

Reflections on Midyat and Tur Abdin¹

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It is a great pleasure to have been invited to this symposium and it is an honour for me to introduce and moderate this first panel. Until very recently, I would have thought that a symposium like this, which its emphasis on the ethnic and religious diversity of the city and district of Midyat, would be impossible in Turkey, and I am happy to be a witness of important changes in public discourse in Turkey, away from the fiction of a homogenous nation and towards a recognition of diversity as a source of pride.

Perhaps you will allow me to make a few personal comments, on how my own encounter with Midyat helped me to rethink some of my own preconceived ideas on the identity of the people of this region. Some of you may know me because of my writings on Kurdish society and history, on which I began research in the mid-1970s. A few visits to Midyat that I made in that period helped me to reframe the way I should look at the social and cultural dynamics of the entire region of Turkey and its neighbours. In those days, the fiction that everyone in Turkey is a Turk was still upheld by many people, including some of the Kurds whom I met. I was aware that this fiction was being challenged by an emerging Kurdish movement. But at the same time, I had myself an equally simplistic idea of the ethnic identity of Eastern Turkey, believing that there lived mainly two peoples in the country, Turks and Kurds, and only a few pockets of remaining Christian communities. In Midyat and Tur Abdin in general, I became aware that the ethnic situation is far more complex, that there are communities such as the Muslim and Arabic-speaking Muhallami (Mhalmi), and Arabic- and Kurdish-speaking Christian communities besides the Aramaic-speaking Suryoye (T: Süryani), and Yezidis (K: Êzîdî) as well as Sunni Kurds. Moreover, most of the communities retained memories of having adhered to another religion than their present one: Christians proudly pointed out

¹ This is an updated version of a text originally presented in Turkish at the International Midyat Symposium “Keşf-i Kadim: Matiate’den Midyat’a”, held in Midyat, 7-9 October 2011. I wish to thank Andrew Palmer, Heleen Murre-van den Berg, and Naures Atto for their comments on an earlier version of this paper. The responsibility for the text as it stands is, of course, entirely mine.

remains of earlier fire and sun worship, and Muhallami knew that there had been Christians among their ancestors. And I encountered quite a few people who had their own theories of the origins of the various communities, showing an awareness that religious conversions and changes of language and ethnic identity had not been uncommon in the region.

The most important insight I owe to this region is that it makes no sense to study any one ethnic or religious community in isolation. The history of the region – and this is true of the entire Middle East – is a history of cultural encounters; each community preserves in its cultural heritage a memory of encounters with other cultures, other religions, other languages. Cultural encounters are not necessarily friendly; tension and conflict are also inherently part of every cultural encounter. Each community has memories of conflict with its neighbours; written chronicles and oral tradition abound with stories of war, raiding (*talan*), feuds and persecution. But the same communities that clashed with one another also learned and borrowed from one another; they exchanged goods and products. Political alliances often crossed ethnic boundaries, and so did marriages at least occasionally. In the early 20th century, we find some Kurds and some Suryoye allied against other Kurds and Suryoye. (I remember especially hearing stories of the alliance and friendship between the Christian leader Shemun Hanne Haydo and Elîkê Battê, both of them renowned as raiders, whose close relationship often placed them face to face with other Kurds as well as Suryoye.) The alliances did not only come about through brave men; women also constituted a bridge between the communities. It is true that no community of the region approves of women marrying outside their own group, but such marriages did and do take place, whether voluntarily or, perhaps more often, involuntarily (against the will of the women concerned and their families); and because it is mothers rather than fathers who educate their children, such intergroup marriages are effective channels of cultural exchange.

The institution of *kirvelik* or ritual co-parenthood is a good example of how inter-group conflict and communication are intimately related. The *kirve* (K: *kirîv*) is the man who, at the circumcision ceremony of a Muslim or Yezidi boy, holds the child on his knees during the operation. The relationship between a man and his *kirîv*, reminiscent of godparenthood in Christian cultures, is an elective kinship tie that binds more strongly than any blood relationship; they have a moral duty to help and protect each other. For this reason, parents tend to prefer powerful and respected men, who may well belong to potentially hostile groups, to act as their *kirîv*. Many Muslim fathers have chosen Yezidis or Christians as the *kirîv*, and

Yezidi fathers Christians or Muslims, and this practice has resulted in links of solidarity crosscutting ethnic and religious boundaries.² In episodes of collective violence, such as the mass killings of 1915, there are many stories of Christian families rescued and protected by Muslim Kurds with whom they had a *kirîv* relationship.

Religious and ethnic diversity

The Tur Abdin is one of the oldest centres of Christian civilization in the wider region – we shall hear much about that in other panels at this symposium – and Aramaic-speaking people have been living here for perhaps three thousand years.³ There were other religions here before Christianity and Islam, and they have left a few material traces: as local people are happy to point out, several monasteries and churches were built on the ruins of temples dedicated to fire or sun worship. Less tangible traces of earlier religions no doubt survive in folklore and folk belief. Throughout history, we hear of people giving up their religion and joining another.

By the time of the Ottoman conquest in the early 16th century, Midyat was the chief town of the district of Tur Abdin (Nahiye-i Tur), which was inhabited by settled Christian peasants and nomadic or semi-nomadic tribes, most of them probably Yezidis. The analysis of the first Ottoman tax registers of the larger region, by Nejat Göyünç and Wolfgang Hütteroth, shows that this district differed in some important respects – settlement and type of agriculture – from its neighbouring districts.⁴ It had a considerable settled population, which produced large amounts of wheat and barley and was especially notable for its wine production. The

² On this institution more generally: Ayşe Kudat, 'Ritual kinship in Eastern Anatolia', *Anthropological Quarterly* 44, 1971, 37-50; Ayşe Kudat Sertel, *Kirvelik*, Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1974. The fact that "*kirîvo*" is in some regions a common appellation for Armenians or Yezidis indicates how common it has been for this relationship to cross religious boundaries.

³ Andrew Palmer, *Monk and mason on the Tigris frontier: the early history of Tur `Abdin*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

⁴ Nejat Göyünç and Wolf-Dieter Hütteroth, *Land an der Grenze: Osmanische Verwaltung im heutigen türkisch-syrisch-irakischen Grenzgebiet im 16. Jahrhundert*, Istanbul: Eren, 1997. The detailed maps accompanying this book, unfortunately not available in Turkey, clearly bring out the special character of Midyat.

district yielded more revenue to the state than neighbouring districts. The nomadic or semi-nomadic population was classified into three clusters of tribes, two of which the tax registers call Çalki (*cemaat-i Çalki*) and the third Şıqaqi. Göyünç and Hütteroth interpret the name of Çalki (in Aramaic: Çalkoyo) as referring to Yezidis; but it is interesting to note that one of the two Çalki clusters contains several smaller tribes identified as Muhallami.⁵ The tax registers give no indication of the language spoken by these tribal groups nor of their religion. They did not pay the *ispence* and *cizye* taxes levied from Christians, but for taxing purposes the Ottoman state did not distinguish between Sunni Muslims and Yezidis or other sectarians.

The *Sharafnameh*, the history of Kurdish ruling families that was written towards the end of the 16th century, does not give us much useful information about the population of Midyat either. It mentions Tur as one of the districts of the emirate of Hisn Keyfa, and it lists thirteen tribes of the emirate, among which the Şıqaqi and Calki, but it does not tell us much more about these tribes, except that there are also Şıqaqi further east, in the Finik part of the emirate of Cezire.⁶ Sharaf Khan, the author of the *Sharafnameh*, insisted that most Kurds were staunch Sunni Muslims and loyal allies of the Ottoman state, and he may deliberately have underreported the numbers of Yezidis among the Kurdish tribes. (As we may gather from later authors such as Evliya Çelebi, the Ottoman state tended to be suspicious of Yezidis and other sectarians).

For more information on the religions and cultures of the peoples of the region, we have to rely on later travellers, who confirm that the Tur Abdin was truly a museum of living religious traditions. The Armenian traveller Polonyalı Simeon, who visited his Diyarbekir around 1600, gives some information on a mysterious sect called Shamsi (Şemsi), who were neither Muslims nor Christians and whose name suggests that they were sun worshippers. After a governor had forced them to convert to either Christianity or Islam, many had pretended to be

⁵ Göyünç and Hütteroth, op.cit., pp. 212-4. The Çalkî or Çêlkan are currently a large Yezidi tribal confederation, to which all Yezidis of Tur Abdin and many in the Syrian Jazira belong – but there exist other Yezidi tribal confederations with other names. The documents studied by Göyünç and Hütteroth suggest that in the 16th century the Çalki confederation may have included non-Yezidi groups.

⁶ Sharaf Khan Bidlisi, *Sharafnameh*, ed. M. `Abbasi, Tehran 1343/1964, pp. 196, 201 [in the Turkish translation: Şeref Han, *Şerefname*, trl M. Emin Bozarslan, Istanbul: Yöntem, 1975, pp. 190, 194]. One of the other Kurdish tribes of the Hisn Keyfa district mentioned by Sharaf Khan is listed as Muhallabi. This is probably a copyist's error for Muhallami and adds to the mystery of the ethnic origins of this tribe.

Armenians, while others had fled to the 'land of the Syrians', by which probably the Tur Abdin was meant.⁷ The Şemsi are mentioned by various later travellers, whose accounts partly contradict each other but indicate that they survived long as a distinct community in the region. The Şemsi carefully hid their beliefs and rituals from outsiders; some joined the Syrian Orthodox or (later) the Syrian Catholic church, and others appear to have merged with the Yezidis.⁸

Ethnic heterogeneity and the modern nation state

In the 19th century, the idea of the homogeneous nation state as the most modern form of political organization spread from western Europe to other parts of the world. The colourful mosaic of numerous different ethnic and religious communities living beside one another could be accommodated by the earlier empires of which the region had been part. The Ottoman Empire had arranged for Christian communities to be organized into autonomous and self-governing (though politically dependent) *millets*, with their own internal structure of authority, and it also dealt with tribal groups as collectives. In both cases, forms of indirect rule prevailed for most of the time. Although Kızılbaş (Alevi) and Yezidis were often persecuted, this was usually in response to their perceived 'rebellions' or their refusal to pay taxes; at other times, the state treated them (and most significantly, taxed them) as Muslims and did not attempt to assimilate or convert them.

The modernizing elites who wished to turn Turkey into a modern nation state, however, had no patience with difference and heterogeneity. Nation-building, as elsewhere, was based on the denial of difference and a campaign to propagate the idea of common origins. As the French thinker Ernest Renan said in his famous lecture 'What is a nation?', a group of people constitute a nation because they want to be one, and common memories help in shaping a common national awareness; but even more important than shared memories, Renan

⁷ Hrant D. Andreasyan, *Polonyalı Simeon'un seyahatnamesi (1608-1619)*, Istanbul: İ.Ü.Ed.Fak. yayınları, 1964, p. 100.

⁸ The travellers' reports on the Şemsi are usefully collected and analysed by Racho Donef, 'The Shemsi and the Assyrians', Sydney: 2010; available online at <http://www.atour.com/bn/authors/pdf/DrRachoDonef-TheShemsiAndTheAssyrians-Shamsia.pdf>.

commented, is that they have decided to forget certain things.⁹ Forgetting the memories that divide people, and especially (Renan suggested) forgetting the violent conflicts and hatreds of the past is a precondition for imagining a homogeneous nation.

The Turkish modernizers of the Young Turk and Kemalist period proceeded by various ways to deny diversity. Removal of the most conspicuously different group, the Armenians, from Anatolia, by deportation (*tehcir*) and mass killings, made the idea of a homogenous Turkish nation state possible.¹⁰ Another group that was a potential threat to national unity, the Kurds, became the target of efforts at assimilation, entailing the destruction of their cultural distinctiveness. Several of the early Republican reforms had the character of exercises in planned forgetting: the Law on Unification of Education (*tevhid-i tedrisat kanunu*) ended the tradition of *medrese* learning and removed a large body of traditional knowledge, as well as the non-Turkish languages in which this education had been transmitted, from the collective memory of society. The alphabet reform, which placed all Ottoman writing beyond the reach of the new generation, was perhaps the most massive exercise in organized forgetting to be undertaken anywhere in the world. With memories erased, nationalist theories of history and language could more easily be mobilized to create new shared memories, based on the fiction of a common Central Asian descent.

Since the demise of Kemalist nation-building, long-suppressed memories have returned to public awareness. Conservative Muslims, Alevis, Kurds and other ethnic groups, including the non-Muslim minorities, have all been rediscovering their histories and reflecting on their group identities and their relationships with other communities. The process of rediscovery of the suppressed past has also brought old wounds and traumas to the surface; all communities have suffered, though in different ways, and all demand recognition of their suffering. The debate on the Armenian genocide has been painful for Turks as well as Armenians; many find it hard to face the facts, but society is gradually becoming receptive to an open discussion of those facts. There were few Armenians in Tur Abdin apart from those who fled there to

⁹ Renan's lecture was delivered at the Sorbonne in 1882 and has had great influence both among students of nationalism and among nationalists. For a recent English translation, see: Ernest Renan, 'What is a nation? [trl by Martin Thom]', in: Homi K Bhabha (ed.), *Nation and narration*, London: Routledge, 1990, pp. 8-22.

¹⁰ The role of the 'Armenian question' in the emergence of a Turkish national awareness is emphasized in a study by Taner Akçam, *Türk ulusal kimliği ve Ermeni sorunu*, Istanbul: İletişim, 1992.

escape the killings elsewhere, but Suryoye were also victims of violence directed against their community during the war years. The true extent of the *Seyfo*, as the Suryoye call the violence against their community, is still unknown to the wider public and is a matter of debate among experts, and inevitably more about this will be brought to light in the coming years.¹¹

Less painful memories are being discussed more easily, and it is heartening to see how both the AKP administration and municipalities controlled by the BDP have made an effort to show that non-Muslim minorities have a legitimate place in the cultural mosaic. No doubt the accession negotiations with the European Union and the promises of income from tourism have played a part in the respect now shown to the Christian heritage of East and South-East Anatolia. But this would not have been possible without the important changes that have taken place in public awareness in Turkey, the increasing acceptance of diversity and the insight that heterogeneity is not a source of weakness but, to the contrary, the reflection of a culturally rich past and valuable resource for the future.

Migration from Tur Abdin, diasporas, and the survival of cultures

Migration has been an important aspect of the history of Tur Abdin throughout the 20th century. All communities presently living here have seen many of their members leave, which has weakened them, but there are now strong and well-organized diasporas that may help to sustain them.

The first waves of migration took place in the wake of the First World War, after the settlement of the Turkish-Syrian border and when France established its authority in the Syrian Jazira. Christians of various church affiliations chose to live just across the border, under French rule. In the mid-1920s, the suppression of the Sheikh Said revolt in Turkey led

¹¹ The first major studies of the *Seyfo* in English, by authors who strongly identify with these Christian communities, are: Sébastien de Courtois, *The forgotten genocide: Eastern Christians, the last Aramaeans*, Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2004, and David Gaunt, *Massacres, resistance, protectors: Muslim-Christian relations in Eastern Anatolia during World War I*, Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias, 2006. Earlier overviews include Yves Ternon, *Mardin 1915: anatomie pathologique d'une destruction*, Paris: Centre d'histoire arménienne contemporaine, 2002, pp. 167-78. See also the extract from a still untranslated book about the events of 1915 by the last Chaldean bishop of Mardin in Andrew Palmer's contribution to the present volume.

to the flight of Kurdish tribesmen across the border (including tribes that paid heed to the government's call to oppose the rebellion). Qamishli and the surrounding villages became like a mirror image of the Tur Abdin: we find the same communities on both sides of the border, but after eighty years or more of separate existence, these communities have grown somewhat apart and have different memories of their common past.¹²

After the end of the French mandate, the stream of emigrants from Tur Abdin was redirected towards Beirut, attracted by the economic development and opportunities of Lebanon. It was probably Suryoye first who went there in larger numbers, attracted by the idea of Lebanon as a state dominated by Christians, but soon they were joined by Kurds and Muhallami from Tur Abdin. The communities that had lived side by side in Tur Abdin remained separate and entered different sections of the labour market in Lebanon. Interestingly, in this Arabic-speaking environment, the Muhallami have often been considered to be Kurds, and now, too, other Lebanese Kurds consider the Muhallami to be part of their own group, although they are organized separately.¹³ (Elsewhere in the diaspora, the Muhallami emphasize their Arab identity and dissociate themselves from the Kurds.)

In the 1960s, labour migration to Germany became significant. Again, Suryoye from Tur Abdin were relatively quick to grasp this opportunity, compared with other communities in South-East Anatolia. Once the first men had gained a foothold in Germany, they helped their friends and relatives to join them, and the consequent process of chain migration resulted in large numbers of Suryoye settling in Western Europe. Many others left Tur Abdin for Istanbul. The departure of these men weakened the community in their land or origin. In the mid-1970s, when I visited the region, I heard of many conflicts about land, of Suryoye girls being kidnapped and married by Muslim men, of forced expropriations, and of the connivance of the police. Labour recruitment had stopped in most West European countries, and Suryoye

¹² In an fascinating study of archival sources and oral traditions, Seda Altuğ has demonstrated how the various ethnic and religious communities of the Syrian Jazira – she focused on Armenians, Suryoye and Kurds – remember crucial events of the period 1915-1940 differently and appear to have erased certain events from memory: Seda Altuğ, 'Sectarianism in the Syrian Jazira: Community, land and violence in the memories of World War I and the French mandate (1915-1939)', Ph.D. dissertation, Utrecht University, 2011.

¹³ Farah W. Kawtharani and Lokman I. Meho, 'The Kurdish community in Lebanon', *The International Journal of Kurdish Studies* 19/1-2, 2005, 137-160; Ahmad Muhammad Ahmad, *Akrâd Lubnân wa tanzîmhum al-ijtimâ'î wa'l-siyâsî*, Bayrut: Maktabat al-Faqîh, 1995.

families began to apply for asylum, citing the deteriorating security situation. Conditions became even more difficult in the 1980s and 1990s, when the conflict between the PKK and the state forced many villagers to leave their villages.¹⁴

Already before 1980, I had the strong impression that the Suryoye community had decided they had no future in Tur Abdin and that apart from the elderly, everyone was planning to resettle in Western Europe. After a presence of at least three thousand years, would the Suryoye disappear from Tur Abdin, as the Shemsi had earlier disappeared?

Suryoye immigrants in Sweden, the Netherlands, Germany and Switzerland were rapidly increasing in numbers and organizing themselves into sustainable communities, carefully maintaining their religious and cultural traditions. With churches and priests in virtually all the quarters where their people are settled, monasteries in the Netherlands, Germany and Switzerland, various transnational associations, a whole range of printed and online periodicals and a satellite television station, the survival of the Suryoye as a religious-ethnic community appears assured.¹⁵ The vast majority of Tur Abdin's Suryoye now live either in Istanbul or abroad, but it is precisely the existence of a strong, prosperous and cohesive diaspora that may also make a sustainable presence of Suryoye in Tur Abdin possible. Now that peace has returned to the region, and supported by government policies that are more favourable to non-Muslims than in the past, people have started returning to their original villages – for summer visits in many cases, more permanently in others. Small village communities may not be economically viable, especially when modern education and health

¹⁴ On the factors contributing to migration from Tur Abdin, see: Yakup Bilge, *Süryanilerin kökeni ve Türkiyeli Süryaniler*, Istanbul: privately published, 1991, pp. 128-35; Sabri Atman, *Asurlar, Süryaniler*, Istanbul: Kaynak, 1997; Naures Atto, 'Hostages in the homeland, orphans in the diaspora. Identity discourses among the Assyrian/Syriac elites in the European diaspora', Leiden: Leiden University, 2011, Chapter 4.

¹⁵ Tuma Bar Şawme, *Avrupa'da Süryaniler I (İsviçre); Avrupa'da Süryaniler II (Almanya)*, Södertälje: Nsibin Yayınları, 1992-1994; Heidi Armbruster, 'Homes in crisis: Syrian Orthodox Christians in Turkey and Germany', in: Naje Al-Ali and Khalid Koser (eds), *New approaches to migration? Transnational communities and the transformation of home*, London: Routledge, 2002, pp. 17-33; Jan Schukink, 'De Suryoye, een verborgen gemeenschap. Een historisch-antropologische studie van een Enschedese vluchtelingengemeenschap afkomstig uit het Midden-Oosten' [The Suryoye, a hidden community. A historical-anthropological study of a refugee community in Enschede originating from the Middle East], PhD dissertation, Amsterdam: Vrije Universiteit, 2003; Atto, 'Hostages in the homeland, orphans in the diaspora.' .

services have to be organized, but this is precisely where the diaspora has intervened to support the resurgence of Suryoye village life.

The prospects for the survival of Yezidi culture in Tur Abdin are more precarious. Being neither Muslims nor Christians, Yezidis have suffered even more oppression than other minorities, including strong pressure to convert to either Islam or Christianity. Many have responded by leaving their villages and attempting to hide their religious identity in the towns where they settled. Not believing that there was a future for them in Turkey, many Yezidis attempted to migrate to Western Europe, and in the 1980s a considerable number of Yezidis, some of them from Tur Abdin, applied for asylum in Germany.¹⁶ The concentration of Yezidi immigrants in only a few German towns, and the arrival among them of knowledgeable Yezidi religious authorities from Iraq after 1991 had the effect of a revival of Yezidi culture and the first efforts towards the systematization of the Yezidi belief system in the diaspora. For the Yezidis, it appears to be even more true than for the Suryoye, that the existence of a diaspora enabled not only the survival but also the modernization of their religion.¹⁷ Thanks to the diaspora, there is also an increased international interest in the Yezidis and concern with the protection of their rights as a religious minority, which may contribute to an amelioration of their position in Turkey. One Yezidi village that had been evacuated and occupied by village guards in the 1990s has been formally restored to its legal owners, of whom a few

¹⁶ Robin Schneider (ed.), *Die kurdischen Yezidi: ein Volk auf dem Weg in den Untergang* [The Kurdish Yezidis: a people on the road to annihilation], Göttingen: Gesellschaft für Bedrohte Völker, 1984; Johannes Düchting and Nuh Ates, *Stirbt der Engel Pfau? Geschichte, Religion und Zukunft der Yezidi-Kurden* [Is the Peacock Angel dying? History, religion and future of the Yezidi Kurds], Köln: Komkar, 1992.

¹⁷ Banu Yalkut-Breddermann, 'Der Wandel der yezidischen Religion in der Diaspora' [The transformation of Yezidi religion in the diaspora], in: Gerdien Jonker (ed.), *Kern und Rand: religiöse Minderheiten aus der Türkei in Deutschland*, Berlin: Das Arabische Buch, 1999, pp. 51-64; Philip Kreyenbroek, 'Religious minorities in the Middle East and transformation of rituals in the context of migration', in: Robert Langer, Raoul Motika and Michael Ursinus (eds), *Migration und Ritualtransfer: religiöse Praxis der Aleviten, Jesiden und Nusairier zwischen Vorderem Orient und Westeuropa*, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2005, pp. 35-50; Robert Langer, 'Yezidism between scholarly literature and actual practice: from 'heterodox' Islam and 'syncretism' to the formation of a transnational Yezidi "orthodoxy"', *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 37(3), 2010, 393-403; Philip Kreyenbroek (in collaboration with Z. Kartal, Kh. Omarkhali, and Kh. Jindy Rashow), *Yezidism in Europe: Different Generations Speak about their Religion*, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2009.

have returned from Germany.¹⁸ There appears to be little more than a token presence of Yezidis left in the region, and even this little depends entirely on the community in the diaspora.

Prospects

It is too early for a conclusion, but the changed conditions in Turkey, under which diverse ethnic and religious groups not only are free to assert their existence and to celebrate their culture, but it is also becoming possible to discuss publicly traumatic events of the past that had long remained suppressed, give reason for optimism. No doubt there will also be relapses into the earlier authoritarian attitudes, and the oppression of minorities will not once and for all end. But much has been achieved in recognition of and interest in the rich diversity of cultures in Turkey; another reason for optimism is that people are not only interested in their own cultures and their own family background but have been showing a genuine interest in other cultures as well. As an example I should like to mention a recent book written by the next speaker in this panel, the Kurdish politician Altan Tan.¹⁹ This book is a useful overview of the history of our region and of the various Kurdish tribes of Tur Abdin and neighbouring districts, but it also gives due attention to the Christian populations, to the Muhallami and to the Yezidis as well as Sunni Kurds. The same broad interest in all the religious and ethnic groups of the region is evident in the publications by municipalities in the region. This gives hope for a future in which no single group will claim superiority over others, and in which the region and its rich heritage will be considered a joint property and a joint responsibility.

¹⁸ Johannes Düchting, 'Die Yezidi und ihre Asylrechtliche Behandlung in Deutschland', undated paper (2006?), pp. 8-9. Online at www.yeziden-colloquium.de.

¹⁹ Altan Tan, *Turabidin'den Berriyé'ye: aşiretler, dinler, diller, kültürler*, Istanbul: Nûbihar, 2011.