

Crisis and Perspectives on Policy Change

Swedish Counter-terrorism Policymaking



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***Crisis and Perspectives on Policy Change:
Swedish Counter-terrorism Policymaking***

***Crisis en perspectieven op beleidsverandering:
vorming van een Zweeds contraterrorismebeleid***
(met een samenvatting in het Nederlands)

***Kriser och perspektiv på policyförändring:
skapandet av svensk kontraterrorismpolitik***
(med en sammanfattning på svenska)

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To my parents

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Chapter 1 Counter-terrorism, crisis management and policy change

1.1 Terrorism and the body politic

Today terrorism has according to many become one of the most salient antagonistic threats to human security, outweighing for example armed conflicts and international crises (Human Security Centre 2005). This observation is obviously relative, and does not say much about patterns of terrorism as such. However, the ubiquity of terrorism is indicative of a transforming world in terms of how security is conceived. Terrorism as a phenomenon is certainly not novel. It is usually dated back to the part of the French Revolution (1793–94) known as the Reign of Terror (Laqueur 1987: 11). But since the 1960s, terrorism has become a more or less permanent feature of political life in Europe (Chalk 1996: 2). Organized violence has since then increasingly become a tool for sub-state actors (Ibid.: 1), posing a different set of challenges to those in charge of security policy. The conclusion of the Human Security Centre (2005) can hence be interpreted that what in the 1960s manifested as aberrations in security policymaking has become the norm today.

Clausewitz ([1832] 1991) defined warfare as a simple continuation of politics, but with different means. Terrorism, too, fundamentally aims at changing policies without heeding the democratic processes of government. In contrast to warfare, terrorism is not constrained by laws and conventions that are to

be respected by the 'combatants' on both sides. From the perspective of state actors, there is not even a well-defined adversary. Virtually anyone could be a terrorist, or support terrorism. Pluralistic democracies ideally tolerate opinions that deviate strongly from the mainstream. Problems arise when these opinions trigger behavior that established society judges to be criminal, in particular if the aim is to overthrow the legitimate order. Terrorism is therefore about bringing deviant, often extremist, ideas into effect, manifested in terrorist acts.¹ Counter-terrorism is essentially about preventing those acts from taking place, or to mitigate the consequences if they do. Every act or ongoing terrorist plot is a failure by the self-respecting state. Terrorist attacks force governments to reconsider their array of resources and countermeasures, including surveillance of and coercive measures against a citizenry the state is supposed to protect. Since 11 September 2001, the United States and most European countries have for instance taken actions to facilitate information gathering for preventing terrorism, without showing a commensurate concern for potential human rights implications (Giorgetti 2005).

Since the terrorist attacks known by the dates 9/11, 3/11 and 7/7, an upsurge in activity aiming at preventing a new such date being added to the list has been seen in both America and Europe (von Hippel 2005). The mayhem that these terrorist acts caused was devastating, and efforts to keep an upper hand on developments has come with a cost that at times brings both George Orwell and Franz Kafka to mind. For those concerned that recent terrorist attacks have provoked too far-reaching countermeasures, surveillance policies (such as the information sharing clauses of the U.S. Patriot Act, and European suggestions to compel telecom businesses to store traffic data) and state coercion of questionable justification (such as detaining suspects at Guantánamo, and the use of 'preventive detention' in for instance England, France and the Netherlands) have in particular caused debate. According to a recent New York Times article, the human rights commissioner at the Council of Europe, Álvaro Gil-Robles, said in reference to newly instituted counter-terrorism measures in European countries, "We are fiddling with rights that only a few years ago seemed untouchable" (NYT 17/4/2006). According to the same article, a spokeswoman for the British Home Office called the European Convention on Human Rights a "cornerstone" of the European Union, but added, "There is a valid question about how rights and freedoms are balanced and interpreted in a phase of the current heightened security threat that Europe faces" (Ibid.).

Just where to strike a balance between state effectiveness in countering terrorism, the individual's need for integrity and a state governed by law, is a normative concern of some societal importance. In that normative discussion,

1 In all humility, this is not the place to define the essentially contested concept of terrorism. Schmid and Jongman (1988) identified no less than 109 different conceptualizations in use.

one concern is related to crisis experience: how much should the latest case of terrorism affect counter-terrorism policymaking? Thomas Bodström – then Swedish justice minister – recently said, “In policymaking, one must never be directed by particular events,” (Bodström 2005) when addressing recent developments in Swedish and European counter-terrorism policymaking. On the other hand, British Prime Minister Tony Blair said immediately after the London bombings of 7 July 2005, “Let there not be any doubt. The rules of the game are changing,” (SVT 7/7/2005) indicating that that particular event actually would direct policymaking. How events affect policymaking is a relevant concern, not least in the domain of counter-terrorism, where increasing effectiveness soon becomes normalized, and in that sense irrevocable or at least very difficult to change back.

1.2 Counter-terrorism and crisis management

1.2.1 Terrorism as crisis

Most would probably agree that acts of terrorism inflict archetypal crises upon polities. Crises are usually defined in terms of threats to basic values, uncertainty and a sense of urgency (Rosenthal et al 1989; Rosenthal et al. 2001; Sundelius et al. 1997; Stern 1999; Boin et al. 2005). Acts of terrorism impact not only victims who happen to be at the wrong place at the wrong time, or those who are carefully targeted for a particular purpose. Terrorism almost by definition imposes a sense of insecurity in the populace as a whole, and threatens prized values such as democratic processes of government and the state governed by law, economic interests, interstate harmony etc. (Wardlaw 1982). The uncertainties evoked by terrorist attacks range from the mere surprise of their taking place where and when they do, to the dynamics of the situations they give rise to. Crises often create a sense of urgency, an impetus for action that need not correspond with outspoken deadlines. Terrorist incidents often have explicitly short deadlines and tough ultimata, which turn the sense of urgency into something beyond a feeling.

Terrorist attacks can in most cases also be characterized as ‘fast-burning’ crises that end as they begin: “short, sharp and decisive” (t Hart and Boin 2001: 32). This fast-burning characteristic draws attention to the acute response phase of the crisis. Terrorist attacks normally have a clearly defined starting point. Regardless of its origins, however, when a crisis ends in a broader sense arguably depends on how it is managed (Hansén and Stern 2001). If it becomes clear after the acute phase that preparedness was less than expected, that the decision-making during the response phase was ill-advised, that subsequent preliminary investigations were botched etc., then the crisis can transform and live on for

months, years and even decades. The assassination of John F. Kennedy is an obvious case in point. Such crises are better described as ‘long-shadow’ crises (‘t Hart and Boin 2001: 32).

In the sphere of terrorism, the recent attacks in London, Madrid, and in particular New York and Washington constitute a certain type of long-shadow crisis, namely ‘agenda-setting’ incidents (Ibid: 35).

This cluster involves incidents that have a certain “frame-breaking” quality. They become symbols of an entire class of hitherto unknown or neglected risks and vulnerabilities. As such they pose a major managerial challenge of coping with new, under-researched problems for which no seasoned policy repertoire exists (Ibid.).

As discussed above, recent developments in European and American counter-terrorism policymaking indicate that recent terrorist attacks were precisely frame breaking. The long shadow refers to the perceived novelty of the phenomenon, and it contains elements of ‘warfare’ and increasingly far-reaching legislative gestures. Terrorist campaigns have been agenda setting before. For instance, the long shadows that were cast over West Germany as a consequence of RAF terrorism in the 1970s were indeed of similar substance (Varon 2004). The extent to which terrorism, when it first appeared in Sweden in the early 1970s, was ‘frame-breaking’ will be developed and discussed in part two of this book.

Terrorism can thus manifest itself as fast-burning or long-shadow crises, depending on its aftereffect on the media and public agendas. A question that this study will probe is the extent to which even fast-burning crises survive on the policy agenda after the event is no longer current.

An argument that would seem to cause terrorism issues to retain policy salience is the *étatist* nature of the policy domain. Policing is a core activity of the state, making it an inherently political enterprise (Reiner 2000). Over 120 years ago Maitland observed that “[t]he group of words, *police, policy, polity, politics, political, politician* is a good example of delicate distinctions” (Maitland 1885: 105). It certainly still is. Compared to crises that erupt in other policy sectors, where the state may need to intervene temporarily to protect public interests vis-à-vis private investment in for example public transport, the state is constantly responsible for policing criminal behavior. It is in other words important to keep in mind that terrorism and serious crime are types of crisis that may wax and wane on media and public agendas, but which the state can never disclaim ownership of.

1.2.2 Crisis management opportunities and predicaments

To argue that counter-terrorism equals crisis management may seem to disregard that counter-terrorism fundamentally aims at preventing acts of terrorism

from happening in the first place. But that depends on how crisis management is conceived. As mentioned above, the shadow that a crisis casts tends to be longer if it becomes obvious that poor management was related to suboptimal preparedness, or if subsequent investigations are botched. The acute crisis response is therefore only one managerial challenge.

Crises are sometimes divided into phases: crisis escalation, the acute phase, de-escalation, and accountability and learning, where each phase entails a broad array of predicaments and opportunities for responsible actors (Stern and Sundelius 2002; Hansén and Stern 2001; cf. Brecher 1993). In an effort to more poignantly articulate the leadership challenges of crisis management, Boin et al. (2005) pinpoint five critical tasks: sense making, decision making, meaning making, terminating, and learning, which to some extent overlap with the crisis phases. Whether phases or challenging tasks, one can conclude that there are constantly crisis managerial issues to consider, but that these seldom become acute. The acute phase tends to get most attention, however, even in scholarly analysis. Acuteness pertains to the present – what to do now? (the acute phase or the sense making and decision making challenges). But the recent past also at times stirs up a sense of acuteness – how could this have happened? (the accountability phase or the meaning making and learning challenges). Since this book is interested in the relationship between crisis and subsequent policymaking, a few opportunities and predicaments regarding the learning and meaning making aspects of crisis management will be discussed.

A question that frequently arises in the wake of major emergencies is how to prevent them from happening in the future, and/or how to respond more effectively if they do occur again. The very occurrence of crisis may call attention to the need for change in the existing arrangements, as might an ineffective emergency response. Crises can thus generate strong symbolic and political pressure to make a clear break with past governance practices if those practices are discredited. Crises can also infuse a sense of urgency into ongoing and often stagnant policy struggles or discussions over institutional arrangements in a policy sector. This raises the possibility that crises act as ‘reform triggers’, ‘change agents’ or ‘learning opportunities’ (Keeler 1993; Boin and ‘t Hart 2000). This notion has been much discussed (Hall 1993; Sabatier and Jenkins Smith 1993), but seldom investigated in the governance literature.

This is an important issue, because there is a fundamental tension that political and bureaucratic actors face in the wake of an emergency between two imperatives: to investigate and reflect upon what happened on the one hand; and to survive the political ‘blame games’ and media ‘witch hunts’ that tend to follow most contemporary disasters (cf. Bovens and ‘t Hart 1996; Hood 2002).

The first imperative fosters learning and policy reappraisal. Many consider crisis an unusually clear form of 'positive feedback', one that cannot be ignored by policy makers and executive organizations (Baumgartner and Jones 2002). Postmortems almost invariably reveal large amounts of intricate information about the shortcomings and faults that made the disaster possible. In a pluralistic polity this provides opportunities for 'entrepreneurs' (Kingdon [1995] 2003) favoring change and innovation, for altering the policy frames of key actors and for gaining support for the policies they seek to sell.

The second imperative constrains learning and policy reappraisal (Stern 1997). The highly mediatized and politicized nature of post-crisis investigations and debate may provide more incentives for policy makers and heads of government agencies to defend existing arrangements (and thereby themselves) than to engage in the thorough soul-searching that genuine learning requires (Argyris and Schön 1978; Staw et al. 1981; Stern 1997). There is much evidence that well entrenched institutions can put up great resistance against efforts to change them. It is by no means clear that the mere occurrence of a major emergency is a sufficient condition for overcoming institutional inertia (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Hall 1993; Rose 1993; Alink et al. 2001). However, this merely underlines Majone's (1989) point that policy alternatives are brought forth by political arguments (driven by interests and beliefs), rather than by rational calculations (even though such may come in handy, not least as justifications).

It may, however, be a highly ambiguous undertaking to ascertain after a crisis whether existing policies enabled it to take place or to develop the way it did (Bovens and 't Hart 1996; Brändström and Kuipers 2003). Also in this regard, policy makers face two imperatives that pertain to meaning making: uphold existing policies or advocate new solutions, both without informed notions of causes and effects.

The first imperative fosters negative feedback, where policy makers strive to convey an image of the policy problem that converges with existing policy structures (Baumgartner and Jones 2002). This is a matter of defining the situation and the policy problem in such a way that actions are taken, and the legislative foundations within which they were made seem reasonable, defensible, or even appropriate (Boin et al 2005).

The second imperative leads to policy reappraisal. Typically political and/or administrative opposition groups capitalize on the event to launch their own pet solutions (Kingdon [1995] 2003). But incumbent administrations may also seize the opportunity to abandon prior practices. In either case, the challenge is to depict the crisis development, decision-making, or aftermath as being symptomatic of ill-conceived or obsolete policy structures.

The notion of terrorism, and thereby counter-terrorism, is 'essentially contested' (Connolly 1993). Means and ends, causes and effects, are in this policy domain inherently subject to beliefs, ideas and preferences. The crises that terrorist attacks and serious crime give rise to are not as obvious to draw lessons from and are therefore more difficult to prevent from happening again, compared to crises of more technical nature.

1.3 Aims of the study

This study has both empirical and theoretical aims. It will explore how Swedish counter-terrorism policies developed between the mid 1960s and the mid 1990s. In so doing, it will probe the effects of three crises: the 1972 Bulltofta skyjacking, the 1975 seizure of the West German embassy in Stockholm, and the 1986 murder of Olof Palme. These cases are not chosen for their actual effect in terms of policy change, but because they created incentives to reappraise existing policy structures and exhibited the managerial challenges, predicaments and opportunities discussed above. *The empirical aim is to present a plausible explanation of Swedish crisis-induced patterns of counter-terrorism policy change.* The rationale is that the role of crises in ongoing policy processes is unclear. An examination of terrorist cases since the turn of the millennium seems to indicate that the relation is rather simple; that such crises cause major policy change. Observations of that kind however do not in themselves say why that would be the case. There is a need for understanding the nature of the political (in a broad sense) forces coming into play in relation to critical challenges. Therefore, *the theoretical aim is to make a contribution to the study of policy change and stability by focusing on the role of crisis.*

In a nutshell, the thesis argues that Swedish policy makers have been heavily influenced by cognitive biases when interpreting crises, which has had a moderating effect on policy change initiatives. Major policy changes or innovations have occurred, although those have been in keeping with dominating policy core beliefs, if such have prevailed. They however needed entrepreneurial exertion to come about. Government and administrative turnovers have had little impact on changing the constituencies for a certain belief structure. Interestingly, crises of types other than the three investigated here, such as scandals and affairs, have had a decisive impact on policy outcomes. They have not sparked new counter-terrorism policy initiatives, but they have been used by policy entrepreneurs to bend the understanding of problems, and they have reinforced cognitive biases.

1.4 Plan of the book

The book is divided into three parts. The first describes crisis cases and policy processes, the second seeks to explain the nexus between those entities, and the third makes conclusions based on the findings and discusses theoretical implications.

Part one will in some detail look into three crises: the 1972 Bulltofta skyjacking, the 1975 seizure of the West German embassy in Stockholm, and the 1986 murder of Olof Palme. All three included a range of managerial problems, but more importantly created pressures for change in the domain of counter-terrorism. The two first cases were also acts of terrorism, whereas the Palme murder has never proved to be so. However, rather than the nature of the crises, it is here important that the cases were precisely national crises for Sweden. They were also chosen because independent or partly independent policy processes with a bearing on counter-terrorism followed them. The thesis covers a roughly thirty-year period, between 1965 when the Swedish police were nationalized and the mid 1990s when the effects of the Palme murder petered out from Swedish counter-terrorism policy-making structures. Chapter two, which covers the period before terrorism became a policy problem, can hence be regarded as a contextual background, the status quo ante.

Part one is largely descriptive and includes a close look into the management and dilemmas of crises, followed by descriptions of what the policy-making processes looked like and entailed. The policy-making processes will in turn be divided into the issue areas that actually became relevant, such as pre-emptive and repressive policing.

The crisis cases of chapters three, four and five describe the managerial dilemmas, the sense of urgency, threat and uncertainty that are typical for crisis situations (Boin et al. 2005; Sundelius et al. 1997; Rosenthal et al. 1989). As discussed above, the policy-making processes that follow crises need not correspond with the problems, shortcomings and dilemmas that the crises exposed. In order to understand how crises relate to policy change patterns, it is however important to get a feeling for what the problems at the scene of the event looked like.

Apart from these three cases, other crises, events and affairs transpired that had an impact on Swedish counter-terrorism policy. One could therefore argue that other crises should have been scrutinized as well (or instead). Events that in some way had an effect on the policy process will be covered only briefly. As mentioned above, the larger case of Swedish counter-terrorism policy-making was broken down into time sequences centering on the three crisis cases because distinct policy processes followed them. Other events affected them, but did not produce independent policy streams.

The policy change patterns that followed the three crises are puzzling. The ambition of part two is to sort these puzzles out and explain the nexus between crisis and policy change in the domain of Swedish counter-terrorism policy.

Theoretical frameworks will be explored in chapter six. This first chapter of part two delves into three significant theoretical frameworks that elaborate policy change and stability, namely multiple streams theory (Kingdon 1984; [1995] 2003), policy advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; 1999) and punctuated equilibrium theory (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; 2002; Jones and Baumgartner 2005). We will look specifically into what these theoretical bodies of work say about crisis and prospects for policy change. The conclusions of chapter six are that the theoretical assumptions of the three theories are largely overlapping and complementary. The complementary assumptions are further collapsed into two perspectives: one belief-based and one attention-based. The puzzles of part one are then analyzed in chapters seven, eight and nine, each from both a belief-based and an attention-based perspective. Each of these chapters ends with a concluding section that discusses the complementary nature of the two perspectives.

It is not usual to place the theoretical chapter in the middle, as it is here. But it reflects the research process. The crises, and to some extent also the policy processes that followed in their wake, have been studied and reported before (Hansén and Nordqvist 2005; Hansén and Hagström 2004; Dekker and Hansén 2004; Hansén and Stern 2001; Stern and Hansén 2001; Hansén 2000). The pursuit of theoretical significance in the field of policy analysis began after. The arrangement of this book allows for presenting the rationale for the theoretical conduits, based on empirical puzzles familiar to the reader.

1.5 Methodological discussions

A few methodological considerations need to be addressed before getting into the study. 1.5.1 presents the explanandum of the study. Section 1.5.2 discusses case studies and process tracing as a means of developing theory. Since the thesis elaborates three theoretical frameworks, which are collapsed into two perspectives, 1.5.3 takes up some issues related to multiple perspectives. 1.5.4 contains a discussion on the sources used, and 1.5.5 describes the delimitations of the research.

1.5.1 Characterizations of the explanandum

This thesis relies on a niche of policy analysis that concerns policy change and stability. The role of crisis is of particular interest. Crises are here assumed to bring about occasions for policy decision-making for at least some political par-

ties, although not necessarily those in office. Crises associated with terrorism and violent crime naturally receive much media attention (Fielding 1991) and thereby gain salience on the public agenda. There is no immediate relationship between the media agenda and the policy agenda in terms of solutions, but salience on the media agenda to a large extent informs both the public and policy makers on “what issues to think about” (Dearing and Rogers 1996: 8). The policy agenda is at any given time fixed, but is better described as a process of controversies over how to prioritize issue importance (Cobb and Elder 1972). Crises in the criminal justice sector are hence likely to disrupt the course of policy controversy. In that regard, subsequent policy dynamics benefit from being traced from the impetus that caused a certain pattern of policy change. Doing the reverse – beginning with manifestations of policy change and tracing the policy process backwards – would certainly say less about the relationship between crisis and policy change. This is not least true to the extent that crises do not produce policy change, but nonetheless have an impact on the policy agenda.

The chapters of part one are essentially efforts to trace policymaking processes, to display the explanandum of this work, which is made up of the policy outcomes resulting from the crisis experiences. These outcomes may be decisions to innovate or change a policy, or decisions not to change the prevailing order. Drawing on the work of Rose and Davies (1994), the patterns of policy change will be given descriptive characterizations that designate policymaking goals and means. The typology was prompted by Rose and Davies’ (1994: 40) observation that policy analyses typically treat intended policy goals and program means indiscriminately. They claim that each incoming government has four choices, as presented in Figure 1 below. Here, the focus is not on governmental turnovers but that, arguably, crises and other impetuses for policy change present policy makers with the same alternatives.

Figure 1: Alternative choices about policy (Rose and Davies 1994: 41)

		Intended goals	
		No change	Change
Program means	No change	Maintain routine	Symbolic gestures
	Change	Instrumental adaptation	Innovation

Routine maintenance describes a pattern of policy change where the perceived situation does not compel the majority coalition (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993), or policy monopoly (Baumgartner and Jones 1993) holding legislative power over the issue domain to convey policy intentions that break with prior practices, or to actually establish new program means. Status quo ante remains.

Symbolic gestures, on the other hand, describe a pattern of policy change where the perceived situation compels the majority coalition/policy monopoly to signal that new program means are underway, but where those, at the end of the day, are still absent, or do not correspond with the purported need for change.

Instrumental adaptation describes a pattern of policy change where the perceived situation does not compel the majority coalition/policy monopoly to convey policy intentions that break with prior practices, but that result in new program means. This may be due to spillover effects of changes in other and related policy domains, or related to institutional rearrangements within the program means already politically sanctioned.

Innovation, finally, describes a pattern of policy change where the perceived situation compels the majority coalition/policy monopoly to signal that new program means are underway, and where policy changes corresponding with the intentions also follow suit.

The objective of using these descriptive characterizations is to visualize the explanandum, or the policy outcomes that will later be explained. It should however already at this point be made clear that the theories that in chapter six will provide mechanisms for explaining the nexus between crisis and patterns of policy change do not use the same typology. They use minor/major policy change (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993), or equate policy change with major policy change (Kingdon [1995] 2003; Baumgartner and Jones 1993). Discriminating between intended policy goals and program means in part one is however important in order to not treat intended goals as if they were effective in the analysis of part two. But more importantly, it will be argued in the theoretical chapter that the three theories tend to characterize policy outcomes in terms that are difficult to separate from their explaining variables. Therefore it is helpful to rely on a different, and in that sense independent, characterization for describing the explanandum.

1.5.2 Case studies, process tracing and theory development

Case studies are useful for developing theoretical knowledge. Pioneers such as Lijphart (1971), Eckstein (1975), and George (1979) argue that case studies are useful in the formation, development and testing of theories. The idiosyncratic-case study may pave the way for new lines of thought, unveiling explanatory variables that have previously been overlooked. The case study in the form of a plausibility probe may help make the precise meaning of theoretical concepts and assumptions more exact. Further down the theory development path, the critical case study may corroborate or falsify hypotheses.

The ambition here is to contribute towards developing the body of theoretical knowledge on policy stability and policy change, the ‘class’ to which this case study pertains. A question that needs to be addressed is in what ways the theoretical ‘class’ is supposed to be transferred with this endeavor; i.e. what the theory *development* is really about. In Lijphart’s (1971) terminology, this case study can be characterized somewhere between “interpretative” and “hypothesis-generating”.² Knowing that the theoretical frameworks to be elaborated in chapter six are multiple streams theory (MS), advocacy coalition framework (ACF) and punctuated equilibrium theory (PE), one may argue that these constitute proper theories, more apt for testing than development. Edella Schlager (1999), for instance, treats them all as theories and not as frameworks (from which theories can be refined). In chapter six I argue otherwise – that the three theoretical frameworks leave much to be desired. At least with regard to the main concern of this study – the nexus between crisis and patterns of policy change – there are ways to proceed with more caution. Lijphart’s “interpretative” category refers to cases that are described and analyzed in terms of theoretically relevant general variables, whereas the “hypothesis-generating” case study aims at discerning important new general problems, identifying possible theoretical solutions, and formulating potentially generalizable relationships that have not been previously apparent (George 1979: 51). Incorporating and scrutinizing the role of crisis in policy processes is an effort of that kind. The crisis concept is here believed to impart potentially generalizable relationships to analyses of the policy process.

This is admittedly a single case study that examines Swedish counter-terrorism policymaking in relation to crises. However, it contains more observations. It has been made clear above that three crisis cases intersect the broader case. The policy processes that follow each crisis will be treated individually, where each observation is presented in the previous subsection. Events and occurrences other than the three crisis cases will also be taken into account, which promises to further increase the number of observations. In addition to this effort, the study can also be regarded as an implicit comparison to cases of the same ‘class’, i.e. studies of policy change and stability. That is the structure of this study, which allows it to make a contribution to the cumulative knowledge of the phenomenon. It is hence a single case study only to the extent that the cases and observations it contains are likely to be cumulatively contaminat-

2 Lijphart (1971) distinguishes between the following types of case studies: atheoretical case study, interpretative case study, hypothesis-generating case study, theory confirming and theory infirming case studies, and deviant case study. Eckstein (1975) distinguishes among: configurative-idiographic, disciplined-configurative, heuristic, plausibility probe, and crucial case studies. Lijphart does not designate a separate category for Eckstein’s “plausibility probe”, and Eckstein does not take Lijphart’s “deviant” case study into consideration.

ing each other. They cannot be treated as independent units for comparative analysis.

This study adheres to George's (1979; George and McKeown 1985; George and Bennett 2004) process tracing method. It is widely acknowledged for increasing the number of observations in case studies (King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 227). But is that in itself an asset for theory development, as suggested by King et al. (Ibid.)? "In fact, process-tracing is fundamentally different from statistical analysis because it focuses on sequential processes within a particular historical case, not on correlations of data across cases" (George and Bennett 2004: 13).

The process tracing method is conducive to historical explanation. The investigator has to give a reason for the steps of the case's historical development, that is, the observations chosen for analysis – at least hypothetically. And it is precisely the ability of the hypothesized explanation of the intervening steps between impetus and explanandum that is theory developing.

In using theories to develop explanations of cases through process-tracing, *all* the intervening steps in a case must be as predicted by a hypothesis [...], or else that hypothesis must be amended – perhaps trivially or perhaps fundamentally – to explain the case. It is not sufficient that a hypothesis be consistent with a statistically significant number of intervening steps (George and Bennett 2004: 207).

The number of observations within the case study in other words adds to the cumulative knowledge of the studied phenomenon, similar to the way cross-comparisons between cases of the same 'class' do. The theory development consists of the amendments that empirical evidence suggests to the hypothesized links between observations. In this research effort, theory development is about providing a sharper view of the nexus between crisis and policy change than what is currently given by the three theoretical frameworks individually.

The process tracing strategy attempts to capture the underlying reasons for different courses of action – to probe (or at least identify potential) causal mechanisms between explanans and explanandum (Elster 1989). The goal is therefore to explain why actors in the field of Swedish counter-terrorism policy-making – individually or collectively – produced the patterns of policy change displayed in part one. In so doing, the analyses probe two sets of mechanisms derived from the three theoretical frameworks. Both assume the individual to be boundedly rational, but differ in their assumptions about how crises are likely to affect policymaking behavior. Both presume policy change *or* policy stability to result as a consequence of crisis, for which reason the main difference lies in the hypothesized intervening steps. The analyses will therefore tell the same story twice, but from different angles and using partially different sets of general questions.

1.5.3 Multiple theoretical perspectives

The rationale for using the three theoretical frameworks chosen for this study will be further developed in chapter six. Here it is however appropriate to discuss the use of multiple theoretical perspectives. Ever since Allison's seminal study of the Cuban missile crisis (Allison 1971; Allison and Zelikow 1999), it has been popular to design studies pitting alternative models against each other (Stern 2004: 106). Such designs are vital for theory development, not least if one of the theories, models or paradigms turns out to be the 'winner' as a result of the research effort. One problem with competitive approaches is the difficulty they tend to have in keeping the explanatory leverage of different perspectives separate. They tend to overlap, which was one of the main critiques of Allison's monograph from the early seventies (Ibid.). However, alternative perspectives can also benefit from being viewed as complementary, instead of competing (Kleiboer 1998). If the ambition is theory development, letting alternative perspectives compete or complement boils down to the maturity of the theoretical body of knowledge, and the proximity of the perspectives in terms of what variables they claim to be explanatory. These two properties arguably interrelate.

The three theoretical frameworks used in this work collapse into two perspectives but, even so, do not compete. The reason is primarily that the explanatory claims of the theories – and the perspectives – are not fundamentally at odds with each other. This will be developed in chapter six. Whereas Allison explains the same episode with three models at least purporting to different units of analysis, the two perspectives developed here do not claim entirely different units of analysis. It is more a question of emphasizing different dimensions. Metaphorically, the two perspectives are like Chinese boxes, where the one perspective is supposed to fit within the other, while Allison's models are like three spotlights directed at different places on the stage.

The choice of theoretical frameworks, or models, is decisive. Allison chooses three models with distinctly different epistemological foundations to illustrate that a particular political outcome could have completely different explanations, depending on what questions one asks. That point is taken. The frameworks chosen here have in common the same epistemological foundation. The objective is not to provide essentially different explanations to the historical case, but to get a richer historical explanation and, importantly, to contribute to theory development.

1.5.4 Discussion on sources

The empirical evidence of this book builds on parliamentary publications, internal reports and memos produced at the various authorities involved, aca-

demographic accounts, biographies and interviews. Apart from these, media sources have been used, but to a limited extent.

The Swedish parliamentary publications include governmental propositions, motions by members of Parliament, reports from the various standing committees where governmental propositions and MPs' motions are discussed and assessed within their policy field, governmental official reports, departmental memos, and parliamentary debates. In the yearly indexes, keywords such as terrorism, acts of terrorism, counter-terrorism, police, National Police Board, security service, Säpo or RPS/Säk (Swedish abbreviations for the police's security service) guided the search for the relevant documents and debates. From there, the content of debates and reports have directed further investigation into related issues, such as policies on aliens.

Of these reports, one is worth mentioning in particular: The governmental official report on the country's security and the personal integrity (SOU 2002:87). Due to a rather heated debate on the role of Swedish intelligence and security services (both police and military) since World War II, the government issued a special law when instituting the inquiry commission that obliged the authorities involved to open their archives, without considering security aspects. Current and retired employees alike were obliged to testify in front of the commission (SFS 1999:988). The report has certainly helped penetrate the walls of these well-entrenched institutions.

Sweden is indeed a consensual democracy. A policy suggestion can originate from anywhere. The National Police Board, for instance, can persuade the Cabinet to present a proposition or a group of MPs to deliver a motion, or politicians may come up with ideas of their own. But when it is time to vote, the outcome is hardly ever a surprise. The suggestion has been partitioned and remitted to all conceivable authorities, redrafted and discussed in relevant parliamentary committees. So there is typically a broad consensus about the final policy suggestion. It should however be made clear that consensus is something different from a majority vote in Parliament. At times that majority is narrow, but for the most time it is known. Consensus does not normally include all, but is based on a sufficient and stable majority. Dissenting ideas are put forth, but the process implies that much of the hesitations, deliberations and 'pulling and howling' of the actual policymaking remains invisible in the parliamentary publications. In order to mitigate these circumstances, this thesis consults autobiographies, which in a way have become a legitimate forum for recounting 'how it really happened'.

Swedish counter-terrorism policies have not been subject to policy analysis within the field of public administration, although some criminological research efforts have been made on the topic (see Flyghed 2000). Flyghed's edited volume (2000) covers many of the empirical points this study delves

into, but with different theoretical ambitions. It has however served to indicate avenues for empirical investigation, and occasionally been relied upon as a secondary source.

Moreover this study relies on interviews with some key actors. They are listed in the references, where which issues they were interviewed about as well as what capacity they held in relation to that issue is also indicated. Some of the interviews took place prior to this research project, when I was carrying out case studies on Swedish experiences of crisis decision-making in the criminal justice domain. Other interviews were conducted specifically for this research project. The interviewees hence include a variety of actors over time and consist of politicians both of incumbent and opposition parties, as well as actors within the criminal justice field, including the National Police Board and local police, the National Prosecution Board and local prosecutors, and officials within the justice ministry. The study has benefited greatly from the insights gained from their perspectives. Obviously, human memory of the (sometimes distant) past is not always accurate. The interviews have therefore as far as possible been triangulated with written sources on factual issues.

The different individuals were interviewed for different purposes; either for the purpose of this study or for previous studies on crisis decision-making. The written sources were collected in the same way. The different means of collection thereby makes such data risk being incommensurable; that the crisis cases point at dilemmas that the policymaking cases are unlikely to cover. That is admittedly a caveat worth keeping an eye on. But it should not be exaggerated. Many of both the written sources and interviews have served the purpose of covering crisis episodes and subsequent policy processes.

1.5.5 Delimitations

A few words should be said about what this thesis is *not* about. The empirical focus delimits the scope of inquiry to some extent as does the availability and accessibility of sources. The empirical focus of this study is on processes where state actors have the last say, which is related to the policy domain of counter-terrorism. Issues that ultimately have to do with national security can certainly be salient in various sub-national forums, but unless they at some point get the attention of Parliament, the government, governmental agencies or ministries, they also fall under the radar of this research.

The activities of many organizations certainly have decisive impacts on their capacity to actually manage terrorism (whether the preparedness or acute phase, or preconditions to learn and evaluate). Steps may be – and probably are – taken within for instance a police unit as a result of an experience (related to terrorism or not) that affects its capability in one or more crisis management

activities. When such steps are taken without leaving any paper trail or written documentation in the form of for example biographies, or transpire in interviews, they are neither portrayed nor analyzed here. That is not to suggest that such measures are less important, not even for theoretical purposes. They are just impracticable to trace, which of course is even more the case the further back in history one goes.

These choices have important implications. The focus on state actors directs attention towards legal foundations for counter-terrorism perhaps more than on the operational elements of counter-terrorism capacities. Such issues are probably of more concern the closer to the operational activities one gets. In this thesis they are discussed when they become topical in the processes traced. An implication of the reliance on the paper trail, on actors and their formal justifications for paths taken or shunned, is that more tacit considerations are missed. For instance, when looking at counter-terrorism policymaking today, policy diffusion seems to be rampant, and therefore a viable explanation to policy outcomes in individual countries. Whether policy diffusion was an important factor during the time covered here is unclear because it did not leave a paper trail. The interviews were carried out to complement written documentation, but on this particular issue, they gave little additional information. This is only to say that there are dimensions of the policy process that may potentially be overlooked due to the way the study was set up.

The aims of this study are both to present a viable explanation for patterns of Swedish crisis-induced counter-terrorism policy change and to contribute to theory development on policy change and stability. What are the foreseeable generalizations given the scope and limitations of inquiry presented in this chapter?

The theoretical frameworks elaborated here were developed in the U.S., and the criminal justice sector has not been predominant in their prior application. In that sense this effort – treating counter-terrorism policies in a consensual and corporatist democracy in northern Europe – is theory development in its own right. The ambition is not however to develop a theory tailor-made for Swedish counter-terrorism cases. The conclusions should at least be valid for political systems similar to the one studied here. The extent to which the relationship between crises and patterns of policy change also applies to different political systems and to other policy domains is to be further analyzed elsewhere. The limitations of this inquiry can therefore be regarded as facilitating. The emphasis on state actors arguably helps future comparisons of political systems in a way that foci on sub-national processes have difficulties in doing.

PART 1: CRISES AND SWEDISH COUNTER- TERRORISM POLICY CHANGE PATTERNS

Brief introduction to the Swedish policymaking scene

Before entering the first empirical chapter, here follows a brief introduction to the policymaking context in Sweden for the benefit of the non-Swedish reader. On the surface, it does not deviate much from that of its European neighbors. A popularly elected Parliament has the legislative power, a Cabinet governs the country, the public authorities are organized under the Cabinet, and independent courts exert judicial power.

However, upon closer examination there are a few particularities that should be highlighted. These are not particular to the extent that the Swedish form of government merits a different designation than a representative and parliamentary democracy, but still gives the execution of power in Sweden a distinctive touch (Petersson 2002).

The Constitution was under revision between 1970 and 1975 and changed gradually. The new 1974 Constitution, which is in fact then a set of bills, came into full effect on 1 January 1975 (Holmberg and Stjernquist 1988). Before this, the two-chamber Parliament was abandoned in 1971.³ With the 1970 general elections, the term of office for MPs changed from four years to three. In 1971 it was also decided that the monarchy should continue to exist, albeit with a monarch deprived of political and economic authority. The Privy Council was abandoned and a cabinet office was established close to the prime minister. From 1974 the Cabinet had the power to make decisions when a minimum of five ministers were present. This was partly in reaction to the experiences of the Bulltofta skyjacking, where – as will be described in chapter 3 – it had been difficult to gather the whole Cabinet.

The old Constitution dating from 1809 had been very flexible in its interpretation and application; the new 1974 Constitution therefore did not signal a major change in how Sweden was governed (Ibid.).

The unicameral Parliament has 349 seats, which is quite a lot for a country of nine million.⁴ Parliament has a self-assumed duty to handle all errands raised by MPs or otherwise referred to it, for which reason it is weighed down by small matters. Therefore, the parliamentary standing committees play a more instrumental role in the preparation of errands, compared to for instance the English or French parliament (Petersson 2002: 47). On the other hand, and consequen-

3 The last general elections to the 2nd chamber were held in 1968. In 1970 the Swedish electorate for the first time voted to the unicameral parliament. Amendments to that part of the new Constitution were carried out until 1971 (Holmberg and Stjernquist 1988).

4 Until 1976, the unicameral Parliament had 350 seats, but between 1973 and 1976, the two political blocks had 175 seats each, which made it difficult to govern. In order to avoid future stalemates the number of seats went down to 349.

tially, Parliament's own capacity to take an overall responsibility is limited. It functions more as an arena for negotiations than a forum for debate and critical scrutiny (Ibid.). There are sixteen standing committees in Parliament, and the political parties are represented in each with the same proportions as their overall parliamentary representation. The standing committees prepare governmental propositions and motions from MPs, and can also bring forth errands on their own initiative within their area of competence. The standing committee of most interest to this study is the Parliament Justice Committee, which prepares errands that are related to courts of law, public prosecutors, police, correctional treatment, rent and leasing tribunals, and errands that are connected to the Criminal Code and the Code of Judicial Procedure (Birgersson and Westerståhl 1989).

In Parliament, the Justice Committee handled counter-terrorism issues during this period. But for the government, several ministries have been involved on such issues. The Justice Ministry has been in charge of the police with the exception of the years 1988–91, when police issues were run by the Ministry of Public Administration (interior ministry). The Terrorist Act, when it first came into being in 1973, was administered by the Labor Ministry. From 1976, some parts of the law were transferred to the Aliens Act and thereby run by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. In 1989, terrorism-related parts of the Aliens Act were transferred to a new Terrorist Act run by the Labor Ministry. In 1991, a new Terrorist Act was implemented, then under the jurisdiction of the Justice Ministry. How criminal justice issues have moved around between portfolios will be further elaborated in the thesis, and is here only briefly introduced for the sake of clarity.


Swedish cabinets make decisions collectively. Contrary to most European governments, ministers in the Swedish Cabinet can only in exceptional cases make individual decisions. The Prime Minister appoints the departmental ministers, who comparatively speaking are few and relatively detached from their ministries. This gives the Prime Minister great power in controlling the work of government, and it makes coordination within the government very important. This construction is meant to facilitate coordinated policy planning (Larsson 1986).

Public authorities are organized under ministries, but are not under the direction of their ministry or minister in the everyday implementation of public policies. This arrangement is quite unique in western democracies. Ministerial rule is in fact unlawful, even though it has proved to be very difficult in practice to ascertain the exact influence of ministers in particular cases (Petersson 2002; Larsson 1986).

In principle, there are two processes by which the government prepares and shapes its policymaking: the budget process, and governmental inquiry

committees and commissions. Public authorities have quite limited prospects in influencing budget processes, but these normally result in only marginal changes to previously made decisions (Larsson 1986: 15). If looking at all proposed budget suggestions between 1965 and 2001, the Justice Ministry has been rather stable at between three and four percent of total governmental spending. The police have been even more stable at an annual two percent of the total governmental budget.

Figure 2: Justice Ministry and police shares (in %) of proposed total annual governmental spending, 1965–2001



To the budget process should be added the government's annual letters of regulation to the public authorities, which are more or less detailed in terms of earmarking allocated means. The budget process does not make the Swedish system particular, but the system of investigative committees may seem more unusual.

Governmental inquiry commissions prepare most major policy decisions. Normally the Cabinet establishes such a commission, but Parliament can also urge the Cabinet to do so. In either case, the Cabinet appoints members to the commission, and decides its directives, time frames and budget. When the commission presents its results, the Cabinet decides whether or not they should be referred to organizations, authorities, etc. for consideration. Ultimately the Cabinet decides whether or not to write a proposition based on the commission report and the considerations provided by the bodies it was referred to. Inquiry commissioning is hence an important instrument for the Cabinet in shaping policies (Larsson 1986).

Compared to other European countries, Swedish ministries are quite small. Instead of increasing the size of the ministries, the system with inquiry commissions helps the Cabinet in preparing suggestions. Each commission is its own temporary authority, which allows certain flexibility to the Cabinet. In the 1970's commissioning was seen as an emblem of the corporatist state, where organizations and government met. Since the 1980's, the trend has been that the Cabinet appoints fewer commissions and instead relies more on the minis-

tries. The commissions that are appointed have less time and resources at their disposal (Petersson 2002).

Nationalization of the police

Since the National Police Board is one of the most important authorities with regards to Swedish counter-terrorism activities, a section on its coming into being is presented here.

Until 1965 police forces fell under the responsibility of local municipal governments and were therefore rarely prioritized. Parish constables were divided into hundreds of small, scattered, isolated and unequally equipped districts (Falkenstam 1983; Persson 1990). Above the parish constable, the district superintendent – a police chief, prosecutor and distrainer all in one – had several municipalities under jurisdiction. Each county had a superintendent who was subordinate to the county governor in police, prosecution and distraint issues. The county board was the regional representative of the national government.

This organizational model was popular, especially in the countryside, since each village had its own local law enforcement. It infused the populace with a sense of security even though, given the police's poor resources, that feeling may have been illusionary. However, problems arose as soon as criminals moved across municipal borders, or when it otherwise was unclear where an investigation should be carried out (Persson 1990). By the 1960s, the parish constables had become obsolete. The need for reform had been expressed on several occasions since the 1920s with no result. In 1962, however, Parliament decided to nationalize the police and a working committee was organized within the Ministry of Interior. Its politically unaffiliated deputy minister Carl Persson chaired the committee and became the architect behind the nationalization of the police (Persson 1990).⁵

On January 1st, 1965 the National Police Board was established with Carl Persson as its first director-general. One of the principal ideas was to separate police and prosecution authorities. The National Prosecution Board was therefore created the same year. Both operated under the Ministry of Justice and became the first government authorities to have a board with parliamentary representation (with the exception of the Communist Party).

Even before the nationalization of the police there existed a limited state police force that, among other duties, handled intelligence operations. The state police was organized under the Stockholm police, since most problems they handled were related to the capital. For the state police, issues related

5 At this time it was common that the minister and his political adviser were the only politically appointed persons at the ministries (Persson 1990).

to national security included counter-espionage and counter-subversion. The National Police Board absorbed the state police upon its creation in 1965. The nationalization of the police led critics to warn of implications similar to those seen before and during World War II in authoritarian European regimes, where national police forces formed states within states (Persson 1990). The national police concept was not universally endorsed by left wing elements of the Social Democrats and parties further to the left. It was therefore important for both Carl Persson – when drafting the plans for the national police – and the Cabinet that oversight bodies were empowered to look into the work of the police, especially Säpo (the Swedish Security Service).⁶ Apart from parliamentary representation in the National Police Board, the Justice Ombudsman, the Attorney General and a panel of parliamentarians – headed by the speaker of the parliament – also monitor the National Police Board (Persson 1990; see also Protocol 1966:38 § 7).

The remainder of this study will go deeper into some areas of Swedish policymaking, either when presenting empirical puzzles in part one, or when trying to explain these in part two. But the peculiarities presented above hopefully makes the non-Swedish reader a bit more familiar with some basic conditions.

6 Throughout this study, the police security service will be referred to as Säpo. This acronym was adopted by the organization in 1987. Before that the Swedish abbreviation was RPS/Säk.

Chapter 2 Before terrorism: Controlling crowds and opinion

Before terrorism became a policy problem, the issue of safeguarding national sovereignty and security from internal, non-military threats was a matter of keeping subversive forces under control. At the same time, the wave of radicalism that swept over most of the industrialized world implied law and order problems. These two rather different policy problems merged to form a platform for counter-terrorism policies, not least because the core of the radical movement overlapped with the subversive elements of society. Here we will see how this development came about and how critical challenges played in.

2.1 Old and new security issues

2.1.1 Counter-subversion: A legacy of Red Scare

In the two first decades following World War II, several Swedish citizens were sentenced for spying for the Soviet Union. In the summer of 1963, a Swedish Air Force Colonel named Stig Wennerström was caught and later sentenced for gross espionage. The so-called Wennerström affair was the theretofore most severe case of espionage in Swedish history (SOU 2002:87). These espionage cases created a fear over Soviet intentions in Sweden and were accompanied by other skirmishes. In 1953, for instance, a Swedish reconnoiter plane was shot down by the Soviet Air Force over the Baltic Sea, the so-called Catalina affair. Also, developments within the Soviet Union and demonstrations of Soviet force

in Eastern Europe contributed to Swedish fear of the Soviet Union and communism. Subversive forces with Soviet connections constituted the overall threat frame for Säpo. "Tracking down Soviet spies was more or less what our business was about," Deputy Director of Säpo Olof Frånstedt remembers of this time (Frånstedt 2003).

Since Wennerström was an officer in the Swedish Armed Forces, the affair had a major influence on vetting job applicants in certain sectors; it was important to map out potential security risks and make sure they were blocked at an early stage when applying for sensitive posts (for the most part within the police or the defense sectors). It was primarily followers of communist parties and other such factions who were subject to this mapping. Carl Persson is supposed to have said that, apart from those who could be believed to run errands for foreign powers, "people who, in a situation of domestic instability, could be feared to lead or actively support attempts to overthrow the society, with or without violence, should be registered" (SOU 2002:87, p. 329).

2.1.2 Radical movements and large-scale manifestations

As the wave of radicalism gathered momentum, one of the most tangible changes seen was the emergence of large-scale manifestations. Throughout the second half of the 1960s, demonstrations against the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, as well as pro-FNL and PLO rallies were common. On display during these demonstrations was a clash between the society of rules, laws and institutions – represented in particular by the police – and upholders of the radical movement. The radicals did not necessarily recognize the legal status of governmental authorities and were therefore disinclined to apply for permission to carry out demonstrations. These often ended at the American or Israeli embassies, where flags were burnt. Burning flags and desecrating national symbols was illegal in Sweden and hence something that the police were supposed to take action against.

In June 1966, a large-scale manifestation took place in Stockholm that protested U.S. involvement in Vietnam while showing support for the Vietnamese people. American flags were burnt and riots took place. Police officers on the scene documented the event with cameras; demonstrators were photographed and filmed. Säpo was widely criticized in the media, leading Justice Minister Kling to call a press conference where he clarified Säpo's legal rights to gather information about people who might be involved in subversive activities. The statements were later that year discussed in the second chamber of Parliament (Protocol 1966:38 § 7). The head of Säpo, Vinge (1988: 77-81) maintains that the filming had rather been carried out by local police to collect evidence for legal proceedings related to the crimes that had been committed (burning flags

and organizing a demonstration without permission). Regardless of who documented the event and for what purposes, Säpo did not come out stronger.

From 1968, as “the radical generation” lived up to its name in much of the industrialized world, a few Swedish rioting incidents are worth mentioning in this account. Inspired by the events in Paris in May 1968, Swedish radicals marched to the Opera House in Stockholm, where they tried to break in. When this failed, they instead went to the student union building, which they occupied. For the local police this was a law and order issue. They decided to encircle the building and let people out but not in. The National Police Board sent an observer to the scene and when the local police commander needed someone to inform the legitimate leadership of the student union, the representative from the National Police Board was chosen. The event was heavily covered in the media, and the National Police Board representative also gave a TV interview on the proceedings of the operation. The Stockholm police commissioner considered this an infringement on his territory (Falkenstam 1983: 61-62).

Later the same month, Sweden was supposed to play a Davis Cup tennis match against Rhodesia in Stockholm. Because of the risk for riots, the match was moved to Båstad, some 600 km southwest of Stockholm. The National Police Board sent three observers, which were not warmly embraced by the local police commissioner. Severe riots broke out where the police used water canons to scatter the crowd and the match had to be cancelled. In a report, the National Police Board directed harsh criticism towards the local police for not accepting the expertise that they had offered prior to the match (Ibid.).

For the local police, the large-scale demonstrations implied problems for upholding law and order. For at least some parts of Säpo, radical groups were feared to harbor subversive elements, for which reason they had an interest in closely monitoring these manifestations. Maintaining law and order at large-scale manifestations also exposed problems between the local police – who had formal responsibility for crowd-control within their police districts – and the National Police Board, which monitored the events (SOU 2002:87 p. 291–292). The former felt that the latter interfered in their jurisdiction (Falkenstam 1983: 61-64).

Embassies, in particular the American, were popular terminal points for radical manifestations, where flags were burnt and other national symbols were insulted. FNL groups made it a habit to join traditional socialist May 1st demonstrations, from which they either broke off to gather in front of an embassy, or desecrated flags in their own procession. The National Police Board observed that the organizers of these manifestations did not do much to prevent such things from taking place (RPS 1969).

2.2 Säpo, IB and the Law on Personnel Monitoring

In order to uncover subversive elements, the state police and from 1965 Säpo registered individuals whom they for some reason found suspicious. These registrations were not related to ongoing investigations and were therefore not meant to lead to indictments, being instead of a general search nature. Often it was a matter of monitoring, and if possible preventing, recruiting efforts by foreign powers' intelligence services (Vinge 1988). But the net was cast wide and encircled many people associated with political extremism, particularly those to the left of the Social Democrats.

A second use of the register was for so-called "personnel control" purposes. Before employing a person in a sensitive national security post, the employer contacted Säpo to see if that person was registered. If so, the employer then assessed whether the annotation had any bearing on the position in question. A limited law on personnel control existed during World War II, but was extended by royal decree in 1961 to also apply to non-military personnel who could then be controlled by their respective company or authority (SOU 2002:87, p. 282).

In 1965, Parliament instituted a law on registration, which made it lawful for the police – both local and Säpo – to create files on people whom they found suspicious, or likely to commit subversive crimes. Parliament passed the law without controversy (see Protocol 1966:38 § 7).

On 13 December 1966 the issue of monitoring citizens was taken up in a parliamentary interpellation with justice minister Herman Kling. This was a direct consequence of riots that had broken out during a Vietnam demonstration earlier that year, or rather as a consequence of a memo that the justice minister wrote in defense of the police after the incident (Protocol 1966:38 § 7). Communist party leader Hermansson wanted to know if Säpo registered people on the basis of their opinion and if the rumors that 300,000 people were registered were true. Kling answered that the grounds for registering people was, and needed to be, secret and that the numbers were irrelevant, since those who informed Säpo of suspicious people or activities were also registered (Ibid.); he deferred further discussions on the topic until the committee set up after the Wennerström affair had presented its report.

The committee presented its report in January 1968 (SOU 1968:4). They found no reason to regulate what information Säpo could register. They however suggested that the regulations for providing employers with information from individuals' Säpo files should be re-evaluated and that the principles for registering individuals should be more open. Influential actors such as the

Justice Ombudsman and the Attorney General backed the committee's report (SOU 2002:87 p. 289).

The Cabinet declared that it would go a step further than the committee regarding registration issues. In June 1969, the Cabinet passed a Law on Personnel Monitoring, according to which registration based solely on political opinion was prohibited; more concrete suspicions of criminal activities needed to be present (SFS 1969:446).

At the same time, the Cabinet gave classified instructions to Säpo (HT 15) specifying that membership of an organization or expressions of opinion were insufficient grounds for registration. However, people who by their actions could be suspected to undermine the rule of law or Sweden's sovereignty should be registered. Example of such actions could be active participation in an organization with revolutionary ambitions.

In December 1970, Säpo and the National Police Board redrafted HT 15, with the new instructions (HT 16) entering into effect on 1 January 1971. Regarding the prohibition on registration based on political opinion:

It is however well known that certain political extremist parties advocate objectives that aim at subverting the democratic society by violent means. The risk is obvious that people who are members or sympathizers of such groups are prepared to participate in anti-social activities. Such persons must therefore be controlled by the security service (SOU 2002:87 p. 310).⁷

Apart from Säpo, the military intelligence service also kept files on potentially subversive elements, primarily abroad. From 1958, one military intelligence section (the so-called B-office) also started registering Swedish citizens and events. The B-office moved out from the defense premises and in 1965 merged with another section. The new organization was called IB (Information Bureau), one part of which gathered information on Swedish citizens whom they suspected could engage in subversive activities such as sabotage. IB was too secret to publicly exist, and worked under the auspices of the Supreme Commander. The existence of IB was also known within the Cabinet and Säpo leadership (SOU 2002:87 p. 528–561).

After the Law on Personnel Monitoring was instituted, the Cabinet decided in September 1969 that IB's domestic activities would cease to exist; Säpo alone would be responsible for domestic surveillance on individuals. The domestic

⁷ The instructions mentioned five revolutionary, four anarchistic, seven Trotskyite, three Nazi organizations, and one organization based on refusal to do one's military service, that the National Police Board assessed were representing such subversive opinions (SOU 2002:87 p. 310–311).

activities of IB were however restarted in 1971, under whose initiative it is still unclear to this day (SOU 2002:87 p. 535–536).

The Law on Personnel Monitoring was a policy innovation insofar as it implied new intended goals, which went further than what the Wennerström affair committee had recommended. It also implied new program means for Säpo and to an even greater degree for IB, which was deprived of its domestic surveillance function. The secret existence of IB, however, and the fact that it resumed its domestic activities in 1971 – together with the secret instructions to Säpo – certainly leads to questions about what actually changed during this period and why.

Chapter 3 Croatian terrorism challenges security policy structures

3.1 Terrorism becomes a policy problem

When the radical student and New Left movements swept over most of the industrialized world in the mid/late 1960s, terrorism was not a particularly salient issue for Swedish policymakers. Säpo, for example, did not even have a counter-terrorism department until the early 1970s (Frånstedt 2003), and the term 'terrorism' is not indexed in parliamentary publications until 1971. As we have seen, subversive forces were the greater concern for the Swedish security services.

At the same time as the radical movement challenged law enforcers at large-scale demonstrations, a new type of crime emerged on the Swedish and international scene. In the late 1960s, an inspector at Säpo, Folke Axman, began taking an interest in crimes committed between immigrants from Yugoslavia, who harassed and killed each other in Sweden and elsewhere. Within Säpo, Axman advocated investigating these deeds more carefully, although his calls fell on deaf ears. Reportedly, he himself began mapping out these cases and realized that the conflicts involved Croatian separatists and Serb-Yugoslavian nationalists. Counter-terrorism activities at this time were pretty much a one-man show: "There was one more guy in our Gothenburg section that I could

talk to” (Axman 2004). His activities constituted a forerunner to Säpo’s counter-terrorism unit.

The skirmishes that Axman had taken an interest in included an air-gun shooting against the Yugoslavian ambassador’s residence in Stockholm in 1968, the December 1969 assassination of the leader of a Serb exile organization in Gothenburg, and the detonation of a plastic mine in a Yugoslavian club in Malmö in May 1970 that killed one woman. Similar events took place in Denmark, Norway and West Germany at this time (Ibid.). However, it would not take long before the violence escalated.

On 10 February 1971, two Croatian separatists occupied the Yugoslavian consulate in Gothenburg for about 24 hours. They demanded that a Croatian be released from Yugoslav imprisonment. On 11 February they surrendered and were brought before the Swedish criminal justice system. The two-man group said they belonged to ‘Jadran’ or the Black Legion. The Yugoslavian ambassador to Sweden said they were part of ‘Ustasja’ – a Croatian movement that had collaborated with the Germans during World War II – and urged the Swedish police to look more seriously at terrorist activities (Dagens Nyheter 11/2/1971). The Croatian separatists were henceforth referred to as Ustasja in the Swedish debate.

Only a few months later, on 7 April 1971, two other Croatian separatists broke into the Yugoslavian embassy in Stockholm, where they shot the ambassador Rolovic dead and wounded a secretary. The two intruders/killers were caught in the act; three others who had taken part in the planning were also apprehended. Together with the consulate occupiers, seven Croatians served time in different Swedish prisons; the two that murdered the ambassador received life sentences.

Up to this point, the Swedish experience with terrorism was confined to Croatian separatism. However, in the surrounding world PLO activists and other Palestinian factions had begun talking the language of terror after the Arab defeat in the 1967 Six Day War. Palestinian terrorists were even more active in Western Europe than the Middle East, with their operations including a large amount of skyjackings (Chalk 1996: 28-31). The climax of Palestinian terrorism in Europe was the massacre at the Munich Olympics in 1972. On 5 September, a Palestinian group called Black September killed nine members of the Israeli Olympic team. The all-day drama was televised and broadcast live around the world (see Reeve 2000).

The so-called New Left, the radical movement that became the dominant political force at university campuses in the industrialized world, sympathized with disadvantaged and oppressed people in general and with the Palestinian and Vietnamese peoples in particular. By the end of the sixties, the New Left started to fade out as a political movement. A few of them almost simultane-

ously, and inspired by each other, chose to “go illegal”. Therefore the West-German Red Army Fraction (RAF) and 2 June Movement, the Italian Red Brigade, the English Angry Brigade, the American Weathermen, the French Action Directe and the Japanese Red Army emerged within a short time period around 1970. These groups often made common cause with each other and also with Palestinian terror groups (Laqueur 1987; Becker 1977; Chalk 1996).

In June 1972 the West German police had managed to capture the hard core of RAF. Their imprisonment, however, caused other radical forces to rally to their cause. Around West Germany, so-called torture committees emerged that fought to improve the imprisoned RAF members’ allegedly inhumane treatment (Aust 1990). Between 1970 and 1972 the West-German police had been looking for 40 people, but within a couple of years that amount had risen to 300. The number of sympathizers was in 1974 estimated at around 100,000 (Ibid.). Activists outside West Germany also sympathized with the RAF prisoners, and the torture committees were met with understanding in the liberal and left press (Ibid.). In Sweden, Säpo knew that radical individuals sympathized and communicated with RAF members (Persson 1998; Frånstedt 2003) and as early as 1972 the Swedish Security Service had in fact perceived a potential threat against the West German embassy in Stockholm (RPS 1975a).

Säpo’s interest in radical groups gradually shifted during this period from the threat of Soviet instigated subversion to that of collaboration with RAF and other terrorist organizations. The Croatian separatists were however totally dissociated from the radical left, since they essentially fought the socialist Tito regime in Yugoslavia. Below we will in some detail follow the first skyjacking drama on Swedish soil, which was perpetrated by Croatian separatists in an effort to gain the release of their imprisoned comrades. The skyjacking took place on 15 September 1972, only ten days after the massacre at the Munich Olympics.

3.2 Crisis case one: The Bulltofta skyjacking

3.2.1 Introduction

On Friday 15 September 1972, three Croatian men boarded flight SK 130 to Stockholm-Arlanda at Torslanda airport in Gothenburg. A few minutes after departure, shortly after 4:30 p.m., two men stood up with drawn guns. A third man, armed with two guns, advanced to the cockpit. One gun was pointed at a cabin attendant while the other pointed through the doorway to the cockpit (Andersson and Gudmundsson 1974: 152). The man explained that the plane was being hijacked and ordered the captain to turn the plane with its 86 passengers and four crew 180 degrees and instead head south towards Malmö

(Persson 1990: 232). The skyjackers demanded that seven Croatians be released from prison and brought to Malmö. They also demanded safe-conduct out of Sweden for themselves and the released inmates. If these demands were not met, the skyjackers threatened to detonate an explosive device they had brought with them.

3.2.2 Dilemmas

At 4:55 PM the superintendent on duty at the Malmö police communications center received a message that SK 130 had been hijacked. The police frantically started to prepare for the landing at Bulltofta airport. The police had to gather troops at the airport and prepare for all eventualities. However, the strategy was clear: the police would do everything to minimize the use of force. No police were allowed to increase the risk of violence against the passengers and crew by provocatively showing their weapons; officers could only use their weapons after being ordered to do so (Andersson and Gudmundsson 1974: 156).

The threats from the skyjackers were taken seriously from the outset. At about 6:20 cabinet minister Carl Lidbom called justice minister Lennart Geijer, who was at his summerhouse in Ystad, only a few kilometers away from Bulltofta. After having been informed, Geijer called the permanent under-secretary of state Ingvar Gullnäs and told him to call for a cabinet meeting that night. All available ministers were called in to the chancellery, creating something of a crisis cabinet.⁸ But justice minister Geijer went to Bulltofta airport after which he called Prime Minister Olof Palme and the rest of the crisis cabinet in Stockholm. Several from the National Police Board soon arrived at the airport at the behest of director-general Carl Persson (Welander 1999).

Carl Persson (together with his souschef) joined the crisis cabinet, which decided to proceed with caution: The use of force should be avoided as far as possible. Their strategy instead called for tiring the skyjackers out through protracted negotiations.

The first dilemma that the crisis cabinet had to manage was the issue of releasing the Croatian inmates from prison. The skyjackers gave the authorities eight hours to meet their demands and specified which Croatians they wanted set free. It was the seven who had been involved in the murder of the Yugoslavian ambassador in 1971, and those that occupied the Yugoslavian consulate in Gothenburg earlier that year. Considering the crimes committed, the

8 To rapidly gather a quorum was problematic. All members of the government had stopped for the weekend. There did not exist any lists of addresses and telephone numbers to the ministers and in many cases uncertainty prevailed on how to reach them. Initially a lot of time and energy was spent on this (Welander 1999). At about 7 p.m. all but four ministers came to the chancellery.

threat frame became more severe: The Croatian separatists were known to make good on their threats.

Between 10–11 p.m. the crisis cabinet decided that the seven inmates should be brought from four different prisons to Bulltofta by the police with military assistance. This step was deemed obvious. The lives of the passengers and crew outweighed the principle of not complying with terrorists (Gullnäs 2004). At this time rumors spread that the skyjackers were Serb enemies of the Croatian prisoners, and that the latter would be liquidated as soon as they boarded the plane (Andersson and Gudmundsson 1974: 160). Nonetheless, the crisis cabinet decided to take that risk in order to save the hostages (Welander 1999), under the condition that the prisoners would first have a chance to talk to the skyjackers. It was hence not a question of forcing prisoners onboard against their will.

At midnight the police leadership at Bulltofta received a telegram from Stockholm, which said that Palme, Geijer and two other ministers would be killed if the Cabinet complied with the skyjackers' demands. The murder threat was taken seriously and special measures were taken to protect these people (Malmö police 1972a).

Between 1:35-2:10 a.m. the prisoners arrived at Bulltofta airport, where they immediately were brought to the police command center. Via a Yugoslav interpreter they were informed about the situation and about the demands of the skyjackers. The second dilemma the decision-makers faced related to the organization of the exchange. Justice Minister Geijer explained that it was unclear if the skyjackers were friends or enemies of the prisoners. The latter were reluctant when asked if they were willing to go along with the exchange, first wanting to see or talk to the skyjackers. Only one, Miro Baresic – who had murdered the ambassador – declared that he would allow an exchange even though he wanted to talk to the skyjackers first. This happened at 2:12 a.m. Baresic seemed to know the man he was talking to. The other prisoners also talked to the skyjackers, but remained reluctant. Baresic persuaded all but one to agree to an exchange (Malmö police 1972a).

An agreement on how to organize the exchange had still not been made, and everyone involved was well aware that the deadline had passed more than an hour earlier. At 3:02 a.m. police leadership decided that 1) the unwilling prisoner would not be exchanged, 2) superintendent Lewijn would handle the practical arrangements and be in command of the transport to the aircraft, 3) the inmates should be transported two at a time in cars with police escort, and 4) thirty passengers should be released first, after which two prisoners could board the plane. Thirty more passengers should then be released before the next two prisoners could board. The rest of the passengers and the two cabin attendants should thereafter be released before the two last prisoners could

board the plane. The decision was made unanimously by the police leadership at Bulltofta, having conferred with the crisis cabinet at the chancellery. They were aware of the importance “not to play all their cards at once with the prisoners” (Welander 1999).

When the police leadership a few minutes later delivered the last point, the skyjackers countered with a new demand: all prisoners should be onboard before any of the hostages were released. The aircraft would be blown up unless this demand was met. A new contact was established soon after and the captain of the aircraft conveyed to the police leadership at Bulltofta that he thought the skyjackers were serious with their threat. This caused new deliberations and new contacts with the cabinet. The police suggested that the skyjackers should release half of the hostages for three prisoners, and then the rest of the hostages for three more prisoners. The skyjackers replied immediately: when three prisoners were onboard, half of the passengers would be allowed to leave the plane; the flight attendants would be released after the three remaining prisoners boarded the plane. The police and cabinet accepted the offer (Malmö police 1972a).

The first part of the exchange took place as agreed at 4 a.m. Three inmates were exchanged for thirty passengers. Five minutes later the next three prisoners boarded the plane, but the remaining hostages were not released as agreed, leading to the third dilemma of the crisis. At 4.08 a.m. the skyjackers demanded that the aircraft be refueled before any more passengers were released. After new deliberations, justice minister Geijer, who was on scene with the police, complied with this demand.⁹

The news that all prisoners were released while fifty passengers and the entire crew remained onboard hit like a bomb in the chancellery. With six well-rested prisoners able to take command of the situation on the aircraft, the responders were back on square one (Persson 1990: 239). At 4:48 a.m. the plane was refueled. After that, the newly boarded prisoners made a new demand: they wanted one million Swedish crowns. Otherwise the hostages would not be released.

This demand was rejected since it was not included in the prior agreement. In addition, the police command said it would be practically impossible to get hold of such an amount of money at that time. The skyjackers replied by asking for half a million crowns, which they thought could be easily delivered. If not, they would take the hostages along to their unnamed destination. At this stage the leadership on the scene was utterly keen on solving the conflict and conveyed that they would take their demand into serious consideration. They reminded the Croatians that bringing the money could take a long time, since

9 Whether or not this decision was taken by Geijer self, or in consultation with Palme, is unclear. According to Carl Persson, Palme refused to talk about it after the event (Persson 1990: 240).

it was a Saturday and the banks were closed. Arguing that a new and rested crew would assure a safer flight, Geijer made them promise to release the crew (Andersson and Gudmundsson 1974: 182).

At 5:45 a.m. the county governor (who was also at the airport) made a request for 500,000 crowns within an hour to the director of Kreditbanken, who replied that the earliest he could be at Bulltofta with the money was 7:30 a.m. When the Croatians were informed of this (at 6:56 a.m.), they expressed their intent to wait for the money before leaving Bulltofta (Ibid.: 183).

The money arrived at the airport at 7:29 a.m. Two police officers volunteered to deliver it to the plane, although it had not been agreed on how this should be done. The skyjackers and prisoners wanted the money onboard before releasing any hostages, but the police refused. The threat picture was a bit different at this stage, since the threat of blowing up the plane had not been reiterated. The uncertainty rather had to do with what destination the skyjackers had in mind. There was however still a palpable threat. If the hostages were not released before take-off, a risky rescue operation would likely take place in another country. When an agreement could not be reached, the aircraft's engines were started and the crew was given the departure information from air traffic control. As the plane was about to taxi out for take-off, a new bid came from the skyjackers that more or less corresponded with what the police had suggested. The exchange started at 8:28 a.m. and by 8:35 the last passenger left the plane. The cabin attendants were not released (Ibid.:187-190).

The Croatians headed for Spain. At 11:30 a.m. the captain asked for permission to land at Madrid Barajas. The Spanish emergency command sounded the catastrophe alarm and all available firefighters and ambulances drove to the runway. Two hundred police surrounded the airport. Upon landing, the plane taxied away from the arrival hall, where the police had surrounded it (Malmö Police 1972a).

Mediated by an English-speaking technician, the head of the airport, together with a Norwegian SAS employee, were allowed onboard the plane. They successfully negotiated an immediate release of the crew (Andersson and Gudmundsson: 191-192).

The Spanish authorities declared that they would not let the plane leave and at 2:47 p.m. the skyjackers surrendered. The skyjacking drama was over. The nine Croatians spent one year in a Spanish prison.

3.3 Policy change patterns

Only after the Croatian occupation of the Yugoslav consulate in Gothenburg and the assassination of the Yugoslavian ambassador did counter-terrorism become a politically salient issue. On 23 April 1971, Prime Minister Palme

debated three parliamentarians who had forwarded questions and interpellations after the embassy incident (Protocol 1971:69 § 8). The chairmen of the Communist and Liberal parties and an MP from the Center party wanted to know what actions the Cabinet would take after the murder of the Yugoslav ambassador. Olof Palme said the Cabinet proposed that Parliament increase in the penalty for unlawful possession of weapons and explosives. Immigrants committing such crimes would, according to the proposition, be deported after having served a prison sentence.

Until the summer of 1972 the policy debate on terrorism was rather calm. In two different parliamentary debates (Protocols 1972:62 § 3 and 1972:87 § 9) a Communist MP held justice minister Geijer to task for not doing more to protect Yugoslavians residing in Sweden from Ustasja terror, and not declaring Ustasja illegal. Geijer referred to the severe punishments meted out for crimes committed by Ustasja as being the best deterrent in an open society; he also noted the ongoing surveillance and intelligence operations.

3.3.1 Terrorism legislation: A policy innovation

After the killing of their ambassador, the Yugoslav government expressed its dissatisfaction with the way Sweden handled terrorism. Their deputy foreign minister flew to Sweden and urged that the culprits receive the death penalty or else be sent back to Yugoslavia for execution (Peterson 2002: 170–171). After the Bulltofta skyjacking, the Swedish Cabinet was again severely criticized by Belgrade for having complied with the skyjackers (Leijon 1991: 135; Peterson 2002: 170–172). The handling of the skyjacking was however seen as successful, as no one was killed and all hostages were released. With the Munich massacre fresh in mind, the outcome of the Bulltofta incident was a major relief, not least for the Cabinet (Peterson 2002: 172).

However, the event called for reflection. A working committee in the chancellery was already dealing with terrorism issues; Bulltofta made the matter topical, and the working committee became a commission with the addition of a few members of Parliament. Cabinet minister Carl Lidbom headed the commission, which presented a report on 8 December 1972 (Ds Ju 1972:35). The main conclusion was that Sweden needed a Terrorist Act. In the background description of the document, the commission referred to the alarming tendencies of terrorism around the world and in Sweden. According to the report, measures should be taken against certain foreigners deemed as security risks. For instance, it should be easier to deport or refuse entry to foreigners suspected of belonging to a group that might engage in politically motivated violence, or use threat or coercion in pursuit of their goals, in Sweden. Under certain conditions, these foreigners should be subjected to special investigative measures,

such as domiciliary visits, body searches, wire tapping, and the monitoring of post, letters and other sealed documents.

Carl Lidbom outlined the terrorism commission's report before Parliament on 11 December 1972 during an interpellation debate on Säpo's political opinion monitoring activities (Protocol 1972:136 § 8). By 19 January 1973 the Cabinet had already presented a proposition regarding the Terrorist Act (Proposition 1973:37). The act was due to be time-limited and in effect from 15 April 1973 and 14 April 1974. The proposition led to some parliamentary activity in the form of debates and motions from various MPs.

The major debate in Parliament on the Terrorist Act took place on 6 April 1973, bringing the different motions and considerations from the Parliament Justice Committee to the fore. The session ended with a vote on the various aspects of the proposition (Protocol 1973:64 § 6). Despite lengthy and sometimes lively discussions, Parliament passed the proposed Terrorist Act with a broad majority.¹⁰ It would apply from 1 May 1973 to 31 April 1974.¹¹

One year later on 25 April 1974, when the Terrorist Act was prolonged for the first time (Protocol 1974:67 § 10), the Cabinet's main argument was that the law had so far not jeopardized the integrity and legal rights of innocent citizens or foreigners. Cabinet minister Lidbom, representing the Cabinet, declared that only 60 people were put on a watch list that made it possible to turn them away at the border (although none to the knowledge of the authorities had attempted to enter Sweden). The police estimated that ten foreign residents in Sweden should fall under the Terrorist Act's jurisdiction, but the Cabinet had only permitted three (who could not be extradited because of the political situation in their home country) to be subject to the Act's aforementioned intrusive measures, such as wire tapping, etc.

The Terrorist Act was certainly a policy innovation, the intended purpose of which was to demonstrate resolution against politically motivated violence on Swedish territory. The Act also allowed law enforcement authorities – particularly Säpo – to use new methods for monitoring foreigners.

10 The law was divided in 15 different points. The voting result of the first point, if the proposition about the law was necessary, gave: yes 254, no 22 and 5 abstained. Only two points were decided upon by secret ballots.

11 On 25 April 1974, the Parliament voted to prolong the Terrorist Act until 30 June 1975. 19 MP's voted against, 4 abstained and 288 voted for a prolongation (Proposition 1974:55; JuU 1974:12; Protocol 1974:67 § 10).

3.3.2 The Hague and Montreal conventions: Routine maintenance on air transport safety

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, air transport proved to be particularly vulnerable to terrorist assaults. Hijacks and attacks at airports became something of a global plague. For counter-terrorism policy, this reality forced policymakers to bring Swedish practices in line with international norms and treaty obligations in order to meet domestic challenges.

Parliament ratified the Hague Convention in March 1971. The UN, the European Council and other supra- and international organizations had urged legal action. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) developed a draft for the convention, which was ready for ratification in The Hague on 16 December 1970. Fifty countries, including Sweden, signed on. The main idea of the convention was to increase the severity of punishment for hijacking aircraft and to guarantee that legal proceedings against skyjackers be held in the country where the crime had been committed, or that the culprits be extradited. For Sweden, no major changes in the existing Criminal Code were necessary and the ratification was uncontroversial (JuU 1971:9).

In 1973 the Swedish Parliament ratified a complement to the Hague Convention called the Montreal Convention that broadened the former to also include acts of sabotage on aircrafts. There was no opposition to the convention in Parliament's justice committee. Like with the Hague Convention, the penalty for committing crimes against civil air transport was a maximum of ten years (JuU 1973:21). The two conventions were seen as effective means for combating crimes within civilian aviation (Ibid.). On 22 May 1973, Parliament ratified the Montreal Convention based on the justice committee's recommendation.

The ratification of The Hague and Montreal Conventions can be described as "routine maintenance" insofar as they merely increased the penalties for already punishable crimes.

3.3.3 Säpo subject to symbolic gestures

The emergence of Croatian terrorism in Sweden led to internal reprioritizations at Säpo. A counter-terrorism unit took shape, pulling resources from the counter-subversion unit. In terms of working methods, however, counter-terrorism did not essentially differ from counter-subversion: Uncovering potential links between subversive elements and hostile states had to be extended to finding ties to terrorist organizations. The sphere of activity for both counter-subversion and terrorism was more or less the same (Frånstedt 2003).

Just after the Bulltofta skyjacking, the Cabinet issued new open instructions amending the 1969 law on Säpo's personnel monitoring activities (see chapter 2). When it became publicly known that Säpo had been monitoring the annual conference on military conscripts in 1972, the Cabinet felt it needed to intervene in Säpo's working methods. On 22 September that year, the Cabinet assumed authority from the National Police Board on interpreting the 1969 law (SOU 1988:16 p. 48).

On 27 April 1973 the Cabinet issued new classified instructions (HT 17) to Säpo regarding their monitoring activities. Surveillance criteria needed to be broadened to provide sufficient protection for the defense sector. However, the list of organizations to be monitored was reduced while a few right-wing extremist organizations were added (SOU 2002:87 pp. 571–572).

Terrorist groups were placed on a list along with subversive organizations that allowed Säpo to pursue coercive measures against suspected members. When the Terrorist Act went into effect in 1973, the Croatian Ustasja, the Japanese Red Army Faction and the Palestinian Black September were the only organizations on the Cabinet terrorist list (Frånstedt 2003; Leijon 1991: 140). The Cabinet decided which organizations, groups and individuals should be included on the list, and then the National Police Board made a register of persons not allowed to reside in Sweden (Persson 1990: 389).

The internal policy changes within Säpo after Bulltofta were instrumental adaptations. But the most visible change in policy came on 22 September 1972 when the Cabinet assumed the right to direct the execution of the Law on Personnel Monitoring. This, however, was not related to Bulltofta or terrorism and bore the characteristics of a symbolic gesture. The open instructions do not correspond to the secret (HT 17) instructions in such a way that would give substance to the programmatic means of the former.

3.3.4 Routine maintenance of law and order policing

In August 1973 a hostage situation transpired during a bank robbery in central Stockholm. For five days the perpetrator and an inmate he succeeded in having released from prison held four bank employees hostage in a vault. This drama gave name to the so-called "Stockholm Syndrome", as it was observed that the hostages and the hostage-takers bonded in ways that made it difficult for the culprits to harm their captives. Several policemen were wounded during the standoff by gunfire from the robbers. The issue of confronting dangerous individuals therefore became a priority for the police (Nylén 2004; for a deeper description, see Hansén and Hagström 2004).

The issue of creating a counter-terrorism force was absent from policy discourse in the first few years after the nationalization of the police. However,

one has to bear in mind that before nationalization, there existed no uniformly-equipped police at all. The parish constables did not necessarily wear a uniform and were seldom armed; in larger cities, they sometimes carried a pistol instead of a saber after dark (Nylén 2004; Persson 1990). Gradually and with experience, body protection and equipment improved, especially as encounters with dangerous persons increased. This period was marked by an unparalleled re-equipping of the police (Persson 1990; Falkenstam 1983; Welander 2003) that was driven by the need to establish acceptable working conditions for all police officers, and not for the purpose of creating a special unit. The first years of the national police era have been described as 'the golden age' because of the enormous resources allocated to equipment purchases (Falkenstam 1983).

The Bulltofta incident was the first truly difficult test for police preparedness in the face of terrorism.¹² The commissioner on duty during the skyjacking reported on police shortcomings: They had no contingency plans, insufficient weaponry and equipment, and high-ranking officers were poorly trained in leadership. Sensitive to the spirit of the time, he ended his report (Malmö police 1972b) by stating that:

It should again be underlined that what has been suggested under this headline does not aim at increasing the use of violence on the part of the police in situations like this or in everyday circumstances. The intention is only, if possible, to create resources for the police to meet and subdue violent crimes with a maximum effect and without unnecessary and undesired injuries to culprits or others.

Director General Carl Persson took an interest in the matter and reportedly advocated the creation of a specially trained and equipped police unit; he later claimed, however, that he was repeatedly rebuffed by the Cabinet (Persson 1990: 258; 1998).¹³

Large-scale manifestations that became out of hand were still in the 1970s the most common extraordinary challenge for the police. This created a need for buying equipment and developing tactics for crowd control, for which Swedish police looked toward other European countries, especially England. Representatives from the Swedish National Police Board closely monitored the experiences of their European colleagues. Gradually, a strategy for crowd control took shape at the National Police Board (RPS 1975b).

12 The consulate occupation and the murder of ambassador Rolovic indeed took place before the Bulltofta skyjacking, but none of them turned out to be particularly challenging for the police as it were.

13 There are no documents corroborating this claim, but some interviewees suggest that it may well have happened informally in corridor chats (interviews with Fränstedt 2003; Welander 2003).

The worrisome developments in air transport safety called for increased preparedness at international airports. The organization of airport police in Sweden's three metropolitan areas (Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö) therefore became an issue. Did they have the capacity to meet the new demands? The largest airport in Sweden, Arlanda – some 40 km north of Stockholm – did not belong to the Stockholm police district, but to a small suburban district. The same was true for Gothenburg, where a new airport was built (Landvetter) outside the Gothenburg police district.

In 1973, the National Police Board suggested to the Cabinet that a special airport police belonging to the Stockholm and Gothenburg districts be created (instead of the smaller suburban districts – Sturup airport already belonged to the Malmö police district). These forces would be at the disposal of the National Police Board. Such reorganization would promote efficiency and rationality (JuU 1974:36). In 1974, this suggestion was forwarded to the Parliament Justice Committee by its chair, conservative MP Astrid Kristensson (Motion 1974:383). The motion was however rejected by the standing committee, since it was unclear how a centralization of airport police would enhance efficiency. The problem of increasing air traffic combined with its increased vulnerability would however be further investigated (JuU 1974:36).

The Bulltofta drama together with international conventions on air transport safety bred new policy ideas in the law enforcement sector. But up to this time, no changes took place, and old routines remained.

Chapter 4 Terrorism crisis and the absence of policy change

4.1 Crisis case two: The seizure of the West-German embassy

4.1.1 Background

After the capture and imprisonment of the RAF hard core in June 1972, second generation West-German armed activists focused entirely on freeing – or at least improving the captivity conditions for – their predecessors. They tried to put a positive spin on their cause, and sometimes pursued hunger strikes. In November 1974 detainee Holger Meins starved himself to death. Some considered him a martyr; in fact several thousand people attended his funeral (Aust 1990; Becker 1987). For the second generation of RAF, Meins’ “martyrdom” was the last straw: Their new strategy would be to take action outside West Germany. An RAF lawyer, Siegfried Haag, traveled to Stockholm in December 1974 to establish contact with sympathizers to the left of the Communist Party. That same month they helped organize a demonstration outside the West-German embassy, protesting so-called “isolation torture” used in West-German prisons (Frånstedt 2003; Axman 2004). Court proceedings were due to begin in May 1975 against imprisoned RAF extremists, who sent clear signals through their lawyers to supporters on the outside: act now and act fast (Aust 1990).

Säpo continued to wire tap individuals within certain communist factions, in particular the revolutionary Marxist-Leninist Communist Party (KFML(r)) (SOU 2002:87 pp. 295–300). The courts permitted these wire tapping activities on the basis of ongoing pre-investigations on subversive activities, e.g. espionage. Säpo archived surplus information in fake “informant” folders, as if people within these circles themselves reported their comrades to Säpo (Ibid.).

In the early spring of 1975 Säpo learned through wire tap that some Swedish KFML(r) activists were in contact with West-German members of RAF. Based on incoming information, Säpo suspected that the West-German Stockholm embassy was a potential target (Frånstedt 2003). Deputy director Frånstedt visited the embassy to inform the ambassador and the head of security on the intelligence Säpo had picked up. A week later he learned that the embassy staff had called the *Bundeskriminalamt* and that they had decided to bring the issue up in the coming year’s budget talks (Ibid.).

According to the Terrorist Act, coercive measures could be taken against individuals linked to Cabinet-listed terrorist organizations. In the spring of 1975 only the Croatian Ustasja, the Palestinian Black September and the Japanese Red Army Faction were listed. Suspicions that RAF was planning an action against the West German embassy in Stockholm made Director General Carl Persson call for a meeting with minister in charge of the Terrorist Act Anna-Greta Leijon, and security experts from both the police and military. It was decided at the meeting that the question of putting RAF on the Cabinet’s terrorist list would be further investigated. As far as they knew, RAF had no record of operating outside West Germany (Persson 1998; Leijon 1991; Frånstedt 2003).

4.1.2 The siege begins

At about 11:30 a.m. on Thursday 24 April 1975, a group of six RAF terrorists began their action at the West-German embassy in Stockholm. In line with RAF tradition, they named the action in commemoration of a for them fallen hero, *Kommando Holger Meins*. They infiltrated the premises in three groups under the pretext of more or less legitimate errands. Within 20 minutes the Swedish police had been alerted, and by a few minutes after 12 p.m. the first patrol was at the scene. By that time, the terrorists had occupied the top floor of the building and taken 13 embassy employees hostage. However, the police did not know the number of hostages, who the intruders were and how many they numbered, or what they wanted. When the first policemen tried to go up the stairs, they were met with submachine gun fire. They retreated and waited for reinforcements on the first floor (Stockholm police 1975a).

4.1.3 Dilemmas

The first issue the police had to deal with was whether or not to evacuate the embassy premises. When all but the top floor had been secured, the police established a command group on the first floor and the building became increasingly crowded with officers. The terrorists demanded they leave the embassy, or a hostage would be shot. Between 1 p.m. and 2 p.m. the terrorists called the police four times; they also had West-German military attaché von Mirbach shout down to the police on the floor below. But the police decided to not evacuate the building under the pretext that they had not received any orders from the Swedish or the West-German Cabinets to do so. They were uncertain of the legal status of the embassy and did not take the threat seriously. In the telephone contacts, the police had been told that the terrorists had 15 kilos of TNT, which they threatened to detonate if the police tried to storm the top floor. They were also informed that the occupation aimed at freeing “political prisoners” from West-German prisons.

At 2 p.m. military attaché von Mirbach was shot five times and pushed down the staircase, where he wheezed and bled profusely. The terrorists threatened to throw hand grenades if the police tried to fetch him. Only at this point did the command group begin discussing the pros and cons of leaving the building; but they needed to know what the West German Cabinet wanted. Five minutes after the shooting, decision makers in Bonn wanted the police to remain in the building, but half an hour later they asked them to evacuate. During the evacuation, the terrorists allowed the police to fetch the dying military attaché and also released one hostage with a written proclamation. By 3 p.m. the police had vacated the embassy.

At this point it became clear that there was nothing the Swedish authorities could do to satisfy the terrorists. Their demands were entirely directed to the West-German government. They wanted no less than 26 RAF prisoners freed before 9 p.m. and brought to Rhein-Main airport for further transportation. They should each be given \$20,000 and the Swedish ambassador to West Germany should accompany them. If these demands were not met, one hostage would be executed each hour beginning at 10 p.m. If the police tried to storm the embassy or attack it with gas, they would detonate the explosives.

A crisis cabinet gathered at the chancellery that included Prime Minister Palme, justice minister Geijer and director-general Carl Persson. The Stockholm police commissioner, who had been at the embassy between 2-3 p.m., delivered the terrorists’ proclamation. The effort to resolve the situation became a diplomatic challenge. Would the West German Cabinet comply with the demands? Were they willing to negotiate at all? What signals would the Swedish Cabinet send their West German counterparts?

In Bonn, the crisis plan “BM” [for Baader-Meinhof] was activated, bringing together a large group of cabinet ministers, opposition leaders and regional governors. They decided to meet at 4:45 p.m. (Sievers 1976). Before the West German crisis cabinet gathered, the federal justice minister ordered a delegation consisting of *Bundeskriminalamt* investigators, cabinet representatives and relatives of the ambassador to fly to Stockholm (Ibid.). The *Luftwaffe* aircraft that later landed in Stockholm also brought a group of about 20 specially trained and equipped police from GSG 9 (Krusell 2004).¹⁴

The crisis cabinet in Bonn had decided early on that it would not release any prisoners – the hard core of RAF was among the 26 prisoners that Kommando Holger Meins wanted released. The Swedish crisis cabinet received the message at 5:30 p.m., but Prime Minister Olof Palme chose to interpret it as merely a preliminary decision and told his West German counterpart to return when the final decision was made. He also informed him that the Swedish police had very limited resources for resolving the situation by force, and that the Swedish line would be to negotiate for a safe conduct out of the country if the West German Cabinet did not comply with the terrorists’ demands (Peterson 2002: 180). Carl Persson and the Stockholm police commissioner told the Swedish Cabinet that they were not willing to risk the life of Swedish police officers by ordering them to storm the embassy – they had not been permitted to train or equip for this type of situation prior to the siege (Persson 1990: 258).

Meanwhile outside the embassy, a group of ten Swedish police officers were ordered to prepare for an assault. The next-door Norwegian embassy was prepped for medical treatment and observation posts were set up at the nearby British and American embassies. The only contact with the terrorists was maintained by the ambassador’s wife, who lived at the embassy annex (this is also where the police command had relocated after the evacuation). She pleaded in vain to be exchanged for her husband who was in poor health.

At 8:30 p.m. West German Chancellor Schmidt called Olof Palme to tell him that the crisis cabinet in Bonn had made a final decision not to meet the terrorists’ demands, and that the embassy’s extraterritorial status was invalidated. The Swedish Cabinet and police henceforth owned the situation. An infuriated Palme lost his head and cried to Carl Persson that he must do something – they could not just let the terrorists kill a hostage every hour. Persson made sure the assault group got access to teargas. He was not optimistic over the prospects of a successful attack, but he had to do something (Persson 1990: 258-259). Other senior police officials were incredulous as well, especially when they saw inexperienced officers training outside the embassy grounds (Welandar 2003; Frånstedt 2003). After the West Germans placed responsibility on the Swedish

14 Krusell worked with the Stockholm police and met the West-Germans at the airport. It is however not clear who ordered the GSG 9 group to come to Stockholm.

authorities to solve the hostage situation, justice minister Lennart Geijer headed to the embassy (Persson 1990: 259).

The ambassador's son (landing in Sweden at 7:20 p.m. on the Luftwaffe flight) arrived before Geijer at the embassy annex, where he spoke directly to the terrorists. He held out a promise – which he claimed came on the authority of the crisis cabinet in Bonn – that the West German Cabinet would comply with their demands. The Swedish justice minister was therefore not taken seriously when he arrived at the embassy shortly after and told the terrorists that the West German Cabinet would *not* comply with their demands and they only had the Swedish Cabinet to negotiate with from then on. At 10:15 p.m. the representative from the West German Cabinet (also arriving in Sweden at 7:20 p.m. but initially taken to the chancellery) joined Geijer at the embassy annex to negotiate with the terrorists. As he spoke to one on the phone, the terrorist declared that they would not compromise and said, “now we just shot commercial attaché Heinz Hillegaard.” The government representative could hear the shots, and the observation post at the British embassy saw the execution take place.

The shots rang out at 10:20 p.m., and the police counted on having an hour before the next murder. While final preparations for storming the embassy were being made, justice minister Geijer informed the police that the assault had to be delayed since the West German Cabinet had not yet approved. Five minutes before the next shooting was expected to take place – at 11:15 p.m. – the terrorists announced that they would release three hostages with a new proclamation. The crisis managers outside the embassy saw this opening as perhaps a chance to resolve the stand off; the proclamation, however, was simply a repetition of the terrorists' previous demands.

As it turned out, the Swedish police's assault capacity was never tested. At 11:46 p.m. the explosives detonated and the top floor of the embassy caught fire. The seven remaining hostages managed to get out of the burning building. Of the six terrorists, one died and five were caught by the police.

The following day, the Terrorist Act – which was meant to be used to deport (or deny entry to) people whom the police suspected could commit politically motivated crimes before they were committed – was put to the test. Now terrorists had already taken hostages, killed two people and occupied an embassy. The Cabinet had strong incentives to extradite them instead of initiating legal proceedings in Sweden, fearing retaliations and new hostage situations in attempts to get the terrorists out of Swedish prisons. Carl Lidbom – the Terrorist Act's architect – claimed there were no legal grounds for deporting the terrorists. Lawyers working for Anna-Greta Leijon – the minister in charge of the Terrorist Act – thought differently: The terrorists could hypothetically escape from prison and commit politically motivated crimes, and therefore the law applied. In

addition, all other ministers (except Lidbom) were eager to get the terrorists out of the country as soon as possible. West German authorities were willing to receive them, and the same night four of the five were flown to Düsseldorf. The fifth was too severely injured to leave hospital and was transported to West Germany a few days later, where he died within a week from wounds caused by the explosion.

The ending of the embassy drama was met with relief on both the Swedish and West German sides. Olof Palme said in a press conference less than two hours after the explosion that it was a relatively happy ending, given the circumstances. And he thanked in particular the Swedish police for their efforts. He also said that it was impossible to fully prevent acts of terrorism from happening, unless a police state was created (Swedish Television: Extrarapport 1975-04-25). In the West German *Bundestag* Chancellor Schmidt praised the Swedish Cabinet and police for their handling of the situation. The twelve-hour siege, he claimed, was the most critical test to the rule of law in the history of the young West German state (Dagens Nyheter 26/4/1975).

For the Stockholm police, however, the embassy drama was something of a wake-up call. Their ability for operating in this kind of situation had proven to be deficient. With the pre-investigation of the terrorist crimes shifted to West German authorities, the Stockholm and national police had time to evaluate their performance.

For Säpo, though, the investigation was far from over with the deportation of the terrorists. During the day that the embassy was occupied, someone had left written proclamations at three news bureaus (DPA, AFP and Reuters) stating the terrorists' demands. Säpo and the Cabinet feared that RAF had sympathizers or members on the streets of Stockholm, which is why the deportation was so urgent for the Cabinet (Leijon 1991: 151). But the notes at the news bureaus together with the intelligence buzz – which in hindsight could have been related to the embassy occupation – made Säpo believe in a Swedish link. The terrorists must have had logistical assistance from the Swedish extreme left in carrying out the attack (Frånstedt 2003). Säpo's investigation would continue for almost two years, and lead them into a conspiracy of a totally different nature: Operation Leo.

4.2 Policy change patterns

The embassy drama was indeed a major crisis for the Swedish government and the Swedish police. But as indicated by the title of this chapter, the crisis as such did not translate into any significant changes in Swedish counter-terrorism policy. We will here follow the development of terrorism legislation and the broader Swedish police reforms – including how police assault capabilities

were treated in that context – as well as developments within Säpo. The reform of the Swedish police and the instrumental adaptation of Säpo were clearly not related to the embassy drama; the change patterns and their motives are however presented to give a more complete picture of developments that had a bearing on the subject matter.

4.2.1 Terrorism legislation: A symbolic gesture

The Terrorist Act – or the law on special measures to prevent certain acts of violence of an international nature (SFS 1973:162) – remained an emergency powers act during its existence and therefore had to be renewed on a yearly basis. However from 1 January 1976, the law split into two parts. The main part of the law, with some amendments, was integrated into the Aliens Act of 1954 (SFS 1954:193), which was reformed in 1980 (SFS 1980:376). The parts that were not integrated into the Aliens Act related to special investigative and coercive measures. These parts were henceforth referred to as the Special Investigations Act, or the law on coercive measures for investigative purposes in certain cases (SFS 1975:1360). This law was a new emergency powers act and that needed to be renewed every year.

In its annual review for renewing the emergency powers acts, the Parliament justice committee without exception requested Parliament to approve them. The annual parliamentary decisions demonstrate a stable and overwhelming support for these laws (with the exception of Communist MPs, who usually voted against them).

Political debate over the emergency powers acts was animated, with broad-based support for them sometimes slipping. Upon closer look, it was not only the Communists who argued against them; some Social Democratic, Liberal and Center Party factions were also skeptical. The mere fact that these laws were not made permanent attests to their break from Swedish legal traditions.

The prolongation of the Terrorist Act was up for discussion on 13 May 1975 (protocol 1975:78 § 6), only a few weeks after the drama at the West German embassy. The Cabinet had proposed prolonging it until the end of that year, since the labor ministry was working out amendments to the law that should be presented during the fall. Anna-Greta Leijon, the assistant labor minister, presented Parliament with the prospect of imparting a personal prerequisite to the special coercive measures included in the law: ‘guilt by association’ should as far as possible be eliminated. This swayed the Liberal party into supporting the prolongation, despite the fact that they had decided to vote against any prolongation at their 1974 party summit (*ibid.*). One Communist MP reminded the Cabinet that significant parts of Social Democratic grass root organizations opposed to the law, including the Stockholm branch of the party (*ibid.*).

The conservative chair of the Parliament justice committee, Astrid Kristensson, criticized the proposed softening of the Terrorist Act, since it would make it easier for terrorists to reside in Sweden. She further lamented the Cabinet's generally soft attitude towards terrorism, and insinuated that a special operations police unit for such incidents should at least be taken into consideration (*ibid.*). With reference to the recent attack on the West German embassy, a Liberal MP pointed out the toothlessness of the law, which apparently had not stopped terrorists from entering the country (*ibid.*).

During the fall of 1975, the Cabinet proposed transferring the parts of the Terrorist Act having to do with deporting or extraditing potential terrorists to the Aliens Act. It was also contended that the sections related to special coercive measures formed a law unto themselves, the above-mentioned Special Investigation Act (Proposition 1975/76:18). On 12 December 1975, the proposed changes were subject to parliamentary debate and voting (Protocol 1975/76:44 § 10). All parties, including the Conservatives, approved the personal requisite, which was included in the governmental proposition. The reason for the Conservative shift was that SÄpo reportedly had in fact followed the personal requisite since the time of the law's institution in 1973 (*Ibid.*). The proposed change was hence more in keeping with reality. The Communists welcomed the personal requisite, but were suspicious of SÄpo's methods. Even if the personal requisite meant that affiliation with an organization was not enough for being subjected to the law – concrete evidence in each individual case was required – it was still unclear to them what this “concrete evidence” implied. Based on what information could a person be judged to be a terrorist? (*Ibid.*).

The main concern for MPs during the debate revolved around the legal rights of the individual. On the one hand, the main argument for transferring parts of the Terrorist Act to the Aliens Act was that the threat of terrorism could be regarded as constant. The law therefore deserved a permanent status. This point was not controversial. On the other hand, the Special Investigations Act could not be transferred to the Code of Judicial Procedure, since the level of suspicion (and thereby burden of proof) for potential terrorists was lower compared to cases of already perpetrated crimes. A fusion would imply too great of an infringement on the Code of Judicial Procedure. The Special Investigations Act remained an emergency powers act. In other words, the mandate given to SÄpo to encroach upon the privacy of foreign residents could not be made permanent; it needed to be assessed on an annual basis. Upon voting, Parliament passed the Special Investigation Act and the additions to the Aliens Act by an overwhelming majority (Protocol 1975/76:44 § 10).

After the partition of the law, only the Special Investigation Act was up for annual parliamentary decisions.¹⁵ Debate faded, and passage of the law became increasingly unnoticed each year. The changes that terrorism legislation underwent in this period can be characterized as symbolic gestures, since they implied new intended policy goals but no new program means. The implementation phase had preceded the political codification.

4.2.2 The national police: Policy innovation

The national police experienced its first review between 1975 and 1979. Already when the police were nationalized in 1965, it had been explicitly understood that the organization would need to be continuously reviewed. On 26 June 1975, the Cabinet assigned an expert commission the task of scrutinizing the police. The commission's work was based on the Social Democratic platform and vision of how the police could better meet the needs of society (Nygren 2004) in a world that had changed greatly in the past ten years. The police had to adjust to the realities of 1975 (SOU 1979:6 pp. 33–37).

When justice minister Geijer presented the Police Commission, he did not mention the recent seizure of the West German embassy. Rather, he focused attention on other problem areas, such as the need for better cooperation between the police and other social authorities and organizations dealing with youth activities, social work, non-institutional care, etc. The commission was also to find means of enhancing police-public relations. The much-appreciated neighborhood police should therefore be examined along with alternative solutions for strengthening mutual understanding between police and citizens. Other topics the commission was to investigate were the recruitment of police officers (especially women); police community outreach activities should be evaluated and solutions for making these services better match societal needs should be found; police academy education should better correspond to developments in society; the relationship between the local, regional and national police should be assessed with the intention of decentralizing authority that need not be centralized (and vice versa) (SOU 1979: 6, pp. 33–37). It can be inferred from the tasks the justice minister assigned the commission that the Cabinet saw public confidence in the police as the main challenge at hand; service-minded officers working preventively and close to local communities represented the ideal police force for the initiators of the 1975 Police Commission.

Terrorism and the law enforcement challenges it posed were only mentioned in a four-sentence paragraph:

15 The Aliens' Act was reformed in 1980, but the infused parts of the Terrorist Act remained unchanged, to some extent because they were interrelated with the Special Investigations Act (JuU 1979/80:1y).

A particular problem is the police activities related to very severe incidents, e.g. acts of terrorism and hostage takings. The experts should analyze the organizational and technical problems that such occurrences may bring to the fore. When working out their suggestions, the experts should throughout strive to increase the influence of public representatives at all levels of the police. They should also consider how a strengthened influence of public representatives could be arranged in the recruitment process (Ibid.: 37).

In late December 1978 the Police Commission presented its report (SOU 1979: 6) called *Polisen* [The Police], which contained a comprehensive review of organizational, functional and principal aspects of the Swedish police. The commission made a wide range of suggestions and recommendations, with two recurrent themes: decentralization and legitimacy. The former implied changes in the chain of command as well as delegation of power on a more structural level. The latter stressed the need for a higher degree of transparency, implying both codetermination and greater public (by political representation) oversight of police work. Questions of legitimacy were salient even during discussions on what the limitations of police work should be. The commission also brought attention to the need for a Police Act, since at this time no such legal basis for police authority existed in Sweden. Unlike the legal rights of citizens – which were guaranteed by the 1974 Constitution – police powers were only based on regulations that are by definition inferior to law.

In April 1981 the Cabinet established a working committee to prepare the implementation of decided reforms – mostly from the 1975 Police Commission – regarding police duties, organization, education etc. The working committee carried on until 1989 and produced an abundance of reports for the Cabinet and Parliament to take a position on. Most importantly, the committee presented a suggestion for a Police Act, which went into effect on 1 October 1984 (SFS 1984:387).

Even though it took until the mid-1980s for the changes proposed by the 1975 Police Commission to take place, they must be regarded as policy innovations. They were based on a new political vision of the Swedish police and implied new program means, not least in terms of the distribution of power. However, the embassy drama and acts of terrorism in general did not leave much of an imprint on the change patterns, although there was no lack of effort in improving police assault capacity as we will see in the two next subsections.

4.2.3 Stockholm police Special Response Units: Routine maintenance

The Stockholm Police Board launched an initiative to increase their preparedness for severe situations in the fall of 1975. An internal evaluation of their performance during the embassy drama resulted in harsh criticism. The police were improperly equipped, and the gear they did have was poorly designed or the officers did not know how to properly use it, which led to unnecessary injuries. Tactical training was also lacking, and police leadership at the embassy had been overlapping and unorganized (Stockholm police 1975b). The scathing evaluation led the Stockholm Police Board to produce a report on reforming the Stockholm police's two Special Response Units in terms of organization, education and equipment. This report was presented on 16 September 1975 to the National Police Board who in turn established a working group on 10 December 1975 to further investigate its content. The issue was submitted to the Cabinet on 25 January 1976, with the National Police Board in support of the proposals put forth by their Stockholm counterpart.

The 1975 Police Commission was asked by the Cabinet on 13 May 1976 to prioritize a fast study of the report, dealing with severe incidents such as hostage takings, acts of terrorism, violent crimes and natural disasters. The Stockholm police Special Response Units and the Stockholm subway police were to be the subject of additional scrutiny. The commission's recommendations differed from those of the Stockholm Police Board, whose main objective was to merge the two Special Response Units and increase the personnel of the single unit from 80 to 124 specially trained officers.

The 1975 Police Commission concluded that the type of incidents referred to by the Stockholm police were not limited to the capital, and affected all levels of law enforcement: local, regional and national. The commission therefore referred organizational matters to the main inquiry and narrowed the special assignment to deal only with educational matters (Ds Ju 1977: 2).¹⁶

In January 1977, the Police Commission presented a memorandum with the results of their special assignment (Ds Ju 1977: 2) that took a rather defensive attitude towards police reform. As mentioned above, the commission did not touch upon organizational matters. Nor did it suggest any changes in tasks or command structures. In terms of training, the commission stressed the importance of the following subjects: correct behavior, psychology and psychiatry. The additional training for the Special Response Units could not come at the expense of the training of other units within the police district. In addition,

¹⁶ For this reason, the suggestions by the Stockholm Police Board related to the subway police were also referred to the main inquiry, since the suggestions were only of organizational character (Ds Ju 1977: 2).

the commission recommended that the two existing Special Response Units be enlarged by 20 (from 40/40 to 50/50) in order to be operable on a twenty-four hour basis (Ibid.).

For the expert police advisers engaged by the commission, the recommendations appeared meager, even disappointing. They therefore attached a special remark to the memorandum on behalf of the Stockholm Police Board and representatives from the police union with whom they had been in contact. In clarifying their position, they stated that the commission's recommendations only partially fulfilled their requirements for achieving secure working conditions for police and meeting public demands on what the police should be able to cope with (Ibid.).

In the government budget proposition (1977/78: 100, appendix 5), justice minister Sven Romanus carried on a rather lengthy discussion and account of various aspects of the Special Response Units that had been discussed since 1975. For the time being, the coalition government agreed with the commission's special assignment report.

In December 1978 the Police Commission was about to finalize its report. The adjusted regulations for the Stockholm police's Special Response Units, which were of primary importance to the special assignment report of 1977 (Ds Ju 1977: 2), had not yet been implemented. Due to rumors of the "new police capacity", a parliamentary hearing took place on 18 December. Justice minister Romanus reassured the uneasy questioners that the adjusted regulations regarding the Special Response Units would be in strict keeping with what the Cabinet and Parliament had decided in 1977, that implementation would take place by February 1979, and that he would monitor the process closely (Protocol 1978/79:57 § 13).

4.2.4 The Special Response Units and "the atom police": Routine remains

In the second half of the 1970s, a growing public concern for the environment brought the issue of nuclear energy to the fore, and to some extent replaced the social concerns of the New Left. For the police, the task of maintaining law and order became more complicated since nuclear energy protesters, besides organizing large demonstrations in cities, often aimed at obstructing the transport of hazardous material (Nylén 2004).

Since Sweden does not produce nuclear fuel, it has to be imported. This is also the case for many other countries dependent on nuclear energy. Due to increasing security problems related to nuclear fuel and waste transport, a convention on nuclear safety was ratified by Sweden in 1977 (Ibid.).

In order to meet the requirements of international obligations, the Swedish police started to work out suggestions for enhancing security at nuclear reactors (Nylén 2004). They turned to the Danes, Norwegians and Finns to hear how they solved security issues at high-risk facilities. Even though the international obligations had been established between industries, the police realized that they at some point would have to increase their preparedness. In March 1979 a working group within the National Police Board was established. By coincidence, this was the same month as the most high profile nuclear accident the world had known to that point – the meltdown at the Three Mile Island power plant in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, USA (Ibid.).

The working group's objective was to estimate police needs for storming a power plant in the event of such a facility being occupied by a hostile group. An estimate on the needs for operative police preparedness related to other criminal acts was also to be made (Svensk Polis 5/1980).

In May 1980 the project team presented its results that recommended: the creation of a special assault force within the Stockholm police's Special Response Units; a doubling of Special Response Unit staff; strengthening leadership for the assault force; additional – and more specialized – equipment should be procured; airborne transport of the Special Response Units should be arranged; and the education for this team should be extended and specialized (Svensk Polis 5/1980).

On 27 May 1980, this initiative was discussed in a plenary session of Parliament (Protocol 1979/80:153 § 4). The conservative justice minister (since the 1979 general elections) Håkan Winberg answered questions from Socialist and Communist party representatives. He did not want to discuss details of the National Police Board's report, since it was referred to the Cabinet for consideration. Socialist MP Arne Nygren reminded Parliament that the idea behind the initiative was not new; it had in fact been lingering since 1975, and the 1975 Police Commission had opposed the kind of organization that the police now wanted to launch. The Communist representative warned that the forces the proposed police force was modeled on – the Norwegian Delta Force and the West German and French "Atom Police" – had not limited their duties to what they were created for. They were also used in normal crowd control operations.¹⁷

In August 1980 the Cabinet proposed (1980/81:13) some general guiding principles for police reform (i.e. for the 1981 working committee mentioned above). A section was dedicated to counter-terrorism and law enforcement during very difficult situations (Ibid. 129-132). In that respect the proposition

17 Lars Nylén claims that the "normal crowd controlling" in West Germany and France were related to transportation of nuclear waste and located to nuclear power plants (Nylén 2004).

leaned on the conclusions of the 1975 Police Commission (Ds Ju 1977:2) as well as recent governmental and parliamentary decisions. However, it emphasized decentralization as the overall goal. The newly launched National Police Board recommendation regarding the Stockholm Special Response Unit and the potential threat of terrorist attack on nuclear power plants was discussed only briefly. The recommendation should be treated in normal sequence.

This meant the budget proposition (1980/81:100 appendix 5) came first. In principle the justice minister found it important to have a police capacity capable of handling the challenges posed by terrorism. However, he was not prepared to support a special unit exclusively for this purpose; under normal circumstances, officers comprising such a team should patrol with ordinary police. The Cabinet should assign the National Police Board to further investigate how police preparedness for serious criminal assaults could be organized in Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö. The investigation should be carried out keeping in mind the prevailing personnel limits in the three districts (Ibid., 34-35). The parliamentary justice committee had no objections on that front (JuU 1980/81:33).

On 15 March 1982, the National Police Board presented its report "Polisiär beredskap vid vissa allvarliga brottsliga angrepp" (Police preparedness at certain serious criminal assaults) (RPS 1982). The report was far less ambitious than the original suggestions, recommending, for instance, that the Stockholm police's Special Response Unit should be increased by only 35 officers (compared to the initial proposition of a 100 % increase).

The Social Democratic party returned to power after the general elections of September 1982. In their first budget proposition (1982/83:100, appendix 4), justice minister Ove Rainer referred to the poor economic situation in rejecting National Police Board recommendations (Ibid. p. 45).

After almost a decade on the policy agenda – a period that also included the embassy drama – the police capacity for handling terrorist attacks had not significantly improved. The decade can be described as "routine maintenance" for the Stockholm Special Response Units.

4.2.5 Operation Leo, the Bergling affair and instrumental adaptation of Säpo

The drama at the West German embassy was the last large-scale manifestation of terrorism on Swedish soil to date. But terrorists continued to operate or reside in Sweden. Less than two months after the drama, two members of the Japanese Red Army Faction were deported from Sweden after having mapped out the Lebanese embassy in Stockholm and its personnel (Axman 2004). What Säpo did not know at that point was that a former member of the West German

2 June movement, Norbert Kröcher, resided in Sweden. Kröcher had planned to kidnap Anna-Greta Leijon, the Swedish minister responsible for the deportation of Kommando Holger Meins. Together with a group of 15–20 people, he mapped out Leijon's life, equipped a gas-proof "people's prison", and amassed explosives to be used at a Jewish center and at the offices of Stockholm tabloid newspaper *Expressen*, unless the government complied with his demands. His goal was the release of the embassy hostage-takers from West German prisons and a ransom of one million U.S. dollars in exchange for Leijon's freedom (Stockholms tingsrätt 1978; Svensk Polis 4/1977; Hederberg 1978).

By pure coincidence, when staking out a potential Swedish link to the embassy drama, Säpo spotted peripheral members of the Kröcher gang in April 1976. In January 1977 Norbert Kröcher himself was identified, and the plot against Anna-Greta Leijon uncovered through extensive wire-tapping. On 1 April 1977 the gang was arrested, and in the days that followed Kröcher and five other foreigners were deported. Criminal proceedings were initiated against 14 Swedish citizens (Stockholms tingsrätt 1978; Hederberg 1978). None of the persons arrested for participating in the plot could be tied to the embassy drama. The Kröcher affair was nevertheless a huge success for Säpo.

The satisfaction did not last long. Suspicions had long existed within Säpo that one of their own, Stig Bergling, was a KGB agent. But it took until 1979 before suspicions materialized into proof. The public unmasking and legal proceedings were labeled the Bergling affair, with the culprit receiving lifetime imprisonment. More importantly, Säpo experienced a period of reform, not least since many of their secrets had been sold to foreign powers (Forsberg 2003: 324–327). Measure were already taken by 1978 – with strong suspicions of Bergling in mind – to make infiltration more difficult. After the Bergling affair, old cases were evaluated by Säpo staff, which could see that after World War II the agency had primarily worked with the ambition of revealing and prosecuting those who resorted to espionage. Much less energy had been devoted to preventing such crimes in the first place. After the Bergling affair, Säpo reoriented their efforts towards prevention (Ibid.). The Bergling affair also caused the Cabinet to appoint a commission comprised of lawyers that presented two reports (Ds Ju 1979:18 and Ds Ju 1980:2). This official inquiry, however, did not interfere with the instrumental adaptations undertaken by Säpo. When organizational matters and routines were discussed in the reports, reference was instead made to the ongoing internal reforms (Ibid.).

After the Kröcher affair, the Swedish terrorism scene was rather uneventful. But in June 1984 a Kurdish refugee who had been a leading member of the PKK (Kurdish Labor Party) was shot dead in Uppsala by a member of his former organization. In November 1985, another PKK defector met the same fate in Stockholm. To some extent these murders had similarities with the

Ustasja crimes committed in the early 1970s. Sweden had once again become a battleground for a conflict originating in another part of the world.

Incidences of terrorism – or close calls – in Sweden after the embassy drama were relatively speaking infrequent, while surrounding areas saw an upsurge in terrorism. In Western Europe terrorist incidents reached an average of 101.6 per year between 1968 and 1974, increasing to an annual average of 251 for the period 1975–1985 (Chalk 1996: 173).¹⁸ Arguably, only the more conspicuous incidents received public and media attention in Sweden, but Säpo monitored the development closely, especially with regard to organizations that could be feared to harm Swedish interests abroad or use Sweden as a platform for their activities.¹⁹

18 If the years 1968–1970 are excluded, the annual average of terrorist incidents in Western Europe between 1971–1974 was 142,25 (Chalk 1996: 173).

19 Säpo communicated statistical accounts to the government, which they in turn referred to when proposing to prolong the emergency powers act (see e.g. Proposition 1985/86:31 pp. 6–7).

Chapter 5 Non-terrorist crisis and major changes

5.1 Crisis case three: The murder of Olof Palme

5.1.1 The Night of the murder²⁰

On Friday 28 February 1986 Prime Minister Olof Palme was shot dead on the sidewalk of Sveavägen in central Stockholm. Palme and his wife Lisbet were unescorted that night, having dismissed their bodyguards and telling them that they would not be needed any more that weekend. As the couple strolled down the major thoroughfare after a visit to the cinema, the perpetrator stole up from behind and fired two shots at close range. The first bullet hit the prime minister between the shoulder blades, smashing his spinal cord, aorta and windpipe. The second grazed Lisbet Palme's back.

The shots rang out at 11:21 p.m. The first police patrol arrived a few minutes later, alerted by a taxi driver. Their first sight of the crime scene was a man lying in a pool of blood, surrounded by about ten people. When the head of the patrol asked for information about the victim from what seemed to be his wife, she cried to him, "Can't you see who I am? I'm Lisbet Palme, this is my Olof, Prime Minister of Sweden!" For a split second, the chief inspector stood alone with the knowledge that the prime minister had been gunned down.

The fact that the prime minister had actually been shot caused something of a paralyzing shock within the police department. The Stockholm police com-

²⁰ This section builds, if not otherwise stated, on SOU 1987:14.

munication center became the hub of activity; as the crime had been committed in the heart of Stockholm, the search for the murderer was organized from there. It was also their duty to inform the Cabinet and the National Criminal Division of Palme's assassination, as the latter carried instructions on how to protect the 'quarter' (where the headquarters of the National Police Board and the Stockholm police are housed) and since Säpo was responsible for bodyguard activities.²¹

Almost everything that could go wrong did go wrong that night. It should be kept in mind that the murder took place late on a Friday night, on the last weekend of winter holidays for school children. Many Swedes, including vital decision-makers, were therefore on vacation and unreachable. Director General Holger Romander of the National Police Board as well as Stockholm Police Commissioner Hans Holmér and his second in command Hans Wranghult were all at different ski resorts in Sweden. At 11:30 p.m., less than ten minutes after the murder, the Stockholm police communication center staff was aware of the fact that it was the prime minister of Sweden who was the victim of the Sveavägen shooting. It was then no longer an 'ordinary' murder, but perhaps the most serious crime in Sweden for centuries. The perpetrator had to be caught as soon as possible in order to clear the fog around possible motives, further implications, etc. It was imperative to find out whether or not the shooting was an isolated event, if other persons needed protection, or if other counter-measures had to be taken.

The initial search efforts were marked by deviations from standard operating procedures. The roped-off area around the crime scene had been much too small, making technical evidence unlikely to be found as people began entering the area to toss flowers. Within ten minutes after the shooting, some ten police patrols were searching the surrounding area – but not systematically. Moreover, neighboring police districts were not alerted, and could not assist in the search effort. Off duty police officers who volunteered to assist were not made use of. Possible escape routes were not secured. Since the Stockholm police commissioner was on vacation and unreachable, his deputy Gösta Welander was called in. Arriving at around 12:30 a.m., Welander took charge but did not change how the search effort was organized. He prepared a nation-wide alert – sent out at 2:05 a.m. – that indicated two perpetrators, probably belonging to the Ustasja movement. Prior to the alert's transmission, Welander and the head of Säpo, Sven-Åke Hjälmsroth, joined several cabinet ministers and the Palme

21 As stated in the opening lines, Olof Palme had told his bodyguard earlier during the day that he would not need more protection that weekend. Palme had an agreement with Säpo, according to which he decided quite arbitrarily on his level of personal security. Palme was supposed to tell the bodyguards whenever he moved outside the 'triangle', consisting of his home, Rosenbad, and the Parliament, but this time he did not do so.

family at Sabbatsberg's Hospital, and then followed the ministers to a cabinet meeting at the chancellery at Rosenbad that started at 3:07 a.m.

An official at the chancellery was responsible for taking care of necessary duties during extraordinary events occurring on weekends. This person should continuously follow Swedish National Radio's news broadcast and be reachable by phone or beeper. In the case of an emergency, he or she should immediately go to Rosenbad and inform the head of security and his substitute, as well as the chancellery's press secretary. The justice minister and under-secretary of state should also be contacted, and if necessary, military headquarters should be informed. However, the official on duty the night of the Palme assassination had been dining out, and was returning home on the subway – where his beeper did not work – when the alarm was sent.

The question for the Cabinet, which gathered at Rosenbad, was whether it was constitutionally functional. This was the first test to the order of succession since the creation of the new constitution in 1974. Regulations existed, but legal expertise was required. However, the Cabinet Office's constitutional adviser, who was also its head of security, had recently passed away and had not yet been superseded (Eklundh 1999). Under more normal circumstances, the parliamentary Speaker would have dismissed the Cabinet and asked its members to continue holding their offices in a caretaker capacity. It so happened, though, that the Speaker was on vacation in Spain and could not fulfill this task until 11 a.m. on 1 March, when he was flown home. Ingvar Carlsson took charge of the caretaker Cabinet during the night, an act that – whether constitutional or not – was never subjected to criticism.²² Beside constitutional issues, security concerns and the need for bodyguards were discussed. Welander and Hjälmroth updated the Cabinet on the ongoing police efforts; their presence at Rosenbad meant that the highest-ranking police commanders available were not involved in the search operation. It should be also noted that the head of the National Criminal Division was never contacted, leaving the task of reinforcing the protection of police headquarters unfulfilled (Tommy Lindström 1998).

After having driven like a “car thief”, Stockholm police commissioner Hans Holmér returned from his interrupted vacation at 10:50 a.m. on Saturday 1 March and took charge of police efforts (Holmér 1988). The crisis that never occurred—a possible *coup d'état*, or, less dramatic, a succession disorder—was over and the crisis that never ended—including erroneous ‘main leads’ and severe tensions between various actors and organizations in both the judicial and political spheres alike—had just begun (Eklundh 1999).

²² The executive committee of the social democratic party chose Ingvar Carlsson as candidate for the post as party leader unanimously already on 1 March, and Sweden got a regular government on 12 March, with Ingvar Carlsson as Prime Minister.

5.1.2 The subsequent search organization

A managerial group was set up quite spontaneously during the first weekend of March. Besides Holmér, it included a number of other senior staff from the Stockholm police force and the National Police Board, mainly police chiefs. Apart from them, two officials from the justice ministry were assigned to the managerial group as observers. Within this group, Holmér created an inner circle, the “Brain Trust” – a forum to formulate tentative thoughts and play devil’s advocate to one another’s favorite hypotheses (Åsheden 1987).

Holmér approached the investigation from the motive side, which appeared unorthodox for experienced murder investigators, who are accustomed to finding the motive in the technical and circumstantial evidences (Krusell 1998). Anything from a single madman to an international terrorist organization was interesting for the managerial group. A dilemma for Holmér and the managerial group was however the absence of an obvious motive; one seemed no more prominent than another.

The growing amount of information, tips and testimonies seemed to the Brain Trust to indicate that the deed had been carefully planned. In order to encourage people who might know anything about the assassination to come forward, Holmér and Wickbom (the Justice Minister) decided to offer 500,000 SEK for any tip that led to the capture of Palme’s murderer. This course of action was quite unique for Sweden.

On 2 March, Säpo wanted to tap the telephone of Miro Baresic, who killed the Yugoslavian ambassador to Sweden in 1971 and was serving time in a Stockholm criminal institution. Chief prosecutor K-G Svensson found not a shred of suspicion against Baresic and declined this request. However, by that night, someone close to the justice minister called Svensson and reported that the Cabinet had decided to tap Baresic’s telephone, based on a provision in the Law on Correctional Treatment in Institutions (SOU 1999:88 pp. 557–559).

Some initial – and crucial – positioning by key actors defined the second phase of this crisis. The managerial group, and Holmér personally, had taken the preferential right of interpretation. In a way, his close connection to the Cabinet entitled him and his managerial group to this privilege. The ‘normal’ murder investigators and the prosecutor’s office were already at this stage positioned at the periphery of the decision-making hub.

5.1.3 Main suspects and organizational breakdowns

A 33-year-old with no previous convictions became the first main suspect in the Palme murder investigation. The chief prosecutor took him into custody when the police presented evidence that strengthened the suspicions against him.

However, before court proceedings were supposed to start, chief prosecutor K-G Svensson realized that the evidence presented to him by the police was manipulated in the sense that it was not complete. He then had to release the suspect (K-G Svensson 1998). This was the deathblow to Holmér and Svensson's relationship. Holmér visited the director of the Stockholm Prosecution Authority and asked him to replace Svensson. On 21 March, the director decided not to meet Holmér's request (Åsheden 1987: 59-67).

Relations between police leadership and the chief prosecutor deteriorated in April. The 33-year-old was still under investigation, even if prosecutors became increasingly less interested in that case. Holmér and his staff however insisted on conducting a large number of line-ups, which Svensson denied with respect to the primary suspect because of the extended amount of time it would take. He took the list of names the police had produced and pointed out eleven witnesses who should be subjected to a police line on 28 April. According to Svensson, his decision regarding the line-ups with the eleven witnesses was not final. He would evaluate them after they had been carried out, and decide whether or not more line-ups were needed (KU 1986/87:33 p.149). Prosecutor General Magnus Sjöberg explained to Svensson that he might have to overrule his decision on the amount of line-ups. After the initial line-ups, Svensson decided that another eleven witnesses would be called in for additional line-ups, this mostly because he wanted to avoid a confrontation with the managerial group (Ibid.).

At a meeting with the justice minister, Holmér and Svensson reported on their different points of view, which almost entirely concerned the number of line-ups. Svensson found them rather useless and stated that the eleven additional line-ups were the last ones, and thus his final decision on that matter. Holmér stressed the importance of exhausting this 'main lead' and thus urged for more line-ups. Justice Minister Wickbom expressed support for Holmér's position. Wranghult (1998) reveals that neither he nor Holmér at this stage thought that the 33-year-old had anything to do with the murder, but that he was hiding something. The following day, Sjöberg overruled Svensson's decision. Svensson was present, but did not object (Sjöberg 1998).

Holmér found the situation intolerable and paid a visit to the director of the Stockholm Prosecution Authority on 1 May, who decided to replace Svensson and take over his duties. Svensson would remain the prosecutor in the case of the 33-year-old (SOU 1987:72). Before this, however, on 29 April when Sjöberg officially handed in his decision to overrule Svensson regarding the line-ups, Svensson explained to Sjöberg that he was not able to pursue his prosecutor duties under the current circumstances. Svensson contended that the way Holmér organized the investigation did not derive from realistic assumptions and in fact wanted the managerial group to be dismissed and replaced by the

police that he normally worked with, i.e. police officers and not police jurists (KU 1986/87:33 p.152).

After two months the relationship between the managerial group and the public prosecutors collapsed. However, history repeated itself only a few months later. After suspicions against the 33-year-old were dismissed, the managerial group focused their interest on the Kurdish Labor Party (PKK). They had been interested in PKK from the beginning of the investigation, but from late spring/early summer 1986, it came to be *the* main lead.

Holmér and the managerial group planned a major series of arrests on a large number of PKK members in January 1987. When preparing and implementing the operation, problems in terms of cooperation occurred between the managerial group and the new prosecutors. The latter thought that the managerial group was too optimistic regarding the validity in its findings, and complained about not being sufficiently informed. After the arrests – which were postponed ten days because of the cooperation problems – the prosecutors set the Kurds free the same day (20 January 1987). The managerial group found that to be a rash decision. The severe cooperation problems and personal tensions between police and prosecutors made it impossible to continue the murder investigation. The Cabinet therefore decided on 5 February 1987 that the National Prosecution Authority would lead the investigation and that the National Criminal Division would lead the search efforts (SOU 1987:72).

5.2 Policy change patterns

During the extended period described above, many missteps made within the Swedish criminal justice sector can be discerned. The underperformance of the Stockholm police during the night of the murder – in terms of both search efforts and their procedures in sounding the alarm that Palme had been shot – as well as the slow reaction of other actors, gives witness to a non-functioning crisis preparedness system. The organization of the subsequent search for the murderer and further efforts to solve the Palme assassination reveal even more profound problems in the sector. In June 1986 the Cabinet decided to appoint a commission consisting of legal experts – the so-called Jurist Commission – to look into the Palme murder investigation. A parliamentary commission would follow up on the conclusions of the Jurist Commission. The two commissions chose to investigate the eleven months described above, i.e. the period in which Holmér was in charge of the Stockholm police and headed the murder investigation (SOU 1987:14; SOU 1987:72; SOU 1988:18). Several other commissions and committees were appointed in the end of the 1980s. A Säpo Committee presented a report in July 1988 (SOU 1988:16), a one-man investigation presented in January 1989 a report on Säpo's threat assessments prior to

the Palme murder (SOU 1989:1), and another one-man investigation reported in April 1989 on Säpo's working methods (SOU 1989:18). In 1990 the Säpo committee presented its final report (SOU 1990:51). A terrorism legislation committee presented a report on the Terrorist Act in 1989 (SOU 1989:104).

Most policy ideas concerning counter-terrorism were therefore the product of commissions that carried out inquiries into specific events. These were related to terrorism legislation, a reform of Säpo, and the creation of an anti-terrorist police force. We will follow these three policy issues below.

5.2.1 A permanent Terrorist Act: A policy innovation

The Terrorist Act – established in response to the 1972 Bulltofta skyjacking – went through changes in 1976, after which the parts of the law related to deportation and refusal of entry into the country were transferred to the Aliens Act. The Special Investigations Act, which allowed police to use coercive measures against people who had not yet committed crimes, still existed in the form of an emergency powers act, which was renewed on a yearly basis by Parliament. Until 1989 Parliament sanctioned governmental propositions to prolong the Special Investigations Act.²³

Both the Jurist and Parliamentary commissions paid attention to the laws aimed at preventing acts of terrorism. Since they centered on the Palme murder, their analyses of the legal framework focused on its bearing on such situations. The Jurist Commission found that terrorism-related sections of the Aliens Act did not allow for the deportation of terrorists who were believed to be a threat only to their country of origin, i.e. that they could only be deported if they were believed to commit terrorist acts in Sweden. They also pointed out that the Special Investigations Act – at least with regard to bodyguard protection – only applied to foreigners who, despite being classified as potential terrorists, had a right to reside in Sweden (SOU 1987:14 pp. 132–133). The parliamentary commission did however not see a need for changing the existing terrorism legislation (SOU 1988:18 pp. 162–175).

In 1988 the Cabinet appointed a parliamentary committee called the Terrorism Legislation Committee to scrutinize existing counter-terrorism legislation. According to the Cabinet's instructions (1988:49) to the committee, an overhaul was needed because of the criticism that the existing terrorism regulations had received during the 1980s, both in terms of its effectiveness and the legal rights of the individual. But before the committee presented its report, the Cabinet proposed instituting a new Aliens Act (Proposition 1988/89:86), which required the changing of the Terrorist Act. The main idea was to remove

²³ For a complete reference list of propositions and considerations of the justice committee, and government decisions, see 1988/89:JuU 12, p. 3.

terrorism-related sections of the Aliens Act and insert them into the Special Investigations Act. The new law should also become permanent. In terms of substantial changes, the proposition suggested that foreigners, even if they had received permanent residence permits, should be subject to deportation if they were classified as terrorists. If a presumptive terrorist had the right to asylum, the Cabinet could after court proceedings place restrictions on his or her freedom of movement (so-called municipality arrest). Presumptive terrorists could also be subject to coercive measures based on grounds not otherwise permitted by the Law of Legal Procedures or the Aliens Act (Ibid.). The new Terrorist Act (SFS 1989:530) was in effect from 1 July 1989.

The parliamentary Terrorism Legislation Committee presented its report in December 1989 (SOU 1989:104). They agreed that there was a need for a coherent terrorist act like the one that had been established earlier that year. However, the committee proposed a number of changes to it. First, the organizational requisite should be discarded. As it was, two conditions needed to be met for a presumptive terrorist to be deported or refused entry into Sweden – a personal and an organizational. A person needed to be associated with a group that was known to perpetrate acts of terrorism outside its country of origin (the organizational requisite) and he or she also had to be personally suspected to having such inclinations (the personal requisite). The committee found the organizational requisite superfluous, and that it unnecessarily singled people out on the basis of association. Such suspicions could also follow them to other countries, making deportation much more difficult. The committee further suggested that the Terrorist Act did not need particular paragraphs on refusing entry to foreigners, since those were covered in the Aliens Act; the Terrorist Act should only cover deportation. The committee wanted to strengthen the Terrorist Act to make it possible to deport foreigners whom one could suspect were preparing to carry out terrorist acts anywhere in the world, and not only on Swedish territory. Finally, the committee wanted to change the conditions for presumptive terrorists residing in Sweden under the right to asylum. Coercive measures, such as restrictions of a person's freedom of movement, should only be valid for three years. A court decision could then prolong such measures for additional three-year periods. This suggestion was based on the assumption that a presumptive terrorist's inclination to commit terrorist acts would typically abate over time.

The Cabinet essentially accepted the suggested changes put forth by the Terrorism Legislation Committee (Proposition 1990/91:118). However, the Cabinet proposed that restrictions regarding place of residence, accommodation and work place applicable to presumptive terrorists whose deportation had been denied should be abolished. Such persons should instead be obliged to check in with the police on a regular basis (Ibid.: 41-46).

The proposition together with the motions it had generated was taken up on 7 May 1991 by the Parliament Justice Committee (1990/91:JuU29), which suggested making only small semantic edits to the original proposition such as changing the name of the proposed “Law on Special Control of Certain Aliens” to “Law on Special Control of Aliens” (Ibid.: 35). Only representatives of the left and environmentalist parties had reservations against the committee’s decision (Ibid.: 36-44). On 28 May 1991, the parliamentary Speaker informed the Cabinet that Parliament accepted the proposition, as edited by the Justice Committee. The Law on Special Control of Aliens (SFS 1991:572) went into effect on 1 July 1991.

The patterns of change in terrorism legislation that took place between the 1986 Palme murder and 1991 can be characterized as policy innovation interspersed by instrumental adaptation. The intermittent Terrorist Act of 1989 was an instrumental adaptation insofar as it was required for changes in the Aliens Act. It was however much in line with the intent of the upcoming 1991 Terrorist Act. The incentive for the legislative overhaul was reportedly criticism of the old legislation (Directive 1988:49). In terms of content, the new legislation implied innovation insofar as it received permanent status and wider applicability, but also more restricted investigative means.

5.2.2 Säpo scrutinized and reorganized: A policy innovation

The Jurist Commission set up after the murder of Olof Palme heard during its inquiry process voices of dissent that thought that Säpo should not be responsible for counter-terrorism activities. Such issues should instead be transferred to local or regional police (SOU 1987:14 p. 127), according to the dissenters, since normal criminal activities typically preceded acts of terrorism. For example, terrorists need to rob banks to get money to buy weapons. The fight against terrorism would supposedly be more effective if local law enforcement, i.e. the Stockholm police, had all responsibility for counter-terrorism. Furthermore, Säpo was reluctant to provide information to local police that they considered vital in combating terrorism (Ibid.).

The Jurist Commission rebuffed these arguments. In their estimation Säpo was more suitable in taking the lead on counter-terrorism activities in Sweden, considering the international characteristics of terrorism and terrorist networks. The commission did not find it realistic to place a national issue in the hands of a local authority, let alone several local authorities. But it urged Säpo to become more transparent, as vital information needed to filter down to local law enforcement to a greater degree (Ibid.: 126-131). The parliamentary commission also commented on the role of Säpo, but had the same assessment as the jurist commission: Säpo was the best suited for being responsible for coun-

ter-terrorism. The Parliamentary Commission referred changes regarding Säpo to the parliamentary Säpo Committee, which had been up and running since 5 November 1987 (SOU 1988:18 pp. 155–162).

On 6 October 1987 a former Säpo employee, Stig Bergling – who had been serving a lifetime sentence for espionage since 1979 – escaped during a leave from prison. As a consequence, the Cabinet assigned National Police Board Director General-designate (from 1 January 1988) Nils Åhmansson the task of scrutinizing police organization and to also present suggestions for responding to surprising events (Åhmansson 1987). With especially the Palme murder in mind, Åhmansson saw the division of labor between the local police and the National Police Board as problematic. He specifically found the fact that the National Police Board could not take command over operations of national interest from local police without governmental intervention unfortunate. Such authority should be included in the regulations governing the National Police Board (Ibid.: 38-44). Åhmansson also drew attention to the relationship between Säpo and the ‘open’ police (i.e. the local and regional police organizations, and the non-secret parts of the National Police Board), suggesting that local and regional police should be required to inform Säpo of events and threats suspected of being terrorism related. Säpo should in turn provide better information to local and regional police regarding facts and tendencies within the terrorism domain. He also proposed that bodyguards – who at the time were working for either the Stockholm police or Säpo – be transferred to the National Police Board, or at least that the National Police Board took charge over the training of all bodyguards in order to prevent different professional cultures from developing (Ibid.: 45-52).

Also in the wake of the Bergling escape, the Cabinet appointed Carl Lidbom as head of a committee to scrutinize Säpo. Lidbom was the architect of the first Terrorist Act in the early 1970s, and from 1982 served as the Swedish ambassador to France. Apart from Lidbom, MPs of all parties in Parliament (with the exception of the Communists) participated in the committee, which began work on 5 November 1987.

The report presented by the Säpo committee in July 1988 proposed two significant changes related to the leadership and oversight of Säpo. The latter suggestion grew out of the observation that the Cabinet in particular did not fully exert control allowed for in the constitution. The parliamentary representatives of the National Police Board, the Parliament Justice Committee, the Cabinet, the justice ombudsman, the attorney general and the prosecutor general all already exerted control over Säpo to one degree or another. The Säpo committee’s suggestion was to strengthen the powers of these already existing oversight bodies. They also highlighted the need for the Cabinet to provide clearer instructions to Säpo with regard to priorities among Säpo’s different subunits

(counter-espionage, counter-terrorism, counter-subversion, and protection of government officials and the royal family). These instructions should then be subject to additional thorough follow-ups. But since Säpo – whose operations needed a higher degree of flexibility in relation to the amount budgeted for their various priorities– could not be monitored the same way the regular police were, the committee suggested that the National Police Board's non-police (mostly parliamentary) representatives carry on continuous informal deliberations for monitoring purposes. With regard to the subject matter, the Säpo Committee advocated that the instructions should be firmly established within parliamentary structures. The leaders of the parties represented in the Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs (i.e. all but the Communist/Left and Environmental parties) should have a say in their formulation (SOU 1988:16 pp. 194–199).

The need for increased oversight of Säpo activities called for, according to the committee, a somewhat new type of Säpo leadership. Säpo's need for firmer leadership could be achieved by the appointment of a qualified individual to head a public service department. This new post could be one step below the Director General. The Säpo chief was traditionally recruited from within the law enforcement establishment and ranked as head of the department. The Säpo Committee recommended that Säpo continued to exist as a department within the National Police Board, but that its director should be given a higher position. According to the committee, the head of Säpo needed to have a broader understanding of security policymaking in general and be adept at communicating with Cabinet representatives. The suggestion was also based on Säpo's international contacts and the department's importance for Sweden's security, as well as the potential for intrusion into the legal rights of the individual, all which made Säpo's mission the subject of debate. However, the new powers of the Säpo chief would not reduce the authority of the Director General of the National Police Board, who would remain the head of all under-departments, including Säpo (SOU 1988:16 pp. 200–201).

The Säpo Committee, like Åhmansson (1987), made the observation that bodyguard issues were spread between Säpo – which was responsible for the protection of government officials and the royal family, the Stockholm police – who provided security for diplomats, and a bureau within the National Police Board that coordinated the protection of foreign visitors. The committee suggested that Säpo should have a more comprehensive responsibility for all bodyguard concerns. The committee also wanted bodyguard issues within Säpo to be more closely related, in organizational terms, to counter-terrorism activities (Ibid.: 187-189).

A scandal related to the Palme murder investigation was uncovered in the summer of 1988. A Säpo investigation had secretly run parallel to the Palme group (which superseded the managerial group headed by Holmér) that con-

tinued following the PKK lead. This group consisted of two PKK experts from Säpo and Ebbe Carlsson, Geijer's press secretary in the 1970s, who was at this time a publisher and close friend of the Justice Minister, Anna-Greta Leijon. Leijon had sanctioned their activities and National Police Board Director General Åhmansson was informed. The scandal was called the Ebbe Carlsson affair and gave rise to a new commission. Was there reason to believe that information or warning signals about the murder of Olof Palme existed within Säpo prior to the murder? On 25 August 1988, the Cabinet appointed county governor (of Jönköping) Gösta Gunnarsson to investigate what assessments Säpo had made on the threat against Palme and how these had been communicated to him (SOU 1989:1 pp. 9–10). Gunnarsson stated in the opening of his report presented in January 1989 (Ibid.: 7):

In my assessment whether or not any concrete threats against Olof Palme prevailed in the time preceding the murder, I begin by stating that any circumstances of such kind – that it was obvious that his safety was endangered – did not prevail.

Suspicions cultivated by Ebbe Carlsson and possibly the Cabinet that initiated the investigation were not supported. Säpo was, however, criticized on a few points. Through wire-tapping, Säpo knew that PKK members spoke of an imminent "wedding" – which was a code word for murder – and that the target could be the Swedish Cabinet. The PKK had however never committed a murder in Sweden outside its own organization, i.e. to PKK defectors. Had Palme been informed of this, he would have perhaps not gone out without bodyguards. There was an agreement between Palme and Säpo saying that Palme should have constant protection, except for the triangle marked out by his apartment, the Parliament building and the chancellery, as well as his summer residence on the island of Fårö. Palme therefore broke this agreement by not informing his bodyguards of the cinema visit on 28 February 1986. Säpo's standpoint had been to not impose personal security upon anybody against his or her will. This should not have, however, prevented them from informing Palme on security-related intelligence (Ibid.: 25-29).

Gunnarsson also pointed to a sloppiness regarding Säpo's translations of tapped telephone calls. His investigation found a considerable number of tapes with not yet translated conversations in Kurdish and delayed translations of Turkish. Säpo had problems recruiting reliable translators, but Gunnarsson concluded that the delay was not acceptable (Ibid.: 37-40).

In February 1989, the Cabinet presented a proposition (1988/89:108) regarding the aim, direction and organization of Säpo, which drew upon the various commissions directly related to the Palme murder (SOU 1987:14; SOU 1988:18; SOU 1989:1), the Åhmansson report (1987) and the Säpo

Committee (SOU 1988:16). The proposition essentially followed the suggestions presented by the latter, which had in turn incorporated the ideas of the other reports (except SOU 1989:1). It was important to the Cabinet that the Säpo Committee had been unanimous in its recommendations. Most of the proposed changes did not need a parliamentary decision, meaning they could be implemented as early as 1 July 1989.²⁴ Consequently, the Cabinet proposed keeping Säpo as a department within the National Police Board, where it would continue to be in charge of counter-espionage, counter-terrorism, counter-subversion and security protection (e.g. bodyguard activities). Bodyguard activities performed by the Stockholm police should be transferred to Säpo. The Cabinet should further give clearer and continuous instructions to Säpo regarding the prioritization of their activities, necessitating Cabinet consultations with the leaders of parties represented on the Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs. Säpo should be led by a higher-ranking civil servant (one step below Director General level) than before. The board of the National Police Board should be given the task of monitoring Säpo's implementation of Cabinet instructions. In order to professionalize Säpo and mitigate sectarianism, specialists from outside law enforcement should be recruited and the circulation of personnel between Säpo and the 'open' police should be facilitated (Proposition 1988/89:108).

The proposition was given to Parliament on 9 February 1989 and was discussed together with the motions it had provoked (1988/89:Ju21) by the Parliament Justice Committee on 9 May. For the most part, the motions came from Left and Environment party MP's who resented the fact that they were excluded from insights into Säpo. The Justice Committee as a whole however supported the proposition.

In April 1989 Lidbom presented his one-man investigation (SOU 1989:18), which dealt with the working methods of Säpo. Lidbom found that Säpo performed activities, such as bugging, that were constitutionally questionable. However, he traced these practices to weak leadership. Neither the Director General of the National Police Board nor the head of Säpo had much influence on Säpo operations. Instead, dedicated deputy directors – for whom constitutional concerns had been secondary at best – had ran the show for a long time. Just as Lidbom was about to present his report, Sune Sandström – who had succeeded Hjälmroth as head of Säpo in 1987 – chose to resign. The suggestion of appointing a person qualified to head a civil service department could therefore

24 The two exceptions were the suggestion to give the National Police Board authority to take command in incidents over the local police, when required with reference to the national interest, which needed an adjustment to the Police Act. The second was related to the law on public employment, which needed adjustments to facilitate circulation of personnel between Säpo and the local police.

be realized. Mats Börjesson became the first head of a more independent and open Säpo. He was in fact given the title of Director General.

Lidbom's critique paved the way for radical changes in Säpo's internal regulations. In the early 1990s new procedural rules replaced a complex system of internal instructions. The documentation of decisions was improved, and from fiscal year 1989/90 a public version of the annual report has been published (SOU 2002:87 p. 63). In 1990 connections between Swedish communist organizations and the Soviet Union and its satellite states disappeared, leading Säpo's counter-subversion unit to be transformed into a unit for the protection of the constitution. As this unit realized its shortcomings in analyzing developments within extremist parties, a civil analysis group was established in 1992 to increase analytical capacity (Ibid.: 63-64).

The change patterns with regard to Säpo can be characterized as policy innovation. Driven by an intention to come to terms with an organization that had been subject to severe criticism and could not be surveyed by the Cabinet, the changes also implied a new leadership structure and new means to monitor and follow up on political instructions.

5.2.3 Time ripe for policy innovation on anti-terrorist policing

Just like after the West-German embassy drama in 1975, the Stockholm police took the initiative after the Palme murder to produce a report, which was presented to the National Police Board on 26 November 1986. The report concluded that the Stockholm police was not prepared to meet the challenge of terrorism. Shortcomings in training and equipment were likely to prove fatal in the event of a terrorist attack (SOU 1988:18 p. 177). These observations were in keeping with what the National Police Board had pointed out in 1980 and 1982, when it had scrutinized safety at nuclear power plants.

In January 1987 a conservative MP raised a motion (1986/87:Ju208) urging that an anti-terrorist police force to be set up. When the Parliament Justice Committee handled the motion (JuU 1986/87:23 p. 20), it was left with an inconclusive reference to the ongoing Jurist Commission and work that was carried out by the National Police Board. However, the Justice Committee stated that it could not sanction a self-contained police force, as was suggested in the motion.

On 27 April 1987, the Jurist Commission presented its first report dealing with the night of the murder. The commissioners devoted the concluding chapter to the protection of public persons and the combating of terrorism (SOU 1987:14 pp. 107-136). More in passing, they called attention to the fact that the existing Special Response Units were incapable of handling a severe terror-

ist assault of the type experienced at the West German embassy in 1975 (Ibid.: 131).

The subsequent parliamentary commission, with a more policy-oriented approach, picked up on the issue of the insufficient assault capacity of the police that the lawyers in the Jurist Commission left open (SOU 1988:18 pp. 175–203). They recommended creating an anti-terrorist police force.

The commission made four main arguments for setting up an anti-terrorist police force (Ibid.: 178-180). First, the frequency of terrorist acts perpetrated around the world was continuously increasing, raising the likelihood of terrorism taking place in Sweden. Not least were nuclear power plants mentioned as vulnerable and potential terrorist targets. Second, inadequate training and equipment would put the security of police officers dealing with a terrorist assault at risk. Third, Sweden's ratification of various international terrorism-related conventions obligated Sweden to also effectively act against terrorists. Foreign governments might otherwise insist on having their police forces operate inside Sweden. Such situations could cause unnecessary conflicts with other states. Fourth, being less prepared than neighboring countries would create an incentive for terrorists to attack targets in Sweden.

The parliamentary commission proposed creating a force of about 50 officers that would be organized under the Stockholm police, but detached from the existing Special Response Units. One-third of the time they would be training (during which they would also be on standby in case of emergency), the rest working with other Stockholm police district units. According to the commission, the force would have one commander who would be subject to Cabinet confirmation to guarantee political control of the unit's deployment (Ibid.: 187-194).

The suggestion put forth by the parliamentary commission was circulated for consideration to some thirty public authorities in the judicial sphere. Only three opposed the idea of an anti-terrorist police force altogether. Most agreed on having the Cabinet decide on its deployment for each individual case, which would ensure political control over its operations. When dealt with at the Chancellery, some issues regarding organization and costs were in need of further analysis, for which reason the matter was referred to the National Police Board. The National Police Board was tasked with analyzing these questions in August 1989, and delivered a report that October. According to the instructions given to the National Police Board, they were supposed to use the parliamentary commission's suggestions as a point of departure. In terms of organization, the National Police Board suggested that an anti-terrorist police force be established only in Stockholm, separate from the existing Special Response Units, and comprised of 53 officers. The force should only perform other police work 20 % of the time. While the parliamentary commission's policy suggestions were

on remittance in 1988, the National Police Board proposed reinforcing the Special Response Units of Sweden's three largest cities (Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö). In the fall of 1989 they instead suggested a special unit be set up in Stockholm, which was in keeping with the parliamentary commission's proposal but at odds with statements made by the Parliament Justice Committee in 1987 (Proposition 1989/90:100, appendix 15).

When the Cabinet presented its budget proposition for 1990/91 (1989/90:100), the arguments for setting up an anti-terrorist force were identical to those made by the parliamentary commission. The Cabinet suggested that a force of about 50 men be organized in the Stockholm police district, but separate from the Special Response Units. The force would train half the time, during which it should be prepared to act if the Cabinet so decided. The rest of the time the officers should perform normal police duties.

Only two motions in Parliament objected to the Cabinet proposition (Motions 1989/90: Ju211 and Ju233). The former, authored by a faction of the Communist party, cited negative international experiences with the kind of police force proposed by the Cabinet; similar forces in other countries had been rather counterproductive and caused more violence than necessary. The latter motion written by a Social Democratic party faction opposed a militarization of the police. Both motions called for decentralized, but specialized, training of ordinary officers in a number of police districts, especially those encompassing nuclear power plants. The Parliament Justice Committee did not comply with these motions, instead approving the Cabinet proposition (1989/90:Ju27).

On 25 April 1990, Parliament discussed the police budget (Protocol 1989/90:109 § 6). The issue of an anti-terrorist police force was brought up and criticized by only one Communist and one Environmental MP. The communist wondered why the Cabinet had argued that the proposition was in keeping with what the Parliament Justice Committee had concluded in 1987, when they in fact had two different views over the organization of such a force. The social democratic representative avoided a discussion of the anti-terrorist force by ignoring the questions. The debate was instead between the social democrats and the three non-socialist parties, and exclusively on the need to recruit more police officers. When it was time to vote (Ibid. § 11), the suggestion by the Justice Committee – which was essentially the same as the governmental proposition on the anti-terrorist police force – won by 258 to 38. In June 1990, the Cabinet made the decision to create the anti-terrorist police force.

The anti-terrorist police force was supposed to be fully operational by spring 1991. In its first years of existence, it faced two important challenges. The first was related to recruitment. By the end of 1992, only 32 out of 156 applicants had passed the rigorous tests to join the force (Flyghed 2000: 152). The second was motivational. Since terrorist incidents did not occur, the force was never

used. The Cabinet did not call on the force for other severe incidents that were not terrorism related, and their lack of utilization caused frustration among the staff with some quitting as a consequence (Ibid.).

In 1996, the social democratic Cabinet suggested in the budget proposition (1996/97:1) that the anti-terrorist police force be integrated with the Stockholm police Special Response Units. The Cabinet proposed (1997/98:1) the following year to relinquish its unique right to command the force, and suggested that the National Police Board, on the authority of a regional police chief, could also make use of the force.

The creation of an anti-terrorist police force and the subsequent developments around it can be characterized as a policy innovation followed by another policy innovation. The creation of the anti-terrorist force implied both new intention and new programmatic means. The subsequent changes may seem like instrumental adaptations, but since the original concerns over creating the force had been about how it should be used (i.e. only during terrorist incidents, or for other difficult police missions as well such as prison riots and hostage situations), the later changes implied new intentions. They also involved new means, since the chain of command was transferred from the political to the operational level.

PART 2: EXPLAINING THE NEXUS BETWEEN CRISIS AND PATTERNS OF POLICY CHANGE

Chapter 6 Theoretical perspectives on policy dynamics

6.1 Boundedly rational assumptions

Over the past few decades, a concern for scholars interested in policy analysis has stayed with policy stability and change. Observations of items flying on and off policy agendas for seemingly unclear reasons, of long periods of policy stability interspersed with short bursts of policy change, and of massive pressure for change that results in only incremental adjustments has increasingly stimulated research on the evolution of policymaking.

The core of this study examines the relationship between crisis and patterns of policy change. The empirical puzzles presented in part one indicate patterns of both stability and change in the Swedish criminal justice sector that deserve to be better understood. It is therefore crucial that the theoretical insight be drawn from prior attempts to account for both policy stability and change.

For this purpose we will turn to three significant contemporary approaches to describing and explaining policy dynamics, namely multiple streams (MS) theory (Kingdon 1984; [1995] 2003), punctuated equilibrium (PE) theory (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; 2002; Jones and Baumgartner 2005), and policy advocacy coalition framework (ACF) (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; 1999). These approaches do not primarily focus on policy processes after crises; crises do however play a role in their accounts of policy change and stability, as we

shall see below. These three approaches or frameworks are prominent upholders of the policy stability and change discourse, perhaps most of all because they can potentially elucidate policy change and policy evolution over time. John (1998) pointed out that this is because they all consolidate mixes of approaches: MS embraces ideas-based and institutional approaches, without ignoring the importance of individuals and external processes; PE also encompasses institutional factors where networks, individuals and interests are vital; ACF is more parsimonious and departs from policy subsystems, but acknowledges the influence of external processes and events. For the sake of convenience, these frameworks are here labeled the 'policy change' strand of the policy analysis literature.

Why these three frameworks? The agenda setting and policy analysis literatures certainly offer more potential candidates. Path dependency and policy inheritance (Rose and Davies 1994; Pierson 2000) are other important strands that deserve comment. In principle, path dependency and policy inheritance elaborate similar concepts when explaining at least policy stability, as does the policy change strand. Both for instance rely on assumptions of 'increasing returns to scale' (especially PE, and to some extent MS) when accounting for collective behavior (Kuipers 2004). The Rose and Davis (1994) categorization of policy change was used in part one of this study to classify the type and level of change that were observable in the Swedish counter-terrorism arena. However, as Jones and Baumgartner maintain, "[p]olicy inheritances must be understood as organizational phenomena" (2005: 50). Path dependency and policy inheritance are well adapted for explaining why policy structures, often translated into bureaucratic organizations, remain in place for very long periods once they have been established. But the policymaking processes on display in the previous part shows that the history of Swedish counter-terrorism to a large extent has been about establishing policy structures in the first place. Theories that focus on agenda attainment and the restraints and opportunities to move an issue from there to policy decision making hold more promise for actually shedding light on the processes at work.

The scholars that have developed MS, ACF and PE do not engage in much cross-referencing. Other scholars however see commonalities between the approaches and often treat them together – all three or only two – and sometimes together with a fourth framework, such as epistemic communities (Parsons 1995; Dudley and Richardson 1996; Mintrom and Vergari 1996; John 1998; Schlager 1999; Meijerink 2005). One reason for grouping these frameworks together is that they all depart from assumptions of the individual as being boundedly rational (Schlager 1999). They may explain historical accounts of policy change or non-change that seem counterintuitive. In light of the policy change patterns related to the crises presented above, MS, ACF

and PE are not simply a random selection of interesting theoretical frameworks – they are actually quite promising.

The three theoretical lenses will be presented in three steps. First, a general overview of the main arguments will be given. The second step will be a closer examination of their respective assessments and conceptions of crises, focusing events and perturbations, and how they supposedly affect the policy process. The final step is a critical discussion of each lens, mainly concerning the nexus between critical challenges and patterns of policy change. After these expositions, a discussion about similarities and differences of the three theoretical lenses will follow. An argument will be developed that the three lenses harbor mainly complementary, if not overlapping, propositions. From the three theories, two perspectives will be derived on their complementary aspects. The last section of this chapter will discuss the applicability of the process tracing method to the three theories and two perspectives.

6.2 Multiple streams theory

6.2.1 General overview

The multiple streams theory explores how agenda-setting and alternative specification come about under conditions of ambiguity (Kingdon 1984; [1995] 2003; Zahariadis 1999). Largely inspired by Cohen, March and Olsen's (1972) garbage can model of organizational choice, it challenges stimuli-response notions of the policy process and explores how solutions find problems and vice versa. Attempts to trace the roots of policy ideas often lead to infinite regression. It is therefore not fruitful to ascribe ideas to single actors, but to see how the sharing of agendas creates them.

Multiple streams theory in fact refers to three streams: problems, policies and politics. In the problems stream, some problems have to be closest to the surface in the eyes of the (policymaking) beholder. The theory examines what factors make certain issues visible and others invisible. Indicators acquired by routine procedures or special studies may reveal the scope and nature of a problem, to which dramatic events or feedback from existing policies may draw attention.

The policies stream pertains to ideas, which can basically be seen as solutions to problems, prevalent or not. These ideas are raised by specialists in policy communities, e.g. bureaucrats, politicians and scholars interested in a specific policy domain. Whether they have a chance to survive hinges upon their practicability: They have to be technically feasible and concordant with the values that cement the networks. The policies stream develops independ-

ently from the problem stream, which means that solutions may be at hand before the problem.

The politics stream could possibly be understood as a *zeitgeist*, which centers on the national mood, pressure group campaigns and administrative or legislative turnovers. Each of these processes can have a promoting or inhibiting function on policymaking. Issues can be pushed onto or kept off of the policy agenda. The national mood appears somewhat undefined and hence not easily accounted for. Opinion polls might be one indicator, although Kingdon (1984: 155) contends, “the mood does not necessarily reside in the mass public”. Changes related to administrative or legislative turnovers, on the other hand, are easier to trace. Pressure group campaigns in a way epitomize the national mood. If the majority of interested parties in an issue unanimously voice a preferred direction for a policy, then incumbents are likely to catch on. When views are conflicting, political leaders are likely to “arrive at an image that strikes some balance between those for and those against a given proposal” (Kingdon 1984: 157). If they perceive that the balance of support is tilting against a proposal, it can still be pushed on the agenda; the perception helps calculating the costs of doing so.

At certain junctions in time, items from these streams that somehow inter-relate link together, opening a ‘window of opportunity’. For a limited period, an idea’s time has come, and provided that some policy entrepreneur shows the readiness and resolution to invest the required resources, an alteration in the policy agenda is likely to occur. These windows are opened by compelling problems or events in the political stream, but in order for something to happen someone has to produce a current in the policies stream.

6.2.2 The relationship between crisis and policy agenda attainment

Focusing events, such as crises, pertain to the problems stream and are under some conditions conducive to putting issues on the agenda. Kingdon (1984: 100) proposes that the nature of the policy domain matters in terms of how crises affect policy agendas. The more publicly visible the policy domain, the less important are crises and disasters, he concludes, comparing focusing events’ effects in the transportation sector – where they tend to be high – to the health sector, where their effects are usually low. Health problems are ubiquitous and naturally on our agendas, with an occupational branch dedicated to taking care of them. These problems do not easily become urgent for governments. To this should be added (Ibid.: 101) an effect of aggregation built in to the structures of the sectors. The more people affected, physically or otherwise, the greater the likelihood of the problem reaching the policy agenda. A problem in the

transportation sector, like an airplane crash (to be drastic), is hence more likely to attain crisis proportions than a problem in the health sector, where “[t]he basic unit—is a patient-provider exchange. When something goes wrong, it doesn’t show up as a major crisis” (Ibid.). For health sector problems to have a crisis-like impact, they must gradually build towards major proportions, or the individual cases must be aggregated into startling statistics. “But in transportation, something that goes wrong is often already pre-aggregated. An airplane goes down, killing hundreds of people at once rather than killing one patient at a time” (Ibid.).

Given these preconditions, Kingdon (Ibid.: 103-105) argues that focusing events need ‘accompaniment’ to create meaning for policy makers, which determines the likelihood of agenda attainment as a consequence of crisis. Crises need to “reinforce some preexisting perception of the problem, focus attention on a problem that was already ‘in the back of people’s minds’” (Ibid.: 103). Crises can also serve as early warning signals to unprecedented disasters and crises, “if subsequent consideration really establishes that there was a widespread condition that needs attention” (Ibid.). It is also possible that crises and focusing events affect problem definition in combination with other events. “Awareness of a problem sometimes comes only with the second crisis, not the first, because the second cannot be dismissed as an isolated fluke, as the first could” (Ibid.: 104). Also, if one incident of a particular kind does not create an impression of a salient problem, the occurrence of similar events may add prominence to the issue.

The notion of ambiguity should be differentiated from uncertainty. More information can reduce uncertainty, but not ambiguity. The more we know about for instance SARS, the more we combat ignorance and inaccuracy about how the disease spreads, its contagiousness etc. But it is still an ambiguous task to establish whether SARS is primarily a transport, animal, healthcare, political, or why not a policing, issue (cf. Zahariadis 1999: 74-75). The job of the policy entrepreneur is to reduce that ambiguity for policy makers by presenting solutions that fit into a particular issue domain. Crises are therefore ripe moments for affecting policy makers’ understanding of problem areas.

Crises are clearly potential window openers in MS reasoning. In contrast to policy developments in normal situations where elements from the three streams somewhat mysteriously converge – not seldom by chance, crises provide more focused and discernible opportunities for policy innovation. Crises make policy problems visible. To achieve agenda prominence, someone in the policy stream has to present a potential or possible solution to the arisen problem. Of course, in the stream of politics, the crisis needs to be interpreted as a symptom or part of a familiar problem to promote policy change. On the other

hand, if no one could meaningfully grasp an event, it would hardly reach crisis proportions.

6.2.3 Critical assessment

MS notions on how policies are made have had a seminal impact on the academic field of policy analysis.²⁵ Not least the 'window of opportunity' metaphor is widely referred to. However, scholarly attempts to build further on the theory or lens have been scarce, let alone efforts to empirically test its claims. In MS reasoning it is not clear how the streams relate to each other (whether they are independent or interdependent), how the streams affect coupling, how entrepreneurial strategies affect coupling and how coupling relates to the windows. Chance and serendipity are apparent attributes of (political) life and Kingdon is keen on capturing such dimensions. In fact, they are duly ascribed their explanatory leverage. The scientific virtue of parsimony is however infringed, which renders efforts to operationalize follow-up studies difficult.

When Kingdon observed how problems in different sectors translated differently to the policy agenda, he related this to diverse and inherent degrees of preaggregation. Comparing the 2002 outbreak of SARS or the 2005 outbreak of avian influenza in Southeast Asia and in Europe with fatal car accidents in any of these countries of course undermines the implied sector logic. In an interesting study of plane crashes in the U.S., Cobb and Primo (2003) find that the link between crashes and public policies is rather ambiguous. The cause of the crash and the location of the impact are examples of factors that affect media reporting and further policy implications. It is however clear that plane crashes receive a lot more attention than the far larger number of fatal car accidents. The preaggregation seems rather to be associated with institutionalized subsidies for control and safety. Where the car driver has control and is accountable, the air passenger relies on public and industry agencies for safety. These agencies in turn more easily become targets for policymaking. If this logic holds, it is likely that infectious disease epidemics, as well as acts of terrorism, are prone to sail up on the policymaking agenda. The key is not the policy sector, but governmental responsibility for coping with (rare and unpredictable) hazards that common citizens cannot control.

The 'accompaniment' needed for a crisis to gain prominence on the policy agenda suggests that the three streams are interdependent to some degree. Mucciaroni (1992) holds that changes in one stream can trigger or reinforce changes in another. In relation to the role of crises in the policy process, this observation points to an inconsistency in the original framework. The 'accom-

²⁵ According to Sabatier (1999: 9), Kingdon is cited about eighty times annually in the Social Science Citation Index.

paniment' needed for a crisis to bring meaning to a certain problem seems to require some sort of pre-coupling: The streams of policies and politics, i.e. the national mood and potential solutions, have already made contact. Most likely, some have already framed the problem as well. The crisis attracts wider attention to both the problem and solutions and hence reinforces, or ties closer together, the already interdependent streams.

Zahariadis (1999) considers Kingdon's nebulous conceptualization of the precise role of windows in coupling. Windows open up in both the problem and politics stream and "the different properties of opportunities indicate that each window has a differential impact on coupling" (Ibid.: 82). From a case study on the attempt to sell British Rail, he derives two hypotheses:

When windows open in the problem stream, coupling is likely to be consequential (finding a solution to a given problem), and when windows open in the politics stream, coupling is likely to be doctrinal (finding a problem for a given solution).

One case study may not be enough to convince the skeptic, although the assumption may have some leverage. It would however imply that crises (pertaining to the problem stream) would produce consequential coupling. The launching of a Swedish antiterrorist team after the Palme murder seems to provide falsifying evidence.

Keeler (1993) elaborates on the concept of policy windows in connection to crises. He argues that there is a function between the severity of the crisis and the size of the mandate that policy makers get. There is also a relationship between the cumulative effect of these factors and the size of the window for reform, i.e. the more severe the crisis is perceived to be, the bigger the reform window.

Zahariadis (1999) and Keeler's (1993) points combined seem to suggest that problems that evolve over time provoke consequential solutions, whereas abrupt crises call for solutions of any kind, consequential and/or doctrinal.

6.3 Policy advocacy coalition framework

6.3.1 General overview

The policy advocacy coalition framework (ACF) considers policy dynamics over extended periods of time (Sabatier 1988; 1998; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; 1999). It focuses on the interaction of advocacy coalitions within a policy subsystem. An advocacy coalition consists of actors from a broad range of organizations and institutions who share policy beliefs and hence strive towards a common goal in a given issue.

Based on prior research on policy implementation, ACF rests on the assumption that theories of policy processes need to embrace a time span of a decade or more to cover a full policy cycle (formulation-implementation-reformulation). They must further weigh technical data about the nature and scope of the problem, its causes and the estimated cost of alternative solutions, which are normally considered important to policy makers. Short-term analyses do not easily capture changes in belief systems that result from policy research and analysis. Focus should be on policy subsystems rather than on formal governments and institutions. A subsystem consists of actors from various public and private organizations who are actively engaged in and try to influence a certain policy issue, i.e. the total of all advocacy coalitions (usually one to four) in a given matter. However, the focus on subsystems should be broadened from traditional understandings of iron triangles working at a single level of government to include all levels of government. Professional groups such as journalists, policy analysts and researchers should be included in the concept of a subsystem. Lastly, attention should be paid to implicit theories of policy implementation often permeating public policies. Such theories reveal policy makers' notions of causality, value priorities and ideas of efficacy in various policy instruments.

ACF aims at explaining policy change, even though its inheritance from policy implementation research also highlights circumstances and factors that have a stabilizing effect on policy development. To understand the process of policy change, ACF directs attention to external shocks (an exogenous factor) and learning (an endogenous factor).

The latter relies on actors' belief systems, of which ACF differentiates among three degrees. The first is labeled *deep core*, and refers to fundamental normative and ontological axioms, "akin to a religious belief." The deep core beliefs operate across most policy domains and are suggestive in overarching assessments on societal problems (e.g. the relative rank of citizens' integrity and personal freedom versus societal equality). The second degree is *policy core* aspects, which ACF assumes is the glue of advocacy coalitions. They represent the coalition's basic normative commitments and causal perceptions across a policy domain (e.g. crime can best be mitigated by preventive and caring means since it is related to a societal failure, versus repressive and punishing measures because criminals should be held personally accountable). The policy core beliefs also include fundamental policy positions concerning the basic strategies for achieving core values within the subsystem, such as the appropriate allocation of resources between correctional treatment and law enforcement. Policy core beliefs are difficult to change, although they do from time to time if experience reveals serious anomalies. The third degree is *secondary aspects*, which refers to below subsystem level beliefs concerning for instance the relative weight of various causal factors (e.g. correctional treatment is more versus less effective

than community-oriented policing in preventing crime). These beliefs are more easily adjusted than the first two categories. Reliable statistical data and experience, for example, may alter them.

A change of a belief system is about policy-oriented learning, i.e. actors trying to better understand the world in order to advance objective policy positions. In accordance with the tripartite notion of belief systems, it follows that learning is most likely to occur in the secondary aspects. In fact, actors are inclined to disregard information or revelations that run counter to their policy core beliefs, let alone their deep core beliefs. To this should be added the ACF model of the individual, which implies that actors are prone to weight losses more than gains and to view opponents as more powerful than they probably are. This can easily lead actors to regard information and interpretations coming from rival coalitions as attempts to manipulate the policy agenda rather than as insights to learn from. Hence, policy-oriented learning has leverage in explaining change in secondary aspects, but changes in policy core aspects require a perturbation in non-cognitive factors external to the subsystem.

There are basically two types of exogenous factors that may alter the constraints and opportunities of subsystem actors. The first type is rather stable and inert and consists of parameters such as fundamental socio-cultural values and social structure, basic constitutional structures, and basic distribution of natural resources. The second type is more likely to undergo change during a policy cycle. Changes in socio-economic conditions, in public opinion, and in systemic governing coalitions are known to occur with some regularity.

Based on case studies, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993; 1999) formulated and developed three series of hypotheses concerning advocacy coalitions (1), policy change (2) and learning across coalitions (3). These hypotheses suggest that advocacy coalitions show relatively stable lineups over time and that the policy core beliefs of these advocacy coalitions do not alter easily (1). Policy changes are unlikely to occur as long as the policy-initiating coalition remains in power over the policy jurisdiction in concern. For policy core attributes to change, significant perturbation external to the subsystem is of greatest importance (2). Policy-oriented learning across coalitions is about reorientation of secondary aspects of one party's belief system towards a competing coalition's core values. The prevalence of quantifiable data and theory involving natural systems (as opposed to political systems) and/or a prestigious arbitrary forum may facilitate this (3).

6.3.2 External perturbation and policy change

In short, ACF (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; 1999) provides a framework that points towards stabilizing factors in policy processes that inhibit or

limit the scope of change. What then is the role of focusing events and crisis in their thinking? Actually, crisis (or at least an external perturbation such as the oil shock in 1973) is a key variable in explaining the policy shifts that do occur. Beliefs and policy ideas are challenged when they fail to bring meaning to events. According to the notion of policy core beliefs (as being very difficult to change), it

follows that the only way to change the policy core attributes of governmental policy in that jurisdiction is through some *shock* [italics added] originating *outside* [italics in original] the subsystem that substantially alters the distribution of political resources or the views of coalitions within the subsystem (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999: 125).

Political resources can therefore be redistributed through shocks. Arguably, an advocacy coalition's core values determine the content of the policy agenda, for which reason shocks should have the potential for causing agenda reappraisals.

The ACF is in agreement with the idea that shocks provide necessary but not sufficient conditions for policy change. External shocks to the policy subsystem are not equal to the crisis concept applied in part one. These shocks can include a new government taking power, a crisis in another sector, etc. More specifically, ACF holds that agenda shifts require some shift in coalition actors and/or mandates, alternatively that the existing coalition reappraises policy core beliefs. Much like in MS, ACF contends that the cumulative effect of events that disturb perceptions of the order of things may lead to the alteration of policy core beliefs.

6.3.3 Critical assessment

Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999) reassessed ACF in light of follow-up studies. The prominence ACF has achieved is due to its applicability; by 1998, no less than 34 cases critically applying ACF had been published (Ibid.: 126). The attractiveness pertains to clearly defined concepts, two distinct causal drivers (core values of coalitions and external perturbations), many falsifiable hypotheses, and a fairly broad ability to be generalized (at least for OECD countries).

As mentioned, in the 1999 (pp. 125–150) assessment of ACF, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith answered the criticism that up to that point had been put forward in academic discourse and adjusted the framework (at least the secondary aspects of it) accordingly. I will here address problems related to the notion of external perturbations and learning, and policy change.

In their search for the causal nexus between the two phenomena, Mintrom and Vergari (1996) pointed out that not all external perturbations, and not all instances of policy learning, lead to policy change. For this reason, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999: 147) adjusted their contention: "Significant perturba-

tions external to the subsystem [...] are a necessary but not sufficient, cause of change in the policy core attributes of a governmental program". It is however still not clear whether external perturbations are measured by their effects, or if real world events of a certain kind would qualify as such, regardless of their effects. Would for instance the 1973 oil shock have qualified as an external perturbation, had it not resulted in policy change?

Mintrom and Vergari (1996) suggest that ACF has much to gain from lending insights from what they referred to as the policy entrepreneurship model. This is because "policy entrepreneurs serve to bring new policy ideas into good currency" (Ibid.: 422). Policy entrepreneurs help in forming and uniting coalitions; they articulate policy innovations and bring them forward while networking in government circles. They are willing to take the risks involved with pursuing actions that have uncertain consequences. The success or failure of policy entrepreneurs would then provide the causal link between policy-oriented learning/external perturbation and policy change. The policy entrepreneurship model instead adds emphasis, since the early ACF also included the "policy broker,' whose principal concern is to find some reasonable compromise that will reduce intense conflict [and hence facilitate cross coalition learning]" (Sabatier 1993: 18-19). Policy brokerage is however more associated with the 'binding-in' of opposition, which facilitates incremental change. In the reassessed version of ACF (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999), the role of the individual is still downplayed in favor of coalitions. Moreover, it is only minority coalitions that are supposed to have an incentive to change policies after perturbations (Ibid.: 148). The entrepreneurship is taken over by minority collectives, which only makes policy shifts more impracticable, given the collective action problem.²⁶ In order to understand how swift policy change actually happens, the policy entrepreneur cannot easily be discarded from the analysis.

One may also question the notion that major change only happens as a consequence of external perturbation, i.e. that learning is unlikely to lead to alterations of policy core beliefs. This notion is consistent with the ACF contention of major and minor policy change. "Major change is change in the policy core aspects of a governmental program, whereas minor change is change in the secondary aspects" (Ibid.: 147). This implies that major change requires a shift in mandate – a change in power between the majority coalition and one competing minority coalition. Learning takes place with the majority coalition intact. As Schlager (1999: 252-253) points out, this assumption is problem-

26 The collective action problem includes "(1) the transaction costs involved in coming to a common understanding the policy problem and the proper means of addressing it, (2) the difficulty of finding policies that fairly address the distributional conflicts among coalition members, and (3) the temptation for each individual and organization to free-ride" (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999: 138).

atic for a number of reasons. In particular the idea that “[t]he same change may be ‘minor’ for one subsystem and ‘major’ for a subsystem nested within it” (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999: 147), calls into question what exactly a subsystem is. There are apparently subsystems (containing policy core beliefs on an issue) that have sub-subsystems (containing secondary aspects of the same issue) nested within them. Since ACF does not account for how the subsystems are empirically distinguishable from the sub-subsystems, it may as well be that policy-oriented learning actually produces major change.

Some ACF scholars have focused on the difference between beliefs and interests. “The ACF does *not* assume that actors are driven primarily by simple goals of economic/political self-interest, nor does it assume that self-interested preferences are easy to ascertain” (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999: 131). Moreover, beliefs are supposed to encompass (economic and organizational) interests (Sabatier 1993: 28). This view has been contested for primarily two reasons: beliefs are not necessarily easier to ascertain empirically than interests (Hann 1995), and interests are not by definition subordinated or encompassed by beliefs (Nohrstedt 2005). Nohrstedt (2005) argues for instance that the Swedish Social Democratic party’s policy change on the issue of nuclear energy in the 1970s had much to do with that party’s interest to regain governmental power, and very little to do with their beliefs in the policy issue. In that case, beliefs and interests were successfully disentangled.

Crises should then have the potential (however with difficulty) of altering policy core beliefs as well, and be conducive to policy-oriented learning. Interests should arguably be less susceptible to crisis episodes.

6.4 Punctuated equilibrium

6.4.1 General overview

The punctuated equilibrium (PE) theory ambitiously aims at explaining observations of both swift policy changes within limited time periods, and of policy stability over extended periods (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; 2002; True, Jones and Baumgartner 1999; Jones and Baumgartner 2005). The main ambition is to describe conditions that lead to the emergence of policy monopolies and the dynamics of decay in such systems. PE argues, like ACF, that policy incrementalism depends on the degree to which policy makers succeed in defending their preferential right of interpretation. Both seem to agree that institutions normally maintain power over issues for a considerable time. PE explains both this phenomenon and the eventual decay of a policy monopoly with two central concepts: images and venues.

A policy *image* is equal to the public understanding of a policy problem. Every policy problem, according to PE, is understood in simplified and symbolic terms, even by the politically sophisticated. Policy images are further a mix of empirical information and emotive appeals. In fact, this latter evaluative component (which can be measured in terms of its *tone*, e.g. good/bad, desirable/undesirable, etc.) is critical when it comes to the alteration of image predominance on the public agenda. Hence, by pitching a policy issue in a certain manner, stakeholders aim at getting enough support to maintain or alter a problem definition, as defined by the public (often also including appropriate solutions).

According to PE (Ibid.) a policy *venue* is the institutions or groups in a society that have the authority to make decisions concerning an issue. To the extent that different images compete for predominance in a political setting, each institutional venue is home to a different image to the same issue. How an issue gets assigned to a particular arena of policymaking is as much an empirical question as how certain issues come to be associated with one policy image rather than another. A distinction can be made between venues that are firmly established and those where change is more likely. Whether or not a venue is more or less permanent may stem from logic or tradition, and may be codified in a country's constitution or emerge from common practice. Hence, venues that are firmly cemented in constitutional arrangements are less likely to be a driving force for change.

If images and venues are the tangible manifestations of change, the causal drivers are processes of positive and negative feedback. The notion of positive feedback is inspired by the economic conceptualization of increasing returns to scale.²⁷ This *mimicking* logic applies also to political decision makers.

If the probability of any action on the issue is zero, then there is little reason to focus attention on the issue, since there is no expected benefit. What would cause the probability of success to rise? One important element is the expected behaviors of other relevant actors. This is why focusing events can be so important..." (Baumgartner and Jones 2002: 21-22).

Societal problems, for which political decision makers are to varying degrees accountable, are normally complex and multidimensional. However, often only one dimension at a time draws the attention of the public, media actors and elite decision makers alike: the profitable dimension. Faced with new evidence that cannot easily be refuted and not matching the policy image of a policy monopoly, a flock movement to the expected future winners is likely to be

²⁷ Regardless of objective quality criteria, VHS rather than the Beta system seemed to be the incipient universal video standard. The VCR manufacturer, the retailer and the consumer therefore chose the VHS system, which then only reinforced the initial assumption.

seen, a so-called *attention shifting*. Take for instance the U.S. homeland security concept, which was far from familiar before 11 September 2001. When it became excruciatingly clear that U.S. soil could be the theater of terrorist attacks, homeland security became the winning concept around which governmental programs were initiated. Expected benefits may take time or be absent, but expected behaviors come more rapidly. Jones (1994: 13) noted, “that preferences change only grudgingly but that attentiveness to those preferences can shift rapidly”, thereby indicating that different dimensions to a certain issue are not necessarily mutually exclusive to the policy maker. However, when a policy image loses meaning for the general public and especially the media, the policy monopoly breaks down. An alternative image gains momentum and a rival policy venue gains prominence.

Long periods of equilibrium come about through negative feedback. Regardless of the direction of an outside or inside influence, the mechanisms of negative feedback work to correct and counterbalance. In any policy domain, equilibrium or incremental change is the predominant feature. Most policies remain stable for long periods because institutions do not often change. According to Baumgartner and Jones (2002: 24), institutions maintain rigidity because

[they] are typically designed to encourage participation by certain groups and discourage participation by others. Institutions are also designed to facilitate the use of some aspects of information rather than others. Institutions often promote certain issue definitions by requiring that decision makers consider some types of information but not others.

In times of heightened attention, institutions are likely to undergo some adjustment. When attention fades, institutions remain. In addition to the reflex to nip competing problem definitions in the bud, institutional rigidity is therefore related to the fact that the type of heightened attention required to cause institutional change is for the individual institution an infrequent phenomenon.

6.4.2 Focusing events and policy monopoly breakdown

Crises are conducive to spark positive feedback processes because of the attention they direct to a dimension of a policy problem: An issue can then not easily be confined to a policy subsystem, as parties are drawn in for ideological or populist reasons. To the extent that macro-level political institutions intervene, subsystems tend to be disrupted. The familiar crisis phenomena of mediatization and politicization therefore facilitate policy shifts.

Even if crises seem to provide fertile soil for policy change, PE discusses the notion of ‘triggering events’ with some caution. It has been observed that both media and policy attention sometimes follow recurrent ‘real-world’ events such

as riots, while this is not the case at other times. Timing is therefore crucial in PE reasoning on policy processes after crisis. PE argues that when heightened media and political attention actually follow a focusing event, the event as such can best be described as an “attributed trigger” (Baumgartner and Jones 1993: 129-130). The event becomes a symbol of a particular understanding of a problem. In this respect crises fulfill a more consolidating role, since the underlying problem is already publicly widespread. True (2002: 155-183) noted that the changing focus of U.S. national security policy after the second world war was not easily attributed to radical changes in the external environment, such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Crises may therefore be followed by drastic policy change, or policy stability. PE explains this through the concept of disproportionate information processing, which stipulates that a threshold needs to be crossed for a policy to change.

The natural tendency is to underemphasize new threats, new ways of thinking of things, new ways to organize public bureaucracies, until and unless some significant threshold of urgency is crossed. At that point, major changes can occur. While the 9/11 terrorism example is an extreme case of such a thing, similar patterns of overresistance, then overreaction, are general characteristics of government. *Crises seem necessary to drive change.* (Jones and Baumgartner 2005: 51, italics added).

However, PE assumes human and organizational decision-making processes to be marked by strong status quo biases (Ibid.: 53), suggesting that crises may be necessary but not sufficient drivers for policy change. Strong beliefs and ideological convictions are examples of such status quo biases. But unlike ACF, these same mechanisms in some circumstances lead to overreaction according to PE, not least when loaded with emotive attributes. The attention paid to an issue does not necessarily indicate what solution will follow. That depends on a variety of circumstances, such as leadership personality, what ready-made solutions exist, etc. In short, PE like MS in that regard refers to the garbage can model of organizational choice (Ibid.: 52).

6.4.3 Critical assessment

PE theory has proved to be simple yet informative for describing past periods of policy stability that have been interspersed with short bursts of radical change. It is based on the assumption that individual and collective behaviors are guided by bounded rationality. Preferences do not change easily, but behaviors are more transient and subject to change when attention shifts from one dimension of a problem area to another. The model seems to be universal and adaptable to at least most open democracies, although Baumgartner and Jones have not shown

much interest in or encouraged studies of policymaking outside America. A few efforts have been carried out however, such as Dudley and Richardson (1996), John and Margetts (2003) and Mortensen (2005). In the United States, however, they have conducted or solicited about 20 case studies (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; 2002; Jones and Baumgartner 2005) and promoted follow-ups by making their data bank available on the Internet. It has been demonstrated in the case studies that PE has advantages compared to theories that rely on incrementalism, such as the ease with which PE can include deviant cases (extreme values) in the longitudinal analysis. It encourages us to think about where current policy equilibrium comes from and therefore provides an evolutionary explanation for policy developments.

In assessing PE, True, Jones and Baumgartner (1999: 111-112) only pay attention to the drawbacks that their reportedly historically accurate stories imply: an inability to predict. In any given policy sector at any given time, there are a number of potential punctuations brewing, but PE cannot say which ones will come to fruition and when. This is however not necessarily a scientific problem.

In PE, there is nothing between equilibrium and punctuation. A focusing event leads to either a major change or stasis. PE does not account for minor changes, i.e. the theoretical framework is the exact opposite of (or perfectly complementary to) incrementalism. This has to do with the PE notion of policy monopolies and how they emerge and eventually decay. However, by focusing on changes of images and venues, PE does not examine how interests organize themselves, but instead focuses on the consequences of such organization (Schlager 1999: 245). PE therefore directs us to observe only when such consequences are manifest, i.e. major change or no change.

Closer attention on how interests organize themselves would seem to require a shift in focus from the public agenda to the meso and micro levels of policymaking, which is the direction that PE appears to embark. In the latest PE volume (Jones and Baumgartner 2005), the emphasis has clearly changed in favor of decision-making on an organizational (including government) level. The bottom-up approach has therefore lost leverage within PE. As a consequence, the policy image does not necessarily reflect the public understanding of a certain problem, but rather elite understanding of that problem.

6.5 Concealed similarities and apparent differences

In Beckett's *Play*, three diseased individuals engage in dialogue with only their heads protruding from their urns. The *crime passionnel* retold by them only at a closer hearing crystallizes as three independent monologues, all however relating to the same affaire. With MS, ACF and PE the opposite is discernible; only on closer examination do the seemingly independent monologues turn out to be something of a dialogue. Their illusion is indeed facilitated by sparse cross-referencing. In this section we will compare the frameworks' bearing concepts in order to see in which ways and to what extent they are overlapping, complementary or opposing. The effort is meant to at least conceptually simplify the reality that the three theoretical frameworks individually aim at simplifying.

The criteria for this comparison are 1) a model of the individual, and 2) collective action formation and institutional settings. These points of comparison capture the basic elements of the policy process. The criteria represent the key mechanisms promoting or inhibiting policy change. It should however be clear that none of the three theories presume a clear-cut causal chain reaction from crisis to policy change. This scheme of comparison largely follows the suggestion and example of Schlager (1999).²⁸

6.5.1 Individuals: Ideas, beliefs and preferences

The three theories rely on bounded rationality for understanding how individuals experience and act upon new information and situations. Individuals are assumed to be goal-oriented and to act in ways that they believe are good for them. However, reality is complex and ambiguous. The three theories' notions of the boundedly rational individual take that complex and ambiguous policymaking context into account when trying to understand individual choice. "Choice becomes less an exercise in solving problems and more an attempt to make sense of a partially comprehensible world" (Zahariadis 1999: 75). A susceptibility to contextual matters makes them acknowledge the boundaries of rationality.

Edella Schlager (1999: 241-244) points out that upon closer inspection the theories work with somewhat different perspectives on the individual: in MS the individual is a "satisficer", in ACF a "belief-er" and in PE a "selective attender". In MS theory, bounded rationality means that the logic of rationality has grown into a logic of time. The streams metaphor reflects a time-dependent

28 Besides these points of comparison, Schlager (1999) also includes "boundaries and scope of inquiry" and "policy change". These will here be treated separately in section 6.7.1.

flow of problems, solutions and contextual prerequisites to which policy makers need to abide.

The multiple-streams perspective translates into a process in which individuals are viewed as less capable of choosing the issues they would like to solve and more concerned about addressing the multitude of problems that are thrust upon them, largely by factors beyond their control (Zahariadis 1999: 75).

In an environment marked by constant time constraints in combination with a multitude of solutions, the best solution (allowed by the politics stream) is likely to remain in the primeval soup of ideas. The decision maker, or policy maker is thereby left to be a *satisficer* (Schlager 1999: 244).

ACF explores the cognitive world and takes a foothold in the individual's belief systems. Belief systems determine individual choices and action and form the basis for coalition creation. When confronted with new information or a new situation, individuals interpret that stimulus with their belief system as a benchmark. Depending on the type of belief system affected (deep core, policy core or secondary aspects), the individual's tendency to either refute or be persuaded is more or less likely. Information is essentially used to persuade others of the correctness of their own belief.

In PE, attributes of the situation rather than the belief system characterize the boundaries of individual choice. Since the individual is limited when processing large amounts of information, she can only pay attention to selective parts of the complex reality. Preferences change grudgingly, but the individual can change course drastically over time. Not because preferences have shifted, but because another side of the problem has been presented to her. For the selective attender, the decision-making setting is therefore crucial, since its characteristics affect what angle of a given problem will have salience.

MS, ACF and PE give different perspectives on individual choice. The question is to what extent the perspectives are mutually complementary or competing with each other. The MS satisficer has traits in common with the PE selective attender in that the situation, rather than the conviction of the individual, determines choice. However, all three agree that ideas, preferences and beliefs are robust and hard to change. The ACF belief-er is just a little less easily influenced by situational information overload or situational impression management. On the other hand, the choices that the satisficer and the selective attender actually make are arguably not essentially different from their ideas and preferences. The PE selective attender can make different choices at different times, depending on the decisional situation, but most likely not choices that run counter to the individual's policy core beliefs. PE does not elaborate different degrees of beliefs and preferences. If it did, it could not be excluded that the selective attender is flexible about different secondary aspects within

the parameters of a given policy core realm. Such an interpretation at least does not shake PE to its foundations. Hence, the different concepts of the boundedly rational individual are largely overlapping and complementary.

6.5.2 Collective action formation and institutional settings

Based on models of the individual, the three theories provide different accounts on how individuals come together and produce policy change or stability. The context that sets the boundaries of individual rationality to some extent consists of institutional settings, which are to various degrees venues for collective action formation.

MS pays scant attention to collective action as a means for individuals to achieve policy stability or change. Focus is rather directed towards influential entrepreneurs. Movements in the politics stream form the preconditions and the contextual basis for collective action. “Policy entrepreneurs do not control events or structures, but they can anticipate them and bend them to their purposes to some degree” (Kingdon [1995] 2003: 225). Entrepreneurs therefore must be sensitive to national moods or other broadly supported currents that work in favor of their ends. With this perspective, institutional settings play only an indirect role. In MS reasoning, the institutional position of policy entrepreneurs affects their ability to influence the policymaking process. Different venues contain different accession points and thereby different prerequisites for entrepreneurs to combine streams.

Collective action is of paramount importance to ACF. The question of how coalitions actually take shape and are kept together has become a key concern for ACF scholars. The existence of advocacy coalitions has never been taken for granted, but has always been a matter for empirical scrutiny. Coalition participation is empirically verified by tangible manifestations of shared belief systems. It is however not always clear how tightly or loosely the coalitions are tied together. Implicitly, institutional arrangements provide relatively fixed platforms for beliefs and are for that reason important coalition pillars. Institutional settings therefore also appear in ACF as more or less susceptible venues for a certain coalition’s intentions.

Like in MS, policy entrepreneurs play a crucial role in PE. Unlike MS, PE counts on the entrepreneur as not only a spearhead of policy change, but also a gatekeeper against change. However, PE pays attention to collective action, where entrepreneurs act in groups, but where interest groups and more broad-based public mobilizations also fight for their cause. Institutional rigidity creates hindrances that entrepreneurs and interest groups need to break through to achieve change. But once underway, unclear jurisdictional boundaries between institutional arrangements may allow players from various settings to participate in

the policymaking process. In fact, drawing previously disinterested actors into an issue is a strategy that policy entrepreneurs use to break institutional dead-lock and achieve collective action.

The three theories focus on different dynamics in accounting for collective action and how institutional settings affect such processes. MS and PE share the notion of clever entrepreneurship as the driver of collective action. They also have a common view on macro societal movements, as well as events and structures as contextual preconditions for entrepreneurial maneuvering. ACF largely ignores the impact of entrepreneurs as motors for collective action, just as MS for the most part ignores institutional arrangements and collective action when accounting for policy change. ACF and PE, on the other hand, share an analysis of institutional settings as being to various degrees susceptible to influences from policy challengers. Through venue shopping, coalitions or interest groups can attain collective action. MS, ACF and PE then have to some extent overlapping analyses of how individuals come together to produce (or to prevent) policy change. The MS lack of accounting for collective action and the ACF lack of accounting for entrepreneurial strategies are not at odds with each other. They rather shed complementary light on the process (Mintrom and Vergari 1996; Schlager 1999).

Table 1: MS, ACF and PE: Mechanisms in comparison

	Model of the individual	Collective action and institutional settings
Multiple Streams	Satisficer	Entrepreneur driven, where institutions provide more or less favorable accession points.
Advocacy Coalition Framework	Belief-er	Driven by coalitions' belief systems. Institutions are more or less susceptible to one coalition's beliefs.
Punctuated Equilibrium	Selective attender	Driven by entrepreneurs, interest groups and public opinion. Institutions form barriers for collective action in negative feedback and facilitators in positive feedback.
Comparative Status	MS and PE overlap. ACF complements MS and PE.	MS complements ACF on collective action, where PE overlaps at both ends. MS, ACF and PE largely overlap on assumptions about institutional settings.

6.6 Two perspectives on crisis and policy change

In the previous section, the case was made that the different theories are not fundamentally at odds with each other in any significant aspect with regard to mechanisms purporting to policy stability or change. MS, ACF and PE are

either overlapping or complementary. The exercise was carried out in order to narrow the scope of concepts used for the analysis. Of particular interest are the mechanisms that complement each other. They generate somewhat different propositions on the role of crisis as policy change agent. This is because they involve different assumptions of the boundedly rational individual and of how collective action comes about. However, the tendency of individuals to interpret novel information and situations with the help of cognitive biases lies at the heart of bounded rationality and is thus a common denominator for all three theoretical frameworks. The main difference lies rather in the way these translate into collective action formation: the processes by which individual ambitions, policy goals, solutions, etc. reach wider constituencies or fail to do so. By and large, the different propositions diverge into an ACF perspective (centered around belief systems and coalition structures) and a MS/PE perspective (centered around attention spans and entrepreneurial strategies).

6.6.1 Assumptions of the belief-based perspective

Crises of the type studied previously in this thesis do not, from the point of view of the individual belief-er, typically challenge ingrained conceptions. Policy core beliefs remain stable, even when confronted with new and strange situations. The belief structures typically remain stable over long periods of time and crises are likely to be interpreted as to fit with a given belief structure. Policy core beliefs provide an explanatory dimension to the reason behind the scope of potential solutions. For the individual policy maker, policy core beliefs reduce uncertainty over which policy domain a problem belongs to.

An advocacy coalition shares the same belief structure in a given policy issue and is composed of policy makers such as politicians, bureaucrats, public opinion makers, pressure groups, etc. An advocacy coalition cannot be meaningfully separated from its policy core beliefs. The coalition holding legislative power over a policy issue by inference is a majority coalition. The explanation for the possible lack of major policy change after crises resides in the fact that policy core beliefs remain stable for long periods, and that the crisis occurred when the policy core belief of the majority coalition was well established, but not yet outdated.

Policy change, according to the collective action formation processes suggested by the belief-based perspective, comes in the form of policy-oriented learning, or alternatively through coalition turnover. A majority coalition can learn from a minority coalition, if the level of conflict between them is not too high, but still exists. A sufficiently important forum for arbitration that mediates between the conflicting coalitions increases the likelihood of policy-oriented learning taking place. Learning supposedly comes about easier if the

subject matter is a secondary aspect for the learning coalition and a policy core belief for the opposing coalition. Repeated occurrence of a new phenomenon can challenge the belief system of a majority coalition and hence produce policy-oriented learning without conflict.

But it is still a matter for a coalition as a whole to learn, which requires a collective transformation of belief systems within the learning coalition. The fact that policy entrepreneurs are absent in ACF and that coalitions are viewed as rather flat is due to the primacy of beliefs. The weight of a given coalition depends on the number of belief-ers, not on its activities.

6.6.2 Assumptions of the attention-based perspective

Both the multiple streams and the punctuated equilibrium theories are attention-based. They certainly admit that beliefs, or preferences, remain stable over long periods of time, or change only grudgingly. They however acknowledge that novel and unfamiliar situations hold the potential for radical policy change, depending on how these are framed and understood. Within a given policy core belief there is enough space to change policies quite drastically. There is therefore reason for policy entrepreneurs to capitalize on events. Entrepreneurs are hence of primary importance to PE and MS. A skilful policy entrepreneur can bend the understanding of a situation to fit a preferred solution. Especially the punctuated equilibrium theory focuses on to the hitherto disinterested, which implies that the potential constituency is not entirely exhausted for a given issue at any given time. In accordance with the attention-based perspective, the policy entrepreneur can initiate positive or negative feedback processes by including or excluding the previously disinterested.

The critical challenges discussed in part one are indeed occasions for policy entrepreneurs to capitalize on. The presumed explanation for policy change and stability according to the attention-based perspective is found in the ways attention spans created by crises are managed.

6.7 Process tracing: A method applicable to analyzing patterns of policy change

Having derived two perspectives on policy change, it is now time to discuss how these will help explain the empirical puzzles of part one. In so doing, we will return to the three theoretical frameworks to argue that process tracing is a promising method for that purpose. 6.7.1 argues that MS, ACF and PE have difficulties in meeting proper theory criteria (as put forward in chapter one). In 6.7.2, we relate the process tracing method to the methods normally used by

MS, ACF and PE scholars. In 6.7.3 we will take up the two perspectives again and clarify what theory-driven questions the analysis of the subsequent chapters will probe.

6.7.1 Crisis, policy change and the boundary and scope of inquiry

In the beginning of this chapter it was said that MS, ACF and PE hold the potential for explaining policy stability and change because they consolidate mixes of approaches. That may however be seen as a euphemism for not ascribing the independent or dependent variables their appropriate values. And there is something to that notion. Below, the theories will be deconstructed with the purpose of demonstrating the difficulties they have in designating what is supposed to be explained (policy change) and what the explaining factors aim for (boundary and scope of inquiry). It will be argued that the way part one was structured, i.e. putting the crisis upfront and following the subsequent policy process, actually facilitates focusing the analysis. It certainly facilitates the use of the process tracing method.

The abundance of independent variables, which mirror the complex world that MS, ACF and PE purport to explain, are not necessarily allowed to vary in relation to competing explanatory variables. This makes it hard to assess their individual explanatory leverage. It is also not clear just which of the dependent variables the independent variables aim at explaining. Only at a meta-level is policy change actually the explanandum of their work.

MS seeks to explain alternative specification and agenda setting, which are both assumed to be conducive to policy change (and in that respect independent variables). The many independent variables (e.g. political decision makers inside and outside of governments, interest groups, media, crises, entrepreneurs etc.) are for the most part consolidated into the three streams of policy, politics and problems. The streams bear the weight of explaining why a certain issue is of interest to the government. However, the process of pushing and pulling that characterizes the actual specification of policy alternatives seems to be equal to the policy stream, which turns that explanatory variable into a dependent variable (Schlager 1999: 254).

A closer look at ACF reveals that the dependent variables of most concern are the emergence of policy advocacy coalitions and the development of belief systems (learning) that in turn are conducive to policy change. The variables explaining these phenomena have been different measures of coordination, institutional properties of policy actors, etc. (Ibid.). The two “hypotheses concerning policy change” (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999: 124) largely depict those two dependent variables, without designating their causal relationship in terms of policy stability and change. To state that the policy core attributes

of a governmental program in a specific jurisdiction is unlikely to change in the absence of significant perturbations external to the subsystem, does not, as Mintrom and Vergari (1996) point out, say which external perturbations do and which do not lead to change. The hypotheses do not assume *why*. These dependent variables could therefore as well be regarded as independent variables, competing for explanatory power (of policy change) with for instance entrepreneurial strategies.

PE, like MS, tries to explain agenda setting.²⁹ The explanatory variables are by and large grouped into policy images (mass mobilization, media images, etc.) and policy venues (institutional arrangements, interest group activities, etc.). However, there are more variables involved that in turn explain and are explained. The process typically looks like this: An image projection explains processes of positive and negative feedback. These feedback processes bear the burden of explaining the emergence of policy monopolies and their breakdown. The emergence and decay of policy monopolies explicate the agenda setting. However, agenda setting at time $t-1$ likely determines the policy venue, and not least the policy image, at time t . Among these circular links, the one between image projection and feedback processes is the only link that has been attached to a causal mechanism, namely the assumption of the individual as a boundedly rational selective attender.

Dividing history on crisis events may not be an accurate way of determining the start and end points of policy processes, but the procedure certainly has one advantage: the risk of mixing independent and dependent variables due to undefined time frames is reduced. There may be other ways of organizing time, such as by changes in governments, but given the purpose of this study and not least the importance that the three theories accord crises, this approach holds more promise in tracing processes from impetuses to policymaking effects. The basis of this effort was formed in part one, where the policymaking processes were described.

As discussed in chapter one, the process tracing strategy seeks to find reasons for different lines of action by way of “[identifying] the actors, the decision points they faced, the choices they made, the paths taken and shunned, and the manner in which their choices generated events and outcomes” (Bates et al. 1998: 13-14). How process tracing can be methodologically useful for the theoretical bodies of knowledge will be discussed below.

29 Jones and Baumgartner’s (2005) most recent work does focus on policy decision-making.

6.7.2 MS, ACF, PE: Case studies and process tracing

The body of theoretical knowledge that MS, ACF and PE represent is essentially case study driven. Kingdon ([1995] 2003: 231) pursued “case studies of policy initiation and noninitiation” when developing MS. In Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s studies of elite beliefs over time, they examined two cases: “The debate over development of the Lake Tahoe region and the debate over the breath and speed of oil and gas leasing on the U.S. outer continental shelf” (1993: 237). The ACF has since been further developed by additional case studies – 34 up until 1998 and still counting (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999: 126; see also Nohrstedt 2005 and Nohrstedt forthcoming). The Policy Agendas Project that has further developed PE (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; 2002; Jones and Baumgartner 2005) aims at producing “high-quality datasets that are capable of tracking policy change in the United States since the Second World War within precise policy content categories” (Jones and Baumgartner 2005: 291). These policy content categories have over the years been investigated through a vast number of studies that try to synthesize the merits of “cross-sectional studies of several issues at one point in time, and longitudinal case studies of single issues” (Baumgartner and Jones 1993: 40).

The reference to ‘case studies’ may however have different connotations. It can refer to the study of a case, where the case is defined as “an instance of a class of events” (George and Bennett 2004: 17). The ‘class of events’ are for MS, ACF and PE policy change and policy stability, and it is in that sense of the term that they study cases. But ‘case studies’ can also refer to a set of methods (of which process tracing is one) that “include both within-case analysis of single cases and comparisons of a small number of cases” (Ibid.: 18). Methodologically, case studies are different from statistical methods and formal modelling, even though an historical case can very well be analyzed in numerical terms. PE studies, for instance, are typically constructed as statistical analyses, whereas ACF normally are within-case analyses, and MS based its original conclusions on the comparison of four cases (and more observations). But the preferred methodological approach need not have wider implications in terms of epistemological foundation.

Epistemologically, all three approaches [case studies, statistical methods and formal modelling] attempt to develop logically consistent models or theories, they derive observable implications from these theories, they test these implications against empirical observations or measurements, and they use the results of these tests to make inferences on how best to modify the theories tested (George and Bennett 2004: 6).

The ongoing and at this point long-lasting projects that in particular ACF and PE have become indicate that empirical observations still trigger refinement

of theoretical concepts and arguments. They share the same epistemology, for which reason the methodological approach is a subordinate issue.

The process tracing method is by no means at odds with the epistemological commitment of MS, ACF and PE. It is within-case oriented and as such designed to unveil mechanisms that “trace the links between possible causes and observed outcomes” (Ibid.). None of the three theories refer to the process tracing method, but they are not shoehorned in it by force. After all, they work with models of the individual and they designate collective action accordingly, as discussed above. The two perspectives developed in this chapter can hence be expected to offer the micro foundations for the relationship between the crises and the patterns of policy change portrayed in part one.

6.7.3 Processes to trace

So far, this chapter has in some detail examined three theoretical frameworks in a search for guidance into the ‘black box’ of policymaking, and more precisely into the role of crisis experience for policy developments. Since the three frameworks seemed to share many assumptions, they were collapsed into two perspectives, a belief-based and an attention-based. These perspectives are furthermore assumed to be complementary, that is, they are not here understood to provide competing explanations. Together they are expected to explain the outcomes of Swedish counter-terrorism policymaking at a finer level of detail than what was presented in part one. Hopefully, they reveal causal mechanisms between crises and policy change. In order to probe this, the process tracing method is arguably more productive compared to the methods previously deployed by ACF, MS and PE scholars.

Each of the three analytical chapters that follow below will treat a crisis-related policy process: the period of policy change that followed the Bulltofta skyjacking, the period of policy stability after the West German embassy drama, and the period of policy change after the Palme murder. Each chapter will be divided into a belief-based and an attention-based part.

The parts of the analytical survey that adopt the belief-based perspective will as far as possible uncover belief-based coalition structures and how these endured the crisis in question. The spotlight will be directed at dominating policy core beliefs, but also at challenging core beliefs. It is of importance to detect the main actors of advocacy coalitions.

Within and between coalitions, interaction patterns are likely to unveil preconditions for coalition cohesion and requirements for policy-oriented learning. Evidence of such kind will be looked for. In that respect it is also important to see to what extent policy core beliefs and secondary aspects are related to crisis experience, that is, if crises affect belief systems. In order to discover precondi-

tions for policy-oriented learning, the level and nature of conflict between rival coalitions needs to be defined. What kind of evidence is used in the conflict, and is it convincing? Is there a prestigious enough arbitrary forum in place for coalitions to participate and reach agreement?

How is the existence of an advocacy coalition established? The original ACF was developed to explain policymaking in America, even if Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith argue that the framework is applicable to “all policy areas in at least modern industrial polyarchies” (1993: 225). Others have raised the objection that ACF is less applicable to policy styles that do not correspond with American pluralism (John 1998; Parsons 1995). In fact, the Swedish policy style of ‘corporatism’ and ‘consensualism’ is not likely to produce the type of advocacy coalitions suggested by ACF (Nohrstedt forthcoming). Moreover, the advocacy coalition framework is “particularly applicable to cases involving substantial political conflict and high technological complexity” (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999: 125). Counter-terrorism policymaking is fundamentally non-technological in nature, even if it at times has produced substantial political conflict. In other words, Swedish counter-terrorism policymaking is not benign territory for establishing policy advocacy coalitions. With these caveats in mind, the following chapters will be a difficult test to the applicability of ACF assumptions.

In line with the attention-based perspective, it is the suggestive nature of events that is interesting to capture empirically. This entails two analytical challenges. First, policy entrepreneurs need to be captured in action. Attention must be given to entrepreneurial efforts to capitalize on the event, but not only the case in point. Exactly which events are used for meaning making is to be empirically ascertained. Second, processes of positive and negative feedback need to be traced. It is then a question of identifying how and to what extent previously disinterested actors became engaged in policymaking.

The presence or absence of policy entrepreneurs needs to be established in the first place. A policy entrepreneur however need not be a single individual, but can also be a collective in the form of for instance a pressure group. The identity of the policy entrepreneur is likely to affect the prospect of success. What position or clout does the policy entrepreneur have? And what skills does he, she or it bring to the table? Are outcomes, the patterns of policy change, traceable to positive or negative feedback processes set in motion by the policy entrepreneur?

The questions above reflect assumptions of the two perspectives, which were in turn built from complementary assumptions. But of course issues that were found to be overlapping, such as the role of institutions, should also be covered.

Chapter 7 Explaining the 1973 policy innovation

In part one we learned that the 1973 inception of the Terrorist Act came about as a direct consequence of the 1972 Bulltofta skyjacking drama. In this chapter, we will analyze this period, taking stock from the politics of counter-subversion, which prior to terrorism dominated the domestic security agenda in Sweden. From part one, we impart the empirical puzzle: why did the Bulltofta skyjacking provoke an exceedingly fast policy process, primarily affecting the legal ability to extradite foreigners considered a potential security risk, or refuse them entry in the first place?

7.1 Belief-based perspective and the 1973 policy innovation

7.1.1 Before terrorism: Policy core beliefs remain through shattered coalition structures

Up until the mid 1960s, the issue of monitoring citizens was rather uncontroversial. The leading government circles, including Prime Minister Tage Erlander and Justice Minister Herman Kling as well as Säpo chief P.G. Vinge and the first director general of the Swedish National Police Carl Persson, all belonged to a generation for which the Soviet and communist threat was real. For the Cabinet, the heritage from the 1950s was a struggle with the non-socialist parties on being the most persistent anticommunist advocates. Oftentimes, leading Social Democrats insisted on being the real champions of the struggle against communism (SOU 2002:87 p. 152–153).

The stage of *détente* that marked the Cold War decade after the 1962 Cuban missile crises paved the way for radicalism internationally. Communism was not associated with evil as it had been in the 1950s, and for a large part of the growing student population, communism stood out as an attractive alternative to liberal capitalism. In Sweden, like in many other countries, the radical movement was strongly related to anti-imperialism. The U.S. involvement in Vietnam formed a point of departure for this development (Ibid.: 158-161).

Justice Minister Kling supported the police, which were often a target of radical frustration. Both Carl Persson (1990) and Säpo chief Vinge (1988) testify in their memoirs to their good rapport with Kling. Vinge (1988: 75) gives an example that illustrates both the radicals' aversion to Säpo and Kling's devotion to the staff under his jurisdiction:

One who never ducked was Justice Minister Herman Kling. At a meeting with the Stockholm branch of the Social Democratic party, around 1968, a [person] asked the rhetorical question:
– Maybe someone in this hall is from Säpo?

Herman Kling entered the rostrum, pointed demonstratively at himself and said:
– Yes, here is one.

The police, including Säpo, were backed by the Social Democratic Cabinet, especially its justice minister. Leading circles within the police and Cabinet shared the same view on communism and the Soviet Union, which also meant a green light on registering potential subversive elements in Swedish society. Prime Minister Erlander is supposed to have said in 1965 that Säpo's "Red Scare" was a bit exaggerated, and that for him the communist threat was not a priority (SOU 2002:87 p. 567). But in his 1965 speech to students at the University of Lund, he said that "it is better to register ten people too many than one too few" (Hederberg 2003).

The Swedish Communist party transformed itself in the second half of the 1960s. From 1964 under new party leader Hermansson, formal ties with Moscow were cut. At the 1967 party congress, the Communists established that the only way of reaching their political ends was through parliamentary and democratic means (SOU 2002:87 p. 178). Although some communist factions remained faithful to the revolutionary ideal, the official break with that commitment by the largest communist party – the only one represented in Parliament – meant rapprochement with the Social Democrats.

However, in terms of electoral support, the relative strength of the socialist and communist parties rather changed to the benefit of the former. The Social Democratic party, which had received around 46–47 % of the vote in post-World War II parliamentary elections, received 50,1 % in 1968. At that

election, the Communist party, which during the same period had been stable around 5 %, received only 3 % electoral support. This result is arguably attributable to the Warsaw Pact's invasion of Czechoslovakia earlier that year (Ibid.). The Social Democrats governed Sweden uninterruptedly from 1932 to 1976, but only for two years – between 1968 and 1970 – did they have a majority government. The rest of the time the Social Democrats reigned with the support of the Communist party, which was disinclined to overthrow a socialist Cabinet (Halvarson et al. 1999).³⁰ The communists did not however hold any ministerial posts.

By the late 1960s, SÄpo had become skeptical of the Communist party's break with Moscow and their revolutionary commitment. The conversion was seen as a tactical maneuver to improve their chances for future opportunities in pursuing subversive warfare (SOU 2002:87 p. 178).

The large-scale demonstrations that emerged in the years around 1968 were primarily a problem for the local police in charge of law and order. But SÄpo also kept an eye on them. Carl Persson made a comment in a 1968 memo to the chancellery that reveals his understanding of the problem (SOU 2002:87 p. 186):

The reason for the leadership of the demonstrations to provoke violence from the police is that the organizations [...] that back them up are disposed to overthrow the established society with violent means. To reach these goals, according to the theories of these organizations, “a revolutionary situation” needs to be created. In the long run, they work to undermine the confidence in the authorities in general and in the police in particular.

The police, the Cabinet and the military intelligence establishment shared a belief that political extremists, in particular to the left of the parliamentary Communist party, constituted a threat to democratic society. Until 1968, this posture was rather open and unproblematic (even though the existence of IB – the defense intelligence Information Bureau – was highly classified). However, from the mid-1960 this world-view was challenged. Competing ideas regarding the threat from communism gained momentum, which were blended with aversion to the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Nothing indicates that the Cabinet, SÄpo or military intelligence abandoned the belief that some communist factions were threatening democratic society and that their members and sympathizers should therefore be monitored. Registration continued more or less unabated.

In the late summer of 1969, rumors reached Erlander that the SÄpo chief Vinge considered Palme a security risk (SOU 2002:87 p. 568). Vinge, as well

³⁰ For exact figures on each election, see www.val.se.

as Carl Persson, vehemently denied these rumors (Vinge 1988; Persson 1990). Regardless of their veracity, they seem to have had a negative impact on the Cabinet's confidence in Säpo, if only because Palme became prime minister later that year.

In October 1969 the Social Democratic party elected Palme, who had been Prime Minister Erlander's protégé for many years, as their new chairman. Palme consequently became prime minister in November the same year. The Cabinet was restructured, with Lennart Geijer taking over for Herman Kling as justice minister. As an advisor in legal issues, Carl Lidbom was appointed cabinet minister in the chancellery and Ingvar Carlsson – also one of 'Erlander's boys' – became the new education minister. The Cabinet restructuring meant a rapprochement between the Social Democrats and the radical movement.

Palme and the pre – and post-1969 Cabinets were supportive of the registration activities of IB, the head of which, Birger Elmér, was a friend of Palme since they had worked together in the defense staff's foreign department in the 1950s. Elmér was well connected with the top of the Social Democratic party. With their consent, Social Democratic union representatives reported to IB on communist activities at their work places. The Social Democratic leadership suspected that the creation of socialist people's parties in Norway and Denmark had been instigated by Moscow in order to shatter the Social Democratic parties there. They hence had an interest in seeing that the same thing did not happen in Sweden, and thereby an incentive to maintain the parallel intelligence infrastructure (SOU 2002:87 pp. 590–600).

The new Cabinet, with Prime Minister Palme and Justice Minister Geijer, had a much less confiding relationship with the police, and in particular Säpo (Ibid.: 560 ff.). The new justice minister's worldview differed radically with Carl Persson's, and it did not take long before the two had severe cooperation problems.

The cleavage between the Cabinet and Säpo was primarily rooted in a lack of confidence in the latter's head, which was until 1970 P.G. Vinge. According to Cabinet Minister Carl Lidbom, Vinge was clearly unsuitable for the post, since he was 'dark blue'. He could not be trusted to serve a Social Democratic government (Lidbom 2004), which resulted in his demise. His successor Hans Holmér had more suitable political opinions, but soon became marginalized within Säpo on sensitive issues. He is conspicuously absent from all crisis situations during his tenure. Instead it was Director General Carl Persson of the National Police Board in tandem with Säpo Deputy Director Olof Frånstedt who ran the show (Falkenstam 1983; SOU 2002:87 p. 568). But the lack of confidence was mutual. Frånstedt did not have much trust in the Cabinet's commitment to its security service. He was irritated that the Cabinet regularly

ridiculed their assessments. In fact, he was incredulous of them taking anything that was not politically correct seriously (Frånstedt 2003).

Carl Persson handpicked Holmér from his own staff because of his administrative skills (Persson 1990: 201). Holmér had good connections with the Cabinet and Geijer soon allied with him. It did however not take long before the relationship of trust between Holmér and Persson came to an end. According to Persson (1990: 202), Holmér had drawn up far-reaching plans on how to reorganize Säpo, according to which all sensitive information and decisions should run through him. Persson, in his capacity as director general, rejected these plans when Holmér presented them to him. From then on, their relationship deteriorated rapidly. A situation arose where Holmér allied himself with Justice Minister Geijer, but where Carl Persson sidestepped the Säpo head on sensitive security issues and instead confided in deputy director Frånstedt. For governmental communications, Persson turned to other ministers, preferably Palme over Geijer, since they were not on speaking terms (Frånstedt 2003; Falkenstam 1983: 16). Persson (1990: 203-204) speculates that Holmér wanted to appeal to the young generation, for which reason he was keen on seeking media attention for himself and projecting an outwardly transparent image of Säpo.

Despite the cooperation problems between Persson and Holmér, they shared a belief that political extremists should be registered. As head of Säpo, Holmér initiated a redrafting of the secret instructions (HT 15), which in 1971 became HT 16, with more far-reaching mandates to register communists on the basis of their opinion (SOU 2002:87 pp. 309–310). Publicly, however, Holmér sided with Geijer and flirted with the media.

In sum, the new Cabinet essentially retained the policy core belief of their predecessors: that a strict watch needed to be kept over subversive elements in Swedish society. Despite the leadership reshuffle, Säpo likewise continued to adhere to this worldview, as did the military intelligence apparatus. The change from Vinge to Holmér as head of Säpo can to some extent be seen as an attempt to keep the advocacy coalition intact. But the main difference discernible in the period just before terrorism became a salient policy problem is the dissolution of the advocacy coalition in terms of interaction and mutual trust between its main players. It is also important to see that for the Cabinet, openly bestowing authorities with coercive powers was perhaps in line with policy core beliefs, but due to the problematic relation with the National Police Board and also with regard to the national mood, such measures were arguably not in their interest.

7.1.2 Terrorism legislation: Translation from counter-subversion

When Prime Minister Palme responded to questions in Parliament only days after the killing of the Yugoslavian ambassador, he maintained that preventing all possible political crimes before they happened was without any prospect of success. The proposed punishments regarding unlawful possession of weapons and explosives were already a difficult step to take: the much-cherished open society was thereby being eroded (Protocol 1971:69 § 8).

But the killing of Ambassador Rolovic made the problem concrete, and also entailed new and unfamiliar dimensions. In a governmental meeting after the murder, Olof Palme asked an open question to his cabinet: "What is this the beginning of? Has Sweden become an arena for international terrorism?" Finance Minister Gunnar Sträng muted the discussion before it started: "We brought too much shit into this country" (Peterson 2002: 169).

In February 1972 Palme learned from his undersecretary Thage G. Peterson that Yugoslavian authorities were concerned over the amount of forces subversive to the Yugoslavian state residing in Sweden. Palme became upset and said:

Sweden is not a sanctuary for terrorists. We do not give shelter to gangsters [...] we shall chase gangsters and terrorists out of the country. They will not have a sanctuary in Sweden (Ibid.: 170–171).

This may be seen as an indication that the Social Democratic Cabinet started to reappraise the open society in conjunction with the emergence of Croatian terrorism. Swedish society was not prepared for the new problem that terrorism implied. The *Bulltofta* drama made this insight excruciatingly vivid, after which Palme maintained:

The democracy needs a capacity to defend itself. Those who hijack planes shall be arrested and punished. Those who in organized forms try to carry on political terror must be tracked down and prevented from their intents (Peterson 2002: 172).

But the emergence of Croatian terrorism also challenged partly different interests of the Social Democratic Cabinet. Yugoslavians represented one of the larger immigrants groups, and in the late 1960s Swedish industry carried out recruitment campaigns in Yugoslavia to fill the need for manpower (Leijon 1991: 135). It was important to maintain good relations with the Tito regime, and its discontent with the activities of Croatians scattered abroad could not be ignored.

A working group at the chancellery had been occupied with terrorism-related policy problems since the 1971 murder of the Yugoslavian ambassador. After the *Bulltofta* skyjacking, the Cabinet turned the working group into a commission with parliamentary representatives including all parties except the

Communists. The general director of the National Police Board and a representative from Säpo, together with representatives from the justice ministry, served as experts to the commission. The government appointed Cabinet Minister Carl Lidbom as chairman. The leaders of the non-socialist parties wholeheartedly supported the idea of the commission's creation (Peterson 2002: 172).

The commission was mandated to find solutions to the terrorism problem, and was hence a sufficiently important arbitrary forum for brokering policy. The creation of a Terrorist Law was far from uncontroversial. According to the commission's instructions, "[t]he point of departure for the work of the commission should be that all suggestions that can minimize the risk of political outrage be tested" (Ds Ju 1972:35 p. 7). But during the little more than two months that it worked, it is unlikely that alternatives to the suggested Terrorist Act were ever on the table. It seems as if the commission inherited the Cabinet's belief on the need to monitor certain foreigners.

When the commission's report became a governmental proposition, the Conservative party supported the Social Democratic Cabinet. Conservative MP Kristensson, who was the head of the Parliament Justice Committee and a member of the Terrorism Commission, said in a parliamentary debate on the proposed legislation:

Mr. Speaker, I first want to say that when we [in the commission] started to discuss legislation of this content, I also felt certain skepticism, because of the unusual point of departure of the legislation. But as we twisted and turned the arguments, I became convinced that this is the right way to go (Protocol 1973:64 § 6).

However, the proposed Terrorist Act met criticism from Liberal and Center party MPs. Some Liberal MPs attacked the abandonment of the principle of individual responsibility. To them, the notion of 'guilt by association' was something associated with non-democratic polities. Furthermore, the law was discretionary since it only applied to foreigners. The legal rights of the individual were threatened since the degree of suspicion under the law was very low. They also questioned the necessity of the new law and instead suggested amendments to the already existing Alien's Act, the Code of Judicial Procedure and the Penal Code (Motion 1973: 1605; 1606; 1608; Protocol 1973:64 § 6). Factions of the Center party backed these arguments (Motion 1973: 1607; 1609; Protocol 1973:64 § 6).

The Communist party's opposition to the Terrorist Act was more expected. Above all, they criticized the arbitrariness with which foreigners would be subject to its powers. No clear degree of suspicion would guide its application (Motion 1973:1604; Protocol 1973:64 § 6). The Social Democrats defended the need for a Terrorist Act, although some voiced warnings on the risk of infringing on the legal rights of the individual. The time limit would allow

revision in accordance with implementation problems, and the right to apply for asylum should prevail even for people falling under the law's jurisdiction (Motions 1973: 1602; 1603; Protocol 1973:64 § 6). The voting behavior in Parliament – which was strongly in favor of the legislation – does not capture the ambivalence that actually surrounded the Terrorist Act.

Arne Nygren, a Socialist member of the Parliament Justice Committee, shed light on the Social Democratic divide on the topic. He referred to a 'domestic' and an 'international' flank of the Socialist party. The Terrorist Act was a product of the international flank, which was heavily represented in the Cabinet (Nygren 2004). Their take on the law was that it was consistent with international standards, and were more concerned by terrorism as an inter- or transnational phenomenon. Sweden could not afford to lose face internationally for not taking measures against terrorists. To ratify international, UN sanctioned conventions was uncontroversial.

Within the Justice Ministry and the National Police Board, the Terrorist Act was not of great importance. Johan Munck, who started working for the Justice Ministry in 1974 as an expert adviser to the unit for order and security, claims that it had more of a symbolic value in demonstrating resolve. Already existing laws fulfilled more or less the same purposes.³¹ After the inception of the Terrorist Act in 1973, it was not a concern of great importance to the ministry (Munck 2004). Carl Persson mentions in his memoirs that it's very foundation – to prevent terrorists from entering or staying in the country – was severely undermined by poor border controls, i.e. the ease with which people could enter Sweden with fake passports, etc. (Persson 1990: 388-390). That is only to say that there was no pressure from the police and Justice Ministry to adopt the legislation.

From Säpo's point of view, there was a slow transition from counter-subversion to counter-terrorism in the early 1970s. The idea that the most fundamental threat to national security did not stem from Moscow-sponsored subversion was too drastic to some. Säpo was divided on the issue. However in 1972, Holmér declared that there were two reasons for continuing to attentively follow revolutionary communist factions: Säpo had to monitor if they militarized or cooperated with foreign powers, and they had to prevent the infiltration of the national defense establishment (SOU 2002:87 p. 198).

Terrorism as a threat to deal with became salient for Säpo only after the first serious attack: the murder of the Yugoslavian ambassador to Sweden in April 1971. Before that, chief inspector Axman's warnings fell on deaf ears as he ran

31 Sections of the Terrorist Act, such as so-called municipal arrest, were of course unique and without equivalence in other legislation. The most central parts of the Terrorist Act – having to do with deportation of or denying entry to foreigners – were covered in the existing Aliens Act.

a one-man show trying to figure out what exile Yugoslavians were up to. When it became clear that terrorism was also a Swedish policy problem, Säpo did not have any ready-made solutions. They had from the late 1960s paid attention to potential links between Swedish revolutionary groups and Palestinian terrorist organizations, such as PFLP and Black September. Swedish Marxist-Leninists supported the Palestinian cause and organized demonstrations and meetings, but links to terrorist organizations could not be established. Only in the 1970s, after Croatian separatists had perpetrated terrorist acts in Sweden, did Säpo begin accentuating the risk that individuals within the so-called “Palestine groups” could support Palestinian terrorists (SOU 2002:87 p. 197).

The issue of a Terrorist Act touched upon policy core beliefs on the propriety of infringing on the integrity of the individual based on a low level of evidence, for the sake of preventing acts of terrorism in Sweden. Many actors’ belief systems permitted such measures, whereas they were very alien to others. In that sense, two belief-based coalitions opposed each other on the policy issue. But in terms of cohesion, the advocacy coalitions were shattered. As mentioned in the previous subsection, the communication and information flows between the National Police Board and the Cabinet were problematic at best. If added to the divide within the parliamentary parties, the policy innovation stands out as quite remarkable.³²

Besides the problems between Säpo and the Cabinet, problems also arose in relations between the National Police Board and the local police. From the beginning, the National Police Board was meant to be a small administrative authority for the country’s 119 local police districts (Gullnäs 2004; Munck 2004). Under Carl Persson’s leadership much police power was centralized. The second half of the 1960s was a golden age for the police, in which most of their material needs were met (Falkenstam 1983). By the early 1970s, many thought that the development had gone too far. The parish constable walking a beat had been exchanged for a patrol car dispatched from the closest population center. The rapid re-equipping of Swedish police precincts led to the basis of police work becoming technological development instead of traditional law enforcement methods (Ibid.). The district police commissioners started to lament their lack of influence in the process, and received the backing of county governors on the issue. The National Police Board was often seen as a commanding rather than administrative body. Also, factions within government (the domestically oriented) and parliamentary circles started to feel anxious about the role of the National Police Board and of Carl Persson personally (Welander 2003; Munck 2004; Gullnäs 2004; Nygren 2004).

32 A division is evident within the Social Democratic, Liberal and Center parties. No Conservative MPs came out against the Terrorist Act, and no Communist MPs voiced support for the legislation. But that cannot be taken as a pretext for a complete unity within these parties.

The proud ambitions of the National Police Board – which in its first years had had overwhelming success – eventually ran into a twofold hangover. On the local level, the National Police Board was perceived as an imperialistic force intervening in everyday policing, for which reason local actors questioned the centralization of police authority. At the political level above the National Police Board, people began questioning whether the concentration of power collected around Carl Persson was what they had decided upon. Some suggestions for centralizing power, e.g. regarding airport policing, ran counter to the policy core beliefs of those skeptics. Of course, opinion was divided and there were those who thought that the centralization of power had put the police on the right path (Munck 2004). But at this time, most opposed setting up a special capacity within the police to fight terrorism. Carl Persson and a few police who had personal experience identified the need, but in most quarters the mere idea was alien and undesirable (Welander 2003; Munck 2004; Nygren 2004).

Did the emergence of terrorism in Sweden change beliefs? It seems as if Olof Palme and the circle around him were deeply troubled by the occurrence of terrorism. But in terms of counter-measures, the new phenomenon above all added a new dimension to an already existing belief structure: some foreigners should be added to the list of subversive elements that the state needed to keep in check. The counter-subversion belief scheme was in other words translated into the domain of counter-terrorism. And the 1972 Terrorism Commission turned out to be the venue where the translation reached an accord. If it had included actors who were principally hostile to the coercive measures implied by the law, it is unlikely that it would have resulted in a report in such a short period of time. There were probably more actors nursing policy core beliefs against the legislation compared to the coalition for which the Terrorist Act was a necessity based on policy core beliefs.

7.2 Attention-based perspective and the 1973 policy innovation

7.2.1 Monitoring issue between wind and water

During the second half of the 1960s, the theretofore-homogenous establishment's view on the threat of communism broke down. In 1964, the Communist party launched an attack on Säpo and the military security service. With reference to the Wennerström affair (the most large-scale case of espionage in Sweden, see chapter two), the drift of the critique was that these bodies were

directing their attention towards communists rather than those who had access to classified files (SOU 2002:87, p. 288).³³

When large-scale demonstrations became a recurrent feature of bigger cities, Communist MP's framed the confrontations between the police and protesters as part of Säpo's monitoring activities. After the 1966 demonstration against the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the fact that the police had filmed the protest was taken as a pretext for these monitoring activities. The Communists, who were rather marginalized in Parliament, managed to capitalize on the wave of radicalization by insinuating that Säpo monitored anyone who happened to express his or her opinion against the war in Vietnam (Protocol 13/12/1966). However, the general idea within Säpo was that these attempts to discredit the agency were remote-controlled from Moscow (SOU 2002:87 p. 289).

The issue of monitoring citizens became controversial in wider circles. The leading national daily – the Liberal-leaning *Dagens Nyheter* – began ridiculing Säpo's openly held view of communism being a threat. Liberal and Social Democratic debaters followed suit (Ibid.). A book that became influential at the time argued that innocent people were denied jobs because of the files that Säpo had on them (Rydenfelt and Larsson 1966). The Wennerström Committee dissociated itself from the growing criticism of Säpo. Neither did they find that Säpo could be blamed for the cases that Rydenfelt and Larsson (1966) had presented in their book (SOU 1968:4).

The wave of radicalization was at the same time relentless and global, and to some extent malleable with regard to specific national concerns. The communist parties that had not abandoned the idea of an armed revolution were certainly small and marginal, but they infiltrated and influenced the FNL groups. In 1967 the scattered FNL groups were organized under a central committee, which to a large extent consisted of the Marxist-Leninist communist alliance. This alliance's working committee stated in 1968 that the FNL groups were their tools to reach the public (SOU 2002:87 pp. 184–185).

The Social Democratic party did its best to absorb the radicalization wave. The Social Democratic Student Association became an especially important forum for the 'solidarity with Vietnam' movement (the so-called FNL groups). The young minister for education, Olof Palme, nursed an understanding for the FNL movement's insistence on U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam. On 21 February 1968 he, together with the North Vietnamese ambassador to the Soviet Union, participated in a torchlight procession through Stockholm against the Saigon military junta and U.S. engagement in Vietnam (SOU 2002:87 p. 567). The Social Democrats were quite successful in attracting the radical movement.

33 It is important to keep in mind that Wennerström did not have any political or ideological motives for his espionage. His motives were purely economical.

When the monitoring issue became associated with demonstrators against U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the policy issue was cast in a new light for the young up and coming generation of Social Democratic policy makers. Beliefs regarding what threat communism implied did not change, but the opposition to the war in Vietnam could not without nuance be included to that threat frame. The 1969 Law on Personnel Monitoring was a policy innovation aimed at safeguarding those parts of public opinion that had become skeptical towards Swedish security policing.

Internally, IB and Säpo competed on the same 'market' and safeguarded their turf. But since they were interested in the same people, unfortunate collisions were inevitable. In a meeting regarding Säpo in September 1969, Carl Persson confronted Prime Minister Erlander, Justice Minister Kling, Finance Minister Sträng and Education Minister Palme with the question: who is responsible for domestic security, the police or the military? The Cabinet representatives assured that it was the police, and that IB's domestic activities should cease (Persson 1990: 307; SOU 2002:87 p. 531). It was hence only when the director general of the National Police Board directly confronted the Cabinet that the issue was settled in his favor. The solution does not seem to have been ideal for the Cabinet, let alone for IB. The arrangement with IB had allowed for monitoring activities sheltered from public and parliamentary insight. A skillful entrepreneurial maneuver is discernible. Carl Persson chose a setting where more than the Cabinet ministers most involved in the issue were present. Framing it in terms of police versus military in a domestic policy problem did not leave much of a choice for the gathered quorum. Ever since 1931, military intervention in domestic affairs was taboo for any Social Democratic Cabinet, at least as an open policy.³⁴

Prior to Geijer, the justice minister post was seen as rather apolitical (Nygren 2004). With Geijer, the Social Democrats for the first time had a political platform on criminal justice issues. However, Geijer was, at least in his first years in office, totally disinterested in Säpo and the police altogether (Falkenstam 1983; Persson 1990; Rainer 1984; Welandar 2003; Gullnäs 2004). He focused on penal policy instead. According to Persson (1990), Geijer's posture towards criminals and delinquents was overly liberal. Even among senior Social Democratic parliamentarians, the 'let the prisoners loose' policy attitude of Geijer was a bit thick, even though it appealed to Palme (Nygren 2004). The new justice minister's posture was in line with the radical *zeitgeist*. But more importantly in this regard, he allowed for alternative understandings of criminality in general.

³⁴ In 1931, a union demonstration in Ådalen was put down by military force, whereby five demonstrators were shot dead.

In the early 1970s police education became a hot topic for different reasons. From the vantage point of the National Police Board, the need for a professional and coherent education was paramount. However, recruiting staff turned out to be politically sensitive. It turned out that a majority of the leading staff at the police academy had military backgrounds. In the media and also among politicians, this caused a heated debate around the purported ‘militarization’ of the police. Were police now being trained to become soldiers? In the summer and fall of 1971 more than sixty articles were published in twenty different newspapers on the theme. Descriptions of a ‘military junta’ at the police academy were common (Falkenstam 1983: 103-123).³⁵ The National Police Board had had enormous success in the second half of the 1960s in terms of re-equipping and modernizing the police corps. The debate on the purported militarization of the police is important to have in mind to understand why the emerging terrorism threat never made a specially trained and equipped anti-terrorist police a salient topic on the policy agenda. It was at this time not likely to be a future winner.

7.2.2 Terrorism legislation: A pretext for monitoring political opinion?

The Terrorist Act was controversial and caused misgivings among the public, media and political elite alike. It was not a matter of course that it would be widely endorsed, as skepticism towards it transcended political blocs. The Social Democrats led a minority government, with their supporting party – the Communists – strongly opposing the law. Even some Social Democrats were reluctant to support the Terrorist Act.

Logrolling, arguably, to a large extent explains the seemingly overwhelming support for the Terrorist Act. But in the debates, the issue turned out to imply a siding with or against the Communist understanding of the law, i.e. as an extension of the monitoring of political opinion. And there a positive feedback is discernible to the benefit of the law and to the detriment of the Communist aversion to the National Police Board and Säpo.

Already after the first outbursts of Croatian terrorism, the Communist leader asked in Parliament why Säpo and thereby the Cabinet spent so much energy on monitoring communists, when the real threat consisted of what he described as right-wing Yugoslavian fascist organizations. The Center party and Liberal representatives instead wondered if the Cabinet was now willing to increase the budget and size of the police force, which they had refused to do in previous years (Protocol 1971:69 § 8).

³⁵ The figures are from Falkenstam (1983: 118). At this time Falkenstam was the director of information at the National Police Board.

In a parliamentary debate on 7 March 1973, a Communist MP urged Parliament to cut Säpo's budget by half since they anyway spent most of their energy persecuting innocent left-wing activists instead of fascists. The proposed Terrorist Act would only give Säpo a wider mandate, for which reason it should be rejected (Protocol 1973:37 § 16). A Social Democrat MP defended Säpo and reminded Parliament that Sweden had one of the most transparent security services in Europe (Ibid.). During the main debate on the Terrorist Act on 6 April 1973, the Communists lamented the aim and direction of Säpo, the fact that Communist MPs were excluded from parliamentary control over their activities, and that the proposed Terrorist Act would only reinforce existing structures (Protocol 1973:64 § 6).

Cabinet Minister Lidbom helped in obfuscating the boundaries between counter-subversion and counter-terrorism by presenting the Terrorist Act in broad outline during a parliamentary interpellation regarding the 22 September 1972 restrictions on the Law on Personnel Monitoring (Protocol 1972:136 § 8). The interpellators had not asked for this information. Rather, they had asked for the Cabinet's intentions with the restrictions (which meant that the Cabinet instead of the National Police Board drafted the secret instructions to Säpo, see chapter two). For the Conservative and Liberal MPs, the reasons behind the restrictions appeared strange in light of the announced terrorism legislation; domestic control would be dismantled while at the same time external control would be strengthened. The Conservative/Liberal flank depicted the Communists as still not being politically house-trained, for which reason the 22 September decision was a step in the wrong direction. It also mismatched the conclusions regarding the Terrorist Act (Ibid.).

The 1972 Terrorism Commission, whose results Carl Lidbom presented to Parliament in December 1972, was appointed on 22 September, one week after the Bulltofta skyjacking and the same day as the Cabinet decided on the personnel monitoring restrictions. Setting up the commission close in time to the Bulltofta drama was certainly not a coincidence. But the intentional nature of the coinciding date of the Cabinet decision to restrict the National Police Board's initiative on monitoring issues will likely remain an open question. The fact that the commission's results were presented quite uncalled for while the monitoring issue was on the Parliament agenda may be interpreted as a pretext for an entrepreneurial effort to reconcile differences between counter-subversion and counter-terrorism with the help of the attention generated by the skyjacking. One cannot preclude that it was in the interest of the Cabinet to have the issue out of the way before the upcoming general elections of September 1973, which then made it yet more urgent to capitalize on the skyjacking crisis.

The role of the commission can then be seen as a venue where all parties' spokespersons on criminal justice issues (except the Communists) and the main

bureaucratic actors were gathered close to the Cabinet – not to act as policy entrepreneurs, but as targets for an entrepreneurial strategy. The solution, in the form of the Terrorist Act, was already there, arguably to some extent drafted by the working group. The monitoring issue was however not a favorite question for the Cabinet, as it did not play to the gallery. It was therefore convenient to palliate that discussion with the results of a unanimous commission on a topic that was more likely to gain greater exposure while the skyjacking was still topical.

In the late 1960s, the Communists had with some success capitalized on the Wennerström affair to drive home the point that monitoring communists, or opponents of the Vietnam War, implied aiming at the wrong target. When using Croatian terrorism for the same purpose, forces of negative feedback instead set in. The forces of positive feedback in favor of the law were at least to some extent corresponding to the negative feedback processes to quell the entrepreneurial strategies of the Communist party. The non-socialist concern over terrorism legislation was not rooted in a mistrust of the police, as it was for the Communists and to some extent the Social Democrats. And the leading criminal justice representatives of the non-socialist parties had already committed to the conclusions of the 1972 Terrorism commission.

When consulting the attention-based propositions, the value complexity between the integrity of the individual and the effectiveness of security policing is to some extent relegated to the back seat. The explanation for the swift policy innovation lies rather in the way the problem was framed and with what it was associated. The explanation however highlights the profound ambiguity that surrounded the policy problems that terrorism implied. The winning solution was not far-fetched; it already existed in the form of monitoring activities that the police and IB had been carrying out for decades.

7.3 Conclusions

Why did the Bulltofta skyjacking provoke an exceedingly fast policy process, primarily affecting the legal ability to extradite or deny entry to suspect foreigners? The two theoretical perspectives come to more or less the same conclusion, but for slightly different reasons. The belief-based perspective allows for the interpretation that the emergence of terrorism in Sweden did not fundamentally alter beliefs. The Terrorist Act was a translation from a related policy sub-system: counter-subversion. The attention-based perspective suggests that the Terrorist Act had been prepared and considered for some time, and that the fast policy process after the Bulltofta drama therefore resulted in the legislation. The fact that suggestions to increase the capacity of law and order police were absent from the policymaking agenda can be explained either as a function of

their incompatibility with existing belief structures regarding the police, or as a result of their likely limited prospects for success. Both types of explanation can obviously be true without friction. The question is how they interrelate and add value to each other.

The belief-based perspective gives the boundaries of the potential scope for policy change. It designates the dominating belief-based coalition and its competitors. In this case the Social Democratic Cabinet, in particular its international flank, constituted the holder of the core belief. It was supported by the Conservatives, some Liberal and Center party factions, and the National Police Board and Justice Ministry. The supporters may have wished to go further or in slightly different directions, but they were reluctant to oppose the legislation. Only the Communist party and factions of the Liberal and Center parties objected to the law. The constituency supporting or at least not objecting to the law was large. But the content of the proposed legislation was limited by the beliefs of the smaller Cabinet circle, for which it was important to be in line with international standards and agreements. Options such as increasing law and order police effectiveness were not conceivable.

The attention-based perspective gives a clearer picture on how – within parameters given by the belief-based perspective – policy choices were met. Within the boundaries determined by dominating belief structures, the room to maneuver was not negligible. And the way to success to any one option must be cultivated, sometimes through deception. In theory, there are no delimits to how far a policy image can be stretched, for which reason policy punctuations are possible. But the evidence of this case tells that limits indeed circumscribed the scope for change. But even the change that took place needed strategizing. The support of the law was big, but to some degree the size was created. In order to achieve support – arguably most of all within disquiet layers of the Social Democratic movement – the Terrorist Act could not be associated with the issue of monitoring political opinion. In that regard, the Bulltofta skyjacking, in tandem with other domestic incidents and international experience, was capitalized on.

At the same time, the inception of the Terrorist Act in close relation to repeated incidence of Croatian terrorism in Sweden demonstrates policy-oriented learning according to the belief-based perspective. That is only to say that insights on a cognitive level do not exclude that solutions deemed appropriate also need to be presented and conveyed with consideration taken to the prevailing context.

Chapter 8 Explaining the 1973–1986 policy stability

The period between the 1973 inception of the Terrorist Act and the murder of Olof Palme is marked by policy stability in the Swedish counter-terrorism policy domain. Policy stability prevailed despite the fact that the period was interspersed by the seizure of the West German embassy, which at the time was a crisis of national magnitude. The analysis below will shed theoretical light on the puzzlingly low impact of the embassy drama, but also take into account the impact of other crises and events of relevance.

8.1 Belief-based perspective and policy stability 1973–1986

8.1.1 Terrorism legislation and Säpo: Deterring terrorists?

The Terrorist Act of 1973 was broadly supported in Parliament, both when it was instituted and when it was prolonged for the first time in the spring of 1974. Nonetheless, the political constituency for the legislation was weak. The Liberal party was principally concerned about the ‘guilt by association’ implications of the legislation, and the Communist party as well as elements of the Social Democratic party was uneasy over the way Säpo implemented the law. The personal requisite that was added to the organizational requisite with the 1976 partition broadened the law’s support. The absence of a personal requisite was essentially contrary to a policy core belief of the Liberal party, and its introduction can be seen as policy-oriented learning. The policy change does not seem to have been politically costly for the Social Democratic Cabinet. On the

contrary, it helped in consolidating the Social Democratic movement. The issue was arguably a secondary aspect for the Social Democratic authors of the law. As we saw in part one, the Conservative party was initially against 'softening up' the fight against terrorism, as they first interpreted the suggested amendments' implications. But when they learned that Säpo had actually worked with a personal requisite from the beginning, they too endorsed the policy change.

The decade analyzed here was turbulent on the political and administrative fronts. The Social Democratic Cabinet lost power for the first time in 44 years in the 1976 general elections, which was followed by six years of non-socialist rule that saw four different governments. The head of Säpo and the general director of the National Police Board were replaced in 1976 and 1978 respectively. We will come back to these changes, but it suffices here to conclude that they did not affect support for the terrorist legislation as revised in 1976. The constituency for the new legislation transcended political blocks.

The embassy drama, in combination with terrorist events in the surrounding world, convinced Cabinet and the majority of Parliament that the plague of terrorism had come to stay. That was the motive for giving parts of the Terrorist Act permanent status. The offshoot of the Terrorist Act – the Special Investigations Act – was however too controversial and could not be given permanent status. But it was prolonged by Parliament by a broad majority every year. The Special Investigations Act entitled the police, in particular Säpo, to use coercive powers on a lower level of evidence than the Code of Judicial Procedure allowed for. Therefore that part of the terrorism legislation could not be separated from Säpo as an organization.

In the fall of 1975 an event unfolded that had nothing to do with terrorism, yet called Säpo's operative methods into question. It was revealed in October that year that a person had been employed by a hospital in Gothenburg to map out extreme leftists at the workplace on behalf of Säpo. At least Säpo became the scapegoat, even if some argue that IB orchestrated the arrangement (SOU 2002:87: 546-550). Illegal opinion monitoring, and thereby a need for better control mechanisms, became an issue that tainted the image of Säpo activities in general.

Säpo was the subject of a belief-based coalition. The Communist party and a faction of the Social Democratic party, especially when in opposition, distrusted Säpo's use of coercive powers. This coalition interpreted the hospital spy affair and later the Bergling affair as evidence of their policy core belief: that Säpo inherently and continuously abused their coercive powers to persecute innocent leftists. Because Säpo's attention was misdirected, they maintained, greater perils such as Bergling (and Wennerström a good decade previously) selling intelligence to foreign powers were overlooked (Motions 1979/80:802 and 803). But there did not exist a corresponding advocacy coalition taking

Säpo's side. In fact, during the non-socialist Cabinets there was no coherent coalition advocating police policies in general, which we will come back to in the following subsection. The non-socialist Cabinets had an ambition to make the Special Investigations Act permanent, but failed to do so since a working group looking into if and how Säpo used surplus information had been inconclusive, i.e. whether Säpo used information mustered from approved special investigations to corroborate other cases, to which the district court had not approved special search methods (Proposition 1981/82:45).

The original Terrorist Act was at best a secondary aspect for Säpo and the National Police Board. But the Special Investigations Act was considered instrumental for the police. The National Police Board referred to international terrorism development and argued, from a domestic perspective, that the Emergency Powers Act filled a preventive purpose. They kept the Cabinet updated on how the law had been used. Up until the fall of 1985 it had been used parsimoniously – only 13 cases since 1976 – but was nonetheless of utmost importance according to the police (Proposition 1985/86:31). It was arguably an interest of Säpo to retain the coercive powers allowed by the Special Investigations Act, but counter-terrorism was not the highest priority for the organization – counter-espionage was (Frånstedt 2003).

To justify the yearly propositions, the Cabinet published a chronology of terrorist attacks that had occurred around the world since the previous year, based on Säpo's account and a Foreign Ministry annual report. The terrorist threat could not be dismissed, even though such occurrences were rare in Sweden. In its renewal, the Cabinet followed the police's line of argument – that the law deterred terrorism.

8.1.2 Law and order policing: Decomposed coalitions, beliefs intact

The embassy drama stands out as the most chilling experience of terrorism on Swedish soil. According to Gösta Welander, the head of the Justice Ministry's police unit from 1972–1984, the embassy drama was the only incident during his tenure serious enough to force his ministry to take the issue of counter-terrorism preparedness into consideration (Welander 2003). We have seen that the drama caused both the Stockholm police and the National Police Board to promote policy options intended to better meet the threat of terrorism. But the embassy drama did not fundamentally alter ingrained ideas or beliefs about counter-terrorism police work, at least not in the first decade after the siege.

The National Police Board and the Stockholm police formed an advocacy coalition to try and influence counter-terrorism policies. For players outside the police, counter-terrorism policymaking was to a large extent a matter of taking

sides with or against the police. Thereby the police were left on their own to promote policy innovations that they found pertinent for combating terrorism. To some extent, General Director Carl Persson was himself the glue of this coalition. Reports of what an extraordinary leader, efficient and skilful manager, and charismatic person he was are striking (Welander 2003; Munck 2004; Axman 2004; Frånstedt 2003; Montgomery 2004, Nygren 2004; Falkenstam 1983; Vinge 1988).

We have already established that the police were not overly successful in convincing wider circles on the virtues of a powerful anti-terrorist police force. We have seen how the initial Stockholm police initiative was passed on to the Cabinet, which in turn forwarded the issue to the ongoing 1975 Police Commission. All of this happened between the embassy drama and the 1976 change in government. The question is if the Stockholm police initiative was inevitably futile at this time. Why were the police not successful in mobilizing support for their policy innovation?

The policy initiative's journey does not show any evidence of venue shopping for mobilizing support. Instead, the proposition was cultivated internally until it landed on the desk of the Cabinet in January 1976, and a natural forum to pass it on to was the ongoing Police Commission. Such a move was also fairly safe in terms of containing the understanding of the problem. The Cabinet had appointed the commission, chaired by the deputy justice minister.

The motive for setting up the 1975 Police Commission was reportedly that the time was ripe for an evaluation. There was, however, a more concrete reason for establishing the commission, and its initial instructions were sketched out in the fall of 1974. Discontent among governors of some Swedish counties (which Sweden was divided into 24 of at this time) was approaching the boiling point. The county administrative boards (chaired by county governors) were the highest operative police authorities. The National Police Board and its director general often sidestepped the county boards and instead directly informed county police commissioners (who were members of these boards). The county governors lamented that, as they claimed, the National Police Board had become far too powerful, and the police too centralized. The National Police Board had allegedly become a giant with feet of clay (Falkenstam 1983; Persson 1990).

But the discontent was not reserved to the county boards. "For many, Carl Persson went too far in his ambitions with the National Police Board," according to Welander (2003). "Within the Justice Ministry, certain factions were displeased with the power that the National Police Board developed. It was meant to be a rather limited authority, but it turned out to be a powerful force, thanks to Persson" (*ibid.*). Johan Munck, who was secretary to the 1975 Police Commission, corroborated this claim. "Within the Social Democratic party and also within the Center party, there was a discontent with the fact that the

police organization had been far too centralized, and that was the reason behind the 1975 Police Commission” (Munck 2004). Socialist MP Arne Nygren agreed that there was a widespread Social Democratic uneasiness with the National Police Board’s ambition to centralize power (Nygren 2004).

Director General Carl Persson was not only admired, but was also arguably a reason for discontent and a source of concern for some within the Justice Ministry. It was widely known that Persson and Justice Minister Lennart Geijer were on a collision course during the latter’s term of office (1970–1976) due to different ideas and visions of criminal justice politics (Falkenstam 1983; Welander 1998).

As it became known within the National Police Board that instructions for a police commission were being drafted, they proactively welcomed the idea in an official letter to the Cabinet. They referred to ongoing inquiries where steps towards a more democratized administration were suggested. Indirectly, the official letter reproached the Cabinet for not having heeded prior inquiry suggestions made by the National Police Board (Falkenstam 1983).

It is possible that the Cabinet saw the policy initiative regarding the Stockholm police Special Response Units as a new effort to centralize police power in Stockholm, and therefore the initiative was received with limited enthusiasm. A policy core belief shared by the Social Democratic party elite and not least by local and regional police commissioners was that police power needed to be transferred from Stockholm to the local and regional police authorities. In that respect, it is not surprising that the commission decided not to touch upon organizational issues when preparing the preliminary study on the Stockholm police Special Response Units (Ds Ju 1977:2).

The commission’s room to maneuver on matters of counter-terrorism was limited by the instructions. On the other hand, it is unlikely that its members had any intention to focus on matters that were not of immediate concern for the Cabinet. Deputy Justice Minister Sven Andersson headed the commission and the justice minister’s press secretary Ebbe Carlsson was its secretary together with Åke Polstam, previously of the National Police Board but at that time representing the Center party in Parliament.³⁶ Carl Persson had been appointed as an expert to the commission, but did not attend their meetings since he thought the entire idea with the commission was to have him removed from office (Falkenstam 1983).

For a large part of the Swedish population, 19 September 1976 came with an inconceivable surprise: For the first time in 44 years, the Social Democratic party lost governmental power. The ramifications of this cannot be underesti-

³⁶ Ebbe Carlsson had sketched out the early drafts of the instructions, which allegedly had been rather unrefined attacks against the National Police Board (Falkenstam 1983; Welander 2003).

mated. For the entire Social Democratic party, the experience was bewildering. Renowned Social Democrats cried openly. A few optimists thought that a period of opposition would do well for the party (Peterson 2002: 248; Leijon 1991: 169).

The Social Democratic defeat was perhaps even more difficult to grasp for the parties that were eternally in opposition. The Center party turned out to be the largest of the non-socialist parties with 25 % of the vote, followed by the Conservatives with 15 % and the Liberals with 11 %. It was however not clear that all three parties would form a Cabinet together. The Center party had gained popularity through its resolute opposition to nuclear power, whereas the Conservatives and Liberals continued to believe in it as a source of energy. However, on 7 October the three parties decided to form a coalition Cabinet. The non-affiliated Supreme Court judge Sven Romanus became justice minister, with fellow judge Henry Montgomery his deputy. Neither had prior experience with the police. Within justice politics circles, it came as a surprise that the Conservative chair of the Parliament Justice Committee Astrid Kristensson was not given the justice minister post. She had profiled herself as a law enforcement expert and was allegedly quite disappointed that she did not become justice minister after the 1976 election (Falkenstam 1983; Welander 2003).

With the change in government, a policy window opened for breaking the deadlock on police politics. It should have been natural for the Cabinet to give the 1975 Police Commission supplementary instructions, but that did not happen. In this regard, the fact that non-politicians with no experience of police issues occupied the top two posts at the Justice Ministry is highly relevant. They did not have a police policy agenda (Welander 2003).

In addition to this, Astrid Kristensson became a fierce opponent of the non-socialist Cabinet's justice politics, making it hard to find compromises within the governing coalition (Montgomery 2004). Allegedly, the discontent was a result of her being passed over for Sven Romanus as justice minister (Welander 2003). Conservative party leader Gösta Bohman had according to Kristensson held an over-confidence in lawyers and wanted the justice minister to be a court lawyer, effectively excluding Kristensson from consideration (Falkenstam 1983: 254-255). Besides, the Liberals were not too keen on Kristensson as justice minister (Ibid.). Hence, one of Carl Persson's closest political allies did not get more political room to maneuver after the 1976 elections.

In 1978 Carl Persson resigned as director general of the National Police Board after 14 years at the post. Former Chief Prosecutor Holger Romander replaced him. The demise of Persson marked a new epoch of the National Police Board. Some welcomed the peace and quiet, while others missed the dynamics that had characterized the Persson era (Falkenstam 1983).

Even if the most conspicuous problems between the National Police Board and the Justice Ministry disappeared when Lennart Geijer left the ministry, tensions still existed. Deputy Justice Minister (1976–1979) Henry Montgomery took over the chairmanship of the 1975 Police Commission. He was also the person at the ministry who had most contact with Director General Persson. “When Carl Persson resigned, I saw that as a big relief”, Montgomery revealed (Montgomery 2004). He seldom opposed Persson’s policy suggestions, but had considerable concerns with the way Persson played the political game (Ibid.).

8.1.3 Summing up

The police in charge of law and order were deeply troubled at not having the capability to handle critical incidents. But their efforts to come to terms with this deficiency failed to result in a better-trained and equipped force, even during non-socialist governments.

Social Democratic MP Arne Nygren (2004) maintains that “An anti-terrorism police unit was just completely inconceivable in the 70s,” in a view that neatly captures the opinions of the political-administrative justice establishment of that time. Similar views were conveyed by Johan Munck (2004), Håkan Winberg (2004), Gösta Welander (2003), Henry Montgomery (2004) and Ingvar Gullnäs (2004).

The explanation for policy stability provided by belief-based assumptions reveals that preparedness for being able to effectively meet terrorism was not necessarily a main concern for the actors involved – at least not for the majority coalition. Instead, policymaking was guided by skepticism over the intents of the National Police Board, in combination with an ambition to decentralize police power. These policy core beliefs survived not only the embassy drama as such, but also law and order initiatives promoted by the police and changes in government. They encompassed law and order, as well as security policing. The misadventures that afflicted Säpo during this decade in some respects had a bigger impact on the policy agenda in that they reinforced recurring beliefs about the National Police Board. Interestingly, the embassy drama brought salience to the issue of terrorism, but did not affect beliefs about the police and therefore not views on counter-terrorism either.

8.2 Attention-based perspective and policy stability 1973–1986

8.2.1 Terrorism legislation and Säpo: Entrepreneurs leave the scene

The 1976 amendments to the Terrorist Act cannot be ascribed as entrepreneurial strategizing, unless the positive feedback process in favor of the personal requisite was related to the Liberal argumentation against ‘guilt by association’ aired in Parliament. That point was also advocated by others, however for different reasons. One Liberal MP tried to capitalize on the embassy drama by pointing out the toothlessness of a law that apparently did not hinder terrorists from entering the country, which was the essential purpose of the Terrorist Act (Protocol 1975:78 § 6).

Apart from the paragraphs aimed at keeping terrorists out of the country, the Terrorist Act also contained sections regulating police investigative powers (which became the Special Investigations Act). Within Säpo, signals warning of the embassy assault were picked up beforehand, but means for sorting and acting on them were allegedly lacking. The head of Säpo, Hans Holmér, commented, “A reasonable increase of Säpo can have a reasonable effect” (Aftonbladet 13/05/1975). Holmér was certainly well-situated as head of Säpo, and enjoyed a good relationship with the Social Democratic Cabinet, in particular Justice Minister Geijer. Holmér was aware that his control over Säpo was curtailed by Carl Persson and also by some of his own subordinates (Falkenstam 1983; SOU 2002:87 p. 568). Holmér and the Justice Ministry wanted Säpo to focus more on counter-terrorism, but General Director Persson and his allies at Säpo instead wanted to invest more in counter-espionage. Säpo did not receive additional resources, but some staff from the counter-espionage department was moved to the counter-terrorism department (Persson 1990: 210; Frånstedt 2003).

The hospital spy affair during the fall of 1975 is indeed complicated and opaque. The objective here is by no means to clear up the affair. Säpo and/or IB and/or the Social Democratic party had an incentive to keep some of the staff at the Gothenburg hospital under surveillance for reasons related to subversion and/or terrorism (Falkenstam 1983: 216-230; Vinge 1988: 198-210; Persson 1990: 336-364; SOU 2002:87 pp. 546–550). What is of relevance, however, is that the affair drew attention to the issue of opinion monitoring. The dramaturgy was reminiscent of similar events in the 1960s and implied that the police had created a state within the state, beyond political purposes and insight. In fact, Carl Persson reacted strongly to “the general debate” in which voices had been raised fearing that the police had indeed created such a state within the

state. He maintained that the Swedish police were as open as any police organization could be, with a variety of control bodies including Parliament and the Cabinet (Svensk Polis 10/1975). When the subject matter was discussed and understood in state within the state terms, it was arguably not politically advantageous to promote additional powers for Säpo or to suggest making the Special Investigations Act permanent.

In the summer of 1976 Hans Holmér accepted the job as Stockholm police commissioner, which was more prestigious than head of Säpo. Carl Persson had his last fight with Geijer and the Justice Department over the appointment of Holmér's successor, Sven-Åke Hjälmroth. Persson thought that the head of Säpo should at least have a law degree, and in his capacity as director general he had a prescribed say on the issue. But as the Justice Ministry sidestepped him, he did not even bother to promote his own favorite candidates, among them deputy director Olof Frånstedt (Persson 1990: 216-217). The episode indicates that Carl Persson was losing influence as a policy entrepreneur on security police policy, but also that the Justice Ministry clearly wanted a less pugnacious Säpo head. Holmér, like Persson, had been a colorful and charismatic leader, and the two had been fierce antagonists since Holmér became head of Säpo. Their ongoing battle had had a detrimental effect on the working situation within Säpo (Falkenstam 1983: 151-215). Hjälmroth, the staff manager at the Stockholm police, had allegedly been surprised on being offered the post (Persson 1990: 217), but was arguably not likely to challenge his superiors or employer.

In Parliament, especially after the Social Democratic defeat in 1976, both Communists and Social Democrats were openly suspicious of Säpo. Their criticism was based on a distrust of how Säpo applied their coercive powers. In reaction to rumors of infringements that had circulated in the media and Parliament for years, the Communist party and a Social Democratic faction called on the Cabinet in 1979 to set up a parliamentary commission to scrutinize Säpo (Motions 1979/80:802 and 803). The motions were raised in the aftermath of the Bergling affair (in which a Säpo employee was uncovered as a KGB agent). The sensational event was in other words capitalized on to pursue a campaign against Säpo, the point being made that the Bergling affair was possible *because* Säpo misdirected their attention.

But positive feedback failed to materialize at this point. The Parliament Justice Committee declined the aforementioned motions, not least since the National Police Board in 1978, on their own initiative, had started to reform Säpo (JuU 1979/80:3). As a result, Säpo would change their policies on information dissemination. Despite these self-regulatory efforts, Säpo as an organization was contested by elements of the left. Understanding the Säpo debate

sheds light on the preemptive counter-terrorism policy process of this decade, and is also symptomatic of the image of the police in general.

8.2.2 Law and order policing: Entrepreneurial efforts in adverse conditions

The West German embassy drama called into question police capacity for performing during severe incidents. Prime Minister Olof Palme was soon to take an initiative on this front. In a press conference only hours after the embassy building had been secured, he said that Swedish society would have to live with the occurrence of terrorist attacks. The alternative would be to create a police state (SVT, Extrarapport 25/4/1975). Siding against this position could thereby be associated with extremism and all its unfavorable connotations.

But the police – first in Stockholm and later the National Police Board – made a move. General Director Persson had reportedly advocated creating a police assault capacity even before the embassy drama, without success (Persson 1990: 258). Stockholm Police Commissioner Kurt Lindroth had earlier been Persson's deputy director general, and the two had a good rapport. Both were present at the crisis cabinet at the chancellery during the embassy drama (Ibid.). Arguably, the Stockholm police proposition regarding the Special Response Units did therefore not come as a surprise for the National Police Board. When the issue was referred to the Cabinet, the understanding of the problem that the police conveyed was one of workplace security for the Stockholm police: Equipment deficiency and organizational performance had jeopardized the security for officers on the scene (Stockholm police 1975b).

Except for these expressions of will by the Stockholm police and National Police Board, it is difficult to find any support for a police capacity capable of tackling terrorism or other severe incidents. Only the Conservative chair of the Parliament Justice Committee, Astrid Kristensson, speaking at two consecutive parliamentary discussions on the Terrorist Act (Protocol 1975:78 § 6; Protocol 1975/76:44 § 10) cautiously aired the prospect of considering a re-evaluation of the matter.

I think that we from a Swedish point of view can be happy that the police do their work in a good way, even if it is possible that we need to reconsider the issue of some kind of special education and maybe improved organization to be able to act more effectively domestically in case we are hit by another act of terrorism (Protocol 1975/76:44 § 10).

In April 1977, after Sjöpo's arrest of the terrorist group that planned to kidnap former minister Anna-Greta Leijon for her involvement in the embassy drama, *Svensk Polis* (the National Police Board's peer journal) published an account of the action. Moreover, an editorial in the Stockholm daily *Dagens Nyheter* was

cited in its entirety, since it had attracted much attention within the police. The payoff line of the editorial, entitled “The victory of self-control over great risks”, read:

So far we have been spared one thing more than other societies that have been battlegrounds and bases for capricious cross-border guerrilla warfare: We have been spared having our own defense powers against political violence transformed into a tool for systematic excesses and harassment of citizens (Svensk Polis 4/1977: 2).

The article exposed and articulated the fear that many felt was consistent with creating an effective anti-terrorist police capacity. This took place only months after the 1975 Police Commission had delivered its special assignment report on the Stockholm police Special Response Units and severe incidents, which had resulted in only marginal adjustments to the prevailing order (Ds Ju 1977:2).

The *zeitgeist* changed in the mid-1970. The end of the Vietnam War in the summer of 1975 also ended opposition to it. The political movement started in the 1960s as a reaction to Vietnam, and found itself obsolete when the war ended. A new conflict emerged on the public agenda, where economic growth was put in relation to ecological sustainability. Traditional growth-oriented parties, such as the Social Democrats and the Conservatives, clearly faced a new challenge. However, the Center party (and to some extent the Communists) heralded this development for years, but only gained momentum when the red wave turned green. But the green wave also brought new law and order problems, especially at nuclear power plants (Nylén 2004).

The National Police Board made a new effort to advocate the idea of a specially trained and equipped anti-terrorist police force in March 1979, with reference to the vulnerability of nuclear power plants. The National Police Board set up a working group to explore the issue. Reportedly, this initiative was by coincidence forwarded in the immediate aftermath of the nuclear meltdown at Three Mile Island (it had been in the works since 1977) (Nylén 2004). But as we saw in part one, this framing did not convince the skeptics, who labeled the entrepreneurial effort as an ‘atom police’ – alluding to allegedly brutal police forces in West Germany and France – when the report was presented in the spring of 1980. The nuclear energy issue was glowing hot, and would later in 1980 be subject to a referendum. After the 1980 National Police Board proposal, Communist and Social Democratic MPs wondered if the ‘atom police’ would prevent nuclear energy opponents from organizing demonstrations (Protocol 1979/80:153 § 4).

The unfavorable public image of the police seems to have caused the non-socialist parties to abstain from taking any initiatives once they gained governmental power. Former Conservative Justice Minister (1979–81) Håkan Winberg reflected upon the non-socialist passivity between 1976 and 1982:

When we won the 1976 elections, the Social Democrats and the labor union started a scaremongering, stating that the entire social welfare system would be dismantled. Sick people would be left alone without medical attention. In a climate like that, we were cautious to propose anything that could cause loud disapproval (Winberg 2004).

8.2.3 Summing up

When incumbent, the Social Democrats did not openly contest Säpo or the National Police Board in Parliament. The front against the police-skeptic Communists was unified. However after the 1976 defeat, Social Democrats joined the chorus of Säpo critics. And likewise, whenever reorganization of the Stockholm police Special Response Units became topical, Social Democrats openly aired their discontent. When they regained power in 1982, it is understandable that the issue of the Stockholm police Special Response Units was abandoned. Parliament had become an unpredictable venue for carrying through such policy suggestions. Counter-terrorism police work was not a likely future winner for the new Social Democratic justice minister, and it had been far from a safe bet for his non-socialist predecessors. Processes of negative feedback, in particular in Parliament, set in as soon as the police launched new entrepreneurial efforts. But Parliament also accounted for negative feedback processes when suggestions were made to overhaul Säpo, which made Parliament a non-susceptible venue for efforts at reforming Swedish counter-terrorism policies during this decade.

Counter-terrorism policy stability can hence be explained as political abstention to capitalize on the embassy drama due to insufficient *expected* constituencies. The entrepreneurial efforts of the National Police Board and the Stockholm police resulted in processes of negative feedback because the image of the police, including Säpo, had become marred by problems of legitimacy and trust. And that image had rather been reinforced through the way other events were portrayed and understood.

8.3 Conclusions

The relative standstill of counter-terrorism policymaking after the embassy drama would, in line with the perspectives developed in chapter six, be related to either unchanged advocacy coalition structures or processes of negative feedback. Empirical evidence supported both perspectives in this case, which is indicative of their complementary nature. Both perspectives purported to reveal a relation between crisis and patterns of policy change. This concluding section

is the place to reflect on the role of the seizure of the West German embassy in the period of policy stability that followed.

The embassy drama did not change policy core beliefs on the role and development of the National Police Board. The assault proved that the Terrorist Act was unfit for its purpose, i.e. to prevent terrorists from entering the country. However, this did not change beliefs about the qualities of the law. Despite turbulence on the political and administrative scenes, belief-based coalitions kept judicial power over these policy domains. Even when not in office, the Social Democratic belief-system permeated the issue area. The non-socialist parties did not have a coalesced criminal justice agenda, let alone a police policy agenda. And policy coalitions outside Parliament, such as discontent police organizations outside Stockholm, enjoined the Social Democratic aspirations for decentralized police power, channeled through the 1975 Police Commission.

There is however no evidence that the embassy drama as such was framed by the majority coalition to support its belief about the National Police Board, i.e. that the crisis supported the argument that police power needed be decentralized. The impact of the seizure, and the dilemmas it implied, were arguably not powerful enough for that coalition to review policy core beliefs. Therefore the entrepreneurial efforts, which the analysis also highlighted, were quelled in processes of negative feedback. Skilful (counter) entrepreneurial strategies consigned police initiatives to temporary oblivion.

The fact that the embassy drama was not framed by the majority coalition to be supportive of its policy core beliefs (i.e. to decentralize police power) indicates that it rather challenged those beliefs. In that sense, the attention-based perspective comes closer in its assumptions about the making of policies, when accounting for the policy trajectory. The relatively happy ending of the embassy drama is of great importance here. If compared to the management and the managerial prerequisites, one may even say that the ending was undeservingly happy. As demonstrated by the scenes from inside the crisis cabinet depicted in chapter four, the risks in relation to the low police capacity were well known within governmental circles. But since the ending was happy, (to some extent a construction, since three people died and more were injured), the attention generated by the incident allowed for an interpretation in line with the majority coalition's. A counterfactual argument should be considered: If the embassy drama had ended in carnage, would a policy change in line with what the Stockholm and National Police Board suggested have been possible to ignore? Had a blood bath taken place, it is however probable that a shift of belief-systems would have followed as well.

As it were, events of a different category, like the hospital spy affair and the Bergling affair, instead reinforced images that made policy options implying less power to the National Police Board possible. Both perspectives come to

the conclusion that Swedish preparedness and capability for counter-terrorism was a subordinated issue during this period. The police was in itself a bigger democratic problem than a solution to any one subset of problems within the criminal justice sector.

Chapter 9 Explaining post Palme murder policy innovations

The period following the Palme murder saw fundamental changes in Swedish counter-terrorism policymaking. As reported in part one, the murder as such along with the subsequent managerial problems, mishaps and scandals did not necessitate the changes that followed. Yet the changes are intimately linked to the assassination. The Palme murder was managed far below what could have been expected, but why did reappraisals of counter-terrorism policies follow in its aftermath? This chapter will provide explanations to that empirical puzzle.

9.1 Belief-based perspective and post-Palme murder policy innovations

9.1.1 Terrorism legislation: Majority coalition learns, but not from crisis

Belief-based coalition structures did not change much compared to the situation before the Palme murder. The coalition opposing the legislation had been in a minority position since the inception of the first Terrorist Act in 1973 and consisted of the Communist party (the Left party after 1990), and factions of the Social Democrats and Liberals. The majority had argued that the Terrorist Act was an effective measure for preventing terrorism, until calls for transforming it were made, first by the Jurist Commission in their initial report

(SOU 1987:14 pp. 132–133). The crucial fluctuation in beliefs rather happened within the majority coalition of policy makers that was essentially in favor of the legislation.

The Parliamentary Commission did not side with the skeptics or the reformers, instead favoring the status quo. Its members did not see a reason for changing the existing terrorism legislation from an efficiency standpoint. The main argument was that the Criminal Code and the terrorism sections of the Aliens Act already covered crimes committed for political reasons. To murder, cause mayhem or take hostages was punishable already at the planning or plot stage, regardless of motive, and no non-Swedish citizen had an unconditional right to reside in the country. Since the already existing special laws on terrorism required a rather low level of evidence, making these rules more stringent would have a negative impact on the legal rights of the individual (SOU 1988:18 pp. 162–175). The Parliamentary Commission established in the wake of the Palme murder represents the strand of beliefs that opposed changes to the legislation. The Commission's conclusions reflected the core beliefs that had up till then glued the majority coalition together:

It is important that such special regulations do not receive wider application than motivated with regard to their purpose. The reason behind the inception of the terrorism legislation – the need to protect against violent acts in Sweden – is also, according to us, the only reason that can motivate these far-reaching regulations. The need for protection against violent acts in Sweden can however not be invoked to support an expansion of the applicability of the legislation, as to imply national terrorism as well (SOU 1988:18 p. 168).

The reference to 'national terrorism' was meant to preclude expanding terrorism legislation to apply to presumptive terrorists constituting a threat to countries besides Sweden. But it also reveals the notion that Sweden does not have national terrorism – that terrorism inherently is a foreign phenomenon. The Palme murder did not alter that belief for the Parliamentary Commission.

The Cabinet proposition (1990/91:118) to change the 1989 Terrorist Act provoked criticism from MPs of all parties except the Center. Representatives from the Left and Liberal parties rejected the proposition altogether and wanted the 1989 Terrorist Act to be abolished (Motion 1990/91:Ju 31; Motion 1990/91:Ju 35). The main reason was the discriminatory nature of the law (which only applied to foreigners). The Left party pointed toward recent domestic trends and experience such as arson at refugee camps, which, they argued, showed that politically motivated violence was not reserved for foreigners. They thereby contested the notion of terrorism being a uniquely foreign phenomenon. Factions of the Environmental and Social Democratic parties also objected to

the discriminative character of the law, however without the goal of abolishing it (Motion 1990/91:Ju 32; Motion 1990/91:Ju 34).³⁷

Another concern for the skeptics was the role of the Cabinet as the actual executor of deportations. Since 1973 and over the various changes to the Terrorist Act, including Proposition 1990/91:118, the Cabinet was supposed to arrive at a decision for each case based on information provided by the police. Since there existed no instance for appealing decisions, arguments were made (by the Left and Environmental parties) for transferring the process to a normal court of law. With regard to the proposed regulations on coercive measures, the Left and Environmental parties, along with Social Democratic factions, urged that the level of evidence be raised from “can be suspected” to “there is an obvious risk” (that the person in question will commit acts of terrorism). The only Conservative MP who made a motion (1990/91:Ju 33) regarding the proposition urged more restrictive refugee policies, implying less tolerance towards people entering the country without passports or other papers claiming to be refugees. He also wanted to increase international police cooperation. But as we saw in part one, the Cabinet proposition passed with only minor semantic changes. The majority coalition had found a new equilibrium.

Expanding terrorism legislation to also include presumptive terrorists who did not constitute a threat to Swedish interests had arguably become a secondary aspect to influential elements within the majority coalition. That meant that these aspects were susceptible to change if confronted with reliable evidence.

After the summer of 1988, Säpo Committee chairman Carl Lidbom continued as a one-man investigator on Säpo’s working methods. His efforts in this capacity convinced him that terrorist groups to a large extent used Sweden as a platform for planning terrorist attacks abroad. “There is no doubt at all that Sweden in certain cases has been used as a point of departure for planning and supporting terrorist activities in other countries” (SOU 1989:18 p. 49). According to Lidbom’s informants at Säpo, this situation was related to the fact that many people resided in the country based on the right of asylum, even if they came here without passports or other papers verifying their identities. Lidbom also learnt that these people typically remained inactive or kept a low profile until they received a permanent residence permit, after which it was more complicated, if not impossible, to have them deported (Ibid.: 47-48).

The Terrorism Legislation Committee was explicitly asked to follow Lidbom’s scrutiny of Säpo’s working methods (Instructions 1988:49). For the Terrorism Legislation Committee, the section of SOU 1989:18 referred to above was of particular interest (SOU 1990:104 p. 159). Furthermore, two of the Committee’s most substantial suggestions referred to presumptive terror-

37 The 1988 general elections saw the Environmental party enter Parliament for the first time in Swedish history.

ists working to bring about terrorism abroad and to the possibility of deporting such individuals even if they had been granted permanent residence. The majority coalition hence came to incorporate the belief that terrorism legislation needed to be sharpened to reflect the nature of the problem. Policy-oriented learning is discernible, where Säpo's point of view was taken seriously by the coalition that previously had supported annual prolongations of the Special Investigations Act. Lidbom was a recognized Säpo critic, and the fact that Säpo's security assessment was mediated through him arguably lent reliability of the evidence.

9.1.2 Säpo: Social Democratic Cabinet alters belief through crisis inquiries

The belief structures regarding terrorism legislation cannot be separated entirely from the beliefs dividing coalitions on the issue of Säpo, not least because Säpo is the main authority executing the coercive measures implied in the terrorism legislation. That is also why belief-based coalitions centered on Säpo are interesting for this study.

The political left had been skeptical about Säpo since the 1960s, when monitoring political opinion had become an issue. In Parliament, above all the Communist/Left party advocated Säpo skepticism, not least since they alleged that they were the victims of Säpo activities. And as we have seen, the fact that the Communist/Left party was excluded from parliamentary insight into Säpo policies amplified the distrust. When the Environmental party entered Parliament in 1988, its MPs had the same objection. However, the Social Democrats were also to a large extent suspicious of Säpo. Social Democratic cabinets and Säpo had a less than trustful history (see prior chapters), and Social Democratic cabinets felt under-informed on Säpo activities (Leijon 2004).

The Palme murder itself and the subsequent escape of Stig Bergling in 1987 added grist to the mill of distrust. Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson had plans to initiate a committee to investigate Säpo after the Palme murder, but it was not until the escape of Stig Bergling that it became urgent (Lidbom 1990). In the days after the sensational escape in October 1987, Ingvar Carlsson called on Carl Lidbom to head a committee with the purpose of scrutinizing Säpo. He in fact considered appointing Lidbom temporary head of Säpo, "investigating and cleaning up" the organization. But since Lidbom did not want to leave Paris where he served as Swedish ambassador, he and Carlsson settled on him chairing the Säpo Committee (Ibid.: 24).

Carl Lidbom and the Säpo Committee found irregularities in the way Säpo worked and was organized, but their – or at least Lidbom's – worst fears do not seem to have come to pass. At least solutions were found on a structural

level, which gave Säpo more influence and a more independent position vis-à-vis the National Police Board. Political influence over Säpo prioritizations also increased. It may also be noted that the investigation carried out by county governor Gunnarsson regarding the threat picture against the Cabinet prior to the Palme murder (SOU 1989:1) silenced some suspicions against Säpo.

It is not easy to establish the contours of a pro-Säpo and an anti-Säpo advocacy coalition, arguably because a large majority was more or less Säpo indifferent. It is also a daunting task to separate beliefs from interests. Suffice it here to ascertain that a crucial shift of beliefs in favor of Säpo took place within governmental quarters. Carl Lidbom was chosen to head the Säpo Committee because he was outspokenly critical of the organization; the Liberals and Conservatives therefore did not consider him well suited for the assignment (Protocol 1988/89:6 § 12; Lidbom 1990: 22). Lidbom himself (1990: 29-30) said that the task was his most difficult and ungrateful, “but the Cabinet got to know more about Säpo than it had ever known before. And the work rendered extensive consequences for the organization and work of Säpo”. The belief that Säpo and the National Police Board were part of the problem, apparent above all in the 1970s, had thus swung in the opposite direction. Säpo could, with some adjustments, be trusted to help solve the policy problem of terrorism underscored by not least the Jurist and Parliamentary commissions set up after the Palme murder.

9.1.3 Anti-terrorism policing: Minority coalition becomes majority, but not due to crisis

In chapter four we saw that only the National Police Board and the Stockholm police advocated an anti-terrorist police force after the West German embassy drama. Politically, the issue was silent. The Palme murder did not as such change any beliefs on the matter. It however gained momentum as a consequence of above all the Parliamentary Commission report (SOU 1988:18). Throughout this period, both skeptical and favorable beliefs are discernible.

The belief-based coalition skeptical of an anti-terrorist police force had clearly been in a majority position prior to the Palme murder, but as indicated by the 1990 parliamentary vote on the issue (258 for and 38 against), the pro side clearly became the majority. Again, this indicates that the issue of having an anti-terrorist police force had ceased to be a policy core belief for a large majority, and had become a secondary aspect susceptible to change if confronted with reliable evidence. The Jurist Commission provided statistical data showing that terrorism as a global phenomenon was increasing (SOU 1987:14 pp. 112–115). And the Parliamentary Commission brought into the current debate, not so much the Palme murder in this regard, but the drama at the West German

embassy and situations of that kind (SOU 1988:18 pp. 178–180). Statistics presented by the Jurist Commission certainly revealed that terrorism as a phenomenon was changing, e.g. that business people more often than politicians had become the target for actions, that national terrorism had become more common than international (e.g. ETA and IRA independence struggles) and that terrorism had become less selective (i.e. aiming randomly) to cause public fear rather than targeting public representatives (SOU 1987:14 pp. 112–115).

Such statistics could have spoken against maintaining an anti-terrorist police force, since national terrorism, at least for some, was not believed to exist in Sweden, and there is not much such a force can do to prevent or mitigate the effects of a randomly aimed bomb attack. Arguably, the forum as such – the Jurist and Parliamentary commissions that followed the Palme murder – lent a certain cachet to the issue. If they ascertained that terrorism was an increasing threat and that an anti-terrorist police force was an adequate means for increasing preparedness, there must be some truth to it.

Once up and running, the issue of the special force increasingly fell into the domain of secondary aspects among policy makers belonging to the then-majority coalition, who were in general favorably disposed to its existence. The policy core belief that had cemented the majority coalition prior to the Palme murder, which had also hindered the topic from being politically viable – i.e. that an anti-terrorist police force cannot act under its own command, nor be used for purposes that are not terrorism related – had become concerns of secondary belief aspects.

9.1.4 Summing up

The decade following the Palme murder witnessed profound changes in the realm of Swedish counter-terrorism policymaking. The explanations for these changes provided by the belief-based perspective refer to transformation of belief systems, or policy-oriented learning. What had constituted policy core beliefs for the majority coalition up to the Palme murder quite rapidly became secondary aspects. Changes of political constituencies cannot be attributed to this circumstance. The Social Democratic party led minority governments between 1982 and 1991. None of the counter-terrorism related policy changes discussed above happened during the three years of non-socialist rule between 1991 and 1994, occurring only before and after. However, the coalition that previously had advocated a decentralized police had dissolved, since their objectives had been met with the 1975 Police Commission report (SOU 1979:6), which had been implemented during the first half of the 1980s.

However, the crisis as such did not contribute to changing belief systems or coalition structures. The murder of Olof Palme rather evinced dysfunctional

crisis preparedness in general terms. The policy core beliefs of the majority coalition were reassessed, and thereby found to be obsolete. ACF does not assume policy core beliefs to be eternal, but to have life spans of about a decade. In this case, according to the belief-based perspective, the expiration date had passed. The crisis forced a revaluation that would have probably been prompted sooner or later.

9.2 Attention-based perspective and post Palme murder policy innovations

9.2.1 Terrorism legislation: Immigration policies played up

Responsibility for terrorist legislation was assigned to the assistant minister of labor in 1973, because the justice minister did not want to deal with it. In 1976, the legislation was divided between the Labor Ministry and the department for immigration issues at the Foreign Ministry, since sections of the Terrorist Act had been transferred to the Aliens Act. The laws were however executed by the police, for the most part by Säpo, which belonged to the Justice Ministry. In Parliament, the issue was handled by the Justice Committee.

In a February 1988 parliamentary debate on refugees who were suspected to be terrorists, a Communist MP made the following comment on an answer given by a minister:

Mr. Speaker! I thank the minister of immigration for the answer and regret at the same time that the minister of immigration was saddled with this question. That is in fact the wrong pigeon. This is not a refugee or immigration issue, but an equity and justice issue (Protocol 1987/88:71 § 16).

What the terrorism legislation was actually about is paramount to the understanding of the need for change. When the Cabinet proposed changing the Aliens Act in 1989, there were two reasons for removing the terrorism sections. First, they had made the Aliens Act complicated, and second, placing parts of the terrorism legislation in the Aliens Act “negatively affects the public view of this law, which is otherwise characterized by a generous attitude regarding foreigners’ prospects of residing in Sweden” (Proposition 1988/89:86 p. 139).

The unspecified critique of terrorism legislation from the 1980s (Instructions 1988:49) that motivated the Cabinet to set up the Terrorism Legislation Committee arguably referred to a 1984 decision to include the Kurdish Labor Party (PKK) on the terrorist list, i.e. the list that formed the basis for the organizational requisite. In so doing, nine Kurdish Turks were sentenced to deportation, which was inhibited. They continued to live in Sweden, but with restricted

rights of movement. The Communist MP cited above was in February 1988 concerned about their situation.

One year earlier, Kurds had become associated with the unsuccessful Palme murder investigation, but as victims. The mass arrest of Kurds staged by Holmér and the managerial group had led to his downfall and a reorganization of the entire murder investigation. But it also sparked concerns on how the legislation protected the rights of the individual, what coercive measures were tolerable, etc. In 1984, Sweden had been the only European country except Turkey to label PKK a terrorist organization, which at that time had brought severe criticism from human rights organizations. After the Palme murder, thanks to Holmér's erroneous main lead, the issue became topical again.

The Communist party was marginalized in Parliament in its annual opposition to prolonging the Special Investigations Act, but can to some degree take credit for the overhaul of terrorism legislation mandated by the Terrorism Legislation Committee. It was an entrepreneurial strategy to constantly take a responsible minister to task for individual cases that he or she was formally proscribed to respond to. The case with the Kurds was no exception, but was an inescapable issue because of the implications the failed attempts to find Palme's murderer had. And it also included immigration politics.

Immigration politics also became salient in Carl Lidbom's investigation into Säpo's working methods. But in that case, lax immigration policies were associated with a terrorism-related security problem. It is not clear what views Lidbom had on immigration policies, i.e. whether he had a personal agenda prior to chairing the Säpo Committee. But during the course of investigation, he became convinced and acted as a policy entrepreneur, advocating the idea that existing immigration legislation created vulnerabilities regarding terrorism. This policy image was communicated to the Terrorism Legislation Committee where it first gained momentum, or where a positive feedback is discernible. But to judge from the argumentation that preceded the revision of the Aliens Act (and the 1989 provisional Terrorist Act), it was important to dissociate terrorism legislation from immigration policies. When that was done, potential opposition to more far-reaching terrorism legislation was likely removed.

The explanation for the policy innovation regarding terrorism legislation hence lies in that a perceived necessity to reform legislation – the policy idea or solution – came about through a skilful juggling of associations and dissociations. First the Aliens Act was cleansed of associations with coercive measures. Then foreigners were associated with security problems, which paved the way for stricter legislation on foreigners, however within the framework of the 1991 Terrorist Act and not the Aliens Act.

9.2.2 Säpo: Exonerated or contained?

The Palme murder was certainly not a success for Säpo. The organization however evaded much criticism when it was made clear that Olof Palme himself had declined bodyguard protection the night of the murder. But over the course of events, the image of Säpo would change through two affairs, briefly introduced above: the escape of Stig Bergling and the Ebbe Carlsson affair.

As we saw in chapter four, an inspector at Säpo, Stig Bergling, was sentenced to lifetime imprisonment in December 1979 for having abused his position and the selling of classified information to the Soviet Union (Ds Ju 1980:2). Eight years later, on 6 October 1987, he escaped with the help of his wife while on leave from prison. The escape was at the time sensational and the search efforts immense, at least until it was clear that he had left the country.

When Bergling began serving his sentence, the Cabinet decided that he would be subject to severe restrictions, including isolation and the control of letters, telephone calls and visits. These restrictions were in place at the time of his escape; the Cabinet had in August 1987 denied a petition for mercy and a petition for revoking the restrictions. However, the National Prisons and Probation Administration decided on the regulations for leaves, and these had become more lax in the case of Bergling. On the night of 5–6 October, he was alone with his wife at her apartment. His absence was not noticed until lunch-time the following day. When Justice Minister Wickbom received word of it, he asked Säpo if a nation-wide alert had been sounded and was informed that it was about to be. It took another six hours before it was.

In a parliamentary debate on 20 October (Protocol 1987/88:10 § 5) Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson accounted the facts of the case, referring to a report written by the attorney general who did not see systemic problems, and instead blamed local police, Säpo and above all the prisons and probation administration for failing to fulfill their duties (Ibid.). The director general of the latter chose to resign. When it became clear that the Justice Ministry (however not the justice minister) had known of the nature of Bergling's leaves, Justice Minister Wickbom chose to resign as well (Ibid.). In his place came Anna-Greta Leijon, who in the mid 1970s had been in charge of the Terrorist Act in her capacity as assistant labor minister.

The unaffiliated conservative Stockholm daily *Svenska Dagbladet* published an editorial entitled “The Hunt for Säpo”, which began:

The disappointment was in many circles great when the attorney general last Monday presented his report on the circumstances surrounding the escape of Stig Bergling. Not least Social Democratic creators of public opinion had mounted three gallows, one small for a suitable civil servant at the Prisons and Probation Administration and two larger for well-chosen officials within Säpo (SvD 24/10/1987).

Regardless of the fact that the attorney general had not directed severe criticism against Säpo, the Social Democratic press was less forgiving. The main Social Democratic daily *Arbetet* in Malmö chose the headline “Incompetent Säpo a Security Risk” (*Arbetet* 9/10/1987), and Social Democratic Stockholm tabloid *Aftonbladet* followed up with “Säpo – a joke” (*AB* 10/10/1987). Ingvar Carlsson and the Cabinet had already planned to investigate Säpo, but the escape of Bergling “was the last straw” (Lidbom 1990: 23).

There was a perceived need to scrutinize Säpo from the Social Democratic Cabinet’s perspective. But considering the relatively mild critique of Säpo regarding the Bergling escape, that incident can probably best be described as an attributed trigger. The distrust of Säpo expressed by leading spokespersons within the political left had to be parried. It was a public understanding, or a policy image, of the nature of the problem that had to be dealt with. In that sense, forces outside Cabinet created positive feedback processes that could have been politically costly to ignore. When the Säpo Committee was about to publish its first report, the Ebbe Carlsson affair broke out.

The ‘Palme group’ that took over after Holmér had not prioritized the PKK lead. The new search group continued to investigate the murder from a broad perspective, proceeding without incident for a year and a half until the biggest scandal of the investigation to that point transpired.

On 1 June 1988 the Stockholm tabloid *Expressen* published the sensational story that a secret search group had been running parallel to the official Palme group, and was still pursuing the PKK lead. That was only the beginning of the so-called ‘Ebbe Carlsson affair’. Two days later, Holmér’s former bodyguard, who at this time had been assigned by the head of Säpo as Ebbe Carlsson’s bodyguard, was detained by the Customs Service in the southern Sweden city of Helsingborg. In his car they found illegal bugging equipment, destined to bug a possible witness in the PKK lead. The equipment was ordered by Säpo and procured in England. The bodyguard was also carrying a recommendation letter, provided by National Police Board Director General Åhmansson and signed by Justice Minister Leijon (Krusell 1998; Forsberg 2003). The latter’s political career was thereby over. In the legal aftermath, chief prosecutor (of the Ebbe Carlsson affair) Ola Nilsson found out that, besides the possible PKK witness, the equipment was also meant to eavesdrop on certain Säpo personnel, most notably operative head P.G. Näss. The alleged reason was that Näss did not put much credence in the PKK lead, and besides, Ebbe Carlsson and his group believed that he knew of a threat to Palme before the murder, which he had concealed (SvD 07/01/89).

The Ebbe Carlsson affair broke about a month before the Säpo Committee was to present its first report (SOU 1988:16). According to Lidbom, Ebbe Carlsson was better informed on how Säpo worked than the director general of

the National Police Board, for which reason he had drawn upon his knowledge when conducting the investigation (Lidbom 1990: 32-39). Lidbom's chairmanship of the committee was therefore questioned in the summer of 1988, as the political opposition accused him of being involved in the affair (Ibid.). Instead, Lidbom continued as a one-man investigator from October 1988 and was at the same time (on his own request) dismissed as chair of the Säpo Committee, which was put on hold (Proposition 1988/89:108 p. 5).

The parliamentary Säpo Committee had been unanimous in its conclusion that Säpo needed a higher degree of political oversight as well as stronger leadership. The Ebbe Carlsson affair certainly underlined these conclusions. There is no evidence of entrepreneurial efforts attempting to create processes of negative feedback regarding the Säpo Committee suggestions. But it is easy to see insurmountable obstacles for possible advocates of the status quo.

9.2.3 Anti-terrorism policing: Embassy drama played up

The initiative for an anti-terrorist police force obviously dated back to the early suggestion by the Stockholm police in 1975. And the arguments against such a force – articulated by the Communist/Left party, and from 1988 also by the Environmental party and a Social Democratic faction – were the same as earlier, i.e. that a militarization of the police would lead to more violence than necessary, and the force could be used in situations other than intended. It would hence be counter-productive and risky. The main difference this time however was that arguments for an anti-terrorist force were articulated at all. In the Parliamentary Commission after the Palme murder (SOU 1988:18 pp. 175–203) as well as in the governmental proposition (1989/90:100), the arguments referred to international solidarity and national sovereignty. But what convinced Parliament, in particular its Justice Committee, to reappraise this policy issue, which theretofore had been politically stalemated? Two arguments were pivotal in this regard, of which only one had been brought up by the commission and in the governmental proposition: a reference to the occupation of the West German embassy in Stockholm in 1975. If such a thing happened again, and if a foreign power would insist on using its own police units to handle the incident due to a Swedish lack of capacity, how would we react? The second argument built on experience from abroad. Well-trained and well-equipped police were less likely to resort to unnecessary violence in a stressful situation than were ill-trained and ill-equipped – and therefore insecure – officers (Nylén 2004). The issue was thereby transferred from the original concern, i.e. regarding the type of situations a specially trained and equipped police force would be used (would it also be used against processions of demonstrators?), to

how such a force would handle a given and very particular situation compared with how the existing police would cope.

Representatives of the Stockholm police and the National Police Board paid visits to the Parliament Justice Committee and succeeded in convincing the theretofore indifferent or skeptical in the necessity of the policy solution. Committee members were exposed to a different dimension, or situation, of the problem than they had been exposed to before, which made it politically viable. Given that fifteen years had passed since Sweden last experienced a terrorist situation where a specially trained and equipped anti-terrorist police force was called for (the 1975 West German embassy drama), the alarming statistics presented in the commission reports, together with the prospect of the intervention of foreign countries, arguably functioned as accompaniment.

The police did not initially have a unified front. Reacting to the Parliamentary Commission's suggestion, the National Police Board stated their preference for the Special Response Units of Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö receiving special training and equipment, rather than the suggested changes that were limited to the Stockholm police. But when the National Police Board was asked to develop the Parliamentary Commission's proposal, imitation of sorts can be seen. At least their suggestion closely resembled that of the Inquiry Commission, which may have seemed like a future winner.

Once the Social Democratic Cabinet had decided to propose an anti-terrorist force, they alleged that this was consistent with the Parliament Justice Committee's conclusions of January 1987 (JuU 1986/87:23). That was far from true, since the Justice Committee at that time had rejected the idea of establishing an anti-terrorist police force. But the allegation arguably filled the purpose of legitimizing the proposition in order to start a process of positive feedback among those previously unfamiliar with the issue. The ruse was however uncovered by a Left party MP, but with no effect. The Cabinet had not written a particular proposition about the anti-terrorist police force, but slipped it into the budget proposition (1989/90:100 appendix 15). The parliamentary discussion on the policy initiative hence revolved around more issues than the special police force (Protocol 1989/90:109 § 6). The Left party MP's objection to the revisionist history was left unanswered, with the Cabinet representative answering only questions from non-socialist MPs on the size of the Swedish police force. Placing the proposition in the budget proposition can be seen as an entrepreneurial strategy that made it easier to keep opposing views and interpretations out of the discussion altogether.

Further developments surrounding the anti-terrorist police force (as long as it is followed here), i.e. the discussion on when the force could be used and on whose order, were prompted by incidents not connected to terrorism.

On 22 August 1994 some 100 inmates at Tidaholm prison refused to go back to their cells. The local police were called to the prison, and later in the evening the Stockholm and Gothenburg Special Response Units were brought to the scene as reinforcements. The prisoners were at that point rioting and had set fire to some buildings. The situation was not settled until the next day (Ds 1994:140 pp. 15–22). In the investigation that followed, the potential usage of the anti-terrorist police force was brought up. Even if it was clear that its assault capacity could not have been used, questions still remained regarding its potential use for consulting, logistics, etc. The issue had been overlooked in the original Cabinet proposition and clear guidance was lacking. But the investigation also highlighted that the existing regulations on the use of the force, i.e. that only the Cabinet could activate it, was in conflict with the police regulation (1 chapter, 4 §) that stipulates that police resources should be used as effectively as possible. The investigator hence suggested that the force's mandate be expanded to also include hostage situations at prisons (Ibid.: 43).

On 19 March 1995, a confused man was shot dead by a Stockholm police Special Response Unit at Möja, an island in the Stockholm archipelago. His mother had contacted the police, as he had suddenly started behaving erratically and was carrying a shotgun. Despite gas attacks the man refused to leave the building. When a police officer climbed a stair to see how the gunman was doing from outside the building, he saw the shotgun pointed at him and responded by shooting the man dead. The police commander was later sentenced to pay a fine for breach of duty. The situation had not called for the level of violence applied, including the use of teargas. However, the anti-terrorist force capitalized on the event, saying they would have solved the situation in a different way. Outside the force, this statement was considered disloyal by the police in general and the Stockholm police Special Response Units in particular. But it also prompted the Justice Minister, at the time Social Democrat Laila Freivalds, to reconsider the regulations for the anti-terrorist police force (Flyghed 2000: 153-154).

It came to be a vital interest for the newly established anti-terrorist police organization to get a political mandate to also operate in non-terrorism types of incidents. Otherwise the organization would likely languish, since real terrorism had not occurred. The organization's message after the incidents at Tidaholm prison and Möja – where they had not been used – reinforced the image conveyed before it was set up: the force could do more with less violence. And besides, the issue was portrayed as being about the efficient and effective use of taxpayer's money. This was a clever entrepreneurial strategy, which however presupposed that the public image of the force's mere existence had gained a position of normalcy.

9.2.4 Summing up

When consulting the attention-based perspective for an explanation of the policy changes that followed the Palme murder, timing and entrepreneurial efforts to bend the understanding of certain occurrences and phenomena not surprisingly protrude.

The Palme murder and the crisis it caused fulfilled the function of a window opener. The policy window was opened wide and allowed policy entrepreneurs – however not in the form of pugnacious and charismatic leaders – to advance their ideas. And other crises, like the Bergling escape and the Ebbe Carlsson affair, kept the policy window open, or increased the inlet. They were at least capitalized on to further bend the development of policy in the direction that the Jurist and Parliamentary commissions embarked upon.

Somewhat ironically, the police – both law enforcement and Säpo – were first heavily criticized for their performance in the Palme murder. But in the end, they came out stronger. Their ideas on an anti-terrorist police force and views on terrorism legislation gained momentum after the murder. This was to a large extent because inquiry commissions/committees explored these organizations when investigating the Palme murder.

9.3 Conclusions

An interesting phenomenon can be seen in the period after the Palme murder: the termination of a policy core belief system. And it is to a larger degree the actual beliefs that transformed, rather than coalition structures. Policy core beliefs that had guided policymaking in the realm of counter-terrorism for a good decade were revived as secondary aspects after the murder of Palme. That, rather than the murder as such, explains the prerequisites for policy change according to the belief-based perspective.

The attention-based perspective, however, reveals how the policy changes were brought into good currency. Interesting in that regard is that the actual Palme murder was not the main target for entrepreneurial strategies. It was rather the 1975 embassy drama, the Bergling escape and immigration policies that were played up. As described in chapter five, there are ample examples of shortfalls that could have been capitalized on with regard to the police organization and the criminal justice sector in a wider sense. But attention was directed towards counter-terrorism policies. Arguably this is because the first inquiry commissions embarked on that route (SOU 1987:14; SOU 1988:18).

Inquiry commissions by construction are less rigid institutions compared to authorities, political parties and ministries. They proved in this case to be susceptible venues for advocates of policy change. At the same time, they

represented sufficiently important arbitrary forums; their conclusions gained momentum even when they deviated from the majority's ingrained policy core beliefs.

The patterns of policy change after the Palme murder fit very well with the "garbage can" model of organizational choice (Cohen, March and Olsen 1972; Kingdon 1984). This case suggests that such patterns, implying seemingly odd or far-fetched solutions to the problem at hand, require a state in which a dominating policy core belief has outlived itself, but has yet to be superseded by another. The case in that sense proves quite well how the two perspectives combined enhance explanatory leverage.

PART 3: CONCLUSIONS

Chapter 10 Crisis and policy change

A look at the Swedish counter-terrorism policymaking process to date clearly indicates that crises have affected policy outcomes in complex ways. It is for instance clear that terrorist experiences (domestic or foreign) have not been the only events affecting Swedish counter-terrorism policymaking. And not all terrorist events have been conducive to Swedish counter-terrorism policy change.

We have examined three crisis cases in this study, two of which were terrorism related – the Bulltofta skyjacking in 1972 and the seizure of the West German Stockholm embassy in 1975 – and one with unclear origin and purpose – the murder of Prime Minister Olof Palme in 1986. The selection fell inductively: when organizing the material, separate or partially separate counter-terrorism policy processes were discernible following these three crises. In this regard it is striking that the most vivid and violent experience of terrorism on Swedish soil – the drama at the West German embassy – had such marginal effects on policy. Equally striking is the fact that a non-terrorism incident (as far as we know) – the Palme murder – produced substantial policy changes. The Palme murder, however, represents one of the most traumatizing crises in contemporary Swedish history. Political and criminal justice systems lost legitimacy and vitality as a consequence of not having prevented the deed, and for the shoddy search efforts and many mishaps and scandals that followed the assassination. The entire process was unsatisfying beyond comparison. The Palme murder was not only a decapitation of national leadership; it also represents a compound failure of the Swedish justice apparatus (Hansén and Stern 2001).

A different set of crises or events – in this study colloquially referred to as affairs – had tangible effects on the policy process. The IB affair in 1973, the

hospital spy affair in 1975, the Stig Bergling affair in 1979 and his escape in 1987, and the Ebbe Carlsson affair in 1988 can all be characterized as institutional crises affecting the public trust in the Cabinet and governmental agencies. The most well known success of Säpo – uncovering and foiling Norbert Kröger and his band's plans to kidnap Anna-Greta Leijon in 1977 – was however also referred to as an affair – the Kröger affair. These affairs did not trigger counter-terrorism policy processes, but had an impact insofar as they circumscribed or stretched the room to maneuver in already ongoing processes. In fact, the Wennerström espionage affair in 1963 had already set some parameters for how counter-terrorism came to be managed initially.

This study aims to clarify the relationship between the phenomenon of crisis and patterns of policy change. The empirical chapters have examined the instigation of, discussions about, and reforms of both preemptive and repressive aspects within the law and order domain of counter-terrorism policies. Prior research into the acute response phase and management of crises in the Swedish criminal justice sector (Hansén and Hagström 2004; Hansén and Nordqvist 2005) indeed prompted a few questions, which were further developed in part one of this study. Why did the Bulltofta skyjacking provoke an exceedingly fast policy process, primarily affecting legal means for extraditing unwanted foreigners or refusing them entry? Why did the policy initiatives after the West German embassy drama not result in substantive policy changes? The Palme murder was poorly managed, but why did reappraisals of counter-terrorism policies follow in the wake of the assassination?

These queries in turn nursed an analytical ambition to explore mechanisms providing explanatory leverage to longitudinal policy processes marked by both periods of policy stability and periods of rapid reassessment and change. Attention was paid to multiple streams theory, advocacy coalition framework and punctuated equilibrium theory. Notions of crisis, focusing events and external perturbation play a role in all three theories' accounts of policy dynamics, and all question the empirical validity and analytical cogency of the 'stage heuristics' or 'textbook approach' in studying policy processes (Sabatier 1999: 6-9).³⁸ They instead rely on mechanisms that here have been formed into belief-based and attention-based perspectives. The three theories emphasize somewhat differently the various aspects of these mechanisms, but are largely overlapping and complementary.

The main contribution of this study is its consistent focus on crisis in relation to policy change patterns. The academic discourse on policy change and stability has certainly included crisis as a phenomenon, and at times attributed

38 The stages heuristics divide the complex policy process into discrete stages – normally agenda setting, policy formulation and legitimation, implementation, and evaluation (Sabatier 1999: 6).

explanatory leverage to it in instances of policy change without further ado. But studies that put an explicit primacy on crisis, and organize time sequences thereafter, have been rare. This may seem surprising, given the ubiquity of crisis and the stature they have in everyday policymaking. A contribution to the theoretical frameworks elaborated here is exposing them to the process tracing method, which has facilitated probing mechanisms that they point at as explanatory variables. Another contribution to the policy change discourse is the insertion of a highly *étatist* policy subsystem, dealing with the criminal justice policy domain. That sector is certainly not overrepresented in the literature on policy change and stability, even if it is arguably central to the body politic.

The remainder of this chapter will be structured as follows. Section 10.1 will discuss the policy change patterns. How the theoretically derived mechanisms have exposed Swedish counter-terrorism policy process will be investigated in section 10.2. How the cases at hand have informed the theoretical body of knowledge will be evaluated in section 10.3, where suggestions for further research will also be presented. The broader analytical agenda that emerges from this study will be discussed in 10.4.

10.1 Policy change patterns

In part one of this book, the patterns of policy change were described as they unfolded after each crisis. Here they will be summarized thematically to illustrate the fluctuations of each theme. The categorizations of the policy change patterns were based on Rose and Davies' (1994) effort to discriminate between intended and unintended policy goals and program means. This way the explanandum of the study (these policy change patterns) were successfully separated from the mechanisms that would later explain the nexus between crisis and policy change.

10.1.1 Terrorism legislation: From policy innovation to policy innovation

The 1973 Terrorist Act (SFS 1973:162) was an immediate policy upshot of the Bulltofta skyjacking in September 1972. Croatian separatists had for a number of years harassed symbols of the Yugoslavian state and its interests in Scandinavia. In 1971 they occupied the Yugoslavian consulate in Gothenburg and killed the Yugoslavian Stockholm ambassador in cold blood. But it was the skyjacking that undoubtedly galvanized the policy process.

The legislation was rapidly drafted, and was an innovation without equal in Swedish policymaking at that time. But how can its establishment be characterized? The main clauses of the Terrorist Act made it possible to extradite and

refuse entry to certain individuals, but even before that legislation on terrorism, in particular the Aliens Act (SFS 1954:193), stipulated that no foreigner had an unconditional right to reside in Sweden. However, the Aliens Act required a personal requisite, whereas the Terrorist Act was built on an organizational requisite, i.e. people who belonged to, or could be suspected of belonging to a terrorist group, were subject to the law. The 1973 Terrorist Act also allowed the police to conduct investigations to find out if a person could be suspected of belonging to terrorist organizations. Compared to the Criminal Code, the investigative measures of the Terrorist Act required a lower level of evidence.

In factual terms, the Terrorist Act therefore did not provide law enforcement authorities with radically new tools to prevent crime. An examination of how it was applied reveals that until 1976, only one person was refused entry into the country and eleven were deported, four of who could stay in Sweden based on the right to asylum. Of these eleven, five belonged to Kommando Holger Meins, the group that occupied the West German embassy in 1975. They had already committed crimes when they were extradited, for which reason the Terrorist Act was not applicable in a strict sense (since its purpose was to deport people that could be suspected of committing politically motivated violence). Regulations in the Aliens Act would however have made the deportation possible (Munck 2004). Accounts from the National Police Board and the Justice Ministry indicate that the law was rather toothless (Persson 1990) and merely fulfilled a symbolic function (Munck 2004).

But precisely for symbolic reasons, regardless of its effectiveness in application, the Terrorist Act encountered severe opposition from population segments and Parliament based on principle. For a vocal minority, the Terrorist Act implied a major change of principle, since coercive measures could be taken against individuals who could be suspected of having criminal inclinations but had not yet committed a crime. A 'guilt by association' principle had found its way into Swedish legal usage. From a governmental point of view, the legislation was portrayed as a breach in tradition, although a necessary evil and hence a major change. Its initial status as a time-limited emergency powers act is also indicative of this.

The changes that terrorism legislation underwent in 1976 were described as symbolic gestures. A personal requisite was added to the organizational requisite, indicating who could be subject to the Special Investigations Act (the remainder of the Terrorist Act). A person thereafter had to be individually suspected of a propensity to commit an act of terrorism to fall under the law's jurisdiction. This can be seen as policy-oriented learning, or an adaptation from critique directed towards the legislation. But the change was symbolic in the sense that it was only an adjustment of prevailing practice. The 1980 and 1982 adjustments to the terrorism related parts of the Aliens Act were minor, or even insignificant.

They did not change anything from either a principle or practical point of view. The Aliens Act was reformed which required some adjustments to terrorism legislation, not least since parts of the Terrorist Act had been transferred to the Aliens Act. The changes were however more of an editorial nature.

The question is what kind of change the 1989 and 1991 Terrorist Acts actually implied. The 1989 legislation (SFS 1989:530) came about when the parliamentary Terrorism Legislation Committee was still sitting, and was rather a consequence of the fact that a new Aliens Act was established in 1989 (SFS 1989:529). But the Special Investigations Act (1975:1360), which had been renewed annually since its split from the original Terrorist Act in 1976, was merged into the new Terrorist Act. The opportunity for Parliament to vote annually on a renewal thereby disappeared. However, the Cabinet was still obliged to report each year to Parliament on how the law had been applied. Another change compared to previous legislation stated that foreigners, even if they had obtained permanent residence permits or had otherwise strong connections to Sweden, could be subject to the law. The 1991 Terrorist Act (SFS 1991:572) included three more notable changes: the organizational requisite was abolished, the paragraphs on refusing entry to the country were deleted (the law in those parts thereafter only dealt with deportation), and some restrictions regarding the freedom of movement for presumptive terrorists residing in Sweden under the right to asylum were removed.

In the early 1990s a loud minority still opposed the very existence of a discriminatory law that was only applicable to foreigners. From a belief-based principle point of view, the 1989 and 1991 changes were for this minority inconclusive. Some welcomed the relaxations the 1991 law meant for presumptive terrorists' freedom of movement, for instance. It is notable that the Social Democratic Cabinet did not vindicate the mere existence of the law, and that the issue of making the Special Investigations Act permanent was referred to as pragmatic, rather than as a matter of principle (Proposition 1988/89:86 pp. 139–140). In terms of content, however, the new legislation implied innovations insofar as it received permanent status and wider applicability, but also more restricted investigative means.

10.1.2 Säpo: From “overlooked” adaptations to reform

Säpo has had the main responsibility for implementing the Terrorist Act since its inception in 1973. Based on their intelligence activities, Säpo has recommended to the Cabinet which organizations should be placed on the so-called terrorist list (when the organizational requisite was still in use), and which individuals should be deported based on the personal requisite of the Terrorist Act.

Coercive measures such as wiretapping were used by Säpo to determine if an individual should be suspected as a potential terrorist.

However, when the Cabinet decided to form a parliamentary committee to scrutinize Säpo in 1987 (the so-called Säpo Committee), the justice minister pointed out that Säpo had been largely overlooked when the rest of the Swedish police had been subject to far-reaching reforms in the mid-1980s (Directive 1988:49). It is true that few political initiatives to change policies related to Säpo had been taken over the years.

The policy dynamics between Social Democratic Cabinets and Säpo have since the 1965 nationalization of the police revolved around trust. Before terrorism manifested as a policy problem, subversion filled that space. Countering both security threats were not essentially different activities from Säpo's perspective. When the Cabinet in 1969 passed the Law on Personnel Monitoring (SFS 1969:446) the idea was to better oversee Säpo's investigative measures and in so doing prevent them from applying coercive measures to individuals based on their opinion. Enacting this law implied a breach between the Cabinet and Säpo, not least since the leadership of Säpo and the National Police Board were informed that the military's Information Bureau, with closer ties to the Social Democratic party, continued to keep files on individuals based on their opinion. It would take two decades and the murder of a prime minister before the relationship normalized.

Meanwhile, Säpo underwent reorganizations of an adaptive nature. The mere appearance of terrorism as a phenomenon in Sweden in the early 1970s required internal re-prioritizations away from counter-subversion activities. After the West German embassy drama, political pressure dictated an emphasis on Säpo's counter-terrorism unit despite internal prioritizations leaning towards a greater focus on counter-espionage (Frånstedt 2003). When Bergling was exposed as a spy in 1979, internal reforms were carried out to make the organization less vulnerable to infiltration. This was probably due to pressure from the Jurist Commission, which was formed after the Bergling affair.

The 1989 Säpo reform represents perhaps most of all closure to the infected relationship between Säpo and the Social Democratic cabinets. Säpo was given a more independent position vis-à-vis the National Police Board and increased status, as its head became a director general. Political oversight of Säpo priorities increased, which is also indicative of political trust in the organization. In that sense, the 1989 reform can be seen as a policy innovation.

10.1.3 Repressive policing: From reluctant adaptation to radical reform

The 1975 seizure of the West German embassy in Stockholm revealed that the Swedish police lacked the capacity to manage severe hostage situations. The first visible policy change related to this shortcoming appeared in 1979, when the Stockholm police's Special Response Units started to train and equip to better meet such situations (Proposition 1977/78:100, appendix 5). The Stockholm police and the National Police Board however saw this policy outcome as a disappointment (Ds Ju 1977:2, reservations). The changes were not as extensive as they had aimed for when initiating the process, and they therefore considered them only a minor achievement.

The 1979 changes to the Stockholm police's Special Response Units met political opposition from the more or less same quarters as had opposed the Terrorist Act, citing a general fear of a militarization of the police. But the Cabinet (a non-socialist coalition at the time) reassured them that a small step had been taken deliberately. The justice minister promised Parliament that he would monitor the implementation process to make sure that the Stockholm police's Special Response Units did not transform into something beyond what had been agreed upon politically (Protocol 1978/79:57 § 13). From the Cabinet and Parliament's point of view, the change was therefore also of minor consequence.

The Palme murder generated interest in the police's tactical assault capacity, and in April 1990 Parliament approved a governmental proposition to create a special task force to fight terrorism within the Stockholm police district (Protocol 1989/90:109 § 6 and § 11). In light of the solid opposition to such a force at virtually all political levels before the Palme murder (advocated almost exclusively by the police), the policy change must be considered major. The issue had been lingering on the policy agenda for almost two decades, with minor adjustments being made, but the creation of an anti-terrorist force had never been approached before. When that breach took place, further developments such as moving command from the Cabinet to the police and allowing the force to also be used for non-terrorist events, were regarded as minor and pragmatic adjustments. However, against the backdrop of fear that had previously hindered the force's creation (i.e. that a too-independent police unit with a high assault capacity could produce more violence than necessary), such steps might have been regarded as greater in principle than putting the force into place. By any measure, the establishment of the anti-terrorist police unit was a clear policy innovation.

Table 2: Summary of policy change patterns

	Background	Bulltofta drama	Embassy drama	Palme murder
Terrorism legislation	Non-existent	Major change/ policy innovation	Instrumental adaptation partly due to change in other legislation	Instrumental adaptation and policy innovation
Säpo	Instrumental adaptation – due to mistrusting police/political relations	Maintain routine	Instrumental adaptation	Major change/ policy innovation to restore political/ police trust
Anti-terrorist police force	Non-existent	Maintain routine	Symbolic gestures	Major change/ policy innovation

10.2 Mechanisms

The main thrust of the argument of this study is that the relationship between crisis and policy change is far from self-explanatory. The match between crisis and policy change patterns described above and primarily throughout part one does not suggest that policy change is necessarily related to the shortcomings that the crisis exposed, or that it takes place at all. It is however clear that crisis affects the policy process in ways that justify the careful scrutiny of mechanisms connecting events with policy change patterns. This study relies on a mix of belief-based and attention-based mechanisms derived from the advocacy coalition framework, and the multiple streams and punctuated equilibrium theories. They all encourage viewing the policy maker as a boundedly rational individual. The boundaries of individual choice are made up of contextual opportunities and constraints to help make sense of a complex reality. Below we will see how the belief-based and attention-based perspectives, respectively, helped explain the nexus between the phenomenon of crisis and patterns of policy change observed in the case of Swedish counter-terrorism policymaking.

10.2.1 Belief-based mechanisms and patterns of policy change

The advocacy coalition framework is belief-based. It stipulates that policy core beliefs tend to remain stable, even when confronted with new and strange experiences. The belief structures typically remain stable over long periods of time, and crises are likely to be interpreted as to fit a given belief structure. Policy core beliefs provide an explanatory dimension to the reason behind the scope of potential solutions. For the individual policy maker, policy core beliefs reduce uncertainty as to which policy domain a problem belongs to. An advocacy

coalition shares the same belief structure in a given policy issue and is composed of policy makers such as politicians, bureaucrats, public opinion makers, pressure groups, etc. An advocacy coalition cannot be meaningfully separated from its policy core beliefs. Two to four advocacy coalitions normally compete for legislative power within a policy domain. The coalition holding legislative power over a policy issue is by inference a majority coalition. When a minority coalition defeats a majority coalition, policy change is likely to follow. But a majority coalition can also learn from a minority coalition, if the level of conflict between them is not too high.

The analytical perspective, here called belief-based, does not attribute any of the three crises cases much leverage as change agents of belief systems. It does however give reasonable accounts of both instances of policy change and policy stability. The 1973 inception of the Terrorist Act – regardless of the fact that it signaled a breach with prior legal traditions and that the phenomenon of terrorism was novel – was according to the belief-based perspective a translation of a related policy problem, i.e. counter-subversion. The embassy drama, like the Bulltofta skyjacking, was certainly problematic and challenging, but did not fundamentally alter policy core beliefs on the law enforcement role of the police, and therefore did not challenge beliefs on how to cope with terrorism. The Palme murder served as a catalyst, not to policy change per se, but for reassessing policy core beliefs that in that process were determined to be outdated. That which had been considered policy core beliefs before the murder resurfaced as secondary aspects after. None of the three crises challenged coalition structures with regard to counter-terrorism policymaking.

It should be noted that crises other than the three examined played into reinforcing existing beliefs. The street riots in the 60s and 70s, the hospital spy affair, the Bergling affair and Bergling escape, and the Ebbe Carlsson affair were all interpreted by the Säpo and police skeptical advocacy coalition as confirmation of their distrust. These crises had to some extent a bigger effect on the policymaking process, in the sense that they undid or did one better on affecting policy makers' cognitions, at least compared to the cases where terrorism was managed.

The belief-based perspective suggests that the terrorism legislation described was consistent with the majority coalition's policy core belief that terrorism should ideally be kept out of the country, and that the legislation was effective in a preventive sense. For the police and justice ministry, the legislation was a secondary aspect at best. But the exact contours of the legislation seem to have been secondary aspects for the Social Democratic authors of the Terrorist Act. Different changes and amendments therefore came about through policy-oriented learning. The 1976 partition and incorporation of a personal requisite is indicative of a learning process where the terrorism legislation-averse minority

coalition convinced the majority of the perils connected to the organizational requisite. After the Palme murder, a type of policy-oriented learning is discernible, where the beliefs of Säpo regarding Swedish immigration policies came to have a decisive effect on the 1991 Terrorist Act. To some extent the mere inception of the Terrorist Act in 1973 was also the result of policy-oriented learning. The emergence of Croatian terrorism in the early 70s informed the policy coalition advocating counter-subversion policies that Swedish domestic security also implied keeping some foreigners in check. Those are the only instances where policy-oriented learning had an effect on the policy process. But it should also be remembered that Swedish law enforcement learned the difficulties of dealing with dangerous people. The lessons learned were the results of the Bulltofta and West German embassy cases, as well as the 1973 bank robbery and hostage drama at Norrmalmstorg in Stockholm (Nylén 2004). They did not however have any immediate effects on the policymaking process. But the 1990 establishment of the anti-terrorist police can be seen as a remote form of policy-oriented learning, the result of the Palme murder which forced a reassessment of policy core beliefs. Sweden was thereby preparing to handle not the last but the penultimate crisis.

The belief-based theoretical perspective encourages scrutinizing sufficiently important arbitrary forums that grease the wheels of policy-oriented learning. Over the years, crisis-induced commissions with fairly broad representation have in that respect determined more than anything else the trajectory of policy change patterns. The Terrorism Commission set up after the Bulltofta drama and the various commissions and committees that followed the Palme murder all resulted in extensive policy change. At the same time, the ordinary (non crisis-induced) Police Commission that began an overhaul of the Swedish police in 1975 effectively quelled initiatives to change the prerequisites for the Stockholm police Special Response Units to tackle terrorism. This indicates that institutional, as well as party political, rigidity has been overcome when a particular situation has prompted moving the initiative to groups focusing on that specific problem. They filled functions of sufficiently important arbitrary forums. The 1975 Police Commission was not established due to a particular crisis, and was heavily imbued with Social Democratic beliefs on criminal justice policy. It was not receptive to ideas advocated by the minority coalition.

10.2.2 Attention-based mechanisms and patterns of policy change

Both the multiple streams and punctuated equilibrium theories are attention-based. They certainly admit that beliefs, or preferences, remain stable over long periods of time, or change only grudgingly. However, they acknowledge that novel and unfamiliar situations hold a potential for radical policy change,

depending on how these are framed and understood. Entrepreneurial strategies are not important to ACF – since policy core beliefs are insensitive to spin doctoring – but are paramount to PE and MS. A skillful policy entrepreneur can bend the understanding of a situation to fit a preferred solution. Especially the punctuated equilibrium theory pays attention to the previously disinterested. If advocacy coalitions are supposed to be stable, they should not include all potential constituencies. In accordance with the attention-based perspective, the policy entrepreneur can initiate processes of positive or negative feedback by including or excluding the previously disinterested.

Not surprisingly, the attention-based theoretical perspective ascribes the three specially investigated crises a high level of explanatory leverage for the policy change patterns reported in part one of this study. They all opened opportunity windows for policy entrepreneurs. Policy outcomes are explained by the ways actors managed to put forward their pet solutions, or hindered other parties' initiatives. In this light, the Bulltofta skyjacking opened a window for the Cabinet to push a policy solution in the form of a Terrorist Act through with remarkable speed. The unavoidably dramatic nature of the terrorist attack gave the Terrorist Act sponsors the leeway to promote their legislation which, without the skyjacking drama, would have likely been associated by its opponents with the at the time infected issue of opinion monitoring. The legislation was by all means associated with the monitoring of opinion, but thanks to the Bulltofta drama such associations did not catch on. The 1975 embassy drama certainly gave rise to entrepreneurial efforts to advocate the need for a better-trained and equipped police force. The initiative was quelled by referring it to a policy venue, the 1975 Police Commission, where the prospects of success were minimal. The subsequent effort was quelled with a similar tactics. It was referred back to where it came from, the National Police Board, for further investigation. In 1982, the policy proposal was simply put off with reference to the budget situation. But the Palme murder opened a new window for policy change. This time, the various commissions set up as a direct or indirect consequence of the assassination worked as policy venues that turned out to be highly receptive to ideas that had been developed within the police.

The notion of policy entrepreneurs is pivotal to the attention-based perspective, as is the notion of entrepreneurial strategy. However, the two have slightly different connotations. The former transfers the thought to a pugnacious, charismatic, or at least clever spin-doctor, whereas the latter rather leads the thought to collective ambitions, not as dependent on leadership practices. The empirical evidence provided in this study suggests that entrepreneurial strategies have been paramount in pushing through policy change, but that pugnacious leaders have been less successful in the Swedish context. The General Director of the National Police Board, Carl Persson, had great success in his early efforts

to centralize power and re-equip the Swedish police. But in the domain of counter-terrorism, his efforts were rather counter-productive. With regard to the changes that took place after the Palme murder, it is easier to point towards entrepreneurial strategies than at particular policy entrepreneurs. It was for example a strategy of the police to sell the Parliament Justice Committee on the virtues of creating an anti-terrorist police force, but it was not so clear who managed to do that. The smooth policy entrepreneur, if existing at all, maneuvered far from the public limelight.

The attention-based perspective urges the analyst to focus attention on processes of positive and negative feedback, the reward for skillful entrepreneurial strategies that result in wider endorsement of pet solutions, be they policy change or stability. This tool then helps in explaining the inception of the 1973 Terrorist Act by suggesting that the Bulltofta skyjacking worked to dissociate the legislation from other legal means to monitor citizens. The police initiative to increase its assault capacity after the West German embassy drama was on the other hand associated with a militarization of the police, which many felt was frightening and alien for Sweden. The desired police capacity was hence dissociated from the embassy drama and the dilemmas it implied as such. After the Palme murder, the anti-terrorist police force was associated with international solidarity and national sovereignty, whereas the 1991 Terrorist Act was successfully dissociated from policies on aliens, which it in fact – at least partly – purported to comprise. This time the changes were dissociated from the crisis as such, i.e. the Palme assassination.

Policy entrepreneurial strategies were behind these works of image making that to various degrees aimed at catching the zeitgeist, or politics stream, to receive wider support. That is where other crises come in, according to the attention-based perspective. The National Police Board could not avoid being associated with the hospital spy affair and the Bergling affair, which restricted its possibilities to promote other policy ideas, even if they were unrelated. Interestingly, the many mishaps that followed the Palme murder indeed exacerbated the image of a dysfunctional criminal justice system. Many of the managerial shortfalls were in the process completely overlooked (Dekker and Hansén 2004), but with respect to counter-terrorism, solutions were prompted on a structural level. The message was rubbed in time and again: the system does not work. Entrepreneurial strategies directed the solutions primarily towards counter-terrorism.

10.2.3 Combined analytic leverage

As should be clear by now, the objective has not been to select a winner among the belief-based and attention-based perspectives on analyzing the nexus between

crises and policy change patterns. But it deserves to be emphasized: the different views of the boundedly rational individual, implying two alternative ways of reaching collective action formation, have a synergistic relationship in terms of explaining policy change patterns related to crises. In chapter six it was assumed that the selective attender would be flexible on different secondary aspects within the parameters of a given policy core realm. The relationship between the two perspectives was established a priori, for which reason it is hardly surprising that the relation was also traceable when contrasted with reality.

The belief-based perspective provides an understanding of an issue's stakeholder structure and what is actually at stake prior to the crisis. It points toward the resistance to crisis-induced policy change that advocates of alternative policy solutions need to break through. Policy core beliefs may however survive the type of crisis scrutinized here, and majority coalitions may retain legislative power over policy domains within public administration for extended periods, regardless of changes in government. The scope for policy change related to crises is therefore at any given time circumscribed by the boundaries of the dominant advocacy coalition's policy core beliefs.

The attention-based perspective does a better job in explaining why certain solutions make (or not make) it on to the policy agenda, and from there go on to become new policies. This is because it shows how entrepreneurial strategies and strategists maneuver to promote their solutions, working to instill certain understandings of events and ideas. The perspective comes closer to the notion of crisis-induced policy behavior. However, this study indicates that the complex and ambiguous reality of crisis can be bent to a certain extent, and that dominant core beliefs determine the potential range of that bending. It also shows that crises can trigger reappraisals of belief-systems, and that periods where policy core beliefs are reassessed due to crises are extremely fertile for "garbage can" policy decision making.

The fact that the two perspectives provide a combined explanation to the crisis-induced policy change patterns, which is more viable than each perspective would produce individually, is perhaps the most interesting theoretical finding of this effort. If it holds in more cases, it certainly has contributed to theory development.

10.3 Theoretical implications

There was much explanatory leverage to be found in the two perspectives, which illuminated the nexus between crisis and policy change patterns within the domain of Swedish counter-terrorism. But the Swedish policymaking experience did not always fit well with the theoretical foundation. Some empirical findings challenge MS, ACF and PE assumptions, as will be discussed below.

10.3.1 Implications for the belief-based perspective

The belief-based suppositions, essentially derived from ACF, certainly anticipated that prevailing beliefs would survive crises on the assumption that coalition interaction and cohesion could be preserved. In this study, it has been easier to ascertain that beliefs have survived crises than to establish coalition structures and interaction.

The debacle between the Justice Ministry and the leadership of the National Police Board, as well as the unfortunate relationship between General Director Carl Persson and Säpo chief Hans Holmér in the 1970s, certainly allows for the interpretation that conditions for coalition cohesion were not present. Yet, beliefs were shared on which individuals should be kept under surveillance for counter-subversion or counter-terrorism purposes.

Government turnovers and bureaucratic reshufflings within the criminal justice sector in the period between the embassy drama and the Palme murder do not seem to have provided advantageous conditions for policy stability. Such conditions, according to ACF, are “external (system) events”, which are not so stable and likely to produce at least minor policy change (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999: 149). Such changes on the political and administrative front do not seem to have had any significant impacts in terms of policy change and stability. All policy changes reported in this study came about during periods of Social Democratic rule, and the long period of policy stability was accompanied by political turbulence.

This is of course only one longitudinal case study, focusing on one policy domain in one country. But it includes many observations. The evidence calls attention to interaction patterns of advocacy coalitions, and how these are linked to belief systems. Future research would benefit from making empirical surveys on to what extent shared beliefs need to interact, and how such interaction patterns should be classified. This study also calls for a ‘Europeanized’ application of external system events that should at least include consensual and/or parliamentary systems such as Sweden’s. A body of empirical knowledge is needed to determine the expected implications of political power shifts and for holding office across elections in such polities.

In the theoretical chapter, the ACF notion that policy-oriented learning would likely only produce minor policy change was questioned. The evidence presented by this study points toward instances of policy-oriented learning that were connected to instances of minor policy change. But both the inception of the 1973 Terrorist Act and the major changes it underwent in 1991 were results of policy-oriented learning. These observations underpin the initial questioning, but also suggest a possible solution: the scope of policy change (major/minor) should not be as intimately related to belief-system transformation as

ACF suggests. These changes were major (in the ACF sense) for segments of the majority coalition's constituency, but were rather consistent with prevailing beliefs of the Social Democratic elite and initiators of these changes. Major policy change did not require major changes in their policy core beliefs. The avenue suggested by Rose and Davies (1994), and also deployed in the first part of this book, may be a better way of characterizing patterns of policy change. It certainly eliminates the risk of mixing that which is to be explained with essential explanatory variables.

Lastly, a few comments are in order on the ACF approach to the cognitive world of policy makers, which is explicitly instrumental and as such preoccupied with so-called 'cold cognitions'. Of interest are beliefs that have a bearing on a particular policy domain, a certain subsystem, or a specific policy suggestion. ACF does not encourage the investigator to account for so-called 'hot cognitions', the extent to which 'affect' also has an impact on the boundaries of rational choice (Lebow and Stein 1993). It is clear that the personal tensions between individual decision makers in the Justice Ministry and the National Police Board in the 1970s had an effect on Swedish counter-terrorism policy-making and Swedish police politics overall. These are not easily attributable to beliefs about the instrumental effects of various options. The explanatory leverage of the belief-based perspective would probably benefit from elaborating 'hot cognitions' when accounting for cognitive aspects as boundaries for rational choice. Before moving on to implications for the attention-based perspective, it should be pointed out that this last point is also valid for that perspective. The reasons for attention shifts and efforts to create positive and negative feedback processes may very well stem from affection.

10.3.2 Implications for the attention-based perspective

The attention-based assumptions explain policy change or stability as effects of *intentional* entrepreneurial strategies. The perspective, somewhat deceptively, also highlights successful entrepreneurial strategies. This goes for multiple streams theory in particular, where the policy entrepreneur is discovered while searching for policy change explanations.

The notion of negative feedback processes implies that someone's intentions or aspirations have been successfully subdued. In that regard, a kind of zero sum game is discernible, where one party's success corresponds with another party's failure. The logic of punctuated equilibrium theory recognizes this, even if emphasis is on the successful party. However, this study gives witness to *unintentional* entrepreneurial efforts that have had impact on the patterns of policy change.

There is of course a difference between unintentional policy means and unintended policy effects. The failed attempt by the police to reorganize the Stockholm police Special Response Units in the 1970s is an example of an intentional entrepreneurial strategy with an unintended policy outcome. In that case, the actual outcome corresponded with the intention of an opposing party, and was thus intentional from the perspective of the adversary.

But the reform of Säpo in 1989 speaks of an entrepreneurial strategy of the Cabinet (i.e. to have Carl Lidbom chair the Säpo Committee), the intentions of which remain quite nebulous. Moreover, Lidbom's scrutiny had a decisive impact on the Terrorism Legislation Committee, which – at least from the onset – was unintended in terms of the policy solutions that transpired.

These findings imply that policy entrepreneurship cannot, in an unqualified way, be attributed to explain instances of policy change or stability. To understand the role of policy entrepreneurship, intentional or unintentional instances of both success and failure, requires further analysis. The evidence here certainly encourages the investigator to be cautious with observations of entrepreneurial strategies and efforts. The analysis should not begin with instances of entrepreneurial success that are traced backwards, but should rather start with the impetus for entrepreneurial strategizing and closely monitor where it leads.

10.4 Theoretical perspectives, process tracing and explanations for policy change

This last section will comment on the research process and the broader analytical agenda that emerges from this study.

The historical explanation for the development of Swedish counter-terrorism policymaking was carried out by exploring two theoretical perspectives. The exploration as such followed the process tracing method. How well did that work? The process tracing strategy is a tool for unveiling the causal mechanisms that explain the outcome of a historical case, where the explanation is intimately related to a 'class' of events; a set of theoretical assumptions. Does that imply that this study has actually analyzed two cases, one for each perspective that were however complementary? That would have been true if the Swedish case had only informed the two perspectives individually. It has been discussed above how that aspect of theory development – the generation of new or different variables – was advanced by the Swedish example. With regard to the two perspectives, it was conceptually assumed in chapter six that they were complementary, although this assumption was examined empirically in the chapters that followed. In that sense, the case study method using the process tracing strategy fulfilled a different theory-developing task. In an interpretative way, it

closely examined the roles of causal mechanisms in the context of an individual case, whose complementary relationship could be better hypothesized after empirical investigation. The belief-based perspective provides delimitations, within which policy change is feasible, whereas the attention-based perspective comes closer at explaining policymaking behavior within the parameters provided by dominant policy core beliefs. This hypothesized relationship deserves to be further investigated in different political systems and/or in other policy domains.

How well the exploration of the two perspectives worked using the process tracing strategy is also related to how convincingly the processes were traced. To trace a process to the point of being certain that the underlying reasons for each decision point are unveiled is admittedly a daunting task. But it is also a question of where the theoretical frameworks encourage the researcher to look. The underlying reasons are supposed to correspond with theoretical assumptions. In that respect, it is possible that the process tracing strategy asks too much of the theoretical perspectives. It has been difficult to empirically corroborate assumptions of the belief-based perspective in particular. Mechanisms have been consistent with empirical findings, but maybe less convincingly causal. This point has bearing on both the sources used and the sources needed, but empirical findings that are merely congruent with theoretical assumptions are also helpful in the theory-developing enterprise (George and Bennett 2004: 181-204). Observations of congruency can, at least hypothetically, open the door to and entertain further examination, whereas incongruence alerts the investigator of inconsistencies and the indistinctness of the theoretical frameworks employed. The process tracing method may have had mixed success here, but remains a potentially prosperous route to take in making a contribution to the theoretical body of knowledge on the reasons for policy change and policy stability.

Samenvatting in het Nederlands

Crisis en perspectieven op beleidsverandering: vorming van een Zweeds contraterrorismebeleid

Contraterrorisme, crisismanagement en beleidsverandering

Terrorisme heeft zich in de afgelopen decennia gemanifesteerd als één van de grootste bedreigingen van open, pluralistische democratieën. Uitgevoerde terroristische aanslagen of verregaande samenzweringen om terreur te zaaien, betekenen een mislukking voor elke zichzelf respecterende staat. Terroristische aanslagen leiden er vaak toe dat staten hun middelen, strategieën en tegenmaatregelen herzien, ook met betrekking tot controlerende en dwingende maatregelen tegen de bevolking die ze in de eerste plaats moeten beschermen en veiligheid moeten bieden. Omdat het bestrijden van terrorisme voelbaar kan worden voor burgers en gevolgen kan hebben ver buiten de groepen die moeten worden bestreden, is dit beleidsgebied een zaak van groot maatschappelijk belang. Een belangrijk aspect van terrorismebestrijdingsbeleid is hoe het wordt beïnvloed door crises. De terroristische aanslagen die de wereld sinds 11 september 2001 getroffen hebben, lijken op een duidelijk verband te wijzen: crises genereren beleidsveranderingen. Maar is dit altijd het geval?

Contraterrorisme wordt in deze studie gezien als een vorm van crisismanagement. In het algemeen wordt contraterrorisme geassocieerd met preventieve maatregelen, terwijl crisismanagement vaak geassocieerd wordt met acute besluitvormingsprocessen en besluitvormingsprocessen onder stress wanneer de crisis reeds een feit is. Bij crisismanagement gaat het er echter ook om achteraf lering te trekken uit het gebeurde met het doel de effecten van toekomstige crises te voorkomen of te verzachten. Men zou kunnen zeggen dat er een vanzelfsprekend en aan een drang tot zelfbehoud gekoppeld verband is tussen crisiservaringen en beleidsprocessen.

Een probleem is dat een gegeven crisis op zich niet noodzakelijk de richting aangeeft voor beleidsontwikkeling. Zowel offensieve, repressieve, als reactieve of preventieve maatregelen kunnen als efficiënt beschouwd worden in het kader van de drang tot zelfbehoud. In dat opzicht worden beleidsprocessen eerder gekenmerkt door ideeën, voorkeuren en voorstellingen dan door gestaafde verbanden tussen oorzaak en gevolg.

Dit proefschrift gaat in de eerste plaats over precies die relatie tussen crises en beleidsveranderingen, waarvoor de terrorismebestrijdingspolitiek de empirische basis vormt. Meer in het bijzonder wordt het Zweedse contraterrorismebeleid gerelateerd aan Zweedse crisiservaringen. Het uitgangspunt zijn drie crises in de Zweedse politiesector: de kaping op de luchthaven Bulltofta in 1972, de bezetting van de West-Duitse ambassade in Stockholm in 1975 en de moord op

de Zweedse premier Olof Palme in 1986. De twee eerstvermelde crises werden veroorzaakt door terroristen, terwijl de moord op premier Palme voor zover bekend geen terroristische achtergrond heeft. De selectie van deze drie crises heeft echter niets te maken met hun oorzaak, maar met het feit dat ze ieder apart geleid hebben tot een druk tot verandering met betrekking tot het beleid dat het Zweedse contraterrorisme bepaalt. Het empirische doel van deze studie is het verklaren van de gevallen van beleidsverandering en -stabiliteit die op deze crises volgden. Het theoretische doel is een bijdrage te leveren aan de theorieontwikkeling met betrekking tot de relatie tussen crises en beleidsverandering.

De drie gevallen kunnen gedeeltelijk gezien worden als één geval – van beleidsontwikkeling op het gebied van contraterrorisme in Zweden. Tegelijkertijd gaat het om verschillende gevallen van Zweeds crisismanagement met verschillende beleidsresultaten; de gevallen beïnvloeden elkaar echter vermoedelijk cumulatief. In dit verband is het echter belangrijk om erop te wijzen dat deze studie zich verlaat op de methodiek van de casestudy, meer in het bijzonder de *process tracing* methode.

Drie Zweedse crises en patronen van beleidsverandering

Vóór terrorisme überhaupt een beleidsprobleem werd in Zweden, werd het binnenlandse vijandbeeld gekenmerkt door subversieve elementen en ongerustheid over waartoe het linkse radicalisme aan het einde van de jaren 1960 zou leiden. Zowel de plaatselijke politie als de Zweedse Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst (Säpo) hadden redenen om grootschalige demonstraties te bewaken. De eerste om diegenen die de wet overtraden (en vlaggen schonden of demonstraties organiseerden zonder toestemming) voor de rechter te kunnen dagen, en de tweede om mogelijke subversieve elementen te kunnen registreren. De demonstraties, en niet in het minst de bewaking ervan, leidden tot opschudding en een debat in de media en bij het publiek. In 1969 besliste de regering met de zogenaamde bekendmaking werknemerscontrole, dat het verboden was voor de Zweedse Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst om iemands opvattingen te registreren. Later datzelfde jaar besliste de regering bovendien dat een geheime afdeling binnen de Krijgsmacht, het Informatiebureau (IB), moest ophouden met het registreren van individuen binnen de landsgrenzen. Alleen de Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst werd verantwoordelijk voor contrasubversie, maar mocht individuen slechts registreren op basis van hun gedrag.

Bulltofta en de terrorismewetgeving

Op 15 september 1972, net na 16.30 uur, werd een Zweedse binnenlandse vlucht van Gothenburg naar Stockholm gekaapt. De kapers waren Kroatische

separatisten die met hun actie de vrijlating wilden afdwingen van zeven landgenoten die in de Zweedse gevangenis zaten na in februari 1971 het Joegoslavische consulaat van Gothenburg bezet te hebben, of medeplichtig waren aan de moord op de Joegoslavische ambassadeur in Stockholm in april 1971. De kapers dwongen de bemanning om te landen op de luchthaven Bulltofta bij Malmö in het zuiden van Zweden. Daar begonnen ze onderhandelingen met de Zweedse regering, die besloot om de Kroatische gevangenen vrij te laten. Bij het ochtendgloren op 16 september vlogen de kapers, de vrijgelaten gevangenen, en de bemanning van het vliegtuig verder naar Spanje, waar de kapers tot overgave gedwongen werden.

Het kapingsdrama was aanleiding voor de regering om een Terrorisme-commissie in te stellen die de opdracht kreeg om maatregelen voor te stellen om gelijksoortige handelingen in de toekomst te voorkomen. De commissie was een omvorming van een werkgroep die zich sinds de moord op de ambassadeur in 1971 voor de nationale overheid had gebogen over deze vraag. Na nauwelijks drie maanden, in december 1972, presenteerde de voorzitter van de commissie, minister Carl Lidbom, een voorstel voor een terrorismewet. Het voorstel werd onaangekondigd gepresenteerd tijdens een debat in het Zweedse parlement dat eigenlijk over de vermeende registratie van opvattingen door de Zweedse Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst ging. In januari 1973 presenteerde de regering een voorstel voor een terrorismewet gebaseerd op het rapport van de commissie.

Het was de bedoeling dat de wet begrensd was qua tijdsduur en telkens één jaar geldig zou zijn. In hoofdzaak had de wet tot doel het mogelijk te maken om buitenlanders die ervan verdacht werden lid te zijn van een terroristische groepering waarvan gevreesd kon worden dat ze met een politiek doel geweld zou gebruiken in Zweden, uit te zetten of de toegang tot het land te ontzeggen. Om te bepalen in hoeverre een persoon dergelijke banden heeft, stelde de terrorismewet de politie in staat om gebruik te maken van bepaalde dwangmaatregelen, zoals huiszoeking, fouillering, het afluisteren van telefoonverkeer, en het openen van brieven en andere gesloten verzendingen. Niet iedereen kon echter zomaar onder de jurisdictie van deze wet vallen. De verdenkingen moesten betrekking hebben op door de regering bepaalde terroristische organisaties; in 1973 waren dat de Kroatische Ustasja, het Japanse Rode Leger en de Palestijnse Zwarte September. Het uitzetten en afwijzen zou niet ten uitvoer gebracht worden als er reden was om aan te nemen dat de veroordeelde in zijn geboorteland het risico liep om gefolterd te worden of de doodstraf te krijgen. Ondanks de af en toe heftige debatten en interne wrijvingen binnen verschillende politieke partijen, stemde in april 1973 een overweldigende meerderheid van het Zweedse parlement voor het wetsvoorstel. Een jaar later stemde een even grote

meerderheid van het parlement voor het voorstel om de geldigheid van de wet met een jaar te verlengen.

De Zweedse Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst onderging kleine instrumentele aanpassingen als gevolg van het feit dat terrorisme meer prioriteit kreeg. Zo werd er onder andere een afdeling voor contraterrorisme opgericht, waarvoor via een interne herverdeling middelen werden vrijgemaakt, vooral via de afdeling voor contrasubversie, die toezicht hield op politieke extremisten. De landelijke politie, niet in het minst de politie in Malmö die verantwoordelijk was voor de kaping op Bulltofta, uitte de wens om de voorwaarden voor het hanteren van incidenten te verbeteren. Ook het hoofd van de Zweedse rijkspolitie, Carl Persson, merkte op dat zowel de uitrusting als de opleiding voor dit soort gebeurtenissen ontbraken. Dergelijke voorgestelde beleidsveranderingen belandden echter nooit op de politieke agenda.

Het drama in de West-Duitse ambassade en beleidsstabiliteit

In de morgen van 24 april 1975 drongen zes terroristen de West-Duitse ambassade in Stockholm binnen, waar ze de bovenste verdieping bezetten en 13 mensen gijzelden. De terroristen maakten deel uit van de Rote Armee Fraktion en eisten de vrijlating van 26 “politieke gevangenen” uit West-Duitse gevangenissen. Anders zouden ze met ingang van tien uur die avond elk uur een gijzelaar doodschieten. Als de politie zou proberen om het gebouw te bestormen of de gijzelaars op een andere manier te bevrijden, dreigden ze 15 kilo trotyl, die ze in de ambassade aangebracht hadden, op te blazen. De eisen waren in de eerste plaats tot de West-Duitse regering gericht, maar de bezetting stelde ook de Zweedse gezagdragers zwaar op de proef. Zo schoten de terroristen bijvoorbeeld de militaire attaché dood, omdat de politie de ambassade niet evacueerde. Pas daarna ontruimde de politie het gebouw. De premier omringde zich met een crisiskabinet, waarvan ook het hoofd van de Zweedse rijkspolitie en de hoofdcommissaris van de politie van Stockholm deel uitmaakten. Ze begonnen te onderhandelen met het crisiskabinet dat zich rond de West-Duitse bondskanselier in Bonn verzameld had. Tegelijkertijd waren ze gedwongen om een politieactie om de gijzelaars te bevrijden, te plannen. Het uitvoeren van deze actie werd des te actueler toen de West-Duitse regering om 20.30 uur meedeelde dat ze niet van plan was om te zwichten voor de eisen van de terroristen. De voorbereidingen voor een bestorming stopten toen de terroristen om 22.20 uur opnieuw een gijzelaar doodschoten, de handelsattaché. Vóór de slecht opgeleide en uitgeruste Zweedse politie een poging kon doen om de ambassade binnen te dringen, brachten de terroristen per ongeluk hun trotyl tot ontploffing. De gijzelaars werden gered en de terroristen werden gearresteerd en uitgezet op basis van de terrorismewet, hoewel die eigenlijk bedoeld was voor personen waarvan

gevreemd werd dat ze terreurdaden zouden plegen, en niet voor terroristen die reeds dergelijke daden hadden gepleegd.

De bezetting van de ambassade betekende een ernstige crisis voor de Zweedse regering en politie en genereerde een druk tot verandering. De politie van Stockholm en de leiding van de Zweedse rijkspolitie presenteerden een voorstel aan de regering om politiecapaciteit te creëren voor het bestrijden van terroristische aanslagen en gijzelingssituaties, een capaciteit die voorheen niet bestond. De politieonderzoekscommissie uit 1975 – die om andere redenen werd ingesteld dan het onderzoeken van de crisismanagementcapaciteit van de politie – kreeg in april 1976 van de regering de opdracht om in het bijzonder de voorstellen van de politie te behandelen. Het voorstel dat de commissie in januari 1977 presenteerde, werd door politie-experts als verwaterd beschouwd: het voorstel betekende geen grote veranderingen voor de patrouille-eenheid van Stockholm, de politie-eenheid waarvoor de beleidsvoorstellen in de eerste plaats waren bedoeld. In 1979 lanceerde de leiding van de Rijkspolitie een voorstel dat veel leek op dat uit 1975, ditmaal met verwijzing naar de behoefte om kerncentrales te kunnen beschermen, of er binnen te kunnen vallen en ze veilig te stellen. Dit initiatief drong evenmin door tot de politieke agenda. In het midden van de jaren tachtig was de voorbereiding van de Zweedse politie om bijstand te verlenen niet noemenswaardig veranderd, in vergelijking met de situatie ten tijde van de bezetting van de West-Duitse ambassade.

In de periode van 1975 tot 1986 werd de Zweedse terrorismewet enigszins gewijzigd. In 1976 werd de wet opgedeeld: de delen die verband hielden met uitzetten en afwijzen werden ondergebracht in de vreemdelingenwet en werden daarna niet onderworpen aan jaarlijkse stemmingen; de delen die de voorwaarden bepaalden voor de politie om onderzoek te verrichten om potentiële terroristen te ontmaskeren, vormden een nieuwe wet, de bijzondere onderzoekswet, die tijdelijk was. Eén van de belangrijkste componenten van de nieuwe terrorismewetgeving was dat er sprake moest zijn van een concrete verdenking jegens een persoon om onder de jurisdictie van de wet te kunnen vallen. Deze voorwaarde werd echter reeds in acht genomen door de politie, zodat de verandering gezien kan worden als een instrumentele aanpassing.

De moord op Olof Palme en de daarop volgende beleidsveranderingen

Om 23.21 uur op 28 februari 1986 werd premier Olof Palme in Stockholm op straat doodgeschoten. De schoten kwamen als een donderslag bij heldere hemel. De politiemaatregelen die tijdens de moordnacht werden genomen, waren over de hele linie onder de maat. De paraatheid bij zowel de politie als de regeringskanselarij bleek erg gebrekkig, wat gedeeltelijk te wijten was aan het feit dat een groot aantal centrale gezagdragers die de beslissingen moesten

nemen, niet bereikbaar waren. Ook het daarop volgende vooronderzoek was problematisch. Na elf maanden van gestrande onderzoekspogingen en grote spanningen tussen de politie en de officier van justitie, zag de regering zich in februari 1987 gedwongen om in te grijpen en het onderzoek van het lokale niveau over te hevelen naar de Rijksrecherche en de procureur-generaal.

Als een gevolg van de moord op Olof Palme, en niet in het minst van hoe die aangepakt werd, werden er verschillende onderzoekscommissies ingesteld die de taak kregen om het crisismanagement te onderzoeken. De onderzoeken vormden op hun beurt de basis voor een aantal beleidsveranderingen met betrekking tot contraterorisme. In 1989 veranderde de terrorismewetgeving als gevolg van de hervorming van de vreemdelingenwet: de delen die betrekking hadden op het uitwijzen en afwijzen van terroristen werden uit de vreemdelingenwet gehaald en in een – wat later bleek – voorlopige wet geplaatst. In 1991 vond opnieuw een wijziging van de terrorismewetgeving plaats, maar dan als gevolg van een commissieadvies. Door verandering werd de terrorismewet permanent, ook met betrekking tot bijzondere onderzoeksmaatregelen. Bovendien gold de wet nu ook voor personen waarvan vermoed werd dat ze ook buiten de Zweedse grenzen terroristische misdrijven zouden kunnen begaan, en dat was daarvoor niet het geval. De nieuwe wetgeving was nog steeds gericht op buitenlandse staatsburgers, maar het werd ook mogelijk om personen met een permanente verblijfsvergunning uit te zetten. De organisatievoorwaarde werd afgeschaft evenals de paragrafen met betrekking tot het afwijzen van terroristen.

De Zweedse Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst werd het onderwerp van een speciaal onderzoek naar aanleiding van de moord op Olof Palme. Dit resulteerde in voorstellen om de politieke monitoring van en controle op de activiteiten van de dienst te versterken. Bovendien was de onderzoekscommissie van mening dat de dienst een ander soort hoofd nodig had; het oordeel was dat de persoon in kwestie de competentie van het hoofd van een openbare dienst moest bezitten. Voor de meeste voorgestelde wijzigingen waren slechts regeringsbesluiten nodig. De besluiten werden in 1990 van kracht.

De capaciteit van de politie om bijstand te verlenen, werd benadrukt door de Commissie van parlementariërs, die ingesteld werd om het rapport van de Commissie van juristen naar aanleiding van de moord op Olof Palme op te volgen. Ze stelde vast dat het Zweden ontbrak aan politiecapaciteit om terroristische aanslagen zoals het drama in de West-Duitse ambassade, te bestrijden. In 1990 besloot het parlement met een overweldigende meerderheid dat Zweden een dergelijke bijstandseenheid nodig had. Deze eenheid is sinds 1991 operationeel. In de navolgende jaren kreeg zij bovendien de bevoegdheid om te werken zonder regeringsbesluiten, en bovendien bij gebeurtenissen die niet direct verband houden met terrorisme.

Theoretische perspectieven op crises en beleidswijziging

Het patroon van beleidsveranderingen in relatie tot de crises die hierboven werden beschreven, druist wellicht in tegen de verwachting. Met het doel de relatie te verklaren, steunt dit proefschrift theoretisch op de Multiple Streams Theory (MS), het Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) en de Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PE), die toonaangevend zijn in het academisch discours over beleidsveranderingen. Er wordt vooral belang gehecht aan de redenering van deze theorieën met betrekking tot de relatie tussen crises en beleidsverandering. De drie theoretische perspectieven blijken wat die relatie betreft niet in conflict te zijn met elkaar; de argumenten vullen elkaar eerder aan en overlappen elkaar. Ze zijn allemaal gebaseerd op veronderstellingen over het begrensde rationele individu (boundedly rational individual). De begrenzingen worden bepaald door de overtuigingen en voorkeuren van het individu, maar ook door tijdgerelateerde factoren, zoals kansen die ontstaan doordat een issue aandacht krijgt.

In dit proefschrift zijn de drie theoretische raamwerken geconsolideerd tot twee perspectieven op hoe beleidsprocessen zich verhouden tot crises: één gebaseerd op overtuiging (belief based), en hoofdzakelijk steunend op ACF, en één gebaseerd op aandacht (attention based), vooral gebaseerd op MS en PE. De perspectieven worden geconstrueerd door de elkaar aanvullende aspecten en hebben vooral betrekking op het collectief handelen, dat wil zeggen de weg van individuele stellingnames, voorkeuren en overtuigingen naar beleidsverandering of het ontbreken ervan.

Het op overtuiging gebaseerde perspectief gaat ervan uit dat coalities van partners die dezelfde overtuiging delen (advocacy coalitions) actief een bepaald issue ondersteunen. Het zijn de overtuigingen die de coalities samenbinden, en omdat mensen zich niet zo snel van hun overtuigingen af laten brengen, wordt verondersteld dat ook de coalities stabiel zijn in tijd. Om die reden wordt er evenmin aangenomen dat crises van het soort dat hierboven werd beschreven radicale beleidsveranderingen teweegbrengen. Voor zover het op overtuiging gebaseerde perspectief aan crises invloed toeschrijft op beleidsveranderingen, gaat het om *kleinere* beleidsveranderingen die tot stand komen via beleidsggericht leren. Dit leren gebeurt tussen coalities en betreft hoofdzakelijk secundaire overtuigingsaspecten, gewoonlijk geen beleidskernaspecten (policy core aspects). Voor zover exogene variabelen tot radicale beleidsveranderingen leiden, is het vereist dat deze variabelen een vorm van machtswisseling tot gevolg hebben.

Het op aandacht gebaseerde perspectief daarentegen, gaat er vanuit dat relatief drastische veranderingen tot stand kunnen komen als het resultaat van minder ernstige, maar wel geruchtmakende crises en schandalen. De voorkeu-

ren veranderen langzaam in de loop der tijd, maar de specifieke aandacht die een bepaalde kwestie krijgt, kan om verschillende redenen het gedrag van de beleidsmaker beïnvloeden. Zo kan een oude kwestie bijvoorbeeld op een nieuwe manier belicht worden, of kan het politiek winstgevend lijken om een bepaalde kwestie op te volgen. De hoop op toekomstige politieke winst kan dan een veranderd gedrag genereren dat uitgebreide gevolgen heeft. Opdat dit mogelijk zou zijn, moet er een beleidsmakelaar (policy entrepreneur) in het beleidsproces stappen en een speciale oplossing voor het ontstane probleem, of het fenomeen, genereren. De beleidsmakelaar, in de vorm van een toonaangevend persoon of een goed georganiseerde lobbygroep, krijgt in dit perspectief veel ruimte als een verklarende factor van het collectief handelen. De beleidsmakelaar kan een zogenaamde positieve feedback tot stand brengen, wat inhoudt dat de wijze waarop de ondernemer het probleem onder woorden brengt gehoor vindt. Voor zover de makelaar een heersend inzicht in een probleem verdedigt en daarin slaagt, wordt dit negatieve feedback genoemd.

Het grootste verschil tussen de twee perspectieven is bijgevolg dat het op overtuiging gebaseerde perspectief ervan uitgaat dat overtuigingen grenzen stellen aan de rationaliteit van het individu, terwijl het op aandacht gebaseerde perspectief eerder wijst op de begrenzingen in de rationaliteit bepaald door tijdgerelateerde factoren. Deze verschillen hebben gevolgen voor hoe het collectief handelen tot stand komt, en voor hoe crises verondersteld worden beleidsprocessen te beïnvloeden. Vooropgesteld dat de grenzen die het op aandacht gebaseerde perspectief aangeeft binnen het kader vallen van de grenzen die het op overtuiging gebaseerde perspectief aangeeft als kernovertuigingen, zouden de beide perspectieven elkaar eerder moeten kunnen aanvullen, dan met elkaar concurreren. Het is de ambitie van dit proefschrift om aan theorieontwikkeling te doen en tegelijkertijd de resultaten te verklaren. De theorieontwikkeling omvat verschillende componenten. De min of meer begripsmatige oefening die drie theorieën omzette in twee perspectieven, kan als reducerend beschouwd worden; een poging om de werkelijkheid die de drie theorieën ieder op zich beogen te vereenvoudigen, nog verder te vereenvoudigen. De nadruk die precies op crises wordt gelegd, is een poging om grotere helderheid te brengen in de verhouding tussen crises en beleidsprocessen, die eerder veronachtzaamd werd en daarom tot misverstanden heeft geleid, of tenminste tot verschillende opvattingen. In deze ambitie ligt het zwaartepunt op het problematiseren van heersende veronderstellingen.

Een proces traceren houdt in dat men op zoek gaat naar de sporen van de werkelijkheid die zichtbaar worden wanneer het proces door theoretische lenzen wordt bekeken. Om de beleidsontwikkeling die hierboven gepresenteerd werd, te verklaren, worden daarom in de verklarende hoofdstukken twee lenzen parallel gebruikt, één lens voor elk theoretisch perspectief. We moeten in

gedachten houden dat de verklaringen die *process tracing* biedt in de eerste plaats zogenaamde verklaringen binnen een geval (within case explanations) zijn, die slechts in beperkte mate gegeneraliseerd kunnen worden. Het is eigenlijk zo dat de geboden verklaringen van toepassing zijn voor het geval in kwestie, maar dat de theoretische en conceptuele vorderingen die eventueel worden gemaakt, verdere implicaties hebben. In dat opzicht is de casestudy een impliciete vergelijking met andere gevallen. Het kan de moeite lonen om de haalbaarheid van theoretische vooruitgangen ook elders te testen.

Theoretische perspectieven op de beleidsontwikkeling voor wat betreft terrorismebestrijding

De terrorismewet uit 1973

Hoe komt het dat de kaping op Bulltofta tot een snel beleidsproces heeft geleid, dat resulteerde in de terrorismewet uit 1973, maar niet in een feitelijk verhoogde politiecapaciteit om terroristische aanslagen te bestrijden?

Het op overtuiging gebaseerde perspectief biedt een verklaring die erop neer komt dat er eigenlijk geen overtuigingen gewijzigd werden door de opkomst van terrorisme in Zweden. De oplossing die de terrorismewet bood, was op verschillende manieren een verlenging van het beleid dat gedurende een aantal decennia ruimte gaf om toezicht te houden op subversieve elementen. In principe kon de categorie met individuen die onder toezicht stonden, uitgebreid worden met bepaalde buitenlanders. Opmerkelijk is dat de periode die aan de terrorismewetgeving vooraf ging, gekenmerkt werd door tegenstellingen binnen de coalitie die in feite de overtuigingen die als richtsnoer dienden, in stand hielden.

Volgens het op aandacht gebaseerde perspectief wordt het relatief snelle beleidsverloop verklaard door het feit dat een oplossing, in de vorm van de terrorismewet, reeds beschikbaar was toen de Terrorismecommissie aan haar taak begon. Het gedeelte van de regering dat het werk startte, en waarvoor deze oplossing gewenst was, gebruikte op die manier de commissie als onderwerp van haar beleidsmakelaarschap. De kaping op Bulltofta creëerde een ruimte die benut werd om de oplossing die de terrorismewet inhield – toezicht houden op verdachte buitenlanders om ze eventueel te kunnen uitzetten – te associëren met het dreigende aspect van de daad zelf, in plaats van met de registratie van opvattingen – iets wat vooral de Vänsterpartiet kommunisterna (Zweedse linkse communistische partij, VPK) deed. De VPK probeerde echter de terrorismewet te associëren met een naar hun mening politieke politie, dat wil zeggen de Zweedse Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst. Hierdoor raakten ze geïsoleerd en slaagden ze er niet in om anderen op dezelfde lijn te krijgen, en werd de terrorismewet goedgekeurd met een overweldigende meerderheid. De terrorismewet

werd gezien als een waarschijnlijke toekomstige winnaar, die voor veel partijen politiek rendabel was om in te investeren.

De lange beleidsstabiliteit

Waarom volgden er op het drama in de West-Duitse ambassade in Stockholm geen feitelijke beleidsveranderingen met betrekking tot contraterorisme?

Het op overtuiging gebaseerde perspectief toont aan dat het decennium dat volgde op het ambassadedrama sterk beïnvloed werd door een overtuiging, dat de politie een democratisch probleem vormde. De dramatische bezetting van de ambassade en de problemen die daar ontstonden, veranderden die overtuiging niet. Dit decennium kende wel grote veranderingen op het politieke en administratieve vlak, met onder andere vier verschillende niet-socialistische regeringen tussen 1976 en 1982. Dergelijke veranderingen zouden volgens dit perspectief beleidsveranderingen kunnen vergemakkelijken. De coalitie die de overtuiging aanhing dat een versterkte, gecentraliseerde politie eerder een probleem dan een oplossing was, hield het beleidsproces desondanks in een vaste greep.

Het op aandacht gebaseerde perspectief richt de schijnwerpers op een bijna contraproductief makelaarschap, beoefend door het hoofd van de rijkspolitie, Carl Persson, persoonlijk, maar na hem ook door andere autoriteiten. Er zijn verschillende redenen voor het mislukken van de pogingen van de politie om het beleidsproces te beïnvloeden. Het politiewezen raakte tijdens dit decennium – via andere crises van meer institutionele aard – geassocieerd met onregelmatigheden en worstelde met geloofwaardigheidsproblemen. Vanuit dat oogpunt gezien werd een verandering van de paraatheid van de politie om terrorisme te hanteren een tamelijk onzeker beleidsalternatief, geen waarschijnlijke toekomstige winnaar.

Beleidsveranderingen na de moord op Olof Palme

Hoe komt het dat de moord op Olof Palme – die voor zover we weten, geen verband hield met terrorisme – tot nieuw beleid op het gebied van contraterorisme leidde, en bovendien op een breed terrein?

Het op overtuiging gebaseerde perspectief biedt een verklaring die erop neerkomt dat de coalities in principe intact bleven, maar door de moord op Olof Palme werd het duidelijk dat eerder heersende kernovertuigingen (zoals dat de politie een democratisch probleem vormde, waardoor een bijstandseenheid ondenkbaar was) teruggevallen waren tot secundaire aspecten. Er kan niet gezegd worden dat de crisis op zich enige overtuigingen gewijzigd heeft; de crisis heeft eerder aangespoord tot nadenken en een nieuwe start. Ondanks alles maakte het crisismanagement van de moord op Olof Palme eerder duidelijk dat

de paraatheid in het algemeen veel te wensen overliet. Toen de overtuigingen die eerder zo toonaangevend waren, hun kracht hadden verloren, werden zowel de terrorismewet als de Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst, de belangrijkste uitvoerder ervan, het voorwerp van beleidsgericht leren. Wat de nationale inzet tegen terrorisme die werd opgericht, betreft, zou men eventueel van overdrijven kunnen spreken. Er werd lering getrokken uit het ambassadedrama in plaats van uit de meer voor de hand liggende moord op Olof Palme.

De moord op Olof Palme was absoluut een mislukking voor zowel de Zweedse Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst als de landelijke politie. Uiteindelijk kan men echter vaststellen dat hun beleidsagenda's een vrij grote invloed hadden op de ontwikkeling van het beleid. Het op aandacht gebaseerde perspectief verklaart dit door te wijzen op het feit dat verschillende commissies open stonden voor het begrip van de aard van de problemen zoals dat binnen de politie gekoesterd werd. De commissieleden verhoorden een groot aantal politie-actoren en deden op die manier dienst als filter van geloofwaardigheid tegenover de politieke macht, die daarvoor een erg sceptische houding had aangenomen tegenover het politiewezen. Vertegenwoordigers van de politie deden dus dienst als effectieve beleidsmakelaars. Ze zorgden ervoor dat andere crises en schandalen die dezelfde sector troffen, de gewenste ontwikkeling in de hand werkten.

Crisis en beleidsverandering

Crisis hebben op zijn zachtst gezegd een gecompliceerde invloed gehad op het Zweedse contraterrorismebeleid. Deze studie heeft aangetoond in welke omstandigheden ze dienst deden als katalysatoren voor verandering, en in welke omstandigheden ze eerder een belemmering vormden voor beleidsveranderingen. Het proefschrift heeft laten zien dat andere soorten crises dan de bestudeerde casus eveneens een sterke invloed op het beleidsproces hebben gehad. Affaires en schandalen hebben op zich geen druk tot verandering gecreëerd, maar wel tendensen in de richting van verandering of stabiliteit versterkt. De studie toont ook aan dat crises ruimte kunnen creëren om oude overtuigings-systemen, die slechts gedeeltelijk beïnvloed worden door de crisis in kwestie, te herwaarderden.

Op een conceptueel vlak werd reeds aangenomen dat de twee perspectieven elkaar aanvullen. Het feit dat de verklaringen van de resultaten bij elkaar passen volgt daaruit. Het op overtuiging gebaseerde perspectief geeft een redelijke verklaring voor lange periodes van beleidsstabiliteit, waarin ogenschijnlijk drastische beleidsveranderingen plaatsvinden, maar waarvan toch gezegd kan worden dat ze in overeenstemming zijn met de heersende overtuigingen. Het perspectief wijst aan welke actoren welke overtuigingen delen vóór de crisis zich voordoet, en geeft op die manier de parameters waarbinnen beleidsveran-

deringen mogelijk zijn. Het op aandacht gebaseerde perspectief werpt daarna een verklarend licht op hoe beleidsveranderingen wel of niet tot stand komen in verband met een crisis, binnen het kader dat het op overtuiging gebaseerde perspectief biedt. Het op aandacht gebaseerde perspectief wijst op de rol van de beleidsmakelaar om positieve of negatieve feedback te creëren rond een gegeven interpretatie van een issue. Het perspectief benadert in dit opzicht het gedrag van de beleidsmakers.

In deze opzichten kan men dus zeggen dat crisisgerelateerd contraterro-rismebeleid in Zweden de veronderstellingen die op theoretisch vlak werden gedaan, bevestigt. Enerzijds zijn veronderstellingen gerelateerd aan de twee perspectieven ieder voor zich houdbaar en een richtsnoer gebleken, en anderzijds kon de aangegeven onderlinge verhouding tussen de perspectieven bevestigd worden en kon daardoor een robuustere verklaring gegeven worden dan wat de perspectieven afzonderlijk hadden kunnen bereiken. Een voorwaarde hiervoor was echter dat het explanandum van het proefschrift, de beleidsresultaten, eerst beschreven werden met behulp van een categorisering die onafhankelijk is van hoe de beleidsresultaten gecategoriseerd zouden worden door de respectievelijke perspectieven. Het is een feit dat de drie theorieën er naar neigen de beleidsresultaten te categoriseren in termen die afhankelijk zijn van de variabelen waarvan aangenomen wordt dat ze een verklaring bieden (wat op zich een probleem is en een methodologisch punt waaraan aandacht wordt besteed in deze studie).

De empirische bewijzen die in dit proefschrift gepresenteerd worden, vormen in bepaalde mate ook een uitdaging voor de theoretische perspectieven. Zo was het bijvoorbeeld eenvoudiger om erop te wijzen dat het beleidsproces gekenmerkt werd door overtuigingen, dan om patronen van de interactie binnen de coalities, of zelfs maar de contouren van de coalities te beschrijven, wat ACF's veronderstellingen over de rol van stabiele coalities als drager van overtuigingen in twijfel trekt. Doordat de studie zich heeft verlaten op *process tracing*, werd aangetoond dat de effecten van de beleidsmakelaar (en van het makelaarschap) soms onbedoeld en contraproductief zijn. Aan deze dimensie wordt normaal geen aandacht besteed in MS of PE, waar men meestal op beleidsmakelaars stuit, wanneer een gegeven beleidsverandering terug in de tijd wordt getraceerd. Deze studie oppert dat de rol van de beleidsmakelaar beter beoordeeld kan worden door het proces vanaf de crisis, of wat het ook is dat de beleidsmakelaar geïnitieerd heeft, te traceren en het voorwaarts in de tijd te volgen.

Process tracing stelt hoge empirische eisen, waaraan in dit proefschrift niet altijd voldoende kon worden voldaan. De voordelen van het bestuderen van beleidsprocessen vanaf de drijfveren (impetus) en voorwaarts in de tijd, eerder dan vanaf de beleidsveranderingen en terug in de tijd, wegen echter zwaarder

dan dergelijke nadelen. In deze studie heeft *process tracing* een duidelijker licht geworpen op de mechanismen die het effect van crises op beleidsprocessen verklaren. *Process tracing* is daarom potentieel een veelbelovende weg om te volgen in toekomstige studies van beleidsverandering- en stabiliteit.

Sammanfattning på svenska

Kriser och perspektiv på policyförändring: skapandet av svensk kontraterrorismpolitik

Kontraterrorism, krishantering och policyförändring

Terrorism har under de senaste decennierna kommit att framstå som ett av de allvarligaste hoten mot öppna, pluralistiska demokratier. Fullbordade terroristdåd, eller långt gångna konspirationer i syfte att åstadkomma terror, innebär ett misslyckande för varje stat med självaktning. Terrordåd får ofta stater att ompröva sina resurser, strategier och motåtgärder, även med avseende på övervakning av och tvingande åtgärder mot den befolkning de primärt är satta att värna och beskydda. Eftersom terrorismbekämpning kan bli kännbar och få konsekvenser långt utanför de grupper som den avser bekämpa, är detta policyområde ett ämne av stor samhällsrelig betydelse. En viktig aspekt av terrorismbekämpningens politik är hur den påverkas av kriser. De terrordåd som drabbat världen sedan den 11 september 2001 tycks peka på ett tydligt samband; kriser genererar policyförändringar. Men är det alltid så?

Kontraterrorism ses i denna studie som en form av krishantering. Kontraterrorism är i allmänhet förknippad med preventiva åtgärder, medan krishantering ofta associeras med akuta och stressbemängda beslutsprocesser när krisen väl är ett faktum. Men att hantera en kris handlar också om att i efterhand dra lärdomar i syfte att förhindra eller mildra effekterna av framtida kriser. Därmed kan man säga att det finns ett självklart och med självbevarelsedrift förenat samband mellan kriserfarenheter och policyprocesser.

Ett problem i sammanhanget är att en given kris inte med nödvändighet i sig själv utstakar den riktning i vilken policyutvecklingen bör utformas. Såväl offensiva, repressiva, som reaktiva eller preventiva åtgärder kan uppfattas vara effektiva i självbevarelsedriftens namn. Därvidlag präglas policyprocessen av idéer, preferenser och föreställningar, snarare än av belagda orsaks- och verkansamband.

Denna avhandling handlar primärt om just förhållandet mellan kriser och policyförändringar, där terrorismbekämpningens politik utgör det empiriska underlaget. Närmare bestämt är det den svenska kontraterrorismpolitiken som ställs i relation till svenska kriserfarenheter. Utgångspunkten är tre kriser inom den svenska ordningsmaktsektorn: kapardramat på Bulltofta flygplats 1972, ockupationen av den västtyska ambassaden i Stockholm 1975 samt Palmemordet 1986. De två förstnämnda av dessa kriser orsakades av terrorister, medan Palmemordet inte har några kända sådana kopplingar. Att den huvudsakliga fokusen lagts på dessa tre kriser beror dock inte på deras upprinnelse, utan på att de var för sig gav upphov till förändringstryck med avseende på

policyen som styr svensk kontraterrorism. Det empiriska syftet med denna studie är att förklara de instanser av policyförändring och -stabilitet som följde på dessa kriser. Det teoretiska syftet är att med dessa observationer – detta svenska longitudinella fall – bidra till teoriutvecklingen med avseende på relationen mellan kriser och policyförändring.

De tre fallen kan delvis ses som ett fall – av svensk policyutveckling inom området kontraterrorism. Samtidigt handlar det om olika fall av svensk krishantering med olika policyutfall; fallen påverkar dock förmodligen varandra kumulativt. I detta sammanhang är det emellertid av vikt att påpeka att denna studie förlitar sig på fallstudiemetodik, närmare bestämt *process tracing*.

Tre svenska kriser och mönster av policyförändring

Innan terrorism över huvud taget blev ett policyproblem i Sverige präglades den inhemska hotbilden av subversiva element och en oro över vad vänsterradikalismen i slutet av 1960-talet skulle föra med sig. Både den lokala polisen och Säkerhetspolisen (Säpo) hade anledning att bevaka storskaliga demonstrationer. Den förra för att kunna lagföra lagöverträdare (som skändade flaggor eller organiserade demonstrationer utan tillåtelse) och den senare för att föra spänningsregister över potentiellt subversiva element. Demonstrationerna, och inte minst övervakningen av dem, föranledde en medial och publik uppståndelse och debatt. Regeringen beslutade 1969, med den s.k. personalkontrollkungörelsen, att Säpo inte skulle tillåtas bedriva åsiktsregistrering. Senare samma år beslutade regeringen också att en hemlig avdelning inom Försvarmakten, IB (Informationsbyrån), skulle upphöra med att registrera individer inom landets gränser. Säkerhetspolisen skulle där ensamta ansvara för kontrasubversionen, men den skulle bara registrera individer på grundval av deras beteenden.

Bulltofta och terroristlagstiftningen

Den 15 september 1972, strax efter klockan 16.30, kapades ett svenskt inrikesflyg på väg mellan Göteborg och Stockholm. Kaparna var kroatiska separatister som med sin aktion ville tvinga fram ett frisläppande av sju landsmän som satt fängslade i Sverige efter att ha ockuperat det jugoslaviska konsulatet i Göteborg i februari 1971, eller varit delaktiga i mordet på den jugoslaviske ambassadören i Stockholm i april 1971. Därför tvingade kaparna besättningen att landa på Bulltofta flygplats utanför Malmö i södra Sverige. Därifrån inledde de förhandlingar med den svenska regeringen, som fattade beslut om att frige de kroatiska internerna. I gryningen den 16 september flög kaparna, de frigivna fångarna och flygplansbesättningen vidare till Spanien, där kroaterna tvingades ge upp.

Kapardramat föranledde regeringen att tillsätta en Terroristkommission med uppgift att komma med förslag på åtgärder för att förhindra liknande dåd. Kommissionen var en ombildning av en arbetsgrupp som i regeringskansliet arbetat med frågan sedan ambassadörmordet 1971. Redan i december 1972, efter knappt tre månaders arbete, presenterade kommissionens ordförande, statsrådet Carl Lidbom, ett förslag på en terroristlag. Förslaget presenterades oannonserat under en riksdagsdebatt som egentligen handlade om Säpos förmenta åsiktsregistrering. I januari 1973 presenterade regeringen en proposition om en terroristlagstiftning, som utgick från kommissionens betänkande. Terroristlagen var tänkt att vara tidsbegränsad och gälla för ett år i sänder. I huvudsak gick den ut på att möjliggöra utvisning eller avvisning av utlänning som kunde misstänkas tillhöra en terroristgrupp som kunde befaras tillgripa våld i politiskt syfte i Sverige. För att fastställa huruvida en person hade sådant samre gav terroristlagen polisen möjlighet att använda vissa tvångsåtgärder, såsom husrannsaking, kroppsvisitering, telefonavlyssning, öppnande av brev och andra slutna försändelser. Vem som helst kunde dock inte falla under denna lags domvärjo. Misstankarna måste gälla av regeringen bestämda terroristorganisationer, vilka 1973 var kroatiska Ustasja, japanska Röda armén och palestinska Svarta september. Avvisning och utvisning skulle inte verkställas om det fanns anledning att tro att den dömde i sitt hemland riskerade tortyr eller dödsstraff. Trots under stundom hätska debatter och interna slitningar i flera riksdagspartier, röstade en överväldigande majoritet för propositionen i april 1973. Ett år senare röstade en lika stor majoritet av riksdagen för att förlänga lagens giltighet med ett år.

Säkerhetspolisen genomgick mindre instrumentella anpassningar med anledning av att terrorism seglade upp som en prioriterad angelägenhet. Bland annat tillskapades en rotel för kontraterrorism, som tilldelades resurser via intern omfördelning, framför allt via roteln för kontrasubversion, vilken höll politiska extremister under uppsikt. Från den öppna polisen, inte minst Malmöpolisen som hanterat Bulltoftakapningen, restes önskemål om att förbättra förutsättningarna för att hantera allvarliga incidenter. Även rikspolischefen Carl Persson observerade att såväl utrustning som utbildning för den typen av händelser saknades. Men det blev inte aktuellt att politiskt sanktionera några sådana policyförändringar.

Dramat på den västtyska ambassaden och policystabilitet

På förmiddagen den 24 april 1975 tog sig sex terrorister in på Västtysklands ambassad i Stockholm, där de ockuperade det översta våningsplanet och tog 13 personer som gisslan. Terroristerna tillhörde Röda arméfaktionen och krävde att 26 "politiska fångar" skulle släppas fria från västtyska fängelser. I annat fall

skulle de skjuta en ur gisslan varje hel timme från och med klockan 22. Om polisen stormade byggnaden, eller på annat sätt försökte frita gisslan, hotade de med att spränga 15 kilo trotyl som de apterat i ambassaden. Kraven var primärt ställda på den västtyska regeringen, men ockupationen satte även svenska beslutsfattare på svåra prov. Inledningsvis sköt t.ex. terroristerna försvarsattachén till döds eftersom polisen inte evakuerade ambassaden. Först därefter utrymde polisen huset. Runt statsministern samlades ett kriskabinett, i vilket även rikspolischefen och Stockholms polismästare kom att ingå. De började förhandla med det kriskabinett som församlats runt den västtyske förbundskanslern i Bonn. Samtidigt var de tvungna att planera för en polisiär aktion för att frita gisslan. Detta blev desto mer aktuellt när den västtyska regeringen vid 20.30-tiden meddelade att de inte tänkte ge efter för terroristernas krav. Förberedelserna för en stormning kom av sig när terroristerna kl. 22.20 sköt ihjäl ytterligare en gisslan, handelsattachén. Innan en ytterst undermåligt tränad och utrustad svensk polis hann påbörja en inbrytning bringade terroristerna av misstag sin trotyl att explodera. Gisslan kunde räddas och terroristerna gripas. Dessa utvisades med stöd av terroristlagen, även om denna egentligen var avsedd för personer som kunde befaras komma att begå terrordåd och inte för terrorister som faktiskt begått sådana.

Ambassadockupationen var en allvarlig kris för den svenska regeringen och dess ordningsmakt och den genererade ett förändringstryck. Stockholmspolisen och Rikspolisstyrelsen framförde förslag till regeringen på att tillskapa en polisiär kapacitet att hantera terroristattentat och gisslansituationer, vilket tidigare inte existerat. 1975 års polisutredning – som tillsatts av andra orsaker än polisens krishanteringskapacitet – fick av regeringen i april 1976 i uppdrag att särskilt behandla de förslag som framförts från polisen. Det förslag som kommissionen lade fram i januari 1977 upplevdes av polisexperter vara urvattnat; det innebar inga större förändringar av Stockholmspiketen, d.v.s. den polisiära enhet som främst avsetts med policyförslagen. 1979 lanserade Rikspolisstyrelsen ett förslag som på många sätt liknade det som tagits fram 1975, denna gång med hänvisning till behovet av att kunna freda, eller bryta in i och säkra kärnkraftverk. Inte heller detta initiativ fick genomslag på den politiska dagordningen. I mitten av 1980-talet var insatsberedskapen för svensk polis inte nämnvärt förändrad, jämfört med hur situationen var när den västtyska ambassaden ockuperades.

Under samma period förändrades den svenska terroristlagen något. Lagen delades upp 1976 och de delar som var relaterade till utvisning och avvisning förlades i utlänningslagstiftningen och blev därefter inte föremål för årliga omröstningar. De delar som reglerade polisens förutsättningar att bedriva spaningsverksamhet för att uppdaga potentiella terrorister blev en ny lag, den särskilda spaningslagen, vilken var tidsbegränsad. En av de viktigaste komponenterna i den nya terroristlagen var att den begåvades med ett personligt rekvisit.

Detta hade förvisso iakttagits av polisen redan tidigare, varför förändringen kan ses som en instrumentell anpassning.

Palmemordet och efterföljande policyförändringar

Klockan 23.21 den 28 februari 1986 sköts statsminister Olof Palme till döds på öppen gata i Stockholm. Skotten kom som en blixtnedslag från en klar himmel. De polisiära åtgärder som vidtogs under mordnatten var överlag undermåliga. Beredskapen visade sig vara mycket bristfällig inom både polisen och regeringskansliet, vilket till del berodde på att många centrala beslutsfattare var otillgängliga. Även den efterföljande förundersökningen blev problematisk. Efter elva månader kantade av havererade spaningsuppdrag och svåra spänningar mellan polis och åklagare, blev regeringen i februari 1987 tvungen att gripa in och lyfta utrednings- och spaningsarbetet från den lokala nivån och istället lägga fallet hos Rikskriminalpolisen och Riksåklagaren.

Som en konsekvens av Palmemordet, och inte minst av hur det hanterades, tillsattes ett flertal utredningar med uppgift att granska krishanteringsarbetet. Dessa i sin tur kom att ligga till grund för en rad policyförändringar med bäring på kontraterrorism. Sverige fick en ny terroristlagstiftning 1989 som en konsekvens av att utlänningslagstiftningen reformerades. De delar som rörde utvisning och avvisning av terrorister lyftes då bort från den senare. 1991 ändrades terroristlagen igen, men som en konsekvens av ett kommittébetänkande. Terroristlagen blev genom dessa reformer permanent, även beträffande tvångsåtgärder. Därtill kom lagen att gälla personer som kunde misstänkas begå terroristbrott även utanför Sveriges gränser, vilket tidigare inte varit fallet. Den nya lagen riktade fortfarande in sig på utländska medborgare, men det blev möjligt att utvisa även personer som erhållit permanent uppehållstillstånd. Organisationsrekvisitet togs bort och likaså de paragrafer som gällde avvisning.

Säkerhetspolisen blev föremål för särskild granskning med anledning av Palmemordet. Som ett resultat av detta framkom förslag på att stärka den politiska styrningen och kontrollen över dess verksamhet. Därtill ansågs Säpo behöva en annan typ av chef; det bedömdes att vederbörande behövde besitta en verkschefs kompetens. De flesta av de föreslagna förändringarna krävde bara regeringsbeslut och de trädde i kraft 1990.

Polisens tillslagskapacitet lyftes fram av Parlamentarierkommissionen som tillsattes för att följa upp Juristkommissionens betänkande med anledning av Palmemordet. Den konstaterade att Sverige saknade en polisiär kapacitet att hantera terroristattentat av den typ som dramat vid den vättyska ambassaden hade utgjort. 1990 beslutade riksdagen med överväldigande majoritet att Sverige behövde en sådan styrka. Sedan 1991 har den varit operativ. Så

småningom fick den dessutom befogenheter att verka utan regeringens beslut, och därtill vid händelser som inte är terrorismrelaterade.

Teoretiska perspektiv på kriser och policyförändring

Det mönster av policyförändringar i förhållande till kriser som beskrivits ovan kan i viss mån te sig konstraintuitivt. I syfte att förklara förhållandet stöder sig denna avhandling teoretiskt på Multiple Streams Theory (MS), Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) samt Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PE), vilka är tongivande i den akademiska diskursen om policyförändringar. I synnerhet har vikt lagts vid dessa teoriers resonemang kring relationen mellan kriser och policyförändring. De tre teoretiska ramverken befinner sig inte i konflikt med varandra; snarare förhåller sig argumenten kompletterande och överlappande. De bygger samtliga på antaganden om den begränsat rationella individen. Begränsningarna sätts av individens övertygelser och preferenser, men också av tidsrelaterade faktorer, såsom de möjlighetens fönster som öppnas av att ett ärende ges uppmärksamhet.

I denna avhandling har de tre teoretiska ramverken konsoliderats till två perspektiv på hur policyprocesser relaterar till kriser: ett övertygelsebaserat, som i huvudsak bygger på ACF, och ett uppmärksamhetsbaserat, som främst bygger på MS och PE. Perspektiven konstrueras av de aspekter som kompletterar varandra. Framför allt är dessa relaterade till det kollektiva agerandet, d.v.s. vägen från individuella ställningstaganden, preferenser och övertygelser till policyförändring eller avsaknaden därav.

Det övertygelsebaserade perspektivet utgår från att koalitioner av parter som delar samma övertygelse aktivt befrämjar en viss sak. Det är övertygelserna som binder koalitioner samman, och eftersom övertygelserna inte så lätt rubbas, förmodas även koalitioner vara stabila över tid. Av den anledningen antas heller inte kriser av det slag som beskrivits ovan i sig föranleda omvälvande policyförändringar. I den mån det övertygelsebaserade perspektivet tillskriver kriser funktionen att orsaka policyförändring, så är det *mindre* policyförändringar, som kommer till stånd via policyorienterat lärande. Detta lärande sker mellan koalitioner och berör främst sekundära övertygelseaspekter; vanligen inte kärnaspekter. I den mån exogena variabler föranleder omvälvande policyförändringar, så krävs att dessa medför någon form av maktskifte.

Det uppmärksamhetsbaserade perspektivet, däremot, antar att relativt drastiska förändringar kan komma till stånd som ett resultat av även mindre allvarliga, om än uppmärksammade, kriser, skandaler och dylikt. Preferenserna förändras långsamt över tid, men den specifika uppmärksamheten på en viss fråga får, kan av olika skäl ändra policymakarens beteende. Exempelvis kan en gammal fråga belysas på ett nytt sätt, vilket kan förefalla vara politiskt lönsamt att

anamma. Hoppet om framtida politiska vinster kan då generera ett förändrat beteende som får omfattande konsekvenser. För att detta ska vara möjligt krävs att någon entreprenör kliver in i policyprocessen och driver en speciell lösning på det uppkomna problemet, eller fenomenet. Policyentreprenören, i form av en tongivande person eller en välorganiserad påtryckningsgrupp, får i detta perspektiv stort utrymme som en förklarande faktor till det kollektiva agerandet. Entreprenören kan få till stånd en s.k. positiv feedback, vilket innebär att entreprenörens förståelse för problemet vinner gehör. I den mån entreprenören värnar om en rådande förståelse av ett problem och lyckas, så kallas det negativ feedback.

Den största skillnaden mellan de två perspektiven är således att det övertygelsebaserade förutsätter att just övertygelserna sätter gränser för den enskildes rationalitet, medan det uppmärksamhetsbaserade snarare pekar på de begränsningar i rationaliteten som tidsrelaterade faktorer sätter. Dessa skillnader får konsekvenser för hur det kollektiva agerandet kommer till stånd, och då också i hur kriser antas påverka policyprocesser. Förutsatt att de gränser som det uppmärksamhetsbaserade perspektivet anger ryms inom ramen för de gränser som det övertygelsebaserade perspektivet anger som kärnövertygelser, torde de båda perspektiven kunna komplettera, snarare än att konkurrera med varandra.

Ambitionen är att vara teoriutvecklande, samtidigt som utfallen förklaras. Teoriutvecklingen innehåller flera komponenter. Den mer eller mindre begreppsmässiga övning som förvandlade tre teorier till två perspektiv, kan ses som reducerande; ett försök att ytterligare förenkla den verklighet som de tre teorierna avser förenkla var för sig. Den fokus som lagts på just kriser är ett försök att bringa större klarhet i förhållandet mellan kriser och policyprocesser, som tidigare har försummats och därför givit upphov till missförstånd, eller åtminstone till oklara uppfattningar. I denna ambition ligger tyngdpunkten på att problematisera rådande antaganden.

Att spåra en process handlar om att leta efter de spår av verkligheten som framträder när den betraktas genom teoretiska linser. För att förklara den policyutveckling som presenterats ovan, utnyttjas därför två linser parallellt i de förklarande kapitlen; en lins för varje teoretiskt perspektiv. Det bör hållas i minnet att de förklaringar som *process tracing* erbjuder primärt är så kallade inomfallsförklaringar, vilkas generaliserbarhet är ganska begränsade. Det är snarast så att de förklaringar som erbjuds gäller fallet i fråga, men de teoretiska och konceptuella landvinningar som eventuellt görs har vidare implikationer. I så måtto är fallstudien en implicit jämförelse med andra fall. Det kan vara värt att pröva teoretiska landvinningsars bärighet även annorstädes.

Teoretiska perspektiv på policyutvecklingen inom terrorismbekämpningsområdet

Terroristlagstiftningen 1973

Varför kom Bulltoftakapningen att försäkra en snabb policyprocess, som resulterade i 1973 års terroristlag, men inte i någon egentlig höjd kapacitet att polisiärt hantera terroristöverfall?

Det övertygelsebaserade perspektivet erbjuder en förklaring som går ut på att några övertygelser egentligen inte förändrades av att fenomenet terrorism kom att uppträda i Sverige. Den lösning som terroristlagstiftningen innebar, var på många sätt en förlängning av policyn som under flera årtionden medgivit övervakning av subversiva element. I princip kom den kategori med individer som stod under uppsikt att utökas med vissa utlänningar. Anmärkningsvärt är att den tid som föregick terroristlagstiftningen präglades av motsättningar inom den koalition som faktiskt upprätthöll de vägledande övertygelserna. Förutsättningarna för att hålla samman denna var minst sagt undermåliga.

Enligt det uppmärksamhetsbaserade perspektivet förklaras det relativt snabba policyförloppet med att lösningen, i form av terroristlagen, redan fanns tillgänglig när Terroristkommissionen påbörjade sitt arbete. Den del av regeringen som satte igång arbetet, och för vilken denna lösning var önskvärd, använde på så vis kommissionen som ett föremål för sitt entreprenörskap. Bulltoftakapningen skapade ett utrymme som utnyttjades för att associera den lösning som terroristlagstiftningen innebar – att hålla suspekta utlänningar under uppsikt för att eventuellt kunna utvisa dem – med det hotfulla i själva dådet, istället för med åsiktsregistrering – vilket framför allt Vänsterpartiet kommunisterna gjorde. VPK försökte dock att associera terroristlagen med en enligt deras tycke politisk polis, d.v.s. Säkerhetspolisen. Detta gjorde att de blev isolerade och inte fick andra med på den linjen, och terroristlagstiftningen röstades igenom med överväldigande majoritet. Terroristlagen kom att ses som en sannolik framtida vinnare som det var politiskt lönsamt att investera i.

Den långa policystabiliteten

Varför följdes inte dramat på den västtyska ambassaden i Stockholm av några egentliga policyförändringar med avseende på kontraterrorism?

Det övertygelsebaserade perspektivet ger vid handen att det decennium som följde på ambassaddramat starkt påverkades av en övertygelse, enligt vilken polisen i det närmaste var ett demokratiproblem. Den dramatiska ockupationen av ambassaden och de problem som uppstod där, förändrade inte den övertygelsen. Detta årtionde bevitnade förvisso stora förändringar på den politiska och administrativa scenen, med bland annat fyra olika borgerliga regeringar mel-

lan åren 1976–1982. Sådana förändringar skulle enligt detta perspektiv kunna underlätta policyförändringar. Men den koalition för vilken den rådande övertygelsen var att en förstärkt, centraliserad polismakt var ett problem, snarare än en lösning, höll detta till trots ett fast grepp om policyprocessen.

Det uppmärksamhetsbaserade perspektivet riktar strålkastarljuset mot ett i det närmaste kontraproduktivt entreprenörskap, utövat av rikspolischefen Carl Persson personligen, men efter honom också av en drivande grupp på myndigheten. Det finns flera skäl till att försök från polisiärt håll att påverka policyprocessen misslyckades. Framför allt handlar det dock om att polisväsendet i stort under detta decennium – via andra kriser av mer institutionell karaktär – kom att associeras med oegentligheter och tvingades brottas med trovärdighetsproblem. Sett ur det perspektivet blev en förändring av polisens beredskap att hantera terrorism ett tämligen osäkert policyalternativ; ingen trolig framtida vinnare.

Policyförändringarna efter Palmemordet

Hur kommer det sig att Palmemordet – som inte var relaterat till terrorism, så vitt vi vet – förlöste nya policyn på kontraterrorismområdet, och därtill på bred front?

Det övertygelsebaserade perspektivet bjuder på en förklaring som går ut på att koalitionerna i princip höll sig intakta, men i och med Palmemordet stod det klart att tidigare rådande kärnövertygelser (såsom att polisen utgjorde ett demokratiproblem, varför en insatsstyrka var otänkbar) kommit att sjunka undan till sekundära aspekter. Krisen i sig kan inte sägas ha ändrat några övertygelser, utan manade snarare till eftertanke och en nystart. Om något så visade trots allt krishantering av Palmemordet att beredskapen mer allmänt sett lämnade en del i övrigt att önska. När de övertygelser som tidigare varit så tongivande hade mist sin bäring, blev såväl terroristlagstiftningen som Säpo, dess främsta verkställare, föremål för policyorienterat lärande. I fråga om den nationella insatsstyrkan mot terrorism som bildades kan man eventuellt tala om överinlärande; lärdomar drogs från ambassaddramat, snarare än från det mer näraliggande Palmemordet.

Palmemordet var definitivt ett misslyckande för såväl Säkerhetspolisen som den öppna polisen. I slutändan får man dock konstatera att deras dagordningar fick en tämligen stor genomslagskraft på policyutvecklingen. Det uppmärksamhetsbaserade perspektivet förklarar detta genom att peka på att diverse kommissioner var mottagliga för den förståelse av problemens natur som närdes inom polisen. Kommissionsledamöter hörde ett stort antal polisiära aktörer och kom på så vis att fungera som membran av trovärdighet gentemot den politiska makt, som innan hade förhållit sig mycket skeptisk till polisväsendet. Representanter

för polisen fungerade m.a.o. som verkningsfulla policyentreprenörer. De såg till att andra typer av kriser och skandaler som drabbade samma sektor spelade den önskade utvecklingen i händerna.

Kriser och policyförändring

Kriser har haft en minst sagt komplicerad inverkan på svensk kontraterrorismpolitik. Denna studie har visat på under vilka omständigheter de tjänat som katalysatorer för förändring, och under vilka förhållanden de snarare hindrat policyförändringar. Avhandlingen har visat att andra typer av kriser än de tre som här analyserats särskilt också har haft en stark inverkan på policyprocessen. Affärer och skandaler har inte i sig skapat förändringstryck, men väl förstärkt tendenser i förändringens eller stabilitetens riktning. Studien visar också att kriser kan skapa utrymme för att omvärdera gamla övertygelsesystem, som bara delvis berörs av krisen ifråga.

De två perspektiven antogs redan på ett konceptuellt plan komplettera varandra. Att förklaringarna av utfallen kom att matcha varandra är därför snarast en funktion av det. Det övertygelsebaserade perspektivet ger en rimlig förklaring till långa perioder av policystabilitet, under vilka tillsynes drastiska policyförändringar sker, men som ändå kan sägas vara i samklang med rådande övertygelser. Perspektivet pekar på vilka aktörer som delar vilka övertygelser före krisens inträffande och ger på så sätt de parametrar inom vilka policyförändringar är möjliga. Det uppmärksamhetsbaserade perspektivet kastar sedan ett förklarande ljus på hur policyförändringar kommer till stånd eller inte i samband med en kris, inom de ramar som det övertygelsebaserade perspektivet ger. Det uppmärksamhetsbaserade perspektivet pekar på policyentreprenörens roll för att skapa positiv eller negativ feedback kring en given förståelse för ett ärende. Perspektivet kommer närmare policymakarnas beteenden i det hänseendet.

I dessa avseenden kan man alltså säga att det svenska fallet av krisrelaterad kontraterrorismpolitik styrkte de antaganden som gjordes på ett teoretiskt plan. Dels har antaganden relaterade till de två perspektiven var för sig visat sig hållbara och vägledande, och dels har perspektivens stipulerade inbördes förhållande kunnat styrkas och därmed ge en mer robust förklaring än vad varje perspektiv för sig hade kunnat åstadkomma. En förutsättning för detta har dock varit att avhandlingens explanandum, policyutfallen, först beskrivits med hjälp av en kategorisering som är oberoende av hur policyutfallen skulle ha kategoriserats av respektive perspektiv. Faktum är att de tre teorierna tenderar att kategorisera policyutfall i termer som är avhängiga de variabler som antas förklara dem (vilket i sig är ett problem och en metodologisk poäng som uppmärksammas i denna studie).

De empiriska belägg som presenteras i denna avhandling utmanar i viss mån också de teoretiska perspektiven. Det har t.ex. varit enklare att peka på att övertygelser har präglat policyprocessen, än att etablera mönster av interaktion inom koalitionerna, eller ens koalitionernas konturer, vilket ifrågasätter ACF:s antaganden om stabila koalitioners roll som bärare av övertygelser. Genom att studien förlitat sig på *process tracing*, så har policyentreprenörers (och entreprenörskapets) effekter ibland påvisats vara oavsiktliga och kontraproduktiva. Denna dimension uppmärksammas normalt inte i vare sig MS eller PE, där policyentreprenörer allt som oftast påträffas när en given policyförändring spåras bakåt. Denna studie föreslår att policyentreprenörens roll bättre kan bedömas genom att spåra processen från krisen, eller vad det kan vara som initierar entreprenören, och följa den framåt i tiden.

Process tracing ställer höga empiriska krav, vilka förvisso inte alltid tillfyllest har kunnat tillfredsställas i denna avhandling. Men fördelarna med att studera policyprocesser från drivkrafter och framåt, snarare än från policyförändringar och bakåt, överväger sådana nackdelar. I denna studie har det kastat ett tydligare ljus över mekanismer som förklarar krisers inverkan på policyprocesser, och det är potentiellt en lovande väg att ta i framtida studier av policyförändring och -stabilitet.

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