Facebook.

### **Keywords**

national web, internet politics, political culture, *Facebook*, Hungary

## **acknowledgements.**

to Therese Schedifka and Despina Skordili for the coffees and the laughs, the complaining and the discussions on theoretical frameworks.

to my parents for their excellent parenting and unconditional support.

to Detti for the long-distance encouragement during two out of the two theses I have written.

to Philip for pep talks, flawless copy-editing, and hours of stress-resolving Minecraft.

*"Technology is like a mirror; if an idiot looks in, you can't expect an apostle to look out." (Stephen Fry)*

## introduction.

“Hungarian memes for the Hungarian web!” - reads the text on the cover image, accompanied by an image of a moustached Barack Obama. *Hungarizált mémek* (32,355 likes) is one of the many sites<sup>1</sup> that collect instances of a meme that involves photoshopping a particular drawing of a moustache on other famous memes, movie posters, screen captures, even photographs of politicians occasionally, and adding a catchphrase in a boorish Hungarian translation. These “Hungarianized” image macros parody both the characters it transforms and the rural Hungarian stereotype; furthermore it stands as a particularly literal and poignant example of the localization and especially “nationalization” of web content and the web.

The “nationalization” of web space actually began in the mid-1980s with the introduction of geographic determinates, such as .fr or .jp for websites originating in France and Japan respectively (Saunders 2011, 49). Although such determinates for every country in the world exist to this day, the internet has most often been framed as global and virtual. The internet has been described as the flagship of globalization, in particular of communication (Slevin 2002) and of information (Hartley 2003): it is both a factor and an indicator (Engel 1999) of the set of processes that “realize commonality by increasing homogeneity and reducing diversity” (Hopkins 2006, 7). Virtuality is another frequently referenced characteristic of the internet, meaning the internet is understood in terms of its

---

<sup>1</sup> Collections of Hungaro-memes can be found on multiple sites, among others: <https://www.facebook.com/hungaromemhu?ref=ts>; <http://hungaromemes.tumblr.com/>

“placelessness” and a separation from “real life” that results in the existence of a distinct cyberspace.

However, only analysing the internet from this angle can impair our understanding about the full impact of the internet on our society, as well as hinder us in learning about the ways the internet is more and more embedded in our lives. In scholarly analyses, we need to account for the fact that instead of being a monolithic entity, the internet is “full of heterogeneous zones and layers” (Rieder 2012, n.p.), such as “language and culture zones”, exemplified by national domains, targeted advertising, and other localized content (Rogers et al. 2013). To capture the ways the internet is localized and embedded in different social and cultural contexts, Rogers et al. recommend to explore “national webs” as units of analysis. An emerging field in the larger area of internet studies, national web studies is based on analyzing the internet according to multiple webs demarcated according to national borders (Rogers et al. 2013).

Focusing on the nation as a guide in navigating the internet is founded on the fact that the nation is still a significant integrating force (Verba 1965, 528; Hartley 2003, 258-9), retaining its place as one of the key forms of organization in the world. Nationality is often of considerable importance in identity formation offline and online alike; as Miller and Slater remarked, “the object we call the internet actually consists of groups such as the Trinidadians”, because people use the internet as themselves, through their own identities and coming from a specific social and cultural context (2000, 7-8).

This points to a crucial question that needs to be addressed when studying national web. What makes the national web national? In what ways is it embedded in the life of a nation, what is its function in the nation if it belongs to it as such? As a nation is in its simplest sense a community or grouping of people, “imagined” or not, one answer to these questions must lie with the members of nations. Thus, this thesis will focus on how people effectively shape the

national web with their national identities and other political beliefs , and how that web might shape their beliefs too.

### **Research questions and goals**

In this master's thesis, I would like to investigate how and with what approach national webs can be fruitfully analyzed. In order to answer this question, I will examine the concept of the national web and propose a theoretical framework with which its nature and workings can be assessed usefully. I will argue that political culture is a particularly relevant approach to the study of national webs, as not only is the national web a concept filled with political connotations, but political culture as an approach describes the many attitudes and beliefs of people that shape political activity on the internet and consequently the (national) web space in which it occurs.

This research will take place in the paradigm of national web studies as described in two seminal papers (Baeza-Yates et al. 2007; Rogers et al. 2013), which in itself is an emerging subfield of internet studies. I will concentrate on the concepts of national web and political culture in this context, and devise a theoretical framework to investigate national webs as well as showcase this framework's potential by using it in a case study on the online political scene and political culture of Hungary. In the course of this research, I will look at the questions of what the national web and political culture are, where and in what way political culture appears on the internet, what influence it can have on the national web, and how political culture can at the same time also be influenced by the context of the web.

National web studies was coined by Rogers et al. who suggest a change in the object of study when it comes to the internet, and they argue that the concept of the national web represents “a

historical shift in the study of the Internet, and especially how the web's location-awareness repositions the Internet as an object of study" (Rogers et al. 2013). I will analyze and critique Rogers et al.'s conception of the national web and their approach to studying it, and argue that there is a need for alternative frameworks that are not only useful practical approaches but at the same time can advance our understanding of national webs and how one's belonging to a particular nation, with all its connotations, influences how they appear on the web and how they use the web. In this thesis, I will attempt to create such a theoretical framework to investigate the changing dynamics of the internet, based on the concept of political culture.

### **Research outline: theories and methods**

In order to find how national webs can be analyzed with the help of political culture, I will construct a theoretical framework to conceptualize this perspective, and then apply it in a mixed-methods case study exploring Hungarian political culture and its influence on the country's national web.

The first section will contain my proposed theoretical framework to studying national webs, or the "knowing-that" as Gilbert Ryle referred to it (Elsaesser & Buckland 2012, 5): I will describe and explain the concepts, presumptions and propositions that are necessary for understanding political culture on the national web, drawing on several media, cultural and social theories. Firstly, I will conduct a literature review (as defined in Herek 2011, 143) about earlier studies that focus on a particular national web, followed by a discussion of the different definitions and understandings of the concept, after which I will compare them to definitions of the nation (Rogers et al. 2013; White 2006). In the next section, I will introduce the notion of political culture as

defined by political scientists (Elkins & Simeon 1979; Goldfarb 2012; Pye 1965; Verba 1965) through a literature review, and I will summarize the most important aspects of its analysis. As political culture is not an integrated theory but rather a set of variables or an approach (Almond & Verba 1989, 26; Verba 1965, 526), the third section will follow with my conceptualization of political culture on the national web, which is based greatly on the theory of cultural transmission (Thompson 1995) as re-interpreted for the internet (Slevin 2002), and the dynamics of media use as developed from an ethnographic perspective (Miller & Slater 2000). The last section of the theoretical framework will focus on how the different sets of assumptions that comprise political culture are potentially “moulded” and transformed in the process of informing online political activity, guided by four dimensions of political culture (Verba 1965), and working from the observations about the social and political impact of the internet of several media scholars (Bimber et al. 2010; Chadwick 2009; Hartley 2003; Hepp 2013; Margetts et al. 2013; Mazzoleni & Schulz 1999; Saunders 2004; Slevin 2002; Thompson 1995).

In the second part of the thesis, I will ground and test this theoretical framework about political culture on the national web with a descriptive and illustrative case study. This research method - or "knowing-how" as termed by Ryle (Elsaesser & Buckland 2012, 6) - is aimed at empirically investigating a phenomenon in its real-life context (Yin 2009, 3). In order to see political culture on the national web in such circumstances, I will focus on the political culture of Hungary and its interrelationship with the Hungarian web. I will introduce both Hungarian political culture and its national web in two descriptive sections, where I will review the works of political and social scientists (Batory 2010; Boros-Kazai 2005; Körösényi 1999; Tóth 2009; 2010), as well as reports and statistics (Tóth 2012; SocialTimes.me). The

source of empirical data in the case study will be Facebook, more precisely the creation and liking of pages, as Facebook is the most widely used social networking site in Hungary, as well as the second most visited website among Hungarians (Tóth 2012, 41; 2012, 43). I will use two methods to collect data from Facebook: web sphere analysis and direct observation. A web sphere is a collection of web objects (either connected by hyperlinks or not) that focus on a given topic or event, which is then analysed often within a temporal framework (Schneider & Foot 2004, 158). As political culture informs people's reactions to political events, web sphere analysis will help identify the Facebook pages whose creation and liking can be understood as reacting and expressing opinion about a certain event in Hungarian politics. As a research method, direct observation involves monitoring a segment of reality, for example the behaviour of people in certain circumstances for a given period of time (Yin 2009, 109). Through direct observation, I will collect Facebook pages that are the most liked among Hungarians and which best showcase the influence or lack of influence of political culture on participation in politics on Facebook.

In order to interpret this data in the light of the findings about Hungarian political culture, I will use the method or analytical technique of pattern matching, which Tellis defines as the comparing of hypotheses with observations acquired empirically (1997, n.p.). Through applying this method, I will assess which predictions hold true in the light of real-life data, as well as what sort of online political activity could be the manifestation of what political attitude or belief. This pattern matching exercise will be a test of how useful the proposed theoretical framework is in investigating actual online political activity, as well as provide further insights into the workings of the online Hungarian political scene.

# **1. political culture on the national web.**

## **1.1 Studying the national web**

National web studies - the emerging field in internet studies based on the national web - was coined and described in the seminal paper of Rogers et al. (2013). This follows a series of studies published in the past decade that already focused on the internet or specific websites in a national context, but without identifying it as a specific field. These studies have employed a variety of angles and research methods, such as analyzing the public web space of specific national domains using web characterization methods (a comparative analysis of such studies can be found in Baeza-Yates et al. 2007), investigating the influence and role of the internet with an ethnographic approach focused on separate countries (Miller & Slater 2000, Trinidad and Tobago; Wheeler 2001, Kuwait), and looking at big data to find out how political activity is organized and national politics are discussed on the internet (Etling et al. 2010, blogs in Russia; Ausserhofer & Maireder 2013, Twitter use in Austria). Although the methods and approaches of these studies can lead to interesting results, as they do not explicitly refer to their object of study as a national web, these studies do not concern themselves with the conceptualization of a web space that belongs to a particular nation.

Rogers et al. explain that the aim of national web studies is to analyze web space as demarcated by national lines, as well as investigate the ways the national web might reflect what is happening “on the

ground” (2013). Rogers et al., who coined the term ‘national web studies’, explored the workings of national webs with the emphasis on web health, through methods of web characterization. Where exactly these national lines can be found on the internet remains inconclusive, however. In their study, Rogers et al. describe two quite different sets of criteria for finding websites that belong to a particular national web, but then opt to develop their own approach based on device cultures and web metrics (partly due to the fact that a national web can not be automatically demarcated by software based on these definitions, 2013). These definitions, however, do merit further discussion. White argues that as there is no universally accepted definition for ‘nation’ or ‘nation-state’, researchers should clarify what they mean by the concept (White 2006, 264). Therefore, before using the national web as an object of study, it needs to be explicit what exactly the ‘nation’ is in ‘national web’.

The first definition Rogers et al. discussed was devised by the Royal Library of the Netherlands concerning Dutch websites (2013). In their opinion, a website can be considered Dutch if at least one of the following criteria is met: the site is registered in the Netherlands, it is written in Dutch, or its subject matter is related to the Netherlands (Rogers et al. 2013). The other definition mentioned in the study was reached through a survey (Zarrinbakhsh cited in Rogers et al. 2013) among Iranian bloggers about the Iranian web. According to the surveyed Iranians, it is only web content authored by Iranians (regardless of language or location) that can be considered national (Rogers et al. 2013).

The two understandings can yield very different results when used to find national webs. The Royal Library of the Netherlands represents a more objective approach to the question, where the idea of the national is related more to the civic institution of the state: regardless of who the author is, if the web content can be connected to the state of the Netherlands (based on location, official language, etc.), it belongs to the national web. In the view of Iranian bloggers, it is

national identity that defines the national web, a more subjective concept. A similar duality exists in the many scholarly debates concerning the nation, that of the civic and the ethnic nation. As White explains, a civic nation is led by a sovereign government, which serves all people within its borders, regardless of ethnicity, race or other cultural identifiers (2006, 257), a view echoed in the demarcation of the national web as defined by the Royal Library of the Netherlands. The ethnic nation comprises an ethnically homogeneous group, whose members share kinship, language, and possibly religion and many customs, controls its own sovereign government, which then aims to protect the integrity of the group (White 2006, 257). The national web described by Iranian bloggers emphasizes this shared identity that shows both on- and offline.

As the national web ought to reflect the heterogeneity of the internet and its embeddedness in different social contexts, in defining and analyzing the national web, the specific social and political situation of the nation in question should be accounted for. Citizens' political assumptions and value systems - collectively called political culture - impact social and political life to a great extent in a political system such as the nation, including social and political activity on the internet. It has indeed been argued that political culture forms one of the most significant forces of influence over the way the internet is adapted and adopted into different national contexts, capable of both encouraging and constraining the usage of different devices and applications (Foot et al. 2011, 42; Kluver 2004a, 436; Kluver 2004b, 75-76). In the following section, I will discuss the most important aspects of the political culture approach, as well as further conceptualize how political culture shapes national webs.

## **1.2 The political culture approach**

The term political culture was coined to describe a set of variables that can be used in the construction of theories about the cultural aspect of political life and to find the cultural supports for democracy (Almond & Verba 1989, 26; Goldfarb 2012, 22). The political culture of a society can be defined as “the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which defines the situation in which political action takes place” and the political system is embedded (Almond qtd. in Pye 1965,7; Verba 1965, 513). People’s emotions, basic ethical and political values, cognitions, attitudes, assumptions, and expectations concerning politics form a distinct, subjective realm of political life (Elkins & Simeon 1979, 127; Kluver 2004a, 438-9; Pye 1965, 7; 1965, 9; Verba 1965, 513; 1965, 515), beyond and behind the formal structure of political institutions and the objective account of political events. Attitudes and beliefs have a role both in identity formation and as heuristic devices, but as Delli Carpini points out, in certain cases they can turn out to be based on misconceptions, stereotypes and inaccuracies, leading to actions against one’s interest (2008, 406). Nevertheless, these beliefs are not merely random congeries, but they form patterns that make up a “mind set” which stems from both collective and individual experiences, such as history, and political, philosophical and religious traditions (Elkins & Simeon 1979, 128; Kluver 2004a, 439; Pye 1965, 7-8).

Political culture can be understood as a “system of control” (Verba 1965, 517), because it shapes the shared ideals of a society about their political life and practices (Pye 1965, 9), as well as defines the realm, where members of the political system act and make decisions (Elkins & Simeon 1979, 128). Political culture provides guidelines, coherence and an available range of options in terms of the means and ways of political action: participation and interactions with other political actors, people’s reactions to political events, and how formal political institutions operate (Elkins & Simeon 1979, 141; Pye 1965, 7; Verba 1965, 517).

Naturally, these assumptions of political culture are prone to change, therefore political culture is also in flux. The political socialization of an individual is a continuing process, which is constantly influenced by interactions with family, friends, the workplace, personal and societal events, life cycle changes, as well as the media (Delli Carpini 2008, 410). All these are factors in the maintenance and/or alteration of political beliefs and assumptions that in turn influence potential changes in the political sphere. Verba describes three roles political culture may assume in the face of political change: “represent stabilizing elements in a system” (Verba 1965, 519), “motivate to resist change in the name of traditional beliefs” (Verba 1965, 519-20), or “lead to fundamental modifications of innovative institutions so that they fit the traditional culture” (Verba 1965, 520).

### **1.3 The effect of political culture on the national web**

Foot et al. argue that political culture has considerable influence on the implementation of web production practices (2011, 41), effectively “domesticating” (Hepp 2013, 55) or localizing media technology, which can involve constraining the impact of the internet (Foot et al. 2011, 42; Kluver 2004b, 75-76). Therefore, the national web can be understood to be partially the result of the localizing forces of national political culture. This implies, however, that people of any given locality first meet a global internet, a dualism that Miller and Slater warn against, for there is a more complex dialectic at work (2000, 7). As the national web also indicates, the internet is actually made up of several groups and heterogeneous layers, yet at the same time, as Miller and Slater argue, people also are a part of the global arena and its constituting forces while retaining their own identity (2000, 7-8). To account for all these processes, there needs to be an

alternative conceptualization of the workings of the national web and the role political culture plays in it.

Miller and Slater argue for studying the internet not as a monolithic medium, but instead as an aggregation of a range of different technologies and practices; in order to better understand processes of its adaptation and adoption, we in fact need to consider the internet as disaggregated (2000, 14). National webs, or “people’s own internet”, come to be by assembling various technological possibilities and practices (Miller & Slater 2000, 14), a process that is greatly informed by different aspects of their social and cultural context, such as political culture. Political culture gives coherence to the political sphere and it defines the range of possible political actions in a culture as well as people’s expectations and ideals about their public life (Elkins & Simeon 1979, 141; Pye 1965, 7-9); therefore it can be employed as a hermeneutic tool or framework to grasp the workings and potentials of internet technologies for a particular nation. When technologies are familiarized in a culture, they can become capable of creating and sustaining publics (Hartley 2003, 260), and play an important role in the social and cultural development of the nation.

The internet can be understood with Slevin as a modality of cultural transmission (2002, 61), and as such it provides a space where people can enact and transmit their values, practices and identities (Miller & Slater 2000, 10). Political beliefs and assumptions can be either inherited or transformed in this process (Goldfarb 2012, 34), also referred to as expansive realization and expansive potential respectively (Miller & Slater 2000, 10-1). The first aspect shows how people’s existing beliefs and identities can be realized and inherited on the internet, even if the chance for their realization in real life was lost or never attained (Miller & Slater 2000, 11); the hereditary characteristic of political culture is very often used to explain “political fate” (Goldfarb 2012, 34). The second dynamic of expansive potential describes how beliefs and identities can be reimaged and

transformed through creativity and critique in the face of novelty and a different context (Goldfarb 2012, 34; Miller & Slater 2000, 13). Regardless of which aspect prevails, as beliefs and identities are enacted, they are able to “mould spaces to culturally specific shapes and purposes” (Miller & Slater 2000, 10), pointing to yet another contribution of political culture to the shaping of the national web.

Political culture thus comes into play at two separate moments in the formation of the national web: on the one hand, it informs the makeup of the web in terms of technologies and practices; on the other hand, national webs are also subjected to the influences of the political beliefs enacted on them. Neither of these processes are one-sided, however: the features and particularities of the internet can also transform certain political beliefs and assumptions.

#### **1.4 Recontextualizing political culture**

In this final section of the theoretical framework, I will take a closer look at the way political beliefs and assumptions are inherited and potentially transformed on and by the internet. Hepp argues that the moulding forces of the media do not have a direct effect, nor are they according to an all-powerful media logic; instead the features of these moulding forces are produced by people’s activities, and “they become concrete only in the process of media communication” (Hepp 2013, 54-5). Guiding this investigation will be Verba’s four dimensions or general aspects of political culture, which represent the most important political assumptions and values of a nation, particularly from the perspective of political change and modernization (1965, 527). These dimensions are all closely related and consequently, they influence each other greatly. Since much of this moulding depends on the beliefs and identities enacted on the web, the following is primarily an overview of the domains in which certain assumptions are prompted to shift, drawing on the

observations of several media scholars. Nevertheless, observing these potential changes can already offer insights into how political culture appears on national webs.

### *National identity*

Verba claims political identity to be the most crucial of political beliefs, as identifying with a nation is one of the most basic aspects of self-identification, similar to religious identification (1965, 529). Members' psychological commitment to the political system can build a nation, as well as help it survive the possible crises of social change (Verba 1965, 530). It is therefore no surprise that national identity was argued to be the most important factor in demarcating the national web (Zarrinbakhsh in Rogers et al. 2013). Political beliefs about national identity are generally rooted in tradition, but if it is not sufficiently defined and ego-satisfying, the search for an established identity may push aside other problems in the nation, and the uncertainty could easily become a major defining characteristic of its political culture (Verba 1965, 533).

The new mechanisms of self-formation the internet allows (Slevin 2002) have a profound effect on national identities. Identity formation today can be characterized by open-endedness and reflexivity (Thompson 1995, 207), resulting in identities that are flexible and voluntary (Hartley 2003, 258). This can be attributed to the ever-increasing amount of symbolic material mediated on the internet (Thompson 1995, 207), which greatly influence the way people construct their identities. The internet allows for new ways to activate, maintain and re-articulate one's national identity, as well as to store and preserve national symbols (Saunders 2011, 8; 2011, 13); the high visibility of web content makes the internet a suitable site for the expression of national pride and contribution to the self-representation of one's nation. National identity can also be strengthened through interaction with a greater number of fellow

members of a nation, as it adds to the sense of community and belonging that forms the basis of a nation.

In many ways, national identity in its traditional form might also weaken due to the global reach of the internet and the possibilities to stay anonymous. The internet might reinforce existing groupings and communities, such as nations, while it may also lead to new ones with the earlier ones becoming less important. Identities and communities are often formed on either supranational - such as humanity movements - or subnational level - for example, based on gender, age, sexual orientation or ethnicity (Hartley 2003, 258). These connections are formed beyond "territorially bound spatial entities" (Hartley 2003, 258), showing that face-to-face contact is less needed to build and maintain communities with the internet (Saunders 2004, 156). The internet therefore challenges the assumption that one of the central symbols of national identity is territorial; rather, it may be transformed and based on coexistence in time, rather than space (Hartley 2003, 263).

#### *Identification with fellow citizens*

The second dimension of political culture that Verba describes includes beliefs and assumptions about fellow members of the political system, and how individual political actors identify with each other (1965, 535). This dimension is closely related to the set of beliefs about national identity, as the horizontal identification with fellow citizens implies a sense of integration, a sense of common membership; only on such a basis can the two main elements of identification be built, i.e. trust and confidence in fellow members (Verba 1965, 537).

Trust is one of the most valuable forces in politics, and it is equally elusive online, as the socio-technological environment of the internet can also both encourage and undermine trust (Chadwick 2009, 28). As it has been mentioned before, the internet allows for greater

contact among members of the same political system. In this environment, co-production can prompt voice and loyalty, but anonymity and pseudonymity could also discourage collaboration and its sustainment (Chadwick 2009, 28-9).

A number of mechanisms now are consciously aiming to improve trust levels online by encouraging the use of real names, photos, and the sharing of a variety of personal information; as a result, real life identities are increasingly represented online (Chadwick 2009, 35-6). Such a glimpse into each others' lives has the ability to "alter people's understanding of what other people are doing or have done" (Margetts et al. 2013): they evoke sympathy and solidarity or disappointment and disassociation, either way potentially affecting the levels of trust and confidence among members of the system at large.

Politicians are also often making use of these possibilities of the internet in order to be more open and responsive towards citizens (Slevin 2002, 47) and increase fellow political actors' trust in them. Personal websites and social networking site profiles of political leaders frequently feature private images and videos as a part of their self-representation, in order to make others be more confident in them. Especially in the case of political leaders, the internet can contribute to sudden changes in levels of confidence and trust due to the higher visibility of the opinions and observations of ordinary people; citizen journalism is now a frequent and important component of mainstream media publications as well. From embarrassing images and videos to incriminating documents and information (or "leaks"), all types of content can go viral, seen and shared nation- or worldwide, once it has been uploaded to the internet.

### *Governmental output*

The third dimension involves beliefs about the operation of the political system: what the members of the system expect the government to do for and to them (Verba 1965, 537). The range of possible governmental activities is limitless, therefore Verba argues that the set of beliefs which should be analysed concerns whether government output is desired at all, and whether these activities should be directed at maintaining the status quo or if they should result in significant political changes (1965, 537-8). The expectations of government output are important factors in the effectiveness and stability of the political system, as they set its goals and define the load that is put on it (Verba 1965, 538).

Expectations of governmental output may shift due to an inherent feature of the internet that Thompson calls “mediated worldliness” (1995, 34). The global reach and reduced costs of interaction and finding information on the internet (Margetts et al. 2013) allows people to learn about what is happening in politics in other parts of the world; it offers people unlimited resources for developing their political orientation individually (Thompson 1995, 207; Mazzoleni & Schulz 1999, 253), potentially acting as a deterring or encouraging influence on their already existing beliefs.

Another reason behind a potential shift in expectations is the growth of new organizations in new forms, which are oriented towards public goods and made possible with the help of internet technologies (Bimber et al. 2010, 73). The internet can be and is often used to further promote civil engagement and political participation, which leads to the creation of new formulations that can challenge the role of the government in the solving of certain issues. As voter turnout has been in decline in national elections (Mazzoleni & Schulz 1999, 253), more and more people are turning to online activist groups and new political forces with their expectations. Online co-production and the self-mobilization of citizens are more and more

embedded in political life, with political “amateurs” often taking leading roles instead of “experts”, challenging previous categorizations, and as Chadwick summarized it, raising the question “who governs, and who ought to govern?” (2009, 40).

### *The process of decision-making*

Lastly, the fourth dimension is the set of beliefs concerning the way the government makes decisions (Verba 1965, 541). The two key aspects of this process, according to Verba, are whether there are beliefs and expectations at all about decision-making, and if there are, what the role of the individual is in the process (1965, 542). These beliefs are strongly linked to national identity as emotional attachment can have a great impact on mobilization and whether citizens will commit resources to the political system (Verba 1965, 542).

The internet can be seen as facilitating a significant enlargement of possibilities for political participation, because it allows large-scale dialogical communication as opposed to the monological nature of mass media (Mazzoleni & Schulz 1999, 254); the internet is altering considerably “the degree to which individuals and organizations can enter freely into discourses across extended time-space” (Slevin 2002, 47). This changing information environment offers a number of new modes of (political) participation, such as through peer-production, crowdsourcing or the possibilities for self-mobilizing (Margetts et al. 2013, 2). These “technologies of the public” - or mechanisms that are capable of creating and maintaining publics (Hartley 2003, 259) - can encourage new ways of collaborative decision-making with governments, which might have a profound effect on previous beliefs about the role of individuals in the nation’s political life. One’s beliefs about political participation are also increasingly shaped by the activities of fellow members of the political system, as well as citizens of other nations. The internet can

be used to provide real-time information about the political activities of others, which arguably affects “the perceived viability of a political mobilization [...], thereby altering the incentives of individuals to participate” (Margetts et al. 2013, 2).

In this section, I argued that the political culture approach is a fruitful way of studying the national web because it accounts for the identities and values that people bring with themselves to the internet, and which have an important role in the demarcation, formation and activity on national webs. I theorized that political culture can shape the national web in two ways. Firstly, it has an important hermeneutic role in familiarizing people with the technologies and practices that are assembled into a national web; secondly, beliefs and values of political culture are enacted in the spaces of the internet, moulding these spaces into specific shapes - national webs - in the process.

## **2. Hungarian political culture on the Hungarian web.**

After presenting the theoretical framework of this investigation, in this chapter, I will proceed to the discussion of the case study: a mixed-method look at the political culture of Hungary in the context of Facebook as part of the Hungarian web. Firstly, I will describe Hungarian political culture and the Hungarian web by reviewing relevant literature; then secondly, I will elaborate further on the methods used in collecting empirical data about Facebook pages, as well as present the results of pattern matching these data with the predictions about political culture on the national web and the political culture of Hungary.

### **2.1 The political culture of Hungary**

According to the results of the 2010 World Value Survey, Hungary can currently be described as a “closed, inward looking society at the edge of Western Christian culture” (Tóth 2009, 10). Only having been a democracy for 23 years<sup>2</sup> - “an historical blink of an eye” (Tóth 2010, n.p.), its history and cultural heritage shaped by oppression and totalitarianism affect values and political attitudes to this day.

---

<sup>2</sup> The Republic of Hungary was officially declared 23 October 1989, replacing the People’s Republic of Hungary after 40 years.

## **Historical background**

The most important collective experiences of Hungarian people that form political culture to this day are the Treaty of Trianon signed in 1920, the Second World War, and the socialist era that lasted from 1945 to 1989, including the revolution of 1956 against the government and its Soviet-imposed policies (Körösényi 1999, n.p.). Among these, it is particularly the effect of two events that can still be felt the strongest, and which are the most active in shaping political life in Hungary: Trianon and the socialist era.

After losing the First World War as part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, Hungary signed the Treaty of Trianon with the Allies, which left it with 28% of its pre-war territory and 36% of its original population. Although the re-assigned territories included a majority of non-Hungarians, 3.4 million Hungarians also found themselves outside the borders of Hungary in Romania, Czechoslovakia, the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom, Austria or Italy (Boros-Kazai 2005, 359-60). Seen as a national disaster, Trianon had major economic consequences, drove many to nationalism, and isolated Hungary from its neighbours (Boros-Kazai 2005, 360).

Tóth argues that the memory of the socialist era has still the strongest effect on political culture in Hungary, and it will take time until future generations can leave those attitudes behind (2009, n.p.). The People's Republic of Hungary was a totalitarian, paternalist state where political power was monopolized and organizations and the public sphere were under the strict political-ideological control of the party and the state (initially the Hungarian Worker's Party, then its successor the Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party). People who did not support the communist ideology either joined the party purely for opportunism or retreated to the private sphere (Körösényi 1999, n.p.) The public sphere therefore became suspicious, political identification weakened or even disappeared, and political passivity and cynicism were ever so prevalent (Körösényi 1999, n.p.).

Communities fell apart as society atomised, with the family becoming often the only autonomous, politics-free environment; the family had a considerably more significant role in the formation of political culture than political institutions (Körösényi 1999, n.p.).

The Revolution of 1956, although brutally put down by Soviet forces, restored national identity and provided moral capital for Hungarians (Boros-Kazai 2005, 367). In the long term it also resulted in a slow, unofficial “liberalization” that led to the birth and toleration of a semi-illegal “secondary economy”, existing in symbiosis with the official party-governed economy (Körösényi 1999, n.p.; Downing 1996, 36). Disobeying official state rules was therefore allowed in some cases, which resulted in the Hungary of the 1970s and 1980s becoming characterized by a dual society with separate value systems, norms, languages, and behavioural and moral codes (Körösényi 1999, n.p.).

The trends of wide-scale corruption, political cynicism and isolation from political communities that began in the socialist era were unbroken by the change of regime in 1989. As transformation of the state to democracy was negotiated by the elites of Hungary, where the masses played barely any role, political passivity survived into the 1990s (Körösényi 1999, n.p.). Although Hungary had been re-organized as a democracy, a number of poor social and political compromises continued to have a detrimental effect on the situation (Tóth 2009, 50), such as harmful rhetorics by most political elites that focus exclusively on the duties and social responsibilities of the state, neglecting that of the citizens (Tóth 2009, 51; 2010, n.p.).

### **Characteristics of Hungarian political culture**

Although in 1999 Körösényi recorded that national pride was at a very low level and most citizens felt alienated from the whole entity of the state, in a survey conducted in 2008, it was found that four-fifths of Hungarians are proud of their national identity, the sources

of which are Hungarian inventions and discoveries, athletes, cuisine, artists, and the beauty of Hungarian women (TÁRKI & Image Factory 2008, 3). As the group of Hungarian citizens and the members of the Hungarian national community are not congruent, greatly as a result of the Treaty of Trianon (Batory 2010, 36), the conceptualization of nationhood and national identity are also of key importance in Hungarian political life. The integration of both Trianon minorities beyond the borders<sup>3</sup> and internal minorities into the Hungarian nation is “key fault line” in Hungary’s party system (Batory 2010, 32). These questions have resurfaced after the end of the socialist era, where the topic of nationality was taboo (Stewart cited in Batory 2010, 37), and not surprisingly, in recent years, nationalism has also been undoubtedly on the rise<sup>4</sup>.

After 1989, civil society has gone through a swift regeneration, but the lack of political community and the low level of individual political integration remained (Körösényi 1999, n.p.). Hungarians have very little trust and confidence in each other, as well as in political leaders and institutions (Körösényi 1999, n.p.; Tóth 2009, 15). At the same time, possibly as a result of the double economy of the socialist era, Hungarians are ambivalent when evaluating corrupt behaviour, and they are more accepting towards small crimes (Tóth 2009, 15), contributing to the name “country without consequences”<sup>5</sup> and further destroying the grounds for identification with fellow citizens.

Although trust and confidence in the government and other political institutions are very low, Hungarians’ expectations towards the state

---

<sup>3</sup> The Fundamental Law of Hungary, in effect from 1 January 2012, recognizes Trianon minorities as part of the Hungarian nation. “Bearing in mind that there is one single Hungarian nation that belongs together, Hungary shall bear responsibility for the fate of Hungarians living beyond its borders, shall facilitate the survival and development of their communities, shall support their efforts to preserve their Hungarian identity, the application of their individual and collective rights, the establishment of their community self-governments, and their prosperity in their native lands, and shall promote their cooperation with each other and with Hungary.”

<http://www.kormany.hu/download/4/c3/30000/THE%20FUNDAMENTAL%20LAW%20OF%20HUNGARY.pdf>

<sup>4</sup> Two recent newspaper pieces on the topic: [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-amsterdam/xenophobic-nationalism-cl\\_b\\_516324.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-amsterdam/xenophobic-nationalism-cl_b_516324.html) ; <http://www.dw.de/hungary-experiences-nationalism-renaissance/a-15991580>

<sup>5</sup> This phrase is often used by critics when referring to Hungary, particularly in Hungarian. In English: [http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-protest/hungary\\_3926.jsp](http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-protest/hungary_3926.jsp)

are very high (Körösényi 1999, n.p.; Tóth 2009, 15; 2010, n.p.). As learned during the socialist era, Hungarians believe that it is the state's duty to give, and in case it does not give on its own, it is easy to take what they believe they deserve in a semi-illegal sphere (Tóth 2009, 20). They attribute a major role to the state in political modernization and development, particularly in solving the problem of social inequalities in the country (Tóth 2009, 15). Although the ratio of inequalities in Hungary are barely any different than in other parts of Europe, a majority of Hungarians nevertheless consider the redistribution of income and wealth the primary issue the government needs to solve (Tóth 2009, 38; 2010, n.p.).

In Hungary, the unrealistically high expectations of government output (Tóth 2009, 15) are coupled with a more passive than participatory political culture (Körösényi 1999, n.p.). Many Hungarians still see the state as an authority, or even the "enemy", instead of a representative of common interests, which can account for the low levels of civil activity and political participation, despite the democratic political system (Körösényi 1999, n.p.; Tóth 2009, 13, 20). Scholars also reported a high level of political cynicism and apathy, and although these features are observable in most modern democracies, they increased unusually in Hungary in the 1990's, the first decade of democracy (Körösényi 1999, n.p.).

## **2.2 The Hungarian web**

Statistics<sup>6</sup> report that by the end of 2011, 65.4% of Hungarians were internet users, a total of 6.5 million people. Keeping up with the growing penetration of the internet, the new media regulations passed in 2010 have also been extended to include the internet, in itself a major change to the Hungarian media environment (Tóth 2012, 54). Among the top ten most visited websites by the Hungarian

---

<sup>6</sup> Source: Internet World Stats <http://www.internetworldstats.com/europa.htm#hu>

public, we find the Hungarian localized and the .com version of Google search engine, two social networking sites (one Hungarian), video sharing site YouTube, two different blog engines (one of them again Hungarian), a Hungarian mail provider service and two Hungarian news websites (Tóth 2012, 41).

From the point of view of political socialization, it is important to note how news consumption has changed in Hungary in the light of the internet. The number of visitors to online information resources has been continually increasing in the past years, causing a drastic decrease in the sales of newspapers and in audiences for both national television channels and market-leading radio stations (Tóth 2012, 20). Nevertheless, there are only two news websites among the ten most visited sites, as mentioned above, Index.hu and Origo.hu, as more and more Hungarians regard social networking sites to be equally important news sources<sup>7</sup> (Tóth 2012, 20). The proliferation of Web 2.0 platforms have enhanced multi-way communication in Hungary as well, allowing for more specialized information to appear on the web and new opportunities for political activity. The ability to reach mass audiences immediately and at a low cost inspired many voices, including smaller parties, civil organizations and minorities who otherwise have very few outlets; for example, many attribute the relative success of new parties Jobbik and Lehet Más a Politika (LMP) in the 2010 national elections to their informed use of web technologies in communicating with their audiences (Szigeti and Bodoky cited in Tóth 2012, 55). Although pluralism certainly exists on the Hungarian web, Tóth argues that extreme voices, such as anti-Roma sentiments, have been magnified by the internet (2012, 54, 56, 98).

Although the civic sphere is fragmented on the internet (Bodoky qtd. in Tóth 2012, 47), arguably the most popular online platforms for political activity in Hungary currently are blogs and Facebook

---

<sup>7</sup> "According to the 2011 news consumption survey, 6 percent of the population used social networks as primary news sources; for those younger than 20, it was 16 percent. An additional 30 percent regarded this function of the social networks to be important, which also holds true for those older than 50 years." (Tóth 2012, 20)

(Balogh 2011, Bodoky qtd. in Tóth 2012, 47). The Hungarian social networking site Iwiw is rapidly losing users (Balogh 2011, n.p.), while Twitter has failed to realize its potential political communication in Hungary due a low number of users (Balogh 2011, n.p.), and although Tumblr is increasingly used for political content, the number of visitors and registered users is still low<sup>8</sup>. As examples of citizen journalism, blogs are a prominent part of political discussion today, frequently monitored by mainstream media, yet many journalists still believe it to be more of an “opinion genre” (Tóth 2012, 31; 2012, 51).

### **The role and relevance of Facebook**

Facebook is the most widely used social networking site in Hungary, with penetration at 46%, it boasts 4.6 million registered Hungarian users. It has an obvious place now in Hungarian political life, as people are used to it being mentioned in the public discourse, as well as in political newscasts (Balogh 2011, n.p.). Most registered users live in Budapest (1.2 million users), and the most represented age group is those aged 26-35 (1.1 million users). Although 83% of Hungarian users did not disclose information concerning their level of education, it is known that the majority of the 17% who did are either attending or graduated from a tertiary educational institution<sup>9</sup>. The fact that civil society is increasingly active on Facebook can be attributed to the high number of registered users, as well as its features that can enhance political communication. In many cases, Facebook took over from blogs, as it allows similar functionalities, particularly as it can serve as a personal (or seemingly personal) online channel for sharing thoughts and opinions, often concerning everyday happenings (Balogh 2011). As such, it is a suitable space for enacting political values and assumptions, and therefore the way

---

<sup>8</sup> For the exact numbers, see SocialTimes.hu: <http://socialtimes.hu/articlepage/?article=2735-magyarok-az-osszes-kozossegi-oldalon>

<sup>9</sup> All statistics in this section come from SocialTimes.hu: <http://socialtimes.hu/stat/HU>

Hungarians use, act and interact on Facebook should be to a certain extent informed by political culture.

### **2.3 The case of Facebook and Hungarian political culture**

65% of all Hungarian internet users have registered an account on Facebook, which shows that the social networking site is a significant part of the Hungarian web. As Facebook supports many different forms of interaction, a comprehensive, all-encompassing analysis of the site is not feasible in the course of this paper. Therefore, this case study will focus exclusively on investigating Hungarian people's habits of creating and liking Facebook pages that deal with Hungarian political events and issues.

Pages on Facebook serve as the profile and communication channel of organizations, products, services, individuals and even concepts that Facebook users can 'like' (originally 'become a fan') and consequently subscribe to its posts and updates. Pages can be created by any registered user, and the content that is shared on the page can be further liked, shared and commented on by the fans of the page. Connections between pages can also be established by pages liking each other. Chadwick argues that political life on Facebook "piggybacks" on everyday life context, such as a broader repertoire of self-expression and lifestyle values (2009, 30). Although the majority of early applications and pages in the history of the site were focused on lifestyle choices and consumerism, politics also soon appeared, and Facebook profiles are now "a mish-mash of content and genres, where music, film, and fashion sit alongside political campaigns, donation drives, sloganeering and so on" (Chadwick 2009, 30-1). Liking pages, which then appear on our personal profiles, therefore can also be considered a quite literal way of identity construction.

Creating pages is a simple and easy means of gathering supporters for a political cause or organization, while liking a page is an equally easy way to show agreement and support. Whether Facebook is capable of facilitating real mobilization by these means, or if it is merely encouraging slacktivism, still divides observers <sup>10</sup> ; nevertheless, through creating and liking pages, people are enacting their beliefs and assumptions about politics among other issues. The Like button then collapses and transforms people's affective, spontaneous reactions - such as "excitement, agreement, compassion, understanding, but also ironic and parodist liking" - into a number on the Like counter (Gerlitz & Helmond 2013, 11); these numbers of likes can help in unravelling the prevalent political assumptions in a given society.

In this case study, using the method of pattern matching, I will compare the predicted patterns of Hungarian political culture, as well as the patterns of potential changes political culture can undergo on the internet, and the empirical patterns of Hungarians' habits of creating and liking Facebook pages. It is argued that political culture influences reactions to political events, as well as participation and interaction with other political actors (Elkins & Simeon 1979, 141; Pye 1965, 7; Verba 1965, 517). Firstly, I will take a closer look at the online reactions to two particular political events in Hungary, and investigate the role of political culture in informing political activity in the web spheres of these events. Secondly, after the direct observation of the most liked and most relevant Facebook pages from a political culture perspective, I will report on the extent of the effect of political culture on participation and interaction as facilitated by the creation and liking of pages.

---

<sup>10</sup> See for example: <http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/3336/2767>;  
<http://www.digitaltrends.com/social-media/slacktivism-unite-social-media-campaigns-arent-just-feel-good-back-patting>

### **Pages as reactions to political events**

In order to collect the pages that were created and/or liked as a reaction to a particular political event, I will employ the method of web sphere analysis, as developed by Steven Schneider and Kirsten Foot (2004). They define web sphere as “a set of dynamically defined digital resources spanning multiple web sites deemed relevant or related to a central event, concept or theme, and often connected by hyperlinks” (Schneider & Foot 2004, 158), and the boundaries of which are topical orientation and temporal framework. In this section of the case study, I will investigate the web sphere of two recent events in Hungarian politics. Instead of websites, I will focus on Facebook pages related or relevant to the events, gathered through my own network and targeted Facebook search.

#### *Media Act of 2010*

On 21 December 2010, the Hungarian parliament passed the Media Act (law 2010/185), the final piece of the media law package of the newly-elected Orbán government. The Media Act created a new media control body with powers to monitor both public and private media, as well as impose sanctions and fines on media outlets that provide unbalanced coverage or violate other rules. Many Hungarians believed the new media laws to be of direct danger to the freedom of the press, so they drew criticism from Hungarians and international organizations alike; among others, Human Rights Watch argued that the law “undermines media freedom and is incompatible with Hungary's human rights obligations”.<sup>11</sup> In order to discover the pages created in reaction to the Media Act, the keywords “médiatörvény” (Media Act) and “sajtószabadság” (freedom of the press) were used to search for pages on Facebook. The temporal

---

<sup>11</sup> Sources: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-12051665>; <http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/01/07/hungary-media-law-endangers-press-freedom>

frame for this web sphere will be from the passing of the Media Act through early 2011.

The Media Act was one of the first political events in Hungary that generated a large number of reactions on Facebook, which was still competing in the number of visitors and registered users with Hungarian social networking site Iwiw (Balogh 2011, n.p.). Already on 21 December 2010, the day the law passed, two pages were created on Facebook by citizens: *Egy millián a magyar sajtószabadságért* (lit. One million for the freedom of the press in Hungary; currently 105,945 likes) and *Egy perc csend a sajtószabadságért* (lit. One minute of silence for the freedom of the press; currently 651 likes). Both pages served as simple ways to express one's dislike towards the Media Act and support for the cause of the freedom of the press and the lack of censorship. *Egy millián a magyar sajtószabadságért*, or Milla as it later began to be called, became one of the fastest growing Hungarian pages<sup>12</sup>, and generated a previously unseen rate of political activity on Facebook. The community was adamant in keeping themselves independent of political parties, and through Facebook, they managed to organize a number of mass demonstrations starting from January 2011. This spontaneous gathering and political initiative of the Facebook generation was highly unexpected, as daily political activity among Hungarians generally is very low and political apathy is high. The page distancing itself from political parties and declaring its independence from the powers that be can be attributed to the high distrust of Hungarians towards politicians, a fact which also most likely fueled the popularity of the page.

Although Facebook was indeed capable of the creation and mobilization of some publics in the wake of the Media Act, the online Hungarian political sphere was nevertheless as fragmented as it was offline, and the other pages belonging to the web sphere of the Media Act showcase this fragmentation. Pages created and liked in early

---

<sup>12</sup> Source: [http://www.imagefactory.hu/facebooker/lajkometer/lajkometer\\_10\\_52.pdf](http://www.imagefactory.hu/facebooker/lajkometer/lajkometer_10_52.pdf)

2011 are dedicated to views both for and against the Media Act, as they include *A médiatörvény megfelel a vonatkozó uniós irányelvnek* (lit. The Media Act is according to the relevant EU policies; 66 likes), *Aki nem olvasta el az új médiatörvényt, az ne tiltakozzon ellene* (lit. Those who have not read the new media law should not protest against it; 59 likes), *Nem támogatom a médiatörvényt, mert értem is, amit olvasok.* (lit. I do not support the Media Act, because I understand what I'm reading; 25 likes) and *Magyarországon igenis demokrácia, sajtószabadság és jogállam van* (lit. Hungary is indeed a democracy, a state of law, with a free press; 815 likes). These pages can easily be read as a series of bickering and hostility between the two sides of the polarized Hungarian public sphere, in the form of Facebook pages.

The low number of likes these pages received indicates that Milla is rather an anomaly among the pages in this particular web sphere (it gathered even more likes when its English language page was launched, *One Million for the Freedom of Press in Hungary*, currently at 2,101 likes). This could indicate that the reactions of most Hungarians are still more informed by traditional political culture in that they prefer passivity to participation, particularly online.

#### *"Trafikmutyi" or tobacco shop concession gate*

From 1 July 2013, due to a new law aimed at decreasing the number of underage smokers (law 2012/134), only people who applied for and were awarded concessions from the state in an earlier tender were allowed to sell cigarettes and tobacco products. At the end of April, the list of the winners was brought to light, showing that in fact a large number of concessions were given to applicants with family or business ties to the government party Fidesz, often with no previous experience in tobacco sales, instead of long-time tobacco shop owners. Transparency International, the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union and five other organisations have requested data of

public interest concerning the decision making during the tender, but so far the details remain undisclosed<sup>13</sup>. To assess the reactions to the corruption scandal, the keywords used in the Facebook search were “nemzeti dohánybolt” (national tobacco shop), “trafik” (tobacconist) and “trafikmutyi”<sup>14</sup>. The temporal framework of this web sphere is from April 2013, when the first related Facebook pages were created, until August 2013.

There are two pages bearing the name of the scandal, *Trafikmutyi* (3,231 likes) and *A nagy Trafik mutyi* (tr. The great Trafikmutyi; 34 likes). Both wish to gather people who accuse the government party of corruption and therefore only ‘like’ the scandal to express agreement with the allegations. The most liked page in this web sphere is *Trafik-Károsultak* (tr. Victims of the tobacco shop tender; 7,790 likes), which is also one of the three pages that are keen on starting a movement<sup>15</sup> with differing success; *Abbahagyom a dohányzást, hogy ne támogassam a fideszes gengsztereket* (tr. I will quit smoking as to not support the gangsters of Fidesz; 445 likes) aims to gather people whose reaction to the concession gate was to boycott national tobacco shops, while *Ne ússza meg a Fidesz a trafikmutyit* (Tr. Fidesz should not get away with the corruption concerning tobacco shops concessions; 482 likes) also encourages people to fight against the corruption.

The remaining three pages in the web sphere are cynical and humorous reactions to the concession gate. As the names of concession winners surfaced and national tobacco shop signs all around Hungary began appearing to denote future shops allowed to sell tobacco, *Vicces Nemzeti Dohányboltok gyűjtőhelye* (Tr. Collection site for funny national tobacco shops; 1,247 likes) was launched on Facebook to share users’ photographs of national tobacco shops

---

<sup>13</sup> Sources: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-23146659>;  
<http://www.freehungary.hu/component/content/article/1-friss-hirek/1903-the-tobacco-shop-concession-gate.html>;  
<http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/afp/130613/hungarians-fume-over-revealing-tobacco-scandal>

<sup>14</sup> A slang term that approximately means ‘tobacco shop corruption’. It is the term generally used in Hungarian media to refer to the scandal.

<sup>15</sup> Trafik-Károsultak has also already organised a demonstration against the tender results on 15 May 2013.

opening next to for example schools and pharmacies to ridicule the law and the tender, as well as to further prove the existence of corruption. *Dohánybolti egypercesek* (Tr. One minute stories from the tobacco shop; 1,253 likes) assembles people who want to read or share ironic or humorous stories about their experiences in new national tobacco shops in any literary format. *Trafikos Pista* (tr. Tobacconist Steve; 280 likes) is meant to embody a typical new tobacco shop owner, yet another attempt to ridicule corrupt people. The web sphere of the tobacco shop concession gate seems mostly dominated by political apathy and cynicism. As opposed to the reactions against the Media Act, there was no outstandingly popular initiative on Facebook either against corruption or in defense of the government party in the wake of the allegations. Among the reasons could be the fact that many Hungarians are ambivalent when it comes to evaluating corruption, and the discovery that the government party might be engaged in such a corrupt ploy only lowers trust in a political institution that is already largely distrusted. The low number of likes and the relative popularity of pages created and liked to ridicule the situation are indicative of this political apathy and a semi-acceptance of the fact that Hungary is a “country without consequences”.

### **Pages as participation and interaction with other political actors**

To analyse the influence of political culture on political participation and interaction on Facebook pages, I first used the method of direct observation to collect data from my own Facebook network, relevant pages' own like networks, and also consulted statistics to find the political pages with the most number of likes and most relevance to different aspects and characteristics of political culture. Creating and liking pages may not directly facilitate interaction, but it helps build communities, and can count as participation, or the entryway to participation.

The lack of sense of integration, coupled with a constant redefinition of Hungarian nationhood while still maintaining high levels of national pride, can easily be one of the reasons for the many pages dedicated to gathering all Hungarians or those who love Hungary. There are two relatively popular pages attempting to build a community and unite all Hungarians on Facebook: *Magyarok* (tr. Hungarians; 80,301 likes) and *Magyarságért* (tr. For the Hungarians; 26,685 likes). The importance of Hungarian national identity for many Trianon minorities also shows in the pages *Magyar vagyok, nem "idióta"* (tr. I am Hungarian, not an "idiot"; 13,885 likes) and *Mi akkor is magyarok maradunk a felvidéken!* (tr. We will still stay Hungarians in Upper Hungary; 7,560 likes), which were created by and for Hungarians living in Transylvania and Upper Hungary, respectively.

Some of the most popular pages among Hungarians are dedicated to national symbols or national pride, such as the pages *Túró Rudi* (772,786 likes), *I ♥ Magyarország* (498,483 likes), or *Pálinka* (301,860 likes). Many of these pages directly reflect the results of the survey mentioned earlier in this paper, conducted by TÁRKI and Image Factory in 2008: the pages *Szeretlek Magyar Csapat* (tr. I love you Hungarian team; 103,625 likes) and *A magyar lányok a legszebbek* (tr. Hungarian girls are the most beautiful; 351,295 likes) are among the most prominent examples. The fact that many of these pages are among the most popular in the country indicate that national symbols still have an important role in the identity construction of Hungarians, and the internet is merely providing new ways to preserve them and show their relevance. The page *I bet Hungary can get 1 million fans before any other European Country.* (130,246 likes) can also be seen as an indication of the importance of national pride for many Hungarians, as it has been one of the most successful pages in the impromptu competition on Facebook to rally one million people to like similar pages of European countries.

The internet not only allows for collective expressions of national identity, but the high visibility of web content provides new channels to participate in the communication of a national image. Both grassroots organizations and the government are keen on taking advantage of this feature: pages such as *Friends of Hungary* (10,807 likes), *Hey Europe, sorry about our Prime Minister* (2,248 likes), and *Hey Armenia, sorry about our Prime Minister*<sup>16</sup> (12,189 likes) use Facebook to inform the world about what Hungary and Hungarians are really like, aiming to fight the assumed misrepresentation of the country by politicians and the mass media. The Hungarian government is also attempting to use Facebook for this purpose, but the page created by the Deputy State Secretary for International Communication *Ferenc Kumin - About Hungary* (457 likes) is significantly less popular than ordinary citizens' initiatives.

Greater interaction with others and participation in Facebook pages by liking as well as being able to see the similar actions of other political actors can effectively shape levels of trust towards fellow members of the nation. Facebook provides possibilities for like-minded people to form new communities or reinforce existing ones without being confined by location. This can potentially improve the lack of sense of community and integration which is traditionally a problematic area of Hungarian political culture. There are now more and more Facebook pages dedicated to uniting and mobilizing Hungarians for or against a particular issue, particularly to offer support to those suffering injustice, which could have an effect on how people identify with their fellow citizens. The previously discussed *Egy millióan a magyar sajtószabadságért* (tr.: One million for the freedom of the press in Hungary; 105,932 likes), *Tiltakozunk a felsőoktatási törvény egyoldalú módosítása ellen* (tr.: We protest against the one-sided amendment of the law concerning higher education; 62,903 likes), and *Az alkotmány nem játék* (tr.: The constitution is not a game; 9,102 likes) are only three of the

---

<sup>16</sup> Also, *Bocsánatot kérünk, Örményország - Hungarians are sorry, Armenia* (2,666 likes)

numerous pages that rally people to take a stand together and fight for the political issues they feel strongly about. Most of these pages are critical of the government, and they aim to create new national publics who are responsible and prolific political actors.

Many politicians also want to build on these possibilities of being closer and communicating more directly with citizens, mainly in order to increase voters' trust and confidence in political leaders and parties. The pages of prime minister Viktor Orbán (*Orbán Viktor*; 159,393 likes) and Jobbik party leader Gábor Vona (*Vona Gábor*; 110,599 likes) are currently the most popular political Facebook pages among Hungarians; this status can be partly attributed to the regular posts and updates that deal with political issues and the everyday life of the politicians (Tóth 2012, 55). Particularly in the case of politicians, political parties and organizations, a 'like' from a citizen can imply that they put trust and confidence in the person or organization. The number of likes for the pages of political parties that are currently in parliament or running in the national election in 2014 range from around a few thousands (*KDNP - Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt*<sup>17</sup>; 1955 likes) to more than a hundred thousand (*Együtt 2014 Mozgalom*<sup>18</sup>; 123,423 likes); this indicates that there is nevertheless a considerable number of people who want to actively show who they trust and support politically on Facebook as well. There are further groupings where people express their beliefs about the trustworthiness of political actors, which reflects the existing polarization and fragmentation of the Hungarian political sphere. One example showing the distrust and hostility between the left and right of the Hungarian political sphere are two pages of eerily similar names: *ELÉG*<sup>19</sup> (tr.: Enough; 31,000 likes) and *Elég a hazugságaikból* (tr.: Enough of their lies; 4,688 likes) are both liked by people who believe the other side of the political sphere is

---

<sup>17</sup> Christian Democratic Party, currently in coalition with government party Fidesz.

<sup>18</sup> The party Together 2014 Movement was founded in October 2012 and will run in the coming national elections. The page with the second most likes is of the far-right party *Jobbik* with 121,304 likes, which has 12.18% of the seats in the parliament.

<sup>19</sup> Originally named 'Elég a hazugságokból', lit. 'Enough of the lies'.

untruthful. Other lines of fragmentation among citizens include the divide over those who trust the government and those who do not: *Bízunk a kormányban* (tr.: We trust the government; 3,154 likes) and *Nem bízunk a kormányban* (tr.: We do not trust the government; 5,705 likes).

Political apathy and cynicism are two of the most prevalent characteristics of Hungarian political culture on Facebook. Cynicism is a strong drawing force on Facebook, and pages that are cynical and humorous in nature often have a bigger group of followers than many that raise awareness for a serious political message or initiative. The pages *Vajon lehet-e több rajongója ennek a szép almának, mint Orbán Viktornak?* (tr.: Can this nice apple have more fans than Viktor Orbán?; 46,168 likes), *Orbán lapjáról kitiltottak társasága* (tr.: Society of those banned from the page of Orbán; 31,943 likes) and that of parody party *Magyar Kétfarkú Kutya Párt* (tr.: Hungarian Two-tailed Dog Party; 83,550 likes) have gathered a high number of likes due to their cynical attitudes towards politicians and political life. This can also be indicative of the fact that many people believe Facebook is more suited for ironic and cynical political participation, either because they do not think it is the place for genuine political action or they do not think any type of political action, regardless of being online or offline, can help the situation.

Political apathy mainly can be observed in the number of likes political pages receive on Facebook. Compared to the 4.6 million registered users on Facebook, and despite the site being a low-threshold platform, only a very small number of Hungarians are interested in politics enough to actively take part in it online. The most popular political page in terms of likes is that of Viktor Orbán, which still dwarfs with its approximately 160,000 likes next to the most widely liked page among Hungarians, the jewellery retailer *Extreme Silver* boasting 954,962 likes. Although the possibilities are there, “piggybacking” on everyday life content, Facebook does not seem to have made a significant impact on levels of political

participation, but instead for the most part reflects what political scientists have observed about Hungarian political culture.

## **conclusion.**

There is no denying that the internet, and the approaches to study it, are in a state of constant change. As the internet started from being seen as a separate virtual world and it became an integral part of contemporary human life, internet studies have also begun to shift their attention towards understanding the medium in terms of its social and historical context. National web studies is only the latest of fields to account for these phenomena. By focusing on a national context, these approaches foreground the importance of the human component of the internet, and thereby contribute to a more nuanced view on the impact of web technologies.

In this master's thesis, I have argued that the political culture approach is particularly suitable for the study of the national web. In the first part of the thesis, I devised a theoretical framework for this approach: after defining and discussing both the concept of the national web and political culture, I conceptualized the way political culture informs and shapes the national web, as well as how political culture itself might be transformed in the process. In the second part of the thesis, through a mixed-method case study of the Hungarian political sphere on Facebook, I tested this framework and explored the inheritance and transformation of Hungarian political culture on the Hungarian web. The theoretical framework proposed in the thesis proved to be a useful and fruitful starting point for analyzing national webs, while also accounting for the implications of the 'nation' in the national web, which can only be improved by further research. Furthermore, analysing political culture on the internet can

help put online political activity into perspective and help understand why each national web is built up in a particular way.

Political culture and the way it is reflected on the internet can also provide insights into the differences between countries in terms of the uses of online technologies, as well as how and why such phenomena as "social media revolutions" occur in one place and not in another. In the case of Hungary, a country with low political participation rates and high levels of distrust among citizens, certain qualities of the internet can have a positive effect on the attitudes and political beliefs of many. Researching the Hungarian national web and its effects on political culture could certainly be beneficial in transforming current Hungarian political culture, which is a remnant of earlier totalitarian and oppressive eras, into one that is suitable for the functioning of a modern democracy.

Naturally, political culture does not provide a full explanation for the nature of online political activity: there can be many other factors that we need to account for to see the full picture. Facebook is also merely one part of the Hungarian national web, including only half of the population of the country, and often representing, for example, one age group more than another. The methods used for data collection and analysis led to interesting findings in this paper; however, my previous knowledge and familiarity with Hungary and the Hungarian political scene on Facebook also added greatly to the successful application of these methods. With these limitations in mind, this thesis was primarily concerned with the initial introduction of the concept of political culture into the study of national webs, and argued that we can observe interesting phenomena even based on a relatively small portion of a national web.

The political culture approach, as defined by Sidney Verba and other political scientists, also includes the possibility of comparative studies. This thesis involves a case study with only a single case due to constraints of time and space; however, the aspects and methods

used were selected so that they can be easily adapted to further case studies of national webs and political cultures. Such comparative studies can help further understand the relation between national webs and national political cultures, as well as the importance and influence of different social, political and cultural factors.

Although national web studies is not an established field so far, it represents an approach that is aware of the changes that the internet has been undergoing in the decades since its inception. The concept of political culture can further clarify these changes in the context of nations through their national webs. Because political culture provides a hermeneutic and normative framework for the political actions of a nation, it can also be helpful in assessing the role of the internet in its historical and socio-political context, effectively inserting the internet in its right place in the course of national history.

## **bibliography.**

Almond, Gabriel and Sidney Verba. *The civic culture: Political attitudes and democracy in five nations*. Sage, 1989.

Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso, 1991.

Batory, Agnes. "Kin-state identity in the European context: citizenship, nationalism and constitutionalism in Hungary." *Nations and Nationalism* 16, no. 1 (2010): 31-48.

Boros-Kazai, András. "Hungary." In *Eastern Europe: An Introduction to the People, Lands, and Culture, volume 1.*, edited by Richard C. Frucht, 329-412. ABC-CLIO, 2005.

Brants, Kees and Katrin Voltmer. "Introduction: Mediatization and De-centralization of Political Communication." In *Political Communication in Postmodern Democracy*, edited by Kees Brants and Katrin Voltmer, 1-16.

Bimber, Bruce, Cynthia Stohl, and Andrew J. Flanagin. "Technological change and the shifting nature of political organization." In *Routledge Handbook of Internet Politics*, edited by Andrew Chadwick and Philip N. Howard, 72-85. Hoboken: Taylor & Francis, 2009.

Castells, Manuel. *The Power of Identity*. Vol. 2 of *The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture*. 1997. Reprint, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 2000.

Chadwick, Andrew. "Web 2.0: New Challenges for the Study of E-Democracy in an Era of Informational Exuberance." *I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society* 5, no. 1 (2009): 9-41.

Delli Carpini, Michael X. Mediating Democratic Engagement: The impact of communications on citizens' involvement in political and civic life." In *Handbook of Political Communication Research*, edited by Lynda Lee Kaid, 357-394. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2004.

Downing, John. *Internationalizing Media Theory: Transition, Power, Culture*. London; Thousand Oaks; New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 1996.

Elkins, David J. and Richard E. B. Simeon. "A Cause in Search of its Effect, or What does Political Culture Explain?" *Comparative Politics* 11, no. 2 (1979): 127-145.

Elsaessar, Thomas and Warren Buckland. *Studying Contemporary American Film: A Guide to Movie Analysis*. London & New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2012.

Engel, Christoph. "The Internet and the Nation State." Presentation at the German Society for Public International Law Meeting. Kiel, March 1999. Translated by Patricia Adler.

Etling, Bruce, Karina Alexanyan, John Kelly, Robert Faris, John Palfrey, and Urs Gasser. "Public Discourse in the Russian Blogosphere: Mapping RuNet Politics and Mobilization." Berkman Center Research Publication, no. 2010-11, 19 Oct. 2010.

Everard, Jerry. *Virtual States: The Internet and the Boundaries of the Nation-state*. London: Routledge, 2000.

Foot, Kristen A., Michael Xenos, Steven M. Schneider, Randolph Kluver, and Nicholas W. Jankowski. "Electoral Web Production Practices in Cross-national Perspective: The Relative Influence of National Development, Political Culture, and Web Genre." In *Routledge Handbook of Internet Politics*, edited by Andrew Chadwick and Philip N. Howard, 40-55. Hoboken: Taylor & Francis, 2009.

Gerlitz, Carolin, and Anne Helmond. "The Like economy: Social buttons and the data-intensive web." *New Media & Society*, February 4 (2013).

Goldfarb, Jeffrey C. *Reinventing Political Culture: The Power of Culture versus the Culture of Power*. Polity, 2011.

Gurevitch, Michael and Jay G. Blumler. "State of the Art in Comparative Political Communication Research: Poised for Maturity?" In *Comparing Political Communication: Theories, Cases, and Challenges*, edited by Frank Esser and Barbara Pfetsch, 325-343. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Hartley, John. "The Frequencies of Public Writing: Tomb, Tome and Time as Technologies of the Public." In *Democracy and New Media*, edited by Henry Jenkins and David Thorburn, 247-269. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2003.

Hepp, Andreas. *Cultures of Mediatization*. Cambridge; Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press, 2013. Translated by Keith Tribe.

Herek, Gregory M. "Developing a Theoretical Framework and Rationale for a Research Proposal." In *How to Write a Successful Research Grant Application*, edited by Willo Pequegnat, Ellen Stover and Cheryl Anne Boyce, 137-146. Springer, 2011.

Kluver, Randolph. "Political Culture and Information Technology in the 2001 Singapore General Election." *Political Communication* 21, no. 4 (2004): 435-458.

Kluver, Randolph. "Political Culture in Online Politics." In *Internet Research Annual, Volume 2*, edited by Mia Consalvo and Matthew Allen, 75-84. Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 2004.

Körösényi, András. "Politikai kultúra Magyarországon." *Szociológiai Figyelő* (1999): n.p.

Margetts, Helen, Peter John, Tobias Escher and Stéphane Reissfelder. "Social Information and Political Participation on the Internet: An Experiment." *European Political Science Review*, 2013.

Mazzoleni, Gianpietro, and Winfried Schulz. "'Mediatization' of Politics: A Challenge for Democracy?" *Political Communication* 16, no. 3 (1999): 247-261.

Miller, Daniel and Don Slater. *The Internet: An Ethnographic Approach*. Oxford: Berg, 2000.

Pye, Lucian W. "Introduction: Political Culture and Political Development." In *Political Culture and Political Development*, edited by Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, 3-26. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965.

Rieder, Bernhard. "Institutionalizing without Institutions? Web 2.0 and the Conundrum of Democracy." Unpublished, 2012.

Rogers, Richard, Esther Weltevrede, Erik Borra and Sabine Niederer. "National Web Studies: The Case of Iran Online." In *A Companion to New Media Dynamics*, edited by John Hartley, Jean Burgess, and Axel Bruns, 142-166. John Wiley & Sons, 2013.

Saunders, Robert A. "Nationality: Cyber-Russian." *Russia in Global Affairs* 2, no. 4 (2004): 156-166.

Saunders, Robert A. *Ethnopolitics in Cyberspace: The Internet, Minority Nationalism, and the Web of Identity*. Lexington Books, 2011.

Schneider, Steven M., and Kirsten A. Foot. "Web sphere analysis: An Approach to Studying Online Action." *Virtual methods: Issues in Social Research on the Internet*, edited by Christine Hune, 157-170. Oxford: Berg, 2005.

Silverman, David. *Doing Qualitative Research: A Practical Handbook*. SAGE, 2005.

Slevin, James. *The Internet and Society*. Cambridge: Polity, 2000.

Tellis, Winston. "Introduction to Case Study." *The Qualitative Report* 3, no. 2, (1997).

Thompson, John B. *The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of the Media*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

Tóth, Borbála. "Mapping Digital Media: Hungary." Open Society Foundations, 2012.

Tóth, György István. "Bizalomhiány, normazavarok, igazságtalanságérzet és paternalizmus a magyar társadalom értékszerkezetében." Budapest: TÁRKI, 2009.

Tóth, György István. Interview with Eszter Rádai. "Closer to the East or the West?" *Eurozine*, 30 March 2010.

<http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2010-03-30-toth-en.html>

Verba, Sidney. "Comparative Political Culture." In *Political Culture and Political Development*, edited by Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, 512-560. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965.

Wheeler, Deborah L. "The Internet and Public Culture in Kuwait." *Gazette* 63, no. 2-3 (2001): 187-201.

White, Philip L. "Globalization and the Mythology of the "Nation State"." In *Global History: Interactions Between the Universal and the Local*, edited by A. G. Hopkins, 257-284. Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006.

Yin, Robert K. *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*. Vol. 5. SAGE Publications, Incorporated, 2008.

## appendix.

List of the Facebook pages consulted during the research for this thesis.

Abbahagyom a dohányzást, hogy ne támogassam a fideszes gengsztereket

<https://www.facebook.com/dohanyfust>

A magyar lányok a legszebbek

<https://www.facebook.com/legszebbek>

A médiatörvény megfelel a vonatkozó uniós irányelvnek

<https://www.facebook.com/pages/A-m%C3%A9diat%C3%B6rv%C3%A9ny-megfelel-a-vonatkoz%C3%B3-uni%C3%B3s-ir%C3%A9nyelvnek/170429829665069?fref=ts>

A nagy Trafik mutyi

<https://www.facebook.com/TrafikMutyi>

Aki nem olvasta el az új médiatörvényt, az ne tiltakozzon ellene

<https://www.facebook.com/pages/Aki-nem-olvasta-el-az-%C3%BAj-m%C3%A9diat%C3%B6rv%C3%A9nyt-az-ne-tiltakozzon-ellene/121220934612955?ref=ts&fref=ts>

Bocsánatot kérünk, Örményország - Hungarians are sorry, Armenia

<https://www.facebook.com/SorryForLettingSafarovGo>

Dohánybolti egypercesek

<https://www.facebook.com/DohanyboltiEgypercesek>

Egy perc csend a sajtószabadságért

<https://www.facebook.com/egypercscsend/>

Egymillióan a magyar sajtószabadságért

<https://www.facebook.com/sajtoszabadsagert?fref=ts>

Ferenc Kumin - About Hungary

<https://www.facebook.com/FerencKumin>

Friends of Hungary

<https://www.facebook.com/we.friendsofhungary>

Hey Armenia, sorry about our Prime Minister

<https://www.facebook.com/SorryArmenia>

Hey Europe, sorry about our Prime Minister

<https://www.facebook.com/pages/Hey-Europe-sorry-about-our-Prime-Minister/200431290042349>

I ♥ Budapest

<https://www.facebook.com/IBudapest>

I ♥ Magyarország

<https://www.facebook.com/IMagyarország>

I bet Hungary can get 1 million fans before any other European Country

<https://www.facebook.com/pages/I-bet-Hungary-can-get-1-million-fans-before-any-other-European-Country/350956600989>

I love Balaton

<https://www.facebook.com/ilovebalaton.hu>

Lángos

<https://www.facebook.com/pages/L%C3%A1ngos/34423153793?fref=ts>

Magyar vagyok, nem “idióta”

<https://www.facebook.com/magyar.vagyok.nem.idiota>

Magyarországon igenis demokrácia, sajtószabadság és jogállam van

<https://www.facebook.com/magyardemokracia?fref=ts>

Magyarságért

<https://www.facebook.com/Magyarsagert?fref=ts>

Magyarok

<https://www.facebook.com/magyarokmindenhol>

Mi akkor is magyarok maradunk a felvidéken!

<https://www.facebook.com/magyarfelvidek>

Ne ússza meg a Fidesz a trafikmutyit

<https://www.facebook.com/dohanymutyi?fref=ts>

Nem támogatom a médiatörvényt, mert értem is, amit olvasok.

<https://www.facebook.com/pages/Nem-t%C3%A1mogatom-a-m%C3%A9diat%C3%B6rv%C3%A9nyt-mert-%C3%A9rtem-is-amit-olvasok/190992904249557?fref=ts>

One Million for the Freedom of Press in Hungary

<https://www.facebook.com/freepresshun>

Szamizdat

<https://www.facebook.com/pages/Szamizdat/133378390055001>

Szeretlek Magyar Csapat

<https://www.facebook.com/SzeretlekMagyarCsapat>

Trafik-Károsultak

<https://www.facebook.com/trafikkarosultak>

Trafikmutyi

<https://www.facebook.com/trafikmutyi2?fref=ts>

Trafikos Pista

<https://www.facebook.com/trafikospista>

Túró Rudi

<https://www.facebook.com/turorudi>

Vicces Nemzeti Dohányboltok gyűjtőhelye (1,247 likes)

<https://www.facebook.com/ViccesNemzetiDohanybolt>

### **Parties currently in the parliament**

FIDESZ

<https://www.facebook.com/FideszHU?fref=ts>

KDNP - Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt

<https://www.facebook.com/kdnphu?fref=ts>

MSZP

<https://www.facebook.com/mszpfb?fref=ts>

Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom

<https://www.facebook.com/JobbikMagyarorszagertMozgalom?fref=ts>

[s](#)

Lehet Más a Politika! - Politics can be different

<https://www.facebook.com/lehetmas?fref=ts>

### **Other major parties**

Magyar Kétfarkú Kutya Párt

<https://www.facebook.com/pages/Magyar-K%C3%A9tfark%C3%BA-Kutya-Part/14792493292?fref=ts>

Együtt 2014 Mozgalom

<https://www.facebook.com/egyutt2014?fref=ts>

Demokratikus Koalíció

<https://www.facebook.com/dk365?fref=ts>

4K! - Negyedik Köztársaság

<https://www.facebook.com/NegyedikKoztarsasag>

Párbeszéd Magyarországért

<https://www.facebook.com/parbeszedmagyarorszagert>