The Anglo-Dutch Favourite.

The career of Hans Willem Bentinck, 1st Earl of Portland (1649-1709)

De Engels-Nederlandse favoriet.

De carrière van Hans Willem Bentinck, 1ste graaf van Portland (1649-1709)

(met een samenvatting in het Nederlands)

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Door
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Contents

Note on style and date

Throughout the text New Style dates have been adopted, with regard to both British and continental events. Dates of letters have been printed as they appear in the letter; OS or NS has been printed when there is cause for confusion. Where possible, the place where letters by Portland were written is indicated between brackets. Quotations from manuscripts follow the original spelling.

Abbreviations:

AAE CPA: Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Cahiers Politiques d'Angleterre
AAE CPH: Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Cahiers Politiques de Hollande
BL Add Ms: British Library, Additional Manuscript
BL Eg Ms: British Library, Egerton Manuscript
CSPD: W.J. Hardy and E. Bateson, eds., *Calendar of State Papers, domestic series, in the reign of William and Mary* (11 vols., Nendeln, 1969).
CTB: A.W. Shaw, ed., *Calendar of Treasury books* (London, 1935).
Huygens, *Journaal*, I-1, I-2: *Journaal van Constantijn Huygens, den zoon, van 21 Oct. 1688 tot 2 Sept.1696* (2 vols., Utrecht, 1876).
Huygens, *Journaal*, II: *Journaal van Constantijn Huygens, den zoon, gedurende de veldtochten der jaren 1673, 1675,1676, 1677 en 1678* (Utrecht, 1881).
Huygens, *Journaal*, III: *Journalen van Constantijn Huygens, den zoon* (Utrecht, 1888).
HMC: Historical Manuscripts Commission, ed.
NA SP: National Archives, London, State Papers
NAH: Nationaal Archief, The Hague.
NAS: National Archives of Scotland
NLS: National Library of Scotland
NUL Pw A: Nottingham University Library, Portland of Welbeck Archive.
RGP: N. Japikse, ed., *Correspondentie van Willem III en van Hans Willem Bentinck, eersten graaf van Portland* (5 vols., The Hague, 1927-1933).
RU HA: Rijksarchief Utrecht, Huisarchief Amerongen
SHC: Surrey History Centre

Cover illustration:

Hans Willem Bentinck, 1st Earl of Portland
By an artist in the studio of Hyacinthe Rigaud, 1698-1699. Oil on canvas. (National Portrait Gallery)

Introduction

The Glorious Revolution of 1688/1689 was a pivotal moment in British history. For the first time in more than a century the British Isles became committed to large-scale continental warfare, marking their emergence as Great Power. For the United Provinces, the brief moment of success paradoxically contained the seeds of their decline, as the wars against Louis XIV would exhaust the States' finances in the long run.[1] The revolution also led to profound political, economic and constitutional changes on the British Isles. According to revisionist historians, these were the unforeseen results of the mobilisation of human and financial resources to conduct the Nine Years War which had commenced at the same time on the continent.[2] The events were therefore closely connected, because William's main purpose had been to forge an alliance between the Maritime Powers against France, one that would last for a quarter of a century until the Peace of Utrecht was concluded in 1713.

The reign of William III therefore witnessed domestic changes as well as prolonged warfare. It also signified a unique period in Anglo-Dutch history, because a 'composite state' emerged comprising Britain and the United Provinces.[3] The King-Stadholder headed a 'personal union', of which the separate parts co-operated on various levels.[4] An Anglo-Dutch army operated in the Low Countries under William's command, and a joint fleet protected the shores and merchant ships of the Allies. British and Dutch diplomats worked together, and counter-espionage networks exchanged intelligence. However, despite a certain degree of integration within the personal union, the three kingdoms and the republic also developed independently, each experiencing distinct domestic political and economic changes. To rule the independent parts of his realms and at the same time to co-ordinate their war efforts was a complex task.

This personal union was conjoined only at the highest level by the King-Stadholder, who was well served by a small circle of confidants.[5] Most English literature refers to them as 'Dutch favourites', but they constituted an international rather than a specifically Dutch entourage.[6] The most prominent of these was undoubtedly Hans Willem Bentinck, 1st Earl of Portland (1649-1709), renowned politician, military officer and diplomat. Bentinck started his career in 1664 as page to the Prince of Orange. His fortunes gained momentum with the Prince's coming to power as Stadholder in 1672, after which he emerged as William's favourite at court. He distinguished himself during his diplomatic missions to England between 1677 and 1685. Moreover, he was part of a select decision-making core group responsible for the formulation of (mainly foreign) policy, most notably in the period from 1685 leading up to the Glorious Revolution. In 1688 he joined the Dutch forces invading England and re-emerged as William's favourite after his coronation. He was instrumental in the co-ordination of Dutch and British foreign policy and grand strategy during the Nine Years War (1688-1697). Between 1689 and 1699, at the zenith of his political career, Portland was intimately involved in the formulation and implementation of the domestic and foreign policies of both Britain and the United Provinces. He retired from public life in 1699, the

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[1] Cf. S. Groenveld, ' "J'equippe une flotte très considerable": the Dutch side of the Glorious revolution', in: R. Beddard, ed., *The revolution of 1688* (Oxford, 1988), 244-245; J. Aalbers, 'Hollands financial problems (1713-1733) and the wars against Louis XIV', in: A.C. Duke and C.A. Tamse, eds., *Britain and the Netherlands VI: War and society* (The Hague, 1977). For criticism of this view see O. van Nimwegen, *De Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden als grote mogendheid. Buitenlandse politiek en oorlogvoering in de eerste helft van de achttiende eeuw en in het bijzonder tijdens de Oostenrijkse Successieoorlog (1740-1748)* (Amsterdam, 2002) and D.W. Jones, 'Economic policy, trade and managing the English War economy, 1689-1712', in: S. Groenveld and M. Wintle, eds., *State and Trade. Government and the economy in Britain and the Netherlands since the Middle Ages* (Zutphen, 1992).

[2] E.g. J. Brewer, *The Sinews of Power. War, Money and the English State 1688-1783* (Cambridge MA, 1990).

[3] 'Anglo-Dutch' will refer to British (rather than English) and Dutch throughout this thesis for stylistic reasons only.

[4] To what extent Britain and the United Provinces did in fact form a personal union is open to debate, as the Stadholder was formally a servant to the sovereign Provincial Assemblies. Given William's *de facto* influence in the United Provinces, such a view has been accepted by several historians. E.g. S.B. Baxter, *William III* (London, 1966).

[5] Cf. Baxter, *William III*, 280; N. Japikse, *Prins Willem III - De Stadhouder-koning* (2 vols., Amsterdam, 1933), 292.

[6] E.g. M. Kishlansky, *A monarchy transformed. Britain 1603-1714* (London, 1996), 291; T. Harris, *Politics under the late Stuarts. Party conflict in a divided society 1660-1715* (New York, 1993), 165.

reasons for which are still somewhat obscure. Behind the scenes, however, he remained active, most notably in negotiating the Partition Treaties with Louis XIV. The possibility of returning to active politics was abruptly removed by William's death in 1702, but the earl was occasionally instrumental in the maintenance of Anglo-Dutch relations during the War of the Spanish Succession until his death in 1709.

Literature dealing with British and Dutch political history of the late-seventeenth century suffers from two shortcomings. Firstly, despite the publication of a number of excellent monographs, the last decade of the seventeenth century has attracted surprisingly little scholarly attention. In fact, Craig Rose's 1999 monograph on British politics in the 1690s marked the first synthesis on this period since the studies of Henry Horwitz of 1977 and Patrick Riley of 1978.[7] The history of Dutch politics after 1688 remains as yet unwritten. Anglo-Dutch political relations during this period have been almost completely neglected, with the exception of the antiquated works of Gregorius van Alphen on anti-Dutch pamphlets and Sir George Clark on the war on French trade.[8] The tercentenary commemoration of the Glorious Revolution witnessed an outburst of bilateral research, but few historians have considered Anglo-Dutch relations in the aftermath of the 1688/1689 events.[9] After a brief upsurge of historiographical interest in William's reign in 1988, the past decade has remained relatively barren in this respect,[10] although the tercentenary commemoration of William's death in 2002 saw the publication of two biographies.[11]

The second shortcoming in historiography is the lack of an international interpretation model, or the actual application thereof. Traditionally, Whig historians such as T.B. Macaulay and G.M. Trevelyan, and Orangist historians such as N. Japikse, have each studied William III and his context from a national perspective. The revolution of 1688 was analysed whilst the European context was ignored; primary sources were selectively used, because English and Dutch historians were not always familiar with each other's language or source material.[12] By now, historians have become increasingly aware of the necessity to write British history, encompassing the Scottish and Irish as well as the English contexts.[13] Jonathan Israel has rightly pointed out the need to expand on this tendency, to place British history within a wider European framework, or more specifically, to study the 'Anglo-Dutch moment' of 1688/1689 and its aftermath.[14] In his biography of William III, Stephen Baxter as well stressed the significance of the supranational nature of the 'Dual Monarchy'.[15] Only within this British-Dutch, indeed European, context can William's reign be properly understood, a view endorsed in recent works, including the two latest biographies of William III. To Anthony Claydon, William was as much an Orange as a Stuart. Wout Troost paid attention to the United Provinces and England as well as Ireland and Scotland.[16] Nevertheless,

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[7] C. Rose, *England in the 1690s: revolution, religion and war* (Oxford, 1999); H. Horwitz, *Parliament, policy and politics in the reign of William III* (Manchester 1977); P.W.J. Riley, *King William and the Scottish politicians* (Edinburgh, 1979).

[8] G. van Alphen, *De stemming van de Engelschen tegen de Hollanders in Engeland tijdens de regeering van den koning-stadhouder Willem III 1688-1702* (Assen, 1938); G.N. Clark, *The Dutch alliance and the war against French trade 1688-1697* (New York, 1923).

[9] E.g. K.H.D. Haley, 'The Dutch invasion and the alliance of 1689', in: L.G. Schwoerer, ed., *The revolution of 1688 - Changing perspectives* (Cambridge, 1992); J.I. Israel, 'The Dutch role in the Glorious Revolution', in: J.I. Israel, ed., *The Anglo-Dutch moment. Essays on the Glorious Revolution and its world impact* (Cambridge, 1991); Groenveld, 'J'equippe une flotte'.

[10] But see A. Claydon, *William III and the godly revolution* (Cambridge, 1996).

[11] W. Troost, *Stadhouder-koning Willem III. Een politieke biografie* (Hilversum, 2001); A. Claydon, *William III* (London, 2002).

[12] G.M. Trevelyan, *England under the Stuarts* (London, 1997); T.B. Macaulay, *History of England from the accession of James II* (6 vols., London, 1914). Japikse's solid biography of the King-Stadholder is entrenched in traditional Orangism and can rightly be termed Dutch orientated. Primary sources that have been published also bear the mark of national interpretations. While Japikse's publication favoured Dutch correspondence, the *Calendars of State Papers Domestic* for the reign of William and Mary, for instance, have downplayed references to Dutch politics. W.J. Hardy and E. Bateson, eds., *Calendar of State Papers, domestic series, in the reign of William and Mary* (11 vols., Nendeln, 1913-1969); N. Japikse, ed., *Correspondentie van Willem III en van Hans Willem Bentinck, eersten graaf van Portland* (5 vols., The Hague, 1927-1933).

[13] Cf. J.G.A. Pocock, 'British History: A Plea for a New Subject', *JMH* XLVIII (1975).

[14] Israel, *Anglo-Dutch Moment*, 11.

[15] Baxter, *William III* , 280.

[16] Jonathan Scott's recent study on Stuart history emphasised the lasting and structural influence of the Dutch on English institutions in the 1690s, J. Scott, *England's troubles. Seventeenth-century English political instability in European context* (Cambridge, 2000), 474 ff. Cf. M. 't Hart, 'The devil or the Dutch: Holland's impact on the financial revolution in England

until now little research has been conducted into the actual co-operation between the Dutch and British on military, naval, and political matters during the 1690s.

The purpose of this thesis is to partly fill this gap and follow historiographical trends of international approaches by investigating a significant aspect of the 'personal union'. One of the blind spots in the historiography of the 1690s has been the circle of foreign confidants that assisted William III.[17] Consequently, little is known about the so-called 'Dutch counsels' and the influence of William's foreign advisers in England such as Everard van Weede van Dijkveld, the Duke of Schomberg, the Earl of Galway, Arnold Joost van Keppel, William Carstares and Portland. Marion Grew wrote a biography of Portland in 1924, but recently Mark Kishlansky, in his synthesis on Stuart politics, acknowledged the need for a modern study of his career.[18]

A reason for the neglect of William's confidants may lie in the way in which the relationship between a prince and his favourite has often been regarded. The emergence of a strong favourite was seen as a sign of the weakness on the part of the sovereign. Because William was seen as a strong and independent ruler, it was relatively easy to overlook the efforts of his aides. Stephen Baxter admired William III and infamously dismissed Portland as a 'male-nurse tending a semi-invalid'.[19] Literature dealing with the favourite has now moved away from such 'superficial psychological explanations' and concentrates rather on the 'growing complexity of the early modern state' as a way of understanding the significance of the favourite.[20] Indeed, recent literature on the 1690s suggests that Portland's activities as favourite should be rather explained in light of the profound changes that occurred during this decade. John Carswell has drawn attention to Portland's pivotal role during the Glorious Revolution. Patrick Riley, Wout Troost and John Simms have pointed to Portland's involvement in the government of Scotland and Ireland. John Kenyon has analysed his connection with the Earl of Sunderland and their involvement in ministerial and parliamentary management in England. Rather than emphasising Portland's personal relationship with William, therefore, this thesis will focus on the political and military developments of the 1690s and will provide a new overall interpretation and evaluation of Portland's role as favourite.[21]

The central concern of this thesis will be to establish the nature of Portland's role as William's favourite, and the work will aim to connect the three historiographical debates mentioned above. Firstly, it will build upon the findings of a recent volume of essays edited by J. Elliott and L. Brockliss, which sought a model for the favourite as a European phenomenon. At the same time it will engage the editors' conclusion that this phenomenon disappeared after 1660, and explain its re-emergence in England between 1689 and 1711.[22] Secondly, it will explain the role of Portland against the background of the changes analysed by British revisionist historians. The emergence of the favourite coincided with two fundamental developments: the Nine Years War and the consequent political changes on the British Isles. Thirdly, Portland's role will be situated within an Anglo-Dutch and European context, as proposed by Jonathan Israel. It is the purpose of this thesis to show how these elements were intimately connected. The Anglo-Dutch favourite was an anomalous, pivotal figure during the Anglo-Dutch war against France; he oversaw William's various realms and became involved in political processes on the British Isles. His influence declined after the end of the war. Portland's career can therefore be divided into three phases. Until 1688 he was William's adviser and confidant in the United Provinces. From 1689 he acted as the

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1643-1694', *Parliaments, Estates and Representations* XI (1991); Claydon, *William III and the godly revolution*; Troost, *Willem III*.

[17] But see Van Alphen, *De stemming van de Engelschen*.

[18] S.B. Baxter, 'Recent writings on William III', *JMH* XXXVIII (1966), 260; Kishlansky, *A monarchy* transformed, 359.

[19] Baxter, *William III*, 275.

[20] J.H. Elliott, 'Introduction', in: L.W.B. Brockliss and J.H. Elliott, eds., *The world of the favourite* (New Haven and London, 1999), 4. Elliott specifically refers to the work of Jean Bérenger.

[21] W. Troost, *William III and the Treaty of Limerick 1691-1697* (doctoral thesis Leiden, 1983); J.G. Simms, 'Williamite peace tactics 1690-1691', in: J.G. Simms, *War and politics in Ireland 1649-1730* (London, 1986), D.W. Hayton and G. O'Brien, eds.; J. Carswell, *The descent on England* (London, 1973); J.I. Israel, 'Propaganda in the making of the Glorious Revolution', in: S. Roach, ed., *Across the narrow seas* (London, 1991); L.G. Schwoerer, 'Propaganda in the revolution of 1688-1689', *AHR* CXXXII (1977); Riley, *Scottish politicians*; J.P. Kenyon, *Robert Spencer, Earl of Sunderland 1621-1702* (London, 1958).

[22] L.W.B. Brockliss and J.H. Elliott, eds., *The world of the favourite* (New Haven and London, 1999).

Anglo-Dutch favourite until he retired in 1699. Thereafter he was only occasionally involved in politics until his death in 1709. The emphasis of this thesis will be on his career during the 1690s.

Portland's influence, which was mainly manifest in those spheres intimately related to the two developments mentioned before, will be systematically analysed. The first development was the Nine Years War, during which the army consumed human and financial resources. Portland was active as military organiser and maintained the King's clientele in the army and diplomatic service. The constant need for funds led to his increasing involvement in matters of finance. William's reign saw the emergence of a 'standing Parliament' which provided the King with the financial means to conduct the war and made it necessary for him to develop a means of managing Parliament. Portland acquired seats in the Cabinet Council and House of Lords and became involved in parliamentary management. As Groom of the Stole he had control over access to the King and became an influential power broker, involved in creating and maintaining a royal patronage network. The second aspect of Portland's role as Anglo-Dutch favourite was his involvement in William's various realms: England, Scotland, Ireland and the United Provinces.

A political biography necessarily covers fields of expertise that have increasingly become the terrain of specialists, the more so because this thesis aims to cover a wide geographical space. Scottish, English, Irish and Dutch historians have focused in detail upon the political structures and events of their respective countries. Moreover, in addition to political, military and diplomatic historians, students of court history, garden history and art history have also identified and claimed these scholarly subjects. This thesis intends to integrate existing literature and seek patterns in Portland's political behaviour and methods, and gauge the extent and nature of his influence in the various realms and political spheres. This inevitably means that not all avenues can be exhaustively explored. However, analysing the connection between his activities in various parts of William's reign may further clarify events which have been studied within a national context only. Moreover, comparing Portland's activities in Britain and the United Provinces may also expose patterns which could not have otherwise been uncovered.

This thesis consists of seven chapters grouped into three parts which correspond to the phases of Portland's career. The first part discusses Portland's early years. Chapter one will present 'the making' of the favourite, and covers his years in the United Provinces until 1688. It will analyse his responsibilities as a politician, diplomatist, and military officer. The next chapter is essentially a case study, analysing his political, diplomatic and military activities during the Glorious Revolution. It will also pay attention to the wider international context in which the invasion took place. The second part forms the core of this thesis and covers the years between 1688 and 1697, the zenith of Portland's career as Anglo-Dutch favourite. Its tripartite structure discusses the power, policy and perception of the Anglo-Dutch favourite. Chapter three analyses Portland's influence at court, in the army, in the diplomatic service and in Parliament. It also discusses his influence in Scotland, Ireland, England and the United Provinces and more generally his role as favourite. Chapter four is a study of Portland's political activities during the Nine Years War. Rather than providing an exhaustive chronological account, it focuses on core issues which illuminate the nature of his activities and influence, as well as his role in the formulation of William's policy. Chapter five discusses Portland's role in the creation of Williamite ideology and the politico-theoretical opposition as expressed in pamphlets and parliamentary debates. The third and last part deals with Portland's final years. Chapter six analyses the reasons behind his retirement, initially in 1697 and finally in 1699. It forms a sequel to chapters three to five, as it lays bare the erosion of Portland's power, the decline of his political activities and the growing opposition to the favourite. Chapter seven, lastly, will discuss his continuing diplomatic activities during the final decade of his life, as he remained involved in the negotiations related to the Peace of Ryswick (1697), the Treaties of Partition (1698 and 1700) and the Barrier Treaty (1709).

The most important source on which this thesis has been based is Portland's archive from Welbeck Abbey, which has now been transferred to Nottingham University Library, Manuscripts Department.[23] Although Nicolaas Japikse has published the most material part of the correspondence, much remains

[23] A small section has ended up in the Egerton Manuscripts in the British Library.

unpublished.[24] While Portland's vast archive has proved a solid basis for this research project, its several shortcomings have posed methodological problems. Firstly, part of the archive has been lost, and it is not always clear to what extent it is actually representative and as such relevant in the reconstruction of his activities and network of correspondents. Secondly, outgoing correspondence is poorly represented in the archive, and often analyses had to be based on indirect evidence. This is particularly disappointing as his important letters to, for instance, the Earl of Sunderland, have gone missing. Lastly, Portland preferred to discuss behind closed doors what was not essential to write down on paper, and often conjecture must be employed to reconstruct his role. As a result, the exact dimensions of Portland's role and the extent of his influence cannot always be fully reconstructed.

These shortcomings can only be partly overcome by the scarce and often curt outgoing letters in other archives. The Historical Manuscripts Commission has published his correspondence with several politicians.[25] The most important letters are those written to William III and are fully printed in Japikse's edition and in the Calendars of State Papers Domestic. The State Papers Foreign in the National Archive in London - a vast source much neglected by historians - have correspondence with English diplomats. As an international approach has been adopted in this thesis, much material has been used from non-English archives. The Nationaal Archief in The Hague and the printed Heinsius-correspondence shed light on Portland's activities in the United Provinces.[26] The National Archives of Scotland and the National Library of Scotland contain a considerable quantity of letters to and from Portland that have often been overlooked. Additional material has been found in the published correspondences of George Melville and William Carstares.[27] Lastly, the Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères in Paris contain numerous letters of Portland which have been previously overlooked. They provide an outward perspective of Dutch and British affairs. In addition, a wide range of contemporary correspondence, journals and diaries has been consulted to provide an insight into Portland's socio-political context - the court, the army and Parliament. Pamphlet material has been analysed to reconstruct political discourse on the Anglo-Dutch favourite. Lastly, remnants of his material heritage - his estates, gardens and art collection – illustrate the representative aspects of his position.

[24] Nottingham University Library, Portland Welbeck Archive Pw A 1-2870, Pw2 A 1-29; British Library Egerton Manuscripts 1704-1754B; Japikse, *Correspondentie.* His excellent introduction provides an analysis of the archive and its history.

[25] E.g. correspondence with Nottingham: *Report on the manuscripts of the late Allan George Finch, Esq., Of Burley-on-the-Hill Rutland* (4 vols., London, 1913-1965); with Shrewsbury: *Manuscripts of the Duke of Buccleugh and Queensberry* (2 vols., London, 1903); with Prior: *Manuscripts of the Marquis of Bath etc.* (Hereford, 1908). The Surrey History Centre has the important correspondence with John Somers.

[26] A.J. Veenendaal ed., *De briefwisseling van Anthonie Heinsius 1702-1720* (20 vols., The Hague, 1976-2001).

[27] W.L. Melville, ed., *Leven and Melville Papers. Letters and State papers chiefly addressed to George Earl of Melville, Secretary of State for Scotland, 1689-1691* (Edinburgh, 1843); J. McCormick, ed., *State Papers and letters addressed to William Carstares* (Edinburgh, 1774).

Chapter 1: Bentinck's early career (1649-1687)

Born the third son of a landed nobleman in the eastern periphery of the United Provinces, Hans Willem Bentinck could not have anticipated a distinguished career when appointed page to the politically insignificant court of the Prince of Orange in 1664. In 1672, his fortunes inextricably connected to those of his master, he emerged as his favourite, a position he maintained and strengthened owing mainly to his qualities as military organiser. When the Dutch War ended in 1678, other qualities were required, and Bentinck again managed to adapt to changing circumstances and the ensuing requirements. Bentinck's several embassies to London in 1677, 1683 and 1685 offer windows on key moments in Anglo-Dutch relations during these years. This chapter traces Bentinck's social background and considers how his education, capacities and character contributed to his career, as he developed considerably as a politician, diplomat and military organiser. It also analyses his position at the Orange court and assesses the nature and limitations of his influence, placing him within the framework of William's entourage.

I Youth (1649-1670)

Hans Willem Bentinck was born on 20 July 1649 at Diepenheim, the *havezate* (country house) of Berend Bentinck (1597-1668) and his wife Anna van Bloemendaal (1622-1685).[1] The Bentincks could trace their noble family tree back well into the thirteenth century and had played a significant role in the history of the provinces of Gelderland and Overijssel.[2] During the fifteenth century two generations had been *drosten* (stewards) of the Veluwe quarter of Gelderland. Overijssel, responsible for about three and a half percent of the revenue of the Generality (making it the least significant of the seven provinces) was governed jointly by the cities of Kampen, Zwolle and Deventer and the three noble quarters of Salland, Twente and Vollenhoven. This parity between the cities and the nobility tilted towards the latter, whose *drosten*, the nobility's spokesmen, also chaired the annual provincial assembly. The *drosten* played a significant role in local government, supervised the appointment of magistrates and were responsible for jurisdiction.[3]

Hans Willem's great-grandfather Eusebius had been *Drost* of IJsselmuiden and was succeeded as such by his son Hendrik. The latter was appointed *Drost* of Salland, the foremost office in Overijssel, in 1611. Around 1637 Hendrik had acquired three estates which were to be divided at his death amongst his sons Wolf, Eusebius Borchard and Berend. Hence Berend inherited the estate of Diepenheim in 1639 and was accordingly admitted into the *Ridderschap* (Equestrian Order) of Overijssel, the noble elite of that province.[4] The *Ridderschap* consisted of a selection of a few dozen noble families holding a seat in the provincial assembly. They were required to be of noble and ancient lineage, and had to be in possession of a certain fortune and a qualified *havezate*.[5] The self-conscious and vigorous Overijssel nobility still regarded itself as a distinct, superior estate, and was remarkably successful in checking the influx of burghers into its ranks.[6] The Bentincks were among the four most influential families in Overijssel, and consolidated their dynastic position by intermarrying with the foremost families in Gelderland and Overijssel, such as the Van Haersoltes and the Sloets.[7]

Little is known about the early years of Hans Willem's life, which must have been spent in relative tranquillity in the countryside. Berend Bentinck was *proost* (deacon) of Deventer and did well for

[1] A *havezate* was a country house or manor in Overijssel with feudal rights attached to it, making the owner eligible for a seat in the Equestrian Order.
[2] M.E. Grew, *William Bentinck and William III (Prince of Orange). The life of Bentinck, Earl of Portland, from the Welbeck correspondence* (London, 1924), 2.
[3] A.J. Gevers and A.J. Mensema, *De havezaten in Twente en hun bewoners* (Zwolle, 1995), 14.
[4] Mensema and Gevers, *Havezaten*, 16-19, 176-177.
[5] Ibid, 12-26.
[6] Ibid, 39-42 and passim.
[7] J.C. Streng, 'Le métier du noble: De Overijsselse Ridderschap tussen 1622 en 1795', in: A.J. Mensema, J. Mooijweer and J.C. Streng, *De Ridderschap van Overijssel. Le métier du noble* (Zwolle, 2000), 61.

himself. He had Diepenheim rebuilt, Hans Willem being the first to be born in the new house in 1649. The house was situated in a rural setting close to the village of Diepenheim. It must have been a lively, pleasant and uncomplicated atmosphere with eight children growing up in this relatively small but also luxurious house, and Hans Willem's youth was quite different from William's until they met in 1664.[8] The fifth of nine children and the third son, he could not expect to inherit the estate and would be required to pursue an alternative career.[9] A second son, Wolf Willem, died in infancy, and Hans Willem's elder brothers Hendrik (1640-1691) and Eusebius (1643-1670) inherited the two estates of their father and uncle after their deaths. Hans Willem must have been close to his elder sister, Eleonora Sophie, as she would take care of his children after the death of his wife Anne Villiers. There were four younger sisters, Isabella, Anna Adriana, Agnes and Johanna Elizabeth.[10]

According to the anonymous chronicler 'Monsieur de B.', Hans Willem '... étoit d'assez belle taille, un peu roide, d'un blond tirant sur le roux ... Le visage, sans être irrégulier, n'avoit rien de revenant.'[11] He was a healthy boy with a strong constitution. As a young man he once took the field as officer immediately after having recovered from near-fatal smallpox.[12] Hans Willem had no inclination for intellectual pursuits; Burnet later spoke of the 'defects of his education', although such shortcomings were not uncommon amongst the Overijssel nobility.[13] Most witnesses described him as a man of moderate intelligence. Monsieur de B. commented: 'l'esprit assez limité, facile à prévenir et très difficile à ramener de ce qu'il avoit conçu.'[14] His literary capacities were average; phrases in his correspondence tended to be short, unadorned and repetitive. He learned to write and speak French well, and he seems to have had a flair for arithmetic. His handwriting was neat and regular, and displays the thinking of a disciplined but unimaginative man. In later life he would excel in organisational skills. Presumably gardening and hunting were to his taste, for these were among his passionate pastimes in future years. Martial arts must have been the prime occupation, and he would become an experienced soldier.[15] Overijssel was particularly vulnerable to invasion; Hans Willem's family experienced an attack from Munster in 1665 during the Second Anglo-Dutch War. Hence the province's nobility had acquired a strong sense of responsibility with regard to military service. As a younger son, Hans Willem was probably trained and prepared for service in the army.[16]

The Bentincks were predominantly a Protestant and Orangist family. In 1618 Hendrik Bentinck had supported the Contra-Remonstrant[17] policy of Stadholder Maurice, but with the demise of the House of Orange with the death of William II in 1650 the family lost influence, although Hans Willem's father remained *proost* of Deventer. It must have been this dormant Orangism that was responsible for his assignment as page to the Prince of Orange at the court in The Hague in 1664. It was a low point for the House of Orange. In 1651 the abolition of the stadholderate in five of the seven provinces was confirmed at the Grand Assembly, the Frisian Nassaus remaining in office in the North. Three years later Oliver Cromwell forced Grand Pensionary Johan de Witt to accept the secret clause of seclusion, preventing the Oranges (suspected of being in league with the Stuarts because of the marriage of William II and Mary) from regaining the stadholderate. Factional rifts between William's mother, Mary Stuart, and his grandmother, Amalia van Solms, deepened the misfortunes of the Orange family. Throughout the 1650s the low tide in the fortunes of the Oranges and Stuarts darkened the spirits of those two women. In 1660,

[8] Mensema and Gevers, *Havezaten*, 176 ff.
[9] Berend's brother appeared to have remained childless, so Hans Willem's second brother inherited the Schoonheten estate.
[10] Based on D. Schwennicke, ed., *Europäische Stammtafeln*, IV. *Standesherrliche Häuser*, (Marburg, 1981), I, table 12. See also appendix 1.
[11] 'Monsieur de B.', 'Mêmoires ... ou anecdotes, tant de la cour du prince d'Orange Guillaume III, que des principaux seigneurs de la République de ce temps', F.J.L. Krämer, ed., *BMNG* XIX (1898), 90. The author served in a regiment under Bentinck.
[12] W. Temple, 'Memoirs 1672-1679', in: *The works of Sir William Temple* (4 vols., Edinburgh, 1754), I, 223.
[13] H.C. Foxcroft, ed., *A supplement to Burnet's History of my own time etc.* (Oxford, 1902), 196; Gevers and Mensema, *Havezaten*, 42-43.
[14] 'Monsieur de B.,' 'Mêmoires', 90.
[15] Cf. Streng, 'Le métier du noble', 52.
[16] Cf. Gevers and Mensema, *Havezaten*, 43.
[17] The Contra-Remonstrants were the orthodox Calvinists who emerged victoriously after the Synod of Dordt in 1618/1619.

months after the return of her brother, Charles II, to England, Mary died, leaving the young prince an orphan. The court remained a hotbed of intrigue, and it was here that Hans Willem would arrive from an uncomplicated country life.

It is difficult to estimate what impact the change of environment, both geographical and social, had on Hans Willem. Coming from the east to The Hague, the page entered an alien socio-political environment.[18] The relative alienation must have encouraged a confidential relationship with William, intensified by the surrounding atmosphere of intrigue, distrust and political frustration that characterised the Orange court. As a child William was prone to extreme gravity, and continuous familial rivalry made him taciturn and suspicious. It was during these years that the two boys developed a deep friendship. They shared the larger part of their teenage years in relative seclusion, and developed a strong sense of comradeship. There is an anecdote that Hans Willem had gained the trust of William when he 'had shown' his friend the daughter of a local landlord.[19] But the consolidation of such boyish comradeship must have had deeper causes. One year his junior, William often drew strength from the less complicated Hans Willem, who unlike his friend, was not prone to bouts of depression or faintheartedness. But they were also both taciturn and steady characters. William was drawn to Hans Willem's stable family background, his brothers and sisters and their children, which was not unnatural for an orphan. In 1668 William made a pledge to Hans Willem's parents to take care of their son's future.[20] The Prince's oldest preserved letter to his friend dates from August 1668 conveying his condolences over the death of Hans Willem's father. The expressions William uses about his loyalty to his page and the fortunes of his family are quite extraordinary:

> 'je vous puis asseurer avec vérité qu'il n'y a personne qui prant tant de part à l'affliction que vostre maison en a receu que moy, et principalement de vous, car je suis tellement de vos amis que tout ce qui vous arrive, je le prans comme si cela arrivoit à moy mesme'.[21]

Of Hans Willem's early years at court only fragments are known. As page - of which there would be two or three - he became a member of the entourage of the Prince and accompanied him on various occasions. One of his first public appearances was at the funeral of the Frisian Stadholder Willem Frederik in 1664.[22] In 1668 he attended William at a reception celebrating the wedding of the *greffier*'s daughter.[23] Their mutual friendship was reinforced by the element of continuity that Hans Willem represented to William. Only two years after his arrival a major change took place at the Orange court which swept a number of influential courtiers out of office. The Second Anglo-Dutch War had prompted De Witt to purge the princely household of a number of sympathisers of the Stuarts. Boreel and the dashing nobleman and governor of the Prince Frederik van Nassau-Zuylestein, of whom William was particularly fond, were forced to leave court despite the latter's appeal to the Grand Pensionary. It is difficult to estimate the impact of these measures. Although the *kamerheer* (Chamberlain), the *hofmeester* (Steward) and the *stalmeester* (Master of the Horse) were replaced by Holland noblemen, the ramifications of this purge may not have reached down to the lower echelons at court.[24] One of the newcomers at court was *stalmeester* Hendrik van Nassau-Ouwerkerk, who like Bentinck would remain an esteemed courtier; William rewarded loyalty of the members of his entourage, most of whom would continue to play an important role in his reign.

Their teenage years came to an end in 1668 when the isolated princely court was drawn into the vortex of resurgent Orangism and took its chances in the pursuit of political power. In the aftermath of the Second Anglo-Dutch War and the wake of the War of Devolution a debate developed over the Prince's

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[18] Cf. O. Mörke, *Stadtholder oder Staetholder? Die Funktion des Hauses Oranien und seines Hofes in der politischen Kultur der Republik der Vereinigten Niederlande im 17. Jahrhundert* (Münster, 1997), 113.
[19] 10 April 1678, Huygens, *Journaal*, II, 243.
[20] N. Japikse, *Prins Willem III - De Stadhouder-koning* (2 vols. Amsterdam, 1933), I, 114; *RGP 24*, 710-711.
[21] William to Bentinck 13 August 1668, *RGP 23*, 3.
[22] *Hollandse Mercurius 1664.* (Haarlem, 1665), 195.
[23] Japikse, *Willem III*, I, 114, 132-134.
[24] Ibid., I, 131.

taking political office, a move endorsed by the majority of provinces. To restrain the tide of mounting Orangism, the States of Holland had issued the Perpetual Edict in 1667 abolishing the stadholderate. The Harmony, stipulating the separation between the stadholderate and the captain-generalship in the other provinces, was made a precondition for William's entry into the *Raad van State* (Council of State), an executive body dealing mainly with military matters. It was not until 1670 that William took his seat. The Edict had been devised by the Haarlem Pensionary Caspar Fagel and the Amsterdam regent Gilles Valckenier. Its ambiguous nature, aimed at satisfying both Orangists and True Freedom regents, failed on both accounts as De Witt only grudgingly accepted it, and William's grandmother Amalia van Solms lukewarmly received the news.[25] From 1668 the Orangist advance gained momentum. Amalia, in conjunction with the Prince's relative Willem Adriaan Nassau-Odijk and the Zeeland pensionary Pieter de Huybert, had prepared a plan for William, now of age, to demand his position as First Noble of the province of Zeeland. William travelled to Middelburg in September, where he took his seat in the States of Zeeland.[26]

Bentinck's role in these events was minor, though he accompanied the Prince at key events. William had visited Bentinck's parents in Overijssel, and Bentinck was there again in August on the occasion of his father's death. He was in William's train to Zeeland. In May 1668 Bentinck received his first commission in the army, being appointed cornet in the battalion of Lord 's Gravemoer. The politically significant assignments, however, were entrusted to William's older bastard cousins, Odijk and Ouwerkerk, the latter being sent to England in 1669 on a diplomatic mission. Bentinck's first journey abroad occurred in the autumn of 1670, when William travelled to England to meet his uncle Charles II. The company (also including Ouwerkerk, Odijk and Zuylestein) travelled around, and Bentinck was even awarded honorary degrees from Oxford and Cambridge universities.[27] In London William lodged in Whitehall, and Bentinck must have experienced a taste of English court life.

II Early career (1670-1676)

The political significance of the mission was limited, and the Prince was oblivious to the secret Anglo-French dealings earlier that year to the prejudice of the Dutch state. The increasing threat from France had prompted Gelderland to propose the appointment of the Prince as Captain-General in May 1671 in defiance of the Act of Harmony. In December William urged Godard Adriaan Reede van Amerongen, an influential Utrecht nobleman, to have that province concur. Under pressure Holland decided to appoint William Captain-General for one season with restrictions in January 1672. But the combined Anglo-French attack in the spring of 1672 dramatically altered the situation, and in July William was appointed Stadholder. The task facing him was more than daunting. Although Admiral Michiel de Ruyter managed to fend off the English fleet, French invasion forces crushed Dutch defences and crossed the rivers Rhine and IJssel in June. The demise of William's political opponent De Witt - who was lynched by a frenzied crowd - also deprived him of a political mentor.[28]

As a military officer Bentinck would have accompanied William during these turbulent months. He attended the Prince at the latter's meeting with De Ruyter in August in Den Helder.[29] There is, however, no evidence that Bentinck played a role of any importance in the momentous events of 1672. His was a backstage role during the negotiations between the English ambassadors and William in June.[30] Whereas Bentinck had had no diplomatic or political training, William was now well served by seasoned advisers and diplomats who guided the young Prince through the most difficult year of his life. In comparison

[25] It could also be argued that it succeeded on both accounts, as the compromise paved the way for William to take office, but also satisfied the Republicans who hailed the measure as the apotheosis of True Freedom. W. Troost, *Stadhouder-koning Willem III. Een politieke biografie* (Hilversum, 2001), 61-62.
[26] Japikse, *Willem III*, I, 146-147.
[27] Grew, *Bentinck*, 18-24, has an account of this visit.
[28] Cf. J.I. Israel, *The Dutch Republic. Its Rise, Greatness and Fall 1477-1806* (Oxford, 1998), 796-806.
[29] Japikse, *Willem III*, I, 301.
[30] NA SP 84-189, fos. 143-152, 157-160.

Bentinck had little to offer except his loyalty and commitment. Like William, Bentinck was still relatively inexperienced when taking office in 1672. At 23 he was also the youngest in William's entourage, men like Solms, Odijk, Ouwerkerk and Waldeck being between ten and thirty years his senior. Stephen Baxter has aptly observed that the young prince, faced with enormous responsibility and challenges, tended to rely on older and more experienced men .[31]

Unlike most members of the stadholderly entourage Bentinck was entirely William's creature and did not possess an independent position. But he was undoubtedly more intimate with William and as such well placed in close proximity to the centre of power. Childhood friendship with a ruler often was the origin of a favourite's position of influence. While friendship and continuous close proximity were precious advantages in the pursuit of influence, it was insufficient as a basis to maintain power. 'Monsieur de B.' was sceptical of Bentinck's qualities and observed: 'Le grand attachment qu'il avoit eu depuis la plus tendre jeunesse auprès du Prince, luy avoit ôté les moyens d'acquérir d'autres connaisances qu'un certaine routine dans les affaires, que son maître luy communiquoit; ignorant sur toute autre chose ...'[32]

A loyal and assiduous servant, Bentinck managed to keep his position during the major changes of 1672. Continuous access to the Prince was assured by his appointment as *kamerheer* (Chamberlain) in April 1672, a post hitherto of moderate importance, but now visibly ranking higher amongst courtiers as he was recognised as William's confidant.[33] Although he was, in his new capacity, required to perform a number of menial tasks, proximity to William provided plentiful opportunities to converse about matters of importance which would otherwise have required an audience. His rivals soon complained that Bentinck had '... very much the ear' of the Prince.[34] The ambitious young man was not contented with the mere exercise of routine business and the easy life of a courtier. Monsieur de B. wrote that

> 'Il s'étoit conservé l'affection de son maître par un assiduité qui tenoit de l'esclavage, n'ayant de libre que les heures qu'il étoit occupé a donner les audiences. Cette faveur auroit été un exemple à tous les souverains, d'une constance très rare, si elle s'étoit encore soustenue quatre ou cinq ans.'[35]

The invasion of 1672 had cast a shadow over the fate of the Republic, and it was mainly because of the success of the 'water-line' (a string of waterways and inundated land at the eastern border of Holland) that the Dutch army was not completely destroyed. The military predicament was the main concern of the new Captain-General. Not surprisingly, Bentinck also soon immersed himself in military affairs, and rapidly climbed through the military ranks. By 1672 he was captain of the infantry. In April of that year he was appointed cavalry captain, and in July 1674 he was promoted to colonel of a regiment of horse.[36] But it was as staff officer rather than on the battlefield that his talent shone forth. He became engaged in military organisation, although his exact responsibilities are unclear due to scant sources. The first evidence dating from 1673, when he systematically ordered battle plans and military reports on such subjects as estimations of the strength of armies and their positions.[37] Possibly before, but certainly from 1675 he was responsible for some logistic aspects of the campaigns, having daily marching orders for the troops drafted by his aides.[38] An annotated memorial from 1676 shows Bentinck active in military planning, discussing not only the supply of troops and weapons but also various tactical options with regard to an attack on Wijck.[39]

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[31] S.B. Baxter, *William III* (London, 1966), 249.
[32] 'Monsieur de B.', 'Mêmoires', 90.
[33] NUL Pw A 2865; Mörke, *Stadtholder oder Staetholder?*, 107n, 117.
[34] Qu. in Japikse, *Willem III*, I,.359. Cf. Comte d'Avaux, *Négociations ... en Hollande etc.* (6 vols. Paris, 1752-1753), IV, 240.
[35] 'Monsieur de B.', 'Mêmoires', 91.
[36] NUL Pw A 2865-2866.
[37] NUL Pw A 2039-2059, Pw A 2085.
[38] BL Eg Ms 1704.
[39] NUL Pw A 2048.

Bentinck's increasing interference in military matters naturally incited the animosity of army commanders. When he tried to arrange a promotion for one of his cousins who was serving under the command of the Rhinegrave, he was summoned by the latter and given to understand that as a *kamerheer* he should restrict his activities to 'fetching the slippers' of the Prince.[40] The young officer had been intimidated and retreated, but in 1675 he had allied himself with a powerful faction at court which turned against Waldeck.[41] This intimate confidant of the Captain-General's situated at the apex of the military establishment wielded some political influence as well, which was quite typical for men in the stadholderly entourage. By the same token, men who were essentially courtiers were given a military rank. Olaf Mörke has aptly observed that men such as Waldeck and Bentinck were 'politische Offiziere', superseding their military tasks and also employable as politicians. In fact, it was mainly the military entourage of William III as Stadholder that would continue to serve him in England as well.[42]

This entanglement of military and political responsibility was also manifested in Bentinck's career. As secretary to William for military affairs, he soon also immersed himself in diplomatic and political correspondence. Under William III the stadholderly secretary lost political influence due to the separation of routine and confidential correspondence. If Constantijn Huygens's secretaryship still wielded some political significance, his son Constantijn jr. acted merely as a clerk of routine business. William himself and Bentinck handled confidential correspondence.[43] For instance, a 1675 letter from the Prince to the Earl of Arlington is clearly in Bentinck's handwriting.[44] In Bentinck's case, as it would be in Arnold Joost van Keppel's in later years, this personal secretaryship proved a stepping stone to a more politically significant position in ensuing years. Confidential correspondence of highly placed statesmen, foreign and native, passed through Bentinck's hands. He was responsible for conveying orders to the supreme commanders, but also discussed foreign affairs. He had a good relationship with the English ambassador Gabriel Sylvius, and developed his skills of political analysis with regard to the situation in England, the relationship between Charles II and his parliament and the configuration of court factions. In the anxious years between 1672 and 1674 these matters must have been continuously discussed, and Bentinck learned a great deal about English politics.[45] He thus gained some experience in foreign affairs, although his diplomatic career would not take off until 1677.[46] Although the extent of political influence attached to the secretaryship should not be overestimated, due to its evolution Bentinck developed a thorough knowledge of foreign and domestic policy.[47]

In 1675 he consolidated his position as the Prince's most loyal servant when the latter fell ill with smallpox in 1675 and his life was in danger. Sir William Temple recorded the event, commenting:

> 'I cannot here forbear to give Monsieur Bentinck the character due to him, of the best servant I have ever known in Prince's or private family. He tended his master, during the whole course of his disease, both night and day; nothing he took was given him, nor he ever removed in his bed, by any other hand; and the Prince told me, that whether he slept or not he could not tell, but, in sixteen days and nights, he never called once that he was not answered by Monsieur Bentinck, as if he had been awake. The first time the Prince was well enough to have his head opened and combed, Monsieur Bentinck, as soon as it was done, begged of his master to give him leave to go home, for he was able to hold up no longer: he did so, and fell immediately sick of the same disease and in great extremity; but recovered just soon enough to attend his master into the field, where he was ever next his person.' [48]

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[40] J.H. Hora Siccama, 'Mevrouw van Zoutelande en hare gedenkschriften', *BVGO*, 4th series, (1903), IV, 173-174.
[41] NA SP 84-198, fo. 290r. Cf. page 14.
[42] Mörke, *Stadtholder oder Staetholder?*, 122.
[43] Ibid., 140. Cf. 7 June 1677, Huygens, *Journaal*, II, 175.
[44] Letter to Arlington, 3 February 1675, NA SP 8-1, fos. 10-11. Cf. Japikse, *Willem III*, I, 360.
[45] NUL Pw A 2041.
[46] Dona to Bentinck 28 December 1676, NUL Pw A 363.
[47] E.g. NUL Pw A 2046.
[48] Temple, 'Memoirs 1672-1679', I, 223.

It must have been his youth and physical strength that pulled Bentinck through the disease himself. There is a tradition that he shared William's bed, as it was believed the taking over of the disease could cure the infected. There is, however, no contemporary evidence to support the anecdote. Be that as it may, the event represented a powerful testimony of Bentinck's willingness to serve his master with his life. It would become one of the milestones in his life as well as a key ingredient in panegyric literature, as an elegy in 1709 recollected that he 'To save that valu'd Life expos'd his own.'[49]

Bentinck's career accelerated at his taking political office when William appointed him *Drost*, Bailiff and Deputy-Stadholder in Breda in 1674, and *Drost* in Lingen one year later. As he assumed his new position he reached an equal footing with his brothers in Overijssel. It was a position he had fiercely pursued. One of his competitors complained that Bentinck had '... bitten out of favour' Lord Wotton who had retained the post in Breda for several years.[50] More significantly, in September 1676 William granted him the estate of Drimmelen. Its value was relatively small - an estimated *f* 4,000 only - but due to the feudal rights accompanying the estate Bentinck was eligible to take a seat in the *Ridderschap* of Holland.[51] There were about a hundred noblemen in Holland, but only some ten of the most prominent would take a seat in the *Ridderschap.* The Order had adopted the system of co-optation, and unanimous support was required to incorporate a non-Holland nobleman such as Bentinck.[52] Its pensionary was Caspar Fagel, who also presided over the States of Holland. Until his death in 1688, Fagel was undoubtedly William's mainstay in political affairs. An exceptionally skilled politician and orator, well versed in constitutional and legal affairs, Fagel was able to facilitate William's policy in the States institutions as he held seats in both the States General and the States of Holland.[53] The precise nature of the relationship between William and Fagel leaves room for speculation, but it must be assumed that it largely depended on mutual trust and shared opinions on the direction of policy. Fagel could manage affairs in the States when William's direct interference would perhaps cause friction.[54] Whereas William had ostensibly not pressed Bentinck's admission into the *Ridderschap*, Fagel had arranged for its members to accept his inclusion. Bentinck himself recognised that his '... care and good direction much contributed to that end'.[55] Hence, from 1676 he assumed his life-long seat in the States of Holland, the locus of political influence in the United Provinces.

III The Prince's confidant (1676-)

By the middle of the 1670s Bentinck had assembled a number of important offices, and was recognised as William's foremost confidant. He was consistently part of the inner entourage of the Prince and frequently observed having confidential conversations with William and one or two other confidants.[56] An anonymous English agent in The Hague commented in 1675: 'Monsr. Benthem, they consider as y^{e} man y^{e} Prince most confides in, & to who he unbosomes his private thoughts, his feares & his pleasures,

[49] *An elegy, occasioned by the much lamented death of ...Portland* (1709), NUL Pw A 2864.
[50] Japikse, *Willem III*, I, 359.
[51] The Dutch guilder was about one eleventh the value of the English pound sterling. Drimmelen was only granted to Bentinck as a device to have him in the Order. When in 1703 William's heir Johan Willem Friso reclaimed the estate, Bentinck admitted that the grant 'had only been made with that intention, and no other'. BL Eg Ms 1708, fos. 100-103. Grant of Drimmelen Manor 1676, BL Egerton Charter 103; Japikse, *Willem III*, I, 352; BL Eg Ms 1708, fos. 102-103.
[52] Cf. H.M. Brokken and A.W.M. Koolen, eds., *Inventaris van het archief van de Ridderschap en Edelen van Holland en West-Friesland 1572-1795* (The Hague, 1992), i-xvi; H.F.K. van Nierop, *Van ridders tot regenten. De Hollandse adel in de zestiende en de eerste helft van de zeventiende eeuw* (n.p. 1984), 220ff.
[53] Cf. G. de Bruin, *Geheimhouding en verraad. De geheimhouding van staatszaken ten tijde van de Republiek (1600-1750)* (The Hague, 1991), 251 ff. and passim.
[54] Cf. E. Edwards, 'An Unknown Statesman: Gaspar Fagel in the service of William III and the Dutch Republic', *History*, LXXXVII (2002).
[55] William to Fagel 12 June 1676, Bentinck to Fagel 3 July 1676, *RGP 27*, 107-109, 118.
[56] Cf. 27 May 1675, 22 July 1675, Huygens, *Journaal*, II, 29, 46 and passim.

and as on y[t] will never contradict him in any thing.'[57] Thus Bentinck managed to remain William's closest aide throughout turbulent changes during his reign and despite the proliferation of a number of advisers and favourites at court. Perhaps the most interesting observation is from Burnet:

> 'Mr. Bentinck was bred about the prince, and he observed in him that application to business and those virtues that made him think fit to take him into his particular confidence, and to employ him in the secretest of all his concerns as well as the looking to all his private affairs. He is a man of great probity and sincerity, and is as close as his master is. He bears his favour with great modesty, and has nothing of that haughtiness that seems to belong to all favourites. He is a virtuous and religious man, and I have heard instances of this that are very extraordinary, chiefly in a courtier. He has all the passion of a friend for the prince's person, as well as the fidelity of a minister in his affairs, and makes up the defects of his education in a great application to business; and as he has a true and clear judgement, so the probity of his temper appears in all his counsels, which are just and moderate; and this is so well known, that though commonwealths can very ill bear inequality of favour that is lodged in one person, yet I never heard any that are in the government of the towns of Holland complain of him; nor does he make those advantages of his favour which were ordinarily made by these that have access to princes, by employing it for those who pay them best, I do not know him well enough to say much concerning him; but though I naturally hate favourites, because all those whom I have known hitherto have made a very ill use of their greatness, yet by all I could ever discern, the prince has shewed a very true judgement of persons in placing so much of his confidence on him.'[58]

William's favourites have almost invariably received a bad press. Corruption proliferated during stadholderly periods as an essential ingredient in the maintenance of client networks.[59] William did little to combat such venality as long as his aides remained effective.[60] Bentinck attracted relatively little criticism, and no charges of corruption have been recorded - even though it should be noted that his offices were particularly lucrative.[61] This is surprising, as he stood out as William's favourite and was a natural target for anti-Orangist critiques. Burnet marvelled at the fact that '... though commonwealths can very ill bear inequality, yet I never heard any that are in the government of the towns of Holland complain of him.'[62] Understandably, William's favouring of Bentinck was deeply disliked by other courtiers. Ouwerkerk, one of William's most intimate counsellors, particularly resented the position of the young upstart.[63] Complaints were made that Bentinck antagonised and outrivalled other courtiers, but accounts about his behaviour and attitude at court are invariably contradictory and not easy to interpret.[64] On occasion he could be quarrelsome when challenged by rivals, but it seemed that he was not easily provoked. Especially once his position was established he frequently disdainfully ignored provocations even to his own disadvantage. Once he had developed an esteem for someone he would remain loyal, but he found it difficult to overcome personal antipathy and was on that account often regarded as arrogant. Perhaps his haughtiness was also prompted by an urge to compensate for feelings of social inferiority towards William's other confidants and his fellow noblemen in the *Ridderschap*. Although he could boast an ancient noble family tree, his was obviously inferior to the princely Nassau, Waldeck, or even the noble Van Noordwijks and the Van Wassenaars pedigrees.[65] It was not until Bentinck had made his fortune as Earl of Portland that the Wassenaar-Duyvenvoordes for instance were eager to become

[57] NA SP 84-198, fo. 289.
[58] Foxcroft, S*upplement*, 196-197.
[59] De Bruin, *Geheimhouding*, 377-378.
[60] Cf. Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, 827.
[61] Japikse, *Willem III*, II, 118.
[62] Foxcroft, *Supplement*, 196-197.
[63] E.g. 11 May 1677, Huygens, *Journaal*, II, 164.
[64] Japikse, *Willem III*, I, 359.
[65] Ibid., I, 357-359.

attached to his family.[66] Bentinck must have been regarded as an intruder as well, a relative outsider from Overijssel conspicuously ushered into the *Ridderschap*, though he had spent some years in The Hague at the Orange court and had become part of Holland society.

Bentinck's position was never unchallenged, and faction struggle within William's circle was perennial. According to the anonymous agent mentioned above:

> 'All these men, y^{t} are most in his favour wth y^{e} Prince, are divided into factions amongst themselves. Fagels [sic] relyes only upon the y^{e} Princes [sic], C. de Waldeck & y^{e} Pentioner cannot agree. The Rhinegrave, Mons. Odijke, & Monsr. Benthem are united & cannot abide Waldeck who I am assured lost much ground by his absence.'[67]

As Bentinck became increasingly influential, the bulk of antagonism was aimed at him. In 1680 Willem van Nassau-Zuylestein and Ouwerkerk were enraged with William 'out of hatred that he does good to Mr. Bentinck'.[68] In the summer of 1686 the French ambassador Count d'Avaux witnessed a 'froideur' between Fagel and Bentinck which lasted for months, as a result of which Fagel's favour with the Prince, d'Avaux stated, diminished.[69]

It is doubtful whether such factionalism constituted anything more than mere competition, and it cannot not be seen as a reflection of any significant differences in opinion with regard to policy. William demanded that his aides endorse his views, and would not allow one of his aides to overrule him. In later years in England William would sometimes hold the major offices of state in commission. 'His chief characteristic', one commentator observed, 'is great distrust, so that very few people, even amongst those who are in office, are acquainted with his secrets'.[70] A few of William's closest confidants were employable in more than one way, holding military rank as well as political office. They also tended to maintain a regional clientele and were active in domestic as well as international affairs.[71] But essentially Japikse was correct in arguing that William compartmentalised various aspects of his government, entrusting military, diplomatic and political issues to different men.[72] In military matters he relied on the experienced Prince of Waldeck. Grand Pensionary Fagel was his mainstay in the complicated world of Holland factional politics, whereas the veteran diplomat Everard Weede van Dijkveld was an important adviser in matters of diplomacy and foreign policy. The anonymous English report of 1675 confirmed this view:

> '... the Prince only consults Waldeck on affairs of moment abroad and at home. But someone else said that his influence has been much impaired since his absence, and he consult with the Pensioner only about affairs both abroad and home. I wanted to know in whom he relies in connection with English affairs, that is mainly Fagel, and some of the ministers who contact the presbyterians in Scotland and England, Odijke is only involved when things have to be communicated to the English court.'[73]

Mörke has argued that within this configuration Bentinck held a special position, as he ' .. in vielerlei politischen Zusammenhangen immer wieder als engster Weggefahrte des Statthalters begegnen wird'.[74] As from about the late 1670s he was engaged in every aspect of William's policy and became the Prince's closest confidant. Although due to the lack of relevant source material it is not feasible to get a clear picture of Bentinck's client network, evidence suggests that he was particularly influential at court.

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[66] His daughter Anna Margaretha would marry Arend van Wassenaar-Duyvenvoorde.
[67] NA SP 84-198, fos. 289-290.
[68] 4 October 1680, Huygens, *Journaal*, III, 25.
[69] D'Avaux to Louis 23 January 1687, AAE CPH 150, fo. 82v.
[70] Qu. in W.L. Sachse, *Lord Somers, a political portrait* (Manchester, 1975), 146.
[71] Mörke, *Stadtholder oder Staetholder?*, 194.
[72] Japikse, *Prins Willem III*, I, 357-359.
[73] NA SP 84-198, fos. 289-290.
[74] Mörke, *Stadtholder oder Staetholder?*, 111.

Adriaan van Borssele described him in 1681 as 'le favori tout-puissant à notre cour'.[75] He managed to allot significant posts to his relatives and dependants. In 1680 for instance, he had his cousin van Voorst appointed *hofmeester* (steward).[76]

Bentinck's position at court was strengthened through his wife Anne Villiers, who was lady-in-waiting to Princess Mary and a great confidante of hers. The double relationship between the Bentinck and Orange couples was, on balance, certainly beneficial to him. The birth of his eldest daughter and son in 1679 and 1681, named after Mary and William, only strengthened this. More problematic was the role of Elisabeth Villiers, the sister of Bentinck's wife and William's mistress. Though not known for her beauty, she was intelligent, cunning and witty and clearly appealed to William more than did Mary. Bentinck often secretly ushered Elisabeth through his own apartments to those of William.[77] However, a strong dislike of his sister-in-law and a sense of loyalty to Mary - who clearly suffered emotionally from the liaison - led him into perhaps the only outright conflict with his master. When Mary confronted her husband with her knowledge of his amorous affair, both Bentinck and his wife Anne sided with the Princess. William was furious and temporarily banished his confidant from court.[78] Such a conflict was exceptional and would not be repeated.

Mörke has argued that the noble entourage of William III formed the nucleus of a supraprovincial network connecting the Orangist regional aristocracy and one with international ramifications. William's closest associates were often recruited from the eastern provinces where they held key positions.[79] William's relatives, the brothers Ouwerkerk and Odijk, were members of the Utrecht and Zeeland nobility respectively. The Amerongen family held strong positions in Utrecht, whereas Johan van Arnhem was a prominent supporter of William in the province of Gelderland. Bentinck's brothers and cousin held the prestigious offices of *hoogschout* (sheriff) and *drost* in the States of Overijssel.[80] The decision to put Bentinck and van Reede in the *Ridderschap* was a conscious attempt by William to have his associates in key political positions in Holland and Utrecht.[81] In 1674 William had already put three clients in the *Ridderschap*, Wolfert van Brederode, Maurits Lodewijk van Nassau-Beverweert and Frederik van Rheede, making it a reliable Orangist body in the States of Holland.[82] In this manner an Orangist noble network covered the United Provinces. In Mörke's view Bentinck 'bildete in diesem Zusammenhang lediglich die Spitze einer Einflußhierarchie von Personen, deren politisches und soziales Gewicht über die Grenzen des Hofes hinaus in die Republik hineinreichte.'[83]

IV Diplomatic career (1677-1684)

After the Peace of Nijmegen in 1678, Bentinck was still involved with military secretarial duties, and in October 1683 he was made one of the five major-generals, the highest rank under the three lieutenants-general and the commander-in-chief.[84] He seemed to have continued his old activities with regard to the logistics of the preparations for the campaign to Luxembourg, giving instructions to Ginckel for provisions and marching orders.[85] He was also involved in negotiating with provisioners for forage.[86] As

[75] Borssele van der Hooghe, Heer van Geldermalsen, 'Gedenkschriften', K. Heeringa, ed., *Archief. vroegere en latere mededeelingen voornamelijk in betrekking tot Zeeland* (Middelburg, 1916), 81.
[76] Japikse, *Willem III*, II, 127.
[77] M.F. Sandars, *Princess and Queen of England, Life of Mary* (London, 1913), 142.
[78] Sandars, *Life of Mary*, 134; H.W. Chapman, *Mary II, Queen of England* (London, 1953), 123-124.
[79] Mörke, *Stadtholder oder Staetholder?*, 112.
[80] Mensema, Mooijweer and Streng, *De Ridderschap van Overijssel*, 87.
[81] S. Groenveld, *Evidente factien in den staet. Sociaal-politieke verhoudingen in de 17e eeuwse Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden* (Hilversum, 1990), 62.
[82] Japikse, *Willem III*, I, 352; Mörke, *Stadtholder oder Staetholder?*, 113.
[83] Mörke, *Stadtholder oder Staetholder?*, 170-171.
[84] J.W. Wijn, *Het Staatsche Leger 1568-1795* (The Hague, 1940), VI, 78.
[85] Bentinck to Ginckel 28 March 1684 (The Hague), *RGP 24*, 632.

military officer he also built up a clientele in the army. Although he yielded when Ginckel passed over his brother Hendrik for promotion in April 1684, he must have been pushing for such an advancement as only nine months later Hendrik received the rank of colonel.[87]

The end of the war in 1678, however, rendered his duties as military staff officer less important, but Bentinck managed to redirect his career as diplomatist. Towards the end of the Dutch War, in June 1677, the Prince decided to send Bentinck to sound out Charles II. In order to remove the distrust of his predominantly Protestant parliament, Charles's first minister, the Earl of Danby, considered joining an anti-French alliance. Such considerations gained in importance as Parliament grew increasingly uneasy about the Spanish Netherlands, and pressed the King to counter French territorial ambitions in exchange for generous grants, perhaps even to fund a war. The Dutch ambassador in London, Coenraad van Beuningen, was convinced that Charles II would not support the Dutch, and therefore considered a peace settlement expedient.[88] Frequently reprimanded by the States General on this matter, Van Beuningen had undermined Bentinck's bargaining position by already signalling Dutch eagerness for peace and willingness to make concessions.[89] However, William increasingly realised that a peace settlement was necessary, as can be gleaned from Bentinck's instructions, preserved in a memorandum in his own hand. The apprentice's orders were strict and left little scope for manoeuvring. He was not to make any proposals, but merely to ask the King for his opinion with regard to the state of affairs on the continent. He was to make clear that although William desired to prolong the war, he realised that Charles preferred a peace settlement, and that William was seeking advice on how to conduct himself in that case. Should the King insist on peace, William requested his full diplomatic weight in favour of advantageous terms, whilst being prepared to satisfy the King with territorial gains. Should he still have any 'mauvaises soupçons', Bentinck was to propose that William come over to England.[90]

Bentinck was of course required to sound out those who desired a 'bonne intelligence' between the Oranges and Stuarts. It had really been the influential and ingenious Lord Treasurer the Earl of Danby who was mainly responsible for the rapprochement evolving during the course of the summer. An exceptionally skilled parliamentary manager, Danby had piloted royal policy through the troubled waters of parliamentary distrust. He was now responsible for steering a cautious pro-Dutch course, labouring to reconcile the war-mongering Commons with their monarch.[91] Unwilling to give Charles the benefit of the doubt, they refused funds and the session was consequently adjourned. William thought, however, that Charles might be more flexible now that the pressure from Parliament was gone, and it was in this conjuncture that Bentinck arrived in London on the 14th of June 1677.[92] Ignoring the Dutch ambassador, he went directly to see the King and the Duke where he received a warm reception, such that he thought William 'aura lieu d'estre entièrement satisfaite'.[93] The apprentice's somewhat premature optimism quickly vanished when he found the situation 'dans une toute autre assiette' with Parliament now adjourned.[94] Though the Commons tended to favour a Dutch alliance, Bentinck entirely agreed with William that the adjournment was not necessarily detrimental to his interest, for the MPs had shown 'plein de zèle inconsidéré, qui a fait tant de mal que nous en devions attendre de bien pour nostre cause'.[95]

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[86] Bentinck to Ginckel 31 March 1684 (The Hague), 27 April 1684 (The Hague), *RGP 24*, 633-634, 637; Bentinck to Sidney 22 February 1684 (The Hague), R.W. Blencowe, ed., *Diary of times of Charles the Second, by the honourable Henry Sidney, afterwards Earl of Romney* (2 vols., London, 1843), II, 238.

[87] Bentinck to Ginckel 27 April 1684 (The Hague), *RGP 27*, 637.

[88] M.A.M. Franken, *Coenraad van Beuningens politieke en diplomatieke activiteiten in de jaren 1667-1684* (Groningen, 1966), 152.

[89] Cf. Franken, *Coenraad van Beuningen*, 154.

[90] *RGP 23*, 4-6.

[91] A.B. Browning, *Thomas Osborne, Earl of Danby and Duke of Leeds 1632-1712* (3 vols., Glasgow, 1951), I, 225-227. Cf. K.H.D. Haley, 'The Anglo-Dutch rapprochement of 1677', *EHR* LXXIII (1958), 614-648.

[92] Browning erroneously suggested that William sent Bentinck *because* Parliament was prorogued. His letter to Bentinck of 11 June 1677 shows that the prorogation took him by surprise. Browning, *Danby*, I, 232; *RGP 23*, 6.

[93] Bentinck to William 15 June 1677 (Whitehall), *RGP 23*, 7; dispatch 17 June 1677, AAE CPA 123b, fos. 139v-140r.

[94] Bentinck to William 18 June 1677 (Whitehall), *RGP 23*, 8.

[95] William to Bentinck 11 June 1677, Bentinck to William 18 June 1677 (Whitehall), *RGP 23*, 6, 8.

But Charles, angered with the conduct of his Parliament, refused to enter into Bentinck's first point as to how the Prince should conduct himself with regard to a possible peace settlement. Meanwhile Bentinck had been irritated with Van Beuningen's untimely concessions to Charles.[96] These must have undermined his somewhat disingenuous reasons for continuing the war: 'qu'en cas que la paix ne se fasse point avantageuse, l'on aura des brouilleries à craindre dans les pays [i.e. the United Provinces].'[97] However, since he was instructed not to make any proposals so as not to impair the success of his precarious embassy, he refrained from doing so.[98]

The timing of his mission was well chosen, and gave Danby the backing he needed to convince Charles of the wisdom of a pro-Dutch foreign policy.[99] Bentinck's mission was brief and yielded few concrete results, but observers credited him for his tact in creating some sort of understanding between Charles and William.[100] It had been reasonably successful in that Charles promised to send an ambassador to William to discuss the requests Bentinck had laid before him. All depended, however, on Danby's credit with the King and the latter's willingness to dispatch an emissary.[101] Bentinck urged the Treasurer '... que vous presserez ainsi les choses que le Roy envoye au plustost quelqu'un ici pour instruire Monsieur le Prince de ses sentiments, afin que la bonne intelligence que vous avez juge vous meme qui commencoit a s'etablir...'.[102] Danby satisfied Bentinck with his assurance that Sir William Temple, a reputed pro-Dutch diplomat, was about to be dispatched.[103] The replacement of Temple with Laurence Hyde, a relative and close confidant of the King, exposed Bentinck's somewhat naive optimism. With regard to Charles's proposals for peace, Bentinck complained, 'les sentiments du Roy sont si eloignes de ce qui m'a paru en Angleterre'.[104]

However, Hyde was able to offer assurances that William was welcome in England. The last point on Bentinck's instruction had been to obtain the King's permission for such a visit. The issue of a possible marriage between William and Princess Mary, daughter of James, Duke of York, had been studiously ignored by the emissary but was implicitly there. The Duke of Ormond, in a letter to Bentinck, had referred to a liaison between the Houses of Orange and Stuart.[105] Such a connection had been tentatively discussed as early as 1676 but never formally proposed.[106] The French ambassador Courtin's initial alarm was soon allayed when the Duke of York assured him that a marriage would not be considered at this stage.[107] William had his reservations, as a liaison with Stuart, no matter how desirable, might damage his reputation in Parliament and tie him too closely to the King. But despite James's objections to the marriage between his daughter and a Protestant zealot, Charles gave in to the arguments of the connection's greatest promoter, Danby. In October the Prince, with Bentinck in his entourage, crossed the Channel to ask for Mary's hand. The marriage took place a few weeks later. Bentinck followed his master's example, and married himself to Anne Villiers.

The embassy had been Bentinck's first diplomatic mission abroad, and signified a new stage in his career. Although his responsibilities were restricted, and he only functioned as a personal messenger of the Prince without powers to negotiate, it laid the basis for his increasing involvement in English affairs. His contacts with the Ormond and Danby in particular would become fruitful in future years; he sensed the atmosphere and became familiarised with the intricacies of the Stuart court. In 1675 the English ambassador had identified Fagel and Odijk as William's closest confidants with regard to English affairs,

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[96] Bentinck to William 18 June 1677, (Whitehall), ibid., 8.
[97] Bentinck's memorandum June 1677, ibid., 5n.
[98] Bentinck to William 18 June 1677 (Whitehall), ibid., 8.
[99] Cf. Browning, *Danby*, I, 233.
[100] Haley, 'The Anglo-Dutch rapprochement', 633.
[101] Bentinck to Danby 25 June 1677, Browning, *Danby*, II, 390.
[102] Bentinck to Danby 25 June 1677, ibid., 390.
[103] Bentinck to Danby 16 July 1677 ('Quartier de Calken'), Danby to Bentinck 29 June 1677, ibid., 391, 392.
[104] Bentinck to Danby 18 September 1677, ibid., 398.
[105] Ormond to Bentinck 12 June 1677 OS, *RGP 24*, 3.
[106] Browning, *Danby*, I, 248. It was a delicate matter and Danby was hesitant, as a marriage proposal might alienate the Duke of York and force Charles into the Protestant camp.
[107] Dispatch Courtin 17 June 1677, AAE CPA 123b, fo. 142r.

after 1677 Bentinck would increasingly be involved.[108] He was not an exceptionally good diplomat; men like Zuylestein, and Dijkveld in particular, would frequently undertake highly delicate missions with more success. Bentinck showed himself somewhat naive and impressionable during the 1677 mission, which was partly due to his lack of experience. More importantly, however, the quick shifts of court factions and the cynical and volatile nature of Stuart policy required a certain amount of cunning from an ambassador, something Bentinck clearly lacked. William, himself more ingenious, recognised this failure, as, indeed, did Bentinck himself.

And yet William had ample reason to send a confidant to the court at Whitehall. Referring to his favourite, William wrote to Ossory '... que je l'estime le plus de tous mes gens'.[109] The French ambassador recognised him as '... le Principal confident de Mr le P dorange.'[110] Equally important, Bentinck had now internationally established his reputation as William's personal emissary. Over the years William would employ Bentinck mainly on missions with regard to his own personal interest. Bentinck's value lay precisely in his role as William's mouthpiece, which provided the Prince with an instrument to voice his personal opinion alongside formal Dutch diplomacy. As such Bentinck held a pivotal position within the Prince's informal network of agents that had proliferated alongside the official Dutch diplomatic service.[111] Often, this parallel service had a different agenda, and the States General's envoys were frequently oblivious as to the underlying purpose of these Williamite missions. With regard to Bentinck's mission in 1677 Van Beuningen informed the States General that Charles II had 'expressed particular confidence in a gentleman who enjoys the intimate favour of His Highness'.[112] His report was certainly tainted with sarcasm, as he must have felt bypassed by the Prince's confidant.

Hence Bentinck was continuously employed by William with regard to the situation in England, to which he was now bound with double dynastic ties. The Exclusion Crisis of 1679-1681 was dealt with clumsily by William and his aides.[113] The Stuart court was plagued again in 1683 by the Rye House plot, a conspiracy to assassinate the two royal brothers. Upon its discovery, William again despatched his confidant, ostensibly to congratulate his uncles upon their good fortune, but really to disassociate himself from the conspirators and fathom the King's thoughts concerning foreign affairs. It was a pointless mission and Bentinck did not handle the situation well, nor was his conduct constructive as he frequently lost his temper. But his long private audiences with the King and the Duke of York must have somewhat disconcerted the French ambassador Paul Barillon. Bentinck was under the impression that his attempts to reassure the King that William would do his utmost to pursue suspects of the plot who were now seeking refuge in the Netherlands were successful. William was more astute: '... je crains que vous ne vous flaties un peu'.[114] Bentinck's extreme agitation at Charles's rebuff only worsened matters, and the emissary left dissatisfied.[115]

Obviously, as the French ambassador had noted, 'on croit que Bentem est chargé d'autre chose que de complimens'.[116] Bentinck's chagrin had much to do with his inability to wrest support from Charles in the light of the international crisis arising from Louis's post-war policy. The Peace of Nijmegen had not been unfavourable to the French monarch, but left unsatisfied the need for secure borders. What had not been obtained by the use of force was now sought through legal means by the establishment of the *Chambres des Reunions*. Using ancient charters, these judicial institutions claimed strategic border territories. In the absence of a coherent anti-French alliance, this territorial expansion, supported by the threat of force, met

[108] Cf. pages 14-15.
[109] William to Ossory 8 June 1677, *RGP 27*, 176.
[110] Dispatch Courtin 17 June 1677, AAE CPA 123b, fo. 139v.
[111] D.J. Roorda, 'Le secret du Prince. Monarchale tendenties in de Republiek 1672-1702', in: D.J. Roorda, *Rond prins en patriciaat* (Weesp, 1984).
[112] Van Beuningen to States General 15 June 1677, BL Add Ms 17677 DD, fo. 85v. Cf. William to Danby 9 June 1677, Browning, *Danby*, II, 388-389.
[113] W. Troost, 'Willem III en de "exclusion crisis" 1679-1681', *BMGN* CVII (1992), 28-46.
[114] William to Bentinck 2 August 1683, *RGP 23*, 4.
[115] Barillon to Louis 12 August 1683, AAE CPA 150, fo. 224v.
[116] Barillon to Louis 26 July 1683, ibid., fo. 112.

with little resistance. Louis's main opponent, the Emperor, was caught in a desperate defence of the Austrian heartland when a Turkish army beleaguered Vienna itself in 1683. Whilst in London, Bentinck showed himself extremely concerned about what would be the crown on the *reunions*-policy: the capture of Luxembourg. As early as February 1682 Bentinck had approached the English envoy Thomas Chudleigh in The Hague to press him to get his master to give assurances with regard to that city.[117] During his own embassy, Bentinck had warned Charles 'avec plus de chaleur ... que la cession du Luxembourg seroit la perte des Pays Bas et qu'il vaut mieux tout hazarder que d'ij consentir.'[118] But Charles was unwilling to become embroiled in a conflict with Louis XIV. Bentinck was unable to support the pro-Dutch faction in the Cabinet Council, which had battled in vain for intervention.[119] Nor did Bentinck's exhortations carry much weight, as the Spanish and Dutch ambassadors Pedro Ronquillo and Arnout van Citters did not support him.[120]

The latter was of some concern to William. The siege of Luxembourg triggered a crisis when the Captain-General urged the States to send 16,000 troops to the rescue as obliged under a treaty with Spain. Ever since the middle of the 1670s the Stadholder and Holland, particularly Amsterdam, had drifted apart in matters pertaining to the general course of foreign policy. Amsterdam was not unwilling to use force under certain circumstances, but someone like Van Beuningen, now burgomaster, thought that firm resistance against French aggression was expedient only if the Dutch were supported by a resolute international alliance. With the Emperor embroiled with the Turks, Charles unwilling to intervene and the Spaniards lethargic, the only option for the Amsterdammers was not to antagonise the French.[121] Bentinck sharply condemned 'l'opiniâtreté de Mess^{rs} d'Amsterdam ou proprement de Mons^{r}. de Van Beuningen'.[122] He was part of William's train when the latter visited Amsterdam in November 1683 in order to put pressure on the city.[123] A compromise seemed unlikely, as William regarded the integrity of the Barrier against France as the cornerstone of his lifelong strategy. A constitutional crisis occurred when the Captain-General tried to push a resolution through the States General for the recruitment of troops despite fierce resistance from the deputies from Groningen and Friesland.[124] Meanwhile Bentinck had expressed sharp criticism of a meeting between the English ambassador and Amsterdam regents to discuss a French offer for an international truce, accusing them of forming a party against the Prince. 'L'on rejete les conditions de la treve proposée pour nous obliger a des conditions plus honteuses et ruineuses', he wrote to Sidney, 'nos affaires paroissent dans un etat desesperé si l'Angleterre nous donne a dos, mais prennez garde que tombant [?] dans le desespoir, nous ne disions comme Samson, quant il arracha le pilier qui soutenoit la maison, perisse donc Samson avec les Philistins.'[125] To Ginckel he complained: 'Nostre chagrin est d'apprendre que ceus de Luxembourg ce défendent bien, sans que nous puissions les secourir, quoyque en Allemagne tout marche; mais j'ay peur que cela ne soit moutarde après souper.'[126] He proved right, as Luxembourg fell in July 1684. Relations between the Prince and Amsterdam reached a low point. Despite casual interventions, there are few indications that Bentinck played a significant role in the political arm-wrestling during the 1683-1684 crisis.

V The Monmouth crisis (1685)

[117] Chudleigh to Conway 27 February 1682 NS, F.A. Middlebush, ed., *The dispatches of Th. Plott (1681-1682) and Th. Chudleigh (1682-1685): English envoys at the Hague* RGP Kleine Reeks 22 (The Hague, 1926), 52.
[118] Barillon to Louis 2 August 1683, AAE CPA 150, fo. 146v.
[119] Citters to William 6 August NS 1683, *RGP 27*, 585.
[120] Barillon to Louis 2 August 1683, AAE CPA 150, fo. 146.
[121] Van Beuningen to William 12 November 1683, *RGP 27*, 614-616.
[122] Bentinck to Ginckel 13 November 1683 (The Hague), ibid., 616.
[123] D'Avaux, *Négociations*, II, 1 ff.; Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, 831-832.
[124] Troost, *Stadhouder-Koning Willem III*, 170-171.
[125] Bentinck to Sidney 4 February 1684, 17 March 1684 (The Hague), BL Add Ms 32681, fos. 263-264, 267v.
[126] Bentinck to Ginckel 2 June 1684 (The Hague), *RGP 27*, 640.

The death of Charles in February 1685 was a shock to Bentinck, as James II, who succeeded his brother, was a known Catholic. Reflecting on the new situation, Bentinck wrote to Sidney: 'nostre perte est assez grande pour nous occuper touttes nos pensees, et pour remplir nos esprits de craintes pour la Religion Protestante.'[127] William became immediately embroiled in English affairs as he hosted the Duke of Monmouth, Charles's bastard son. When the Duke had arrived in Holland in December 1684, William dispatched Bentinck to fetch him to The Hague, and he organised balls in his honour. Bentinck was much concerned with Monmouth, and soon gained control over the impressionable young Duke.[128] The favourite declared to everyone that nothing was done in this matter that did not please Charles.[129]

The situation changed with Charles's death, as James disapproved of the presence of Monmouth, a dynastic rival and magnet of domestic Protestant discontent, in The Hague. When the news of Charles's death reached The Hague, Bentinck declared that Monmouth had been sent away from court - at James's request - but in fact he had sent for the Duke immediately and closeted with him for some time.[130] Monmouth left the following day, but d'Avaux noted that a page of Monmouth's arrived in The Hague at night, spoke to Bentinck only, gave him a letter and returned the following evening to receive an answer. They remained in contact during the ensuing weeks.[131] Meanwhile English and Scottish refugees were planning a descent and managed to draw the Duke into their plot. It is unlikely that Bentinck was wholly unaware of the proceedings, as he remained in contact with Monmouth throughout the spring, but there is no evidence that he was in any way involved.[132]

There was, of course, a certain cunning to this tactic, as William ostensibly complied with James's demand but through Bentinck continued to monitor the Duke's movements. Monmouth would ultimately fall victim to an ill-conceived rebellion, but his position was also exploited in a domestic dispute between William and Amsterdam over the course of foreign policy and the size of the standing army.[133] Throughout the spring William and Bentinck went to great lengths to present William as a dependable ally to the new sovereign. Discussing in the States of Holland the possibility of sending the Anglo-Dutch regiments to James's aid, Bentinck created a spectacle by ceremoniously drawing from his pocket a paper containing a personal request from the King. The delegates were shocked that such a weighty request was communicated '... par un canal qui n'est pas naturel.'[134]

This gave Bentinck the opportunity to communicate to Lord Treasurer Rochester that he had been instrumental in serving the King's interest in spite of opposition.[135] The brazenness of William and his confidants was breathtaking. Ouwerkerk, even though he had recently been seen toasting the destruction of the Duke of York, was dispatched to assure the new King of William's good will.[136] Bentinck assured Rochester that they were doing all they could to inform the new ministry of the movements of Scottish and English refugees, suggesting to the Lord Treasurer that the three ships that had left for Scotland had completely escaped their attention. The Prince wrote to James that he was 'exceedingly troubled' at Monmouth's escape, and assured the English ambassador Bevil Skelton that such a thing would not happen again.[137] William and Bentinck's efforts in this regard were only partially successful. Rochester was suspicious as to William's sincerity, and Skelton was increasingly hostile to Bentinck who had

[127] Bentinck to Sidney 21 February 1685 (The Hague), BL Add Ms 32681, fo. 274r.
[128] D'Avaux, *Négociations*, IV, 225 ff.
[129] Ibid., IV, 217.
[130] D'Avaux to Louis 22 February 1685, AAE CPH 141, fo. 190r. Cf. d'Avaux, *Négociations*, IV, 270-271.
[131] E.g. d'Avaux, *Négociations*, IV, 316.
[132] Ibid., IV, 347.
[133] Cf. W.R. Emerson, *Monmouth's rebellion* (MA thesis, New Haven and London, 1951), ch. 3.
[134] D'Avaux, *Négociations*, V, 48.
[135] William to Rochester 9 June 1685, S.W. Singer, ed., *The correspondence of H.H. Earl of Clarendon and of his brother, Laurence Hyde, Earl of Rochester; with the diary of Lord Clarendon from 1687 to 1690 ... and the diary of Lord Rochester during his embassy to Poland in 1676* (2 vols., London, 1828), I, 128.
[136] D'Avaux, *Négociations*, IV, 281.
[137] Bentinck to Rochester (Honselaarsdijk) 25 May 1685, Singer, *Correspondence*, I, 125-126; dispatch Skelton 8/18 May 1685, BL Add Ms 41812, fos 57-60.

clearly overplayed his hand in this matter as his connection with Monmouth had been too obvious.[138] Bentinck frequently fed Skelton scraps of intelligence which the latter dismissed as 'canting impudent stuff', though in his despatches he put the blame mainly on the Amsterdam authorities.[139]

That spring William launched a diplomatic offensive as three missions to London were in his pocket. At Charles's death William had sent Ouwerkerk to congratulate the new King, assuring him that William was willing to admit his past mistakes and follow James's lead.[140] A formal embassy had already been dispatched to London consisting of Wassenaar-Duyvenvoorde, Citters and Dijkveld, all, as Bentinck wrote to Sidney, 'bien intentionnez pour les interrets de son altesse'.[141] James had demanded from William that he abandon Monmouth, appoint new officers to the Anglo-Dutch brigades in the Republic and support his policies. In the new constellation William had to regain the confidence of the new monarch, and promptly complied with the first two conditions, whilst temporising on the latter.[142] 'son Altesse fera assurement tout ce que le Roy peut attendre de lui', Bentinck assured Sidney, 'sauf la religion, je croy que vous le cognoissez assez pour savoir qu'il ne fait pas dordinaire les choses a demi.'[143]

When the news arrived that Monmouth and his rebels were actually sailing to England and Scotland, William realised he must act swiftly. His decision to despatch Bentinck was a calculated risk. '... sa Majesté britanique', d'Avaux thought, '... est persuadé que Benthem est son ennemy personnel, quil a toujours eu commerce avec Mr de Montmouth ainsy sans quelque avance de la part du Roy d'angleterre ce n'estoit pas un homme agreable et propre a estre envoyé.'[144] By sending Bentinck William thus played his trump card and gambled that his ambassador would remove the impression that Monmouth had been supported. William demanded the recall of Skelton, hoping perhaps this would ease Bentinck's mission.[145] The net effect of this daring action was that the Prince managed to gain credit with James and discredit his opponents in Amsterdam at the same time. Two Amsterdam representatives were reprimanded by James in the presence of the full Cabinet Council for their negligence in not stopping Monmouth, and the embassy, dominated by William's aides, did little to alleviate the city's plight.[146]

Bentinck was quite well informed of James's sentiments because of Ouwerkerk's dispatches, whilst he had sent Abel Tassin D'Alonne, his confidant and Mary's secretary, with the ambassador to contact a number of allies in England. To Sidney he wrote that he could speak freely with the secretary.[147] Bentinck's instructions make clear the twofold purpose of his mission. In the short term, he needed to assure James of William's sincerity and his willingness to dispatch the Anglo-Scottish regiments should there be a need for them. The eagerness William displayed to come over in person to command the troops and suppress the rebellion shows to what extent he desired a reconciliation with James. It might weaken his appeal to the English opposition, but the offer was cunning. Even though James would not accept the offer, he would still have to acknowledge his apparent loyalty. Second, Bentinck was to sound out James about the course of his foreign policy, whether he would rely on the King of France or on the States General.[148] Bentinck arrived in London and immersed himself in a struggle with the French envoy

[138] Bentinck to Rochester 10 April 1685 (The Hague), William to Rochester 10 April 1685, Rochester to William n.d. no 91, Singer, *Correspondence*, I, 119-123; dispatch Skelton 15/25 May 1685, BL Add Ms 41812, fo. 76 ff.
[139] Dispatch Skelton 15/25 May 1685, BL Add Ms 41812, fo. 76 ff. and passim; d'Avaux to Louis 19 April 1685, AAE CPH 141, fo. 395v.
[140] Barillon to Louis 1 March 1685, C.J. Fox, *History of the Early part of the reign of James the Second* (London, 1808), Appendix, xxxvii ff.
[141] Bentinck to Sidney 30 March 1685 (The Hague), BL Add Ms 32681, fo. 278r.
[142] D'Avaux, *Négociations*, IV, 305 ff.
[143] Bentinck to Sidney 11 March 1685 (Dieren), BL Add Ms 32681, fos. 276-277.
[144] D'Avaux to Louis 5 July 1685, AAE CPH 142, fos. 188v-189r.
[145] William to James 25 June 1685, Blencowe, *Diary*, 251-253. Cf. Grew, *Bentinck*, 92-94.
[146] *Verbaal van de buitengewone ambassade van Jacob van Wassenaar-Duivenvoorde, Arnout van Citters en Everard van Weede van Dijkveld naar Engeland in 1685* (Utrecht, 1863), 29. Cf. dispatch Skelton 31 March 1685, 5/15 June 1685, BL Add Ms 41812, fos. 7-8, 119; d'Avaux to Louis 6 July 1685, AAE CPH 142, fo. 204r.
[147] Bentinck to Sidney 21 February 1685 (The Hague), BL Add Ms 32681, fos. 274-275.
[148] Instruction Bentinck 4 July 1685, *RGP 23*, 20-21.

Barillon for James's favour. He found out that Skelton had given the new King a negative impression of him, as a result of which Bentinck was rebuffed on his first audience with James when asking permission for William to come over to command the troops personally.[149] Nevertheless, Bentinck was able to offer James the services of the three Scots regiments, who arrived in Gravesand the day after. On 6 July William was able to inform his ambassador that the three English regiments would be sailing as well.[150] The ambassador was working hard to gain James's confidence and remove any bad impressions he might have had of him as well as to dissolve James's scepticism towards his own nephew.[151]

Despite rumours to the contrary, William and Bentinck both arduously desired the rebellion to be suppressed.[152] Bentinck's main purpose of course was to draw James into an Anglo-Dutch alliance, or at least to pull him out of the French sphere of influence. Bentinck was not unsuccessful in this respect.[153] He suggested to James that it could clearly be seen that the rebellion was supported by the French. He seemed to have been convinced, by 'La manière dont le Roy ce gouverne', that James believed him.[154] Obviously he was overly optimistic, and both Barillon and Skelton were convinced that James distrusted him. But the French faction at court was losing ground rapidly - if only temporarily - when the ambassador could ensure Dutch military support to suppress the rebellion, whilst Louis snubbed the new King by refusing more subsidies. Barillon's position at court was weak; according to Bentinck he '... ne ce presse pas tant à la Cour que par ci devant, le Roy ne lui parlant que très peu.'[155] The lengthy discussions Bentinck held with Rochester caused concern among the pro-French faction at court, although the exact contents remain unclear and the Lord Treasurer was sceptical.[156] In his letter to William he referred to Bentinck personally rather than elaborating at length about their discussions.[157] On 20 July, the rebellion having been suppressed, William ordered his ambassador to return to The Hague. He must have talked to the King about the Anglo-Scottish regiments that were to be returned and his inadvisable intention to appoint Catholic officers. Before Bentinck left, James had summoned him to speak to him personally. The contents of the conversation are not recorded, but immediately afterwards Dijkveld was able to re-initiate the deadlocked talks on the renewal of the Anglo-Dutch treaties.[158] Although on 14 July William had written to Bentinck that he feared that the three Dutch ambassadors – Dijkveld, Wasssenaar and Citters – would return without having achieved anything, contrary to the expectations they made progress in renewing the alliance.[159] In fact, throughout the summer James was withdrawing from Louis's sphere of influence and both domestically and internationally William's position strengthened considerably. All existing treaties were renewed in August and the English ambassador in Paris, William Trumbull, was ordered to appeal to the French King on behalf of William with regard to the principality of Orange.[160] In Madrid William's aide Coenraad van Heemskerck was trying to get the Spanish to renew their treaties with the Republic.[161] Moreover, the Brandenburg envoy Paul Fuchs was ordered to conclude a treaty with the States General as well, and French diplomacy suffered serious setbacks throughout the summer.[162]

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[149] D'Avaux to Louis 5 July 1685, AAE CPH 142, fo. 188v; A. Boyer, *The history of King William III* (3 vols., London, 1702-1703), I, 27.
[150] William to Bentinck 6 July 1685, *RGP 23*, 21.
[151] James to William 30 June 1685, J. Dalrymple, ed., *Memoirs of Great Britain and Ireland etc.* (2 vols., London, 1790), II, 131-132.
[152] William to Bentinck 10 July 1685, *RGP 23*, 22; Bentinck to Fagel 24 July 1685 (London), *RGP 27*, 703.
[153] Cf. d'Avaux to Louis 19 July 1685, AAE CPH 142, fo. 219v.
[154] Bentinck to William n.d. July 1685, *RGP 23*, 23.
[155] Bentinck to William n.d. July 1685, ibid., 23.
[156] J.P. Kenyon, *Robert Spencer, Earl of Sunderland 1621-1702* (London, 1958), 118.
[157] Rochester to William 20 July 1685, *RGP 27*, 705.
[158] D'Avaux, *Négociations*, V, 99.
[159] William to Bentinck 14 July 1685, *RGP 23*, 24.
[160] J. Rule, 'France caught between two balances: the dilemma of 1688', in: L.G. Schwoerer, ed., *The revolution of 1688-1689: changing perspectives* (Cambridge, 1992), 41-42.
[161] Heemskerck to William 30 August 1685, *RGP 27*, 710.
[162] Rule, 'France caught between two balances', 35-51 and passim.

If Bentinck's 1677 and 1683 missions were still brief and his responsibilities limited, his embassy in 1685 was of some significance as the apprentice had matured and developed his diplomatic skills. He had assumed more responsibility now as he also acted as conduit between William and the other ambassadors in London.[163] The Prince had left his ambassador an unusually free hand compared to his first mission, and trusted him to judge the situation on the spot and take measures accordingly. Bentinck's sense of independence as an ambassador clearly resonates in the correspondence, particularly when he twice flatly ignored a direct order to return to The Hague immediately.[164] Bentinck, being intimately informed about William's ideas, was clearly confident that his conduct would be tolerated.

Bentinck had suggested to Rochester that an envoy be sent to the Republic to continue the 'bonne intelligence' between the King and the Prince. It is likely that he had asked for the recall of Skelton, who had hindered his mission so much, – as is suggested by his draft notes.[165] Bentinck arrived back at Honselaarsdijk on the third of August 1685, taking with him his friend and confidant Sidney - a bitter antagonist of Skelton.[166] Ignoring Skelton, Bentinck stayed in The Hague for a few days and then set out with Sidney for William's hunting lodge in Dieren. Sidney, Bentinck and D'Alonne had many conversations after their return.[167] Bentinck made no secret of his deep antipathy towards Skelton, and William's attitude towards the envoy changed considerably. With the arrival of Sidney - who maintained a correspondence with Sunderland – Skelton's position weakened.[168] Bentinck and Sidney ultimately discredited the envoy and had him removed.[169]

VI Politics and the States of Holland (1685)

If in 1685 the Dutch could still entertain some hopes for an understanding with James II, their mutual relationship rapidly deteriorated over the ensuing years.[170] Bentinck undertook several informal missions to muster domestic support for William's policy, particularly as the changing configuration abroad affected domestic relations. In the spring of 1685 William and Amsterdam still clashed over an augmentation of the army, Bentinck in particular heating up the debates in the States of Holland.[171] But despite such quarrels, relations improved as the apparent upsurge of aggressive Catholicism in England and France caused many changes of heart in the city councils as well. While the nucleus of the Orangist provincial faction in Holland gained in significance, the Republican faction led by Amsterdam was losing strength.[172] In Amsterdam Van Beuningen now wheeled into the Prince's interest.[173] In December 1684 Bentinck had been dispatched on a seemingly hopeless mission to detach the Frisian Stadholder Hendrik Casimir II from the 'Peace Party'. The latter had arrived in Amsterdam to confirm his support for that party and repudiate rumours of a reconciliation with William. Bentinck visited the Stadholder but was

[163] William to Bentinck 14 July 1685, *RGP 23*, 24.
[164] William to Bentinck 17 July 1685, 20 July 1685, ibid., 25, 28.
[165] *RGP 23*, 27.
[166] D'Avaux to Louis 26 July 1685, AAE CPH 142, fo. 251r-v; dispatch Skelton 24 July/4 August 1685, BL Add Ms 41812, fo. 148r.
[167] D'Avaux, *Négociations*, V, 105.
[168] D'Avaux to Louis 9 August 1685, AAE CPH 142, fos. 261r-264r.
[169] D'Avaux to Louis 23 August 1685, ibid., fos. 286r-287r; d'Avaux was right, as Mordaunt reminded Bentinck later: 'Monsieur Skelton nous a mis dans la dernière intelligence; son discours n'est que de l'aversion que vous aves pour luy et de la grande liason qu'il y a entre Mons. Beintem et Mylord Mordaunt pour le décréditer; Monsieur de Sydney y a sa part; il a raison de nous mettre ensemble, car je croy effectivement que nous avons tous mesme opinion de luy', Mordaunt to Bentinck 22 October 1687 OS, *RGP* 24, 11-12.
[170] J. Miller, *James II, a study in kingship* (London, 1989), 158.
[171] D'Avaux, *Négociations*, IV, 322-325.
[172] Groenveld, *Evidente factien*, 67.
[173] D'Avaux, *Négociations*, IV, 360-361. The Prince refused to be reconciled with Van Beuningen.

slighted and achieved little in several meetings.[174] Now the Leeuwarden theologian Van der Waayen managed a reconciliation between Henry Casimir and William.[175]

Hitherto Bentinck's political role had been limited. Odijk, Dijkveld and Fagel figure as William's most useful aides with regard to the management of the States of Zeeland, Utrecht and Holland respectively, and Bentinck seems to have played a supporting role to the Grand Pensionary. D'Avaux seldom mentions him with regard to political affairs before 1685. Although Bentinck sometimes spoke in the States of Holland, unlike Fagel he did not act as a political manager during sessions. In November 1684, for instance, Fagel could not be present at an important session of the States of Holland, and advised William to be there instead. Unable to attend himself, the Prince asked Bentinck, not so much to take care of affairs, but to have the item postponed for a few days.[176] Beginning in about 1685 Bentinck seems to have developed a growing interest in affairs brought into the States of Holland, although evidence is scant and only indicative, as his archive before 1685 is particularly fragmented. He would attend when matters vital to the interest of the Stadholder and Captain-General were debated. In 1686 Bentinck was dispatched by William to take part in the deliberations on the augmentation of ground and naval forces.[177] Some notes have been preserved as minutes of the meeting of the States of Holland in July deliberating this matter. During 1686 and 1687, despite the rapprochement between Amsterdam and William, his confidants frequently quarrelled with the Amsterdam representatives in the States of Holland. In July 1686 a motion was put forward to prorogue the ineffective session. Bentinck clashed with the Amsterdam Pensionary Jacob Hop in a furious attempt to prolong the session.[178] He lingered on in The Hague until late September without reaching an agreement on the ways and means. In December he was involved in the continuous dispute between William and Dordrecht.[179] March 1687 saw Bentinck in The Hague witnessing debates on the ways and means.[180] It seems, therefore, that although Bentinck was a regular attendee of the debates in the States of Holland, he played a supporting rather than a leading role.

VII Conclusion

It was Bentinck's luck to have grown up with William, and their similar temperaments and interests resulted in a close friendship. But his ability to emerge from the turbulent changes in 1672 as William's closest adviser was the real key to his success. Competing with rivals that were in many ways his superiors in ability and experience, he managed to retain the confidence and favour of the Prince through loyalty and ambition. The years between 1672 and 1676 were the true formative years, during which Bentinck became an experienced soldier and learned the trade of a politician tolerably well. His career reached a relative zenith in 1676, by which time he had attained high military rank and a significant political position.

During the 1680s Bentinck maintained his position as William's favourite. He was primarily the Prince's mouthpiece, conveying his opinion in the States of Holland. The end of the war necessitated a shift in his career, as his military duties became less important. He developed as a diplomat during his missions to London in 1677, 1683 and 1685. Thus Bentinck became one of the Prince's main confidants with regard to English affairs. Undoubtedly Bentinck was the foremost among William's aides, and his favour remained for two decades. Nevertheless, it is not at all clear that he was particularly influential compared to men like Dijkveld, Waldeck or Fagel. As a military secretary and officer he was surpassed by others. His political activities were still limited, and there were few public appearances as he lacked any significant public office apart from his seat in the States. Rather did he co-operate behind the scenes

[174] Ibid, IV, 183. Cf. G.H. Kurtz, *Willem III en Amsterdam 1683-1685* (Utrecht, 1928), 160-161.
[175] D'Avaux, *Négociations*, IV, 294-295.
[176] William to Bentinck 7 November 1684, *RGP 23*, 20.
[177] Again evidence is scarce, only two letters of William from 1686 are preserved. William to Bentinck 21 July 1686, ibid., 30.
[178] BL Eg Ms 1754 B, fo. 34r; d'Avaux to Louis 1 August 1686, AAE CPH 147, fo. 102.
[179] Cf. BL Eg Ms 1754 B, fos. 53-54.
[180] William to Fagel 27 March 1687, *RGP 27*, 747.

with men like Fagel. The missions to England by Ouwerkerk, and later Zuylestein and Dijkveld, were as important as Bentinck's. Only at court did Bentinck emerge as a pivotal figure. Thus Bentinck's figure certainly did not loom large over William's policy during the 1670s and 1680s. At the same time, however, he was probably the only one of William's favourites who was involved in all aspects of government. It was precisely the combination of his experience as soldier, diplomatist, manager and politician that would contribute to his grandest moment in preparing the invasion for the Glorious Revolution. The following chapter, then, will look at the events of 1688 in which Bentinck played a pivotal role.

Chapter 2: '*For religion and liberty*'? The Glorious Revolution (1688-1689)

The Glorious Revolution was a pivotal moment in British history; the dynastic revolution initiated fundamental constitutional, political and strategic changes. But it also coincided with dramatic developments on the continent, in particular the start of the Nine Years War. Only recently have historians become more aware of the role played by the Dutch. Jonathan Israel has rightly argued that any analysis of the Revolution needs to take into account Dutch strategic considerations. Yet taking the consequences of this argument even further, it should be pointed out that in the summer of 1688 the situation in England was not the only priority for the Dutch. Keith Haley has already noted that developments in the Empire have often been neglected when the events of 1688 are studied.[1] To date no full, satisfactory analysis of Dutch strategic considerations in 1688 has appeared.

This chapter aims to at least partially fill this gap by analysing Bentinck's diplomatic missions to Germany during the summer of 1688 and will situate the decision to invade England within a sequence of interlocking international and domestic events that can provide some explanation for the Dutch actions. The chapter is essentially a case-study, and will analyse Bentinck's involvement in the preparations for the invasion in England and his role during the revolution itself. Drawing from Dutch source material illustrating the role of William's Dutch advisers during the dramatic changes, it will offer an analysis complementary to the findings of existing English literature.

I The intelligence network (1687-1688)

As relations between the Dutch and the English gradually deteriorated, the need to stay informed about developments increased. During the missions in England several confidants of William had established useful contacts; Bentinck, Dijkveld and D'Alonne had freely conversed with Sidney and others during their embassies in 1685.[2] Bentinck's secretary Christoffel Tromer had also been to England during that summer.[3] As James's policies became more radical, such infrequent contacts were solidified during the mission of Dijkveld in the spring of 1687. Dijkveld was instructed to attempt a reconciliation with James and convince him of the soundness of William's foreign policy, as well as to make contact with the opposition in England.[4] These contacts were strengthened later that year during Zuylestein's diplomatic mission. Political correspondence was hazardous, and Bentinck and his correspondents were keenly aware that their contacts might very well be monitored. For example, the Countess of Sunderland's correspondence with Bentinck was studiously superficial and touched upon such trivial matters as garden design, with the explicit purpose to mislead.[5] D'Avaux clearly suspected Secretary of State the Earl of Sunderland of having secret liaisons which he connected to Bentinck's underground network.[6] One of Bentinck's correspondents, Charles Mordaunt, had jested that he did not dare to speak freely: 'sy, tous jardiniers que nous sommes', he wrote to Bentinck, 'nous parlions des plantes et des fleurs, les pénétrants y voudroit trouver mystère'.[7]

Meanwhile it was Bentinck who, building on such contacts, maintained and expanded a network of informers, mainly through the mediation of Sidney, who was politically sidelined during James's reign but related to Sunderland. Sidney and Bentinck set up what became effectively a secret service network in

[1] J.I. Israel, 'The Dutch role in the Glorious Revolution', in: J.I. Israel, ed., *The Anglo-Dutch moment. Essays on the Glorious Revolution and its world impact* (Cambridge, 1991), 11; K.H.D. Haley, 'The Dutch invasion and the alliance of 1689', in: L.G. Schwoerer, ed., *The revolution of 1688, changing perspectives* (Cambridge, 1992), 24n.
[2] Bentinck to Sidney 21 February 1685 (The Hague), 11 March 1685 (Dieren), BL Add Ms 32681, fos. 274-277.
[3] Anonymous letter 5 August 1685, NA SP 84-220, fo. 9.
[4] D'Avaux to Louis 6 February 1687, AAE CPH 150, fo. 124; J. Muilenberg, 'The Embassy of Everaard van Weede, Lord of Dykvelt, to England in 1687', *University Studies of University of Nebraska* XX (1920), 125.
[5] Countess Sunderland to William 7 March 1687, R.W. Blencowe, ed., *Diary of times of Charles the Second, by the honourable Henry Sidney, afterwards Earl of Romney* (2 vols., London, 1843), II, 260.
[6] D'Avaux to Louis 6 May 1688, AAE CPH 155, fos. 19-21.
[7] Mordaunt to Bentinck 11 March 1687 OS, *RGP 24*, 9.

England, complementing Dijkveld's contacts that were essentially of a political nature. Beginning in December 1687 Bentinck also received a steady flow of letters from the Scot James Johnstone and thus initiated what outwardly looked like a prolonged business correspondence.[8] Sidney forwarded relevant correspondence and papers to Bentinck or his aides.[9] Secret correspondence from England was addressed to Abel Tassin D'Alonne, Christoffel Tromer, Johannes Hutton (William's secretary and physician) or John Blancard, most of whom were or would later become personal aides to Bentinck.[10] The letters, partly written in invisible ink, encrypted and sent to undercover addresses both in London and The Hague, ensured the Prince of Orange of a continuous supply of information concerning developments in England.[11] Most historians have regarded these dispatches as mere newsletters, but the contents rather suggest a genuine correspondence, although Bentinck's replies seem to have been lost.[12] Moreover, those involved in the correspondence would be rewarded after the Revolution with prominent posts in the ministry. Sidney would become Secretary of State and Lord Chancellor of Ireland, and Johnstone Secretary of State in Scotland under Bentinck's tutelage.[13] Such men were hardly simple reporters. The timing of the establishment of this network, only weeks after the news of the Queen's pregnancy, leaves little doubt as to its initial purpose. Increasingly this secret correspondence became the line of communication William and Bentinck relied on when making policy, rather than the dispatches of the Dutch ambassador Arnout van Citters, which were opened and checked, whereas the envoy's movements were closely observed.[14] This is in line with William's tendency to bypass the official envoys and create his own intelligence network.[15]

Bentinck also functioned as a liaison between William and political and religious exiles. Having served in and commanded Dutch regiments filled with Huguenots, such contacts also had a military dimension. When the Huguenot refugee Isaac Dumont de Bostaquet arrived in The Hague in the summer of 1687, he was received by Bentinck and later accepted a post in the army embarking to England.[16] Bentinck maintained relations with Huguenots as they sent requests to him.[17] A list of grievances to be forwarded to the Prince from English Protestants was delivered into his hands in the autumn of 1688.[18] Such religious contacts point to an often underestimated aspect of William's aides in general and Bentinck's contact persons in particular, amongst whom was a high percentage of clergymen. Pierre Jurieu, a Huguenot minister and propagandist would become involved in setting up an intelligence service. Desmarets, a Huguenot minister, was actively labouring on William's behalf, and the Utrecht minister

[8] Rivers to Sidney 17 November 1687 OS, Bentinck to Sidney 5 December 1687 OS (Antwerp), NUL Pw A 2098, 2105.
[9] William to Bentinck 19 September 1687, *RGP 23*, 33.
[10] D'Avaux to Louis 5? August 1688, AAE CPH 155, fo. 262. Cf. Trumbull to Portland 28 May 1695, HMC, *The manuscripts of the Marquess of Downshire preserved at Easthampstead Park Berkshire, Papers of Sir William Trumbull* (London, 1924), I-2, 471-472.
[11] Most letters were either anonymous or pseudonymous, but there are clear indications that, in addition to Johnstone, a number of correspondents were involved. At least three others are mentioned in NUL Pw A 2110, to 'Honoured Sir' 18 December 1687 OS. Although not all letters are addressed to Bentinck, they all have ended up into his private archive, and on several occasions it is clearly implied that he is managing the operation. NUL Pw A 2087-2178.
[12] J. Carswell, *The descent on England* (London, 1973), 132; J.R. Jones, *The revolution of 1688 in England* (London, 1984), 226; anonymous letter 2 July 1688 OS, NUL Pw A 2175.
[13] Cf. B.P. Lenman, 'The poverty of political theory in the Scottish Revolution of 1688-1690', in: Schwoerer, *The revolution of 1688*, 249.
[14] 'Rapport van Jacob van Leeuwen' September 1688, *RGP 24*, 607-610. According to Carswell, Citters was fully in touch with William, but the envoy was never in the Prince's inner circle. Carswell, *Descent on England*, 150.
[15] D.J. Roorda, 'Le Secret du Prince. Monarchale tendenties in de Republiek 1672-1702', in: D.J. Roorda, *Rond prins en patriciaat* (Weesp, 1984).
[16] M. Glozier, *The Huguenot Soldiers of William of Orange and the Glorious Revolution of 1688. The Lions of Judah*. (Brighton, 2002), 58. Bostaquet, Isaac Dumont de, *Mémoires ... sur les temps qui ont précédé et suivi la révocation de l'édit de Nantes* (Paris, 1968), 152.
[17] P.J.A.N. Rietbergen, 'William of Orange (1650-1702) between European politics and European Protestantism: the case of the Huguenots', in: J.A.H. Bots and G.H.M. Posthumus Meyjes, eds., *La révocation de l'édit de Nantes et les Provinces-Unies* (Amsterdam, 1986), 46.
[18] BL Add Ms 32095, fos. 283-296.

Vicius was taken by Dijkveld to England to establish connections with the clergy there.[19] The most significant clergymen were, of course, Gilbert Burnet and William Carstares, who came to play important roles before and after the Revolution. After Burnet had been banished from the Orange court on James's demand, Bentinck was frequently seen to meet with him.[20] The Reverend William Carstares, a Scottish exile, was introduced to Fagel and subsequently to William and Bentinck.[21] In 1687 Carstares would receive the famous letters from Steward, intended to make James's position more acceptable, but thwarted by Gaspar Fagel. The letter was forwarded to Bentinck, who must have been his main channel of communication. It was Bentinck as well who instructed him how to write to Steward.[22] Burnet was let in on the plan managed by Carstares to print the Fagel-Steward correspondence. It is almost certain that Bentinck was directly involved in the correspondence.[23] The common religious background and sense of political purpose of these men facilitated Bentinck's task to forge those talented individuals into a team.[24]

The summer of 1687 saw the Orange court buzzing with visitors from England such as the Earl of Shrewsbury and Mordaunt. In April George Melville arrived from Scotland, another exile to work closely together with Bentinck in the post-revolutionary settlement. His visit was a typical example of how William screened visitors through Bentinck. Presumably at Het Loo, William sent Bentinck to nearby Hoog-Soeren to meet and interview Melville.[25] Such meetings could never remain a complete secret. A certain Forter, a known anti-papist, was spotted travelling with Bentinck to meet William.[26] But the advantage of this scheme was considerable, as William could show the outside world that he did not publicly receive exiles of whom James disapproved. That the actual meeting with Bentinck took place follows from a letter from Patrick Hume, another Scottish exile in Utrecht, written later that month, which shows that Bentinck had had conversations with George Melville and James Dalrymple.[27] Thus Bentinck became the channel of communication between William and the British exiles. He recognised their qualities and recommended them to William for their discretion, discernment, moderation and contacts.[28] In future years he would continue to work with them.

II Rising international tensions (October 1687-June 1688)

Despite diplomatic manoeuvring between James and William during the autumn of 1687 there was no hint of any military design. 'Le dessein', which Bentinck and Mordaunt discussed throughout the summer, was to send a fleet to the West Indies and as late as April 1688 Bentinck seemed preoccupied with 'les nouvelles des Indes Occid$^{s'}$.[29] With regard to England there were three major concerns: domestic troubles as a result of James's policy, rising tensions with the Republic, and dynastic considerations as a result of the Queen's pregnancy. These issues were inextricably connected, as one of Bentinck's correspondents explained in the autumn of 1687:

> 'They add y^{t} they believe things near their crisis, & y^{t} if y^{e} Greate Belly should any way fail, (of which people have different sorts of jealousies) y^{e} Court will pursue much warmer measures, and y^{t} a stricter Alliance being lately made, between us and France; 't is believed y^{e} Dutch may next summer find y^{e} effects of it'.[30]

[19] E.g. Comte d'Avaux, *Négociations ... en Hollande etc.* (6 vols. Paris, 1752-1753), IV, 279, 303, 304.
[20] D'Avaux, *Négociations*, VI, 48-51.
[21] R.H. Story, *William Carstares, a character of the revolutionary epoch (1649-1715)* (London, 1874).
[22] Carstares to Bentinck 1 August 1687, 2 August 1687, *RGP 27*, 757-761; Fagel's draft letters are in Bentinck's archive, NUL Pw A 2071-2072.
[23] NA SP 8-2, fo. 29; William to Bentinck 21 September 1687, *RGP 23*, 33-34.
[24] Cf. Carswell, *Descent of England*, 26-30.
[25] William to Fagel 13 April 1687, *RGP 27*, 750.
[26] D'Avaux, *Négociations*, VI, 51.
[27] Hume to William 22 April 1687 OS, *RGP 24*, 13.
[28] E.g. Melville's correspondence to William in Portland's papers, NUL Pw A 2335.
[29] Mordaunt to Bentinck 11 March 1687 OS, *RGP 24*, 8-9; De Wildt to Bentinck 17 November 1687, *RGP 27*, 768-769; Bentinck to Sidney (Het Loo), 8 April 1688, BL Add Ms 32681, fo. 306r.
[30] Letter to 'Honoured Sir' 8 December 1687 OS, NUL Pw A 2110, fo. 2.

Hence Bentinck needed to learn from his English correspondents whether James would actually be able to obtain a loyal Parliament, whether there was a secret understanding between Louis and James - the potential military threat of which caused more concern at the Orange court than domestic turmoil - and whether the Queen was pregnant. Although there was concern about James's domestic dealings, one of Bentinck's correspondents informed him that most of James's ministers, as well as Halifax (whose advice William greatly valued), were sceptical about his attempt to create a loyal Parliament.[31] Moreover, the court itself was heavily divided which crippled effective decision-making. 'Il y a de grandes factions parmi les Catholiques ...', Bentinck was informed, 'On ne conclud rien presentement dans leurs Assemblées, tant il y a de division'.[32] By late January Bentinck was told that James's ministry was in crisis, and would not succeed in giving the King the Parliament he wanted; but they might take stronger measures.[33] Meanwhile Anglo-Dutch relations deteriorated when the States refused James's request to return the Anglo-Dutch brigades to English soil. There were now growing fears that James would back up his domestic policies by force, and there was also the first sign of a military build-up on both sides of the Channel.[34] But despite the increased threat Bentinck, advised both by Citters and Johnstone that James was not in a condition to wage war, was not alarmed.[35] The situation thus hardly signified a prelude to open conflict, which neither James nor William considered a viable option.

The situation dramatically and radically shifted with James's clash with the bishops, who were tried for seditious libel and imprisoned in the Tower in June. 'cett affaire des Evesques pouroit porter les affaires promptement à des extremités', William wrote to Bentinck.[36] The King, moreover, was reassured by the birth of the Prince of Wales on 20 June, a male Catholic heir ensuring him of a continuation of his policies. Bentinck was asked to officially congratulate the King, but due to his wife's illness the mission was entrusted to Zuylestein.[37] Soon rumours were spread that the child was 'supposititious' and swapped for a still-born Prince. Such talk heated public trepidation to fever pitch, but was hardly taken seriously at the Orange Court until Johnstone suggested to Bentinck that it should be exploited. He did not believe the rumours himself and ridiculed Hutton being '... really so foolish as to give car to idle stories, and doubt of the P^{rs} birth'.[38] But still many people did: 'Be it true Child or not, the People will never believe it'.[39]

It was probably at this stage that Bentinck believed it opportune to take political advantage of the situation. One can only speculate as to the precise sequence of events, but the astute d'Avaux noticed William hurriedly convening a meeting with Fagel, Dijkveld and Bentinck, after having received an express message from England. Whether it was the anonymous letter from London written five days earlier, criticising Zuylestein's mission, cannot be known, but the French ambassador seems to indicate that after this meeting the public prayers for the new Prince were suspended, which is in line with the contents of the dispatch.[40] Bentinck himself refused to lend trumpeters to the English ambassador who had organised a fete to celebrate the princely birth, and Ouwerkerk and Odijk declared that William would take it ill if anyone would attend the event.[41] Meanwhile apprehension as to James's plans was rising. By the late spring both Citters and Johnstone reported that Barillon had offered naval and military

[31] Anonymous letter 8 December 1687 OS, La Montagne's letter of 21 December 1687, anonymous letter 27 February 1688 OS, NUL Pw A 2112, Pw A 2120, 2147. Cf. Carswell, *Descent on England*, 112.
[32] Anonymous letter to Howel 12 January 1688 OS, NUL Pw A 2126, fo. 9v.
[33] Jones to Hutton 29 January 1688 OS, NUL Pw A 2137.
[34] M. Ashley, *The Glorious Revolution of 1688* (London, 1966), 129, 156; A. van der Kuijl, *De Glorieuze Overtocht. De expeditie van Willem III naar Engeland in 1688* (Amsterdam, 1988), 23.
[35] Anonymous letter 4 April 1688 OS, NUL Pw A 2159; Citters to States General 9 April 1688, BL Add Ms 17677 UUU, fo. 539v.
[36] William to Bentinck 4 June 1688, *RGP 23*, 40-41.
[37] Ham to Bentinck 4 July 1688 OS, NUL Pw A 521; Petit to Middleton 29 June 1688, BL Add Ms 41816, fos. 82v-83r.
[38] Johnstone to Hutton 3 August 1688 OS, NUL Pw A 2177.
[39] Letter from Rivers 18 June 1688 OS, NUL Pw A 2171.
[40] D'Avaux, *Négociations*, VI, 172-174; anonymous letter 2 July 1688 OS, NUL Pw A 2175.
[41] Dispatch 26 July 1688, BL Add Ms 41816, fo. 124v.

assistance to James.[42] Historians have often described James's attempts to pack Parliament as unrealistic, but J.R. Jones has shown that by recreating the corporations he might still achieve his objectives. Bentinck probably believed so, having been informed by one of his correspondents in the summer that by the winter of 1688 everything would be changed; the King will have a strong army and a loyal Parliament. William must intervene.[43] If you do not come over, Johnstone warned in early August, 'c'est montrer les dents sans mordre'.[44]

The alarming letters from London coincided with the death of the Wittelsbach archbishop of Cologne, Maximilian Henry, in early June.[45] His death had not been unexpected and the spring of 1688 had seen frantic diplomatic activity at the German courts. In January, with French support, Wilhelm von Fürstenberg had been elected coadjutor, a position in which he was in effective control of the actual administration. Due to his dispute with Louis over the Gallican articles, the pope was unwilling to confirm Fürstenberg's coadjutorship and, after the ecclesiastical Prince's death, unlikely to support his candidacy for the see.[46] Both William and Louis were quick to grasp the significance of the event; the archbishopric comprised not only Cologne, but also Munster, Liège and Hildesheim, extending along the Rhine frontier, and as such of crucial strategic importance. The French Secretary of State, the Marquis of Louvois, realised that the situation was to the advantage of his master, the Emperor being engaged in the Hungarian campaign and Fürstenberg still in actual control of the territories. He also noted that William was likely to intervene, and in the meantime 4,000 French cavalry were directed towards Cologne to support the coadjutor.[47] The Duke of Schomberg, the Huguenot marshal in Brandenburg service, marched towards Wesel, Brandenburg territory some 50 miles from Cologne. Meanwhile French troops were also converging on the Palatinate to settle the succession there - which had been disputed since 1685 - by force.[48]

This event triggered William's decision; war seemed inevitable now. [49] On 7 June he wrote to Bentinck:

> 'cecy causera sans doute un grand changement aus affaires, car il est certain que la France bon ou malgré faira élire de nouveau le Cardinal de Furstenberg et pour cett effet envoyera des trouppes dans l'archevesché de Cologne. Si l'Empereur et les Princes de l'Empire souffrent que les chapitres soient forcé tant là qu'à Munster, Hildeshiem et Liège, il faut qu'ils ne songent plus à leur liberté germanique, mais comment l'empesche?'[50]

The Dutch were alarmed.[51] Bentinck was to contact Eberhard von Danckelmann, the Brandenburg first minister, to sound out the Elector, and Saxony, Brunswick-Lunenberg, Hesse-Cassel and the Palatinate were to be drawn into a defensive alliance.[52]

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[42] Anonymous letter 9 June 1688 OS, NUL Pw A 2165; dispatch Citters 15 June 1688, BL Add Ms 17677 UUU, fo. 569.

[43] Anonymous letter 23 May 1688 OS, La Riviere to Hutton 27 May 1688 OS, letter from Rivers 18 June 1688 OS, NUL Pw A 2161, Pw A 2163, Pw A 2173. It was thought much more likely that the King would eventually succeed than that a republic would be established. This is confirmed by the Secret Resolution which the States of Holland took on 29 September 1688. *Secreete Resolutien van de Ed. Groot Mog. Heeren Staaten van Hollandt. Beginnende met den jaare 1679 en eyndigende met den jaare 1696 incluis* (17 vols., The Hague, 1653-1795), V, 229-235.

[44] Johnstone to Hutton 3 August 1688 OS, cf. letter from Rivers 18 June 1688 OS, NUL Pw A 2173, Pw A 2177; Jones, *The revolution of 1688*, 129 ff.

[45] J. T. O'Connor, *Negotiator out of season. The career of Wilhelm Egon von Fürstenberg 1629-1704* (Athens, 1978), 157.

[46] J.B. Wolf, *Louis XIV* (London, 1968), 435-439.

[47] A. Richardt, *Louvois* (Paris, 1990), 221; G. Symcox, 'Louis XIV and the outbreak of the Nine Years War', in: R. Hatton, ed., *Louis XIV and Europe* (London, 1976), 193.

[48] In May 1685 the Elector Palatinate, Karl von Simmern, had died, and was succeeded by the anti-French Philip Wilhelm von Pfaltz-Neuburg. Louis disputed the succession on behalf of the Duchess of Orleans, and would invade the Palatinate in 1688 under pretence of defending her claim.

[49] Haley, 'The Dutch invasion', 25; Symcox, 'Louis XIV and the outbreak of the Nine Years War', 195.

[50] William to Bentinck 7 June 1688, *RGP 23*, 41.

[51] Albeville to Middleton 18 June 1688, BL Add Ms 41816, fo. 61 and passim. But see Albeville to Middleton 22 June 1688, BL Add Ms 41816, fo. 68r. The reports sent by the Dutch envoy Van Wassenaar-Sterrenburg from Paris concerning French movements of troops towards Cologne were alarming. Carswell, *Descent on England*, 161.

It is worth reflecting on the historiographical neglect of the Cologne-affair (or indeed in Dutch-German relations in general during this period) as it has led to a somewhat distorted perspective. While historians are increasingly aware of the importance of Dutch strategic considerations when studying the Glorious Revolution in Britain, little research has been conducted into the wider European context of the Dutch position. Most historians seem to accept the view that Dutch intervention in Cologne was part of a 'cover up plan' to conceal preparations for the invasion into England.[53] But Bentinck's correspondence and activities during these months strongly suggest that the Dutch were primarily concerned with events along the Rhine as a possible trigger for war, rather than with English domestic troubles. The preponderance of an Anglocentric interpretation of Dutch events has been reinforced by some of the main contemporary chroniclers in Holland, most notably Burnet and d'Avaux, who are often referred to by historians, and who both emphasised that William was only using his involvement in the Cologne affair to camouflage his intentions towards England. But these two chroniclers interpreted the events from their own, foreign, perspectives, and writing in hindsight. Dutch contemporary sources, such as the *Hollandse Mercurius* but later also Wagenaar's *Vaderlandsche historie* pay far more attention to the Cologne affair.[54] To fully understand the Dutch position in 1688, attention must be paid to the international forcefield, in particular the French-German tensions along the Rhine.

III Bentinck's missions to Germany (June-August 1688)

It is therefore worth studying Bentinck's diplomatic mission to Berlin, following the death of the Great Elector of Brandenburg in May. The importance of the mission was not lost on interested observers; eager to speculate on its purpose, they supposed it was a rapprochement and a warning signal to Versailles.[55] The English ambassador Marquis d'Albeville suggested that Bentinck would be instrumental in swinging the aloof Brandenburgers definitely into the Allied camp by giving 'advise in modeling the new court and in takeing measurs as to affairs.'[56] It was precisely for that reason that William had despatched Bentinck as his personal emissary, lending weight to the mission. There may have been some truth in d'Avaux's acid comment, that William must have been well assured 'de reussir dans cette affaire puisque sans cela il ne confieroit pas cette negociation a Benting, qui est d'une tres mediocre capacité et ne voudroit pas commettre son favorij.'[57] On the other hand, the new Elector, Frederick III, seems to have held Bentinck in high esteem, which to William may have been reason enough to choose his favourite for the mission.[58] Indeed, Bentinck had clearly matured as a diplomat since his less successful mission to London three years before. The support of Frederick, though himself a zealous Calvinist and averse to allying with France, could not be taken for granted, and there were strong differences in opinion as to how to handle the impending crisis in Cologne.[59] The lukewarm commitment of the powerful first minister, Danckelmann, caused William and Bentinck a considerable amount of anxiety.[60] At the Brandenburg court, pro- and anti-French factions emerged around Franz von Meinderts and Paul Fuchs respectively.

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[52] William to Bentinck 7 June 1688, *RGP 23*, 41-42.

[53] Most analyses have paid little attention to the German context: Israel, 'The Dutch role' and S. Groenveld, ' "J'equippe une flotte très considerable": the Dutch side of the Glorious revolution', in: R. Beddard, ed., *The revolution of 1688* (Oxford 1988), 240-242. In support of my view, cf. Haley, 'The Dutch invasion', 24n. Louis was therefore right in his assumption that the most likely course of action the Dutch would take was to intervene in the Rhineland, rather than in England.

[54] G. Burnet, *History of his own time* (6 vols., London, 1725); d'Avaux, *Négociations*; J. Wagenaar, *Vaderlandsche historie, vervattende de geschiedenissen der nu Vereenigde Nederlanden, inzonderheid die van Holland, van de vroegste tyden af* (21 vols., Amsterdam, 1791-1796), XV.

[55] Dispatch Moreau 18 May 1688, 22 June 1688, BL Add Ms 38494, fos. 68v, 77v.

[56] Albeville to Middleton 18 May 1688, BL Add Ms 41816, fo. 24v. Cf. d'Avaux, *Négociations*, VI, 156.

[57] D'Avaux to Louis 25 July 1688, AAE CPH 155, fo. 230r.

[58] Ham to Bentinck 4 July 1688 OS, 10 September 1688 OS, NUL Pw A 521, Pw A 534; William to Frederick III 17 May 1688, *RGP 28*, 14.

[59] W. Troost, 'William III, Brandenburg, and the construction of the anti-French coalition, 1672-1688', in: Israel, *The Anglo-Dutch moment*, 299-333, esp. 332.

[60] Ham to Bentinck 11 August 1688, NUL Pw A 527.

But Bentinck's mission coincided with a definite swing towards a more pro-Dutch policy under Frederick, as Meinderts' influence was rapidly declining and the diplomatic advantages of the French were evaporating. Bentinck had managed to persuade the Elector to maintain the pro-Dutch Brandenburg envoy Ezechiel Spanheim at his post in Paris. He established good relations with the influential Duke of Schomberg, who had recently left France and was now in the service of Brandenburg. During his mission they had talked 'frenchement sur touttes choses.'[61] According to Schomberg, Bentinck's presence at the Berlin court had had a favourable and inspiring effect on the Elector and his first minister.[62] Due to his wife's illness, Bentinck was urged by William to return to The Hague immediately, where he arrived on 19 June.[63] A few days later d'Avaux worriedly wrote to his King that Brandenburg was now in William's interest.[64] The States General's envoy Johan Ham informed Bentinck that Danckelmann and Fuchs were acting in tandem.[65] 'l'on ne doute pas', d'Avaux thought, 'que le P^{ce} d'orange et Mr Benting ne soustiennent le Sr fuchs et ne taschent de luy faire avoir l'entiere direction des affaires'.[66]

Bentinck's mission was pivotal in a wider Dutch diplomatic offensive to mobilise German princes. Godard Adriaan van Reede van Amerongen had been despatched to Aachen to arrange an encounter with the Elector of Saxony who was taking the waters there. On 28 May he had informed Bentinck that the Elector was willing to make a defensive alliance with the States General; in his opinion the new Brandenburg ruler might be inclined likewise. Amerongen kept Bentinck informed about the negotiations.[67] Waldeck was in Arolsen, and corresponded with him on German affairs.[68] After his mission Bentinck had found it expedient to establish a frequent correspondence with Ham, who was now instructed by the favourite to write regular despatches. The correspondence is particularly useful as it provides a contrast to the published Danckelmann letters. On his return Bentinck informed Danckelmann that he found 'l'esprit de S.A.^{sse} ... dans une meilleure assiette que je ne l'avois laissée à l'égard de toutes nos affaires ...'[69] Danckelmann likewise wrote to Bentinck in reassuring terms, but according to Ham the councillors of the Elector were divided, and support was not to be taken for granted.[70] Danckelmann himself was averse to supporting the Emperor's candidate for the Cologne see, and in fact preferred Fürstenberg to the Bavarian pretender, Max Emanuel, because it may have been 'useful to be allied with the House of Austria, but not to be surrounded and enclosed by it and its allies'.[71] Bentinck suggested to Danckelmann that they should co-ordinate diplomatic efforts in Munster, and William's envoy had been instructed to support the desired candidate.[72] On 20 June Danckelmann informed Bentinck about discussions with the Brunswick-Lunenberger envoy whose master leaned towards France.[73] Bentinck's labours throughout June to choreograph Brandenburg and Dutch diplomacy were not unsuccessful. Moreover, Fürstenberg's schemes were crippled; the Cardinal did not succeed in keeping all the territories in one hand, and his candidacy for Cologne was deadlocked on 19 July due to his failure to achieve a two-thirds majority.[74]

It is difficult to establish when exactly a sound commitment from the Germans to support the Dutch in their English enterprise materialised, but correspondence with Danckelmann and Waldeck was preoccupied with affairs regarding the Empire until late June. It is almost certain that Bentinck and the Elector had discussed the possibility of an intervention in English affairs during his mission. Bentinck had

[61] Schomberg to Bentinck 23 June 1688, *RGP 24*, 152.
[62] Schomberg to Bentinck 27 June 1688, ibid., 153-154.
[63] Albeville to Middleton 22 June 1688, BL Add Ms 41816, fo. 68.
[64] D'Avaux to Louis 24 June 1688, AAE CPH, fos. 160-161.
[65] Ham to Bentinck 23 June 1688, NUL Pw A 518.
[66] D'Avaux to Louis 17 May 1688, AAE CPH 155, fo. 42.
[67] Amerongen to Bentinck, 28 May 1688, 1 June 1688, RU HA 1001/3128.
[68] Waldeck's letters in *RGP 24*, 142 ff.
[69] Bentinck to Danckelmann 22 June 1688 (The Hague), *RGP 24*, 124.
[70] Ham to Bentinck 30 June 1688, NUL Pw A 520.
[71] Ham to Bentinck 30 June 1688, NUL Pw A 519.
[72] Bentinck to Danckelmann 22 June 1688 (The Hague), *RGP 24*, 124-125.
[73] Danckelmann to Bentinck 20 June 1689, ibid., 123.
[74] O'Connor, *Negotiator out of season*, 160 ff.

mainly 'préparé les choses' for further negotiations, as William suggested.[75] He had also arranged a meeting between the Elector and William which ultimately took place in September in Minden.[76] The decision to intervene militarily in England was made after Bentinck's mission to Berlin. It was now that Bentinck instructed Ham to write directly with every post.[77] On 20 July Arthur Herbert arrived from England with the 'invitation', and was closeted the next day at Honselaarsdijk with William, Dijkveld and Bentinck.[78] This document was signed by seven leading politicians and could serve as a pretext for invasion. That same day Bentinck wrote to Ham: 'The Elector of Brandenburg has shown much fervour and sincerity about that affair [i.e. of England], and has told me at my departure that he wanted to establish "tout pour le tout" in this affair with His Highness; now it is surely time for him to stick by that'.[79] It is interesting to note that Bentinck suggested here that the State would intervene: he hoped for an alliance with Brandenburg because 'the State would step into the English case with all its might'. Bentinck furthermore suggested that unless Brandenburg provided troops for backup and defence against a possible French attack on the Dutch state, 'everything will be lost'.[80] Ham was strictly instructed not to correspond with anyone apart from William and himself. To Danckelmann he likewise explained: 'les affaires d'Angleterre commencent à presser extrêmement, et elles sont à présent en telle crise que Son Alt.[e] n'oseroit plus tarder à ce préparer, de telle manière à ne pas estre surpris à l'impréveu'.[81]

On the 25th of July Bentinck left for Berlin to arrange a secret meeting with Fuchs, leaving the foreign diplomats the impression that the aim of his mission was to confer with the German princes to counter Fürstenberg's ambitions.[82] He passed through Hesse-Cassel, Hanover, Celle and Wolfenbüttel and seemed optimistic about the success of his mission.[83] The Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel promised troops and free passage for the Dutch army.[84] Bentinck had also requested a joint diplomatic effort in Hanover and asked for the presence of Danckelmann's brother there. But here the Elector was unwilling to force a rupture with France.[85] Bentinck and Fuchs met in utter secrecy in Celle on 6 August.[86] The most remarkable aspect of their conversation was that even at this stage the particulars of the expedition were still being discussed, which is in line with the absence of any specific references in correspondence or documents prior to late July. It was only now that the connection was made between the hiring of troops and the expedition to England, whereas formerly troops were directed to the Rhineland. Bentinck's mission was successful. Both Fuchs and the Celle minister Andreas von Bernstorff offered troops, as did the negotiators of Württemberg and Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel. The two major dissenting princes of Saxony and Hanover, John George III and Ernst August did, however, participate in the Magdenburger Concert to defend the Empire against French aggression.[87] Bentinck arrived at Honselaarsdijk on 10 August, having secured a sizeable army of German troops to defend the Rhine and Dutch borders against impending French aggression.[88]

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[75] William to Bentinck 4 June 1688, *RGP 23*, 40. This letter, however, contains the first reference to the 'affaires d'Angleterre' with relation to Brandenburg troop hires.
[76] Ham to Bentinck 30 June 1688, NUL Pw A 519.
[77] Ham to Bentinck 30 June 1688, ibid.
[78] D'Avaux, *Négociations*, VI, 72-73.
[79] Bentinck to Ham 20 July 1688, *RGP 24*, 132-133.
[80] Bentinck to Ham 20 July 1688, ibid., 133.
[81] Bentinck to Danckelmann 20 July 1688, ibid., 132.
[82] Albeville to Middleton 26 July 1688, BL Add Ms 41816, fo. 124v.
[83] D'Avaux, *Négociations*, VI, 174.
[84] Ibid., VI, 178; Waldeck to Bentinck 16 August 1688, NUL Pw A 1520; J.W. Wijn, *Het Staatsche Leger 1568-1795* (The Hague 1940), VI, 270-271.
[85] Ernst August of Brunswick-Lunenburg to William 24 July 1688 OS, *RGP 28*, 35-36.
[86] Cf. Bentinck to Danckelmann 20 July 1688, Bentinck to Ham 20 July 1688, *RGP 24*, 132.
[87] W. Troost, *Stadhouder-koning Willem III. Een politieke biografie* (Hilversum, 2001), 197-198.
[88] Albeville to Middleton 10 August 1688, BL Add Ms 41816, fo. 142v; H.J. van der Heim, ed., *Het archief van den raadpensionaris Antonie Heinsius* (The Hague, 1867), 52-54.

IV Preparations for the invasion (June-October 1688)

Meanwhile Bentinck was involved in mustering support domestically. In June Dijkveld and Bentinck had already contacted several Amsterdam burgomasters to acquaint them with the Prince's plans to intervene in England.[89] Upon his return from his German mission in early August Bentinck, now instructed by William to handle the negotiations with Amsterdam, arranged a secret meeting with Johannes Hudde and Nicolaas Witsen, hoping that his diplomatic successes in Germany would induce the burgomasters to co-operate. They were, however, not convinced. In fact, as late as September the burgomaster's council chamber remained in confusion as the 'considerations brought [Hudde] in a very great perplexity').[90]

Nevertheless, William and his aides had been making preparations all summer. According to Burnet, 'Bentink used to be constantly with the Prince, being the person that was most entirely trusted and constantly employed by him'.[91] Although the importance of William's advisers has been recognised, little research has been undertaken which would illuminate their influence and impact.[92] The events in the spring and summer of 1688 provide a window for the historian on the concentration of power in the hands of the Stadholder and his advisers.[93] Fagel and Dijkveld efficiently took care of establishing consensus among the regents and of obtaining funds. To this purpose Bentinck contacted William's agent in Madrid, Francisco Schonenberg.[94] Upon his return from Celle in early August, Bentinck devoted himself to the logistic preparations for the expedition. Bentinck's reports, which were sent daily from The Hague to Het Loo, have unfortunately not survived, but it is still possible to reconstruct his logistic activities, which consisted of the procurement of supplies, the equipage of the fleet and the embarkation of the troops.[95] The provisioning was handled in close co-operation with Job de Wildt, Secretary of the Amsterdam Admiralty.[96] Bentinck and De Wildt also supervised the equipage of the fleet, which was taken care of by the admiralty colleges.[97] On 6 September Bentinck and Captain Gerard Callenburg discussed the issue of the fleet of transport ships needed to cross the Channel.[98] Details were worked out during a meeting on 19 September, attended by Admiral Willem Bastiaansen, Callenburg, Herbert, De Wildt and Bentinck.[99] Time was running out now, and the next meeting was planned for 22 September, by which time the fleet had to be ready; meanwhile the States were still formally unaware of the proceedings.[100] Bentinck was directly responsible for the actual embarkation of the troops, which had been encamped on the Mookerheide near Nijmegen since August. It was not clear whether the intentions of the French marshal, the Duke d'Humières, who had built up a defence line along the borders of the Spanish Netherlands, were hostile, and William admitted to Bentinck, 'J'advoue que cecy me mest dans des terribles pienes et inquiétudes, craignent que nostre dessin avortera et que nous voilà engagé en une grande geurre.' But intelligence had reached him 'que le maréchal d'Humières a receu ordre d'aller maintenir le cardinal', in which case a direct threat on the border would be removed.[101] The final details about troop movements

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[89] J.F. Gebhard, *Het leven van Mr. Nicolaas Cornelisz. Witsen (1641-1717)* (2 vols., Utrecht, 1882), I, 320-327; Israel, 'Dutch role', 116.
[90] Gebhard, *Witsen*, II, 173; G.H. Kurtz, *Willem III en Amsterdam 1683-1685* (Utrecht, 1928), 187.
[91] Burnet, *History*, III, 1311.
[92] N. Japikse, *Prins Willem III - De Stadhouder-koning* (2 vols., Amsterdam, 1933), I, 357-359; S.B. Baxter, *William III* (London, 1966), 274; Jones, *The revolution of 1688*, 222-223; 'Bentink, Dykvelt, Herbert and Van Hulst, were for two months constantly at the Hague, giving all necessary orders, with so little noise that nothing broke out all that while. Even in lesser matters favourable circumstances concurred to cover his design.' Burnet, *History*, III, 1311.
[93] Cf. G. de Bruin, *Geheimhouding en verraad. De geheimhouding van staatszaken ten tijde van de Republiek (1600-1750)* (The Hague, 1991), 347.
[94] William to Bentinck 4 September 1688, *RGP 23*, 56.
[95] E.g. William to Bentinck 27 August 1688, ibid., 47.
[96] *RGP 24*, 604.
[97] Van der Kuijl, *De Glorieuze Overtocht*, 31-33. Cf. William to Bentinck 25 August 1688, *RGP 23*, 44-45.
[98] *RGP 24*, 605-606.
[99] Carswell, *Descent on England*, 168-169.
[100] Albeville to Middleton 24 September 1688, BL Add Ms 41816; *RGP 24*, 606.
[101] William to Bentinck 4 September 1688, *RGP 23*, 55.

must have been discussed during the meeting of Waldeck, William and Bentinck on 21 September.[102] The last week of September saw the release of tension when Schomberg occupied Cologne and French troops flooded the Palatinate on the 25th, meaning the direct threat on the Dutch borders was removed. The following day William wrote to Bentinck that the troops camped at Nijmegen would be given marching orders for the port of Hellevoetsluis for embarkation.[103]

Naval strategy was determined by Bentinck and the admirals of the fleet. On 20 September Bentinck had received Philips van Almonde and Cornelis Evertsen at his residence, where it was decided that Herbert would be in command.[104] It was probably after consultation with the admirals that Bentinck drew a diagram representing the sailing order of the fleet, showing the 196 vessels in nine units, each protected by one man-of-war, and one unit of ten ships including Herbert's ship the *Leyden*. Thirty-nine men-of-war surrounded the fleet.[105] This configuration implied that the choice was made not to engage the English fleet if that could be avoided. The enormous transport fleet, although shielded by a superior force of men-of-war, was extremely vulnerable, and Bentinck had to implore Herbert to shun battle at all costs.[106] Bentinck personally supervised the embarkation of the troops in early October.[107] Around the middle of October, the expedition force was ready to set sail, and Bentinck, Fagel and the admirals were in continuous consultation in The Hague.[108] Astonishingly, the preparations for what may have been the most complicated and extensive naval operation in the seventeenth century were essentially managed by half a dozen men within two months in the utmost secrecy.

Central to the propaganda campaign was the slogan for the expedition: *pro religione et libertate*, a powerful phrase, since it not only assured the Prince of the ardent support of Calvinist preachers and foreign Protestants, such as the Huguenots, but also played into the hands of English Protestants. Evidently, Bentinck, who devised William's banner with this motto, was aware of the propaganda value of the pretext of William's invasion.[109] But to Bentinck the phrase 'religion and liberty' was not a cynical piece of propaganda; it lay at the heart of his ideology and continuously recurs in his correspondence. In an unusually personal and sincere retrospective letter to William - obviously devoid of propaganda - Bentinck would later reflect on the enterprise of 1688, arguing that it had only been for the 'service de Dieu, la défence des lois d'Angleterre et de la liberté de c'est Estat et l'intérest de toutte l'Europe'.[110] On several occasions he explicitly relates the phrase to the safety and integrity of the Dutch Republic. To Ham, Bentinck had written that it was to be expected that the affairs in England '... would burst into extremities, in which case we cannot sit still, but have to do our best, or the Republic and Religion is lost.'[111] Thus, to Bentinck religion and liberty were inextricably connected.[112]

With the preparation of the *Declaration of Reasons* the propaganda campaign was approaching its apotheosis. Several draft versions of the *Declaration* had been sent to William in August. According to Wagenaar, these were compiled by Fagel and translated back into English by Burnet, but evidence suggests that the text was debated at length between Fagel, Dijkveld and Bentinck in The Hague.[113] A few hitherto unstudied drafts of the *Declaration* in Bentinck's archive containing (minor) marginal notes in

[102] Albeville to Middleton 24 September 1688, BL Add Ms 41816, fo. 191v.
[103] William to Bentinck 26 September 1688, 29 September 1688, *RGP 23*, 57-59.
[104] Van der Kuijl, *De Glorieuze Overtocht*, 36.
[105] *RGP 24*, 622; NUL PW A 2197.
[106] William to Bentinck 26 September 1688, *RGP 23*, 58.
[107] Van der Kuijl, *De Glorieuze Overtocht*, 43; Albeville to Middleton 10 October 1688, BL Add Ms 41816, fo. 228v.
[108] Albeville to Middleton 15 October 1688, BL Add Ms 41816, fo. 239v.
[109] Van der Kuijl, *De Glorieuze Overtocht*, 37.
[110] Bentinck to William 22 March 1690 (The Hague), *RGP 23*, 153.
[111] Bentinck to Ham 20 July 1688, *RGP 24*, 132.
[112] Cf. Groenveld, ' "J'equippe une flotte très considerable" ', 241.
[113] William to Bentinck 29 August 1688, *RGP 23*, 50. Burnet and Wildman were also involved: Albeville to Middleton 1 October 1688, BL Add Ms 41816, fo. 209v. Cf. J.I. Israel, 'Propaganda in the making of the Glorious Revolution', in: S. Roach, ed., *Across the narrow seas* (London, 1991), 169, 172 and L.G. Schwoerer, *The declaration of rights 1689* (Baltimore, 1981), 107.

his handwriting provide definite proof of his direct involvement in drafting the text.[114] But his main responsibility was the distribution of the manifesto. He kept copies of the printed *Declaration* safely in his quarters and co-ordinated the ensuing propaganda campaign.[115] His network in England was instrumental in the distribution of the pamphlet in unprecedented numbers and evaluated its impact. The *Declaration* for the English sailors was sent 'to some trusty parson in London, who is usually intrusted with the receiving and dispersing of such secrett papers as ar frequently sent thither from Holland.'[116] Earlier, Johnstone had notified Bentinck that he had no printing facilities available, so that they were dependent on copies printed in the United Provinces.[117] The distribution of the *Opinion* had confronted Bentinck with logistical problems, since according to his agent the pamphlet was very difficult to obtain even when distributed in large numbers.[118] An effective campaign was necessarily a sustained one, requiring permanent and reliable lines of communication.

The virtual breakdown of these lines between April and July (apparently because Bentinck had not followed directions properly and his letters miscarried) was affecting the 'Williamites' in England, who complained of the lack of intelligence.[119] Bentinck and William likewise were confronted with an acute shortage of intelligence when it was most needed. Bentinck's intelligence network in England had become less useful with the crossing the Channel of his foremost agents, Sidney and Johnstone, the former arriving at Het Loo in the last week of August.[120] With Citters in The Hague for consultation, it was necessary to send some agent, a task which William naturally delegated to Bentinck. It was difficult to dispatch either Dijkveld or Zuylestein, the latter having just returned and no obvious pretext being available.[121]

Bentinck decided to send Jacob van Leeuwen, his personal secretary, to London in secret, where he arrived on 11 September.[122] Armed with credentials and instructions from Bentinck to contact several key Williamites, he arranged to meet Edward Russell and Richard Lumley, both signatories of the 'invitation'. The former was relieved as lines of communication between William and the English opposition had been disrupted for several weeks. They provided Van Leeuwen with detailed information on English fortifications, troop mobilisation and fleet movements. Lumley gave Van Leeuwen the impression that James had refused offers of military support from the French ambassador Bonrepas. Russell and Danby supplied the secretary with crucial strategic intelligence but urged him to return to the United Provinces immediately, as they were afraid their secret dealings would be discovered. They also advised William to land in the West. Lastly, they claimed that James would concentrate all his forces in London. From another source Bentinck received exhaustive intelligence with regard to the garrison strengths in ports.[123] Van Leeuwen's intelligence report, received by Bentinck probably in late September, was important for its estimation of James's military strength, but no less for the fact that lines of communication had been re-established.[124]

V The invasion (November 1688)

[114] NUL Pw A 2246-52. Cf. NUL Pw A 2288.
[115] Albeville to Middleton 24 October 1688, BL Add Ms 41816, fo. 251r; Albeville to Middleton 15 October 1688, ibid., fo. 238v: 'The manifest or declaration can not be yett had at any rate, for i have offer'd considerably for it'. Cf. Israel, 'Propaganda', 169.
[116] *RGP 24*, 618-619.
[117] Anonymous letter 8 December 1687 OS, NUL Pw A 2112.
[118] Anonymous letter 16 February 1688 OS, NUL Pw A 2141.
[119] Anonymous letter 2 July 1688 OS, NUL Pw A 2175.
[120] William to Bentinck 27 August 1688, *RGP 23*, 47. Johnstone had sent a coded message in early August saying that his activities would cease: 3 August 1688 OS, NUL Pw A 2177.
[121] Citters had been recalled for consultation to The Hague in July. Probably he was only then briefed about the impending invasion, which may explain his particularly odd behaviour during his first audience with James on his return. See his dispatch of 22 September 1688, BL Add Ms 17677 UUU, fo. 581v; *RGP 23*, 46-47.
[122] This must have been Bentinck's personal decision, as William suggested Citters would do, *RGP 23*, 47.
[123] NUL Pw A 2181.
[124] Jacob van Leeuwen's report of September 1688, *RGP 24*, 607-610.

Around the middle of October the States General granted their support and the fleet lay ready, waiting for the turn of the south-westerly wind which prevented the ships from Texel reaching the port of Hellevoetsluis. Bentinck arrived there on the 26th of October and was engaged with the final preparations, all the while anxious about the health of his wife, to whom he daily wrote. On the 29th Bentinck sailed in William's entourage to Maassluis, writing optimistically to his wife: '... le vent estant assez fort, sous la sainte guarde de Dieu'.[125] But the wind suddenly changed and the fleet was driven back into the harbour. Bentinck though laconically remarked: 'il semble que le bon Dieu ne l'ait pas voulu encore.'[126] Bentinck was obliged to labour to restore the disarrayed fleet and was unable to attend to his wife. On 9 November he briefly visited her in The Hague, only to return after two days to hold a meeting on the *Leyden* with the admirals.[127] Quite likely the decision whether to land in the West or North of England was made then and there. Earlier Bentinck had drafted a memorial listing all places along the coast suitable for landing, thus keeping the options still open.[128] The council decided what Herbert had already suggested: that the decision should be based on the wind. On 12 November Bentinck once more suggested to William that 'if this wind continues, we feel that Exmouth or the river of Exeter would be much better to securely land ...'.[129] So the 'Protestant wind' directed the invasion force westward, evading the English fleet, which was held back by the same wind. Presumably Bentinck paid a last visit to his wife, since on 12 November William strongly urged his adviser to join the fleet which had put out to sea.[130] On 14 November Bentinck advised William to set a course for Torbay, which, he had argued, 'can hardly be defended by the King'.[131]

The fleet reached Torbay the next day, unscathed by the English fleet. From a high cliff near Brixham, Bentinck and William witnessed the swift disembarkation of the troops.[132] Torrential rain hampered the subsequent march to nearby Paignton, and from there to Exeter, the nearest city, as carts and canons frequently got stuck in the mud. Notwithstanding a festive reception by the citizens of Exeter, William may have been dismayed by the initial lack of support by the local gentry, with the mayor of Exeter 'playing the beast', according to Huygens, in proclaiming to Bentinck his loyalty to the King.[133] Bentinck attributed the reservation mainly to the dismal memories of Monmouth's recent failed attempt. To Herbert he suggested:

> 'Le peuple paroist partout ici extrêmement incliné. Il n'i a que les gentilshommes et le clergé qui sont un peu plus retenus et n'entrent pas dans nos intérrêts. Je suis surpris de ces derniers. Il me semble que la peur du gibet fait plus d'effect sur leurs esprits que le zèle de la religion.'[134]

Was William lingering in Exeter because he was disappointed with the lack of English support? Bentinck supposed that within a few days gentry from outside Devon would come flocking in - which indeed they did.[135] He seemed to imply that the break in Exeter was a useful and necessary intermezzo. The twelve

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[125] J. Whittle, *An exact diary of the late expedition of his illustrious highness the Prince of Orange into England etc.* (London, 1689), 16; Bentinck to his wife 30 October 1688, *RGP 23*, 361.
[126] Bentinck to his wife 31 October 1688, *RGP 23*, 361.
[127] Bentinck to his wife 8 November 1688, ibid., 365; 9 November 1688, Huygens, *Journaal*, I-1, 111; *RGP 28*, 628-629.
[128] Bentinck's memorial October 1688, *RGP 24*, 617-618.
[129] Bentinck to William 12 November 1688 (The *Leyden*), *RGP 24*, 624.
[130] William to Bentinck 12 November 1688, *RGP 28*, 53.
[131] Marginal note in memorial NUL Pw A 2188/8. Cf. *RGP 24*, 624. Another document in Bentinck's papers clearly shows that Torbay was not a preconceived landing place, and was decided on according to circumstances, NUL Pw A 2238; J.I. Israel and G. Parker, 'Of Providence and Protestant winds: The Spanish armada of 1588 and the Dutch armada of 1688', in: Israel, *The Anglo-Dutch moment*, 339-341. Cf. Van der Kuijl, *De Glorieuze Overtocht*, 58-66; *RGP 24*, 625.
[132] '... a great tribute to Bentinck's gift as a staff officer', Carswell, *Descent on England*, 184.
[133] 25 November 1688, Huygens, *Journaal*, I-1, 21.
[134] Bentinck to Herbert 22 November 1688 (Exeter), *RGP 28*, 58. *Mémoires d'Isaac Dumont de Bostaquet*, 196.
[135] This is confirmed by contemporary journals: 'Seker ende omstandigh verhael van het gepasseerde, zedert het overgaen van Syne Hoogheydt naer Engelandt', 'Advysen uyt Engelandt', 'Journael gehouden by Johan Adolphi, Secretaris van Syne Excellentie den Luytenant Generael Admirael Herberts etc.', in: *Political Tracts* (1688), fos. 67-68.

days in Exeter were, thus, not spent in anxious passivity, but used to regroup battalions, set up a council comprised of influential gentry and create a revenue system.[136]

Beginning on 15 November, the day of the landing, Bentinck kept a concise journal of events in the form of several letters to Princess Mary.[137] It is one of the very few lengthy reports and reflections we have in his hand and provides a perspective of one of William's senior staff. Bentinck seldom wrote anything particularly personal. During the march to London, Citters had brought to him the news of his wife's death. There is hardly a trace in his correspondence reflecting on his loss, just one line to Herbert: '... ma grande douleur pour la mort de ma femme ...'.[138] In the *Account* the events are described in a dry, factual but concise manner. Most of the journal simply constitutes a prose version of the marching orders for the troops that Bentinck meticulously drafted. It shows the mindset of a man preoccupied with operational difficulties: the condition of the roads, the marching of the troops and the provisioning of supplies. It is apparently devoid of any sense of excitement. One reason for the journal's lack of enthusiasm may be its purpose; as it basically witnessed a conflict between Mary's husband and father, Bentinck may have attempted to make the account devoid of any drama. But the account is not very different in style from that which Bentinck wrote during the Battle of the Boyne.[139] It also lacks a sense of religious fervour. Another diarist, the well-known Huguenot officer Dumont du Bostaquet, for example, felt himself part of a glorious enterprise, and, in his exhilaration, claimed '... que l'on n'a jamais vu marcher une si petite armée si gaiement et avec tant de confiance dans une saison aussi fâcheuse et dans un pays si sujet au changement'.[140] Despite the apparent lack of zeal, Bentinck radiated a clear sense of confidence and purpose: 'Je ne doutte pas que le bon Dieu ne bénisse la cause.'[141]

VI The Revolution (December 1688-February 1689)

Although James had marched his army to the Salisbury plain and a military encounter seemed imminent, he ultimately decided to negotiate with his nephew. On 17 December his commissioners, the Marquis of Halifax, the Earl of Nottingham and Sidney Godolphin were dispatched to Hungerford to meet William. After having presented their credentials, they conveyed the message that James was prepared now to convene a free Parliament. The commissioners then withdrew into another room with a Williamite delegation, consisting of English peers only, not including Bentinck, as some historians have supposed.[142]

In doing so, William clearly signalled his intention not be an interested party, but rather an arbiter.[143] But the atmosphere is best typified, perhaps, by Zuylestein's triumphant exclamation 'that the king sought to capitulate.'[144] William virtually ignored the commissioners' proposals and presented a list of demands,

[136] *RGP 24*, 627; 27 November 1688, Huygens, *Journaal*, I-1, 22-23; Herbert to William 8 December 1688, William to Herbert 20 December 1688, *RGP 28*, 73, 79.
[137] *RGP 24*, 626-634.
[138] Bentinck to Herbert 20 December 1688 (Newbury), Tromer to Bentinck 22 November 1688, *RGP 28*, 58-60, 80.
[139] W.L. Melville, ed., *Leven and Melville Papers. Letters and State papers chiefly addressed to George Earl of Melville, Secretary of State for Scotland, 1689-1691* (Edinburgh, 1843), 459-461n.
[140] *Mémoires d'Isaac Dumont de Bostaquet*, 199
[141] Bentinck to Herbert 22 November 1688 (Exeter), *RGP 28*, 58.
[142] Ashley, *The Glorious Revolution*, 230; R. Beddard, ed., *A kingdom without a king. The journal of the provisional government in the revolution of 1688* (Oxford, 1988), 28; Huygens only notes that the commissioners withdrew to 'Bentinck's room'. 18 December 1688, 20 December 1688, Huygens, *Journaal*, I-1, 38, 41. Cf. 8 December 1688, S.W. Singer, ed., *The correspondence of H.H. Earl of Clarendon and of his brother, Laurence Hyde, Earl of Rochester; with the diary of Lord Clarendon from 1687 to 1690 ... and the diary of Lord Rochester during his embassy to Poland in 1676* (2 vols., London, 1828), II, 210.
[143] Cf. Bentinck to Frederick III 19 December 1688, *RGP 28*, 77.
[144] 11 December 1688, Huygens, *Journaal*, I-1, 33

which were not unreasonable, but hardly negotiable.[145] Although William was aware of his position in control of the situation, the demands appeared to be in line with his declaration and aimed at having a free Parliament.[146]

There was thus a stalemate, but William did not have to force his hand. In the night of 22 to 23 December Bentinck received a letter from the commissioners informing him that James had decided to leave the country, arguably the most crucial event in the Glorious Revolution. The rationale behind his decision was probably more sound than he has been given credit for. Although William's demands had been moderate, with a military and political disadvantage the King was no longer a free agent and his policies were now doomed to fail.[147] It was clear that William aimed at least to be in a position where he could influence foreign policy and the dispensation of offices. Both Bentinck and Zuylestein implied that a power struggle with James was occurring in which William was now in an advantageous position.[148] The possibility of having William as a regent was hardly attractive, and so the King decided to at least retain a free hand. The Prince, for one, was quite pleased with his flight, since it opened a possibility hitherto not seriously considered. It is impossible to know whether William had entertained any hopes for the crown, but ostensibly all his actions until then had been exactly what he claimed them to be: to fulfil his declaration. However, Louis having declared war on the Dutch in November, and William having noticed the indecision and division among politicians, he changed his mind and decided to take full advantage of the possibility James himself had created.

The news of James's arrest in Faversham was brought to Bentinck in the early morning of the 25th of December.[149] William then despatched Zuylestein to safeguard the King, but meanwhile the Lords, having assembled in the Guildhall to temporarily take over the administration, had taken the initiative to have James safely accompanied to Rochester. Zuylestein thus missed James, who had by then returned to London and settled in St James's palace, much to William's displeasure. Pressure now was exerted to induce James to repeat his flight. Lieutenant-General Count Solms was sent to forcibly remove James from his quarters in St James's palace and to escort the King to Ham House officially, for his safety. Quite likely Bentinck sensed it opportune to grant James's request to withdraw instead to Rochester, seeing that he might wish to escape again: 'que l'on creut dabort estre une marque du dessein qu'il avoit de se retirer'.[150] Once in Rochester, James found it easy to leave the country for France, facilitated by the Dutch Guards turning a blind eye. The King being out of the country, William was now effectively in control, the peers having requested the Prince to temporarily take over the administration until a Convention could meet. The period that followed was arguably decisive, and curiously historians have hitherto paid hardly any attention to the Dutch role leading up to the Convention.[151] With the Prince in control of the administration, his main advisers labouring for his elevation and with the Dutch army virtually occupying the capital (the English troops having been ordered to leave the city) a free public debate on the future of the throne was a mirage. The King, now in exile and universally condemned for his supposed foolishness, was probably more farsighted than his subjects who still thought that with a foreign army occupying the city a free Parliament could be established.[152]

At first sight evidence seems to support the idea that William abstained from any interference either before or during the Convention.[153] It is extremely difficult to find any direct evidence of William's intervention, but as early as August 1688 he had intimated to Bentinck that he was particularly reluctant

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[145] *RGP 24*, 24-25.
[146] Beddard, *Kingdom without a king*, 27.
[147] Jones, *The Revolution of 1688*, 309-310; 22 December 1688, Huygens, *Journaal*, I-1, 43.
[148] 5 December 1688, Singer, *Diary of Clarendon*, II, 216-217; 11 December 1688, 18 December 1688, Huygens, *Journaal*, I-1, 33, 39. Cf. Blencowe, *Diary*, II, 281-291.
[149] *RGP 24*, 632-623.
[150] Ibid., 634n.
[151] But see Beddard, *Kingdom without a king*, 65; Israel, 'The Dutch role', 129-130.
[152] Carswell, *Descent on England*, 195.
[153] Burnet, *History*, III, 1380; 30 January 1689, J. Reresby, *Memoirs ... and a selection from his letters*, W.H. Speck, ed., (London, 1991), 546.

(though not unwilling) to grant Parliament the initiative.[154] Given the fact that he was effectively in control, that English politicians made anything but a decisive impression, and that, with the French having declared war and moving their troops to the Dutch borders, a decisive stand was crucial, it is hard to believe the Prince did not play his hand.[155] In fact, a careful reconstruction of the conduct of the Dutch suggests three ways in which William strengthened his position.

Firstly, as Dutch troops swarmed the London streets, the invaders were in effective control of the city and did not allow the least act of interference or criticism. The general mood was, initially, particularly pro-Dutch. Sir John Reresby noted upon his arrival in London that

> '... the streets were filled with ill lookeing and ill habited Dutch and other strangers of the Prince's army. And yet the Citty was soe pleased with their diliverers that they did not or would not perceave their deformity nor the oppression they laid under, which was much greater then what they felt from the English army.'[156]

If the notorious removal of the King from his palace by the Blue Guards was a display of power not to be repeated, Bentinck had on an earlier occasion made it very clear that he would not allow any interference by the English with regard to the conduct of Dutch troops.[157] Such an unbending attitude caused friction; Huygens remarked that the English 'already held a grudge against Bentinck because he had so much authority.'[158] Understandably, there was widespread resentment against Dutch command. It seems, though, that for that very reason William withdrew some of his troops from the City during the Convention. It appears therefore that Jonathan Israel's plausible suggestion that some pressure was exerted by the army's presence cannot be substantiated.[159]

Secondly, although apparently William did not directly influence the elections, throughout December and January the Williamites actively tried to sway public opinion; public prayers and sermons were delivered, Burnet, most notably, presenting the Prince as a deliverer for the Protestant cause, William himself, though shunning crowds, firmly reinforcing that view. On the 10th of February, as the Lords in the Convention fiercely debated William's position, a national Thanksgiving Day was organised.[160] Reresby noted that

> '... the lords that were for conferring the crown immediately upon the Prince, fearing the contrary interest of makeing him only regent, or crowning him in right of his wife, might prevaile, sent some instruments to stirr up the mobile [mob] who came in a tumultuous manner with a petition, offering it both to the Lords and Commons this purpas: to crown both the Prince and Princess of Orang, to take speedy care of religion and property, and for the defence of Ireland'.[161]

Most significant, however, was an active lobbying to confer the crown upon William in which Bentinck was particularly instrumental. There has been much speculation on William's motives, mainly because concrete evidence is scarce and ambiguous. Two sources, however, which have seldom been used by historians, namely the journals of Constantijn Huygens and Nicolaas Witsen in Dutch, provide interesting insights into the mindset and motives of William's Dutch counsellors. With the death of Fagel and the absence of Dijkveld, William now heavily depended on Bentinck's advice.[162] The Prince being hesitant, Bentinck - much more ambitious and tenacious - was the driving force behind his decision to settle for

[154] William to Bentinck 29 August 1688, *RGP 23*, 49.
[155] Cf. Israel, 'The Dutch role', 134-136.
[156] 22 January 1689, Reresby, *Memoirs*, 545.
[157] 5 December 1688, Singer, *Diary*, II, 217.
[158] 8 January 1689, Huygens, *Journaal*, I-1, 57.
[159] Dispatch Witsen 11 January 1689, GA 5027 - 7; Israel, 'The Dutch role', 126 ff.; BL Eg Ms 2717, fo. 426r.
[160] It is the main theme of A. Claydon, *William III and the godly revolution* (Cambridge, 1996); 4 December 1688, Singer, *Diary of Clarendon*, II, 215.
[161] 2 February 1689, Reresby, *Memoirs*, 548-549.
[162] Dijkveld arrived in early January with the Dutch extraordinary embassy. Fagel had died in December.

nothing less than the crown.[163] One aspect of Bentinck's activities was to sound out the opinion of the Williamites themselves. Clearly William's councillors understood the importance of upholding the *Declaration* in public. With regard to the purpose of the expedition, Bentinck had assured Clarendon during a conversation on 4 December:

> '... his Highness had given a sincere account of it in his declaration; and that he had proceeded in pursuance thereof ever since his landing. Though ... there are not ill men wanting, who give it out that the Prince aspires at the crown; which is the most wicked insinuation that could be invented; that though three kingdoms would be a great temptation to other men, yet it would appear, that the Prince perferred his word before all other things in the world, and would pursue his declaration in endeavouring to settle all matters here upon a true foundation.'[164]

Surely Bentinck understood that Clarendon would be satisfied with this statement, but there is reason to believe he was not just being disingenuous. Around that same day William's staff had gathered and discussed the difficulties of the Hungerford negotiations. With regard to the position of the Prince of Wales, an irritated Bentinck had stated, Huygens wrote, that '... we had nothing to do with those things, that all affairs had to be examined by Parliament and that His Highness [William] was to stick to his declaration.'[165] William himself had written to Dijkveld in December that he hoped 'that through a Parliament these realms may be made useful in order to assist our State and her allies.'[166]

The situation had obviously changed after James's flight. Some of William's staunchest supporters were dismayed by his apparent passivity during the Convention, but behind the scenes there was frantic lobbying. When Halifax suggested that William should be offered the crown, Bentinck, according to Burnet,

> 'spoke of it to me, as asking my opinion about it, but so, that I plainly saw what was his own. For he gave me all the arguments that were offered for it; as that it was most natural that the sovereign power should be only in one person; that a man's wife ought only to be his wife; that it was a suitable return to the Prince for what he had done for the Nation; that a divided sovereignty was liable to great inconveniences: and, tho' there was less to be apprehended from the Princess of any thing of that kind than from any woman alive, yet all mortals were frail, and might at some time or other of their lives be wrought on'.[167]

Burnet defended the rights of Mary as well, and the two men discussed the matter until deep in the night, unable to agree. When Bentinck sounded out a circle of Williamites, Herbert furiously rejected the proposal, and next day Bentinck came round and agreed to respect Mary's rights.[168] This lobbying behind the scenes was taken very ill by others as well. Burnet reported that with regard to his authority both Bentinck and the Prince 'spake to a great many upon this subject in a style of such earnestness and positiveness that all this tended to increase the jealousy'.[169] Witsen, as member of an extraordinary embassy, wrote that

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[163] The Prince had written to Waldeck that he did not find the crown appealing: J.K. Oudendijk, *Willem III, Stadhouder van Holland, koning van Engeland* (Amsterdam, 1954), 235-236. But the lobbying had started even before James's actual flight, see Bishop of St Asaph to Bentinck, 17 December 1688, J. Dalrymple, ed., *Memoirs of Great Britain and Ireland etc.* (2 vols., London, 1790), II, 336-337. Cf. Ronquillo to Cogolludo 7 January 1689: '... en un modo u otro' he wrote, 'establecerán en el Príncipe una suprema autoridad', Duque de Maura, ed., *Correspondencia entre dos embajadores, Don Pedro Ronquillo y el Marques de Cogolludo 1689-1691* (2 vols., Madrid, 1951), I, 63.

[164] 4 December 1688, Singer, *Diary of Clarendon*, II, 215.

[165] 12 December 1688, Huygens, *Journaal*, I-1, 34. Cf. William to Danby 12 December 1688 OS, *RGP 28*, 84.

[166] William to Dijkveld 19 December 1688, *RGP 28*. Cf. 12 December 1688, Huygens, *Journaal*, I-1, 34.

[167] Burnet, *History*, III, 1377.

[168] M.E. Grew, *William Bentinck and William III (Prince of Orange). The life of Bentinck, Earl of Portland, from the Welbeck correspondence* (London, 1924), 150-151.

[169] H.C. Foxcroft, ed., *A supplement to Burnet's History of my own time etc.* (Oxford, 1902), 334.

> 'While the Convention was in session, the Prince kept silent, not enticing the members by promises, like many had expected. The 11th [of February] the Prince speaks to Dijkveld in secret, who subsequently speaks with the Lords of the Convention. Still the Prince asks for nothing, neither promises nor threatens, but his friends labour.'[170]

In early February Lord Yester wrote his father the Earl of Tweeddale:

> 'Mr Seymoor told here that he had it from Monsr Beintheine that the Prince was not satisfyed with the restrictions and limitations these were putting upon the crowne and that if it had been left to himself he would have done better and more for theire securitye, this almost fired the house but much more the lords, where it was said by Nottingham that the Prince ought to consider that the Crown of England with whatever limitations was far more then any thing the States of Holland were able to give him.'

When Sidney was despatched to the Prince, the latter 'said such a thing was far from his mind'.[171] The next day Dijkveld had a conversation with Nottingham, who was willing to grant William the power of a regent, but not to make him King. According to Huygens, Dijkveld had replied that there was very little difference between those two.[172] Although Dijkveld reportedly laboured constantly for William's elevation, he seemed more willing to accept a compromise than was Bentinck, who must have persuaded William to ultimately play his hand. Witsen, on various occasions, remarks that Bentinck was the driving force behind the Prince's decision to insist on the sole exercising power:

> 'Dijkveld had arranged for the Princess to be elected next to the Prince, although someone (probably Bentinck) had strongly laboured to have only the Prince elected ... Bentinck and Dijkveld had laboured hard, the former with great vehemence, be it on his own account or not.'[173]

It was William himself, eventually, who forced the situation and informed the Lords of his demand, although he was willing to let Mary be queen. Clearly Bentinck's policy was the one that was adopted. Between December and February William's advisers were divided amongst themselves and making up their minds as events unfolded, which indicates that there had been no specific design for William to claim the crown.

VII Conclusion

By 1688 Bentinck was an experienced soldier and politician and had developed into William's foremost favourite. It was precisely the combination of his experience in various spheres that was particularly useful, and throughout the events Bentinck would emerge as a pivotal figure. In many respects the invasion marked Bentinck's grandest moment, and he became the most important instrument of the Prince. Like Zuylestein and Dijkveld he was involved in the establishment of a secret intelligence network in England, which he gradually took over during the course of 1688. He also became involved in the logistical preparations of the invasion, taking care of food supplies and ammunition and drafting marching orders for the actual embarkation of the troops. He was dispatched on diplomatic missions to Germany in order to muster support and construct an anti-French alliance.

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[170] Dijkveld 'strongly continued the work of the elevation in January', N. Witsen, 'Verbaal', J. Scheltema, ed., in: J. Scheltema, ed., *Geschied- en letterkundig mengelwerk* (6 vols., Utrecht, 1818-1836), III, 135, 139.

[171] Yester to Tweeddale 11 February 1689, House of Lords archives, The Willcocks Collection Section 6.

[172] 12 February 1689, Huygens, *Journaal*, I-1, 80.

[173] Witsen, 'Verbaal', 135, 147, 159-160. 'When the Conditions upon which the Crown was to be conferred upon him were under Debate, Mynheer Benting told some of those he judged most fit to transmit his Master's Mind to the leading Members of his Party, that if they intended to clog the Crown with such Limitations, they little understood the Disposition of the Prince', *The Dear Bargain, or, A true representation of the state of the English Nation under the Dutch. In a letter to a friend*, in: J. Somers, ed., *A third collection of scarce and valuable tracts etc.* (4 vols., London, 1751), III, 253.

If diplomacy and military affairs constituted his core responsibilities, Bentinck was involved in virtually all other aspects related to the preparations. He discussed the size and configuration of the invasion fleet. Together with Dijkveld and Fagel he was engaged in establishing domestic consensus and raising funds. It was perhaps typical that, although Bentinck commented on the text of the *Declaration* and discussed it with William's other advisers, his role in the propaganda campaign was concerned with logistics rather than with contents; he mainly took care of the distribution of pamphlets. Bentinck therefore emerged as William's only confidant to become involved in all aspects of the operation, and would be the only one permanently at his side.

This chapter has yielded two conclusions of wider significance. Firstly, it has shown the importance of paying more attention to William's Dutch confidants and favourites, most of whom have suffered from historiographical neglect. There are almost no modern biographies available of the members of William's foreign entourage.[174] Although William tended to act reasonably independent, he relied more on the advice and support of his closest aides than has hitherto been thought. The activities of extremely able men like Fagel, Zuylestein, Bentinck and Dijkveld contributed in a large measure to the successes obtained. It is also important to see that these men entertained their own ideas about the reasons for the invasion. Although William was perhaps a lukewarm Protestant, as Jonathan Israel has suggested, it is worth paying attention to the fact that to a number of key advisers such as Schomberg, Carstares and most notably Bentinck, religion and liberty were hardly empty phrases.[175] It also appeared significant that William's advisers were not of one mind. Bentinck was a driving but intolerant force behind the Prince, whereas Dijkveld was more prone to make compromises.

A second conclusion is that it is important to study the events of 1688/1689 in an international context. In the spring of 1688 the Dutch were as much focused on Germany and France as on England. Bentinck spent considerable time conducting talks with the German Allies and diplomatically intervening in the Cologne disputes. At the same time he maintained communication lines with the opposition in England. As from June events in Germany and England both dictated the use of force. From then on Bentinck was tirelessly engaged in preparing German alliances and preparing the invasion. This chapter has analysed Dutch strategic considerations in 1688 and placed them within a European framework.

[174] Fagel and Heinsius are only cursorily studied in A. de Fouw, *Onbekende raadpensionarissen* (The Hague 1946). But see A.J. Veenendaal, 'Who is in charge here? Anthonie Heinsius and his role in Dutch politics', in: A.J. Veenendaal and J.A.F. de Jongste, eds., *Anthonie Heinsius and the Dutch Republic 1688-1720* (The Hague, 2002); E. Edwards, 'An Unknown Statesman: Gaspar Fagel in the service of William III and the Dutch Republic', *History*, LXXXVII (2002).

[175] J.I. Israel, 'William III and toleration', in: O.P. Grell, N. Tyacke and J.I. Israel, eds., *From persecution to toleration, the Glorious revolution and religion in England* (Oxford, 1991).

Chapter 3: Power

After William's coronation in April 1689 he was King over three kingdoms and 'eminent head' of a republic. The sheer complexities of William's new wide-ranging prerogatives rested uneasily with his inclination to personally retain control.[1] He had difficulty overseeing and co-ordinating his different realms, and Bentinck emerged as virtually the only advisor to transcend a national perspective. William could consult him in relation to the co-ordination of his realms, rendering his role extremely important. Bentinck had played a material role during the Glorious Revolution and afterwards emerged as a prominent favourite of the King-Stadholder. The re-emergence of the phenomenon of the favourite was not foreseen, and the measure of Portland's personal success and of his usefulness to the King depended largely on his own initiatives. J.R. Jones has described him as the '... mainstay of William's government in its first five years'.[2] This chapter aims to substantiate this claim and estimate the extent of Portland's influence as favourite. It will analyse his influence in William's various realms (England, Scotland, Ireland and the United Provinces). It will also pay attention to the different spheres of his influence at court, in the army, in the diplomatic service and in political bodies.

I The Anglo-Dutch favourite

William had recognised that Bentinck had laboured to make the expedition of 1688 a glorious success - and duly rewarded him. Just before they had embarked from Hellevoetsluis, William had bestowed upon his confidant the county of Leerdam and the baronies of Acquoy and IJsselstein.[3] In England the new King rewarded him with the grant of the country house of Theobalds. Offices and grants were showered upon the favourite after the offering of the crown in Banqueting House. Bentinck was made Keeper of the Privy Purse, Groom of the Stole and First Gentleman of the Bedchamber - for which he received a handsome pension of £ 2,000 per annum - and was allocated apartments in Kensington, Hampton Court and Whitehall, next to those of the King.[4] These were quite spacious; in Whitehall, for instance, he owned some 23 rooms.[5] William created for him an office of superintendency for all the gardens belonging to the royal palaces.'[6] On the 15th of April 1689 Bentinck took his seat in the House of Lords as 1st Earl of Portland, Viscount Woodstock and Baron of Cirencester.[7] As early as January two Dutch competitors for William's favour, Dijkveld and Odijk, noted that his ascendancy excited great jealousies among the English.[8] The ostentatious display of favouritism made Portland the object of scorn and malicious rumours, one popular satire remonstrating that 'Lord Portland takes all'.[9]

Portland was the only Dutchman to receive an English peerage. He was also the only Dutchman who took a real interest in English politics, and the event marked the continuation of his position as William's foremost confidant, but also the re-emergence of the favourite on the English scene. The Duke of Buckingham, the favourite of James I and Charles I, had exerted an influence that Archbishop Laud and the Earl of Strafford never had, let alone the parliamentary managers of the Restoration period. There was another difference. According to Linda Levy Peck, 'By 1659 a paradigmatic shift had taken place in both the position and analysis of minister-favourites, one that focused less on the court and more on the

[1] Cf. J. Carter, 'Cabinet Records for the Reign of William III' *EHR* LXXXVIII (1963), 104; S.B. Baxter, *William III* (London, 1966), 272.
[2] J.R. Jones, *The revolution of 1688 in England* (London, 1972), 325.
[3] Testamentary disposition by William III, 16 October 1688, *RGP 28*, 47.
[4] 11 December 1689, *CTB*, X-III, 329.
[5] H.M. Colvin, ed., *The history of the King's Works 1660-1782 V* (London, 1976), 184; R.O. Bucholz, *The Augustan court. Queen Anne and the Decline of Court Culture* (Stanford, 1993), 316n.
[6] Royal Warrant 1 May 1689, *CTB*, IX-1, 102, cf. 1095-1096.
[7] HMC, *The manuscripts of the House of Lords 1689-1690* (London, 1889), 84; *House of Lords Journals*, XIV, 175.
[8] 8 January 1689, 8 February 1689, Huygens, *Journaal*, I-1, 57, 77.
[9] Qu. in G. van Alphen, *De stemming van de Engelschen tegen de Hollanders in Engeland tijdens de regeering van den koning-Stadhouder Willem III 1688-1702* (Assen, 1938), 230.

state'.[10] Charles II and James II made use of parliamentary managers, such as the Earls of Clarendon, Danby and Sunderland, and counsellors such as Father Petre. Portland's influence can hardly be compared to the degree of monopolisation of power Buckingham achieved, but ostensibly he resembled his illustrious predecessor (with whom he was occasionally compared) as he operated from the Royal Household rather than Parliament, as was the case with the Restoration managers.[11]

Peck's view is in line with a recent historiographical reappraisal of the phenomenon of the favourite that argues that the phenomenon of the favourite had been in decline in Europe as from around 1660 when bureaucracies had been established and the large-scale wars had ended.[12] But the re-emergence of the favourite in England between 1689 and 1712, a period of major changes, rests uneasily with this view. The Earls of Portland, Albemarle to a lesser extent, but certainly Marlborough, played an important role during the last two decades of Stuart England. It is obviously no coincidence that the careers of the two great favourites, Portland and Marlborough, spanned almost precisely the length of the Nine Years War (1688-1697) and the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-1713), Albemarle being far less influential during the interbellum (1697-1702). This phenomenon calls for an explanation. The three favourites operated during a time when three major developments occurred, of which Portland's career represents in some way a microcosm.

Firstly, there were domestic developments as a result of the Glorious Revolution, in particular the rise of Parliament. If Portland started his career as favourite in the Royal Household, his responsibilities would shift towards parliamentary management during the course of the 1690s. The second development was the outbreak of war in 1688, and Portland was deeply involved in military and diplomatic organisation and patronage. The revisionists' argument connects these two developments, as it sees a relation between the wars and domestic developments. It explains why Portland, Albemarle and Marlborough became crucial figures in the connection between the court and the army, all having high military ranks and dominating the King's councils. The third development was the emergence of an Anglo-Dutch union after 1688, and the three favourites would play an important role in the maintenance of the Anglo-Dutch connection. The remainder of this chapter will therefore systematically pay attention to these three aspects typical to the late-Stuart favourites. It will study Portland's role in Scotland, Ireland and England, but also in the United Provinces in order to show his role as Anglo-Dutch liaison. It will pay attention to his increasing involvement in parliamentary affairs. Lastly, it will establish his position as a military and diplomatic organiser.

II Position in England

Having been the Prince's chamberlain, Portland was now First Gentleman of the Bedchamber, of the Stole, but also Keeper of the Privy Purse - the latter office being delegated to his aide, Adriaan van Borssele van der Hooghe.[13] Portland reportedly opposed a parliamentary measure for a separate allowance for the Queen, insisting it should be channelled through the Privy Purse.[14] There are reports of certain irregularities with regard to the use of the Purse, but it is difficult to find out whether these had any foundation.[15] The significance of his new position becomes clear from his instruction, stating that the '... Groom of y^{e} Stole (being by his place y^{e} first Gent of our Bedchamber) hath & shall & ought to have

[10] L. Levy Peck, 'Monopolizing favour; structures of power in the early seventeenth-century English court', in: J.H. Elliott and L.W.B. Brockliss, eds., *The world of the favourite* (New Haven and London, 1999), 66-67.
[11] Elizabeth's favourites also came to power through their position in the royal household. P.J. Hammer, 'Absolute and sovereign mistress of her grace? Queen Elizabeth I and her favourites 1581-1592', in: Elliott and Brockliss, *The world of the favourite*. Cf. L. Levy Peck, 'Monopolizing favour; structures of power in the early seventeenth-century English court', in: Elliott and Brockliss, *World of the favourite*. I am grateful to Dr. Barclay for this suggestion.
[12] J. H. Elliott, 'Introduction', in: Elliott and Brockliss, *The world of the favourite*, 4.
[13] Borssele van der Hooghe, heer van Geldermalsen, 'Gedenkschriften', K. Heeringa, ed., *Archief. vroegere en latere mededeelingen voornamelijk in betrekking tot Zeeland* (Middelburg, 1916), 107.
[14] 20 May 1689, Huygens, *Journaal*, I-1, 128.
[15] 10 June 1694, Huygens, *Journaal*, I-2, 359.

y^e sole & absolute charge Command & Governm.^t under Us, of our old & new bedchambers, y^e great withdrawing room ...' in all the royal houses and palaces. As such Portland supervised the other Gentlemen of the Bedchamber, including Sidney, the Earl of Marlborough and the Duke of Ormonde. The Groom was required to perform menial tasks such as assisting the King with getting dressed, and fetching towels and water.[16] As Groom of the Stole Portland could recommend candidates for a few dozen menial offices at court. Being Superintendent of the royal gardens, he could hire craftsmen and artists, quite often of Dutch origin. Nevertheless, these were not hold the greatest offices at court. Indeed, in terms of patronage, his position at court was certainly not as significant as that of the Master of the Horse, Lord Steward or Lord Chamberlain.[17] Still, the vastness of his clientele predictably incited rumours of nepotism in the bustling coffee houses in the City.[18] In July 1689 Portland and Dorset, the Lord Chamberlain, were accused by the Commons of corruption.[19]

However, his seemingly servile office provided the Groom with unlimited opportunities to converse with the King in private.[20] Portland's own apartments, always adjoining those of the King in Whitehall, Kensington and Hampton Court were seen to be frequently visited by peers, and he was in daily consultation with William.[21] Constantijn Huygens described the long hours the King and Portland spent in his cabinet doing tedious paperwork or discussing matters of importance.[22] Only those of royal blood plus a select few, such as Dijkveld and the Lord Privy Seal, the Marquis of Halifax, were allowed to enter the King's bedchamber.[23] The Privy Room could only be entered with the permission of the Groom of the Stole. But it was really the King's bedchambers to which he regulated access, where the locus of power was situated. Here the King received only a very select company. Portland thus had significant control over who could see the King.[24] He successfully monopolised access to the King to such an extent that even the Secretaries of State had difficulty gaining an audience.[25] According to Ronquillo one could only see the King '... por medio de Bentink, que no hay otro'.[26] One pamphleteer bitterly complained that 'For while [William] was conversent not only Hours, but whole Days together with his Bentincks and Capels, [Scottish delegates] could hardly, in two Months, obtain Access to him.'[27] Unlike his uncle Charles II, who kept an open court at Whitehall, William loathed public attention and was far less accessible to courtiers. Access to the King was even more difficult through the removal of the court out of central London, first to Kensington and later to Hampton Court.

These developments rendered the position of his Groom relatively more important, as William used Portland to shield him from unwelcome petitioners.[28] William was perceived as cold, but Portland was particularly blunt and regarded by many as an obstacle, rather than an intermediary between the political nation and the King. When, for instance, after Mary's death in 1695 William locked himself up in his

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[16] BL Add Ms 61419 A, fo. 1.
[17] Cf. Bucholz, *The Augustan Court*, 66-67. I am thankful to Dr Andrew Barclay for this suggestion.
[18] E.g. Horwitz, *Parliament*, 33, 151-152; D.B. Horn, *The British diplomatic service 1688-1789* (Oxford, 1961), 145; Heemskerck to Portland 30 December 1689, *RGP 28*, 137; N. Witsen, 'Verbaal', J. Scheltema, ed., in: J. Scheltema, ed., *Geschied- en letterkundig mengelwerk* (6 vols., Utrecht, 1818-1836), III, 151.
[19] Dispatch Parent 4 July 1689 NS, AAE CPA 170, fo. 203v.
[20] A. Marshall, *The age of faction, Court politics, 1660-1702* (Manchester and New York, 1999), 26-27; BL Add Ms 61419, fo. 4v. Cf. D. Starkey, 'Intimacy and innovation: the rise of the Privy Chamber, 1485-1547', in: Starkey, *The English Court*, 71-118.
[21] Horwitz, *Parliament, policy and politics*, 89. Cf. 12 December 1690, Huygens, *Journaal*, I-1, 374; Witsen, 'Verbaal', 141.
[22] Horwitz, *Parliament*, 204. E.g. Dalrymple to Melville 23 March 1689, W.L. Melville, ed., *Leven and Melville Papers. Letters and State papers chiefly addressed to George Earl of Melville, Secretary of State for Scotland, 1689-1691* (Edinburgh, 1843), 3-4; 20 March 1689, 25 March 1689, 30 March 1689, Huygens, *Journaal*, I-1, 96, 99, 102 and passim.
[23] Halifax, 'Spencer House Journals'; 9 March 1689, Huygens, *Journaal*, I-1, 91.
[24] BL Add Ms 61419, fo. 9v. Cf. R.O. Bucholz, 'Going to court in 1700: a visitor's guide', *The Court Historian*, V, 3 (2000), 208-209.
[25] Cf. Shrewsbury to Nottingham 3 October 1689, HMC, *Report on the manuscripts of the late Allan George Finch, Esq., Of Burley-on-the-Hill Rutland* (4 vols., London, 1913-1965), II, 252.
[26] Ronquillo to Cogolludo 18 March 1689, Maura, *Correspondencia*, I, 113.
[27] *Whether the preserving the Protestant Religion was the Motive unto, or the End that was designed in the late Revolution*, in: J. Somers, ed., *A third collection of scarce and valuable tracts etc.* (4 vols., London, 1751), III, 448.
[28] Baxter, *William III*, 273.

quarters, these were tenaciously guarded by Portland who refused to let anyone in. When the Marquis of Normanby, a Privy Councillor, came clamouring in demanding to see the King, Portland shouted back and continued to refuse access. Such behaviour gave rise to sinister insinuations as to his role.[29] Pamphleteers were quick to satirise the new situation:

> 'Make room', cries Sir Thomas Duppa:
> Then Bentinck uplocks
> The King in a box,
> And you see him no more till supper!'[30]

There are several reports - though often from hostile sources - of applicants having to bribe their way into an audience with Portland.[31] Exclusion from the inner counsels of the King forced courtiers to solicit sometimes Dijkveld, but mostly Portland, for favours or gaining audiences.

Being essentially an intermediary between the King and the political nation, Portland's communicative skills are worth considering. He could read, write and probably speak English tolerably well. Most of his correspondence is in French, the language he felt most confident in after his native language, and one which few of his peers actively mastered. [32] To George Melville he confided in 1690: 'Je suis bien mari d'estre obligé de vous escrire en francois, Je n'en ay que la langue; je voudrois au lieu de cela pouvoir escrire l'anglois'.[33] Portland went to great lengths, however, to be able to communicate with his contacts in their own language, and his confession was tainted with some false modesty. A document from his hand dated 3 January 1689 is written in near-fluent English. In another draft document from 1688 he switches effortlessly from Dutch to English.[34] A few years later Charles Montagu described his English, with a proper dose of flattery, as 'so just, as you need not change your stile.'[35] In 1696 Portland questioned a number of suspects from the Assassination Plot; his numerous hand-written notes of the complex interrogations are near-fluent with very few idiosyncrasies.[36] Nevertheless, his active command of the language may have initially been insufficient to understand the nuances and intricacies of subtle political discourse, and throughout the 1690s he continued to correspond mainly in French.

Although Portland shielded the King from a multitude of courtiers, it is doubtful whether his position provided him with influence over the King himself. Such rumours certainly circulated at court, many regarding Portland as an authoritarian figure holding some sway over his master. Nicolaas Witsen recorded that according to John Wildman 'the King did nothing without the permission of Bentinck'. At the burgomaster's suggestion that 'maybe he only just takes advice from him', Wildman replied: 'no, we have noticed it ourselves'.[37] Yet most evidence suggests the contrary, nor is there any indication that Portland isolated William and surrounded him with his own creatures. In 1691 Portland effectively prevented two Scottish delegates of an opposing faction from having an audience with the King.[38] However, it is significant that Halifax, William's most influential political adviser in England during 1689, never even mentions Portland in his journals recording his private conversations with the King.[39] It seems that in most cases the King kept up lines of communication with a small circle of confidants over whom Portland had no influence whatsoever.

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[29] Ibid., 321.
[30] W. Walker Wilkins, ed., *Political ballads* (London, 1860), II, 29n. Duppa was Gentleman Usher.
[31] E.g. 30 November 1689, Huygens, *Journaal*, I-1, 206; Earl of Ailesbury, *Memoirs*, W.E. Buckley, ed., (Westminster, 1890), I, 228.
[32] An anonymous writer supposed that he did not understand English: 11 September 1689, *CSPD 1689-1690*, 250; Somers to Portland 14 September 1694, NUL Pw A 1176.
[33] Portland to Melville 22 April 1690 (Kensington), Melville, *Leven and Melville Papers*, 429.
[34] *RGP 24*, 720-721; NUL Pw A 2242
[35] Montagu to Portland 11/21 June 1695, NUL Pw A 936.
[36] NUL Pw A 2462-2519.
[37] Witsen, 'Verbaal', 169.
[38] P. Hopkins, *Glencoe and the end of the Highland War* (Edinburgh, 1980), 266.
[39] Halifax, 'Spencer House Journals'.

It is far more difficult to establish the nature of the relationship between William and Portland behind closed doors. In practice, during the summer of 1689 Portland and William were mainly doing administrative work in the King's closet at Hampton Court. Huygens often caught them working, with the King signing documents and issuing orders to Portland. As the King was overwhelmed by his new responsibilities, a large share of official correspondence was delegated to Portland. In actual fact he creamed off material correspondence from the Secretaries of State, the Earls of Nottingham and Shrewsbury, leaving them to deal with routine matters.[40] In this way as well, then, Portland became a channel to the King even for his own ministers. Although it is possible that William on occasion might have kept information from Portland, as Stephen Baxter has suggested, virtually all matters were freely discussed between the two, and the King often intimated that it mattered not whether correspondence was addressed to him or his favourite.[41] In the spring of 1695 Portland reached the zenith of his influence; the King was in mourning and his favourite was in virtual control for at least several weeks. Correspondence meant for the King was sent to him, and audiences were postponed or cancelled.[42] In 1696 James Vernon wrote to Secretary of State Shrewsbury that he had '... ordered a copy of the information to be sent to the King, which I shall enclose to my Lord Portland, as supposing it ought to be so'.[43] Huygens offered glimpses of what to most courtiers remained invisible. He for instance relates that one evening the King ' ... was having a serious conversation with Solms and Portland, talking solemnly and silently, sometimes staring at each other long without speaking.'[44] Mutual confidence provided an exceptionally solid partnership in which all matters could be discussed, weighed and considered. Nicolaas Japikse has, in this context, with some justification described Portland as William's alter-ego.[45]

Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether Portland was a minister for English affairs or a prime minister, as Japikse has suggested.[46] Halifax had proposed suitable candidates for office (he claimed to have been responsible for the appointment of Shrewsbury and Nottingham) and also advised William to conduct his policy of trimming.[47] Portland had had no visible influence on the creation of the 1689 ministry, although he occasionally intervened to strengthen the court party. When, for instance, the Secretary of State, the hypochondriac Shrewsbury, was inclined to return the seals in the autumn of 1689, Portland was despatched to persuade him to stay in office.[48] Increasingly Portland became involved in recommending and selecting ministers. After Halifax's dismissal in December 1689, the Lord President, the Marquis of Carmarthen, was daily closeted with the King and Portland pending a vacancy for the office of Lord Treasurer.[49] Richard Hill suggested to Sir William Trumbull in 1691 that offices were partly in his pocket, though 'the King has few men of capacity whom he and Lord Portland will trust'.[50] In 1692 Portland interviewed Trumbull for the post of Secretary of State. Thus Portland had no leading role, but an important say in ministerial appointments.[51]

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[40] E.g. Shrewsbury to Portland 22 October 1689, *CSPD 1689-1690*, 298; Horwitz, *Parliament*, 89; P.W.J. Riley, *King William and the Scottish politicians* (Edinburgh, 1979), 5; Portland to Nottingham 6/16 September 1689. Cf. Portland to Nottingham 24 September 1689 (Hampton Court), in HMC, *Finch Mss*, II, 248.

[41] If William withheld information concerning the prorogation of Parliament, it should be noted that he suspected letters were being intercepted; Heinsius to William 14 January 1695, *RGP 23*, 436. Baxter, *William III*, 274-275. Baxter's example refers to a delicate matter involving Albemarle and was atypical. William to Heinsius 20 February 1699, P. Grimblot, *Letters of William III and Louis XIV and of their ministers, etc. 1697-1700* II (2 vols., London, 1848), II, 279.

[42] E.g. Citters to States General 18 February 1695, BL Add Ms 17677 PP, fo. 14r; NUL Pw A 1924-1930.

[43] Vernon to Shrewsbury 24 September 1696, Vernon, *Letters*, 1.

[44] 5 April 1691, Huygens, *Journaal*, I-1, 415.

[45] N. Japikse, 'De Stadhouder en zijn alter-ego', *Handelingen van de maatschappij der Nederlandse letterkunde te Leiden en levensberichten, 1927-1928* (1928).

[46] N. Japikse, *Prins Willem III - De Stadhouder-koning* (2 vols., Amsterdam, 1933), II, 320; Horwitz, *Parliament*, 89.

[47] Carmarthen was formerly the Earl of Danby. Foxcroft, *Halifax*, II, 65, 66; A.B. Browning, *Thomas Osborne, Earl of Danby and Duke of Leeds 1632-1712* (3 vols., Glasgow, 1951), I, 429. Cf. Foxcroft, *Halifax*, II, 110; Halifax, 'Spencer House journals', 206 and passim.

[48] T.C. Nicholson and A.S. Turberville, *Charles Talbot, Duke of Shrewsbury* (Cambridge, 1930), 40-41.

[49] Dispatch Parent 12 December 1689, AAE CPA 171, fo. 302r.

[50] Hill to Trumbull 1/11 October 1691, HMC, *Downshire Mss*, I-1, 381.

[51] Cf. Ch. 4 passim.

Portland's seats in the House of Lords and the Privy and Cabinet Councils - which he retained throughout the remainder of his career - constituted the formal sphere of his political activities.[52] Whereas the Privy Council had lost its central role in the royal bureaucracy, the compact Cabinet Council became the most significant governing body during William's reign. Comprising the consequential officials of state, such as the Secretaries of State and the Lord Keeper, it became the nucleus of the King's ministry, as opposed to the expanding Privy Council which lapsed into being an oversized political sounding board of the nation's grandees. The Cabinet was situated at the top of the bureaucracy, but its influence was always more limited than that of William's inner circle of informal confidants. On the other hand, the apparent servility of the Councillors has sometimes been overemphasised; capable Secretaries of State, such as Nottingham, wielded considerable influence. Moreover, against William's wishes the Cabinet Council became informally established as well during his absence.[53] One can only speculate about the reason for Portland's apparent willingness, against the advice of the Earl of Sunderland, to further expand the Cabinet Council, which between 1689 and 1693 had doubled to some ten councillors.[54]

Portland habitually attended the Privy Council and Cabinet Council sessions, the latter held weekly in Kensington or Whitehall Palace. As early as the summer of 1689 there were complaints that the King put his Dutch confidants in key positions in the Councils, a French agent reporting: 'Dikfelt qui a autant de pouvoir dans le Conseil que Benting dans le Cabinet fit de grandes plaintes icy'.[55] But there is little concrete evidence of Portland playing an important role in the Cabinet Council sessions.[56] The Secretaries' succinct minutes yield only fragments of conversations, and sparse reports mention only an occasional disagreement between Portland and other ministers. Only when William did not attend could Portland claim a pre-eminent position in the Cabinet. During the invasion scare of 1692, for instance, the King sent Portland to London as his representative to take charges of affairs.[57] But normally, both the King and Portland would both attend; clearly the favourite was not representing his monarch as such in the Cabinet.

Portland's role in parliamentary affairs during the 1690s is difficult to establish due to scant evidence. Confronted with the incessant threat of impeachment, he rarely entrusted his thoughts or instructions to paper but preferred to closet with his associates. When Lord Keeper John Somers initiated a correspondence in 1694, Portland insisted that his letters remain strictly confidential. His most significant correspondence with Sunderland, spanning the length of the 1690s, was partially in cipher and his own letters have not been preserved.[58] His minutes of the interrogations after the Assassination Plot have been preserved. There are some notes of a 1692 trial case in the Lords, as well as memoranda from meetings of the Holland States Assembly about William's right to elect magistrates in Dordrecht.[59] Presumably more documents have been lost, as he sometimes took extensive notes during sessions. The proceedings of the Holland States Assembly and the House of Lords are not well documented, and Portland's role in either body remains rather unclear. The limited evidence available shows that Portland would attend when matters vital to the King's interest were at stake, or when he was appointed to special committees to prepare Bills. He attended sessions more frequently after 1692, a development coinciding with the demise of the Court Tories.[60]

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[52] 13 August 1689, N. Luttrell, *A brief historical relation of state affairs from September 1678 to April 1714* (6 vols., Oxford, 1857), I, 568; 'The names of the Lords of his Majesty's most Honourable Privy Council', in J. Somers, ed., *A collection of scarce and valuable tracts etc.* 1st Collection (4 vols., London, 1748), II, 332-333.
[53] Carter, 'Cabinet records', passim.
[54] Sunderland to Portland 19 August 1694, NUL Pw A 1241; Carter, 'Cabinet Records', 113.
[55] Dispatch Parent, 1/11 July 1689, AAE CPA, fo. 218.
[56] E.g. Nottingham's notes of the Cabinet Council meeting in Hampton Court, 1 September 1689, HMC, *Finch Mss*, III, 428-429; Shrewsbury's minutes for 1694 (erroneously referred to as Privy Council minutes) are more complete, in HMC, *Buccleugh Mss*, passim; Carter, 'Cabinet Records', 108.
[57] Cf. Ch. 4.
[58] Somers to Portland 14 September 1694, NUL Pw A 1176.
[59] E.g. NUL Pw A 2382 ff.; BL Eg Ms 1754, fos. 53-54.
[60] The evidence is based on a general tendency in the attendance lists printed in the *House of Lords Journals* XIV-XVI.

There are few occasions when Portland actually spoke in the Lords, and no speeches have been preserved. He was certainly a powerful presence and an unyielding defender of the court. During his few performances in the Holland States Assembly or House of Lords, however, he often heated up conflicts and his confrontational style was not always fortunate. He was probably not a gifted orator, but would intimate the King's wishes to the Court's defenders in the House. Although Carmarthen does not mention Portland as a supporter of the Court in his list, he evidently was.[61] Given his intimate relationship with William, Portland was generally regarded as the King's mouthpiece. Royal instructions were issued by the favourite, and his attitude and remarks in the House of Lords were interpreted as a signal from the King.

Portland had little influence in parliamentary management, which had to be delegated to a seasoned 'chief manager' of native origin. The limitations of Portland's influence were explained to Huygens: '.. That he was not a man who could do the King either service or disservice, having neither considerable possessions nor followers and credit in Parliament'.[62] Halifax, and after 1689 Carmarthen, were far more instrumental and experienced in mustering support in the Houses. Nor did Portland show an inclination to become involved. He once expressed his low opinion of the Commons, which he thought '... will not doe the King's but their own businesse.'[63] But having had some experience in the Holland States Assembly, during the early 1690s the Earl developed an interest in parliamentary management. When William prorogued Parliament in January 1690 he did so without consulting his favourite.[64] But in September 1690 Henry Sidney and Thomas Coningsby provided detailed advice to Portland on how to deal with the House of Commons.[65] In October 1692 Dijkveld introduced to him Jean de Robéthon, a French Huguenot who had come to the Court of Celle. His fluent English and good contacts with MPs rendered him useful, not only to act as a liaison between Portland and the Commons, but also to supply the House with information on French designs and so build up a party that would endorse the logic of William's continental policy.[66] As from December 1692 Portland received reports of parliamentary debates almost daily.[67] In November 1692 an agent supposed he would be able to advise the King in these matters.[68] By then he was actively mustering support among placemen in the Commons. In 1695 he complained to Lexington about his exhausting responsibilities in parliamentary management.[69] When in November 1696 the Bill of Attainder was debated, '... My Lord Portland is very hearty and industrious in this matter, and does not stick to speak to any one my Lord Keeper desires'.[70] By the mid-1690s Portland increasingly gained control over parliamentary management in England through his liaison with his client Sunderland.[71]

III Position in the United Provinces

William's position as Stadholder after 1688 has often been neglected by historians.[72] Indeed, it may be argued that the integration of William's offices is one of the most under-researched aspects of his reign, and its political and decision-making mechanisms remain obscure. Contemporaries as well were baffled

[61] Browning, *Danby*, III, 173-176.
[62] 24 October 1689, Huygens, *Journaal*, I-1, 194.
[63] 12 November 1691, Huygens, *Journaal*, I-1, 513.
[64] William to Portland 7 February 1690, *RGP 23*, 95.
[65] Coningsby and Sidney to Portland 27 September 1690, NUL Pw A 299.
[66] Dijkveld to Portland 26 October 1692, *RGP 28*, 302.
[67] NUL Pw A 2385-2390 and passim.
[68] Letter to Portland 1 November 1692, NUL Pw A 2792.
[69] Portland to Lexington 17/27 April 1695 (Kensington), BL Add Ms 46525, fo. 101r; NUL Pw A 2392.
[70] Vernon to Shrewsbury 30 November 1696, James, *Letters*, I, 89.
[71] E.g. Van Zuylen van Nijvelt to Portland 24 July 1694, BL Eg Ms 1707, fo. 263; Sunderland to Portland 20 June 1693, NUL Pw A 1216; AAE CPA 178, fo. 16r.
[72] Whereas Baxter in his biography still paid attention to Dutch politics after 1688, the two most recent biographers Troost and Claydon virtually ignore this aspect. Baxter, *William III*; A. Claydon, *William III* (London, 2002); Troost, *Stadhouder-koning Willem*.

by the complications of his dual position as Stadholder and King, many British disregarding '... the (in Comparison) contemptible Authority of the Stadtholder of Holland'.[73] The underestimation of this highly influential office needs to be redressed, for it is precisely the combination of the offices of the King-Stadholder that lies at the heart of the 'personal union' between Britain and the United Provinces. Throughout his reign William resided in England, only occasionally visiting The Hague or withdrawing to Het Loo. In order to deal with his stadholderly affairs, he appointed Constantijn Huygens as Secretary for Dutch affairs only.[74] Huygens dealt mainly with routine matters, and increasingly William came to rely on Grand Pensionary Heinsius, who would emerge as one of William's closest confidants in the United Provinces.[75] But it was Portland who became the only Dutch counsellor residing in England with whom William could discuss his affairs in the United Provinces on a daily basis.

As Stadholder William was formally a servant of the States, but in practice he could exert pressure and was in effective control of many of the local and provincial assemblies. Gelderland, Overijssel and Utrecht were securely in his pocket through *regeringsreglementen* (governmental regulations), but this was not the case in the provinces that mattered most, Zeeland and Holland. In Holland in particular his influence varied from town to town and was perhaps weakest in Amsterdam, often his staunchest opponent. A stadholderly clientele had emerged during the 1670s and 1680s in the various provinces and towns, constituting a string of local factions co-operating with the Stadholder.[76] William made use of provincial 'managers'. Utrecht and Zeeland were managed by his confidants Dijkveld and Odijk. Friesland and Groningen were dominated by his relative Stadholder Hendrik Casimir, with whom William was often at odds, but who moved to William's position around 1690. On a lower level a string of regents in key positions in the city councils, provincial and national assemblies and councils complemented an informal clientele of Orangists committed to support William's foreign policy. The limitations of his formal influence were partly overcome through the mobilisation of these Orangist regents and provincial 'managers'. William could not entirely keep his sometimes unruly and corrupt dependants in check nor completely subdue their prevalent mutual rivalry. In the summer of 1689 for instance, the recalcitrant and dissatisfied Frisian Stadholder had formed a temporary alliance with William's equally disgruntled relative, Odijk, to topple Waldeck.[77] Although faction struggle amongst William's favourites was common, it was rarely prompted by diverging views on the central focus and direction of his policy as such. In general they loyally supported his foreign policy and facilitated its requirements.

It is difficult to establish Portland's part in the maintenance of William's clientele. Its infrastructure can only fragmentarily be reconstructed, as scant evidence in the form of correspondence remains. The Earl was a well-informed man. His well-connected secretary Christoffel Tromer provided him with intelligence. He also employed a number of informers in several cities and the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. A few key correspondents notified him of the proceedings in the States Assemblies.[78] In Overijssel Portland's relatives held key positions, and he corresponded frequently with his brother, Lord of Diepenheim. Discerning the lines of communication, however, only partly exposes the nature and impact of Portland's authority. In an important memorandum dated 1692, the French chargé d'affaires, on the advice of d'Avaux, identified a string of Orangist regents in the Holland city councils: Nicolaas Witsen in Amsterdam, Simon van Halewijn in Dordrecht, Willem Fabricius in Haarlem, Jacob Van Zuylen van Nijvelt in Rotterdam, Maas in Leiden, Gerard Putmans in Delft, Bruno van der Dussen in

[73] E.g. Hop to Heinsius 9 May 1690, H.J. van der Heim, ed., *Het archief van den raadpensionaris Antonie Heinsius* (The Hague, 1867), I, 30-31; *A very remarkable Letter from King William III. To his Favourite Bentinck, Earl of Portland, in French and English, together with Reflections thereon*, in: Somers, *Collection*, I, 365.
[74] e.g. 19 February 1689, Huygens, *Journaal*, I-1, 85.
[75] Cf. H. Lademacher, 'Wilhelm III. von Oranien und Anthonie Heinsius', *Rheinische Vierteljahrsblätter* XXXIV (1970).
[76] Cf. S. Groenveld, Evidente factien in den staet. Sociaal-politieke verhoudingen in de 17e eeuwse Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden (Hilversum, 1990), 10-13, on the phenomenon of 'provincial factions'.
[77] Waldeck to William 5 July 1689, *RGP 28*, 119.
[78] Portland to Cuperus 7/17 June 1689 (Hampton Court), *RGP 28*, 115-116; Portland to William 25 January 1690 (The Hague), *RGP 23*, 77.

Gouda, his brother Gerard Van der Dussen in Schiedam, van der Straat in Gorcum, and Brassee in Den Briel. Elaborating on the organisation of this faction, he explained:

> '... Tous ces gens la sont gouvernez de la part du Prince dorange par son grand favori Benting qui depuis trois ou quatre ans, ou peut estre encore depuis plus longtemps a pratiqué a ne fair recevoir aucun dans le gouvernement qu'apres qu'ils eussent [?] fait serment qu'ils feroient et qu'ils executeroient aveuglement tout ce qu'il leur seroit ordonné de la part du Prince dorange, dont on leur a fait signer chacun un acte'.[79]

He certainly overestimated Portland's influence, as men like Witsen were neither in his nor in William's control, nor were Dijkveld or van Zuylen van Nijvelt 'governed' by the favourite. Nevertheless, the memorandum does identify Portland at the pinnacle of the Orangist clientele and is relatively accurate in mapping the configuration of his clientele that was mobilised during the controversy.

Portland, then, had remained entangled in Dutch domestic affairs despite his almost continuous absence. Winter seasons would be spent in England, during summertime he was on campaign in Flanders. Only during the spring and the autumn would he join William during his retreat to Het Loo or stay in The Hague for a few weeks. His role in the attempt to reinvigorate the Orangists in 1690 during the Amsterdam magistrates' affair[80] can partly be explained by their temporary weakness and incoherence, and his position during the remainder of the 1690s cannot simply be extrapolated from this. According to the French chargé d'affaires, Portland's ascendancy can be dated from around late 1688 and continued until at least 1692, suggesting that he managed to sustain his considerable influence. It also suggests that Portland's became more influential after the death of Grand Pensionary Fagel, whose successor Anthonie Heinsius was a weaker politician, often co-operating with Portland.[81] It seems likely that he increasingly withdrew from Dutch politics during the course of the 1690s, as he himself suggested to the temporary Grand Pensionary Michiel ten Hove as early as the spring of 1689:

> 'It appears that the good state of affairs here [in England] shall not leave me much occasion to serve my friends in Holland as a result of my absence, which I hope, however, will not be so continuous as to prevent us from meeting with each other; if one, having reached my age, has to change country, one never forgets the first nor the friends there left behind.'[82]

By the mid 1690s however, the limited evidence that is available still suggests that William's favourites in the United Provinces addressed themselves to Portland. In 1694, for instance, a list for the nomination of Schielandt magistrates was sent to William. His favourite in that area however, Van Zuylen van Nijvelt, sent his recommendations to Portland to discuss with the Stadholder.[83] After Zuylen's death in June 1695 a contest for vacant offices commenced; Portland was beleaguered by requests for favours and offices.[84] He had consistently put Orangists in the Rotterdam City Council. During the ensuing redistribution of favours, those on good terms with Portland and Heinsius emerged successfully.[85] Evidence suggests that both William and Portland increasingly left matters of Dutch politics to Heinsius and the impression is one of the erosion of Portland's influence during the later part of the 1690s. In 1699 the Earl of Jersey believed '... que my lord Portland n'a aucune ressource qu'en [Heinsius]'.[86]

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[79] AAE CPH 158, fo. 139r.
[80] Cf. Ch. 4.
[81] Cf. Ch. 4.
[82] Bentinck to Ten Hove 15/25 February 1689 (Whitehall), *RGP 28*, 128.
[83] Van Zuylen van Nijvelt to Portland 24 July 1694, BL Eg Ms 1707, fo. 263.
[84] Van Hogendorp and Van Beijer to Portland 29 June 1695, NUL Pw A 1902.
[85] J.A.F. de Jongste, 'The 1690's and After: The Local Perspective', in J.A.F. de Jongste and A.J. Veenendaal, eds., *Anthonie Heinsius and the Dutch Republic 1688-1720. Politics, War and Finance* (The Hague, 2002); Van Hogendorp to Portland 15 August 1695, Paisecoeur, Vethuysen, Van Heel and Groeninx to Portland 17 August 1695, NUL Pw A 1903, Pw A 1904.
[86] Jersey to Albemarle 9 June 1699, BL Add Ms 63630, fo. 134r.

IV Position in Scotland and Ireland

Portland also wielded considerable influence in Scotland, one pamphleteer remarking:

> '... Benting, who is the Minion and Darling of our Monarch ... has granted unto him as well as Assumed the whole Superintendency of the Kingdom of Scotland & Governs it intirely by his Creatures, who are the only Persons there Trusted with the Administration, and to whom he give such Measures, in Reference both to the Legislative and to the Excutive Part of the Government in that Kingdom ...'[87]

Already in the spring of 1689 the King had decided to delegate Scots affairs almost entirely to Portland, Burnet later remarking that he 'had that nation once wholly in his hands.'[88] He became the sole channel of communication between Scottish politicians and the King and was regarded as his mouthpiece. Lord Advocate Dalrymple wrote to Secretary of State Melville in April 1689, for example, that he had been told '... that the Earle of Portland should wrytt as from the King'.[89] The favourite regulated audiences and virtually monopolised access to the King. Lord Yester, recognising his importance, anxiously tried to get acquainted with Portland in the spring of 1689 when the court party emerged under the latter's tutelage.[90] The major offices were discussed between Portland and the King, the former being actively involved in the creation and management of the ministry. He invited Melville in April 1689 to come to Hampton Court, his 'advyce being so necessary at this tyme, when places ar to be setled'.[91] In the autumn of 1689 he closeted himself for a long time with the Duke of Hamilton, the Scottish Lord High Commissioner, to discuss his continuation in office and the specifics and limits of his authority.[92] When Hamilton neglected to take his seat in the council in January 1693, pressure from Portland forced the sulking Duke to instantly change his mind.[93] Portland's authority was widely recognised and his patronage often sought. In practice, political appointments were regularly suggested by ministers, after which Portland's endorsement would be solicited, the allocation of offices being dependent upon his recommendation to the King.[94] In 1691 for instance, Hamilton, thanking Portland for his 'favers and civillities', asked him to secure a place for his son at the mint.[95]

Patrick Riley, in his penetrating study on Scottish politics, concluded that 'The power generally ascribed to Portland was not at all exaggerated. As the man "interposed" between the king and the secretaries, he played a considerable part in Scottish administrative adjustments'.[96] Most Scottish politicians recognised Portland as the 'chief manager' of their affairs, but as most deliberations took place behind closed doors and relevant correspondence is scarce, it is difficult to assess the exact nature and extent of his influence. For practical reasons Portland often had to delegate business to his associates, being overburdened with administrative work. From 1690 Portland was annually engaged in military campaigns, but during the winter season he did take time to closet himself with Scottish politicians; when Cockburn had an audience with Portland in February 1695, they talked fully 'both of men and things'[97] When Portland arrived in England from the continent in October 1697, the Scottish Secretary of State James Ogilvy '...

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[87] R. Ferguson, *A brief account of some of the late incroachments and depredations of the Dutch upon the English etc.* (London?, 1695), 21.
[88] H.C. Foxcroft, ed., *A supplement to Burnets history of my own time etc.* (Oxford, 1902), 415. Cf. Riley, *Scottish Politicians*, 5.
[89] Dalrymple to Melville 21 April 1689, Melville, *Leven and Melville Papers*, 13.
[90] Yester to Tweeddale 16 April 1689, House of Lords Archive, Willcocks Collection, section 6.
[91] Dalrymple to Melville 21 April 1689, Melville, *Leven and Melville Papers*, 13.
[92] Hamilton to his wife 18 November 1689, NAS GD 406/1/6587.
[93] Johnstone to Hamilton 27 December 1692, Carstares to Hamilton 28 January 1693, NAS GD 406/1/3816, GD 406/1/3769.
[94] E.g. Johnstone to Carstares 27 May 1693, J. McCormick, ed., *State papers and letters addressed to William Carstares* (Edinburgh, 1774), 184.
[95] Hamilton to Portland 27 May 1695, NUL Pw A 375.
[96] Riley, *Scottish Politicians*, 130.
[97] Cockburn to Annandale 16 February 1695, HMC, *Johnstone Mss*, 73.

had the honour and satisfaction to be with the E. of Portland frequently'.[98] But available time was limited. The Scottish Secretary James Johnstone, for instance, complained during the 1692 crisis that '... I have scarcely had any time of My Lord Portland since he came'.[99] Presumably Portland, having never set foot on Scottish soil, was rather oblivious to the intricacies of Scottish affairs and must have initially leaned on his advisers. In practice most Scots business was handled by William Carstares and the Secretaries of State. These were mainly former exiles who had sought refuge in the Netherlands during the 1680s, including Melville and Johnstone, who had been close associates of Portland's. Johnstone had been involved in Portland's intelligence network as it emerged during 1687-1688. He was close to the Presbyterians but basically a Whig, and one who had occasionally flirted with the opposition forces of 'the Club'. Johnstone's good relationship with Portland can be traced in their extensive correspondence. Portland also worked closely with his predecessor, Melville, and most importantly, Carstares, a Presbyterian minister and chaplain to William. H.C. Foxcroft has described Portland and his associates as a Scotto-Dutch group aiming to uphold a Williamite Court party in Edinburgh, pacify the Highlands and establish a moderate Presbyterian church settlement.[100]

Scottish politicians were advised to occasionally write to Portland, in fact were instructed to do so with regard to important matters. When the Earl of Annandale took office in 1694, Johnstone instructed him to '... writ a letter of compliment to my Lord Portland'.[101] Most of the crucial documents addressed to the King went through Portland's hands.[102] Though Portland insisted on being meticulously informed, he issued his instructions through Carstares and seldom replied directly. Often, requests to Portland were issued via Carstares as well.[103] The reason for this construction was in many respects a practical one. The Duke of Queensberry told Carstares that he '... thought needless to trouble E.P. with a letter, since I know you will comunicate what you think fit of this to him'.[104] On other occasions, he simply did not know where Portland was.[105] The Scottish Secretary James Ogilvy was not even sure whether Portland would appreciate him writing.[106] In practice most routine business was delegated to Carstares, who discussed matters with him. Secretary of State Johnstone for instance once informed Portland that '... I give Mr Carstares a note of some things w^{ch} I hope y^{r} Lordship will gett done'.[107] Occasionally Portland himself would conduct the correspondence, the contents of which would usually be discussed with Carstares beforehand.[108] Portland delegated most business to Carstares but would regularly be informed of matters of importance.[109] Johnstone in particular wrote detailed and lengthy reports about proceedings. Characteristically Portland seldom replied, and instructions were usually channelled through Carstares. Often it seemed that the favourite was evading responsibility, whereas in fact he was merely keeping 'behind the curtain', as Johnstone recognised: 'I writ often rather to other than to your self [Portland] because they'll watch opportunities to show you my letters and to pull you in mind to procure answers'.[110] In 1692 however Johnstone complained to Carstares that 'My Lord P told me at parting not to writ [?] often to him I presume [?] by his not answering that he is resolved not to medle in our

[98] Ogilvy to Carstares 1 October 1697, 5 October 1697, 19 October 1697, 5 November 1697, McCormick, *State papers*, 349-352, 356-358, 361.
[99] Johnstone to Stair 10 May 1692, NAS SP 3, fo. 32.
[100] Foxcroft, *Supplement*, 541.
[101] Johnstone to Annandale 6 December 1694, HMC, *Johnstone Mss*, 67.
[102] E.g. NUL Pw A 2436, Pw A 2442, Pw A 2425 and passim.
[103] Ogilvy to Carstares 27 April 1697, 10 August 1697, McCormick, *State papers*, 298, 329.
[104] Queensberry to Carstares 29 June 1697, ibid., 313.
[105] Queensberry to Carstares 21 August 1697, ibid., 333.
[106] Ogilvy to Carstares 10 December 1695, ibid., 270.
[107] Johnstone to Portland 22 March 1692, NAS SP 3, fo. 16.
[108] Carstares to Melville 26 May 1694, 22 November 1694, 22 November 1694, NLS Ms 3471, fos. 20, 24v, 27.
[109] Johnstone to Lord Chancellor 21 February 1693, NAS SP 3. During Portland's absence on the continent he would receive copies of official correspondence sent to Queen Mary, Johnstone to Carstares 24 May 1693, McCormick, *State papers*, 183.
[110] Johnstone to Portland 27 May 1693, NAS SP 3. Cf. Johnstone to Carstares 1 June 1693, ibid.

affaires.'[111] Riley has noted that often Portland feigned abstention, all the while keeping a tight grip on affairs. To Tweeddale for instance Portland wrote in 1692:

> '… je vous prie destre persuadé que je ne mesle le moins quil m'est possible daffaires que ne font point de mon departement et particulierement de celles d'Ecosse, mais cependant quant le service de sa Majesté, ou le vostre en particulier demande que vous preniez la peine de m'escrire Monsieur, je seraij bien aijse de recevoir lhonneur de vos lettres .....'[112]

Thus Portland emerged as the intermediary between the King and Scottish politicians.

If Portland became a central figure in the government of Scotland, his role in Ireland was less prominent, but he still wielded some influence there. In the autumn of 1690, after the victorious battle at the Boyne, the civil government had taken shape with William's appointment of Charles Porter, Thomas Coningsby and Henry Sidney as Lords Justices of Ireland. Coningsby and Sidney started corresponding with Portland on a frequent basis to keep him informed about events.[113] Portland's political involvement in Irish affairs began with recommendations for prospective candidates for high office in Dublin, discussed in a memorandum he provided for the King. Portland clearly had a say in appointments the King made in the church, army and offices.[114] His political influence in Ireland is even more obscure than his role in Scotland, but titbits of information from his memoranda give an insight into what he may have discussed with the King. In an undated memorandum, possibly from 1690, he wrote:

> 'Porter is al too violent and wants too much to be master, therefore his recommendation should not be followed, and as Chancellor he should not recommend councillors nor judges ... Duke of Ormond, Fitzpatrick and others want to recommend all men to sustain their interest ... MLS [My Lord Sidney?] warns that many who stayed with King James until the end still hold political office and make friends in England to be employed again.'[115]

His mediation was sought by the Lords Justices who recommended men for office.[116] Portland discussed with the King the distribution of offices in Ireland, but his main concern was the campaign.[117] Not surprisingly, the Secretary-at-War for Ireland, Sir George Clark, was appointed and kept in Ireland at his recommendation, and together with the commander-in-chief, the Duke of Schomberg, and the generals, Solms and 's Gravenmoer, Portland planned the Irish campaign. Portland continued to function as the channel of communication between the military and the King.[118]

V Position in the army and diplomatic service

Indeed, Portland's military role was an important one. Baxter has described William's control of the allied armies as the core of what he perceived as a Dual Monarchy.[119] Unsurprisingly, William's closest confidants almost all had military ranks. The Prince of Waldeck, commander-in-chief of the Dutch army, was a long-time confidant, as was the Duke of Schomberg, his son the Duke of Leinster and Baron Ginckel, who were in command of the armies in Ireland and England.[120] The overlapping political and

[111] Johnstone to Carstares 22 April 1692, ibid.
[112] Portland to Lord Chancellor of Scotland 23 March/3 April 1692 (Het Loo), NLS Ms 14407, fos. 178-179.
[113] Portland to Schomberg 21 August 1689 (Hampton Court), Coningsby to Portland 21 September 1690, Sidney to Portland 24 September 1690, NUL Pw A 1126, Pw A 298, Pw A 1321. Cf. NUL Pw A 2074.
[114] Sidney to Portland 24 September 1690, 25 September 1697, NUL Pw A 1320, 1321.
[115] NUL Pw A 2074.
[116] E.g. Sidney to Portland 18 October 1690, NUL Pw A 1326.
[117] NUL Pw A 2074.
[118] HMC, *Manuscripts of F.W. Leyborne-Popham Esq.* (London, 1899), 171, 175.
[119] Baxter, *William III* , 280 ff.
[120] Cf. Ch. 1.

military responsibilities of William's favourites also suggests that any analysis of 1690s politics should take into account the extent to which the political arena had been militarised. Parliament voted millions of pounds each year for the army that had become a state within the state. Portland built up an interest at the apex of the military establishment. Men like Leinster, Galway and Ginckel all exerted some political influence, but it was Portland who seemed to personify the superiority of the military interest over politics.

Portland was an experienced soldier and had seen numerous battlefields in the Dutch War. During the invasion of 1688 he had undertaken a reconnaissance mission on the Salisbury plain. In 1690, on the eve of the Irish campaign, Portland had been appointed lieutenant-general, and he joined Schomberg's assault on the Jacobite army behind the Boyne. In 1692 he was sent out on a reconnaissance mission with 2,000 cavalry to observe the enemy.[121] That same year he took part in the battle of Steenkerken, and in 1693 he was wounded at the battle of Neerwinden.[122] On certain occasions he had been delegated operational command. In the autumn of 1692, for instance, Portland was ordered by the King to initiate an attack on Dunkerque after the abortive attempts to launch a descent on the French coast. William had unsuccessfully engaged the French near Steenkerken. An alternative plan was worked out by Carmarthen to use the troops from England, meant for the descent, for an attack on Dunkerque. Portland was eager to take up the idea, and William had put him in charge of the operation.[123] He would also advise the King on a tactical level. When William's main army was expected to engage in battle in the summer of 1694, as Portland notified Shrewsbury, both he and the Secretary advised a defensive stance. Though advisable from a military perspective, the 1694 defensive strategy was politically undesirable and could harm William's reputation, and it was Portland's responsibility to warn the King about the political implications.[124]

Indeed, Portland was not just a military officer, but also a politician. He never distinguished himself on the battlefield and his appointment as lieutenant-general was a political one inasmuch as William put some of his closest aides in high military positions. It is difficult to estimate to what extent he was responsible or was merely executing orders from William, who kept a close eye on military affairs. Probably his true position lay between those two extremes. Essentially a staff officer, his role was well described by the Duke of Schomberg who referred to Portland in 1689 as '... the secretary to write all' concerning military matters.[125] Portland emerged as the pivotal figure in military correspondence, creaming off the most relevant correspondence and leaving Secretary-at-War Blathwayt and the Secretaries of State dealing mainly with routine business.[126]

Before the start of the campaign its practical implications would be worked out with the military commanders, usually at Het Loo. The sketchy character of Portland's memoranda suggests that they may very well have been drawn up during discussions with the King in his closet. Huygens once entered the King's closet during the evening: 'Bentinck handed him a letter or two, and I saw that there was some mighty serious conversation concerning these, sometimes with long silences'.[127] One instruction for Solms gives an idea of how such talks may have transpired. It was written in an unknown handwriting,

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[121] HMC, *Manuscripts of the Rt. Hon. Viscount de L'Isle etc*. (London, 1966), VI, 544; *RGP 24*, 628; Melville, *Leven and Melville papers*, 459-461n.

[122] E.M. Thompson, ed., *Correspondence of the Family of Hatton, being chiefly letters addressed to Christopher, first Viscount Hatton. A.D. 1601-1704* (2 vols., London, 1878), II, 194; 27 July 1693, Luttrell , *Brief historical relation*, III, 146; Bertie to Lindsey 27 July 1693, HMC, *Manuscripts of the Earl of Ancaster* (Dublin, 1907), 35; Sunderland to Portland 28 July 1693, Frederick I to Portland 29 August 1693, NUL Pw A 1224, Pw A 427.

[123] William to Portland 10 September 1692, *RGP 23*, 172 ff.

[124] Shrewsbury to Portland 10 July 1694, NUL Pw A 1376; Portland to Shrewsbury 26 July 1694 NS (Camp of Mont St André), HMC, *Buccleugh Mss*, I-1, 101.

[125] Qu. in J. Childs, *The British army of William III 1689-1702* (Manchester, 1987), 25.

[126] Portland to Nottingham 6/16 June 1689 (Hampton Court), 26 July/5 August 1689 (Hampton Court), HMC, *Finch Manuscripts*, II, 212, 229; Childs, *The British army*, 25; Buchan to Nairne 5 September 1689, Melville, *Leven and Melville Papers*, 271; Portland's memorial of 29 March 1690, *RGP 28*, 160-161; *CSPD 1690-1691*, 214; R.A. Preston, 'William Blathwayt and the evolution of a royal personal secretariat', *History* February/June (1949), 32, 34.

[127] 1 July 1689, Huygens, *Journaal*, I-1, 148; e.g. NA SP 8-6, fo. 172r; NA SP 8-8 fos. 85, 91.

and was probably prepared by one of Portland's aides. The document has corrections in Portland's own handwriting, and was presumably thereafter discussed with the King.[128] After such a discussion, the King would take a decision and issue an instruction to his confidant, or order him to write to the Secretary of State. Portland would subsequently draw up memoranda stating the disposition of troops and their proposed movements.[129]

Portland's main tasks included the gathering of intelligence and logistic preparations for military campaigns, in which he had gained ample experience during the invasion of 1688. He had considerable logistical responsibilities, as is reflected by the wealth of plans, statistics and maps in his personal archive. A lengthy memorandum in Portland's handwriting - a complete strategic plan for an assault on Dunkerque in September 1692 - reveals him taking detailed care of every aspect of the operation. It included marching orders for Allied battalions taking part in the military operation. Ships had to be employed to transport part of the army. It also contained detailed instructions about the provisioning of supplies, such as ammunition and bread. Lastly, it revealed strategy for the operation and the co-ordinated moves of the navy and army.[130] When Portland was in The Hague during springtime he would be involved in the preparations for the continental campaign. In 1690 he was involved in the hiring of troops from Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel and Brandenburg.[131] He was also engaged in lengthy conferences with Waldeck on the management of the Congress in The Hague, and with Antonie Alvarez Machado on forage.[132]

Thus Portland developed into a pivotal military secretary to the King. A continuous flow of intelligence informed him of the overall strength of troops in Ireland, England, Scotland and on the continent, and his task was to inform the King about this. He provided William with diagrams and tables on the number of battalions and their disposition, and made proposals for reforms when necessary. Portland's memoranda often contained lists of available regiments, and suggestions on where to move them. In a draft from 1690 options are discussed to reduce or augment the number of soldiers within each battalion. Portland also gathered additional information on naval matters from various sources.[133] Increasingly, also, he established his own network of correspondents who supplied him with intelligence. Lexington, the British ambassador in Vienna, for instance, sent him private letters on strategic decision-making by the Imperialists with regard to Piemont and the Rhine frontiers.[134] Furthermore, he was kept informed of enemy movements and strength – either a complete overview or a tactical situation - and based on his intelligence strategic alternatives could be discussed.[135] This intelligence also qualified him to be one of the King's key advisers. Although William took ultimate responsibility, overall strategy would be discussed with Heinsius, the Secretaries of State and William's key advisers such as Dijkveld and Portland during winter season.

Another responsibility was Portland's role as a liaison. One task was to maintain contact between William and the commanders of Allied armies, such as Max Emanuel, Louis of Baden and the Prince of Vaudemont.[136] This constituted the bulk of the co-ordinating correspondence, though at times William himself would contact the commanders as well. Within the Anglo-Dutch army, the King would often communicate orders to his commanders, such as Galway or Leinster, through Portland.[137] Portland also maintained a correspondence with the Allied leaders such as the Elector of Brandenburg and the Celle minister Bernstorff.[138]

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[128] Instruction for Solms, *RGP 28*, 308-309.
[129] E.g. NA SP 8-17, fos. 17-30 and passim.
[130] NUL Pw A 2393.
[131] J. Childs, *The nine years war and the British army 1688-1697: The operations in the Low Countries* (Manchester, 1991), 137.
[132] Waldeck to William 14 February 1690, P.L. Müller, *Wilhelm III. von Oranien und Georg Friedrich von Waldeck. Ein Beitrag zur geschichte des Kampfes um das Europaischen Gleichgewicht* (2 vols., The Hague, 1873), II, 211.
[133] Wharton to Portland 13 July 1694, Beckman to Portland 31 October 1695, NUL Pw A 1587, Pw A 50.
[134] E.g. NUL Pw A 1311-1312.
[135] E.g. NUL Pw A 1292, Pw A 2393-2420.
[136] NUL Pw A 30-42, Pw A 43-49, Pw A 725-823.
[137] NUL Pw A 1097-1118, Pw A 1129-1135.
[138] NUL Pw A 131-147, 421-43.

Portland was also in control of civil-military affairs in Scotland. Due to the December 1691 settlement the pacification of Scotland could be undertaken and troops would become available for the new campaign on the continent. Until all of the Highland chiefs had been subdued, however, troops would still be necessary there. During the winter of 1691/1692 Portland was overseeing the troop movements around Inverness.[139]

As part of his role as liaison between England and the United Provinces, Portland was instrumental in the co-ordination of movements of the Dutch and English fleets. Normally, when the King would leave for Holland in the spring, he was accompanied by Portland who organised naval conferences in The Hague, attended by Heinsius, Blathwayt and De Wildt on the co-ordination of the Anglo-Dutch fleet in the Channel.[140] The latter, Secretary of the Amsterdam Admiralty, mainly managed naval affairs whereas in England the Secretaries of State were responsible. Nottingham in particular took a keen interest in naval matters, and maintained a voluminous correspondence with Portland.[141]

Portland kept up a correspondence with most of the army commanders. When Schomberg, 's Gravemoer and Solms were sent to Ireland in the summer of 1689, instructions were issued via Portland, and they in turn were instructed to keep Portland informed.[142] Often these merely conveyed royal wishes, but on other occasions he seemed to have scope for initiatives. His correspondence concerning the Irish campaign clearly shows that Portland was independently issuing instructions and opinions.[143] During the Irish campaign of 1691 he was giving orders and tactical instructions to Ginckel. In 1692 he discussed strategy with Secretary of State Nottingham, and he began to take a more detailed interest in the conduct of his Whig successors, John Trenchard and the Duke of Shrewsbury. They commenced a correspondence on naval affairs and how best to co-ordinate Dutch and English fleet movements.[144] The Secretaries of State after Nottingham were certainly more servile characters and were more prone to follow instructions.

Thus by the mid-1690s Portland had encroached upon the more important military correspondence of the Secretaries of State and War. Past historiography has underestimated his importance, and focused more on John Churchill, Earl of Marlborough, during the early years of the war - one historian even speaking of 'Churchillian policy'. This is based upon a complaint by Schomberg that 'My Lord Churchill proposes all' concerning military affairs.[145] But Schomberg referred mainly to Marlborough's role in the Irish campaign, and it is by no means certain that his role in other spheres was comparable. Indeed, it was the very lack of influence that prompted him to launch an assault on William's foreign generals in 1692. Portland was less conspicuous but essentially more influential in the shaping and executing of royal military policy. It was ultimately Portland who discussed matters with the King on a day-to-day basis and he was influential in the highest appointments. In 1690, for instance, he recommended Sir Richard Haddock for admiral. The generals Count Solms in particular was a close associate of Portland's, and Baron Ginckel was sometimes receiving favours.[146] Clarke hoped to replace William Blathwayt as Secretary-at-War, but claimed that Portland sustained Blathwayt's position.[147]

Arguably the army was the main concern of the King-Stadholder and consequently of his favourite. In fact, the vast bulk of Portland's (and later Albemarle's) tasks was in some way connected with the army.

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[139] NUL Pw A 2435.
[140] E.g. Minutes of the proceedings of the Lords Justices, 27 May 1695 in *CSPD 1695.*
[141] NUL Pw A 1869-1873. Cf. Nottingham's correspondence in HMC, *Finch Mss.*
[142] E.g. NUL Pw A 2365-2375, 463-468, 2312-2313.
[143] E.g. Portland to Nottingham 20/30 June 1692 (Camp de Mesle), HMC**,** *Finch Mss*, IV, 246-247.
[144] E.g. Trenchard to Portland 13 June 1693, 23 June 1693, 27 June 1693, 29 May 1694, 15 June 1694, 13 July 1694, NUL Pw A 1410-1412, Pw A 1422, Pw A 1424-1425; Shrewsbury to Portland 1 January 1695, HMC, *Buccleugh Mss*, II-1, 169; minutes of the proceedings of the Lords Justices 31 July 1696, *CSPD 1696*, 312. This practice had begun during the Nottingham administration, cf. Portland to Nottingham 5/15 May 1691 (The Hague), Nottingham to Portland 12 May 1691, 5 June 1691, Nottingham to the officers of the Ordnance 27 February 1691, HMC, *Finch Mss*, III, 16-17, 48-49, 58-59, 98-99.
[145] M. Glozier, *The Huguenot Soldiers of William of Orange and the Glorious Revolution of 1688. The Lions of Judah.* (Brighton, 2002), 113.
[146] E.g. Portland to Ginckel 4/14 October 1690 (Kensington), *RGP 28*, 187; H. Horwitz, *Revolution Politicks. The career of Daniel Finch, second Earl of Nottingham 1647-1730* (Cambridge, 1968), 108.
[147] HMC, *Leyborne Mss*, 171, 175.

William, through his favourite, was able to keep control over the army to a larger extent than has hitherto been suggested. Portland was involved in the mobilisation of human and financial resources needed for the campaigns in Scotland, Ireland and Flanders, and it is highly significant that the King's favourite was mainly concerned with these matters during the first two years of William's reign.

Diplomacy was another sphere directly related to the war in which the favourite was involved. Portland's diplomatic activities moved in both the formal and informal spheres. The Secretaries of State were handling the day to day diplomatic business, and were certainly not completely marginalised when dealing with foreign affairs. Their roles depended rather on their political significance.[148] Portland's contact with regular envoys was infrequent, and he only made active use of the envoys in specific cases. This was not always understood by diplomats themselves. John Methuen, envoy in Lisbon, reported his audience with the Portuguese King in 1693 to Portland, but George Stepney, envoy to the Empire, had a series of letters unanswered until Portland reprimanded him and made clear that he was to receive instructions from the Secretaries of State and the Secretary-at-War.[149] To Heemskerck, the Dutch envoy in the Empire, Portland explained that he did not have time to maintain a regular correspondence with diplomats. Heemskerck supposed that Portland would receive copies from his letters to Blathwayt.[150] What seems clear is that Portland managed William's informal network of correspondents. When Heemskerck by-passed the ordinary channels of communication and wrote directly to the King concerning a matter that required secrecy, he was reprimanded by Portland, who gave him to understand that all such correspondence to the King was to be addressed to himself.[151]

Appointments were normally made with Portland's consent. Danckelmann, the Brandenburg first minister, asked to have Stepney as a resident and turned to Portland for his approval.[152] Stepney himself approached Portland's secretary, Jacob van Leeuwen, and wrote to Portland directly, complaining about his 'amphibious' character and asking for his patronage and a settled position.[153] When Abraham Kick, consul in Rotterdam, wanted clarity about his position, he wrote to Blathwayt and Secretary of State Trenchard, but indicated that Portland was ultimately responsible.[154] Francisco Schonenberg, the Anglo-Dutch diplomat in Madrid, considered himself a client of Portland's.[155]

A portion of the more important diplomatic correspondence went through Portland's hands, but his informal correspondence with envoys was of more significance.[156] To fully reconstruct Portland's network is problematic, not only because of its secretive nature but also because a substantial part of his archive was lost during the eighteenth century.[157] Part of his network consisted of secret agents engaged in counter-espionage activities. From early 1693, an anonymous agent was stationed in Paris providing him with a steady flow of intelligence of varied value. Evidence suggests that he may also have been part of Portland's intelligence network in 1688.[158] Strictly in the diplomatic sphere were a string of clients who informally corresponded with him. Coenraad van Heemskerck had been a long-time confidant and kept in contact with Portland during his missions to the Empire. Portland's client in Berlin was the Dutch envoy Johan Ham with whom he continued to correspond during the 1690s. In Vienna it was Robert

[148] See his correspondence in HMC, *Finch Mss*; e.g Portland to Shrewsbury 6/16 September 1694 (Camp of Rousselaer): '... Mr. Blathwait n'en a auquune cognoissance', HMC, *Buccleugh Mss*, II-1, 128.
[149] A.D. Francis, *The Methuens and Portugal, 1691-1708* (Cambridge, 1966), 54; Portland to Stepney 12/22 July 1694, NA SP 105-82, fos. 225-226. Cf. Preston, 'William Blathwayt', 36-37, 39, 42.
[150] Portland to Heemskerck 10 July 1692 (Camp de Genappe), Heemskerck to Portland 3 August 1692, NA 1.02.01/83.
[151] Portland to Heemskerck, 21 December 1694, NA 1.02.01/176.
[152] Stepney to Blathwayt 21 March 1693, NA SP 105-58, fos. 85-86. For Portland's involvement in diplomatic matters see, for example, Heinsius to Portland 30 January 1693, NUL Pw A 1915.
[153] Stepney to Strafford June 1694, Stepney to Portland 20/30 July 1694, NA SP 105-54, fos. 32, 47r.
[154] Kick to Trenchard 12 November 1694, NA SP 84-223, fo. 51r.
[155] E.g. Schonenberg to Portland 26 May 1695, NA 1.02.04/7.
[156] Cf. Heemskerck to William 21 November 1694, NUL Pw A 551.
[157] See Japikse's explanation in the introduction of *RGP 23*, xxix ff.
[158] NUL Pw A 2804-2860. The formula of the letters was similar, i.e. they appeared to be trivial letters but there was an appendix in invisible ink with important information. The letters were also sent to undercover addresses. One of the aliases, Bonnet, was actually used for Portland in 1688. (NUL Pw A 2804). Cf. Ch. 2.

Sutton, Baron Lexington, with whom Portland established a crucial line of communication, marginalising Stepney. Similarly, Van Citters was sidelined in London and it was envoy extraordinary Jacob Hop, a trusted aide of William, who was doing the real work.[159] Only fragments of evidence remain of his direct contact with Francisco Schonenberg, William's representative in Madrid.[160] Amerongen, on Portland's suggestion despatched as envoy to Copenhagen.[161] Portland also maintained contact with foreign ambassadors, such as Gabriel Oxenstierna, the Swedish ambassador in The Hague.[162]

Consequently, Portland stood at the axis of formal and informal Dutch and English intelligence and diplomatic networks. A number of these correspondents provided Portland with an alternative flow of intelligence outside the formal channels which ultimately through him reached the King.[163] Portland's influence in these matters reached a zenith in early 1695. As the King was in mourning, evidence suggests that Portland dealt with the bulk of diplomatic correspondence directed to the King.[164] He considerably strengthened his already influential position as intermediary between The Hague and London through correspondence with Heinsius, which from January 1695 came through his hands. This emerging political liaison would only become closer and illustrates the extent of his influence by 1695.[165]

VI Portland and Albemarle

'The government of seventeenth-century England was personal monarchy', Kevin Sharpe wrote, warning not to 'underestimate the power of the king's person'.[166] Indeed, before proceeding to analyse the favourite's political influence, it is vital to pay attention to the relationship between William and his favourites, as the ultimate source of the favourite's influence remained the King's personal good will. One man to foresee the coming of an Anglo-Dutch favourite was Burnet. To Clarendon he confided in December 1688 ' ... that Bentinck was an old servant, was bred up with his master, and had much of his kindness; but, if it pleased God to bless the Prince, Bentinck would not be in the station of a favourite minister.'[167] Competition for William's favour was severe among his Dutch confidants, but most contestants quickly receded. William's relative Zuylestein, for instance, told Huygens that

> 'he had no pretensions to have any part in the grand deliberations. That in England it was customary that the Favourites and Counsellors were accused and punished if the King had done wrong. That he would not care whether the Prince would make him a Lord, unless it was to make him serviceable in Parliament.'[168]

Neither Dijkveld and Odijk, two of William's closest veteran advisers who came to London on a special embassy in the spring of 1689, received office nor a peerage, and they returned to the United Provinces in the autumn, where they remained influential in provincial management. Reportedly Odijk had been highly

[159] G.N. Clark, 'The Dutch missions to England in 1689', *EHR* XXXV (1920), 540 and passim.
[160] E.g. Schonenberg to Portland 18 July 1696, NUL Pw A 1137.
[161] Amerongen to William 28 March 1690, *RGP 28*, 158.
[162] Portland to William, 22 February 1690, *RGP 23*, 114.
[163] E.g. Gortz to Heinsius 13 January 1694 NS, Heemskerck to Heinsius 12 March 1695, 6 April 1695, G. von Antal and J.C.H. de Pater, eds., *Weense gezantschapsberichten van 1670-1720* (2 vols., The Hague, 1929-1934), I, 561, 590, 594.
[164] E.g. Heinsius' letters to William, NUL Pw A 1924-1930.
[165] NUL Pw A 558-628, 1915-1991.
[166] K. Sharpe, 'The image of virtue: the court and household of Charles I, 1625-1642', in: D. Starkey et. al., *The English Court: from the Wars of the Roses to the Civil War* (London and New York, 1987), 226.
[167] S.W. Singer, ed., *The correspondence of H.H. Earl of Clarendon and of his brother, Laurence Hyde, Earl of Rochester; with the diary of Lord Clarendon from 1687 to 1690 ... and the diary of Lord Rochester during his embassy to Poland in 1676* (2 vols., London, 1828), II, 217.
[168] 30 January 1689, 14 March 1689, Huygens, *Journaal*, I-1, 70-71, 93. Cf. 'Monsieur de B.', 'Mêmoires ... ou anecdotes, tant de la cour du prince d'Orange Guillaume III, que des principaux seigneurs de la République de ce temps', F.J.L. Krämer, ed., *BMNG* XIX (1898), 93.

dissatisfied.[169] William's relative Ouwerkerk was given the important Mastership of the Horse, but notwithstanding his enmity to Portland he did not seem to consider himself a competitor.[170] In fact, most Dutch kept a low profile at court. Perhaps Portland's greatest rival was Henry Sidney. According to Burnet, William's favour was initially equally divided between the two, but Sidney soon disappeared into the background.[171] The Spanish Ambassador Pedro Ronquillo wrote in March 1689 that the '... primer Gentilhombre de la Cámara [es] Mr. Bentink, su [William's] valido.'[172] By the late spring of 1689 Portland remained William's undisputed favourite.

In fact, it was not until around 1695, at the zenith of his influence that, for the first time since 1689, a serious challenge to Portland's position as favourite came in the form of a persistent rival, Arnold Joost van Keppel. Perhaps the most neglected English favourite, his somewhat opaque career is overshadowed by those of his predecessor and successor, Portland and Marlborough.[173] Twenty years Portland's junior, the dashing courtier, descended from Gelderland nobility, made his early career in the King's service as page and Groom of the Bedchamber. He came to William's attention at a hunting party where the latter took a liking to him. In 1695 his career accelerated and he received more material tokens of the King's favour. In May he was promoted to the Mastership of the Robes, instead of Zuylestein who was made Earl of Rochfort, the third Dutchman to receive a peerage.[174] William also gave Keppel the means to buy the estate of Voorst in Gelderland and lay out elaborate gardens.[175]

Keppel had regular access to the King and was employed to handle routine military correspondence.[176] The young favourite took over some Dutch correspondence and gradually marginalised Constantijn Huygens. But he also started to encroach on the responsibilities of Portland, whose favour according to one witness '... was in decline, from this and other things, that [William] had ordered Portland to do some business, in which he had failed, but in which Keppel had succeeded.'[177] During Portland's mission to England in August 1696, Richard Hill remarked to the Duke of Shrewsbury that '... Baron de Keppel ... needed not the absence of my Lord Portland to be the first minister here.'[178] Burnet thought his success 'quick and unaccountable', but James Vernon considered him '... a fine gentleman [who] deserves the favour he is in'.[179] Part of Keppel's success can be attributed to those personal qualities which Portland did not possess. The latter could be a polished courtier; one witness - a man in fact distrusted by the favourite - noted he 'treated me with abundance of respect and civility, so that if there be anything concealed within, he has a greater command of countenance than I can perceive'.[180] However, most observers found him haughty and tactless, whereas Keppel was an affable and easy-going courtier. Portland intensely disliked his new rival and resented the favour increasingly granted Keppel. Huygens noted that the two favourites were 'as fire and water against each other.'[181] On their way back from a visit from Cleves in the autumn of 1696,

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[169] 'Monsieur de B.', 'Mêmoires', 113; H. Horwitz, *Parliament, policy and politics in the reign of William III* (Manchester, 1977), 19-20.
[170] Alphen, *De stemming van de Engelschen*, 86.
[171] 'The King's chief personal favour, lay between Bentinck and Sidney', G. Burnet, *History of his own time* (6 vols., London, 1725), IV, 8.
[172] Ronquillo to Cogolludo 4 March 1689, Duque de Maura, ed., *Correspondencia entre dos embajadores, Don Pedro Ronquillo y el Marques de Cogolludo 1689-1691* (2 vols., Madrid, 1951), I, 100.
[173] But see M. Kerkhof, 'De carrière van Arnold Joost van Keppel na de dood van Willem III', *Virtus* V-I (1998).
[174] Saunière to States General 17 May 1695, BL Add Ms 17677 PP, fo. 261r.
[175] J.D. Hunt and E. de Jong, eds., *The Anglo-Dutch garden in the age of William and Mary. De gouden eeuw van de Hollandse tuinkunst* (London and Amsterdam, 1988), 193.
[176] E.g. Carasa to Keppel 2 January 1692, Stratmann to Keppel 24 February 1692, Nassau-Saarbruck to Keppel 12 April 1696, Keppel to Marlborough 20 July 1696, BL Add Ms 63629, fos. 17-21, 45-46, 51-52.
[177] 28 April 1694, Huygens, *Journaal*, I-2, 337.
[178] Hill to Shrewsbury 10/20 August 1696, HMC, *Report on the manuscripts of the Duke of Buccleugh and Queensberry* (London, 1903), II-1, 380.
[179] Vernon to Stepney 26 August/5 September 1694, NA SP 105-82, fos. 235-236; Burnet, *History*, IV, 429.
[180] Kingston to Trumbull n.d. 1695, HMC, *The manuscripts of the Marquess of Downshire preserved at Easthampstead Park Berkshire, Papers of Sir William Trumbull* (London, 1924), 601.
[181] 25 February 1693, Huygens, *Journaal*, I-2, 176.

> '... there happened a quarrel between Lord P and Mr K. P was in one of the Duke of Zell's coaches and K in one of the King's. K overtook P and kept the way quite to Deering [Dieren], where P, getting out of the coach, threatened to beat the coachman, and said he was an impertinent puppy; the fellow excused himself upon the orders he had received, upon which Portland said that he who gave those orders was an impertinent puppy, or words to that effect; the matter was complained of to the King on both sides, but we heard no more of it; it was whispered that K was in disgrace, because he went next day to his own house at Zutphen; but he came back the next, and was as much in favour as ever.'[182]

Publicly Portland kept up a disdainful but polished countenance. In December 1695 Sylvius had confided to Huygens that '... the ascendancy of Keppel over Portland continued; that Portland was very polite to the latter.'[183]

According to most literature, Keppel slowly but surely pushed Portland away after 1694 until the latter's final fall in 1699.[184] Stephen Baxter has argued that with the death of Mary and the expulsion of Elisabeth Villiers, William's mistress and Bentinck's sister-in-law, two links with the King were severed. The Queen had fallen ill with smallpox in late December 1694; after a brief recovery her situation worsened and in the beginning of January she died. The King had to be carried out of the room by Portland and Archbishop Tenison.[185] William's own life was in danger and he could not force himself to face the grave political situation that had accompanied the death of a reigning monarch. He retreated to his quarters, tenaciously guarded by Portland who refused to let anyone in.[186] The situation epitomised Portland's position between the King and the political nation. Two personal changes occurred after Mary's death. William, struck with grief and remorse, married off Elisabeth Villiers to the Earl of Orkney. Thereby deprived of a great deal of the emotional support he had hitherto enjoyed, William clung even more tightly to Portland. Moreover, Elisabeth Villiers' exile was no misfortune for the Earl; she had always been a bitter enemy of Portland, and her removal rather strengthened his position. Baxter also argues that Portland lost influence due to his negligence in maintaining links with the Tories, whereas, moreover, Grand Pensionary Anthonie Heinsius and Secretary-at-War William Blathwayt were increasingly taking over Dutch and military correspondence respectively. This analysis looks plausible but is also problematic. Although Keppel may have profited from Portland's neglect to maintain links with the Tories, Portland's patronage over the ruling Whig Junto had considerably strengthened his position during the mid-1690s. Baxter's second point is more valid, but it does not explain Keppel's ascendancy in relation to Portland's sustained and even increased influence around 1695.

The most obvious explanation for Keppel's rise is that, rather than replacing Portland, he became a central figure in William's affection after Mary's death - which is exactly when his favour increased. If William lost a wife, he gained a son. Another reason for Keppel's success is more complicated. William loathed being dependent on his advisers. During his first year as King, he had confided to Halifax, one of his closest advisers, that 'hee would discourage the falling too much upon particular men'.[187] For this reason he divided influence between his main advisers, Halifax and Carmarthen, and held the main offices, such as Lord Treasurer, in commission. It is likely therefore that he should watch Portland's unchallenged ascendancy with some concern, whilst at the same time he realised that he would be difficult to replace. There were few or

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[182] HMC, *Manuscripts of the Marquis of Bath etc.* (Hereford, 1908), III, 509. Cf. Prior to Vernon 8/18 September 1696, NA SP 84-223, fo. 198v.

[183] 2 April 1695, cf. 25 December 1695, Huygens, *Journaal*, I-2, 467, 561. Cf. Stepney to Montagu 1 November 1695, NA SP 105-54 , fo. 187v: Keppel '... getts ground daily but is harder of access than the other'.

[184] E.g. W. Troost, *Stadhouder-koning Willem III. Een politieke biografie* (Hilversum, 2001), 230.

[185] Johnstone to Annandale 28 December 1694, HMC, *Manuscripts of J.J. Hope Johnstone Esq. of Annandale* (London, 1897), 69; Portland to Lexington 15/25 January 1695, BL Add Ms 46525, fo. 90v

[186] Baxter, *William III*, 320-321. Cf. 20 January 1695, Huygens, *Journaal*, I-2, 447.

[187] G.S. Halifax, First Marquis of, 'The Spencer House Journals', H.C. Foxcroft, ed., in: H.C. Foxcroft, *The life and letters of Sir George Savile, First Marquis of Halifax* (2 vols., London, 1898), II, 202. Cf. Baxter, *William III*, 249, 274.

no Dutch courtiers who were either as willing or as capable; Ouwerkerk and Zuylestein, the two most prominent courtiers, never aspired to the position of favourite. William's English courtiers could not be employed to maintain relations with the United Provinces.

William must have been apprehensive of Portland's authority, reports of which had been common in court circles for years.[188] In April 1694 Huygens was told

> 'That P. had stood this day at the table behind the King, and that someone wanted to go through a door behind him which he stood against, and pushed hard against him, and that the Queen, seeing that, said: 'look, Portland is being pushed' and the King said: 'well, why is he standing there? He knows so little the respect he is owing me','[189]

Mutual friction and irritations were understandable after years of intense, almost stifling friendship. William and Portland had had quarrels before, but the King was clearly increasingly irritated at what he perceived as his favourite's arrogance. Portland had become far more influential, even in relative terms, than he had been in Holland. This degree of monopolisation of his master's favour had never been attained even before 1688, when, moreover, he was less experienced amongst elder counsellors. Now he was a senior adviser himself, assured of his favour and singular position within the Williamite entourage and accustomed to exercise authority.

As yet Keppel was inexperienced, but William was training him to counter-balance the increasing influence of the older favourite. When Portland's client was appointed Dutch Secretary in 1698, Vernon supposed that '... it must cost the King something considerable to set the balance even'.[190] In fact, Keppel was rapidly gaining experience in those areas in which Portland himself was influential: military correspondence, royal patronage and diplomacy. Of course, Portland witnessed the ascendancy of this young favourite with a mixture of jealousy and concern - jealousy of this competitor for the king's favour, concern about the influence he exerted. But he found compensation by strengthening his position in other areas, such as ministerial management in England and Scotland, finance, patronage in diplomatic circles and correspondence with Allied foreign commanders. Keppel did not develop any political activities, and was not in the Cabinet or Privy Council. In 1695 he received quarters in Kensington next to those of the King, but, as the Dutch agent René Saunière de L'Hermitage argued, only those who judge by appearances suppose the new favourite had overshadowed the old: 'la faveur de Myl. Portland est toujours la superieure'.[191]

VII Conclusion

In the pamphlet *The French Favourites* the author resolved to critically investigate the phenomenon of the favourite, in order to show 'Who they are that Reign without Right, without Merit, and without a Crown'.[192] It used extracts of anti-Mazarin literature, but the date of publication (1709) coincided with the death of Portland and the zenith of the career of Marlborough, pointing to the fact that the favourite had become a well-known actor again on the English political stage. The re-emergence of the favourite has been explained in this chapter from changes in domestic and international developments after 1688.

The first development was the emergence of a 'standing' Parliament. Initially Portland's influence was particularly manifest at court only. As Groom of the Stole he was able to control access to the King, but he also had a pretext to spend undisturbed time with the King during which policy was discussed. Portland also dominated the Privy and Cabinet Councils. Increasingly his influence extended to other

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[188] Cf. fn. 37.
[189] 28 April 1694, Huygens, *Journaal*, I-2, 337.
[190] Vernon to Shrewsbury 29 October 1698, G.P.R. James, ed., *Letters illustrative of the reign of William III etc.* (3 vols., London, 1841), II, 209.
[191] Dispatch Saunière de L'Hermitage 6 December 1695, NA 3.01.19/402.
[192] *The French Favourites: or, the Seventh Discourse of Balzac's Politicks* (1709), in: Somers, *Collection*, II, 483.

spheres, and as from around 1692 he became actively involved in parliamentary affairs, although he usually did so in tandem with experienced managers, most notably Sunderland.

The second development was the war. The control over military affairs was relatively centralised, as the King and his favourite commanders kept a close eye on every aspect of strategy and logistics. It is particularly difficult to estimate to what extent Portland was merely an executive to a soldier-king or someone who influenced royal decisions. Evidence tends to support the former conclusion, but increasingly Portland was able to advise the King on more issues. Due to his expanding network of correspondents in various spheres and his overlapping responsibilities he was situated in a unique position, qualifying him to have a general oversight of military and diplomatic affairs. To a large extent his responsibilities were of a mostly secretarial nature, since the King himself was in control, but Portland's opinion held some sway with William. Hence his position can be located somewhere between the poles of executive, secretarial and administrative responsibilities on the one hand, and strategic policy-making on the other hand. His responsibilities were initially mainly of a military nature, but they also served to consolidate his position that could then be utilised to exercise control in other spheres. Portland established himself at the apex of an extensive royal clientele. Apart from advising the King on political appointments, he was regularly approached by military officers seeking advancement or employment.[193] Portland had a fairly tight grip on diplomatic appointments, and advancement without his patronage was difficult, without his permission, impossible.

The last factor was the emergence of the Anglo-Dutch union, or more accurately, the conjunction of four separate states headed by the King-Stadholder. Portland played a co-ordinating role in the government of William's realms. It seems typical that William's favourites were Dutchmen who were naturalised Englishmen as well. In this way Portland could monitor William's affairs both in England and the United Provinces. Portland also supervised the King's affairs in Scotland and, to a far lesser extent, in Ireland. In practice he formed an intermediary between the King and regional managers, such as Carstares in Scotland, Sidney in Ireland and Van Zuylen van Nijvelt, Dijkveld and Odijk in the United Provinces.[194]

The extent to which Portland had these men under control or was rather a figure-head varied. Most textbooks suggest that Portland was influential during the first years of William's reign, but experienced a decline of influence as from the middle of the 1690s. This chapter disproved such a view. Bentinck's significantly strengthened his position amongst William's confidants after the death of Fagel in November 1688 and the absence of Dijkveld after the summer of 1689. By the end of 1689, after Sidney's removal, Portland was William's undisputed favourite. Only in 1695 did Keppel become his rival, but their influence remained in balance. Portland now shared the King's favour with Keppel, but in many areas his influence had increased rather than diminished. By the summer of 1689 he had ousted his Dutch competitors, whereas by 1690 the influential Halifax had been sidelined. Between 1690 and 1692 Portland increasingly became involved in parliamentary management in England and Ireland. During the three subsequent years, through his relations with Sunderland, Sidney and the Junto Whigs, his influence in ministerial appointments in Ireland and England had increased. At the same time his influence in Scotland and the United Provinces had eroded, but his position in Scotland was reaffirmed by his involvement in the ministerial changes in 1695.

During those years he also managed the King's clientele in the core zones connected to the changes occurred after 1689. His influence at court was considerable, causing the Lord Chamberlain to complain that 'Myl. Portland had too much power, that too many favours went through his hands'.[195] Officers and diplomats often solicited him for favours and positions. He also increasingly managed the placemen in Parliament. In 1695 and 1696 his position was stronger than ever before. The Jacobite pamphlet *The Dear Bargain* bitterly concluded that 'Mynheer Bentinck now rules over us.'[196]

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[193] E.g. *CSPD 1693*,255; letters from Russell to Portland, NUL Pw A 1092-1095.
[194] Cf. Riley, *Scottish politicians*, 85.
[195] 26 July 1689, Huygens, *Journaal*, I-1, 157.
[196] *The Dear Bargain, or, A true representation of the state of the English Nation under the Dutch. In a letter to a friend*, in: Somers, *A third* collection, III, 260.

Chapter 4: Policy

The revolution settlement was especially unstable during the first two years of William's reign. While he struggled to maintain his prerogatives in the three kingdoms and the Republic, from outside there was the continuous threat of a French-Jacobite invasion. Jonathan Israel has argued that the period 1689-1691 should be regarded as an essential and distinct phase in William's reign during which he consolidated his position in Britain with Dutch military strength, but also that it is imperative to comprehend the connection between all these realms: 'His position in Britain and Ireland was precarious and his position in the United Provinces potentially so. One defeat in Ireland might well mean the collapse of the entire shaky edifice, Glorious Revolution and all'.[1] It took until the end of 1691 to firmly consolidate the revolution settlement and to subjugate the Scottish and Irish rebels. William could now maintain his authority at home and focus his attention on the continental war. The mounting demands on the society and economy of Britain in terms of finances and troops transformed the political landscape. As the King traded prerogatives for funds, revisionists have argued, Parliament became increasingly important.[2]

Portland played a pivotal role in the resultant collisions between the King and his Parliament. After the Revolution he had emerged as the undisputed favourite of William III, engaged in the implementation of royal policy. He was granted substantial responsibility in order to provide the King with the necessary resources. In this chapter, his political activities in Britain and the consolidation of his position as favourite will be analysed. He was involved in maintaining the stadholderly and royal prerogative. Military success in the Spanish Netherlands largely depended on the efficient utilisation of Dutch and British resources, whereas, vice versa, the war had a tremendous impact on the political and constitutional development of Britain. William's political conduct can only be properly understood within a British and European context. This chapter will adopt an integral approach by examining Portland's activities in the United Provinces, Scotland and Ireland and will seek to examine patterns in the nature of the personal union and the alliance that was shaped in the aftermath of the revolution. It will also investigate the constitutional disputes over the strengthening or maintaining of the King-Stadholder's prerogatives in which Portland was involved and his role in the creation and upholding of Court interests on both sides of the Channel with the purpose of mobilising human and financial resources for the continental campaign. Rather than providing an exhaustive chronological account, this chapter will focus on key moments in Portland's career which will illuminate the nature of his activities.

I The nature of party politics

If one is to study the role of Portland in the politics of the 1690s in William's various realms, it is useful to point out that there were profound differences in their constitution. But it is also true that there were patterns that were similar. Dutch and British historians have fiercely debated the two-party models (Tory-Whig in England, Orangist-Republican in the United Provinces, and Episcopalian-Presbyterian in Scotland) as instruments to analyse political structures in the 1690s. In English historiography the main current is now to see a two-party system of Tories and Whigs, upset now and then by Court-Country controversies. Dutch historians have moved away from explaining political structures in terms of parties, although at key moments ideologically coherent factions could temporarily surface.[3] The patterns and

[1] J.I. Israel, 'The Dutch role in the Glorious Revolution', in: J.I. Israel, ed., *The Anglo-Dutch moment. Essays on the Glorious Revolution and its world impact* (Cambridge, 1991), 154.

[2] Cf. J. Brewer, *The Sinews of Power. War, Money and the English State 1688-1783* (Cambridge MA, 1990).

[3] For debates on party struggles see H. Horwitz, 'The structure of parliamentary politics', in: G. Holmes, ed., *Britain after the Glorious Revolution 1689-1714* (London, 1969), 96-99 ff.; D.W. Hayton, 'The Country interest and the party system 1689 - c1720', in: C. Jones, ed., *Party and management in parliament 1660-1784* (Leicester and New York, 1984); T. Harris, *Politics under the late Stuarts. Party conflict in a divided society 1660-1715* (New York, 1993), 147 ff.; G. Holmes, *British politics in the age of Anne* (London, 1967); H. Horwitz, *Parliament, policy and politics in the reign of William III* (Manchester, 1977); B.W. Hill, *The growth of Parliamentary parties 1689-1742* (London, 1976); H. Horwitz, 'Historiographical perspectives. The 1690s revisited: Recent work on politics and political ideas in the reign of William III', *Parliamentary History*, XV (1996). S.

similarities between partisan struggles in Scotland, England and the United Provinces are of particular interest whilst studying these structures within an Anglo-Dutch context. The Earl of Shaftesbury noted in 1709 that those in England who tended to be pro-Dutch were Whigs, yet paradoxically they favoured what he called the Tory interest in the Dutch Republic, namely the Orangists, and opposed the Commonwealth interest, or that of the Republicans. So William, as King of England, had been the venerable saviour of English liberties, but as Stadholder and Captain-General he was rather like any tyrant or absolute monarch.[4] Likewise, there were similarities between Scottish Episcopalians and Presbyterians and English Tories and Whigs respectively, as for instance the French ambassador Count Tallard noted in 1698.[5] Recently historians have also noted similarities between the Court and Country interest in the various parts of William's realms. There are similarities between the Scottish 'Club', the English Country, and the Dutch Republicans; these were hardly 'parties' but rather temporary alliances to resist the power of the court.[6]

This chapter will analyse Portland's activities during the 1690s within the framework of such complex political structures. As will be argued, Portland was essentially a courtier, not tied to the Whig or Tory interest, and it is from this perspective that this chapter will take off. Keith Feiling, in his classic study on the Tory party, also pointed to the fact that parliamentary managers such as Sunderland must be classified as non-party courtiers, though they would still have to deal with the reality of partisan struggles in Parliament.[7] Portland's concern was essentially one of establishing a strong court party of whatever tenet. A problem with understanding his position is the lack of relevant source material. He seldom reflected on policymaking, but a sketchy memorandum from June 1693 suggests the central issues that were concerning him: '... difficulty money. decrease prerogative. ministers being attacked.'[8] Indeed, it was the effectiveness of the Court to raise revenues and to maintain the royal prerogative in order to wage war that concerned Portland. Inevitably this would result in opposition. Though loath of partisan struggles, it is of some interest that the language he used in describing his opponents had a strong moral, partisan, tone; he frequently referred to 'les mechants' or 'le mechant parti'.[9] If the issues that concerned the King-Stadholder and his favourite would result in continuous political arm wrestling with the various assemblies, Portland's political style would lead to confrontation rather than compromise.

II The Amsterdam magistrates' controversy (1689-1690)

Latent opposition to the stadholderly system and dissatisfaction with the implications of the new alliance surfaced in the spring of 1690 during a constitutional conflict between William and Amsterdam in which Portland was deeply involved. For two reasons the incident has been selected as a case study. Firstly, the widespread ramifications of the conflict provide an unusually detailed and lucid insight into the nature and extent of William's influence and position. Secondly, it is particularly suitable for analysing Portland's role in Williamite domestic policy in the United Provinces. Portland and William were separated only on a few occasions and policy was mostly discussed behind closed doors. Their detailed correspondence concerning the magistrates controversy gives unique and invaluable information on how

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Groenveld, *Evidente factien in den staet. Sociaal-politieke verhoudingen in de 17e eeuwse Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden* (Hilversum, 1990).

[4] D. Coombs, *The conduct of the Dutch. British opinion and the Dutch alliance during the War of the Spanish Succession* (The Hague, 1958), 12-13.

[5] Tallard to Louis 9 May 1698, P. Grimblot, ed., *Letters of William III, and Louis XIV and of their ministers etc. 1697-1700* (2 vols., London, 1848), I, 467.

[6] Country was a 'persuasion' rather than a 'party', a set of ideas prevalent amongst the landed class and aimed at curtailing the central executive. Country strove to strengthen the role of Parliament through the Place and Triennial Bills and reduce the standing army. Cf. T. Harris, *Politics under the late Stuarts. Party conflict in a divided society 1660-1715* (New York, 1993), 147 ff.

[7] K. Feiling, *A history of the Tory party 1640-1714* (Oxford, 1924), 291.

[8] NUL Pw A 1220.

[9] E.g. Portland to William 5/15 January 1690 (Sheerness), Portland to William 14-15 March 1690 (The Hague), *RGP 23*, 65, 147.

Portland advised William and how successful he was, to what extent the King relied on his adviser, how Portland built up a 'court party', how his patronage operated within Dutch political circles, and to what extent William's authority as Stadholder had been altered by his kingship

The extent to which William had increased his authority as Stadholder was of some concern to Republicans, though Orangist pamphleteers argued that William's absence would weaken his position.[10] The dilemma for Dutch moderates such as the Amsterdam burgomaster Nicolaas Witsen, who had supported the expedition but was disappointed in some of its consequences, was that they had reason to oppose the Stadholder but needed the support of the King. The burgomaster, who returned from his embassy to London in November 1689, had become disgruntled by his exclusion from William's inner circle and his failure to gain commercial advantages, setbacks for which Portland's offering him a barony could hardly compensate.[11] When the Witsen faction was aloof, the balance in Amsterdam temporarily swung in favour of the Republicans. The city council had become subject to faction struggles and for the moment it seemed that the Republicans, most notably burgomaster Johan Huydecooper van Maarseveen and the Pensioner Cornelis Bors van Waveren, had the upper hand over the Orangist elements.

The conflict with Amsterdam came into the open in January 1690, but beneath the surface tension had been building up for some time. The autumn of 1689 saw the diminishing influence of William's creatures in the Council of State (the executive body of the union mainly responsible for military affairs and as such vital to his interest). The Council of State consisted of representatives from each province. Naturally those of the regions which were firmly under William's control, Overijssel, Utrecht and Gelderland, could be counted on, and an attempt was made to secure Waldeck a seat in the Council of State.[12] Van Reede van Amerongen, however, the Utrecht representative and father of Ginckel, tied to William's cause as a trusted diplomat, warned Portland in December 1689 about the recent disharmony in the Council of State. He was unable to establish a majority vote on many important issues and good decisions were either prevented or delayed.[13] Portland thought little of Amerongen, and Waldeck complained that the Gelderland deputy Jacob Schimmelpenninck van der Oye lacked vigour in the Council of State.[14] In early January 1690 Amerongen complained to Portland that the *Staat van Oorlog* (State of War, the yearly budget for military expenses) was still under discussion.[15] A majority in the Council of State had blocked the *Staat van Oorlog* from being brought before the States General for approval pending an amendment concerning the Dutch troops in England. Amerongen, Heinsius and Waldeck opposed the amendment because they thought the Council of State had no right to give such a pre-advice.[16] Opposition against William was widespread and also visible on a provincial and local level. Portland's own position as bailiff in Breda was challenged. Tromer, was alarmed when the Breda sheriffs encroached upon the authority of his apparently feeble vice-bailiff: 'Unless your excellency forcefully maintains his authority and office there the foundation will be crushed out of the lawful interest as well as the prerogative of your office of bailiff.'[17] Another creature of William, Halewijn, had been attacked in the States Assembly by Amsterdam.

In January 1690 Amsterdam decided that the time was right to mount a direct attack on the Stadholder himself, refusing to send him the list from which he was entitled to elect the *schepenen* (magistrates) in the city council. A resolution from 1581 served as a pretext to send it instead to the *Hof van Holland* (the Court of Justice imbued with executing several stadholderly prerogatives) during the absence of the

[10] E.g. *De gelukkige aanstaande gevolgen uit de unie en verbintenis tusschen haar majesteiten Willem III. en Maria II. ... en de Ho. Mo. Heeren*. Cf. G.N. Clark, 'The Dutch missions to England in 1689', *EHR* XXXV (1920).
[11] William to Portland 31 January 1690, *RGP 23*, 85; N. Witsen, 'Verbaal', J. Scheltema, ed., in: J. Scheltema, ed., *Geschied- en letterkundig mengelwerk* (6 vols., Utrecht, 1818-1836), 165; J.F. Gebhard, *Het leven van Mr. Nicolaas Cornelisz. Witsen (1641-1717)* (Utrecht, 1882), I, 336.
[12] 29 May 1689, Huygens, *Journaal*, I-1, 133.
[13] Amerongen to Portland 30 December 1689, *RGP 28*, 138; William to Heinsius 27 September 1689, H.J. van der Heim, ed., *Het archief van den raadpensionaris Antonie Heinsius* (The Hague, 1867), II, 13-14.
[14] Waldeck to William 26 July 1689, *RGP 28*, 120.
[15] Amerongen to Portland 3 January 1690, ibid., 141-142.
[16] Amerongen to William 13 January 1690, ibid., 146-148.
[17] Tromer to Portland December 1689, ibid., 139.

Stadholder. William was indignant over the affront and threat to his prerogative. 'I am so alarmed by the conduct of Amsterdam,' he wrote to Heinsius, 'seeing what its consequences might be, not just for me, but for the welfare of the whole of Europe, that I have thought it proper to send the Earl of Portland to The Hague ...'.[18] Not a parochial concern for the intricacies of Dutch politics, as Marion Grew asserts, but the enfolding drama of wide opposition and delays in the ways and means prompted William to reassert his authority.[19]

In Portland's view, 'si nous n'estions pas dans un temps dangereus pour le publicq comme celui où sommes, je reguarderois ce procédé avec indifférence, parce que jamais ils n'ent ont tenu un plus extrordinaire contre la raison et l'ordre du gouvernement...'[20] Indeed, William's dilemma was not an easy one to solve. On the eve of the campaign to Ireland he badly needed the funds Amsterdam could provide, and a good working relationship with the city was worth a compromise. Reflecting on the situation, Portland indignantly wrote to General Godard Reede van Ginckel on 3 January:

> 'Il semble que dans le pais il i a bien des gens qui ne sont pas de vostre sentiment que l'Estat aye fait une grande perte dans la personne du Roy, puisqu'ils tâchent à lui chicaner la juste et due authorité qu'il a exercée au service de nostre chère patrie. Dieu leur pardonne le tord qu'ils lui font en tâchant par leur conduitte d'alterrer la tendre inclination que le Roy conserve pour le païs, et qui dans ces conjonctures est la seule chose qui puisse nous conserver et fair prospérer ... Aprèz ce qui touche directement le Roy, la dissention dans l'Estat et l'armée est de la plus mauvaise conséquence.'[21]

The matter was discussed in detail between William and Portland at Kensington, the latter's first letter from Sheerness reflecting on the course of action to be taken.[22] An expedient had been proposed by Heinsius and Dijkveld, one which Portland had misgivings about. He counselled his master:

> 'à la vérité il me semble de très dangereuse conséquence que Vostre Maj^{té}. admette des expédients envers les premiers qui font les méchants; il est vray que les temps sont dangereux pour laisser venir les choses à des extrémitéz, mais que faire, si Vostre Maj^{té}. sans cela pert ce qu'elle estime plus que tous ces Mess^{s}. de delà la mer ne peuvent s'imaginer, lesquels d'ailleurs songent tous à eux mesme et craignent les brouillerie dont on ne les sauroit pas trop blâmer'.[23]

William agreed with his adviser: 'Plus que je songe à l'affaire d'Amsterdam, plus que j'en suis en piene, quoy qu'entièrement persuadé que je ne dois point admestre d'expédient ... puis que par là je serois déposédé par provision d'un droit que je prétens m'apartenir....'[24] Although the contents of the terms are unknown, Portland comes across as the more uncompromising of William's advisers.

Portland's mission was to bolster and mobilise the Orangists and his arrival was eagerly awaited, Amerongen writing to William that he hoped 'that with the coming of the Earl of Portland this affair will be settled.'[25] His opponents in Amsterdam were also awaiting him, and at his arrival 'the smoke almost transformed itself into flame'.[26] The City Council had passed a resolution on 14 January proposing that the States of Holland deny the Earl access to the Assembly, based upon an ancient resolution of 1581 that

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[18] William to Heinsius 8 January 1690, F.J.L. Krämer, ed., *Archives ou correspondance inédite de la maison d'Orange-Nassau* Troisième serie (3 vols., Leiden, 1907-1909), I, 46.
[19] M.E. Grew, *William Bentinck and William III (Prince of Orange). The life of Bentinck, Earl of Portland, from the Welbeck correspondence* (London, 1924), 170-171.
[20] Portland to William 11 February 1690, *RGP 23*, 101.
[21] Portland to Ginckel 3 January 1690 (Kensington), *RGP 28*, 142.
[22] Portland to William 5/15 January 1690 (Sheerness), *RGP 23*, 65-67; 10 January 1690, Huygens, *Journaal*, I-1, 223.
[23] Portland to William 5/15 January 1690 (Sheerness), *RGP 23*, 65-66. The particulars of the expedient are unknown.
[24] William to Portland 16/17 January 1690, ibid., 67.
[25] Amerongen to William 13 January 1690, *RGP 28*, 147.
[26] *Hollandse Mercurius 1690* (Haarlem, 1691), XLI, 12.

denied access for anyone in the service of a 'foreign potentate'.[27] Although obviously aimed at the Stadholder, the assault threatened Portland's own position. The *Ridderschap*, from which Portland operated and of which Heinsius, in his capacity as Grand Pensionary, was spokesman, was the first to object to the conduct of Amsterdam in the States assembly. Portland conferred with some of the nobles, the Lords Van Noortwijk, Van Wassenaar-Duyvenvoorde and Van Wassenaar-Obdam, who unanimously decided to support their compeer.[28] Having reaffirmed Portland's position within the *Ridderschap*, the nobles now declared in the Assembly that Amsterdam had no authority to interfere with their internal concerns.

It soon became apparent that Amsterdam was quite isolated. Portland confidently wrote to William:

> 'touttes les villes sans exeption en firent non seulement autant, mais s'expliquèrent tous au delà de ce que j'aurois peu attendre, avec beaucoup d'expressions obligantes à mon égard, et témoignant jusques à l'indignation de la conduitte de Mess[rs]. d'Amsterdam tant à l'esgard de la chose que la forme.'[29]

Apart from Amsterdam, the whole assembly seemed willing to support his position, and if the matter could be decided before the members dispersed to their respective cities for consultation (in which case the faint-hearted might after all incline to Amsterdam's side) Portland considered the state of affairs reassuring.[30] In fact, that same day the States of Holland did pass a resolution reaffirming Portland's right to take his position in the Assembly. Amsterdam refused to give in, however, and out of protest her deputation decided to withdraw from the Assembly, leaving only the secretary, Bors van Waveren, as an observer.

Meanwhile Portland started organising the Williamite factions to crush Amsterdam's resistance. Some of his correspondents, the Delft regent Gerard Putmans, the *Hof van Holland* delegate Cornelis van Halewijn and the Utrecht nobleman Everard van Weede van Dijkveld, had informed him of the state of affairs.[31] Hieronymus van Beverningk, deputy of Gouda, was considered a feeble client, but Portland believed he could keep him in the Orangist camp. Van der Dussen was a strong supporter, though Portland failed to secure him a position in the Rotterdam Admiralty.[32] Portland was doubtful as to the firmness of the *Hof van Holland* but depended on William's aide Halewijn there. Associated councillors were mobilised in the Council of State where debates on the *Staat van Oorlog* continued to cause problems. Portland was in close correspondence with Dijkveld and Halewijn and was instructed to confer with Waldeck and Heinsius.[33]

Under Portland's direction a less accommodating policy was adopted. Following his letter to William from Sheerness, the Stadholder had agreed not to settle for an expedient; an open letter to Amsterdam arrived on 25 January demanding that the city send its nomination directly to London rather than to the *Hof van Holland*. Portland decided not to settle for an accommodation, and did so without informing Waldeck and Dijkveld, but was supported by Heinsius. His decision was based on his evaluation of the strength of the opposition. '... je dire sincèrement', he wrote to William on the day his letter was read in the assembly, 'de n'avoir jamais veu dans l'assemblé plus d'union et de vigeur qui me semble d'augmenter de jour en jour'.[34] He also wrote that they would 'préparer les villes à se rendre sensibles'

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[27] Resolution of the Amsterdam *Vroedschap*, 12 January 1690 printed in *Hollandse Mercurius 1690*, 12-14. Cf. *An account of the passages in the Assembly of the States of Holland and West-Friezeland concerning the Earl of Portlands Exclusion from, or Admission into that Assembly* (London, 1690).
[28] Portland to William 20 January 1690 (The Hague), *RGP 23*, 71.
[29] Portland to William 20 January 1690 (The Hague), ibid., 71.
[30] Portland to William 20 January 1690 (The Hague), ibid., 71-73.
[31] Portland to William 5/15 January 1690 (Sheerness), ibid., 65-67.
[32] Portland to William 20 January 1690 (The Hague), 15 February 1690 (The Hague), ibid., 72, 108.
[33] Portland to William 20 January 1690 (The Hague), ibid., 71-73; e.g. Portland to William 3-4 March 1690 (The Hague), William to Portland 16-17 January 1690, ibid., 67-60, 131-134.
[34] Portland to William 25 January 1690 (The Hague), ibid., 76.

that Amsterdam had to be brought to reason. His client in Haarlem, Willem Fabricius, had launched an attack on Amsterdam accusing the city of arrogant behaviour.[35] That same day the States of Holland adopted a resolution, again ordering Amsterdam to send the nomination to London, but the city ignored it and, moreover, refused to pay her quote. 'je ne crains', Portland wrote, 'que la foiblesse et la division des autres villes et celle si n'épargnera ni argent ni promesses d'employs pour séduire des Magistrats dans les petites villes de la Noorthollande.'[36] He immediately countered these movements and began to build up a party among the well-disposed cities: 'j'ay commencé d'establir une correspondance entre les grandes villes dont un homme de chaqu'une, qui sera de la correspondance, concertera avec M[r]. le Pensionaire.'[37] In late February he thought he was about to reap the fruits of his efforts, writing to William that those in the city councils who had seemed to have been drawn into Amsterdam's sphere of influence had been regained.[38] City councils were never entirely in the Stadholder's control. Leiden caused problems but '... dans la grande affair ils sont bien'; in Purmerend the well-disposed burgomaster emerged victorious from faction struggles.[39] Portland managed to reconcile rival factions in Haarlem.[40]

On 28 January the States of Holland ordered Amsterdam to obey the Stadholder and send the nomination to London.[41] The Assembly dispersed until the 6th of February, to prepare the debates concerning the *Staat van Oorlog* for the coming campaign. But due to the uncompromising attitude of Amsterdam, Portland feared that the affairs would go to extremes, and the atmosphere was soured by rumours of a secret correspondence between the Amsterdam burgomaster Appelman and Louvois.[42] When Amsterdam refused to comply with the States' resolution a deadlock was reached. Portland fulminated against '...ceus qui par leur caprice veulent laisser périr la République et renverser les fondements du gouvernement', and demanded that the Amsterdammers send the nomination to London.[43] William had shown himself much more conciliatory, urging Portland to establish a good relationship with Amsterdam rather than to alienate her. The key figure was Nicolaas Witsen, who assured Portland of his goodwill, but, the Earl wrote with some misgivings, '... je croiray au Saint, quant j'en verray les miracles'.[44]

William was satisfied with Portland's attempt to create a correspondence with the towns and initiate preparations for the coming campaign, in which he thought the Council of State had been negligent.[45] Pending the reassembling of the States, Portland started organising the Orangists in the Council of State as well. To the dependable councillors, the delegates from Gelderland (Schimmelpenninck van der Oije), Utrecht (Amerongen) and Overijssel (Borger Bernard van Welvede), he proposed pushing through a decision in line with William's wishes during the absence of ill-disposed members.[46] He convened a meeting of those in the *Gecommitteerde Raden* (the daily government of Holland) and the Council of State who were in the interest of the Stadholder, 'afin qu'ils ne s'absentent pas trop et qu'ils ayent tousjours la pluralité, et puis qu'ils préviennent les disputes qu'on a faites par le presse, et s'est à quoy je travailleray de mon mieux.'[47] Waldeck was signalling his difficulties in maintaining his position, which was being challenged by General Slangenburg, and the *Staat van Oorlog* now required urgent action. William was adamant that no compromise regarding the *Staat van Oorlog* would be acceptable.[48] Since it

[35] Portland to William 20 January 1690 (The Hague), 25 January (The Hague), ibid., 72, 77.
[36] Portland to William 7 February 1690 (The Hague), ibid., 98.
[37] Portland to William 11 February 1690 (The Hague), ibid., 102.
[38] Portland to William 22 February 1690 (The Hague), ibid., 114.
[39] Portland to William 20 January 1690 (The Hague), 4 February 1690 (The Hague), 11 February 1690 (The Hague), 25 February 1690 (The Hague), ibid., 72, 91, 102, 119; Amerongen to William 13 January 1690, *RGP 28*, 147.
[40] Portland to William 11 February 1690 (The Hague), *RGP 23*, 102.
[41] Resolution States of Holland 28 January 1690, *Hollandsche Mercurius 1690*, 38 ff..
[42] Portland to Willem 31 January/1 February 1690 (The Hague), *RGP 23*, 87.
[43] Portland to William 4 February 1690 (The Hague), ibid., 90.
[44] Portland to William 4 February 1690 (The Hague), ibid., 91.
[45] William to Portland 17 February 1690, *RGP 23*, 109.
[46] Portland to William 20 January 1690 (The Hague), *RGP 23*, 72-73.
[47] Portland to William 4 February 1690 (The Hague), ibid., 92.
[48] William to Portland 27 January 1690, ibid., 81.

was imperative that the Council of State be managed properly, threats and bribery were suggested to Portland: 'Je ne sçay pourquoy l'on ne pouvoit gagner Vryberghe [the Zeeland deputy in the Council of State] ou par menasse ou par quelque profit'.[49] It is not clear how Portland managed to do this, but some weeks later he confirmed that he thought he had won over Vrijbergen.[50] But as for Huybert, the other Zeeland deputy whom Odijk ought to have managed: '... je croy que l'on trouvera facilement prise sur lui, mais une chose de cette nature il ne faut pas commencer légèrement ni arrester à moitié chemin'[51] Portland sent the Stadholder a 'projet de lettre' on how to deal with Zeeland.[52] Amerongen was, he thought, old, ineffective and losing his vigour, but the Frisian Stadholder seemed co-operative now.[53] 'Certes M[r]. d'Amerongen ne fait pas comme il doit et promet, et les autres bien intentionnéz se laissent enjoller par des gens dont tout leur devroit estre suspect; j'ay esté obligé de parler un peu intelligiblement hier.'[54]

But meantime the only thing Portland could do was to put pressure on the Council of State to reach a speedy decision.[55] On 7 February the Council completed the *Staat van Oorlog*, and a week later it was brought into the States General, to the satisfaction of Portland.[56] He was gaining the upper hand in two vital organs:

> 'pour les Gecommiteerde Raden, j'ay des promesses et des engagements de la pluspart qu'ils auront soin de prévenir tout ce qui pourroit faire tort au publicq, diminuer vostre authorité ou chagriner mal à propos M[r]. le Prince de Waldec; M[r]. van den Honart qui doit présider en absence de M[r]. de Noortwijk m'a promis cela. Pour le Conseil d'Estat je croy qu'il sera assez facile de former un parti assez fort pour prévenir qu'il ne s'i fasse point de mal...'[57]

A breakthrough came in early March when the faction of Hudde and Witsen ascended in the Amsterdam city council.[58] The latter came to The Hague to confer with Portland and propose an expedient. Portland did not give a definite answer, believing that accepting a compromise, an 'accomodement plastré', would leave fundamental problems unsolved.[59] He blamed the 'moderates' for losing six weeks of precious time debating and negotiating, during which the preparations for the coming campaign had been seriously delayed. Witsen meanwhile promised that the nomination would indeed be sent, but demanded that all references to Amsterdam's conduct be erased from the registers.[60] The only compromise he was willing to make, was to separate his personal interest from the public interest, and his position consequently was still ambiguous. He was tolerated in the assembly, but Amsterdam did not acknowledge his right to take his seat.[61] Moreover, the compromise on which the parties finally agreed was rather equivocal. The city would send the nomination to the States of Holland - since the Stadholder was absent - who then forwarded it to London.[62] Portland acknowledged that it would have been better if the resolution of 28 January would have been upheld, 'mais il me semble que c'est une preuve très évidente que M[s]. les Estats jugent qu'elle doit estre envoyée au delà de la mer, et il est assez bon que Vostre Maj.[té] y voye que, depuis qu'elle est en Angleterre, ils déclarent unanimement qu'ils veulent la maintenir dans ces droits et

[49] William to Portland 27 January 1690, ibid., 80.
[50] Portland to William 4 February 1690 (The Hague), ibid., 92.
[51] Portland to William 4 February 1690 (The Hague), ibid.
[52] Portland to William 11 February 1690 (The Hague), ibid., 103.
[53] Portland to William 4 February 1690 (The Hague), 7 February 1690 (The Hague), 15 February 1690 (The Hague), William to Portland 27 January 1690, ibid., 92, 99, 107-108.
[54] Portland to William 11 February 1690 (The Hague), ibid., 103.
[55] Portland to William 4 February 1690 (The Hague), ibid., 92.
[56] Portland to William 18 February 1690 (The Hague), ibid., 111.
[57] Portland to William 11 February 1690 (The Hague), ibid., 102.
[58] Gebhard, *Witsen*, I, 390; J.I. Israel, *The Dutch Republic, its rise, greatness and fall 1477-1806* (Oxford, 1995), 855-856.
[59] Portland to William 7-8 March 1690 (The Hague), *RGP 23*, 138.
[60] Portland to William 10 March 1690 (The Hague), *RGP 23*, 142-143.
[61] 'the issue of the Earl of Portland silently passed over', qu. in Gebhard, *Witsen*, I, 394.
[62] Resolution States of Holland 12 March 1690, *Hollandsche Mercurius 1690*, 82.

prérogatives.' But since the matter was not resolved in a satisfactory manner, Portland suggested that the Stadholder send a formal letter of complaint - a draft of which he provided.[63]

Portland's use of William's clientele is confirmed by his pivotal part in the ensuing distribution of favours. As early as 25 January he recommended solicitors for posts in the Rotterdam admiralty, receivership of the *Ridderschap*, the Schiedam *Heemraet* (a local governing body), mostly within the Orangist clientele, related to such men as Admiral Bastiaansen and Bailiff Van Zuylen van Nijvelt.[64] On 7 February he recommended someone whose brother had facilitated the 1688 invasion, for a captaincy.[65] Portland and Heinsius jointly examined the names on the list of nominees and sent recommendations to William.[66] Portland's recommendations for offices in Haarlem were accepted by William. Portland had recommended Hermans for *rector magnificus* of Leiden university; he was well disposed and a Calvinist.[67] William accepted his recommendation. Lord Van Voorst, who had entered the *Ridderschap* the previous year, and had been supported by Portland, now entered the Council of State, and Lord Noortwijk was recommended for the receivership of the *Ridderschap*. Lord Wassenaar's son was made *ruwaart* (a local office).[68] Portland recommended to William that all *schepenen* nominated by the Republican Huydekooper should be disregarded.[69] The Amsterdam list caused some problems, as one of the nominees was a protégé of Witsen. Portland would rather not have him, but that would mean that Witsen might be affronted. William selected him, 'croient qu'il estoit à présent plus important d'obliger Witsen que d'avoir considération pour la persone mesme'.[70]

The magistrates' controversy has often been regarded as proof that the Stadholder's authority had increased due to his kingship, but little attention has been paid to the difficulties he experienced as a direct result of his absence.[71] The disputes of the spring of 1690 took place when the King-Stadholder was in a vulnerable position, and to all appearances the victory in Ireland worked wonders in the Dutch Republic as well. Schuylenburg wrote to Portland in late July that the news of the victory at the Boyne had resulted in

> 'a great calm among the evil people, so much even, that a number of the ill disposed from Amsterdam have become divided out of apprehension of the coming of the King, so much even that it is argued that the interest of Amsterdam is not so much different from that of the Stadholder, on the contrary, that there is a mutual good intelligence.'[72]

III The Irish campaigns (1690-1691)

Portland returned to England in June 1690, only to prepare himself for the campaign in Ireland. Indeed, the most direct threat to the revolution settlement came from Ireland and was of a predominantly military nature. Whereas Scotland was mostly plagued by rebel skirmishes, in Ireland a French-Jacobite army had landed near Limerick in the spring of 1689 intent on reconquering the island for James II. The Duke of Schomberg had been appointed in July to command the troops in Ireland, and the preparations for the campaign were discussed between Portland and Secretary of State Nottingham. In August 1689 Portland travelled to Chester, from where the army would cross the Irish Sea, to discuss the final stage of

[63] Portland to William 14-15 March 1690 (The Hague), *RGP 23*, 146.
[64] Portland to William 25 January 1690 (The Hague), ibid., 77-78.
[65] Portland to William 7 February 1690 (The Hague), ibid., 99.
[66] Portland to William 14-15 March 1690 (The Hague), ibid., 147.
[67] Actually he was a *liefhebber*, an occasional attendee of the Reformed Church rather than a member.
[68] Portland to William 25 January 1690 (The Hague), 4 February 1690 (The Hague), William to Portland 7 February 1690, 17 February 1690, Portland to William 22 February 1690 (The Hague), *RGP 23*, 77-78, 91, 96, 110, 114; Wassenaar to Portland 29 July 1691, *RGP 24*, 662.
[69] NA SP 8-8, fo. 106.
[70] William to Portland 21 March 1690, *RGP 23*, 152.
[71] But see S.B. Baxter, *William III* (London, 1966), 258 ff.
[72] Schuylenburg to Portland 28 July 1690, *RGP 28*, 172.

preparations with Solms and Schomberg.[73] The Williamite army under Schomberg had not been successful during its first season. and the King felt obliged to command the forces in Ireland personally. Portland participated in the campaign and fought under Schomberg at the Battle of the Boyne. From the autumn of 1690 Portland retook responsibility for superintending the logistic preparations. 's Gravenmoer, Solms and Schomberg reported to him all problems with the supplies.[74] After the battle of the Boyne and William's return to England, command was taken over by Godard van Reede van Ginckel, who was benefiting from Portland's favours and dependent on his directions.[75] On occasion Portland would even advise Ginckel on what strategy to adopt.[76]

The most important matter was to bring the war to a successful conclusion before the spring. Efforts were made during the winter of 1690/1691 to reach a peaceful settlement. Ginckel and Portland decided to move away from the uncompromising stance William had initially taken. They realised that an expedient might be necessary in order to facilitate a speedy conclusion to the war.[77] John Grady, an intermediary, was interviewed by Portland during the autumn, and returned to Ireland in October 1690, Portland stressing to Ginckel the importance of his mission.[78] Portland insisted that it might be necessary to make concessions and offer pardons, if that could prevent the war from continuing through the following spring. He clearly pressed the Grady-plan: 'Vous pouvez bien aller plus loin que je n'ay fait, lui permettant d'offrir des conditions plus favorables, selon que vous le jugerez à propos et l'emportance de l'affaire'.[79] Nothing was more important than to end the war before the spring campaign, so that troops would become available for the continent, as Portland pointed out to Ginckel.[80] The peace party among the Jacobites proved too weak, however, and by February 1691 Grady requested to be relieved. His mission had failed.[81]

The negotiations in Ireland broken off, Ginckel and the Lords Justices in Dublin decided to test the waters by issuing a declaration that would form the basis of the Treaty of Limerick and offered a pardon and a certain degree of freedom of worship for Catholics.[82] The offer was rejected, and the 1691 campaign commenced, the King impressing upon Ginckel that the fate of Europe depended on his victory.[83] The campaign proceeded successfully, and it is significant that in spite of this Portland continued to insist on reaching a speedy negotiated settlement. Although he had travelled with the King to the Low Countries in May he was still in charge of the negotiations. Portland had good hopes that this campaign might be victorious, the Jacobites apparently not receiving any funds from France and their army being in a poor state. He wrote to Ginckel from Het Loo:

> 'si les Irlandois vouloit songer à se rendre, comme vous avez quelque subjet d'espérer, il ne faudroit pas balancer à leur donner des conditions, quoyqu'un peu avantageuses, car rien ne nous seroit plus avantageus à nous, que de voir une fin de la guerre d'Irlande...'[84]

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[73] Portland's instruction 13 August 1689, *RGP 23*, 63-64; Portland to Nottingham 26 July/5 August 1689 (Hampton Court), HMC, *Report on the manuscripts of the late Allan George Finch, Esq., Of Burley-on-the-Hill Rutland* (4 vols., London, 1913-1965), II, 229; Portland to Schomberg 21 July 1689 (Hampton Court), *CSPD 1689-1690*, 195.
[74] Schomberg to Portland 16 September 1689, Solms to Portland 16 September 1689 and passim, NUL Pw A 1128, Pw A 1163.
[75] Portland to Ginckel 4/14 October 1690 (Kensington), *RGP 28*, 187.
[76] E.g. Portland to Ginckel 15/25 November 1690 (Kensington), ibid., 191.
[77] For a good analysis of these negotiations, see J.G. Simms, 'Williamite peace tactics 1690-1691', in: D.W. Hayton and G. O'Brien, eds., *War and politics in Ireland 1649-1730* (London, 1986), 182 ff., and J.G. Simms, *Jacobite Ireland 1685-1691* (London and Toronto, 1969), 187 ff.
[78] Portland to Ginckel 25 October 1690 (Kensington), *RGP 28*, 188.
[79] Portland to Ginckel 25 October 1690 (Kensington), 13/23 December 1690 (Kensington), ibid., 188, 196; Sidney to Portland 7 November 1690, NUL Pw A 1330; Cf. Simms, 'Williamite peace tactics', 188.
[80] Portland to Ginckel 20/30 December 1690, *RGP 28*, 197.
[81] Simms, 'Williamite peace tactics', 190.
[82] Ibid., 191.
[83] William to Ginckel 1/11 May 1691, *RGP 28*, 235.
[84] Portland to Ginckel 11/21 May 1691 (Het Loo), *RGP 28*, 236.

Such optimism was crushed with the arrival of French reinforcements at the coast of Limerick in May 1691. Portland, now in Flanders, was unpleasantly surprised, pointing out to Ginckel that no money or reinforcements could be provided at this moment. He hoped that Ginckel would succeed none the less, '... sans lequels les affaires de toutte la Chrestienté [sic] deviendroit baucoup plus difficiles.'[85] It became imperative now, he anxiously wrote, '... qu'il faudra tâcher de faire une fin de cette guerre, de quelle manière l'on pourra...' Sidney had been ordered to write to the Lords Justices not to proceed with confiscations of those who had succumbed to the King.[86]

Ginckel's progress was swift and successful. Athlone was besieged during the last week of June and fell on the 30th. The army marched further west and defeated the Jacobite army near Aughrim. On 21 July 1691 Galway surrendered, and only Limerick held out as a Jacobite stronghold. Portland's comment on these events is significant; he congratulated Ginckel on his victory, though '... les Anglois disent que vous avez accordé des conditions trop favorables.'[87] Final victory seemed inevitable now and he had good hopes that the Jacobite commanders, Tyrconnel and Sarsfield, would accept the terms. But August ended and September dragged on without Limerick falling, and William and Portland's optimism lapsed into anxiety when they left Flanders for Het Loo without having received any positive news.[88] Ginckel had decided to bombard rather than attack Limerick, giving the Jacobites hope that they could prolong the siege and take the campaign into the following year. Portland and William were alarmed by Ginckel's tactic, the King writing: '... m'estent d'une si grande importance d'estre mestre de cette ville avent l'hyver, ce qui mesteroit fin à la geurre d'Irlande, et je serois en estat de faire transporter icy des trouppes qui y sont si absolutement nécessaire pour la conservation de cett' Estat et de tous ces alliés.'[89] Limerick fell, however, on 3 October. 'grâces à Dieu', Portland wrote to Ginckel from The Hague, 'qui me donne l'occasion si tost après de me réjouir avec vous de l'heureuse et glorieuse fin de la guerre en Irlande'.[90] The Treaty of Limerick provided for a general pardon and permitted the Jacobite army to retreat to France. By the middle of December all Jacobite forces, some 12,000 troops, had been shipped off to France, and William now had his hands free to fully concentrate on the war on the continent.

IV The Melville administration (1689-1691)

The subjugation of specific national interests to a higher strategy was particularly manifest in William's dealing with Scotland, which Alexander Murdoch described as a 'non-policy of neglect'.[91] According to Patrick Riley, his policy towards Scotland was devoted to '... the maintenance of the royal prerogative and strong executive power. And, in the long run, he sought to tap his northern kingdom as a source of manpower for his armies and of money to defray a fraction of their costs'.[92] The revolution in Scotland had a more radical character and deeper impact than in England. The Convention stated on 4 April 1689 that James had 'forfeited' his throne, whereas the Episcopalian settlement collapsed and prelacy was condemned as an 'insupportable grievance'. The upheaval resulted in the virtual breakdown of existing political frameworks and consequently led to grave difficulties. The first year of William's reign saw the anxious attempts to rebuild a court party that ironically turned out to be even more demanding in terms of the levying of taxes and the establishment of a standing army.[93] Thus the new King strove to establish a court party that would enable him to pursue his foreign policy. The dilemma he was confronted with in Scotland was not unlike that in England; William had to choose between a party that was devoted to him

[85] Ginckel to Portland 18/28 May 1691, Portland to Ginckel 7 June 1691 (Camp de Anderlech), ibid., 238-240.
[86] Portland to Ginckel 18 June 1691 (Camp de Bethleem), ibid., 241.
[87] Portland to Ginckel 13 August 1691 (Camp de Court), ibid., 249.
[88] Portland to Ginckel 27 August 1691 (Camp St Gerard), 18 September 1691 (Vilvoorde), ibid., 251-252.
[89] William to Ginckel 27 September 1691, ibid., 258.
[90] Portland to Ginckel 19 October 1691 (The Hague), ibid., 263.
[91] A. Murdoch, *The people above. Politics and Administration in Mid-Eighteenth-Century Scotland* (Edinburgh, 1980), 1.
[92] Riley, *Scottish Politicians*, 1.
[93] Ibid., 2.

for religious reasons but encroached upon his prerogatives (the Whigs and the Presbyterians), and one that supported his royal authority but had a different religious outlook and was suspected of Jacobite sympathies (the Tories and the Episcopalians).[94] Moreover, an opposition known as 'the Club', the Scottish equivalent of the Country Party, instantly emerged and severely hampered the granting of supplies, arguably the main concern of the King.[95]

There had been several reasons why William had put Portland in charge of Scottish affairs. Firstly, as a close confidant attached to the King, Portland was able to see events within a larger context. It seems imprudent, then, to study Portland's role solely within a Scottish context, as his policy was primarily motivated by events on the continent. Thus Portland was able to intervene in domestic disputes whenever they obstructed royal policy, and support Court parties of any identity.

Secondly, as a Calvinist, he would be more acceptable to Presbyterians. But Portland was unwilling to openly commit himself to any party, and his position was initially unclear to all save his closest advisers. He managed to support the Court whilst keeping lines of communication open to the Club, and support the Presbyterians without frustrating the Episcopalians. Portland and Carstares had initially supported a Presbyterian ministry led by Melville, but by 1691 were inclined to broaden its base. By 1692 the King decided to make Dalrymple a second Secretary, followed by a ministerial reshuffle that was meant to represent both the Presbyterian and Episcopalian interest.[96] Thus it was partly dissatisfaction over Melville's dealing with Mackay and Breadalbane that prompted the King to receive the Episcopalians back into the ministry.

A third reason may have been that a Dutchman in charge was more acceptable for the Scots than an Englishman. He came, however, to be seen as an exponent of English centralism, and there was a real concern that an exclusive Court Party in Whitehall was giving directions to Edinburgh. As one opposition leader clearly recognised, Portland's main concern was to establish a powerful Court party with whomever might serve the King: 'the English Juncto, viz., Hallifax, Denby, Shrewsbury, Nottingham, and Portland, are taking methods for breaking our Parliament'. The phrase 'English junto', here used as an epithet for the Cabinet Council, is reminiscent of the fictitious 'Dutch junto'.[97]

Initially Portland supported the Presbyterian ministry led by George Melville. Although he apparently did not actively meddle in Scots affairs, in fact he regularly intervened when major concerns were at stake. He became increasingly dissatisfied with the Scottish Secretary when military strategy fell prey to partisan animosity. In the spring of 1690 Hugh Mackay had frequently asked for military and financial support from London in order to clear out the Highlands. Would it not be in the King's interest, he wrote to Portland, if Scotland were to be pacified by the time the King went to Ireland?[98] Portland was slow to reply, other matters pressing abroad, but before he had left for The Hague he had given positive orders that Mackay be provided with ships and supplies. When Mackay realised that Melville would not support his strategy and London seemed apathetic, he wrote directly to Portland in The Hague.[99] Portland quickly realised that Melville was obstructing Mackay's efforts, and strongly reprimanded the otherwise successful Secretary:

> 'Jay prie dernierement Mr Castaires de vous parler touchant le General Major Mackay, que vous cognoissez estre un tres honeste homme, et tres zele pour le service du Roy nostre Maistre, qui si fie entierement pour les affaires militaires. Il est tres necessaire Monsieur que vous viviez bien

[94] Cf. Browning, *Danby*, I, 437-438.
[95] P. Hopkins, *Glencoe and the end of the Highland War* (Edinburgh, 1986), 134.
[96] Hopkins, *Glencoe*, 266; Riley, *Scottish Politicians*, 59-60.
[97] Forbes to Hume 22 August 1689, HMC, *Roxburghe Mss*, 118. Cf. Ch. 5.
[98] Mackay to Portland 5 June 1690, H. Mackay, *Memoirs of the war carried on in Scotland and Ireland 1689-1691* (Edinburgh, 1833), 92.
[99] Mackay to Melville 9 November 1689, 21 December 1689. Mackay to Portland 13 March 1690, 9 April 1690, Mackay, *Memoirs of the war.*

> avec lui, c'est a dire que vous lui temoignez de la confidence, que vous concertiez avec lui touchant les dites affaires, et que vous apportiez toutte l'assistance possible avec promptitude.'[100]

Portland again intervened when Melville seemed to undermine the 1691 mission of the Earl of Breadalbane, commissioned to spend £12,000 to get the rebellious chiefs to lay down their arms and swear allegiance to William. Breadalbane was supported by Dalrymple who leaned on Nottingham and Mary, both favouring the Episcopalians for religious reasons.[101] The Duke of Hamilton convinced the Presbyterian faction in Edinburgh that Breadalbane's success would lead to a change in the ministry in favour of the Episcopalians, with the result that Melville now tried to sabotage the Breadalbane mission. When Nottingham complained to Portland that Hamilton had ordered Livingston to march to upset the talks, Portland clearly gave his support to Breadalbane's mission:

> Je nay jamais escoutté ce que lanimosité dun parti fasoit contre tout ce que pouvoit faire quelqu'un dun autre, mais j'ay suivi autant la raison sans distinction de personnes ou partis que mon peu de jugement en estoit capable. Comme je suis persuadé que la negotiation de my Lord Bredalban estoit pour le service du Roy je luy ay rendu le service dont jestois capable. Laffaire est achevee et sa Majesté a accepté la submission des montagnarts d'Escosse ... Dieu voeuille que par la paix et la tranquilite soit establie dans ce royaume.'[102]

Portland's letter seems somewhat disingenuous, as both he and Carstares consistently supported the Presbyterian church settlement. Portland ordered Melville in April 1690 '... que vous establissiez le Gouvernement de l'Eglise en Escosse, qui sera apparemment la premiere chose que vous ferez.'[103] But Riley has explained that the Presbyterian and Episcopalian political factions should not be equated with their religious convictions, thus Portland's support for the Presbyterian church settlement was not necessarily a guarantee for the Presbyterian faction. Indeed, Portland realised that there were political liabilities; the Presbyterian settlement could rest uneasily with the situation in England, where the Tory party dominated by Anglicans was in the ascendant from 1690. To Melville he wrote:

> 'pleut à Dieu que vous puissez adjuster l'establissement du gouvernement de l'Eglise sans le lever si haut qu'il s'abbatte par son propre pois, mais qu'il puisse subsister avec la monarchie, et puis qu'il ne donne point de jalousie à l'Eglise Anglicane ici, et par la ne face du tort aux Presbiteriens de ce royaume.'[104]

The overriding interest was not to encourage an overzealous Presbyterian party.[105] In fact, so concerned were the Presbyterians that they feared Portland was working against them behind the scenes in 'reducing what is doon in our church government upon this ground, that Presbitry is not the generall inclination of the people.'[106] The Presbyterians realised that it was vital to gain his support, and through Carstares they tried to convince the Earl that 'Presbiterian, and King William's friend, are convertable tearmes'.[107] The Presbyterians had good hopes of winning Portland for their cause. One of their most prominent exponents, the Earl of Crawford, ceaselessly solicited him through the channel of Carstares to impress

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[100] Portland to Melville 9 June 1690 ('Daupres de Haylake'), W.L. Melville, ed., *Leven and Melville Papers. Letters and State papers chiefly addressed to George Earl of Melville, Secretary of State for Scotland, 1689-1691* (Edinburgh, 1843), 442-443.
[101] Hopkins, *Glencoe*, 272 ff.
[102] Portland to Nottingham 17/27 August 1691 ('Du Camp de St Gerard'), Dalrymple to Nottingham 17/27 August 1691, HMC, *Finch manuscripts*, III, 211, 213-214.
[103] Portland to Melville 22 April 1690 (Kensington), Melville, *Leven and Melville Papers*, 428.
[104] Portland to Melville 15/25 May 1690 (Kensington), ibid., 435.
[105] Ibid., 1.
[106] Forbes to Hume 22 August 1689, HMC, *Manuscripts of the Duke of Roxburghe etc.* (London, 1894), 118.
[107] Crawford to Carstares 12 November 1689, NUL Pw A 2357.

upon him the importance of Presbyterianism, but uncertainty remained.[108] A Presbyterian delegation was received with protestations of goodwill by the King, but in 1690 Crawford was still anxious to know 'How the Earle of Portland stands affected to Dissenters, he being very differently represented upon that head.'[109]

V The continental strategy 1692

By the end of 1691 the revolution settlement had stabilised; on 22 December the last Jacobite forces left Ireland, whereas on 31 December the deadline expired for the Highlanders to swear allegiance to the King. The termination of the Jacobite wars had made possible a decisive military shift towards the continental campaign. William's successes had immensely strengthened his position, both in the British Isles and on the continent - as Richard Hill aptly observed in December 1691: 'I think our isle is at anchor and is safe enough'.[110] In 1692 William could shift his attention to the continent, but precisely in that year the Williamite settlement on the British Isles was under threat from outside. Rumours of an impending descent by the French had circulated for some time during the spring of 1692, and the French marshal Bellefonds had assembled troops in Normandy with ships ready in Dunkerque for transportation.[111] By the end of April the accumulation of evidence had sufficiently convinced William to have the Irish regiments, destined for Flanders, despatched to England and to send Portland to England with several Dutch men-of-war.[112] He arrived at Whitehall on the 13th of May, after which an emergency Cabinet Council was convened.[113] Several informers had come forward connecting the impending descent to a Jacobite rising. Portland had received an anonymous letter providing fairly detailed evidence for its accusation that a number of officers and nobles, including the Earl of Marlborough and the Treasurer Sidney Godolphin, were involved in the plot; Portland immediately forwarded the letter to Nottingham. William warned Portland that it was a most delicate matter and should be handled with circumspection.[114] The decision to arrest Marlborough was taken by a council of Sidney, Portland, Leinster and a number of officers, and the warrant was prepared by Nottingham. Portland also assumed control of measures to take Jacobite conspirators into custody. A plan was made to systematically search London, inquiries were to be made concerning suspect persons and the main roads to the North and to ports were to be watched.[115] The somewhat inflated hysteria was soon subdued by the news that the French had suffered a shattering defeat at the hands of the combined Anglo-Dutch fleet at La Hogue, which not only destroyed any plans for a descent but also turned out to be a crucial event in war at sea; after La Hogue the Allies had achieved decisive naval supremacy over the French, who now stuck to privateering.[116] The plot turned out to be unsubstantiated.[117]

On the day of the news of the victory the Queen ordered Portland, Sidney, Rochester and Galway to depart for Portsmouth, ostensibly to congratulate Russell but with the purpose of deciding on how to exploit the naval victory. Because the location and condition of the remainder of the French fleet were not

[108] Crawford's letters, NUL Pw A 2353-2357.
[109] Draft letter from Crawford 21 January 1690, HMC, *Manuscripts of J.J. Hope Johnstone Esq. of Annandale* (London, 1897),152.
[110] Hill to Trumbull 8 December 1691, HMC, *The manuscripts of the Marquess of Downshire preserved at Easthampstead Park Berkshire, Papers of Sir William Trumbull* (London, 1924), I-1, 389.
[111] E.g. William to Heinsius 24 April 1692, Heim, *Archief*, II, 50.
[112] Blathwayt to Nottingham 26 April/6 May 1692, HMC, *Finch Mss*, IV, 102.
[113] 3 May 1692, N. Luttrell, *A brief historical relation of state affairs from September 1678 to April 1714* (Oxford, 1857), II, 439, 440.
[114] William to Portland 26 May 1692, *RGP 23*, 171.
[115] HMC, *Finch Mss*, IV, 160-161.
[116] G.N. Clark, 'The Nine years war 1688-1697', in: J. Bromley, ed., *The New Cambridge Modern History* (Cambridge 1970), VI, 244.
[117] Nottingham to Portland 10 June 1692, HMC, *Finch Mss*, IV, 217.

yet known, this could only be discussed in general terms.[118] Plans for a descent had been decided on in the preceding parliamentary session, but when details had to be worked out in the spring only Nottingham seemed enthusiastic.[119] Further preparations had been terminated in the face of the invasion threat, but now options were discussed, troops were concentrated and transport ships had been sent. Portland himself travelled back to the continent and arrived in The Hague on 21 June.[120] Exactly how the victory should be exploited was unclear, the Council of War initially leaving it to the judgement of the naval officers to decide on how '...to annoy y^{e} Enemy'.[121] Ambitious plans for an invasion were narrowed down to a naval descent on St Malo, where part of the French fleet had fled. A bitter dispute followed between Russell and Nottingham; the former had initially proposed an invasion, but because of delays he became sceptical and even dissuaded from the intended descent. Now the pressure on William's armies in Flanders induced the King to consider using regiments initially meant for the descent for his own campaign. Ehrman has erroneously argued that the King kept aloof from the discussions in his ministry. Portland was fully informed of all proceedings, and discussed the options with Carmarthen, Nottingham, Galway and Leinster, the ministers and military commanders responsible for the descent.[122]

Both Portland and William had been staunch supporters of a descent, but strategic disagreements soon came to the fore between Portland and Nottingham. Not surprisingly, it was the Tory ministry - Nottingham, supported by Carmarthen and Rochester - that favoured a shift in resources to the navy rather than to the army. It is worth analysing the ensuing correspondence between Nottingham and Portland in some detail as it illuminates their diverging views on high strategy, which came into the open that summer. Portland was not unwilling to despatch several Flanders regiments for the descent, as he wrote to Nottingham whilst crossing the Channel on 21 June, but he needed to evaluate the situation first. When he arrived in The Hague, it seemed that although the Citadel of Namur (under attack by the French) was putting on a decent defence, the King was unwilling to despatch either cavalry or infantry, and Nottingham was pessimistic about the consequences; a descent would be impossible without reinforcements, and the King should not waste an opportunity to achieve a notable success against France, '... otherwise I may venture to foretell that the Parliament will not be induced to maintain an army abroad...'.[123] The decision lay with the King, and not until Portland had arrived in the camp on 26 June could measures be taken.[124] The King, however, was unwilling to compromise and commanded via Blathwayt that the cavalry be sent across the Channel without delay.[125]

Portland insisted to Nottingham that these were not, in fact, necessary for the descent and that infantry should suffice:

> 'Au nom de Dieu, monsieur, tachons de profiter de l'advantage que nous avons eu par mer, d'autant plus que la fortune ne nous est si propice par terre, ce qui est causé que s[a] M.^{é} ne pourra pas se passer d'auqu'unes des trouppes quil a ici, puisque nos alliés donnent si peu de diversion aus ennemis que ces derniers ne seront pas obliger de faire des detachements de leurs armée d'ici, mais garderont touttes leurs forces en ce pais. Cest la raison pourquoy sa M.^{té} presse si fort d'avoir du moins dix esquadrons de sa cavallerie qui est [en] Angleterre ici à l'armée'.[126]

He suggested that a descent could be carried out '... sans mettre piet à terre...'. In his opinion Nottingham asked for too much and delayed matters whilst the French had time to mount a strong defence.[127] While

[118] J. Ehrman, *The navy in the war of William III 1689-1697. Its state and direction* (Cambridge, 1953), 399-400; 28 May 1692, 4 June 1692, Luttrell, *Brief historical relation*, II, 465, 473; Nottingham to Russell 26 May 1692, HMC, *Finch Mss*, IV, 185-186.
[119] H. Horwitz, *Revolution Politicks. The career of Daniel Finch, second Earl of Nottingham 1647-1730* (Cambridge, 1968), 130.
[120] Portland to Nottingham 11/21 June (in sight of Goeree), 12/22 June 1692 ('Du jaght entre la Haye et Rotterdam'), HMC, *Finch Mss*, IV, 223-225.
[121] NUL Pw A 1087; Ehrman, *The navy in the war of William III*, 400 ff.
[122] Ehrman, *The navy in the war of William III*, 402.
[123] Nottingham to Portland 14 June 1692, HMC, *Finch Mss*, IV, 233.
[124] Meesters to Nottingham 18/28 June 1692, ibid., 245.
[125] Blathwayt to Nottingham 16/26 June 1692 , ibid., 214.
[126] Portland to Nottingham 16/26 June 1692 ('Du camp de Melay'), ibid., 241.
[127] Portland to Nottingham 20/30 June 1692 ('Camp de Meslé'), ibid., 246.

Nottingham had argued the contrary, Portland was clearly supported in his opinion by Leinster and Galway, who were both surprised that the Secretary and Carmarthen had asked for 7,000 troops for what they saw as an uncertain expedition.[128] The discussion now touched the deeper strategic considerations involved, and Portland recognised the Tories' efforts to downgrade the Flanders campaign in favour of their naval strategy. In another letter to Nottingham on the same day, not written on the King's command, he elaborated on what the secretary had written to him of the

> '... surely good success in what I propose, and the prospect of it as fair as we could wish, will abundantly compensate for any of those misfortunes, for whether a town more or less be won or lost in Flanders, certainly the advantage or disadvantage is not comparable to the destruction of their fleet, which leave all France open to an invasion and will encourage the Parliament to pursue it with the uttmost vigour and resolution.'[129]

Portland took exception to his argument:

> '... permettez moy que je vous dise que quant vous parlez dune ville ou deux de plus de perdue en ce pais et de la consequence que cela est pour lAngleterre, vous ne parlez pas à baucoup pres en general darmée, ni meme en habile ministre destat.'

Although it would not be unreasonable to try to humour Parliament, given the fact that Namur was about to be lost, why would the King despatch regiments when it was not absolutely necessary?[130] Nottingham chose not to argue with the favourite, and defended himself, saying he had been misunderstood:

> '... I am sure I never said, that England could be safe if Holland were exposed to ruin; 'tis long that I have thought their interests the same; nor did I say that the loss of a town or 2 in Flanders was of little consequence, but rather quite the contrary, that it would be very prejudiciall and mischevious to Holland, and therefore also to us. But I onely ventured to affirm that such a loss would not be so fatall to Holland and us as the destruction of the French fleet would be to France; and I am not yet convinced that I am in an error.'[131]

But Portland insisted:

> 'Peut estre, mr. que dans ma reponce à la vostre ... je me suis mal expliqué, mais vostre lettre estoit si bien exprimée que je ne vous ay peu mal comprendre. Quant vous dites qu'une ville de plus ou du moins en Flandres ne peut estre de si grande importance que ladventage de la destruction de la flotte ennemie, je repons seulement que lon pourroit perdre ici telle ville qui seroit suivie de lentiere perte des Pais Bas...'[132]

Delays and shortage of transport ships caused the plans regarding St Malo or Brest to be terminated, causing Portland '... un chagrin extreme ....'[133]

During the summer the Tories developed what would eventually become their 'blue water strategy', a shift from continental warfare to naval actions, which was strongly opposed by Portland. The Tories were

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[128] Galway to Portland 28 June 1692, Leinster to Portland 28 June 1692, NUL Pw A 1097, 1129; Carmarthen to William 14 June 1692, *CSPD 1691-1692*, 326-327. Nottingham claimed that Leinster had intimated his desire for more troops, to Portland 15 July 1692, HMC, *Finch Mss*, IV, 316, which was strongly denied by Leinster. Portland knew this, 4/14 July 1692 to Nottingham (Camp of Genappe), ibid., 291-292.
[129] Nottingham to Portland 14 June 1692, ibid., 232.
[130] Portland to Nottingham 20/30 June 1692 (Camp de Meslé), ibid., 247.
[131] Nottingham to Portland 28 June 1692, ibid., 286.
[132] Portland to Nottingham 4/14 July 1692 (Camp de Genappe), ibid., 291.
[133] Portland to Nottingham 11/21 August 1692 (Camp de Ninove), ibid., 384.

now caught in a dilemma they were not able to solve. Only if the King would endorse their strategy could they secure a majority in the House of Commons for supplying him in the coming year. Since William dismissed their proposals, however, they had become an ineffective political force. Nottingham's notions on foreign policy, and Rochester's suggestions along the same lines met with Portland's thorough disapproval.[134] He had his reasons for not sharing their pessimism. In the United Provinces the war was seen by many as a necessary evil, but as long as William effectively blocked the French offensive, he could count on sufficient support.

Thus Portland and the Court Tories disagreed on continental strategy, and consequently also the application of the standing army. The growth of the army had expanded the state apparatus, and a struggle over its control, patronage and resources was inevitable. This process in which politicians and the military both tried to gain control over the decision-making process has perhaps been somewhat neglected by historians. It was a struggle over influence and money, but also over the direction of the war. In his debate over war strategy with Nottingham, Portland had been supported by generals such as the Earl of Galway, who commanded the army in Ireland, and Schomberg's son the Duke of Leinster, commander of the troops in England, who were disgruntled by Nottingham's involvement despite his lack of expertise. In 1693 Nottingham was removed from office for political reasons. It is significant that after this dispute the competent and headstrong Nottingham was replaced with Secretaries that were either weak, such as the Duke of Shrewsbury, or political lightweights, such as John Trenchard and William Trumbull. Simultaneously, those in military positions gained significance; William Blathwayt, the Secretary-at-War during the campaigning season, became increasingly influential even during winter seasons.[135]

VI Court Tories (1690-1692)

Thus the seeds for conflict between Portland and the Court Tories were sown. The latter, led by Carmarthen and Nottingham, dominated the ministry as from 1691 when the Earl of Rochester and Edward Seymour entered the Privy Council. William had been impressed by Halifax, who had advised the King to conduct a policy of trimming: whichever party would be willing to serve the King most would come into office. But William made sure never to be dependent on one party, and although the Court Tories were strong in the ministry, the Whigs were satisfied with several posts. Portland's commitment to this practice shows from his role in the reconstruction of the ministry after Sidney's dismissal as Secretary of State in 1692. The Tory Nottingham being sole Secretary, Portland was sent by the King to interview Trumbull for the Northern Department post. Portland, Trumbull recorded,

> '... would be glad to know my inclinations; and (among other things) to know of what party I was ... Whig or Tory, as commonly called. For my affection to [the] government he knew that well. But as to the other, would desire me to inform him, the Whigs being many in number, rather more than the others, and would expect (upon a removal) to have one they could confide in, and would take it ill if I had not such a one ...'.

To which Trumbull prudently replied that '.... as to any party, I had never been of any, that I was of the Church of England.' Portland then inquired if Trumbull thought if he was esteemed by the Whigs. He thought not. It cost him the office, Portland explaining that '... the Whigs must not be made desperate'.[136]

Portland's preference for a Whig minister thus did not reflect his political predilection but rather his balancing tactic. Portland has often been associated with the Whigs, but he initially rather inclined to the Tories as staunch defenders of the King's prerogatives. Indeed, to Sunderland he suggested in 1693 that

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[134] Godolphin to William 13 July 1692, Rochester to William 16 August 1692, Carmarthen to William 9 September 1692, *CSPD 1691-1692*, 365, 410-412, 443-444.

[135] Normally, the Secretary-at-War was equal to the Secretaries of State only when on campaign. Cf. R.A. Preston, 'William Blathwayt and the evolution of a royal personal secretariat', *History*, February/June (1949), 28-32.

[136] Qu. in Horwitz, *Parliament*, 77-78.

'Tories who are not Jacobites will always be for the King, therefore as many from the Church of England in Parliament as possible.'[137] The statement was not without justification, as some of the radical Whigs perceived it: 'Who would have thought', Hampden lamented, 'so unhallowed a mother as a republic could have produced children that are such heros for episcopacy and the divine prerogatives of Monarchs or that my Lord Portland should become a bulwark of Monarchy, and protector and eldest son of the Church of England.'[138]

Portland's preference in later years for the Court Whigs rests uneasily with his support for the Court Tories in these years. In his imposing study on parliamentary affairs, Henry Horwitz classified Portland among the Whig peers, voting consistently in favour of Whig measures in the Lords.[139] But available evidence, based on the so-called division lists, suggests rather that he consistently voted for non-party measures in favour of the Court.[140] He was a staunch opponent of the Triennial Bill, which forced the King to convene a Parliament every three years. Parliament, Portland retrospectively wrote to William in 1698 with disdain, '... est insensible à toutte autre chose qu'à l'avantage des partis; c'est l'effect du Trianniall Bill.'[141] Although Sir William Temple had counselled Portland to support the measure, in January 1693 the favourite may have advised the King, who was then unsure about its consequences, to veto the Bill. The Country Tory Sir Thomas Clarges accused him of having counselled the King to veto the Place Bill as well (which aimed to bar placemen from taking a seat in Parliament as they were the King's dependants) and even initiated an impeachment procedure in the 1692/1693 session.[142] But the opposition of the so-called New Country Party (a cross-party alliance led by the Tory Thomas Clarges and the Whigs Robert Harley and Paul Foley) did not carry enough weight to bring down the ministry.[143] The Court Party, led by Portland, Nottingham, Rochester and Carmarthen, carried the day, and even managed to muster sufficient support in the Lords to defeat the Place Bill, by a narrow margin, in December 1692. Portland seems to have spoken in the Lords attacking the Place Bill, a measure gravely undermining the King's prerogative as it prevented him from having office holders in the Commons. The Place Bill in particular was a non-party measure. Although William ultimately accepted the Triennial Bill in exchange for Shrewsbury's promise to accept office, the Place Bill remained unacceptable and was vetoed again in January 1694. Evidence therefore strongly suggests that Portland was a non-partisan defender of the Court.[144]

VII Court Whigs (1693)

By the middle of 1692 Portland moved away from the Court Tories as he bitterly argued with Nottingham about the latter's support of a blue water policy and clashed with Carmarthen over his own defence of the Presbyterian settlement in Scotland.[145] By 1693 cracks had appeared in the Tory ministry itself, Nottingham and Carmarthen being increasingly at odds with each other.[146] Due to ministerial weakness

[137] NUL Pw A 1220.
[138] Hampden to Harley November 1690, HMC, *Manuscripts of His Grace the Duke of Portland preserved at Welbeck Abbey* (London, 1891-1923), III, 451.
[139] Horwitz, *Parliament*, 336.
[140] E. Cruickshanks, D. Hayton and C. Jones, 'Divisions in the House of Lords on the transfer of the crown and other issues, 1689-1694, ten new lists', in: C. Jones and D.L. Jones, eds., *Peers, politics and power: The House of Lords, 1603-1911* (London, 1986), 94, 108.
[141] Portland to William 3/13 March 1698, *RGP 23*, 255.
[142] Qu. in Horwitz, *Parliament*, 127.
[143] NUL Pw A 2387; letter to Portland 1 November 1692, NUL Pw A 2792.
[144] HMC, *7th report* (1879), 209a, 212a; Shrewsbury and Essex were absent, the latter gave his vote to Portland; A.S. Turberville, *The House of Lords in the reign of William III* (Oxford, 1913), 182; Horwitz, *Parliament*, 110; Cruickshanks, Hayton and Jones, 'Divisions', 94, 108.
[145] Cf. page 88.
[146] Cf. Feiling, *Tory Party*, 280; J..P. Kenyon, 'The Earl of Sunderland and the kings administration, 1693-1695', *EHR* VXXI (1956), 582.

prospects for the management of Parliament were dim and Portland was open to alternatives. Henry Guy, secretary in the Treasury and client of the Earl of Sunderland, had warned him that

> 'People are posessed of a most dangerous opinion, that England is not taken care on; that must bee cured, or all signifyes nothing, which may bee done, and the Allyes supported to the height; but if it is not done, the confederacy will quickly bee at an end.'[147]

In the summer of 1692 Sunderland had contacted Portland from his country retreat Althorp. His reluctant approach was not so much because Portland had '... a thousand important affaires to looke after', but because of his wariness at returning to mainstream politics after his dramatic fall from power in the autumn of 1688.[148] Sunderland's first letter of 5 May 1692 was answered at once by Portland, who seemed very eager to get him involved in parliamentary and ministerial management. It was necessary, Sunderland argued, to oblige '... the Governement to be more vigorous and not to suffer every body to say and do what they please.' The trick lay, he somewhat disingenuously wrote, in making use of experienced parliamentary managers. 'I can assure your Lord.p', he wrote to Portland, 'that the Considerable Part of [the nation] doe not care who are Ministers of State. Whether this man or that', thereby implicitly criticising William's trimming policy and clearing the way for what came to be known as the Whig Junto.[149]

Portland's dispute with the Tories and their failure to provide strong government made him more open to Sunderland's suggestions. These were communicated to the King on Portland's return to Flanders, and contacts must have been more intensive during the winter of 1692/1693. The military defeats on the continent had not been disastrous in themselves - after all Luxembourg had failed to achieve a decisive victory - but they weakened the Court's support in Parliament. Sunderland had not yet specified his ideas. In a retrospective letter to Portland, he suggested

> '... that the K. must make the foundation of his Governement as broad and as firme as he can, and that all People are to be employed who will serve him. but this Principle, though it is infallible, has with its certainty this likewise common with the Gospell, that everybody turns it to what they please, so that you and I who are both of this mind, may often differ in things, partys and persons.'[150]

Indeed, Portland was still clinging to the Court Tories whom he regarded as the stronghold of royal prerogative but who increasingly came to oppose William's continental policy. 'Whenever the Governement has leaned to the Whigs', Sunderland retrospectively repeated his argument, 'it has been strong, whenever the other has prevayled it has been despised, but as I have already said, I have endeavoured soo often to show this ... I wonder you and the K. after so many years doe not see it as it is.'[151] Sunderland's advice was partially accepted. Indicative of William's new direction of policy, in early January 1693 he dined privately with Portland, Sunderland and a number of Whig stalwarts.[152] At the closing of the 1692/1693 session Whigs re-entered the ministry as the King made John Trenchard Secretary of State and promoted John Somers Lord Keeper. In November 1693 Nottingham was dismissed.

The Court Tories being ousted from government or politically sidelined, by 1693 Portland tightened his grip on ministerial and parliamentary management, as Sunderland was more dependent on the King and his favourite. Sunderland was loathed by most sections of the political nation because of his dubious role during James II's reign. The Imperial ambassador in London, Prince Leopold Auersperg, recorded Portland's answer when he asked him how the King could confide in such a man:

> 'Die Nothwendigheit fordert es. Sehen Sie sich in England um. Sie finden nicht Eine Persönlichkeit von gleicher Befähigung

[147] Guy to Portland November n.d. 1692, *RGP 24*, 37.
[148] Sunderland to Portland 16 May 1692, NUL Pw A 1210.
[149] Sunderland to Portland 5 May 1692, 16 May 1692, NUL Pw A 1209, 1210.
[150] Sunderland to Portland 13 July 1694, NUL Pw A 1238.
[151] Sunderland to Portland 5 August 1694, NUL Pw A 1240.
[152] 7 January 1693, Luttrell, *Brief historical relation*, III, 5.

wie Sunderland. Darum muß man, wie eine Auswahl nicht vorhanden, über Manches hinwegsehen. Auch hat Sunderland sich mit allen seinen Gegnern ausgeföhnt. Er wird um so getreuer dienen, weil sein Heil völlig abhangt von dem Glücke des Königs'.[153]

From 1693 the two earls increasingly co-operated in a manner that foreshadowed the political alliance of the 'du-umvirate' of Marlborough and Godolphin during the War of the Spanish Succession; whilst Portland was on the continent during summers, Sunderland managed the ministry. As to his methods, Portland had argued, whatever Sunderland did, he must take into account that the King treasured his prerogatives and loathed partisan struggle.[154] He condoned his methods of bribing and promising favours to establish a court interest.[155] Sunderland, moreover, was ready to unreservedly endorse a Williamite foreign policy. Dissatisfied with Tory foreign policy, Portland impressed upon him the importance of continental strategy; 'you will not think', the latter assured him, 'that wee would have the businesse of Flanders or Holland neglected, which is of so vast importance.'[156]

As Sunderland constructed a ministry made up of Junto Whigs, Portland functioned as broker to obtain royal approval.[157] Thus it was partly under Portland's tutelage that a Whig Court party emerged. Although the Whig Junto, as it came to be styled, largely worked through Sunderland's mediation, Somers and Trenchard provided Portland with a continuous flow of information, notwithstanding 'the great weight of business wch must be upon you at this time', Somers wrote to him.[158] In May 1693 the ministers had considered a list of MPs and 'agreed on the best meanes of persuading them to be reasonable', and a roster of persons fit for office was drawn up and sent to Portland.[159] He became the main channel of approach when recommendations were made by the Junto. He was keenly aware, however, that the Whig ministers had an agenda of their own. The Tory Godolphin was alarmed by the pattern in Whig appointments, initiated by the Whig Junto, and Portland was careful not to grant all requests.[160]

VIII Struggles with Parliament (1693-1696)

As Portland became increasingly instrumental in parliamentary management and aiding the war effort, criticism against the ministry and William's foreign policy was incessantly expressed in charges against the favourite. In November 1692 Portland was warned by an anonymous correspondent that 'some members [of Parliament] are for impeaching your Lord.^{p} as advising his Ma.^{tie} to keep up the Dutch Confederacy, & therby expending the English Blood and Treasure beyond sea & doing no good therewith against the ffrench'.[161] Such accusations only gained strength as under the tutelage of Portland and Sunderland the Junto was successful during the winter session of 1693/1694, Parliament granting William an unprecedented £5 mln and permission to augment the forces by an additional 20,000 troops. Country MPs bitterly complained that it was Portland who had counselled the King.[162] Accusations concerning his integrity

[153] Auersperg's report, qu. in O. Klopp, *Der Fall des Hauses Stuart und die Succession des Hauses Hannover in Grosz-Britannien und Irland im Zusammenhange der europäischen Angelegenheiten von 1660-1714* (14 vols., Vienna, 1875-1888), VII, 130.
[154] Sunderland to Portland 10 July 1693, NUL Pw A 1222.
[155] Sunderland to Portland 10 July 1693, 21 August 1693, NUL Pw A 1222, Pw A 1230.
[156] Sunderland to Portland 21 August 1693, NUL Pw A 1230.
[157] Sunderland to Portland 4 July 1693, 6 July 1694, 13 September 1694, NUL Pw A 1221, Pw A 1237, Pw A 1243.
[158] Somers to Portland 20 June 1693, Trenchard to Portland 5 May 1693, Russell to Portland 6 July 1693, Sunderland to Portland 3 May 1693, NUL Pw A 1171, Pw A 1407, Pw A 1094, Pw A 1212.
[159] Sunderland to Portland 25 April 1693, 3 May 1693, 20 June 1693, NUL Pw A 1211, 1212, Pw A 1216.
[160] E.g. Sunderland to Portland 20 June 1693, n.d. May 1694, 29 May 1695, 11 June 1695, 18 June 1697, Somers to Portland 24 August 1694, 14 September 1694, 19 June 1696, Shrewsbury to Portland 16 July 1697, Russell to Portland 6 July 1693, NUL Pw A 1216, Pw A 1232, Pw A 1245, Pw A 1246, Pw A 1260, Pw A 1175, Pw A 1176, Pw A 1180, Pw A 1389, 1094; Horwitz, *Parliament*, 154; Sunderland to Portland 6 September 1694 NUL Pw A 1242; J.P. Kenyon, *Robert Spencer, Earl of Sunderland 1621-1702* (London, 1958), 264-266.
[161] Letter to Portland 1 November 1692, NUL Pw A 2792.
[162] C. Rose, *England in the 1690s: revolution, religion and war* (Oxford, 1999), 129.

were also rampant. A 1695 pamphlet criticised him for his role in the East India Company controversy and the Welsh grants, two affairs which were to embroil the Earl in 1695 and 1696 and threatened to pull him under in the ensuing parliamentary turmoil.[163] By then Portland, through the King's generosity, had amassed a fortune, which understandably incited envy.[164] When evidence emerged in 1695 of bribes offered by the East India Company in order to get the charter prolonged, Parliament ordered an enquiry that soon degenerated into a Whiggish witch-hunt for Tories and court members. The enquiries were pushed further, which, Portland wrote to Lexington, 'pourroit toucher leurs propres membres ... il me semble dune Compagnie de gens qui aprez avoir bien beus se querrellent, se gourment se font seigner le nes, et puis se retirent.'[165] But the party soon turned against others. Carmarthen, Nottingham, Trevor, Guy and Portland were all accused of having accepted substantial bribes: the ministers between £1,000 and £10,000 each, and Portland reportedly the astronomical amount of £50,000 - an interesting index of their perceived political influence. The accusations were not wholly unjustified; Trevor resigned, and Carmarthen's already doubtful reputation was tainted again. Nottingham and Portland, however, were found to have indignantly refused the bribes, the latter even declaring that if they would repeat their dishonest solicitations, they would find an enemy of their company in him.[166] Even though he was cleared of all charges, Portland showed little relief and remained resentful.[167] When he received a bottle of wine from his friend Baron Lexington, he whimsically expressed the hope that ' je ne seraij pas coulpabe de Briberij, cependant je le prendray et le boiray a bon compte ...'.[168] Nor was the King pleased with the actions of his Parliament, and he granted Portland a manor worth £2,000 per annum to express his confidence in his favourite.[169]

That summer saw the Whig Junto temporarily in crisis, making the favourite more vulnerable to parliamentary attacks. As Henry Guy, accused of having accepted bribes, was dismissed from the Treasury, Trenchard fell ill and retreated from the Secretaryship, leaving feeble Shrewsbury under severe pressure. The rest of the ministry was bitterly divided. The Junto Whigs Charles Montagu and Thomas Wharton were revolting against Sunderland's leadership. Sunderland had replaced Trenchard with Trumbull - an able administrator but not a strong character.[170] But by mid-August Sunderland seemed to have things under control and wrote to Portland that the Whigs would be ready to serve the King.[171] In October William decided to visit Sunderland at his estate at Althorp, accompanied by Portland, Shrewsbury, Sidney, Godolphin, Wharton and Montagu.[172] Meanwhile an attempt was made to reunite the Court and Country Whigs by inviting Paul Foley, a leader of the Country interest. Portland supported such a rapprochement and even allowed Guy to arrange a meeting for him with Robert Harley.[173]

The reconciliation between Court and Country Whigs failed, which was the more unfortunate as William's instruction to his ministers to find a massive grant for Portland in Wales in the spring of 1695 caused a stir in Parliament. A number of Welsh MPs had heard about the grant and filed a complaint in July 1695. Godolphin told Portland that 'we were all of one opinion in not thinking this a seasonable time, either in respect to his Maj^{tys} service or Y^{r} Ldships advantage to presse the finishing of this grant'.[174] But the Junto laboured to get the grant through, Guy assuring Portland that '... the King may grant it in

[163] R. Ferguson, *A brief account of some of the late incroachments and depredations of the Dutch upon the English etc.* (London?, 1695), 21.
[164] Cf. G. deForest Lord, *Poems on Affairs of State* (7 vols., New Haven, 1963-1975), 753.
[165] Portland to Lexington 22 March/1 April 1695, BL Add Ms 46525, fo. 99r.
[166] Saunière to States General 6 May 1695, BL Add Ms 17,677 PP, fos. 244-248; HMC, *House of Lords manuscripts* (1693-1695) (London, 1900), 557; *Cobbett's Parliamentary History of England etc. 1688-1702* (12 vols., London, 1806-1812), V, 925; Horwitz, *Parliament*, 151-152.
[167] Saunière to States General 10 May 1695, BL Add Ms 17677 PP, fo. 252r.
[168] Portland to Lexington 23 April/3 May 1695 (Kensington), BL Add Ms 46525, fo. 106.
[169] 14 May 1695, Luttrell, *Brief historical relation*, III, 472.
[170] Kenyon, *Sunderland*, 269 ff.
[171] Sunderland to Portland 18 August 1695, NUL Pw A 1249.
[172] Spencer to Newcastle 14 October 1695, HMC, *Portland Mss*, (London 1893) II, 174.
[173] Guy to Portland 31 May 1695, 14 June 1695, 23 July 1695, 6 August 1695, NUL Pw A 502, Pw A 503, Pw A 509, Pw A 511.
[174] Godolphin to Portland 9 July 1695, NUL Pw A 474.

ffee to you or any one; notwithstanding any of the objections, which were in the minutes at the hearing before the Lords of the Treasury'.[175] Despite such considerations there was obvious anxiety that Country MPs would take advantage of the situation. Guy astutely contacted Harley, who complained about rumours that Wharton of the Whig Junto would endeavour to keep him out of Parliament. Guy promised to look into it, and suggested that he arrange a meeting between him and Portland, not least because he was '...a considerable man in the countrey where the affaire of [Portland] doth ly.'[176] Simultaneously he tried to bring Paul Foley closer to the government. Though Portland had his misgivings about Foley, he agreed that the overture could be useful, and Harley showed himself satisfied with Portland's attitude.[177] The rapprochement failed because of animosity between Court and Country Whigs. Thus the Whig Junto was apprehensive and Guy suggested that Portland should lend his personal political weight: 'the putting it forward must come from your side as I before advized you; for Lowndes can go no farther of himselfe'.[178] Portland, indeed, decided to pursue the matter and asked John Somers, the Lord Keeper, for legal advice.[179] In retrospect this was a political blunder, as his request would tarnish his reputation.

Despite the understanding between Harley and Portland the long-awaited attack came in the spring of 1696, led by one of Harley's associates.[180] It was not just the vastness of the grant that was problematic. The three lordships of Yale, Bromfield and Denbigh consisted of almost the complete county of Denbigh and measured some 30 miles in extent. The rents were an estimated annual £1,700.[181] But the lordships were traditionally granted to the Prince of Wales, and past events had shown that to grant them to a subject could even lead to rebellion.[182] A token of subjugation was the so-called mise, a tax levied for the benefit of the landlord, yielding some £ 800 yearly. In a famous speech in Parliament, Robert Price skilfully exploited the underlying resentment in the Commons against foreigners, in referring to Portland as a 'Dutch Prince of Wales'.[183] 'If we are to pay these Mises to this Noble Lord upon this Grant', he complained, 'then he is, or is quasi a Prince of Wales ... I suppose this Grant of the Principality, is a forerunner of the Honour too ...'.[184] The Commons subsequently petitioned the King to withdraw the grant for '... Lord Portland, who had thought to have been Prince of Wales.'[185] Portland now recognised it was unwise to challenge the Commons, and asked William to withdraw the grant.[186]

The protests were obviously exploited to publicly display William's favourites on a political scaffold and thus criticise the King and the Whig Junto. Despite the wave of protests it is likely that the King would have been able to carry the grant through, but a new expensive campaign was impending and a bitter fight over this issue was inopportune. In fact, subsequent grants to Portland went through without a dissenting voice in the Commons. In May 1696, only a few months later, he received a number of

[175] Guy To Portland 25 June 1695, NUL Pw A 505. Cf. Guy to Portland 18/28 June 1695, *RGP 24*, 59-60; Trumbull to Portland 26 August 1695, Montagu to Portland 21 June 1695, NUL Pw A 505, Pw A 936.
[176] Guy to Portland 15 July 1695, NUL Pw A 506.
[177] Guy to Portland 23 July 1695, NUL Pw A 509 ff.
[178] Guy to Portland 30 July 1695, NUL Pw A 510.
[179] Portland to Somers n.d. October 1695 (Althorp), Surrey History Centre, Somers Manuscripts, 371/14/K/7.
[180] E. Cruickshanks, S. Handley and D.W. Hayton, eds., *The History of Parliament. The House of Common 1690-1715* (Cambridge, 2002), IV, 253-254.
[181] An overview of the Welsh grants is in *CTB* X, 1046-1052.
[182] As happened when Elizabeth granted the lordships to Leicester. Godolphin to Portland 9 July 1695, NUL Pw A 474.
[183] *Cobbett's Parliamentary History*, V, 979 ff.; A. McInnes, *Robert Harley, puritan politician* (London, 1970), 36. Portland revealed himself to be sensitive regarding this accusation. Sunderland wrote to him: 'I find you are in a great mistake thinking that the Partiality to strangers which I mentiond in some letters had relation to you, which it has not in the least, nor to none neare the King, but to an Opinion is taken up that he has an aversion and a contempt of English men which I thinke ought to be cured and may very easily be done', Sunderland to Portland 8 September 1695, NUL Pw A 1250.
[184] *Speach for repealing grants in Wales for Bentinck 1696*, in: *A choice collection of Papers relating to State Affairs during the late Revolution* (London, 1703), 526.
[185] Edge to Kenyon 21 January 1696, HMC, *The manuscripts of Lord Kenyon* (London, 1894), 396.
[186] Saunière to States General 14 January 1696, BL Add Ms 17677 QQ, fo. 222v; *Cobbett's Parliamentary History*, V, 986-987n. This must have soured relations between Portland and Harley, although it was now that Guy brought them into acquaintance. Guy to Portland, 23 July 1695, 16 August 1695, *RGP 24*, 61, 62.

lordships scattered over several English counties worth £ 976 annually, but potentially even between £ 3,000 and £ 4,000.[187]

IX The Johnstone and Queensberry administrations (1692-1697)

Thus, despite parliamentary opposition, between 1692 and 1695 Portland managed to strengthen his position through his liaison with Sunderland and the Whig Junto. In Scotland, however, he had withdrawn from business during these years; Burnet observed '... that he had let it go out of his dependence ...'[188] There he lacked a coherent court party and manager of Sunderland's stature, but an important reason must also have been of a practical nature. To a certain extent, to carry out the management of the Scottish Parliament was almost unfeasible during the continental campaign. 'He is so very much taken up in consultations with the Generalls', the Scottish under-secretary informed the Earl of Tweeddale, 'and riding about the camp or towards the enemies lines, that I beleive he can spare very little time to any other thing.'[189] Moreover, his aides were quarrelling, making it difficult for him to gain control over ministerial and parliamentary affairs. Those affairs which required his personal intervention were not always handled well. He had great difficulty managing his ministry, for instance with appeasing the frustrated Duke of Hamilton who had desired the chancellorship in 1692.[190] While Portland withdrew from the intricacies of Scots business, more of it went through the hands of Carstares, who handled most of the relevant correspondence with Portland.[191]

A complicating factor was that Portland's preference for the Presbyterians in Scotland rested uneasily with his support of the Court Tories in England. Although the Episcopalians had come back into the ministry in 1692, it was still dominated by Presbyterians under James Johnstone, who had succeeded George Melville as Scottish Secretary of State. When a bitter conflict emerged between Whigs and Tories over Scottish church matters in December 1692, Portland found himself defending the Presbyterian settlement against the dominantly Tory Cabinet Council:

> 'There was a conference two nights past between the M. of Carmarthen, the two English Secretaries of State, the two Scotch Secretaryes of State ... and Lithglow concerning the State of the Clergy in Scotland ... in the conference above mentioned there was also present the Archbishop of Canterbury the Earl of Portland my Lord Lowthian and that Portland stood with all his last efforts for the Presbyterians but was quite baffled by Carmarthen …'.[192]

But Portland's sympathy for the Presbyterian Church did not prompt him to necessarily support its political ambitions. William had become highly dissatisfied with the Presbyterians when in January 1692 an Assembly refused to admit Episcopalian ministers into the church, which effectively frustrated a new comprehension scheme, and Presbyterian radicalism so much disgusted Portland that once more he gave the appearance of turning his back on Scottish business.[193]

Despite his predilection for the Presbyterian church, his reluctance to wholeheartedly support the Presbyterian-dominated ministry confused and irritated those who regarded him as a potential ally. In 1693 the Presbyterians ingeniously proposed a Bill to give Portland a Scottish title.[194] ' … je vois que le Parlement ma fait lhonneur de faire mention de moy au Roy dans leur derniere act, ce que je n'avois pas merité', he

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[187] BL Eg Ms 1708, fo. 277v.
[188] Foxcroft, *Supplement*, 415.
[189] Pringle to Tweeddale 16 June 1695, NLS Mss 7018-7020.
[190] Portland to Hamilton 20 February 1692, HMC, *Supplementary report on the manuscripts of his grace the Duke of Hamilton* (London, 1932), 124.
[191] Carstares to Melville 26 May 1694, 22 November 1694, NLS Ms 3471, fos. 20, 27.
[192] Mackenzie to Delvin 29 December 1692, NLS Ms 1320, fo. 28.
[193] Hopkins, *Glencoe*, 355.
[194] *The acts of Parliament of Scotland* (1882), IX, 15 June 1693, 323. The Bill was accepted and a memorial was sent to the King by Tweeddale, 15 June 1693, NUL Pw A 548.

wrote to the Duke of Hamilton without apparent enthusiasm.[195] The measure had been contrived by Johnstone; 'I drew the reasons for it back to the Revolution that it might not be said in England that we were thanking you for setting up presbitery', he shrewdly wrote to Portland.[196] For some reason the honour was never bestowed on him, but whether he liked it or not, the opposing factions of Dalrymple and Johnstone kept pulling him into the maelstrom of Scottish faction politics.

The low point was the 1695 session, dominated by the aftermath of the Glencoe affair, and Portland had shown himself a 'trew prophete' by his pessimistic predictions.[197] During the winter of 1691/1692, the clan chiefs who would swear allegiance to the King were exempt from punishment. Those who refused to succumb would be dealt with 'by fire and sword'.[198] The MacDonald clan of Glencoe had hesitated several days too long, and was massacred in January 1692. Though technically the King was responsible, the direct order came from Dalrymple, and the event is best explained within the context of local clan rivalry. Nevertheless the event left an irremovable stain upon the image of the King, who, as in the case of the De Witt murders, was suspiciously reluctant to investigate the massacre. Portland's characteristic hesitation to look into the matter was also unfortunate, but he had his reasons.[199] William had initially instructed Johnstone to investigate the atrocities, who took the opportunity to put the blame on his Episcopalian rival Dalrymple. The Presbyterian faction, led by Tweeddale and Johnstone managed to imprison Breadalbane for his supposed involvement, though the underlying motivation was political rather than legal, as Johnstone attempted to oust the Episcopalians from the ministry. He also encouraged Parliament to insist on an investigation into the Glencoe affair and make it a precondition for the granting of supplies. To William, this renewed clash between rival factions was extremely distasteful.[200] Breadalbane's imprisonment had also disgusted Portland and he was eager to help the former negotiator.[201] At the same time Portland discredited himself by hindering the inquiry, which could suggest some sort of involvement in the massacre.[202] Although the King was cleared by the parliamentary inquiry, there remained a sinister odour about his role and that of his favourite. Portland was unable to forgive Johnstone for his actions and arranged for the removal of his former closest aid from the ministry.

Portland's support for Johnstone had begun to wane as early as December 1694, and he courted Melville, now in the Episcopalian camp.[203] Other Episcopalians, including Dalrymple and Linlithglow, were on better terms with Carstares and Portland, and Presbyterian dominance seemed to be eroding.[204] During the summer of 1695 William was petitioned from both sides, but he was unwilling to initiate any changes. By the autumn Portland was instrumental in the changes the King now made. Magnates such as the Duke of Queensberry and the Earl of Argyle had been pressing to come in and oust Johnstone's old ally, Tweeddale.[205] Now Tweeddale's position was crumbling fast, and after the Lord Advocate's successful audience with Portland, the Chancellor was dismissed.[206] A new ministry consisting of all the major noble interests, had emerged, this time firmly under Portland's control. Tweeddale was replaced with Parick Hume, a former exile and one committed to the Revolution settlement. The two secretaries, Johnstone and Dalrymple, were replaced with James Ogilvy, a client of Portland's, and John Murray. On Ogilvy's recommendation, the high nobility, such as Queensberry and Argyle were placated and given office in the treasury. '...a new set of men are put in', Burnet wrote, 'who will generally depend on

[195] Portland to Hamilton 17 August 1693 ('Du camp de Lembech'), HMC, *Hamilton Mss supplementary*, 127.
[196] Johnstone to Portland 17 June 1693, NAS SP 3.
[197] Breadalbane to Portland 1 June 1695, NUL Pw A 222.
[198] William to Livingstone 11 January 1692, *CSPD 1691-1692*, 94.
[199] Hill to Portland 28 February 1692, *CSPD 1691-1692*, 153-153; Hopkins, *Glencoe*, 338.
[200] Riley, *Scottish Politicians*, 95, 101.
[201] Breadalbane to Portland 29 July 1695 NUL Pw A 224; Stair to Breadalbane 27 June 1695, Glenorchy to Breadalbane n.d., 29 July/8 August 1695, 2 September 1695 OS, NAS GD112/39/169/10, GD112/39/169/16, GD112/39/169/35, GD112/39/172/3.
[202] Foxcroft, *Supplement*, 544.
[203] Carstares to Melville 22 November 1694, NLS Ms 3471, fo. 24.
[204] Riley, *Scottish Politicians*, 94.
[205] Ibid., 109.
[206] Tweeddale to Yester 23 January 1696, NLS Ms 7030, fo. 28; Yester to Tweeddale 19 January 1696, NLS Ms 14404, fo. 335.

Portland ...'.[207] The Earl now actively intervened in disputes that could destabilise the ministry.[208] Portland persuaded Melville to give up the Privy Seal in order for it to be given to Queensberry.[209] Portland reaffirmed his position as the sole channel of communication to the King.[210] The result was a more stable ministry and a successful parliamentary session in 1696.

Portland also became the sole channel for recommendations and established himself as the main distributor of patronage.[211] Argyle demanded office for his brother, Hume for his son, both soliciting Portland's support.[212] By granting requests, Portland meticulously built up prestige and esteem, and bound a court party to himself. 'I have, as directed, offered my mite to serve E. Portland', Argyle wrote, 'I cannot think but he will please to have some regard for me.'[213] The court party freely acknowledged being tied to Portland's favour and interest: 'I am', Ogilvy assured Carstares, 'entirely submissive to what my Lord Portland shall determine.'[214] The Queensberry ministry managed to establish a powerful court party drawn from the main magnate factions. When faction struggles threatened to weaken the ministry, Portland did not hesitate to intervene. For instance, Queensberry and Argyle had become embroidered with Murray, who tried to build up an independent position with the aid of the former following of Johnson and Tweeddale. Queensberry and Ogilvy tried to oust Murray, and asked for the assistance of Carstares and Portland.[215] When Murray was dismissed in 1698 he accused Carstares of being the evil genius, 'a great instrument with Earl Portland' behind unpleasant appointments, as he wrote to Hume.[216]

Portland was thus responsible for the establishment of a Court party that comprised both Presbyterians and Episcopalians.[217] It is therefore worth reflecting on Patrick Riley's portrayal of Portland as an ignorant and partisan favourite. In his opinion, Portland had supported the Presbyterian Secretary of State George Melville because of '... blind loyalty, ignorance and gross miscalculation.'[218] But as has been shown, Portland had been highly critical of the Secretary's role on various occasions and the Presbyterians in general. Riley's mistranslated one of Portland's letters and erroneously suggested that the earl was completely uninformed about partisan animosity in Scotland.[219] Most importantly, however, it should be pointed out that the two imposing studies of Scotland in the 1690s by Paul Hopkins and Patrick Riley almost solely study Scottish affairs in isolation, despite Riley's accurate introduction in which he argues that William and Portland had to deal with a European crisis simultaneously. The image created of Portland as a lazy and evasive favourite is out of perspective when it is realised that the Scottish Parliament sat when he was on military campaign in Flanders, making it practically impossible to become intimately involved. Nevertheless, Portland clearly intervened when matters vital to the interest of the King were at stake.

X Irish policy (1692-1695)

Portland's was increasingly influential in Ireland as well. From Althorp, the estate of the Earl of Sunderland, who was related to him, Sidney had written to Portland in the summer of 1692:

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[207] Riley, *Scottish Politicians*, 109 ff.
[208] Murray to Portland 12 May 1696, NUL Pw A 952.
[209] Riley, *Scottish Politicians*, 113-114; Queensberry to Portland 14 June 1696, NUL Pw A 371.
[210] E.g. Hume to Portland 16 May 1696, NUL Pw A 682.
[211] Argyle to Carstares 3 September 1698, Ogilvy to Carstares 6 September 1698, J. McCormick, ed., *State Papers and letters addressed to William Carstares* (Edinburgh, 1774), 433, 437.
[212] Argyle to Carstares 1 April 1696, Hume to Carstares 22 May 1697, Hamilton to Carstares 5 October 1698, ibid., 289, 201, 351-352.
[213] Argyle to Carstares 3 April 1699, ibid., 476.
[214] Ogilvy to Carstares 10 September 1698, ibid., 441.
[215] Ogilvy to Carstares 22 June 1697, 24 July 1697, ibid., 311, 320.
[216] Ogilvy to Hume n.d. February 1698, HMC, *Roxburghe Mss*, 146.
[217] Riley, *Scottish Politicians*, 161.
[218] Hopkins, *Glencoe*, 265 and passim; Riley, *Scottish Politicians*, 70, cf. 57-58.
[219] See the quote on page 140. Riley erroneously translates 'escoutté' as 'heard of' rather than 'listened to', a significant difference.

> ‘I beleeve you will not be sorry to heare from me in a place where I am sure you have as good freinds as any you have in England; the Master of the house, Mr Guy, and I have had already long discourses, since wee came hither, by which a stander by might easily see the concerne wee had for the Gouvernement and the Kindnesse wee have for you ...’[220]

This meeting lay at the bottom of the political alliance that was emerging between Sunderland and Portland, assisted by Henry Guy and Henry Capel. After the defeat of the Jacobite forces in Ireland and the conclusion of the peace, William had created his commander-in-chief Ginckel Earl of Athlone and Baron Aughrim, only the second Dutchman to receive a British peerage. Another trusted servant, Henry Sidney, was appointed Lord Lieutenant in March 1692, perhaps not the most fortunate choice after his apparent failure as Secretary of State.[221] The appointment of his close friend drew Portland deeper into the vortex of Irish politics. Sidney’s main responsibilities were the implementation of the Treaty of Limerick, as concluded partly due to Portland’s activities, and the preparation for a Parliament to raise the revenue for the King in Ireland. Pending its convocation, Sidney remained in London to arrange initial funds to maintain the army in Ireland, meanwhile informing Portland in detail on his progress.[222] Their correspondence leaves little doubt that the first thing to be arranged was for the Irish to ‘...contribute towards the Expence that is necessary for the maintaining the quiet of that Kingdome ...’.[223] The first parliamentary session in October, however, was ill managed and the King prorogued Parliament within a few weeks.[224]

Sidney’s lenient stance with regard to the Catholics, as stipulated in the Treaty of Limerick, was resented by a number of Protestant MPs. ‘I defy them’, he wrote to Portland, ‘and am sure they can accuse me of nothing but asserting the King’s prerogative.’[225] But he failed to effectively manage the Irish Parliament, which William decided to dissolve. Sidney was recalled and replaced with three Lords Justices: Henry Capel, Cyril Wyche and William Duncombe. It was mainly through the channel of Sunderland, who was steering Capel, that Portland now kept an eye on Irish policy and the plans to convoke a new parliament.[226] Although little evidence of Portland’s direct influence can be found, he now supervised an influential group of Whigs, consisting mainly of Sunderland, Shrewsbury, Trenchard and Capel, who determined the King’s Irish policy.[227]

In 1694 Portland was involved in another ministerial reshuffle in Ireland. Wyche and Duncombe were accused by Secretary of State Shrewsbury of undermining the government’s position on the so-called ‘sole right’ issue, with which the Irish parliament tried to take the responsibility for preparing bills for raising money, thereby infringing on the royal prerogative. A session had to be postponed: ‘the time is elapsed’, Portland wrote to Shrewsbury, ‘for holding a Parliament this year, whence those two [Wyche and Duncombe] who were adverse to a session, have indirectly obtained their end.’[228] Capel, strongly supported by Portland and Sunderland, now moved to become Sole Governor. The actual appointment, not made until 1695, had firm backing from Portland, who had made sure that his competitor Coningsby was by-passed. Capel could also count on the powerful support of Whig magnates such as Montagu, Shrewsbury and Sunderland, and so the court parties in both England and Ireland had become decidedly Whig under the management of Sunderland and the patronage of Portland, who instructed Capel to report

[220] Sidney to Portland 14 August 1692, NUL Pw A 1351.
[221] Baden to the States General 2/12 February 1692, BL Add Ms 17677 MM, fo. 89r.
[222] NUL Pw A 1335-1353.
[223] Sidney to Portland 26 July 1692, NUL Pw A 1344.
[224] W. Troost, ‘William III and the Treaty of Limerick 1691-1697’ (PhD thesis, Leiden, 1983), 55 ff.
[225] Qu. in ibid., 69.
[226] Sunderland to Portland 25 April 1693, 13 June 1693, NUL Pw A 1211, Pw A 1215.
[227] Cf. Troost, ‘Treaty of Limerick’, 156.
[228] Portland to Shrewsbury 6/16 August 1694 (Camp de Mont St André), W. Coxe, ed., *Private and original correspondence of Charles Talbot, Duke of Shrewsbury etc.* (London, 1821), 64.

directly to him any matters of importance.[229] Orders from the King to Capel were, vice versa, communicated through Portland, who hereby had regained a firm grip on affairs in Dublin, together with Sunderland, as Capel wrote to Portland, '...on whose friendship next to Your L.^{s} I intirely depend.'[230] Their political alliance was strengthened by the marriage of Capel's nephew Essex with Portland's daughter Mary.[231]

Capel's appointment had been made possible by a political compromise between the King and his Irish Parliament. Sidney had vigorously opposed the 'sole right' claims of the Parliament, but had ultimately admitted defeat. Capel was acceptable as Sole Governor, because as a dissenting Whig he had the trust of those Protestants who feared the appointment of a second Tory governor; in turn, this faction had agreed not to push the 'sole right' claim, but in the spring there were some fears, as Portland wrote to Capel, that they might hunt for Sidney's former associates:

> 'Sa Majesté m'a ordonne de vous escrire sur le subject des affaires du Pais ou vous estes, que comme vous esperes de reussir dans le Parlement sur les esperances qui vous ont esté donnees par les gens qui ont principalement opposez son service du temps de My Lord Romneij [Henry Sidney], il est a craindre quils attaqueront ceux qui lui ont conseillez dinsister sur le sole Right, et particulierement sur My Lord Coningsby, ce que le Roy souhaitte que vous tachez de prevenir et dempecher au possible.'[232]

But the 'sole right' compromise seemed to work, and William's request for funds was acknowledged in exchange for a pledge for anti-Catholic legislation.[233] 'Je ... me réjouis infiniment ... du succès de vos affaires au Parlement', Portland wrote to Capel in December 1695; 'les apparrances sont si bonnes ici que nous ne pouvons pas doutter d'une bonne session de celui d'Angleterre ...'.[234] But the court party had suffered a heavy blow with the death of Capel in the spring of 1696, and several new candidates addressed themselves to the King and Portland.[235] The appointment of a successor proved troublesome. Charles Porter had stronger support in Parliament than Capel had had, but he was rendered obnoxious to the reigning Whig party in England. William, upon Sunderland's advice, postponed the decision until after the summer, meanwhile instructing Portland to discuss the matter with Sunderland and Shrewsbury.[236] It was Sunderland's associate John Methuen who was made Chancellor of Ireland in 1697.[237]

XI The Assassination Plot (1696)

By the middle of the 1690s Portland was thus supervising William's ministries in Scotland and Ireland, but also acted as patron of the Whig Junto now in control in Whitehall. Increasingly Portland had taken an interest in both ministerial and parliamentary management. Though no party man, in England he was now involved with the Whigs because they appeared more willing and able to provide for the war on the continent. In the spring of 1696 the Williamite settlement was in danger of a threat of an entirely different nature. Rumours about an impending plot against the King's life and an invasion scare caused an upheaval in March 1696. The death of Mary a year earlier had weakened William's constitutional position, at least in the eyes of the Jacobites, who felt that a new attempt on William's life could

[229] Portland to Capel 20 November 1694 (Kensington), 17 March 1695 (Kensington), NUL Pw A 230, Pw A 233; Troost, 'Treaty of Limerick', 98.
[230] Portland to Capel 12 May 1695 (Kensington), Capel to Portland 10 December 1695, NUL Pw A 239, 254.
[231] But see Portland to Capel 22 April 1695, NUL Pw A 237.
[232] Portland to Capel 12 May 1695 (Kensington), NUL Pw A 239.
[233] Troost, 'Treaty of Limerick', 114; Capel to Portland 17 December 1695, NUL Pw A 255; Van Homrigh wrote to Portland that Parliament had granted as much money as can be found in the Kingdom, 14 December 1695, BL Eg Ms 1707, fo. 308.
[234] Portland to Capel 3 December 1695 OS (Kensington), *RGP 24*, 52.
[235] Norfolk to Portland 9 June 1696, NUL Pw A 679.
[236] Sunderland to Portland 3 June 1696, NUL Pw A 1252; William to Portland 13 August 1696, *RGP 23*, 185.
[237] Shrewsbury to Portland 11 January 1697, NUL Pw A 1386.

dramatically alter the state of affairs. A number of plotters had concocted a plan to attack William and his train near Turnham Green, which the King passed on his weekly hunting trip to Richmond. On the 23rd of February, two days before an intended trip, an acquaintance of Portland's, Fisher, told him of a plan to attack and assassinate the King. The plotters planned to send 46 men, thereby outnumbering the King's servants two to one. Portland repeated this information to the King, who remained sceptical; the 1690s were full of plots and rumours, mostly chimerical. The next evening, however, Portland was visited in his office in Whitehall by another reluctant plotter, Captain Prendergrass, who not only confirmed what Fisher had said, but also told Portland that the assassination would be accompanied by an invasion of James II's supporters from Calais and a general insurrection of Catholics and Jacobites.[238] The King still being sceptical, Portland threatened to make the matter public unless the King agreed to cancel his plans; William gave in and the hunt for the next day was called off.[239] Upon receiving the information about the assassination attempt, Portland immediately set things in motion to arrest those involved. 'Les nomes dune bonne partie de leurs complices estoit cogneus', he wrote to Lexington, 'lon fit saisir tous ceus que lon peut trouver.'[240] Having arrested the plotters, Portland was engaged for several weeks with prolonged interrogations of the suspects, the notes of which have survived. The dimensions of the conspiracy were uncovered.[241]

Portland had been earlier involved in dealing with conspiracies. Reports with regard to the interrogation of suspects of the Montgomery Plot in 1690 were sent to the Queen and the Lord Justices, but also forwarded to Portland who was then on campaign in Ireland. The Earl was similarly informed about the proceedings concerning the Lancashire Plot in 1694.[242] The routine gathering of intelligence about matters of security would be handled by the Secretaries of State[243] They informed Portland when anything important came up, but he also received intelligence from his own sources.[244] He had agents and informers in city councils, in Parliament and in the streets. He maintained a private correspondence with agents and diplomats abroad and had secret agents in France. He often received anonymous letters or was visited by informers at his office in Whitehall.[245] Portland was also involved in the employment of spies. He built a network of informers that infiltrated suspect groups and searched the streets. In 1695 Somers recommended the services of a certain Chaloner, who had made 'many and considerable discoveries of the dealings of the Jacobites'.[246] The Jacobite Earl of Ailesbury, who was arrested in 1696 during the Assassination Plot, complained that Portland had employed his son's governor Chondan to spy on him in his own house.[247] In 1690 Portland had been approached by Simpson, a spy who double-crossed him as he was involved in the Montgomery Plot; one year later Portland again made a miscalculation by employing the notorious impostor William Fuller.[248]

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[238] J. Garrett, *The triumphs of providence: the assassination plot, 1696* (Cambridge, 1980), 135-136.
[239] Brande to States General 6 March 1696, Saunière to States General 6 March 1696, BL Add Ms 17677 QQ, fos. 51-54, 287-290.
[240] Portland to Lexington 3/13 March 1696 (Kensington), BL Add Ms 46525, fo. 119v.
[241] NUL Pw A 2462-2519.
[242] NUL Pw A 858-860; Trenchard to Portland 13 July 1695, NUL Pw A 1425.
[243] Cf. Trumbull to Portland 25 June 1695, NUL Pw A 1435; NUL Pw A 1436.
[244] E.g. anonymous letter 11 September 1689, *CSPD 1689-1690*, I, 250; anonymous letter to Portland 13 May 1690, HMC, *Finch Mss*, II, 280. Cf. Somers to Portland 28 May 1695, NUL Pw A 1177.
[245] E.g. anonymous to Portland 13 May 1690, HMC, *Finch Mss*, II, 280.
[246] Somers to Portland 28 May 1695, NUL Pw A 1177.
[247] Earl of Ailesbury, *Memoirs*, W.E. Buckley, ed., (Westminster, 1890), II, 405.
[248] NUL Pw A 446 ff.; 9 December 1691, A. Grey, *Debates of the House of Commons from the year 1667 to the year 1694* (London 1769), X, 203; Fuller complained that '... Lord Portland hindered and discouraged his discovery so long', Bishop of St David's to Huntingdon 10 December 1691, HMC, *The manuscripts of the .... manor house, Ashby-de-la-Zouche* (4 vols.,

Indeed, Portland occasionally encroached upon the Secretaries' responsibilities by personally handling aspects of the intelligence business. Referring to certain amounts of money to be paid to an informer, Secretary of State Shrewsbury professed that 'the heads relating to matter unknown to her Mat^{y} and of which nobody but the King or yourself has any knowledge.'[249] For three reasons Portland played a pivotal role in the intelligence activities during the 1690s. Firstly, given his experience on the eve of the Glorious Revolution, it was only natural that he would assume responsibility for internal and external security. Secondly, the continuous Jacobite threat undermined the confidence William could have in any of his servants, even his Secretaries of State. There were few courtiers who did not contact St Germain at some stage. Marlborough, for instance, had been suspected of high treason in 1694. Portland obviously could not be suspected of Jacobite sympathies.

A last reason was Portland's involvement in the gathering of intelligence in the United Provinces, as indeed the Williamite settlement was threatened on both sides of the Channel. When William's cousin Henry Casimir, the Frisian Stadholder, felt slighted at the appointment of Holstein-Plön as commander-in-chief, he initiated talks with the French agent d'Asfelt in 1694. These were unimportant in themselves, but the case of Halewijn (a close confidant of William who was prosecuted for high treason) the preceding year had shown how vulnerable the Republic was to French intrigues. Portland put heavy pressure on the Frisian stadholder to explain matters and demanded to know what had happened during his conversations with d'Asfelt. Portland's covert employment of Rutger van Haarsolte, a confidant of Henry Casimir, to keep him informed of the Frisian Stadholder's diplomatic escapades formed another tentacle in his intelligence network.[250] In the summer of 1696, only months after the discovery of the Assassination Plot, Councillor Hubert Roosenboom informed Portland that an organ player in The Hague, Van Blanckenburg, had been bribed to assist in the assassination of the King while the latter was attending service.[251]

Surprisingly little research has been conducted to evaluate the response of the Williamite regime to cope with such challenges. Although Alan Marshall in his recent work has done this for the Restoration period, the 1690s still need research.[252] Evidence suggests that the intelligence services developed and improved. Referring to the Assassination Plot, Portland wrote to his friend Lexington: 'Nous estions sur le bord du precipice prets a tomber quant le bon Dieu par sa providence manifeste nous a fait voir nostre peril, et ce lui de toutte l'Europe.'[253] However, later that year he wrote to Richard Hill: 'les jacobites ici nous menacent encore de quelque dessein caché de la sorte que lannee passée mais nous nous precautionons mieux'.[254] The plan Portland provided in 1692 to systematically search London is of particular interest. It suggested for '... an able person [to] be employed to make a list of all streets in and near London, in alphabetical order. These will be divided in eight parts, each division will be taken care of by one who makes a list of all inns, horses, of persons coming and going'. Inquiries should be made about persons in private lodgings, meeting places of non-jurors, horsemarkets and gunsmiths were to be checked etc.'[255] Little is known yet about its implementation or impact, and more research is needed to see whether Williamite intelligence really responded successfully to the challenges.

XII Finance (1696)

London, 1930), II, 222; P. Hopkins, 'Sir James Montgomerie of Skelmorlie', in: E. Corp and E. Cruickshanks, eds., *The Stuart court in exile and the Jacobites* (London and Rio Grande, 1995), 45.

[249] Shrewsbury to Portland 22 June 1694, NUL Pw A 1374.

[250] Portland to Haarsolte 26 February 1694 (Kensington), 26 March 1694 (Kensington), *RGP 23*, 381-382, 385-386.

[251] Saunière to States General 6 March 1696, BL Add 17677 QQ, fos. 289v-290r; NUL Pw A 1912; Roosenboom to Portland 21 July 1696 NUL Pw A 1911. Cf. Galway to Portland 30 June 1696, NUL Pw A 1111, Pw A 1112.

[252] A. Marshall, *Intelligence and espionage in the reign of Charles II, 1660-1685* (Cambridge, 1994).

[253] Portland to Lexington 3/13 March 1696, BL Add Ms 46525.

[254] Portland to Hill 10 November 1696 (Kensington), NUL Pw A 658.

[255] HMC, *Finch Mss*, IV, 160-161.

A last sphere in which Portland was instrumental was that of finance. For some years now he had been actively involved in financial affairs. In the summer of 1694 he had tried to raise money for the army in Flanders, and from the spring of 1695 he kept in close correspondence with Charles Montagu, the chief initiator of the financial reforms. With him Portland co-ordinated attempts to obtain ready money for the Flanders army, and he had had some success in doing so in collaboration with a deputation from the Bank of England to the continent.[256] In 1696 a Recoinage Bill was enacted which called for the replacement of old clipped coins with new currency. By May 1696 the government was faced with an acute shortage of money. William anxiously wrote to Portland: 'j'ai receu par le dernier courier d'Angletere une lettre du duc de Shrewsbury, par lequel il s'explique nettement qu'il ne voit point d'apparance que l'affaire de la monnoye et le crédit se rétablissent, et qu'ainsi le sul parti que j'ay à prendre, s'est de faire la paix'.[257] The King now decided to send Portland as an envoy with full powers 'to pump the nation': to assist the ministry, convoke the Lords Justices and call Parliament if necessary.[258]

The Earl arrived in London on 26 July; 'La surprise que causa avant hier matin l'arriveé du Comte de Portland, fut generale', the Brandenburg envoy Bonnet reported.[259] Except for Lord Keeper John Somers, he found no ministers present, and he immediately sent for Secretary of State Shrewsbury and Sunderland, the latter having retired to his estate Althorp. The next morning Portland conferred with Shrewsbury, Somers and the Lords Justices, stated the urgency of his business and was informed of the steps being taken and the expedients proposed. Portland was willing to consider loans (even from the Land Bank, a Country rival of the Whig-dominated Bank of England), general subscriptions, or, as a last resort, convening Parliament.[260] He was accompanied by one of the directors of the Bank of Amsterdam, who was willing to advance £200,000 on stringent conditions.[261] A deal with a number of merchants came to nothing, Portland suggesting that they refused the conditions proposed and that they were probably not able to deliver the requested £46,000.[262] Portland also arranged a meeting with Foley, Harley and the directors of the Land Bank, but was given to understand that due to the general dissatisfaction with the campaign he should not expect his mission to succeed. Portland met with Paul Foley and representatives of the Land Bank, who promised to advance £40,000, but could not raise it.[263] At the end of August Portland was finally able to communicate the good news that £200,000 had been guaranteed by the Bank of England through a general subscription.[264] Measures for another general subscription should still be considered, Portland, suggested; 'il faut battre le fer pendant qu'il est chaud'.[265]

XIII The Ryswick Negotiations (1697)

The iron was also hot at the negotiation table, as the uneventful campaign of 1696 seemed to signal that peace was imminent. Negotiations for a general peace were resumed in May between the Dutch and French negotiators Everard van Weede van Dijkveld and François de Callières; Portland, though not personally engaged in the talks, was one of the few who was kept informed. On occasion he even

[256] Godolphin to William, 28 July 1694, 31 July 1694, *CSPD 1694-1695*, 242-245. Cf. *CTB*, X-III, 1443; Montagu to Portland 17 May 1695, 21 June 1695 NS, NUL Pw A 935, Pw A 936.
[257] William to Shrewsbury, qu. in D.H. Somerville, *The king of hearts. Charles Talbot, Duke of Shrewsbury* (London, 1962), 115; William to Portland 6 August 1696, *RGP 23*, 179; Shrewsbury to William 21 July 1696, *CSPD 1696*, 280-281.
[258] A. Pryme, *Diary of my own life etc.* (Durham, 1869), 108-109.
[259] Dispatch Bonnet 28 July/7 August 1696, BL Add Ms 30000 A, fo. 192r.
[260] NUL Pw A 2017; Portland to William 28 July 1696 OS (Whitehall), *RGP 23*, 183-184.
[261] Cook to Treby 4 August 1696, HMC, *The manuscripts of Sir William Fitzherbert ...* (London, 1893), 41-42; Bret to Huntingdon 30 July 1696, HMC, *Ashby-de-la-Zouche Mss*, II, 271.
[262] Portland to William 31 July 1696 (Whitehall), *RGP 23*, 183-184.
[263] Stockdale to Irwin 22 August 1696, HMC, *Manuscripts in Various Collections* (London, 1913), VIII, 82-83.
[264] J..E.T. Rogers, *The first nine years of the Bank of England* (Oxford and New York, 1887), 68; Portland to William 25 August 1696 (Whitehall), *RGP 23*, 195-196.
[265] Portland to William 25 August 1696 (Whitehall), *RGP 23*, 196.

instructed Dijkveld to discuss certain matters with the Frenchman.[266] Portland was also instructed to inform the major Allies.[267] Prudently, Portland initiated a correspondence with Jacob Boreel, sometime burgomaster of Amsterdam. In order to pacify the city, the King had promised to keep her informed of the secret negotiations with the French.[268] Diplomatic contacts between the High Allies were severely disrupted, and Portland's correspondence with Lexington assumed relatively more importance. With the deaths of the Spanish ambassador in Vienna, Marquis de Borgomañero, and of Count Windischgrätz, the Austrian ambassador in The Hague, communication became more problematic.[269] Meanwhile Francisco Schonenberg had run into a conflict with the Spanish court and was forced to leave Madrid. 'La expulsión de Schoenberg [sic]', an agent in Vienna wrote, 'ha producido gran tirantez en las relaciones de España con las Potencias marítimas.'[270] The first signs of a disintegration between the Allies thus surfaced. The talks proceeded with difficulty, the major obstacles being Luxembourg and the recognition of William as King of England, a point stressed more by the English ministers than the Dutch negotiators, something Portland discussed with Shrewsbury and Sunderland when in London in August.[271] In September Heinsius broke the news of a diplomatic agreement to the Congress in The Hague.[272] But a peace settlement became less likely with the news of a major setback that reached the Allies in August: the defection of Savoy. The prospects for peace seemed slim to Portland:

> '... I think it is still more uncertain, since advices from France state, that after the peace of Savoy is positively concluded, it is no longer desired, and that Callieres is to continue negotiating, in order to amuse us, and thus increase the disposition of the people towards peace, the more to disgust them with war.'[273]

However, the following spring ministers of the French and the Allies had agreed to meet at Ryswick, near The Hague, in order to negotiate peace. Portland had shown himself consistently a hawk among William's advisers, once dismissing Huygens as 'one of those chaps who want to have the peace'.[274] However, having played an important role during wartime, he would also become involved in the actual conclusion of the peace.[275]

XIV Conclusion

The first two years after the Glorious Revolution were marked by the consolidation of the revolution settlement. Portland had emerged as a highly influential favourite, the only Dutchman in William's train to tenaciously commit himself to his cause and become deeply involved in the politics of the British kingdoms. Portland's activities during these years were mainly of a military and diplomatic nature. He was involved in the preparations for and participated in the Irish campaigns and supervised the subsequent negotiations with the Jacobite and French leaders. Likewise he was involved in the preparations for the war in the Scottish Highlands and oversaw negotiations with the clan chieftains. At the same time he was acting as William's military secretary and dealt with logistics and correspondence related to the war on the continent. He was involved in the conclusion of treaties to extend the Grand Alliance and the supply of auxiliary troops.

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[266] Portland to Dijkveld (Kensington) 5 February [1697], Portland to Dijkveld 26 March [1697], HMC, *Appendix to the 8th report* (1881), II, 559a-b.
[267] Portland to Danckelmann 25 May 1696, NUL Pw A 354.
[268] Boreel to Portland 7 July 1694, *RGP 23*, 397-399; Portland to Boreel 10 July 1694 (Camp of Rosbeeck), *RGP 28*, 342.
[269] Lexington to Portland 28 December 1695, NUL Pw A 1308.
[270] Qu. in Duque de Maura, *Vida y reinado de Carlos II* (Madrid, 1990), 450-451.
[271] Somerville, *Shrewsbury*, 115-118; Shrewsbury to Portland 11/21 September 1696, Coxe, *Private and original correspondence*, 149.
[272] Prior to Vernon 4 September 1696, NA SP 84-223, fo. 195r.
[273] Portland to Shrewsbury 8/18 September 1696 (Het Loo), Coxe, *Private and original correspondence*, 142.
[274] 13 July 1696, Huygens, *Journaal*, I-2, 609.
[275] See Ch. 7.

The five years that followed saw a fundamental shift in William's continental position, changing from a desperate defensive tactic in order to maintain the revolution settlement on the British Isles and guarantee the integrity of Dutch soil, to a confident strategy to contain French expansion. This shift had been made possible partly through the profound changes that swept the English political landscape after 1688. The rise of Parliament made it essential for the King to exercise control over it. Portland was involved in establishing and strengthening court interests in the various parts of William's realms. In 1690 he intervened when the Orangist faction in Holland was weakened. As from 1689 he supported and supervised the Melville administration in Scotland, and to a lesser extent the Johnstone ministry that emerged in 1692. He re-affirmed his central position in Scottish politics with the establishment of the Queensberry administration in 1695. After 1690 he became involved in the government of Ireland, and by 1695 his Whig associates and the Irish Lord Lieutenant Capel were in control in that kingdom. He also became increasingly involved in English parliamentary politics through his liaison with the Earl of Sunderland after 1692. He was involved in the building up of a court party, consisting of Junto Whigs, which successfully thwarted opposition measures to weaken the royal prerogative, such as the Triennial and Place Bills. The war on the continent triggered the financial revolution, and Portland became involved in extracting funding from the Bank of England.

This chapter has described Portland as a courtier rather than as a party politician. Although historians have on occasion referred to him as a Presbyterian or a Whig, it now seems clear that such labels do not adequately describe his position. Portland held a preference for both the Scottish Presbyterians and the English Tories despite their different religious background. But he also was unwilling to become too attached to any party. He moved away from both the Presbyterians and the Tories in 1692 when they could not provide strong government, taking on board Episcopalians in Scotland and Whigs in England. Another reason for his breach with the Tories was the direction of foreign policy. Whereas the Tories preferred a blue water strategy, the Whigs in particular were able and willing to wholeheartedly endorse William's continental policy. Portland therefore became instrumental in William's trimming policy, willing to have a ministry of any colour as long as it provided strong government.

Historians have expressed doubts as to whether Portland was an effective politician. Certainly, little proof of imaginative political manoeuvring either in Scotland or Ireland can be found, and his active involvement in the Cabinet Council was confined to military and naval matters. But once his activities are placed within a wider framework, such criticism comes up short because it fails to grasp the essence of his role as chief manager of the King-Stadholder, in effect heading a personal union at war. Those who accuse him of neglect or procrastination in the Scottish context are not aware of his deep involvement in the Irish negotiations which had priority, and were mainly co-ordinated from moving camps on Flanders battlefields. His activities in Holland in 1690 clearly show how deeply he was involved in local faction struggles, how his patronage network operated and how the court interest was upheld. Portland thus held a supranational perspective; his service to William ran parallel to the defence of Protestantism and the containment of France, a cause for which all available resources in the three Kingdoms and the Republic needed to be mobilised.

Chapter 5: Perception

The fear that a powerful individual could rise to a position which rendered the King a mere figurehead was a common theme in English history and deeply entrenched in the collective political mind.[1] A few years after Portland's retirement, the fall of the Duke of Marlborough was precipitated by insinuations that he aspired to become a second Cromwell. Hence a famous pamphlet - published after Portland was granted land in Wales - voiced the fear that Britain now had a 'Dutch Prince of Wales', a puissant foreigner who was second in command.[2]

In chapters 3 and 4 Portland's power and the application thereof has been studied. This chapter will analyse the way in which Portland was perceived by the political nation in pamphlets and parliamentary debates, and will pay attention to his involvement in the representation of Williamite ideology through his patronising pamphleteers and garden architects. In effect a dialogue took place on various levels within the political nation in which the core political issues of the post-revolutionary settlement figured. First, an overview will be given of Portland's financial position and estates. The earl amassed a fortune during his active political career and founded one of the most influential families in the political history of Britain. It will also explain his involvement in the development of the Anglo-Dutch garden style as a medium of Williamite ideology. The second half of this chapter will analyse anti-Dutch and anti-favourite sentiments and interpret these within the framework of existing political discourse. By comparing these with similar sentiments in the United Provinces, wider conclusions may be drawn about the nature of such ideological debates on the Anglo-Dutch favourite.

I Possessions

Before looking at Portland's actual possessions, it is important to consider the sources of his wealth first. By 1688 Portland was a rich man, and throughout the 1690s his wealth increased substantially. On balance, his superintendency yielded some £200 yearly.[3] As First Gentleman of the Bedchamber, he obtained an annuity of £2,000.[4] A warrant of 27 March 1689 granted him the titles of Baron of Cirencester, Viscount Woodstock and Earl of Portland, and the yearly sums of 20 marks and 20 pounds to support the dignities.[5] More tokens of the King's favour materialised after the coronation. Together with gratifications, Portland received some £3,000 yearly from his offices. Safe investments, mostly in bonds and stock, were made during the 1680s. In May 1685, for instance, he bought ƒ40,700 worth of bonds. In June 1688 William had granted him ƒ26,000 in bonds, mediated by Don Manuel Belmonte, followed by ƒ41,000 in bonds in June 1689, mediated by Baron :Lopez Suasso. In the Republic he does not seem to have invested much in land, in fact the only acquisitions in the 1690s were two orchards purchased in 1691 to extend his Rhoon and Pendrecht lordships.[6] In England he invested £ 10,000 in the New East India Company, but the vast substance of his capital was invested in land.[7] In 1695 Portland received enormous grants of land in Wales, which the King however was compelled to withdraw after a parliamentary outcry.[8] To compensate for the losses, Portland received in May 1696 less conspicuous

[1] Of course this was a common theme in continental monarchies as well, but (within the context of this debate) not so in the Republic.
[2] This obviously gained significance with William being childless. The title was 'conferred' upon Portland for the grant he received, normally associated with the Prince of Wales. Cf. Ch. 4. *Gloriae Cambriae: Or, The Speech of a Bold Britain in Parliament, against a Dutch Prince of Wales, Mr Price 1702*, in: J. Somers, ed., *A collection of scarce and valuable tracts etc.* 1st Collection (4 vols., London, 1748), III, 98-105.
[3] 1 May 1689, *CTB*, IX-1, 102.
[4] 11 December 1689, *CTB* , IX-2, 329.
[5] 27 March 1689, *CSPD 1689-1690*, 43-44; 13 April 1689, HMC, *The manuscripts of the House of Lords 1689-1690* (London, 1889), 84; *House of Lords Journal*, XIV, 175; Tromer to Portland 8/18 April 1689, *RGP 28*, 110-111.
[6] BL Eg Ms 1708, fos. 56r, 172 ff.
[7] J.V. Becket, *The aristocracy in England 1660-1914* (Oxford, 1986), 80-81.
[8] *CTB* X-2, 1046-1052.

estates scattered over England with a yearly revenue of £4,332:3:2.25 and an estimated value in 1709 of £86,643:3:9.[9] The Irish grant conferred upon his son Woodstock, the Clancarty estate (repealed by the 1701 Act of Resumption), comprised about 135,000 acres and must have had a yearly income of some £25,000.[10] In 1697 Portland received fee farm rents in Kent, presumably in an attempt by the King to prevent his resignation.[11] Towards the end of his Paris embassy, a generous grant in Westminster was conferred upon the ambassador, yielding £9,800 yearly, but the property rose in value and had an estimated value in 1709 of £376,027:10.[12] Throughout the 1690s, numerous financial grants were conferred by the King, most of which are listed in his inventory.

Both in the United Provinces and in England Portland possessed a number of country estates, town houses and apartments. In 1674 he had bought the estate of Sorgvliet near The Hague, which would continue to be his main residence. In 1676 William had granted him the estate of Drimmelen, a lordship, enabling him to take a seat in the Holland nobility.[13] Seven years later he purchased the lordships of Rhoon and Pendrecht for the sizeable sum of *f* 154,000,[14] and just before embarkation, in October 1688, William granted him several other Dutch lordships.[15] In 1689 he received Theobalds House in Berkshire, including the surrounding parks of over 2,500 acres and worth £ 1,767 per annum.[16] Reportedly he had a mansion in the Pall Mall, and in about 1709 he bought for £ 3,300 a house at St James's Square for his son Lord Woodstock.[17] His main residences however were his apartments in the royal palaces - Whitehall, Hampton Court and Kensington.[18] These symbolised close proximity to the King, and were consequently continuously disputed with Albemarle during the second half of the 1690s. During the summer of 1699, after Portland's retirement, the new favourite took possession of spacious lodgings in Kensington, and received rooms in Hampton Court linked directly to those of the King.[19]

In Holland, however, Portland normally resided in his Sorgvliet. This country house was in close proximity to William's palace of Honselaarsdijk, but still an independent residence that provided the favourite with opportunities to assert his status. In 1691, for instance, he magnificently received the King-Stadholder, foreign princes and ambassadors at Sorgvliet for dining and falcon-hunting during the Congress of The Hague. This had been preceded by William's glorious entry into the town on 5 February. The citizens had arranged for triumphal arches to be raised along the route through which the King and a long train of noblemen entered under loud acclamations from the public. Portland's status had visibly increased. He sat in his own coach just behind the King's during the triumphant march.[20] Hence Sorgvliet

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[9] BL Eg Ms 1708, fo. 277v.

[10] J.G. Simms, *The Williamite confiscation in Ireland, 1690-1703* (London, 1956), 87. An overview of the Irish grants is in HMC, *House of Lords Mss 1699-1702*, 33-38. This grant was nullified by the Resumption Act.

[11] 29 December 1697, *CTB* X-3, 47-48. Cf. 8 December 1697, 9 December 1697, 22 December 1697, ibid., 44, 172, 190-191.

[12] BL Eg Ms 1708, fo. 277; C.L. Kingsford, *The early history of Picadilly, Leicester Square, Soho and their neighbourhood* (Cambridge, 1925), 65.

[13] N. Japikse, *Prins Willem III - De Stadhouder-koning* (2 vols., Amsterdam, 1933), I, 352, 359; BL Eg Ms 1708, fos. 279-280. According to Tessin and Harris this was a gift from William. J.D. Hunt and E. de Jong, eds., *The Anglo-Dutch garden in the age of William and Mary. De gouden eeuw van de Hollandse tuinkunst* (London and Amsterdam, 1988), 168.

[14] Japikse, *Prins Willem III*, II, 127. Rhoon was valued in 1709 at *f* 198,583:8, BL Eg Ms 1708, fo. 279.

[15] Bequest 16 October 1688, *RGP 28*, 47.

[16] 30 April 1689, 1 May 1689, *CTB*, IX, 101-102.

[17] 25 April 1696, N. Luttrell, *A brief historical relation of state affairs from September 1678 to April 1714* (6 vols., Oxford, 1857), IV, 50; 30 April 1689, 1 May 1689, *CTB*, IX, 101-102. An overview of his estates is in *CTB* X-II, 1018-1026; *Biographia Brittanica, or, the lives of the Most eminent persons Who have flourished in Great Britain and Ireland etc.* (London, 1747), I, 733; NUL PwV 106.

[18] E.g. H.M. Colvin, ed., *The history of the King's Works 1660-1782* (London, 1976), V, 184.

[19] Cf. 11 November 1691, Luttrell, *Brief historical* relation, II, 305; HMC, *6th report* (1877), 206b; A. Boyer, *The History of the Life & Reign of Queen Anne* (London, 1722), appendix, 50; Brande to States General 14 January 1698, 18 January 1698, Saunière to States General 17 January 1698, BL Add Ms 17677 SS, fos. 10-11, 108r; Bonnet to the Elector 4/14 January 1698, 7/17 January 1698, BL Add Ms 30000 B, fos. 2v, 6r.

[20] P. Schazmann, *The Bentincks. The history of a European family* (London, 1976), 88; G. Bidloo, *Komste van Zyne Majesteit Willem III etc.* (The Hague, 1691), 29.

functioned as a grand representative estate, enabling him to represent himself as an independent nobleman rather than the Prince's chamberlain.

This also suggests that his position as a favourite in the Republic was somewhat different from the one he occupied in England. It was only after the Nine Years War that he found the time and opportunity to maintain a country seat. In March 1697 Portland was made ranger of Windsor Park, an office worth £1,500 per annum that he continued to keep until the death of William III.[21] The Ranger's Lodge, close to Windsor Castle and Hampton Court, became his favourite residence. He spent vast sums of money to improve the Lodge and its surroundings.[22] In 1702 he moved to Bagshot in Surrey, and only in 1706 did he purchase Bulstrode in Buckinghamshire.[23] Surprisingly the favourite did not feel the need to purchase an impressive country house for himself, which his financial means and his status both dictated and facilitated. This suggests he consciously tried to keep a low profile in England. In a time when the nobles of England built themselves grand estates, Portland's architectural representation was rather inconspicuous. During his years in power, he resided mainly in palace apartments. Moreover, his estate of Bulstrode in Buckinghamshire - where he settled only after his retirement - fell far short of the magnificence of the Duke of Marlborough's Blenheim Palace in Oxfordshire, the Duke of Devonshire's Chatsworth in Derbyshire and Castle Howard in Yorkshire of the Earls of Carlisle. While such lasting monuments of Christopher Wren, William Talman – one-time aides of Portland - and John Vanbrugh still manage to stun visitors today, the modesty of Bulstrode - torn down in the nineteenth century - generally disappointed contemporary observers.

It may also have been the result of a personal inclination for modesty; none of his town houses and palace apartments were filled with conspicuous luxury. The inventory of Portland's Dutch estate at the time of his death suggests that he had modest taste; the furniture was of good quality, but hardly breathed the atmosphere of grandeur one might expect from a royal favourite. A large collection of silverware, profuse silk ware, ebony chairs and cabinets could be found in his town house in The Hague and Sorgvliet,[24] but his library, part of which was transported to London in the autumn of 1689, was unpretentious.[25] His real wealth, then, was not on display but consisted of bank stock, invested sensibly with little risk in safe enterprises, such as the Dutch and English East India Companies and tallies.[26]

Portland's collection of paintings was not very extensive, but some were done by leading artists of his time. He took a keen interest in the visual arts; Constantijn Huygens mentioned a number of conversations they had had about the display of paintings in the royal palaces.[27] Portland was impressed by Gaspar Netscher whom he had commissioned to paint portraits of his first wife Anne Villiers and William III.[28] It is difficult to determine either the location or contents of the original art collection. Portland left few paintings at Bulstrode, but the inventory of Sorgvliet mentions only three minor

[21] 9 March 1697, Luttrell, *Brief historical relation*, IV, 195.
[22] G.M. Hughes, *A history of Windsor Forest Sunninghill and the Great Park* (London and Edinburgh, 1890), 284-286.
[23] Henry Lord Woodstock to Portland 11 November 1702, 18 November 1702, 25 November 1702 Pw A 103-105; O. Manning and W. Bray, *The history and antiquities of the county of Surrey* (3 vols., London, 1804-1814), III, 84 and E.W. Brayley, *A topographical history of Surrey* (5 vols., London, 1841-1848), I, 234 suggest that Bagshot had been granted to Portland by William, but there are no records for this. Portland leased Bagshot until 20 May 1705, and possibly the lease had started just after the loss of Windsor Lodge on 12 May 1702. Arran to Portland 31 August 1705 NUL Pw A 218; Buckinghamshire County Archive D/RA 1/60. I am thankful to Ms Caroline Knight for alerting me to this document. W. Page, ed., *Victoria History of the Counties of England - Buckinghamshire* (5 vols., London, 1905-1925), III, 208; G. Lipscomb, *The history and antiquities of the County of Buckingham* (London, 1947), IV, 506.
[24] BL Eg Ms 1708, fos. 172-275 passim.
[25] *CTB* IX, 337-338.
[26] BL Eg Ms 1708, passim.
[27] 10 September 1689, Huygens, *Journaal*, I-1, 175; 24 November 1695, 2 December 1695, Huygens, *Journaal*, I-2, 551, 554. Cf. 24 May 1676, 25 June 1676, Huygens, *Journaal*, II, 95, 107.
[28] C.F. Murray, *Catalogue of the Pictures belonging to his Grace the Duke of Portland, at Welbeck Abbey, and in London* (London, 1894), 189.

landscape paintings.[29] The main purpose of the art collection was self-aggrandisement, reflecting the status and recounting the achievements of the favourite-soldier. The collection of portraits reads like a gallery of the highlights of his life. Isaac Soubre painted a double portrait of William and Bentinck in 1675, the latter pale and still recovering from smallpox - a clever image of the master and his loyal servant. The original painting is a portrait of William alone, who clearly occupies the centre of the canvas. Bentinck is later painted behind him so as to make it look like a double portrait. Was it done to acknowledge his loyalty after the event as Noordam suggests? Was it Bentinck himself who commissioned the painting?[30] That was certainly the case with the 1690 painting by Dirck Maas of the Battle of the Boyne, in which Portland had taken the field himself.[31] In 1697 Sir Godfrey Kneller painted him as Knight of the Order of the Garter, which he had then just received; copies of this work are now in England as well as in Holland. In 1698 Portland sat in Hyacinthe Rigaud's studio in Paris for what would become the most impressive portrait, commemorating his grandest moment as ambassador extraordinary, wearing the Order of the Garter in a near-regal pose.[32] Portraits commissioned from Rigaud of the Grand Dauphin and Louis XIV were additional reminders of his grand embassy, during which he also commissioned nine portraits of Ladies of the French court.[33] The latest portrait, dating from 1706, shows Portland amidst his wife and children, a wealthy, retired landed aristocrat.

II Garden architecture

Portland's horticultural activities also represent a good example of the functionality of art. Despite what historians have often written, William was a dedicated patron of the arts and spent vast sums of money on gardens, palaces and paintings in England as well as Holland.[34] In his capacity as Superintendent of the Royal Gardens, Portland was responsible for the extensive building programme and design of the royal gardens. In 1697 he was appointed Ranger of Windsor Park.[35] He was also the Prince's deputy forester, an office reconfirmed by the States in 1702.[36] Portland had superintended the projects in the Prince's gardens and continued to do so in England.[37] He had been responsible, in conjunction with such artists as Romeyn de Hooghe, Daniel Desmarets and Daniel de Marot, for the building programme at Het Loo. One may assume that the professionals had the artistic lead, but there are several indications that Portland was involved with both the layout of the gardens and some of their iconographic aspects.[38] Portland's aides in England were Deputy Superintendent George London, Comptroller William Talman, (both of whom were to co-operate closely in laying out the gardens for his own estate in Buckinghamshire) and his secretary Frederick Henning.[39]

Portland's superintendency was thus not simply an honorary dignity. A dispute in 1695 with Christopher Wren, the King's Building Master, over the appointment of the Master Bricklayer, suggests the direct role he assumed.[40] He paid attention to and was actively involved in the day-to-day activities of

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[29] R.W. Goulding, ed., *Catalogue of the pictures belonging to his grace the Duke of Portland, KG, at Welbeck etc.* (Cambridge, 1936), x. There are few references to Portland's paintings in his correspondence. Cf. K.A. Esdaile, Earl of Ilchester and H.M. Hake, eds., *Vertue Note Books* (6 vols., Oxford, 1930-1955), 52.

[30] Goulding, *Catalogue*, no. 952, 303. The observation is from Grew. Cf. D.J. Noordam, *Riskante relaties. Vijf eeuwen homoseksualiteit in Nederland, 1233-1733* (Hilversum, 1995), 109.

[31] Goulding, *Catalogue*, no. 523, 210; 22 December 1690, Huygens, *Journaal*, I-1, 378. Cf. *Vertue Note Books* (Oxford, 1947), VI, 211.

[32] Cf. cover illustration.

[33] Goulding, *Catalogue*, 374-375. Cf. NUL Pw A 844-856, passim.

[34] As argued by A.P. Barclay, 'The impact of King James II on the Departments of the Royal Household' (PhD Thesis Cambridge, 1993).

[35] E.g. 26 January 1699, Luttrell, *Brief Historical Relation*, IV, 476.

[36] Pw A 2866; BL Egerton Charter 105.

[37] E. De Jong, 'Netherlandish Hesperides. Garden art in the period of William and Mary 1650-1702', in: Hunt and De Jong, *The Anglo-Dutch garden*, 29.

[38] E. De Jong, *Natuur en kunst. Nederlandse tuin- en landschapsarchitectuur 1650-1740* (Amsterdam, 1993), 68-74.

[39] J. Harris, *William Talman, Maverick architect* (London, 1982), 19.

[40] Colvin, *Works*, V, 27.

the gardeners, but also the layout and composition of the gardens. Portland was a knowledgeable and dedicated gardener, and had been an enthusiastic collector of rare plants and seeds for many years.[41] Though no scholar, he had taken a keen interest in garden architecture and acquired a profound knowledge through extensive reading of Italian and French works on this subject.[42] John Maurice had advised him by writing down his *Consideratien op Sorghvliet*, and he had received advice as well from Christiaan and Constantijn Huygens.[43] Having become something of a connoisseur, in 1699 Portland had advised the Prince de Condé on his garden design.[44] André Lenôtre, the French royal garden architect, thought Portland a 'personne quy a meilleure goust'.[45] Portland showed an interest in all aspects of the humanist ideal of garden architecture, combining botanical and scientific knowledge with an appreciation of classical sculpture.[46] He had viewed the gardens of Louis XIV in Versailles extensively and with great interest during his embassy in 1698, and reported about them in elaborate detail to William. Notes in his archive record his observations of the elaborate waterworks of Versailles with calculations on the transport of water.[47] In vain he tried to persuade Lenôtre to accompany him to England, but the latter sent his nephew Claude Desgotz instead.[48] In July 1698, just after Portland's return to England, he and the King viewed the grounds of Windsor with Desgotz and Jack London, Portland's deputy, and work on the Lodge's garden must have proceeded shortly after.[49]

Just before William's visit in 1691 Portland had reconstructed the gardens of Sorgvliet, and a series of prints were commissioned afterwards bearing witness to the splendour of the cascades and topiary.[50] The application of the latest techniques, such as the building of an orangery in 1676 bear witness to Portland's enthusiasm.[51] Huygens reported as early as 1677 that rare citrus trees were growing in the orangery, and in 1689 Portland reportedly brought some pine apple trees from Sorgvliet to the Hampton Court gardens.[52] A catalogue (the *Codex Bentingiana*) was made, later used by Plukenet in his *Phytographica*.[53] The gardens were seen as an example of modern garden architecture. One traveller described Portland's garden as 'a place so neatly composed that here Art and Nature seemed to go hand in hand'.[54] Sorgvliet thus became a well-known stop on the itinerary of connoisseurs.[55]

III Williamite ideology

Portland's involvement in the design of the royal and stadholderly gardens, as well as in his own, is of interest, because it shows him to be not the unlearned man he was often thought to be. It also suggests that the gardens had a decided propaganda value. The gardens at Sorgvliet, for example, conveyed a message about Portland's political convictions. Erik de Jong has argued that William's visit to Sorgvliet in 1691 preceding the Congress of The Hague had profound political implications, Portland having made his country house a symbol of Orangism.[56] Knowledge of the classics combined with extensive reading of modern garden literature inspired him to weave symbolic elements into the garden designs. His close co-

[41] E.g. *CTB*, IX-III, 866.
[42] De Jong, *Natuur en kunst*, 70-73; De Jong, 'Netherlandish Hesperides', 29.
[43] De Jong, *Natuur en kunst*, 73; John Maurice to Bentinck 28 February 1675, *RGP 27*, 14.
[44] Condé to Portland 17 May 1699, NUL Pw A 208.
[45] Lenôtre to Portland 11 July 1698, *RGP 24*, 291.
[46] De Jong, 'Netherlandish Hesperides', 30.
[47] NUL Pw A 2067.
[48] Hunt and De Jong, *The Anglo-Dutch garden*, 158; Lenôtre to Portland 21 June 1698, 11 July 1698, *RGP 24*, 289-291.
[49] 12 July 1698, Luttrell, *Brief Historical Relation*, IV, 401.
[50] Hunt and De Jong, *The Anglo-Dutch garden*, 168.
[51] D. Jacques, et. al., *The gardens of William and Mary* (London, 1988), 38-40.
[52] Jacques, *Gardens*, 197; Hunt and De Jong, *The Anglo-Dutch garden*, 176.
[53] D.O. Wijnands, 'Hortus auriaci: de tuinen van Oranje en hun plaats in de tuinbouw en plantkunde van de late zeventiende eeuw', in: Hunt and De Jong, *The Anglo-Dutch garden*, 77-83.
[54] BL Harley Ms 3516, fo. 14v.
[55] K. van Strien, *Touring the Low Countries. Accounts of British Travellers, 1660-1720* (Amsterdam, 1998), 196.
[56] De Jong, *Natuur en kunst*, 65 ff.

operation with Romeyn de Hooghe strongly suggests that these designs had some elements of propaganda. De Hooghe - undoubtedly with a certain dosage of obliging flattery - acknowledged that '... on peut attribuer le dessein de presque tout ce qu'il y a grand e de rare' in the gardens of Het Loo to Portland.[57] References to the classics were harmoniously integrated into the garden design. At Sorgvliet, a statue of Diana on top of the so-called Parnassus Mount - an artificial hill from which both the sea and The Hague could be seen - marked the border between garden and grounds for hunting, another of Portland's passionate pastimes. Of more interest is the recurring Orangist imagery. A statue of Hercules strangling the serpent represented an heroic image of William.[58] Perhaps most interesting is the use of the image of Ganymede. Abducted by an eagle, this mythological prince of Troy was forced to leave his home to become cup bearer to Zeus. The Ganymede grotto was one of the most remarkable features of the Sorgvliet gardens. Portland's frequent use of this image to portray his own position radiated his image of himself as loyal servant.[59]

Students of garden history have noted that Portland influenced the changing styles of the royal gardens, both through the introduction of the so-called Anglo-Dutch garden style and French elements after his embassy to Paris.[60] A number of gardens that were laid out around Hampton Court and especially Kensington included elements that were specifically Dutch; they tended to be smaller, lacked a clear overall structure, but instead consisted of small independent sections with canals, hedges and topiary.[61] This particular style was copied by such men as William Temple, who integrated Dutch elements into his gardens at Moor Park in Surrey. The Whig minister Thomas Wharton did so at his Winchendon House, and Secretary-at-War William Blathwayt at his country house in Gloucestershire. On the other side of the Channel, Arnold Joost van Keppel copied the garden style of Het Loo at his country house Voorst, as did Ginckel, who laid out gardens around Middachten.[62] Most significantly, Portland, who had been involved in the designing of the gardens of Het Loo and his own estate Sorgvliet, laid out an Anglo-Dutch garden around Bulstrode and the Lodge of Windsor Park.[63] The design of the gardens of Het Loo contained elements of political propaganda. If Louis XIV represented himself as the Sun King, William III was portrayed as Hercules, used as an image of Christian strength and virtue; he thus became the antithesis to absolutism and Catholicism as embodied by Louis XIV and James II. This Hercules imagery appeared on both sides of the Channel and can be found both at Het Loo and Hampton Court.[64] In order to show one's allegiance to the Williamite settlement it became fashionable to imitate this symbolism. The rise of the so called Anglo-Dutch garden style can be traced back to the early 1690s, and must be to some extent attributed to Portland's activities. After 1702 the style was decidedly on the wane.[65]

IV Protestantism

[57] Qu. in ibid., 70n.
[58] Cf. S.B. Baxter, 'William III as Hercules: the political implications of court culture', in: L.G. Schwoerer, ed., *The revolution of 1688-1689: changing perspectives* (Cambridge, 1992), 95-106.
[59] The image of Ganymede was sometimes used as a symbol of a homosexual relationship. Cf. pages 201-202.
[60] E.g. De Jong, 'Netherlandish Hesperides', 35.
[61] J.D. Hunt, 'Anglo-Dutch garden art: style and idea', in: D. Hoak and M. Feingold, eds., *The world of William and Mary - Anglo-Dutch perspectives on the revolution of 1688-1689* (Stanford 1996), 194-195 and passim.
[62] Hunt and De Jong, *The Anglo-Dutch garden*, 105-269; Jacques, *Gardens*, 36-61.
[63] Surprisingly little is known about Portland's estate Bulstrode. Officially it was bought in 1706, but Portland's aid Talman seems to have been involved in the outlay of the gardens as early as 1690. Cf. Harris, *Talman*, 46n, 49, 89; Hughes, *A history of Windsor*, 284.
[64] Baxter, 'William III as Hercules', 95-106.
[65] Hunt, 'Anglo-Dutch garden art: style and idea'. Horace Walpole later described Bulstrode as '… a melancholy monument of Dutch magnificence', qu. in G.W. Keeton, *Lord Chancellor Jeffreys and the Stuart cause* (London, 1965), 352.

Another manner in which the Williamites represented their ideology was through the use of pamphlets and sermons. In his stimulating study on the godly reformation, Anthony Claydon has shown how, spearheaded by Burnet, a providential explanation that 'consisted of a series of interlocking assumptions about the prince and Protestantism in England, and was based upon a deeply spiritual analysis of history' emerged after 1688. A group of Court propagandists adopted this defence of the revolution settlement and linked William's foreign policy to the defence of European Protestantism.[66]

In recent historiography William is seen as a less zealous Calvinist than has hitherto been supposed.[67] It is, however, still significant that a number of his closest advisers were: in addition to Portland, the Duke of Schomberg clearly saw the struggle with Louis as a religious one, and he and the Earl of Galway, both Huguenot 'refugees', had reason to do so. Both were commanding William's forces in Ireland, while the troops in Scotland were under the command of the pious Hugh Mackay. At least two theologians, Gilbert Burnet and William Carstares, had a profound influence in William's councils and they were zealous - but not narrow-minded - Protestants, a fact often overlooked by historians.

There are surprisingly few clues regarding Portland's religious life, and much rests on circumstantial evidence. He was a deeply religious man in his private life, and attending the Sunday sermons seems to have been his normal practice when in the United Provinces.[68] Huygens reveals glimpses of him discussing sermons and he seemed more pious than one would expect from a courtier.[69] Indeed, Burnet marvelled about it: 'He is a virtuous and religious man, and I have heard instances of this that are very extraordinary, chiefly in a courtier'.[70] In his writings Portland seldom reflected on specific theological issues, but frequently displayed his deep dedication to the Protestant cause to which local or even national concerns must be subordinated. Portland was convinced that Divine Providence (a recurring phrase in his correspondence) was guiding the King to protect His church, and he had a tendency to explain political events in such terms. Within such a providential view, Portland frequently assured William 'que le bon Dieu tournera à vostre avantage' events.[71]

In one of his most insightful letters to William, he reflects on how Divine Providence has guided the King's ways to perfect His plan:

> 'C'est sur ce piet que j'ose faire resouvenir à Vostre Maj[té]. qu'elle m'a si souvent témoigné, ce qu'elle a fait voir en tant de recontres, que tout ce qu'elle a jamais entrepris, n'a eu pour but que le service de Dieu, la défence des lois d'Angleterre et de la liberté de c'est [sic] Estat et l'intérest de toutte l'Europe, menacée de l'esclavage, et qu'ellen'a jamais eu son ambition ni sa gloire en veue en premier lieu. Sur ce principe vous avez veu, Sire, que vos entreprises ont esté bénites en tant de rencontres, et quant vous ferez réflexion sur les temps passéz vous verrez que la providence divine a donné les meilleurs succès aus affaires les plus difficiles, et pour ce manifester encore plus évidemment, elle a fait tourner à vostre advantage les choses qui devoit absolument ruiner vos intérêts ... Ce mesme Dieu qui a si souvent fait voir à Vostre Maj[té]. qu'il tire la lumière de ténèbres et qui a tourné en vostre faveur ce qui devoit vous nuire, ne laissera pas son oeuvre imparfaite, mais vous assistera et vous soutiendra sous le pois dont vous estes surchargé.'[72]

From this and other examples Portland appeared to entertain a deep providential view of current events. At first sight, then, Portland comes across as a devout Calvinist, and it was obviously no coincidence that William put him in charge of Scottish affairs. He was also a patron of Huguenot exiles, both soldiers and

[66] A. Claydon, *William III and the godly revolution* (Cambridge, 1996), 51 and passim.
[67] E.G. J.I. Israel, 'William III and Toleration', in: O.P Grell, N. Tyacke and J.I. Israel, eds., *From persecution to toleration, the Glorious revolution and religion in England* (Oxford, 1991).
[68] E.g. Portland to William 29 March 1690 (The Hague), *RGP 23*, 157.
[69] 23 August 1689, Huygens, *Journaal*, I-1, 167.
[70] H.C. Foxcroft, ed., *A supplement to Burnet's History of my own time etc*. (Oxford, 1902), 196.
[71] Portland to William 25 January 1690 (The Hague), *RGP 23*, 76.
[72] Portland to William 22 March 1690 (The Hague), ibid., 153.

scholars, and Portland had shown himself sensitive to the pleas of Huguenots throughout the 1680s.[73] There were, actually, quite a few Huguenots in his household and client network. Woodstock's tutor, Michel Le Vassor, was a former priest who had been converted to Protestantism and had published his *De la véritable religion* in 1689.[74] His venomous anti-Catholic study of Louis XIII incited the wrath of the French King, who demanded that Portland dismiss him from his services in 1699. Initially refusing to do so, he must have sensed that given the ongoing diplomatic negotiations with the French over the Spanish Succession, it was unwise to keep Le Vassor in his service. There are additional reports supporting Portland's reputation of being an anti-papist. According to the catholic Monsieur de B., he was a '... ennemi passioné de nôtre religion'.[75] In his capacity as *drost* of Lingen and Breda he had been involved in the expulsion of priests and in measures against 'popish impudences', showing his sensitivity to the demands of the Calvinist classis.[76] According to Count D'Avaux, he, in conjunction with Calvinist ministers, had persuaded William to rid his officer corps and court of Catholics.[77] In 1691 Portland complained to the Spanish ambassador, who had a chapel in Whitehall attended by Catholics frequently.[78] It is doubtful, however, whether these were clear examples of a deep-rooted anti-papism. D'Avaux and Monsieur de B. were biased in their views, and the last example was rather one of tact, as courtiers in the King's palace itself were daily confronted with people attending mass, and Portland handled the incident with circumspection.

Indeed, in most cases Portland acted as a *politique*. Scottish Presbyterians were uneasy about his commitment to their Church. English Dissenters complained about his support of the Anglican Church.[79] He actively supported the strictly Calvinist Voetians in favour of the looser Coccejans, and preferred recommending officials who were members of the public church or so-called *liefhebbers* (occasional attendees).[80] But here as well political considerations prevailed over dogmatic differences. When, for instance, Comprehension and Toleration bills were introduced in Parliament on the advice of Nottingham in February 1689, Portland took an interest in the affair.[81] Although the Comprehension Bill failed, renewed efforts to assimilate Presbyterians into the Anglican Church were made during the autumn when a royal commission was appointed to adapt the liturgy to accommodate the moderate wings of both churches. A proposal was sent to Portland, who turned for advice to a number of pragmatic Dutch theologians, most of them on good terms with the Orange court at The Hague.[82] Informally Portland, though probably a Voetian, inquired about the opinion of Coccejan ministers in Amsterdam, and the impression arises that he took a very pragmatic stance in this matter.[83] The report of the commission, returned to Portland, endorsed most of the proposals for comprehension set out by Archbishop Tillotson. One of the theologians, Samuel Desmarets, a Walloon, argued that such a union would be 'le coup le plus

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[73] P.J.A.N. Rietbergen, 'William of Orange (1650-1702) between European politics and European Protestantism: the case of the Huguenots', in: J.A.H. Bots and G.H.M. Posthumus Meyjes, eds., *La révocation de l'édit de Nantes et les Provinces-Unies* (Amsterdam, 1986), 46; Bostaquet, Isaac Dumont de, *Mémoires ... sur les temps qui ont précédé et suivi la révocation de l'édit de Nantes* (Paris, 1968), 152.

[74] 28 December 1699, 4 January 1700, Luttrell, *Brief Historical Relation*, IV, 598, 600.

[75] 'Monsieur de B.', 'Mêmoires ... ou anecdotes, tant de la cour du prince d'Orange Guillaume III, que des principaux seigneurs de la République de ce temps', F.J.L. Krämer, ed., *BMNG* XIX (1898), 124.

[76] W.P.C. Knuttel, ed., *Acta der Particuliere Synoden van Zuid-Holland 1621-1700* (6 vols., The Hague, 1908-1916), V, 99, 149, 239, 283, 319.

[77] D'Avaux to Louis 7 October 1688, AAE CPH 156, fo. 237.

[78] HMC, *Seventh report* (1879), 219a.

[79] Hampden to Harley n.d. November 1690, HMC, *Manuscripts of His Grace the Duke of Portland preserved at Welbeck Abbey* (London, 1894), III, 451.

[80] E.g. Portland to William 4 February 1690 (The Hague), William to Portland 17 February 1690, *RGP 23*, 94, 110; N. Witsen, 'Verbaal', J. Scheltema, ed., in: J. Scheltema, ed., *Geschied- en letterkundig mengelwerk* (6 vols., Utrecht, 1818-1836), 152; Cf. Ch. 4.

[81] NUL Pw A 2321-2323.

[82] J. van den Berg, 'Dutch Calvinism and the Church of England in the period of the Glorious Revolution', in: S. Groenveld and M. Wintle, eds., *The exchange of ideas. Religion, scholarship and art in Anglo-Dutch relations in the seventeenth century* (Zutphen, 1994), 94. Cf. J. van Genderen, *Herman Witsius* (The Hague, 1953), 72.

[83] Witsen, 'Verbaal', 168.

mortel que le papisme puisse recevoir.'[84] Fredericus Spanheim, neither Voetian nor Coccejan, had reasonably argued that Presbyterian and Episcopalian churches could adapt better to republican and monarchical forms of government respectively.[85] It appears that Portland's view comes close to this. He was certainly not indifferent, clearly promoted Voetianism in the United Provinces and preferred Presbyterianism in Scotland, but his ideas were broader and it appears he thought rather in the vaguer terms of European Protestantism.

V Dutch community

The self-assertion of the Dutch through the introduction of a garden style with ideological undertones as well as perceived Dutch integration and Calvinist influences into British society provoked ideological, xenophobic rhetoric. The numerous pamphlets warning against Dutch and foreign influences do not give a reliable impression of Dutch integration. The Dutch community in London was not popular, but it gradually eroded after 1689 - although in pamphlets the 'Dutch counsels' theme would linger on throughout the 1690s. A number of foreigners was naturalised after the Glorious Revolution. Schomberg, Portland and his children were included in an Act of Naturalisation passed by the Commons on 8 April 1689. Others followed later that month, such as Ouwerkerk and Zuylestein. However, naturalisation was a measure William rarely applied. Odijk seems not to have been included, and such close aides and confidants as Galway, Leinster, Ginckel and D'Alonne followed only during the subsequent years. Keppel was naturalised in 1697 in order to receive a peerage.[86] Few of those who were actually naturalised or denizised stayed in England.[87] Although Zuylestein, Earl of Rochfort since 1695, took an English spouse- as did most of his children - he returned to his estate in Utrecht after William's death. Keppel, Earl of Albemarle since 1697, married a Dutchwoman and also returned to the Low Countries after 1702. Ginckel, created Earl of Athlone in March 1692, returned to Utrecht and stayed there. The Dutch, then, either integrated successfully or returned to the Low Countries, Portland being one of the very few who remained in England. Nor can the fear be substantiated that too many Dutchmen received titles. Apart from Portland, only Albemarle, Rochfort and Athlone took seats in the Lords, and only Portland's son Woodstock would have a dukedom bestowed on him by George I in 1716.

The degree of Portland's integration can be measured by his own intimations after 1689 that England was to be his new fatherland. Nor did he arrive in an alien environment, as his wife had been English. He must have been delighted that his eldest daughter, Lady Mary, married the Earl of Essex, whom William had made Lord Lieutenant of Hertfordshire. It signified a political liaison as well, linking Portland to the influential Capel family.[88] The marriage seems to refute contemporary images of Portland's failure to make himself popular or assimilate with the native nobility, though he was indeed on occasion bluntly dismissive of his new compatriots and swore to send his son back to the continent so that he would not learn 'debauchery'.[89] Most of his children married into the British aristocracy and were naturalised Britons.[90] Portland integrated with the native aristocracy, and was certainly not the outsider he is often

[84] Berg, 'Dutch Calvinism', 95; Letters to Portland October 1689, Lambeth Palace Library, Gibson Manuscript 932, fos. 70-75.
[85] Hampden's letter to Harley of November 1690 seems to imply that Portland was a member of the Church of England, HMC, *Portland Mss*, III, 451.
[86] Cf. *Commons Journal* X, 77, 78, 79, 83, 84, 87,95, 100, 110, 124, 130; *Lords Journal* XIV, 171, XIV 196, 199, 201, XVI, 51, 54; W.A. Shaw, ed., *Letters of denization and Acts of Naturaliation for aliens in England and Ireland, 1603-1700* (Lymington, 1911), 215, 275 and passim.
[87] Denization, as opposed to naturalisation, did not lead to full citizenship. Nevertheless it was attractive in that it needed not be approved by Parliament, but instead remained the sole prerogative of the King.
[88] Baden to the States General 19/29 January 1692, Hop to the States General 5 February 1692, BL Add Ms 17677 MM, fos. 69, 74. Cf. Blathwayt to Nottingham 2 October 1692, HMC, *Report on the manuscripts of the late Allan George Finch, Esq., Of Burley-on-the-Hill Rutland* (4 vols., London, 1913-1965).
[89] 17 April 1692, Huygens, *Journaal*, I-2, 43-44.
[90] Portland and his children had been naturalised by an Act of Parliament in April 1689, Shaw, *Letters of denization*, 215. The children from his first marriage married with English: his son Woodstock with Lady Elizabeth Noel, and three of his daughters, Mary, Isabella and Frances Wilhelmina with the Earl of Essex, the Duke of Kingston and William Lord Byron respectively.

thought to have been. But naturally there was envy of the newcomer. 'Great Portland', one pamphleteer wrote, 'at the time of the Revolution was plain Mijn Heer Bentinck'.[91] It may have been the case that there was little esteem for the Dutch lower nobility, which had after all more similarities with the gentry; a rigid formal division between gentry and nobility did not exist in the Low Countries. But these sentiments did not reflect Portland's position as such. He held a seat in the Holland nobility, and the barons Bentinck could trace their family tree back easily into the early thirteenth century.[92] At the time of the Glorious Revolution, Portland ranked among the top of the Dutch nobility, in pedigree, wealth and rank.

The expansion of the Dutch community caused friction, and the initial Orangist euphoria turned into frequent outbreaks of xenophobia. According to Witsen, the ambassador extraordinary, who witnessed this reversal during the spring of 1689, the hostility arose from feelings regarding the invasion: '...many say, that it has been for our own interest, that which we have accomplished.'[93] This deep-rooted suspicion was reinforced by the occupation of London and the arrival of a procession of Dutchmen following William. Whether the Dutch 'spread like locusts', as one pamphleteer complained, is doubtful, but there were certainly many Dutchmen who came in William's train as craftsmen, artisans and labourers and settled down in the south of Middlesex and Soho.[94] Portland, as favourite of foreign extraction, was seen to form the core of the so-called 'Dutch junto'. Some of the more sophisticated pamphlets had hinted at sinister political conspiracies being formed behind closed doors. One of the most infamous, the *Dear Bargain*, argued that:

> 'The important and essential Consults and Resolutions are all managed by a few Foreigners, in a secret Cabal of Dutchmen; of whom, that he might form a standing Council, no less than five Ambassadors came over from Holland at once, whereas those States never sent above two to any crowned Head in Christendom; with these, and Benting, and some of the consederate Lords who were with him in Holland, (though these last very rarely), he concerted the Scheme and Model of his Government.'[95]

A similar pamphlet argued that 'Dutch counsels and Dutch measures of acting are the true source of all these mischieves.'[96] Pamphlet literature immediately after the invasion of 1688 picked up this kind of rhetoric in political debates. References to 'Dutch counsels' were to come up consistently in parliamentary debates and pamphlets throughout the 1690s, many of them commissioned by French or

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Anna Margaretha married a Dutch nobleman, Arend van Wassenaar-Duyvenvoorde, whereas Eleanora remained unmarried. Portland had six children from his second marriage. His eldest son Willem was to inherit his Dutch estates, was to be the main advisor of William IV and married the Countess of Aldenburg, whereas his second son, Charles John, married a daughter of Cadogan. His four daughters all married Englishmen: Sophia with the Duke of Kent, Elizabeth the bishop of Hereford, Harriet with Viscount Limerick and Barbara with Lord Godolphin This paragraph is mainly based on E. Brydges, ed., *Collin's Peerage of England ... Greatly augmented, and continued to the present time* (9 vols., London, 1812), II, 29-41, D. Schwennicke, ed., *Europäische Stammtafeln IV Standesherrliche Häuser* (Marburg, 1981), I. Cf. Appendix I.

[91] *The True-born Englishman: a satyr, answer'd paragraph by paragraph* (London, 1701), 73.

[92] Cf. S.B. Baxter, *William III* (London, 1966), 248-249; Schazmann, *The Bentincks*, 1-2.

[93] Witsen to Heinsius 26 May 1689, H.J. van der Heim, ed., *Het archief van den raadpensionaris Antonie Heinsius* (2 vols., The Hague, 1867), I, 16.

[94] G. van Alphen, *De stemming van de Engelschen tegen de Hollanders in Engeland tijdens de regeering van den koning-stadhouder Willem III 1688-1702* (Assen, 1938), 79 ff.

[95] *The dear Bargain; or, A true Representation of the State of the English Nation under the Dutch. In a letter to a Friend*, in: J. Somers, ed., *A third collection of scarce and valuable tracts etc* (4 vols., London, 1751), III, 258.

[96] Qu. in Van Alphen, *De stemming der Engelschen*, 91. Cf. P. Grimblot, ed., *Letters of William III, and Louis XIV and of their ministers etc. 1697-1700* (2 vols., London, 1848), I, 236n; 'Min Heer T. Van C's Answer to Min Heer H. Van L.' Letter of the 15th of March 1689: Representing the true interests of Holland, and what they have already gained by our Losse': 'How careful he has been to put the strongest places of Trust into the hands of our Country-Men [i.e. Dutchmen], or at least such as our Ambassadors and the E. Of Portland were secure of, who, in case of a turn of times, will be able to hold them till we can pour in fresh supplies.', in: Somers, *Collection*, IV, 126.

Jacobite agents.[97] They provided fuel for mordant fulminations against the suppositious influence of the King's 'evil counsellors'.

But most of these were based on conjecture, and little is known about the actual extent to which William's Dutch advisers were influential. The 'Standing Council' to which the *Dear Bargain* refers, was said to consist of Portland and the five Ambassadors, who were only in London until the autumn of 1689. The embassy was appointed by William himself; Odijk and Dijkveld were his aides in Zeeland and Utrecht respectively, Van der Oije was his creature in Gelderland, and the Zeeland regent Citters and Witsen represented the States General and Amsterdam respectively.[98] Yet in practice William disregarded the envoys and let them work out the particulars of the alliance with an English commission. In fact, Dijkveld was the only Dutchman who wielded significant influence in the councils.[99] The embassy was heavily divided, and resentment over William's ignoring their request to repeal the Navigation Acts actually led to a major clash between Amsterdam and the King-Stadholder the following spring. Sir George Clark noted the 'confusion, friction and dissatisfaction among the statesmen who belonged to the less trusted class'.[100] Even Odijk, a prominent aide of the King, resented his exclusion and returned to Zeeland highly dissatisfied. When Witsen, the Amsterdam burgomaster, tried to obtain trade advantages and the revocation of the Navigation Act, his requests were brushed aside by William. When Citters protested against the final draft of the naval treaty, William and Heinsius applied pressure and the ambassador gave in.[101] Thus there had never been a standing council, and the embassy disintegrated in the autumn of 1689, when Dijkveld, the only adviser to whom William did pay attention, returned to Utrecht.[102] The aversion to Dutch courtiers was reminiscent of criticism of the Scottish entourage of James I, which was much more prominent. Similar criticism would be directed at the Hanoverian counsellors of George I, and they were even less influential.[103]

The presence of foreigners in William's circle was bitterly criticised, but it is striking how few of them actually held political office or a position at court. The grand offices went to Englishmen: Dorset became Lord Chamberlain and Devonshire Lord Steward. According to Bucholz, '... the King's Dutch friends were confined to a very few, though strategic, positions'.[104] Moreover, William's court at Hampton Court Palace was not just a royal court; it continued to be a stadholderly court as well. If English courtiers were concerned about foreigners coming to court, Dutch courtiers at The Hague were equally worried that they might lose their influence due to what was essentially a transfer of the stadholderly court to London. Ouwerkerk, for instance, was *stalmeester* to William III, an office which was confirmed in 1689 when the King made him Master of the Horse. Zuylestein was essentially a courtier at the stadholderly court in The Hague, and was made Master of the Robes. Portland's office as Groom of the Stole and First Gentleman of the Bedchamber were not unlike his chamberlainship.

The influence of foreigners in Parliament was marginal. This is something the Dutch themselves realised as well. In a private conversation the High Councillor Hubert Roosenboom stated that the Dutch could not hold high office. When Huygens suggested that the King could naturalise some, the former replied that the English already held a grudge towards Portland, and Dutch officeholders would only attract more antipathy.[105] There were no foreigners in the Commons, and less than half a dozen actually took a seat in the House of Lords. Portland entered the House in 1689, to be followed only by the Duke of

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[97] Van Alphen, *De stemming der Engelschen*, 75-79.
[98] William to Dijkveld 9/19 December 1688, Willem to Hendrik Fagel 9/19 December 1688, *RGP 28*, 74-76.
[99] Dispatch of Parent 11 July 1689 NS, AAE CPA 170, fo. 217v.
[100] G.N. Clark, 'The Dutch missions to England in 1689', *EHR* XXXV (1920), 540.
[101] Witsen to Heinsius 23 August 1689, Heim, *Archief van Heinsius*, I, 21.
[102] Cf. 18 January 1689, 26 August 1689, Huygens, *Journaal*, I-1, 63-64, 168.
[103] N. Cuddy, 'The revival of the entourage: the Bedchamber of James I, 1603-1625', in: D. Starkey et. al., *The English Court: from the Wars of the Roses to the Civil War* (London and New York, 1987); R. Hatton, *George I: Elector and king* (London, 1978), 132 ff.
[104] R.O. Bucholz, *The Augustan court. Queen Anne and the Decline of Court Culture* (Stanford, 1993), 27; A. Barclay, 'William III's royal court', paper given at conference 'William III, Politics and Culture in International Context', Utrecht 14 December 2002.
[105] 8 January 1689, Huygens, *Journaal*, I-1, 57-58.

Schomberg, Zuylestein and Keppel, both in 1695 as Earl of Rochfort and Earl of Albemarle.[106] The Duke of Leinster and Ginckel, created Earl of Athlone in 1692, were eligible for seats in the Irish House of Lords. The Cabinet Council, established in 1689 on the recommendation of William's closest English adviser, the Marquis of Halifax, only included Portland, in addition to Halifax as Lord Privy Seal, the Earl of Danby as Lord President, and the two Secretaries of State, the Earls of Nottingham and Shrewsbury.[107] The Privy Council only contained Portland, and later the second Duke of Schomberg.[108]

The one area in which foreigners were prominent was the army, and the small circle of powerful foreign military commanders was widely resented. The German Hermann Schomberg had fought for Louis XIV but changed sides after the King revoked the Edict of Nantes; he became William's commander-of-chief of the army in Ireland until he was succeeded in 1690 - after a brief interim command by the German general the Count of Solms-Braunfels by the Utrecht nobleman Godard van Reede van Ginckel. The Huguenot officer Henri Massue de Ruvigny, Earl of Galway, succeeded Ginckel in 1692 until appointed Lord Justice in 1697. Hugh Mackay had been commander of the Anglo-Scottish regiments in the Dutch Republic and was despatched to Scotland in 1689. William had good reason to distrust his English officers, but these foreigners were mainly employed for their capacities and experience, and the King was perfectly content to leave the fleet under the able command of English admirals.[109] The most prominent members of William's entourage thus tended to be selected for their military capacities, and not without reason has William been styled a 'warrior King'.[110]

Inevitably, opposition to William's militarised regime materialised in the form of criticism of his army, his strategy and his officers. Rochester's and Nottingham's pessimism concerning the 1692/1693 session of Parliament was echoed in an anonymous letter Portland received, informing him that some were intent on impeaching him for advising the King to wage war on the continent.[111] The prediction was not unjustified and the Commons were after blood. Though Portland was accused of having sacrificed English troops at Steenkerken, it was Solms who had to bear the brunt of a ferocious attack on foreign officers. 'I think', one MP had argued during the debates, 'it is not consistent with the interest of this kingdom for to have foreign officers over an English army when we have so many brave, courageous men amongst us. The Englishman can have no interest but the good of his own country; what foreigners may have I cannot tell.'[112] The opposition, however, though buoyed by a wave of xenophobia, was unable to carry the day. Edward Seymour supported the Crown, arguing that there were no able English commanders to take over.[113] It was clear that the dissatisfaction of English officers such as Marlborough had sparked the conflict. The Imperial ambassador Hoffmann dismissed the criticism: 'Sie haben zu ihren Klagen geringe Ursache weil ausser einigen Generalen wie Portland und Ouwerkerke, sich keine Holländer hier etablirt befinden. Die Klagen sind viel mehr ihrem angeboren Widerwillen gegen alles Fremde beizumessen'.[114] Nevertheless, the foreign officers symbolised William's military regime, and continued to be the focus of protest during the 1690s.

English diplomats likewise protested against the favour shown to the King's and Portland's Dutch clients. Anglo-Dutch diplomatic co-operation during this period was reasonably successful, but relations between English and Dutch envoys were often strained. The Dutch and British resident in Constantinople were hardly on speaking terms, and tended to have separate audiences to the Porte of which they did not inform each other. Heemskerck encroached upon the English resident's terrain as well, causing

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[106] Van Alphen, *De stemming der Engelschen*, 90.
[107] 13 August 1689, Luttrell, *Brief historical relation*, I, 568.
[108] *The names of the Lord of his Majesty's most Honourable Privy Council*, in: Somers, *Collection*, II, 322-323; Van Alphen, *De stemming der Engelschen*, 276.
[109] J. Childs, *The British army of William III 1689-1702* (Manchester, 1987), 74, 76.
[110] D. Rubini, *Court and Country* (London, 1968), 14, 24.
[111] Letter to Portland 1 November 1692, NUL Pw A 2792.
[112] Qu. in C. Rose, *England in the 1690s: revolution, religion and war* (Oxford, 1999), 40.
[113] Childs, *The British army*, 76.
[114] Van Alphen, *De stemming van de Engelschen*, 126.

widespread resentment amongst British envoys such as George Stepney.[115] William allowed his English envoys to work side by side with Dutch representatives, but when real business had to be done he chose to rely on the efforts of trusted envoys.[116] The most vocal protest came from the particularly able and ambitious Stepney, who complained that Francisco Schonenberg was

> 'not less troublesome to [Alexander Stanhope] than Mr Heemskirk was to my Lord Paget, Mr Amerongen to Mr Molesworth and Mr Ham to Mr Johnston at Berlin and to me at Dresden'. He hoped that the king 'may be desired not to suffer strangers any more to concern themselves with our affairs, which is a scandall to our nation, and cannot but embroile us ... There is no dealing with the King when a Dutchman comes into competition.'[117]

But Portland's envoys and informers were not predominantly Dutchmen, and Stepney's objection must be interpreted with care. Portland was in close correspondence with Stepney's Dutch colleague, Johan Ham.[118] In spite of his envy Stepney confessed that Ham, who had considerable experience having served under Amerongen in Berlin for more than a decade, is '... very diligent and generally very well informed of affaires.' Stepney bitterly complained, though, that Ham was '... a creature of my Lord Portland.'[119] To Strafford he confided, that although Portland's expressions 'were very much a courtier's way of dealing. But at the bottom I must assure you he is the man who has hindered me, not so much out of ill will towards me, as of favour to Ham and Keppell. Mr Blathwayt does as good as tell me so; but wee are not allow'd to speak our minds.'[120] Closer inspection suggests that, rather than an attack on Dutch envoys in particular, such criticism was a symptom of ordinary faction struggle between the insiders and the outsiders, as men like Baron Lexington and Richard Hill can be considered Portland's clients.

VI Anti-Dutch rhetoric

Hence criticism of the Dutch may better be explained as resentment of those outside the inner circles. It was also a device to covertly criticise the court or political opponents. John Toland already noted that the English used '... to damn all the Dutch when they durst not expressly curse King William'.[121] An interesting pamphlet, which was presumably written in the spring of 1689 and which reflected on 'the present Administration of Affairs, since managed by Dutch Councils', referred not so much to the Dutch but to the Whigs:

> 'If you have heard or read of the Changes between 1640 and 1660 you can't be surprised at the Accidents between 78 and 89. The Pretences, the Successes, the Methods used and had in both, are so exactly agreeable, that the last would have been impossible, but that the same Men who did procure the first have occasioned the latter.'[122]

In this particular case, a Churchman criticises a Commonwealthman, and the attack seems intertwined with debates between Whigs and Tories rather than a protest against Dutch advisers in William's inner circle. The seemingly anti-Dutch rhetoric can thus be understood within a court-country context, the

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[115] E.g. Nottingham to Heinsius 23 December 1692, HMC, *Finch Mss*, IV, 530-531; Whitcombe to Trumbull 26 February 1692, 26 March 1692, Cooke to Trumbull 2 April 1692, 9 October 1692, HMC, *Downshire Mss*, I, 398, 402, 404, 413.

[116] These were not necessarily Dutchmen though, as many English envoys complained. Cf. M. Lane, 'The diplomatic service under William III', *TRHS*, 4th series, X (1927).

[117] Qu. in ibid., 103.

[118] Portland to Stepney 12/22 July 1694 ('Du Camp de Rostbeck'), NA SP 105-82, fos. 225-226.

[119] Stepney to Colt 11 March 1693 NS, NA SP 105-58, fo. 77v.

[120] Stepney to Strafford June 1694, NA SP 105-54, fo. 32r. Of course, Stepney was wrong about Keppel

[121] Qu. in J.I. Israel, 'General introduction', in: J.I. Israel, ed., *The Anglo-Dutch moment, essays on the Glorious Revolution and its world impact* (Cambridge, 1991), 42.

[122] *A Letter to a Member of the Committee of Grievances containing some Seasonable Reflections on the present Administration of Affairs, since managed by Dutch Councils*, in: J. Somers, ed., *A second collection of scarce and valuable tracts etc.* (4 vols., London, 1750), IV, 62.

Dutch being a convenient pretext to criticise the King. In fact one pamphlet specifically places itself in this Country tradition:

> 'What have we gain'd?
> Grievances retain'd,
> The Government is still the same, the King is only chang'd.
> Was ever such a bargain!
> What boots it a farthing,
> Whether Father Petre rules, or Bentinck and Carmarthen:
> Distresses, oppressed,
> With empty hopes caressed,
> We still remain in *statu quo*, there's nothing yet redressed.'[123]

If anti-Dutch sentiments were exploited by Country to target the key elements of William's regime, anti-favourite rhetoric was adopted to attack the man who embodied all the evils of the Williamite settlement. Julian Hoppit has aptly observed about King William, that the English could love the 'idea' (i.e. the Williamite settlement), but not the man. In Portland's case one could argue that they cared not about the man, but hated the 'idea' (i.e. the favourite).[124] In many respects, to the political nation Portland embodied the archetypal image of the 'evil counsellor'. Portland knew this very well, of course, and understood, as one correspondent wrote to him:

> 'Because Your Excellency has had the good fortune of being the favourite of His Majesty, and is known as that throughout the whole world. Now Your Excellency knows that nothing is more common, and that, because of the animosity of people, it is inevitable, connected to being a favourite, to be hated by many. And no matter how complaisant one is, how serviceable and humble one behaves, in that manner one does not only bring aversion over one self but also over the Prince who one serves …'[125]

Stanley told Huygens in June 1689 '... about the complaints concerning the conduct of affairs, and about the sale of all kinds of offices, in which B[entinck] had the greatest part, but that he would bet that Parliament would attack him within 9 months.'[126]

Portland's obvious support for the continental war and his increasing role in ministerial management provided fuel to his enemies to launch an assault on the ministry and, beyond that, on the King himself. Portland realised he was fiercely unpopular with large sections of the political nation and was careful not to provide the opposition with any pretext.[127] Thus unlike Danby, he was never impeached or forced out of office, and he remained, for ten years, an undisputed force behind the throne, unassailable and untouchable. He had an obsession for secrecy and habitually transmitted instructions in cipher or invisible ink, sometimes directing the recipient to burn the document. Sometimes his orders - when they might be controversial.- were given orally via confidants. When legislation unfavourable to Dutch trade was debated in the Commons, Portland instructed a personal confidant to order a friendly MP to block the measure.[128] A certain Bartholomew Vanhomrig, a former resident of Amsterdam and now alderman in Dublin, was employed to act as a messenger between the future Lord Lieutenant of Ireland Capel and Portland.[129]

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[123] 'Lay by your reason', in: W. Walker Wilkins, ed., *Political ballads* (London, 1860), II, 28-29.
[124] J. Hoppit, *A land of liberty. England 1689-1727* (Oxford, 2000), 135.
[125] Spengler? to Portland 24 February 1694, BL Eg Ms 1707, fo. 249r.
[126] 1 June 1689, Huygens, *Journaal*, I-1, 134.
[127] He did so with success: only during the 1701 impeachment procedures did Parliament have specific evidence.
[128] Portland to Hop 23 April 1690 (Kensington), *RGP 28*, 164.
[129] Portland to Capel 15 April 1695, NUL Pw A 236 and passim. Cf. W. Troost, 'William III and the Treaty of Limerick 1691-1697' (PhD thesis Leiden,1983), 109. Portland sometimes wrote instructions with the explicit order to destroy them after receipt, e.g. Galway to Portland 15 July 1692, NUL Pw A 1099.

Thus Portland tried to remain 'behind the curtain', but he was nevertheless continuously attacked in pamphlets and the Commons throughout the 1690s. A foreign favourite is easily caricatured and pamphleteers could draw inspiration from an available discourse in which greed, corruption and sodomy figured as the main characteristics of the favourite. The extent to which the 'Portland' of pamphleteers is the product of imagination - in fact becomes a fictional character - is evident in a range of pamphlets erupting after 1688 in which specific charges based on factual information are extremely rare.[130] It was easy to accuse a rich and ambitious man of squandering his integrity, but the charge of corruption could not be substantiated. The evidence presented came from hostile sources and was based on rumour.[131]

Widespread hostility towards Portland among English courtiers can be partly attributed to his perceived haughtiness, and men like Dijkveld and later Keppel were less unpopular. There is little doubt that Portland had a profound disrespect for many English politicians. Dartmouth recorded Portland saying to William '... that the English were the strangest people he had ever met with; for by their own accounts of one another, there was never an honest nor an able man in the 3 kingdoms; and he readily believed it was true.' [132] In an unusual personal letter, written just before the Irish campaign, Portland contemplated his relationship with William:

> 'C'est Vostre Majté. que je prens pour le seul témoin des actions de ma vie et qui en puit estre le meilleur juge, en repassant dans sa mémoire ma conduitte passée depuis plus de 26 années; elle i aura sans doutte remarquée que mon ambition a esté moderée et assez bornée par la raison; mon interrest particulier n'a jamais prévalu sur mon devoir ... En arrivant en Angleterre, Vostre Majté. m'a asseuré de son propre mouvement que je ne souffrirois pas ce tort d'estre obligé d'obéir à des gens qui ont très peu de mérite a vostre esgard et qui ont moins de service que moy.'[133]

The charge of arrogance, made by his opponents, is unsurprising, but even many of his political allies perceived him as cold and distant. Marlborough thought him a 'wooden fellow', whereas Sunderland in later years dismissed him as 'a dull animal'.[134] It is interesting to note Portland's reflection upon his own character in this respect. To William he once described himself as 'obstinate', which he recognised as a shortcoming, particularly in a diplomat.[135] He also realised he was not affable and easy with people. Perhaps the most illuminating confession was made in a remarkable letter to Shrewsbury of 8/18 September 1696:

> 'Ever since I had the honour to know you, I have perceived a coldness and reserve towards me, which I wished not to deserve; but rather than attribute it to you, I have concluded that I was myself the cause of it, being sufficiently just to myself, to know part of my failings. But as we cannot control those which arise from nature, and which are born with us, I have deemed the evil incurable, and have merely paid to the minister and secretary of state, the respect which was due to him, without troubling myself farther. But as it is the will of fortune, that you should

[130] E.g. *A very remarkable Letter from King William III. To his Favourite Bentinck, Earl of Portland, in French and English, together with Reflections thereon*, in: Somers, *Collections*, I, 356-362; *A dialogue between K.W. and Benting, occasioned by his going into Flanders after the death of the Queen* (London, 1695).

[131] Earl of Ailesbury, *Memoirs*, W.E. Buckley, ed., (Westminster, 1890), I, 227-228; T.B. Macaulay, *History of England from the accession of James II* (6 vols., London, 1914), 2490-2492; HMC., *The manuscripts of the House of Lords 1693-1695* (London, 1900), 557; *Cobbett's Parliamentary History of England etc. 1688-1702* (12 vols., London, 1806-1812), V, 925; H. Horwitz, *Parliament, policy and politics in the reign of William III* (Manchester 1977), 151-152.

[132] Qu. in M.E. Grew, *William Bentinck and William III (Prince of Orange). The life of Bentinck, Earl of Portland, from the Welbeck correspondence* (London, 1924), 158n.

[133] Portland to William 19 June 1690 O.S (Hilsborough), *RGP 23*, 158-159. The letter was to be sent to William in case of death on the battle field, and was, therefore, never read by William. The latter part of the quotation specifically refers to Portland's appointment as lieutenant-general.

[134] Godolphin to Marlborough 4 February 1709, H.L. Snyder, ed., *The Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence* (3 vols., Oxford, 1975), III, 1219. Cf. 21 February 1693, Huygens, *Journaal*, I-2, 175.

[135] Portland to William 13 March 1698 (Paris), *RGP 23*, 254.

> personally testify to me your approbation of my conduct, and express your satisfaction with it, I assure you, Sir, that I shall return the same cordiality, and that this cold and reserved disposition, which I frankly avow, shall wholly vanish after the candour which you have had the goodness to promise me. I will request some indulgence in regard to my judgment, but none respecting my integrity; and I shall not solicit your friendship, until I shall have taken the first step to render myself worthy of it.'[136]

Perceptions by English courtiers must be analysed with care. The discerning Macaulay already remarked that character judgements were bound to be negative because of cultural and linguistic barriers. Indeed, they fit in exactly with the standard repertoire of anti-Dutch sentiments - as indeed Portland's perception of the English seems rather stereotypical. The Dutch perceived the English as fickle and undependable, the English saw their neighbours as dull, cold and unimaginative.[137] In fact, the impression the French had of him was quite different. According to Saint Simon, 'Portland parut avec un éclat personnel, une politesse, un air du monde et de cour, une galanterie et des grâces qui surprirent. Avec cela, beaucoup de dignité, même de hauteur, mais avec discernement, et un jugement prompt, sans rien d'hasardé'.[138]

The charge of haughtiness was reinforced by persistent rumours of corruption, for which, however, there was little evidence despite scattered reports of his selling offices and favours. In 1689 Witsen was told that Portland had made large profits: 'it has been estimated at thirty thousand rixdollars, on top of the one hundred thousand he has already received. But God knows whether it is true.'[139] It is difficult to imagine that such rumours were wholly without foundation, but the 1695 East India Company enquiry, for instance, cleared him of all charges and he seems to have been relatively incorruptible.[140] But he was certainly an avaricious man. His dispute with John Somers over fee farm rents, for instance, presents him as rather churlish.[141] Even one of his associates, James Vernon, '... was surprised to see one so blinded with his own interest, and consider nothing else, especially having obtained so many grants'.[142] According to one observer he was ' ... very profuse in Gardening, Birds, and Household Furniture, but mighty frugal and parsimonious in every Thing else.'[143] Connected to the charge of corruption was the common image of a greedy and overambitious favourite from a humble background working his way into the highest circles. Portland likewise was perceived a profiteer of 'mean descent', an accusation clearly without foundation.[144]

Pamphleteers accusing him of sodomy could conveniently exploit the parallel with James I and the Duke of Buckingham. Most historians have dismissed the rumours on sensible grounds.[145] Of course, it is not clear what sort of evidence one could expect regarding the sexual behaviour of a man who by all accounts treasured his privacy. Portland's actions in nursing William in 1675 when the latter had caught smallpox is often pointed to in this regard. But it was a well-known medical 'fact' at the time that the ill person could benefit from such an action; the incident was widely publicised in order to show Portland's

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[136] Portland to Shrewsbury 8/18 September 1696 (Het Loo), W. Coxe, ed., *Private and original correspondence of Charles Talbot, Duke of Shrewsbury etc.* (London, 1821), 141.
[137] D. Coombs, *The conduct of the Dutch. British opinion and the Dutch alliance during the War of the Spanish Succession* (The Hague, 1958), 13-15.
[138] Saint-Simon, *Mémoires*, A. de Boislisle, ed. (21 vols., Paris, 1879-1930), V, 61.
[139] Witsen, 'Verbaal', 162.
[140] Macaulay, *History of England*, VI, 2490-2492; HMC, *House of Lords manuscripts (1693-1695)*, 557; *Cobbett's Parliamentary History*, V, 925; Horwitz, *Parliament*, 151-152; Portland to Lexington (Kensington) 3 May 1695, BL Add Ms 46525, fos. 104-106.
[141] Cf. Ch. 6.
[142] In reference to Portland's quarrel with Montagu. Vernon to Shrewsbury 19 June 1697, G.P.R. James, ed., *Letters illustrative of the reign of William III etc.* (3 vols., London, 1841), I, 271.
[143] J. Macky, 'Characters of the court of Great Britain ...', in: J.M. Gray, ed., *Memoirs of the life of Sir John Clerk .... 1675-1755* (London, 1895), 58.
[144] *The True-born Englishman: a satyr, answer'd paragraph by paragraph*, 73; *The Foreigners* (London, 1700), 7.
[145] Baxter, *William III*, 349-351; Horwitz, *Parliament*, 203-204; Claydon, *William and the godly revolution*, 92; D.J. Roorda, 'Willem III, de Koning-stadhouder', in: D.J. Roorda, *Rond prins en patriciaat* (Weesp, 1984), 140.

fidelity, and it would seem highly improbable that it was in fact an act of sodomy.[146] A closer look at the source of such accusations makes it clear that they came almost exclusively from pamphleteers who often operated from St Germain. The charge had never been made before in the United Provinces, nor was it even hinted at by courtiers who were not otherwise unfamiliar with biting sarcastic portrayals of court life. None of the courtiers and diarists who spent most of their days in the vicinity of the King and Portland hinted at intimacy. Huygens, for instance, never surmises there might be more to the relationship between Keppel and the King, though he loathed the former and was quite frank about courtiers' sexual escapades or indeed William's liaison with Elisabeth Villiers. Dutch pamphleteers or diarists never mention a homosexual relationship between Portland and the King, and the topic only comes up after 1689.[147] Indeed, it was not until 1697 that Portland wrote a private letter to William in which he is evidently shocked to have heard the rumours surrounding Keppel and the King, which makes it doubtful that sodomy was something he would condone:

> '... des choses qui me font honte à les entendre, et dont je la croy aussi esloigné q'homme du monde; je croyois que c'estoit les malicieus en Angleterre seuls qui fabriquoit ces sanglantes chozses [sic], mais j'ay esté frappé comme du tonnerre quant j'ay veu que La Haye et l'armée ... fournissoit les mesmes discours ...'[148]

To the political historian the structure and purpose of the accusations are of much greater interest than the actual contents. An interesting indicator of the underlying significance of the pamphleteers' malicious speculation over Portland's sexual life can be found in the rather bizarre contemporary satire by Mary Delraviere Manley published in 1709.[149] Portland's supposed affair with Stuarta Howard is satirised in absurd detail and is evidently fictional, as are the activities of other politicians depicted in this work. The glamorous collection of anecdotes was regarded as a piece of Tory propaganda and the author was charged with libel by the Whig leaders. So why was Portland portrayed as a sodomite in political pamphlets? A rather vicious pamphlet, *A dialogue between K.W. and Benting, occasioned by his going into Flanders after the death of the Queen*, portrays Portland as William's evil adviser, with no morals or scruples or religion. William is a conqueror who plunders the land and brings in his foreign favourites, greedy, evil and sodomitic.[150] A reply to this pamphlet was published under the suggestive title *The spirit of Jacobitism*.[151] Clearly, then, contemporaries understood the genre's political symbolism, recently brilliantly analysed by C. McFarlane.[152] Rather than taking the image of the sodomite literally, he argues that it was used as a metaphor for political, social and cultural upheaval; the sodomite, an example of unnatural behaviour, becomes a symbol for foreign influences, as the following contemporary satire confirms:

> 'For the case, Sir, is such
> The people think much,
> That your love is Italian,

[146] The story that Bentinck actually shared the bed with William seems to be a myth, cf. Ch. 1.
[147] Noordam, *Riskante relaties*, 117-118.
[148] Portland to William 30 May 1697 (Brussels), William to Portland 1 June 1697, *RGP 23*, 198-200.
[149] M.D. Manley, *Secret memoirs and manners of several persons of quality of both sexes from the new atlantis, an island in the mediterranean* (London, 1709). I am thankful to Ophelia Field for this reference.
[150] *A dialogue between K.W. and Benting.*
[151] *The Spirit of Jacobitism; or remarks upon a dialogue between K.W. and Benting. In a dialogue between two friends of the present government* (London, 1695).
[152] 'Conceptualized as the embodiment of a disorder at once sexual, cultural, political, and religious, the sodomite represented an anarchic force that threatened to undermine the nation and against which the nation might define itself ... the formation of the sodomite as a social type was to a considerable degree the product of a displacement of social crisis, anxiety, and disruption - a process that figures typically in the construction of the "unnatural" and "perverse" ... The potential congruence between the prescribed bonds of male privilege and the proscribed bonds of male desire is often (mis)recognized in satiric jabs against people in power and their relationships with their favorites, most notably, perhaps, in a number of anti-Williamite satires which claim that "Billy with Benting does play the Italian"', C. McFarlane, *The sodomite in fiction and satire 1660-1750* (New York, 1997), 78-79.

your Government Dutch,
Ah who could have thought
that a Low-Country stallion,
And a Protestant Prince
should prove an Italian?'[153]

Sodomy is Italian love, which is associated with Roman Catholicism. The swap of Italian to Dutch is ingeniously made, and a very powerful associative anti-Dutch propaganda device is employed here.

The significance of these pamphlets, then, lies not in what they seem to convey, but rather in their underlying purpose. In a sustained propaganda war between the Court and the opposition, the defenders of the Court had stressed the providential nature of the Williamite settlement; the King had been elected as a divine instrument to defend Protestantism both abroad and at home. The 'godly reformation' stirred a nation to revert to piety in general, and to purify the court of her vices in specific. Attackers of the 'virtuous court' could tap into an available discourse that criticised the conduct of courtiers in order to erode their credibility. Such criticism of court life must have been especially appealing in Country circles. Pamphleteers could employ their acid pens to dissolve the image of moral integrity of the members of William's entourage.[154] The real purpose was evidently not to target Portland in particular, nor foreigners in general. The pamphleteer John Dennis had accused his opponent John Tutchin of attacking Portland in his pamphlet only to strike at the King.[155] That, of course, was the underlying motivation, and it was common practice in early modern monarchies to do so.[156]

Of course the Court was not a helpless victim, as numerous pamphleteers were mobilised in its defence. Such artists as Romeyn de Hooghe were commissioned to create propaganda images, and pamphleteers (most notably Daniel Defoe) were employed. Portland himself asked William permission in 1690 '... de faire quelque gratification à ceus qui employent la plume pour la justification de vostre cause'.[157] Portland's patronage of pamphleteers defending the court also figured in 1692, when he advised Secretary of State Nottingham that

> '... a good penn be employ'd (in a concise manner) relating to the affaires of the government, to obviate malignant objections and to maintain truth in its owne colours; and those prints to be sent, gratis, to the severall great towns.[158]

The interpretation of anti-Dutch and anti-favourite rhetoric in terms of partisan struggles becomes more convincing once compared to similar discourse in the United Provinces. In England Portland was hated for being a Dutch adviser, but with regard to his exclusion from the States' Assembly in 1690, one pamphleteer thought that '... Mynheer Benting himself shall be no more admitted to their secret Consultations, since he is become an English Earl', realising full well that Portland was anything but a representative of the loathed mercantile rivals.[159] To the Dutch republicans Portland personified the disreputable, even tyrannical aspects of stadholderly rule. 'ils parlent de moy comme du diable', he laconically wrote in March 1690,

> 'quoy que je n'ay jamais proféré une parolle inmodéree dans l'assemblée ni dehors; si j'avois quelque chose sur mon compte qui peut m'estre reproché, les libelles en seroit bientost remplis, et je n'aurois point de quartier à espérer, mais selon mon humeur ces considérations me feront plustost avancer que reculer, puisque hors celles que je dois avoir pour l'intérest du pais et de la

[153] G. deForest Lord, ed., *Poems on Affairs of State* (7 vols., New Haven, 1963-1975), V, 38.
[154] 'that the brunt of hatred and anger fell upon the favourite', 23 March 1689, Huygens, *Journaal*, I-1, 98.
[155] C. Rose, *England in the 1690s: revolution, religion and war* (Oxford, 1999), 57.
[156] Cf. L.W.B. Brockliss, 'Concluding remarks', in: L.W.B. Brockliss and J.H. Elliott, eds., *The world of the favourite* (New Haven and London, 1999), 288.
[157] Portland to William 11 February 1690 (The Hague), *RGP 23*, 102.
[158] HMC, *Finch Mss*, IV, 160-161.
[159] 'The Dear Bargain', 234.

> religion, il n'i aura asseurément rien qui me fera agir que vos interrets et vostre service, pour lesquels je n'espargneray pas la dernière goutte de mon sang'.[160]

Political opposition had been accompanied by a propaganda campaign. A republican print, *De Hollandse hollende koe* ('The Holland running cow'), satirised Portland's entrance into the States assembly in 1690 and complained about William and his 'vice-stadholder' trampling the privileges of Holland cities. Portland is sitting on a blindfolded cow, carrying a banner in his hand saying 'we are earl and master of these lands'. The accompanying poem asserts that 'New sovereigns make new laws'; now that William was King, privileges of old will be shattered and trampled on. Evidently Portland's case was used as part of a full scale attack by the Republicans on the Stadholder himself. This is how William himself perceived their attack on Portland in 1690, 'qui ne procède que du mal qu'ils me veulent.'[161] Portland as well realised how useful anti-favourite rhetoric could be, and suggested to William he should dissociate his own interest from that of his master:

> 'je suis de plus en plus persuadé que j'ay bien fait de séparer mon affaire particulière de la grande, puisquie cela a convaincu les gens indifférents que j'en ay usé avec modération, et M^{s}. d'Amsterdam s'en trouveront embarassé eus mesme ...'[162]

De Hollandse hollende koe also expressed complaints about higher taxation which were directly linked to financial gain by the English and Germans; just under the cow are the silhouettes of an Englishman and a German secretly profiting from the situation. The Englishman, it says, makes about sixty tons, that is six million, guilders: the amount of the Dutch financial contribution to the invasion, which Parliament had hitherto neglected to repay. Perhaps most interestingly, the pamphleteer says, we are now living under the English yoke, which is worse than the Spanish.

The apparent mixture of xenophobic and anti-Orangist sentiments also invested the notorious resolution of Amsterdam against Portland, but the objection that he was now a naturalised Englishman was not

[160] Portland to William 2 March 1690 (The Hague), *RGP 23*, 129.
[161] William to Portland 20 January 1690, *RGP 23*, 70.
[162] Portland to William 14-15 March 1690 (The Hague), ibid., 146-147.


HOLLENDE EOE 1690

entirely without legal basis. In fact, rather than dismiss it, the *Ridderschap* retorted that an exception should be made for Portland given his record of service to the country. It stated that '... His Majesty had undertaken the aforementioned expedition [to England] only with the previous communication and full approbation of the State ... that this State had not decided otherwise than that this must certainly lead to a closer and tighter bond of those realms with this State.' For this reason, Portland, who had accompanied William on that expedition, should be received with respect into the Assembly.[163] Objections against Portland taking his seat in the States assembly recall the objections to his presence in the House of Lords. It is curious that his position, both in England and in the United Provinces, was challenged by the opposition on the grounds that he was a foreigner. To some extent, there seems to have been a genuine concern for 'English counsels' in the Dutch assembly. A similar protest would be registered in 1715 when the position of Arnold Joost van Keppel, then Earl of Albemarle, was questioned.[164] But Portland himself pointed out that there were other members who were in the service of other monarchs, and one delegate even suggested that such contacts could contribute to a better relationship with other governments.[165]

A further illuminating comparison can be made to the debates in the House of Commons in the spring of 1696 about the Welsh grants bestowed on Portland. Ostensibly an attack on an overmighty, greedy favourite, the controversy can be analysed as a multi-layered cross-section of political discontent. Clearly there was concern about the alienation of Crown lands. Moreover, Robert Price, MP for Weobly but a Welshman originally, channelled genuine local resentment and Welsh patriotism into this attack. Arguing that Portland did not speak Welsh, Price stood up for local and Welsh rights. By the late seventeenth century Welsh political stances in Parliament were rare, and Price brilliantly transformed traditional anti-English sentiments into a protest against the Dutch.[166] 'How can we hope for happy days in England', he complained, 'when this great Man, and the other (tho' naturaliz'd) are in the English, and also in the Dutch counsels...?'[167] In hijacking the rhetoric of anti-Dutch discourse his case attracted a much wider appeal and mobilised the whole of Country. On a personal level, Price had reason to be dissatisfied with the Williamite regime, having been deprived of his attorney-generalship in 1689. He may have also found support amongst fellow Tories who sensed the controversy to be a useful pretext to launch an assault on the Whig Junto. In fact, it is doubtful whether the assault on the ministry could have succeeded without the support of Harley, who ultimately decided to throw his weight behind it. Xenophobic rhetoric was therefore channelled into opposition attacks against the Court.

If the King-Stadholder's court is properly placed in its supranational context of the British-Dutch Alliance, a picture emerges of a cross-channel Williamite party. Anti-Williamite pamphlets in England can be fitted into the existing Court-Country debates, or, in a Dutch context, into the disputes between Orangists and Republicans. Republicans and country gentlemen on both sides of the channel opposed the King-Stadholder, and there is some evidence that they established contact. In the aftermath of William's conflict with Amsterdam in 1690, Portland's secretary informed him that 'it has come to my attention [that Amsterdam] is underhand still making secret movements against the king, in order to make these not only here but also in England effective, for the intention of the ill intended both here and there.' He pointed out that a pamphleteer had contacted the English opposition and tried to have some of his writings translated for their benefit.[168] Some pamphleteers were able to reflect upon the bigger picture; William was neither pro-Dutch nor pro-English, but had his own agenda and cared little for the welfare of either state: 'that his Circumstances force him upon the Policy to let his Protection hover, with doubtful Wings, betwixt the two Nations, (as it does here between the Church of England and the Dissenters), and

[163] *Hollandse Mercurius 1690* (Haarlem, 1691), XLI, 14.
[164] BL Add Ms 15866, fo. 242.
[165] Dispatch 20 January 1690, GA 5029-90.
[166] G.H. Jenkins, *The foundations of modern Wales 1642-1780* (Oxford, 1987), 152-153.
[167] A s*peach for repealing grants in Wales for Bentinck 1696*, in: *A choice collection of Papers relating to State Affairs during the late Revolution* (London, 1703), I, 529.
[168] Schuylenburg to Portland 30 June 1690, RGP 28, 168.

they who please him most shall partake the greatest Share of it, but he will be intire to neither'.[169] Indeed, William's entourage was pluriform and international rather than Dutch. Historians such as George Clark and Andrew Lossky have come to a similar conclusion; to quote the latter: 'Gradually he ceased to be Dutch; British he never became. In the end, William and his closest collaborators - Waldeck, Heinsius, Dijkveld, Bentinck - became emphatically European'.[170]

VII Conclusion

Portland thus emerged from a respectable countryside baronetcy to a position amongst the great nobility of England. This remarkable process of social mobility, facilitated by a brilliant political career, coincided with the rise of William, from Child of State to Stadholder to King. This gradual advance should prevent a rash confirmation of the accusation made by one pamphleteer that Portland was 'of mean descent'. By 1688 he was a distinguished nobleman. Naturally, just as Portland's career in the Republic had led to friction, his quasi-omnipotent position after the Revolution caused resentment. Portland stayed in the background and meanwhile established himself as a typical English aristocrat; the Portlands fully integrated in British society within one generation. At the same time it holds true that William did place a disproportional amount of confidence in a small circle of foreigners, which inevitably incited criticism voiced in numerous pamphlets. One 1695 pamphlet for instance railed about the

> '... Usurper, with his Bentinks and Ginckles ... [who] are in an apparent Conspiracy with the High and Mighty at the Hague, to reduce these kingdoms to a feebleness and indigency, out of which they have a design we shall never emerge.'[171]

However, a heavy reliance on pamphlet material has led historians such as Gregorius van Alphen and more recently Craig Rose to take the critical notes of pamphleteers perhaps too much at face value without examining deeper layers of the debate.[172] It is doubtful whether there were significant 'Dutch counsels', or indeed whether the 'Dutch Junto' was Dutch at all.

Instead, it appears that many of such attacks were inspired rather by faction struggle or rivalry. More importantly, ant-Dutch and anti-favourite rhetoric, whether in Parliament, in the army or in diplomatic circles, became a convenient method of criticising the government. 'Dutch' was principally a metaphor for William's policy. The Anglo-Dutch favourite personified both the foreignness of William's regime and strategy, as well as the changes that strengthened the central executive at the expense of country gentlemen.

Thus the protests against Portland were fashioned within a more traditional discourse in which the favourite figured as a corrupt, sodomitic, greedy usurper. This is illustrated by the parliamentary enquiry over the East India Company scandal and the Welsh grants. But Portland was also seen as the personification of William's foreign policy, being accused of promoting the Dutch alliance and supporting the standing army. Moreover, Portland was frequently seen by Country MPs, who feared the growth of the executive, as the evil counsellor behind William's vetoing of the Place and Triennial Bills. Lastly, as Portland became associated with the Whig Junto by the middle of the 1690s, it became increasingly difficult to avoid being caught up in party struggle, and attacking the favourite became a method of the opposition to attack the court party.

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[169] *A very remarkable Letter*, 359-360. Cf. R. Ferguson, *A brief account of some of the late incroachments and depredations of the Dutch upon the English etc.* (London?, 1695), 14: '... that the Dutch and We being so differently Circumstanced, by reason of the discrepant Relations which the Prince of Orange stands in to us and to them, there is an absolute and indispensable Necessity, that he Renounce being their Stadtholder, or cease to be our King.'

[170] A. Lossky, 'Political ideas of William III', in: H.H. Rowen and A. Lossky, *Political ideas and institutions in the Dutch Republic* (Los Angeles, 1985), 55.

[171] *Whether the preserving the Protestant Religion was the Motive unto, or the End that was designed in the late Revolution* (1695), 442.

[172] Rose, *England in the 1690s*; Van Alphen, *De stemming van de Engelschen*.

Counter-propaganda presented William as a godly Prince heading a virtuous court and fighting a holy war abroad. The war with Catholic France ran parallel to the godly reformation in England itself. Portland became involved in the representation of Williamite ideology through his activities in garden architecture which had a distinct political flavour during these years, but also through his patronage of court propagandists. In this manner, the Anglo-Dutch favourite became the focal point of a political discourse during the 1690s in which the most important issues, directions of policy and changes were being debated.

Chapter 6: Retirement 1697-1699

In this chapter, Portland's position after the war and his subsequent retirement will be considered. The reasons for his retirement have puzzled historians, as little is known about his motivation or the precise circumstances. This chapter will argue that Portland's retirement should not be seen just as the result of a personal clash with William over his rival Keppel, but should be regarded against the background of structural changes in English politics. The period 1697-1701 is described by J.R. Jones as '... one of the most confused periods in English political history'. As the war ended, opposition against the standing army and the Irish forfeitures mounted, whereas weak ministries failed to provide stable government.[1] William was forced to find an alternative for the crumbling Whig ministry with which Portland was connected. The combination of these factors gradually eroded Portland's influence and political relevance. This chapter forms a sequel to the chapters 3, 4 and 5, because it analyses the erosion of Portland's influence, the failure of his policy and the increasing opposition against the Anglo-Dutch favourite.

I Retirement (1697/1699)

In the spring of 1697, Portland suddenly decided to lay down his offices and retire. William responded in an emotional letter to his '... cruelle résolution que l'on m'a dit que vous avies pris de quitter mon service', urging him to reconsider.[2] Portland had been complaining about Keppel for some time, but his resignation still came as a surprise to William. A moving correspondence followed, in which Portland assured the King of his unfailing loyalty, and was assured of the latter's unceasing favour.[3] The King was willing to offer Portland anything, but not the one thing he demanded: Keppel's dismissal. By late May the matter had still not been resolved, notwithstanding the mediation of the Prince of Vaudemont who was on close terms with both. Whilst the King was on campaign, Portland had sulkily retreated to Brussels pleading illness. He explained that it was not self-interest which had prompted him to take his decision: 'c'est vostre honneur qui me tiente au coeur, et les bontéz que V.M.^{té} a pour un jeune homme et la manière dont il semble qu'elle authorise ces libertés et ces hauteurs...'[4] William was obviously shocked by Portland's suggestions that rumours of sodomy between Keppel and the King were circulating both in London and The Hague, and he may have been concerned about Portland's motives in this matter at this time.[5] Such rumours were not new; Portland even kept copies of slanderous pamphlets about himself and cannot have been surprised. William was unwilling to dismiss Keppel but open to compromise if only Portland would agree to stay in his service longer. Portland accepted, but '... je n'ay peu prendre la résolution que j'ay prise, qu'après un grand combat dans mons esprit contre moy mesme.'[6]

Such emotional undertones also marked his second and definitive retirement in June 1699. Portland had been making unmistakable arrangements beforehand. In February 1699 he had ordered £10,000 to be transferred to his Amsterdam account.[7] A few weeks later he ordered Schuylenburg to make enquiries about the house of Sommelsdijk, situated at the Voorhout, close to the Binnenhof in The Hague, which was accordingly bought in August and served as his city residence.[8] It seems that Portland had already made up his mind, and only the exact timing of his retirement was dependent on certain events. The first public sign had been his decision not to join the King on his trip to Newmarket, pleading illness. Several

[1] J.R. Jones, *Country and Court: England, 1658-1714* (London, 1978), 302.
[2] William to Portland n.d. March 1697, *RGP 23*, 197.
[3] William to Portland 29 May 1697, Portland to William 30 May 1697 (Brussels), William to Portland 1 June 1697, William to Portland 1 June 1697, Portland to William 2 June 1697 (Brussels), William to Portland 3 June 1697, Portland to William 5 June 1697 (Camp de Promelle), 6 June 1697 (Camp de Promelle), *RGP 23*, 198-203.
[4] Portland to William 30 May 1697 (Brussels), ibid., 199.
[5] William to Portland 1 June 1697, ibid., 200. E.g. NUL Pw A 2715.
[6] William to Portland 1 June 1697, Portland to William 6 June 1697 (Brussels), *RGP 23*, 200, 202.
[7] BL Eg Ms 1708, fo. 28.
[8] Schuylenburg to Portland 24 March 1699, BL Eg Ms 1708, fos. 29-30; BL Eg Ms 1708, fos. 279-280.

days later he withdrew to Windsor Park instead. Saunière de L'Hermitage wrote that 'ce qui fait dire qu'il a envie de se retirer pour se debarrasser de toutes sortes d'affaires, a fin de jouir d'un plus grand repos.'[9] In the first week of May he came to London briefly, only to return to Windsor within days. By 19 May Saunière could confirm the rumours that Portland had resigned all his commissions.[10] Two days later he came to London and was closeted with the King, who tried everything in his power to retain the Earl in his service. But Portland could not be persuaded, and relinquished all his offices, staying in London only to deal with private affairs and vacate his apartments in Kensington.[11] The King made yet another effort to persuade him to change his mind, and sent Abel Tassin d'Alonne, whom they both trusted, to Windsor. Instead, Portland gave him the key of the Groom of the Stole, to be handed over to the King as a sign of his resignation.[12]

The personal relationship between William and Portland had not visibly deteriorated. They were still seen dining and hunting together, and it was common knowledge that the King still had great esteem for his confidant. Portland insisted on retiring but explained to William: 'Ce qu'une telle séparation fait sentir dans nos cœurs n'est cogneu qu'à nous mesme, et ce secret ne sortira pas du mien ...'.[13] Up to a point one can speculate on that secret. No doubt Portland had developed a lasting loyalty and deep commitment to William and his political goals during his long service. William's favour to Keppel was felt by Portland to have broken the monopoly he had had for so many years. Few favourites served their masters for such a long time, and William did not hide his 'douleur extrême' in a short but deep-felt reply.[14] Although Portland was determined to retire this time, the friendship was never broken and the two men frequently met until their final parting at William's deathbed. What was more, Saunière wrote, '... ce comte dit que le dessein qu'il a formé de se deffaire de ses charges, ne l'empeschera pas que, si le roij avait besoin de ses services, il ne s'emploijast avec le meme zele et le meme attachement qu'il a jamais fait.'[15]

The tidings of his resignation caused panic amongst his clients; '... immediately upon my Lord Portland's retiring', Matthew Prior lamented, 'down with Mr. Prior; so when the pillar is removed the ivy that depended on it falls'.[16] Many others were puzzled by his decision. 'It loocks and is though theer is some misterie in this', Livingstone thought, 'for it appears od that so long in favour and done so great services should so of a suddain retyer; but court maters are misterius.'[17] James Vernon wrote: 'I am sorry to hear any mention of your solitude when it is in your owne power to putt an end to it'.[18] Obviously there were personal reasons for his retirement. Like William (who had threatened to abdicate himself), he was '... si las du monde que si il y avait des cloistres de nostre religion je crois que je pourrois m'y retirer', he complained to Prior only weeks before his resignation.[19] Traditional historiography has mainly sought explanations in the triangular personal relationship between William and his two favourites, and therefore neglected to look into the deeper causes.[20] Portland was well aware of course, of the rumours surrounding his resignation, but he refused to comment on them, no doubt partly because of their personal and emotional nature. But to Prior he wrote that none of the rumours contained any truth, clearly indicating

[9] Dispatch Saunière 24 April 1699, BL Add Ms 17677 TT, fo. 148.
[10] Dispatch Saunière 19 May 1699, ibid., fo. 169r.
[11] Dispatch Saunière 19 May 1699, 22 May 1699, ibid., fos. 169r, 170r; dispatch Bonnet 12/22 May 1699, BL Add Ms 30000 C, fo. 104r.
[12] Dispatch Saunière 19 May 1699, BL Add Ms 17677 TT, fo. 169r.
[13] Portland to William 1 May 1699 (Windsor), *RGP 23*, 337.
[14] William to Portland 28 April 1699 OS, ibid., 339.
[15] Dispatch Saunière 22 May 1699, BL Add Ms 17677 TT, fo. 170v.
[16] Prior to Portland 13 July 1699, HMC, *Manuscripts of the Marquis of Bath etc.* (Hereford, 1908), III, 255-266. Ms Grew was mistaken when she wrote that Portland did not have a court party, *William Bentinck and William III (Prince of Orange). The life of Bentinck, Earl of Portland, from the Welbeck correspondence* (London 1924), 278. Cf. P.W.J. Riley, *King William and the Scottish politicians* (Edinburgh, 1979), 130; Prior to Montagu 20 May 1699, Prior to Portland 20 May 1699, HMC, *Bath manuscripts* III, 343; Sunderland to Portland 4 March 1699, Vernon to Portland 1 August 1699, NUL Pw A 1277, Pw A 1498; Prior to Vernon 20 May 1699, BL Add Ms 40773, fo. 341.
[17] Livingstone to Annandale 11 May 1699, HMC, *Manuscripts of J.J. Hope Johnstone Esq. of Annandale* (London, 1897), 129.
[18] Vernon to Portland 22 August 1699, NUL Pw A 1500.
[19] Portland to Prior 2/12 March 1699 (Kensington), HMC, *Bath Mss*, III, 322.
[20] With the notable exception of S.B. Baxter, *William III* (London, 1966).

that his decision was not motivated by private considerations.[21] He hinted at an ulterior motive to the Earl of Sunderland, as he argued that he felt obliged to lay down all his offices, just like the latter had done a year before. The parallel Portland makes is revealing, for Sunderland's reasons had been twofold. First, opposition in Parliament had become so virulent that Sunderland feared impeachment. When rumours circulated that the King had asked for Portland's return in the autumn of 1699, and he refused, 'Some say he does so, foreseeing stormes; others that he knowes the Commones here beare him at ill will and that if he showld againe enter upon bussieness they wold have a fling at him.'[22] Second, his position was crumbling and he refused to take responsibility without his monarch's undivided backing, just like Sunderland had complained that William virtually ignored him.[23]

II Portland and Albemarle

It will be argued that Portland's retirement (as he never actually fell from favour) was the result of structural political changes in the late 1690s rather than personal motives. Five key zones of analysis can be distinguished. Firstly, the King's relationship with the favourite changed. Secondly, the Whig Junto lost ground due to major political shifts. Thirdly, these shifts resulted in major assaults on the Court party by Country MPs. Fourthly, the end of the war resulted in a breakdown of allied lines of communication and diplomacy, and reduced the intensity of Anglo-Dutch co-operation. Lastly, military management collapsed with the virtual disappearance of the standing army.

There is little doubt that the immediate cause for Portland's decision to retire in 1697 was his mounting dissatisfaction with the position of Keppel, who in February had been elevated into the peerage as Earl of Albemarle.[24] But the new earl's triumph was to be very short-lived indeed, for a few days later Portland was appointed Knight of the Garter, to show, Vernon wrote to Shrewsbury, '... he is still preferred a step above him'.[25] On 4 April Portland was installed in the chapter of Windsor and a pompous dinner was accordingly given in his honour at Windsor, attended by 60 peers, ministers of state and foreign ambassadors.[26] '… cela lui est d'autans plus glorieux qu'il ne l'avoit point recherché', the Brandenburg envoy Bonnet observed.[27] William's generosity knew few bounds. Portland was charged with the desirable rangership of Windsor Park – in the lodge of which he would spend most of his days in - which provided him with some £ 300 rent.[28] On top of that he was granted the Irish estate of the Earl of Clancarty.[29] In a heated argument Albemarle accused Portland of '...acting to his disadvantage'. The latter had drawn his sword in anger in the room right next to that of the King himself, who had to personally part the quarrelsome favourites.[30]

William's sincere friendship with Portland has been partly responsible for the myth that theirs was a natural companionship. Yet there was nothing unusual in a monarch wishing to employ more than one favourite, or at least trying to keep the ruling favourite unsure of his position, and William was no exception. The French ambassador Tallard cynically observed that William exploited the rivalry between

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[21] Portland to Prior 1 June 1699 NS (Windsor), HMC, *Bath manuscripts*, III, 349. Portland to Heinsius 1 May 1699, NA HA 3.01.19 2/189.
[22] Unknown to Annandale 25 November 1699, HMC, *Johnstone Mss*, 113.
[23] Sunderland to Portland 20 March 1699, NUL Pw A 1279. Cf. Tallard to Louis 15 May 1699, P. Grimblot, ed., *Letters of William III, and Louis XIV and of their ministers etc. 1697-1700* (2 vols., London, 1848), II, 329.
[24] Dispatches Saunière 1 March 1697 fo. 230r, Brande 29 January 1697, 1 March 1697, BL Add Ms 17677 RR, fos. 230r, 21r, 32v.
[25] Qu. in Grimblot, *Letters*, I, 146n; 25 March 1697, N. Luttrell, *A brief historical relation of state affairs from September 1678 to April 1714* (6 vols., Oxford, 1857), IV, 201.
[26] Dispatches Saunière 5 April 1697, Brande 5 April 1697, BL Add Ms 17677 RR, fos. 273, 45.
[27] Dispatch Bonnet 23 February/5 March 1697, BL Add Ms 30000 A, fo. 272r; for Portland's position within the peerage, see House of Lords Manuscripts Department, Garter Roll 29, 1697.
[28] Dispatch Saunière 19 March 1697, BL Add Ms 17677 RR, fo. 257.
[29] Cf. Ch. 5.
[30] Eames to Huntingdon 6 March 1697, HMC, *Report on the Manuscripts of the late Reginald Rawdon Hastings etc.* (London, 1930), II, 288. Cf. Jersey to Albemarle 12 March 1697, BL Add Ms 18606, fos. 37v-38r.

his favourites: 'Jay veu Mylord Dalbermal sacrifié a mylord Portland quand j'etois a Loo, ce dernier l'est presentement'.[31] Burnet as well suggested that the King consciously set up a second favourite, whom he began to train in those areas in which Portland was engaged.[32] Rivalry was not new to the ambitious Portland, as he had frequently quarrelled during the 1670s and 1680s with other favourites.[33] In fact, it was only after Sidney's removal in 1690 that Portland's position as William's favourite seemed virtually unchallenged, and there are indications that William grew increasingly uneasy about his influence and indispensability. To Prior, for instance, the King had complained that some people entered '...blindly into all the sentiments of my Lord Portland'.[34] But the King also realised he needed his services, explaining to Van Borssele that he 'se louant de l'attachement avec lequel son premier favori milord Portlandt l'avoist servi, et se plaignant de la négligence du second, milord Albemarle'.[35] Portland knew very well that he was indispensable, and there was a certain cunning in the manner in which he offered his resignation. William clearly wrote that *he was told* that Portland wished to retire in 1697, and did not receive the news first hand; Portland was publicly sulking in Brussels even after having received the Garter.[36] Though he could not persuade William to remove Albemarle from court, his actions had forced William to publicly reaffirm his position. This little game was recognised very well by courtiers: 'You will laugh when I tell you that before you get this, you will hear that some new mark of favour is put on my Lord Portland, or that he has left the court or both'. [37] The King may have needed a second favourite for another reason as well, as Portland was increasingly burdened with parliamentary management and financial responsibilities. William anxiously tried to keep control over government in the hands of a very narrow circle of confidants, and Albemarle would be a useful additional instrument of royal policy. Hence the King now had two favourites, a French report stating that William's '... favour seems to be shared only by the Earls of Portland and Albemarle ...'[38] To a large extent their tasks were overlapping, which resulted in faction struggle, something William had constantly anxiously tried to avoid. The French ambassador was quick to seek ways to exploit their mutual rivalry.[39] Courtiers were at a loss whom to turn to. 'Je suis en suspend si je devrai m'addresser à Milord d'Albemarle, apres avoir parlé au Comte de Portland', Bonnet complained.[40] On the other hand Portland's position as parliamentary and ministerial manager, as well as diplomat, remained unchallenged, whereas Albemarle's responsibilities were largely restricted to the control over royal patronage. Hence Burnet observed that '... the one had more of the confidence, and the other much more of the favour'.[41]

A power struggle was inevitable, however, and emerged firstly over the ability to appoint clients to key positions. Here Portland did lose influence, and to many observers it seemed that Albemarle was gaining the upper hand. The control over what may be styled a 'young court', a number of up and coming ambitious men such as the diplomatists George Stepney and Matthew Prior, wheeled out of Portland's grasp, as his vacillating behaviour had led them to approach the rival favourite to safeguard their future. Lexington, a key client in the diplomatic service, had done so by late 1698. But these men were never entirely in Albemarle's interest, in fact Prior continued to regard Portland as his patron as well.[42] In November 1698, whilst the King was residing at Het Loo, Portland had managed to get his candidate for

[31] Tallard to Louis 22 April 1699, AAE CPA 180, fo. 223.
[32] G. Burnet, *History of his own time* (6 vols., London, 1725), IV, 429.
[33] E.g. N. Japikse, *Prins Willem III - De Stadhouder-koning* (2 vols., Amsterdam, 1933), I, 359.
[34] L.G.W. Legg, *Matthew Prior. A study of his public career and correspondence* (Cambridge, 1921), 114.
[35] Borssele van der Hooghe, heer van Geldermalsen, 'Gedenkschriften', K. Heeringa, ed., *Archief. vroegere en latere mededeelingen voornamelijk in betrekking tot Zeeland* (Middelburg, 1916), 122.
[36] William to Portland n.d. March 1697, *RGP 23*, 197.
[37] Johnstone to Annandale 10 April 1699, HMC, *Johnstone Mss*, 108.
[38] Instruction 2 March 1698, Grimblot, *Letters*, I, 249.
[39] Tallard to Louis 22 January 1699, ibid., II, 234-237.
[40] Bonnet to the Elector 9 January 1699 NS, BL Add Ms 30000 B, fo. 298r.
[41] Burnet, *History*, IV, 430.
[42] Lexington to Blathwayt 24 December 1698, BL Add Ms 46528 C, fo. 284r; Prior to Vernon 20 May 1699, BL Add Ms 40773, fo. 341v; M. Prior, 'An history of the Negotiations of Matthew Prior, Esq', in: M. Prior, *Miscellaneous Works* (2 vols., London, 1740), I, 39.

the post of Secretary for Dutch affairs appointed instead of Albemarle's client. The latter's excessive anger prompted the King to temporarily banish him from court. '... it is assuredly a striking proof that the Earl of Portland gets the upper hand', Tallard thought.[43] Albemarle continued to bring down Portland's old clique, and was involved in the fall of Somers, but even after Portland's retirement Albemarle was confronted with the remnants of his rival's clientele [44] Sidney, Portland's closest ally, remained in office, and Shrewsbury's client Vernon repeatedly urged Portland throughout the summer of 1699 to return to court, meanwhile meticulously reporting the latest news.[45]

Obviously opportunism prevailed amongst courtiers, as the contemporary historian Kennet wrote: 'This change did at first please the English and Dutch; the Earl of Albemarle having made several powerful Friends in both Nations, who out of envy to my Lord Portland, were glad to see another in his place'.[46] Albemarle's moment of triumph was marred by Portland's continuing influence. He was unfortunate as well, in that the initial rejoicing over Portland's retirement, which had temporarily redounded in Albemarle's favour, had turned into a growing opposition against the new favourite that became more vehement than anything Portland had experienced.[47] When Albemarle received the garter in May 1700, many of the nobility (including Portland) declined to attend the ceremony, although William tried to make it go down better by giving Pembroke a garter simultaneously.[48]

III Partisan struggles

The second element related to Portland's retirement was the realignment of parties and factions. After the end of the war the Whig Junto became internally divided and irritated with Sunderland's continuing tutelage. The latter had a number of pivotal clients, such as John Methuen, William Duncombe and Henry Guy, but also maintained contacts with the Country leader Harley, as well as with the increasingly influential Marlborough-Godolphin interest.[49] By late 1697 the co-operation between Portland and Sunderland still functioned adequately, as the Whig Junto and Shrewsbury were dominating the ministry under their supervision. Cracks between the Junto and the Portland-Sunderland interest became apparent in December 1697 when Portland and Sunderland initiated a major ministerial reshuffle. Secretary of State Trumbull had been by-passed in 1692, but had gravitated into the Portland-Sunderland interest since then. But he wanted out, complaining he had been used as a 'footman' rather than a minister of state.[50] On 1 December Portland and Sunderland had tried to persuade him to stay, but he refused and was finally dismissed by the King. Before the Junto had learned what happened, their candidate Thomas Wharton was by-passed and Sunderland managed to get James Vernon appointed.[51]

At the same time, however, their interest suffered severe blows, as Sunderland relinquished the Chamberlainship in December 1697 and Portland was appointed ambassador extraordinary to Paris, in which capacity he would have to leave court for several months at a critical conjuncture. The crisis deepened when Shrewsbury, a cornerstone in the government, expressed an ardent wish to retire. He was tired of office and fearful of the repercussions of Fenwick's accusations, in which Shrewsbury had been associated with a Jacobite plot. Portland had tried to persuade him from doing so in the autumn. '... even if I had the intention of retiring, I would not do it', he wrote, '... to give occasion to my enemies for

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[43] Tallard to Louis 3 November 1698, 17 November 1698, Grimblot, *Letters*, II, 182-184, 188-189; 22 November 1698, Luttrell, *Brief historical relation*, IV, 453.
[44] J. Oldmixon, *The History of England etc.* (London, 1735), 209-210.
[45] Vernon to Portland 4 July 1699, NUL Pw A 1497 ff.
[46] Qu. in Oldmixon, *The History of England*, 179.
[47] *Biographia Brittanica, or, the lives of the Most eminent persons Who have flourished in Great Britain and Ireland etc.* (London, 1747), I, 729.
[48] A. Boyer, *The history of King William III* (3 vols., London, 1702-1703), III, 451; Bodleian Library, Rawlinson Manuscript D924, fo. 429.
[49] E.g. J.P. Kenyon, *Robert Spencer, Earl of Sunderland 1621-1702* (London, 1958), 303.
[50] Qu. in ibid., 295.
[51] Ibid., 296; Portland to Shrewsbury 4/14 December 1697 (Kensington), HMC, *Manuscripts of the Duke of Buccleugh and Queensberry* (2 vols., London, 1903), II-2, 586.

saying, that I could not resist this accusation, of which the falsity is so evident, and which, indeed, destroys itself ... if this should occur to me, I swear to you, that I should laugh at it, and you have cause to do the same'.[52] The irony of these remarks would not become apparent for another year. Portland was well prepared for what might happen, and the following day he summoned Sir John Lowther to come down to London, apparently to have him available as a candidate for the impending vacancy.[53] He was clearly in Portland's pocket, being insecure of the King's favour and Portland having secured a post in the Exchequer for his cousin.[54] Portland and Sunderland weathered the storm by persuading Shrewsbury to keep the seals of the Secretaryship on the condition that James Vernon, a 'little man', would do the work.[55]

In practice, this was a victory for the Portland-Sunderland interest, and though the Junto could not but be content with Shrewsbury's staying, their antipathy towards Sunderland for keeping out Wharton was deep, and explains the latter's approach to Lady Orkney to oust Sunderland. Portland's attempt to let the Tory Lonsdale succeed Shrewsbury also must have alarmed the Whig Junto. Thus far co-operation between the Junto Whigs and Portland had been mutually beneficial and cordial. In May 1697, for instance, Portland had lent his apartments in Hampton Court to Charles Montagu, who had 'fitted them and the offices a little better than they were before'.[56] The relationship between Portland and the Junto Whigs had already soured somewhat, however, during the course of 1697. Edward Russell had been annoyed by being passed over for the Garter, and in September Montagu had complained that Portland's grants were '...likely to be destructive of a grant in which I have some concern ... '. [57] During that same summer Somers became embittered when a royal grant to support his baronetcy was found to be overlapping with one of Portland's. Though the latter's claim preceded that of Somers, and he was well prepared to find an expedient, his ultimate refusal to relinquish his own claim soured mutual relations.[58]

By the beginning of 1698 Portland still hoped that the Junto and Sunderland could be reconciled, but the Junto actively sought to replace or by-pass both Portland (now in Paris) and Sunderland as liaison to the King, Wharton contacting Lady Orkney in an attempt 'to make my lord Albemarle the minister.' On the 6th of February Somers, Russell and Montagu met the young favourite for dinner, Shrewsbury lurking in the countryside but keeping a close eye on the events. Albemarle, Montagu wrote to Shrewsbury, 'renounces the absent [Sunderland], and pretends the king approves of the steps he makes', insisting that 'this is the juncture to press it'.[59] The Junto was pleased with Albemarle's manners, but very doubtful as to his experience, Somers judging him 'too light for the great seal' of the great Chamberlainship. Portland showed himself unconcerned as he must have realised it was inadvisable for a favourite to accept public office and expose himself in such a manner.[60] The King himself laconically informed him that 'l'on n'entend plus parle de M[l]. Sunderland comme s'il n'estoit plus au monde, quoy qu'il y a des gens qui forment bien des projets en l'air don't je vous informeres cy après.'[61] The Junto never went ahead with the scheme, but Albemarle continued to build up his own interest at court with the help of Lady Orkney

[52] Portland to Shrewsbury 14/24 September 1697 (Het Loo), W. Coxe, ed., *Private and original correspondence of Charles Talbot, Duke of Shrewsbury etc.* (London, 1821), 177; Portland to Shrewsbury 8/18 December 1697 (Kensington), HMC, *Buccleuch Mss*, II-2, 587.
[53] Kenyon, *Sunderland*, 297.
[54] Lonsdale to Portland 5 December 1697, 9 December 1697, 13 December 1697, NUL Pw A 827, Pw A 828, Pw A 829.
[55] Portland to Shrewsbury 4/14 December 1697 (Kensington), 3/13 January 1698 (Kensington), HMC, *Buccleugh Mss*, II-2, 586, 594.
[56] Portland to Shrewsbury 8/18 September 1696 (Het Loo), Coxe, *Private correspondence*, 141-142; Montagu to Portland 18 May 1697, NUL Pw A 937.
[57] Montagu to Portland 17 September 1697, NUL Pw A 941.
[58] Somers to Shrewsbury 15/25 June 1697, Coxe, *Private correspondence*, 483-486; Somers to Portland 21 May 1697, NUL Pw A 1182; Portland to Somers 14/24 May 1697 (Zuylestein), SHC Somers Mss, 371/14/K/8.
[59] Portland to William 13 March, *RGP 23*, 255; Montagu to Shrewsbury 11 February 1698, Coxe, *Private correspondence*, 533.
[60] Cf. Kenyon, *Sunderland*, 304. In the summer of 1698 Albemarle bought Twittenham Park: 'I believe he will affect the contrary party to his rival, and seem to make a fine seat and settlement in England.' Montagu to Shrewsbury 16/26 July 1698, Coxe, *Private correspondence*, 543.
[61] William to Portland 13 February 1698, *RGP 23*, 226.

and her brother Edward Villiers, later Earl of Jersey. The latter had been courting Albemarle for some time since he had become ambassador in The Hague, though he managed – like so many others – to walk the fine line between the two favourites for a while.[62] Albemarle suffered a bitter setback in the summer of 1697, when shortly after his elevation Portland received the Garter. Jersey tried to soothe him: 'Je voys bien par votre derniere que vous étés chagrin', he wrote, and continued to elaborate on '… ceux que vous croyez veritablement vos amis …'[63] Jersey was by far Albemarle's most influential and capable ally, and built up an interest comprising his sister and Prior.

Meanwhile Portland's political relevance was rapidly eroding when the Whig Junto ultimately collapsed after a string of resignations, and he failed to re-establish his position in the emerging ministry. Sunderland had resigned in December 1697, Shrewsbury did so exactly one year later. Bonnet implicitly suggested that the timing of Portland's retirement was no coincidence. Describing the events of his retirement, Bonnet continues to note 'ces grands changements dans le ministere'.[64] Two Junto Lords, Montagu and Russell, resigned in the same month as Portland. Albemarle's client Jersey, a Tory, was made Secretary of State in April. By the summer of 1699 a new ministry had emerged. It is unlikely that all these changes were unconnected to Portland's retirement.[65]

The situation was somewhat different in Scotland, where the court party, led by the Duke of Queensberry from 1698, was largely dependent on Portland. Rumours of his retirement had caused panic amongst the court party, Patrick Hume complaining that it was '... prejudicall to the King's affairs, and of no advantage to your selfe'.[66] It was also prejudicial to the members of the court party themselves. Hume and Ogilvy feared the inevitable collapse of the Queensberry ministry without Portland's support; he had been '... a true friend to us all, and has had a great hand in our present settlement and his interest was sufficient to have supported it ...'.[67] Carmichael threatened to resign should Portland lay down his offices.[68] The opposition rejoiced, but although Portland had retreated from court, his influence in Scots business seems to have been undiminished throughout the summer and autumn of 1699, which somewhat reassured his party.[69] Johnstone thought there was all a trick to it: '... that a man shall throw up his places, and yet resolve to continue in business is nonsense, nor does any man of sense here believe it. Its more likely that he come into places again ...'.[70] But although Portland continued to exert some influence from the background and the Queensberry administration prevailed, it seems to have been mainly to finish some business.[71] It was unknown whether he would be replaced. Albemarle does not seem to have been considered a credible alternative.[72] He showed little interest in Scotland, although during Portland's supremacy he had tried to court some of the opposition, most notably Livingstone, with whom Portland was then quarrelling.[73] Attempts were made to install Albemarle in Portland's stead after the latter's retirement, but this never happened and Portland remained influential.[74]

Albemarle had been more successful in the United Provinces, where he managed to find support from those opposed to Portland's interest.[75] He was fortunate in having Jersey, British ambassador to The Hague, as his main ally. Portland had dangerously neglected to maintain his clientele and Albemarle

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[62] Jersey to Keppel 22 January 1697, Jersey to Portland 8 March 1697, BL Add Ms 18606, fos 6v-7r, 34r.
[63] Jersey to Albemarle 12 March 1697, BL Add Ms 18606, fos. 37v-38r.
[64] Dispatches Bonnet 12/22 May 1699, 16/26 May 1699, BL Add Ms 30,000 C, fos. 104-107.
[65] Dispatches Bonnet 21 April/1 May 1699, 12/22 May 1699, 16/26 May 1699, BL Add Ms 30000 C, fos. 87, 104, 106-107. Ranelagh succeeded Portland as Superintendent of the King's gardens and buildings, *CSPD 1700-1702*, 90.
[66] Hume to Portland 21 June 1699, NUL Pw A 684.
[67] Qu. in Riley, *Scottish politicians*, 130.
[68] Carmichael to Carstares 7 August 1699, J. McCormick, ed., *State Papers and letters addressed to William Carstares* (Edinburgh, 1774), 487; Hume to Portland 21 June 1699, NUL Pw A 684.
[69] Ogilvy to Carstares 17 August 1699, Carmichael to Carstares 8 August 1700, McCormick, *State papers*, 492, 601.
[70] Johnstone to Annandale 5 June 1699, HMC, *Johnstone Mss*, 109.
[71] Riley, *Scottish Politicians*, 130.
[72] Unknown to Annandale 15 June 1699, HMC, *Johnstone Mss*, 109-110.
[73] Riley, *Scottish politicians*, 130; Carstares to Melville 4 December 1697, 23 December 1697, NLS Ms 3471, fos. 64-65.
[74] Riley, *Scottish politicians*, 130.
[75] Oldmixon, *The History of England*, 179.

seems to have built up an interest amongst Dutch officers, such as Nassau-Saarbruck and Walraven.[76] After the war opposition against Portland became more outspoken. Dijkveld was inclined to topple Portland, and in the autumn of 1698 Portland and Ouwerkerk reportedly '...had a quarrell at Loo & the last they said had used him like a dog ... This they say has extreamly exalted another person...'.[77] After Portland's retirement Albemarle had Ouwerkerk's son promoted to the Mastership of the Robes, and there seems little doubt that they had been in league in eroding Portland's influence.[78] Van Borssele suggested that William still employed Portland after his retirement to administer the affairs of Overijssel through D'Alonne. In March 1699 Heinsius had assisted Portland in making the latter's nephew *drost* of Valkenburgh, bypassing Dijkveld's candidate with the support of Portland's 'common friends' in Overijssel.[79] But after Portland's retirement, the bulk of Dutch affairs was monopolised by Albemarle in combination with regional confidants, such as Odijk and Dijkveld in Zeeland and Utrecht respectively.[80] According to Jersey, Portland's sole ally was Heinsius, who proved a formidable one, though, and the Grand Pensionary remained close to Portland throughout the Partition Treaty negotiations. After Portland's retirement William tried to establish a similar link between the Grand Pensionary and Albemarle.[81]

IV Attacks by Country

A third reason for Portland's retirement was a mounting attack by Country MPs on William's favourites, either in the form of criticism on grants or general xenophobia.[82] Popular opinion had it that the King had squandered hundreds of thousands of acres of land on grants to foreigners. From the start of the Irish campaign there had been individuals preying on profits. As early as 1690 Thomas Coningsby, for instance, asked Portland to intercede with the King regarding claims for several farms even though large parts were still 'intirely under y^{e} enemy'.[83] William had always intended for the forfeitures to be put to public use, but also for part of the spoils of war to be used to reward his confidants.[84] Coningsby had also recommended an estate to Portland, but it was not until April 1697 that a grant of the estate of the Earl of Clancarty was finalised.[85] Conscious of the risk of public exposure and criticism, Portland had asked Henry Capel's advice as to the legality of the grant. The latter's reassurances lost some credibility when Winchester, Lord Justice of Ireland, warned that the grants might be disputed in the Irish parliamentary session that autumn. Presumably Portland, wiser after the storm aroused by the Welsh grants the previous year, decided to divert the Common's attention by referring the grant to his son Henry, Lord Woodstock. To doubly secure the grant, he also tried to get it enacted by the Irish Parliament.[86]

The Irish grants proved a useful pretext to launch a full-scale attack on the ministry, targeting high-profile grants in particular. Simms has observed that in the Commons 'The line of cleavage was between the court party and the opposition, or country party.'[87] The Commission dexterously concentrated on the

[76] E.g. Ranelagh to Albemarle 13 June 1699, BL Add Ms 63630, fo. 144r and passim.
[77] Giffard to Temple 14 September 1698, BL Eg Ms 1705, fo. 23; Tallard to Louis 6 July 1699, AAE CPA 182, fo. 36v.
[78] Dispatch Bonnet 13/23 June 1699, BL Add Ms 30000 C, fo. 124.
[79] NUL Pw A 55.
[80] Borssele, 'Gedenkschriften', 130.
[81] Tallard to Louis 6 July 1699, AAE CPA 182, fo. 36v; Jersey to Albemarle 9 June 1699, BL Add Ms 63630, fo. 134r.
[82] Cf. J.G. Simms, *The Williamite confiscation in Ireland 1690-1703* (London, 1956), 95; *The exorbitant Grants of William the Third examined and questioned, etc*., in: J. Somers, ed., *A collection of scarce and valuable tracts etc.* 1st Collection (4 vols., London, 1748), III, 106-114.
[83] Coningsby to Portland 26 October 1690, NUL Pw A 303.
[84] William to Godolphin 27 February 1691, *RGP 28*, 211; Cf. Simms, *Williamite confiscation*, 85.
[85] 23 April 1697, *CTB* 1697, 135, 284, 299; 15/25 September 1697, 8 November 1697, *CTB XIII*, 320, 140; 24 April 1697, Luttrell, *Brief historical relation*, IV, 215.
[86] Simms, *Williamite confiscation*, 87; Portland to Vernon 15 October 1698, Portland to Capel 23 March 1696 (Kensington), Capel to Portland 30 March 1696, Winchester to Portland 10 August 1697, NUL Pw A 1492, Pw A 271, Pw A 272, Pw A 1012; Winchester to Shrewsbury 5 August 1697, HMC, *Buccleugh Mss*, II-2, 522.
[87] Simms, *Williamite confiscation*, 97, cf. 98-99.

foreigners benefiting from these grants (they were singled out in a separate list) in order to criticise the Court. But William had ample reason to bestow the grants on these particular persons: Simms has noted that some seven foreigners received 60 percent of the Irish grants, but almost all of these could claim them as a reward for their efforts. The earls of Galway, Athlone and Rochfort had fought in Ireland, as had Portland, who had moreover been instrumental in the establishment of the Treaty of Limerick.[88] Sidney had been Lord Lieutenant. Many soldiers who had fought in the campaign actually received lesser grants. Only the grant to Albemarle was less easy to defend.[89] The Commission's inclusion in its report of a grant made to Lady Orkney was controversial since it belonged to the King's private estates. The document which was included concerning this particular case was signed by only four out of seven commissioners, which reflects the doubtful legitimacy of the decision and the division of the Commission itself.[90] The Commission was divided along partisan lines as it contained two members who were fiercely anti-Huguenot, and a third who was an avowed opponent of the government.[91] Thus, what seemed to be a protest against foreign favourites was rather a measure against the Court, and could only have carried the day during the late 1690s with the collapse of the Court Whig Party and the rise of the New Country Party.

On behalf of the government, Montagu launched a counter-attack by suggesting that the commission had only included the Orkney grant in its investigation because '... the report would signify nothing without it.'[92] It was to no avail. Neither was the protest of three of the seven commissioners that they had been marginalised and even kept outside certain investigations. In April 1700 a Resumption Bill passed the Commons, stipulating that all grants bestowed by William would be nullified.[93] Portland, Albemarle and Lady Orkney were accused of advising the King to veto the Bill, but it appeared that it was William himself who was stubbornly resisting what now seemed inevitable.[94] A constitutional crisis loomed when the Commons decided to tack the measure onto a Land Tax Bill, causing the Lords to return the Bill.[95] William, however, wished to avoid a crisis and gave in. Albemarle was despatched to the Lords to give a signal that William gave his consent to the Bill.[96] Portland and Albemarle, who had both benefited from the grants, complied and voted in favour of the Bill on its next reading.[97]

In Scotland as well Portland ran the risk of being targeted, one observer writing: '...The king (it is saied) has had Earl Portland with him and has beene ernist with him to enter againe into bussieness, but that he refuses it.' He connected his retirement to the 'stormes' he may have foreseen.[98] By this he may very well have hinted at the outcry in Scotland about the collapse of the Darien scheme, which almost exactly coincided with Portland's retirement. This Scottish scheme to found a colony in Central America had failed partly because of English and Dutch resistance to new competition, and William came under heavy attack in the autumn session. In October 1699 one anonymous writer warned Portland that the Darien

[88] Simms erroneously states that Portland was one of William's '... mere courtiers and ... civil advisers..', ibid., 85.
[89] HMC, *House of Lords Mss 1699-1702*, 33-38. From a total of 1,060,792, some 656,807 acres went to foreigners of which Sidney received 49,517, Athlone 26,480, Galway 36,148, Albemarle 108,633, Rochfort 39,871, Woodstock 135,820 and Lady 's Gravemoer 21,006 acres. Most of the other grantees were soldiers who fought in Ireland. Lady Orkney received 95,649 (not included in Irish grants); Cf. BL Add Ms 4,761 fo. 64.
[90] G. van Alphen, *De stemming van de Engelschen tegen de Hollanders in Engeland tijdens de regeering van den koning-stadhouder Willem III 1688-1702* (Assen, 1938), 277-279; Horwitz, *Parliament*, 262-263; Simms, *Williamite confiscation*, 106.
[91] Namely John Trenchard, author of the famous pamphlet *A short history of the standing armies in England*, a fierce opponent of the standing army, Simms, *Williamite confiscation*, 98.
[92] Qu. in Horwitz, *Parliament*, 264.
[93] *Cobbett's Parliamentary History of England etc. 1688-1702* (12 vols., London, 1806-1812), V, 1215, 1217.
[94] William to Portland 5 April 1700 OS, *RGP 23*, 351.
[95] A.S. Turberville, *The House of Lords in the reign of William* (Oxford, 1913), 201-202. *Cobbett's Parliamentary History*, V, 1217; Horwitz , *Parliament* 231, 255.
[96] Simms, *Williamite confiscation*, 112.
[97] *Cobbett's Parliamentary History*, V, 1218; Turberville, *The House of Lords*, 208-209.
[98] Anonymous to Annandale 25 November 1699, HMC, *Johnstone Mss*, 113.

failure would be discussed in Parliament, and already Portland was blamed.[99] But the affair was also embarrassing to William, as the Scottish presence in Spanish-dominated territory disturbed relations whilst negotiations about the Spanish Succession were proceeding.[100] In May 1699 Portland had already received a complaint from the Spanish ambassador with regard to Scottish activities in Darien.[101]

Such attacks on the favourite can be seen as part of a broader wave of xenophobia. Burnet had argued that William made himself the more unpopular by his preference for Dutch things and courtiers.[102] Albemarle seems to have been eager to keep Portland at court out of fear 'qu'il reste a fin de n'estre pas le seul et le premier en bute a la jalousie des anglois'.[103] This xenophobia had been resonating throughout the 1690s, but came to the fore with renewed vehemence after 1697, voiced in parliamentary debates and a continuous stream of pamphlets. The unmistakable xenophobic sentiments, however, were channelled into attacks on the court, and must not be overestimated. One of the more critical pamphlets was *The foreigners* by John Tutchin, published in 1700. In scathing metaphor, describing 'Bentir' plundering the land of 'Israel' [i.e. Britain], Tutchin writes:[104]

> 'Bentir in the Inglorious Role the first,
> Bentir to this and future ages curst,
> Of mean descent, yet insolently proud,
> Shun'd by the Great, and hated by the Crowd;
> Who neither Blood nor Parentage can boast,
> And what he got the Jewish [i.e. British] Nation lost:
> By lavish Grants whole Provinces he gains;
> Made forfeit by the Jewish Peoples pains;'

Portland was defended by the Court propagandist Daniel Defoe in his magisterial pamphlet *The True-born Englishman* published shortly after:[105]

> 'Ten Years in English Service he appear'd,
> And gain'd his Master's and the World's Regard
> But 'tis not England's custom to Reward.
> The Wars are over, England needs him not;
> Now he's a Dutchman, and the Lord knows what'

A flow of doggerels on the same theme followed in which Portland, Albemarle and others were criticised.[106] The criticism against the King culminated in the 1701 Act of Settlement, enacted to safeguard the Protestant succession via the Hanoverian line after the death of the Duke of Gloucester, Anne's only son. The act decisively undermined the royal prerogative, but in many aspects could have been a scathing criticism of Portland as well. It stipulated that

> '... no person born out of the kingdoms of England, Scotland or Ireland, or the dominions thereunto belonging (although he be naturalized or made a denizen, except such as are born of

[99] Anonymous to Portland 31 October 1699, McCormick, *State papers*, 505-506. Cf. H.C. Foxcroft, ed., *A supplement to Burnets history of my own time etc.* (Oxford, 1902), 544. Portland in House of Lords during Darien debate: 'prenant toujours connoissance par ordre du roij des affaires de ce royaume-la'. Dispatch Saunière 16 June 1699, BL Add Ms 17677 TT, fo 189r.
[100] Cf. William to Portland 13 September 1699, *RGP 23*, 343-344.
[101] NUL Pw A 2675-2676.
[102] Horwitz, *Parliament*, 256.
[103] Tallard to Louis 3 May 1699, AAE CPA 181, fo. 19v.
[104] J. Tutchin, *The Foreigners* (London, 1700).
[105] D. Defoe, *The True-born Englishman. A satyr* (London, 1701).
[106] *The Natives* (1700); *The True-born Englishman: a satyr, answer'd paragraph by paragraph* (London 1701); *The reverse: or, the Tables Turn'd* (London, 1700).

English parents), shall be capable to be of the Privy Council, or a member of either House of Parliament, or to enjoy any office or place of trust either civil or military, or to have any grants of lands, tenements or hereditaments from the crown to himself or to any other or others in trust for him.'[107]

Although by 1701 no Dutchmen could be found in the Cabinet or Privy Councils, the Bill obviously targeted William's foreign favourites. When the Commons moved to have Portland removed from the Privy Council, he had already retired and was not even attending the meetings.[108] But the stipulation was firmly embedded within typical Country measures such as a limitation of the King's independence in foreign policy and a reaffirmation of the Place Bill.

V The Anglo-Dutch connection

A fourth reason for Portland's retirement was the end of the war, which rendered the Anglo-Dutch connection as well as diplomatic relations and military-political co-ordination with the Allies less important. These were exactly the areas in which Portland had been influential. It was no coincidence that it was precisely in diplomatic circles that his patronage first eroded. Quarrels with Dutch favourites such as Dijkveld and Ouwerkerk, which had been latent during the war, now came into the open. His influence over Dutch correspondence was openly challenged by Albemarle as his neglected clientele in the United Provinces seemed to rapidly dissolve. On the other hand, it was in this sphere that Portland managed to find compensation as he would now be used by William as negotiator in the Partition Treaty talks, from which Portland effectively managed to exclude Albemarle.

The latter had already succeeded Constantijn Huygens as the King's Secretary for Dutch affairs. The appointment of d'Alonne, Portland's client, in 1698 had therefore been a bitter blow, but he was obliged to work under Albemarle's supervision. But it was in fact only after Portland's retirement that Albemarle succeeded in taking full advantage of the situation, though having 'nou both Dutch and English businesse more in his hands than I thinck he cares to mind.'[109] William's lesser Dutch courtiers struggled over the control of Dutch correspondence, as obviously '... le Roi n'a quasi personne auprèz de Elle, qui aje auqu'une connoissance des affaires de la République'.[110] In fact, Albemarle's capable aide Van Hulst, who would remain an influential courtier in Whitehall during the whole of Anne's reign, took most business out of his hands. Van Hulst systematically made sure Dutch affairs would be channelled through Albemarle and blocked appointments to office for those outside the new favourite's client network. Geldermalsen and Van Borssele, like Albemarle Dutch Gentlemen of the Bedchamber and obvious candidates, fell victim to this exclusion policy.[111]

VI The standing army debates

A last reason for Portland's retirement is connected to the disbandment of the army. Party boundaries briefly faded, and Tories and Country Whigs made a combined assault, led by Harley and his New Country Party, on the Whig Junto Court Party. At the end of the war, a great number of troops had to be demobilised, but a defensive force was still needed. The Parliaments between 1697 and 1702 were utterly unconvinced of the necessity of a large standing army and, urged on by an intense pamphlet campaign, moved to reduce it to its lowest possible size.[112] Contemporary observers divided the newly elected 1698

[107] Qu. in A. Browning, ed., *English Historical Documents 1660-1714* (London and New York, 1966), VIII, 134.
[108] Van Alphen, *Stemming der Engelschen*, 276.
[109] Johnstone to Annandale 10 April 1699, HMC, *Johnstone Mss*, 163.
[110] Heeringa, 'Gedenkschriften', 128.
[111] Ibid., 122-123, 129; Tallard to Louis 5 June 1699, AAE CPA 181, fo. 162.
[112] 'Armies represented centralising power, their officers formed a political interest group of placemen, they cost a great deal of money and necessitated heavy taxation, they reduced the power and importance of the sacred militia, and they weakened the

Parliament into a Court or Army party, and a Country or anti-army party, with a slight majority for the former. It indicates that there was parliamentary support to achieve a strong army.[113]

That the Court failed was largely due to William's ministerial mismanagement and his characteristic predilection for more secretive methods, which ultimately lost him a great deal of credit in the Commons.[114] Portland and Galway had been scheming to find alternative methods to keep up a strong army. One method was to 'hide' troops in Ireland. The idea was to replace depot troops in Ireland with crack troops and veterans from Flanders. This scheme was hatched in utter secrecy, and only the King, Portland and Galway were involved in the plan. On 27 November 1697 Portland had written to Galway that this plan would facilitate the bringing over of more troops to Ireland, and Galway concluded that three extra Huguenot regiments could be brought over.[115] Portland had optimistically suggested that the peace of Ryswick 'will ease our affairs in England, provided we do not rely on, and trust to it too much, and we place ourselves in a condition to ensure and preserve it.'[116] He was despatched to England whilst William was still on the continent, with the instruction to estimate the chances of raising more money.[117] Portland suggested that 30,000 troops be maintained, and set up a project to reform the troops.[118] William thought the plan too optimistic, but nevertheless followed his advice.

Returning to England, Portland realised that the Commons were in no mood to comply. The King had asked Parliament in October for funds to support some 25,000 troops.[119] But it was not to be. In vigorous attacks on the ministry, Harley proposed to further reduce the number, and supply for 12,000 troops was voted. This was a shattering defeat for the Whig Junto. A powerful anti-standing-army movement among Country-circles was quickly undermining the core of William's strength, as well as Portland's responsibilities. The method William and Portland had employed to delay disbandment by finding pretexts to keep more troops afoot than had been agreed had infuriated Country. In December 1698 Parliament decided to reduce the number of troops even further.[120] Moreover, only natural-born troops were to be kept afoot, and notwithstanding William's pleas, the Dutch Red Dragoons and Blue Guards were to sail back to the continent that spring. In January 1699 the foreign troops were sent home. On 3 March Portland's own company departed.[121] The Disbandment Act of 26 March 1699 stipulated the return of the Dutch troops back to the continent. On 10 April the army in Ireland was reduced to 12,000 men. Ten days later, Portland decided to resign. With the disbandment of the army, in Portland's view William's post-Ryswick policy had failed - as the next chapter will show. It also implied an immense loss of influence, for he was clearly connected to those who had 'great places in the court and the army'.[122] Perhaps Defoe's reproach that 'The Wars are over, England needs him not', contained more truth than he realised.[123]

VII Conclusion

Though animosity between Albemarle and Portland was certainly a factor in the latter's decision to retire, the deeper causes are much more important and illuminating. It was not simply a personal mutual hatred between the two favourites, but rather Portland's refusal to take responsibility for William's policy when his influence was gradually eroding. Secondly, as explained in the introduction, the years between 1697

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independence of the provinces.' J. Childs, *The British army of William III 1689-1702* (Manchester, 1987), 185; L.G. Schwoerer, *No standing armies! The antiarmy ideology in seventeenth century England* (Baltimore and London, 1974), 155-187, passim.

[113] Horwitz, *Parliament*, 240.

[114] Childs, *The British army*, 192 ff.

[115] Galway to Portland 7 December 1697, 12 December 1697, NUL Pw A 1114, Pw A 1115; Childs, *The British army*, 194-196.

[116] Portland to Shrewsbury, 14/24 September 1697, Coxe, *Private correspondence*, 177.

[117] William to Portland 27 October 1697, *RGP 23*, 210.

[118] William to Portland 8 November 1697, ibid., 212.

[119] Horwitz, *Parliament*, 224.

[120] Childs, *The British Army*, 200-201.

[121] Dispatch Saunière 3 March 1699, BL Add Ms 17677 TT, fo. 106r.

[122] Qu. in Childs, *The British army*, 201.

[123] Defoe, *True-born Englishman.*

and 1699 saw a complicated political transformation in which the Whig-Tory dichotomy temporarily made way for Court-Country struggles. The consequent decline of the Whig Junto weakened Portland, who failed to reconsider his position. Thirdly, he thus became highly vulnerable as a Court member when attacks by Country (outbursts of xenophobia, protests against the Irish grants, threats of impeachment) remained unchallenged. Fourthly, the end of the Nine Years War had rendered one of his pivotal roles, as liaison between the Allies, less important. Lastly, with the end of the war, the army was quickly disbanded. Portland's main role had been to mobilise resources for the war, and his influence was to a large extent based on his position as military manager. These combined factors gained strength between 1697 and 1699 and led to his resignation.

Chapter 7: *Arcana Imperii*. Portland's last years 1697-1709

Despite Portland's first retirement in June 1697 and his final retirement in June 1699 he remained active as an ambassador and negotiator during the talks over the Treaties of Partition that were to divide the Spanish Empire. Indeed, he remained highly influential in the formulation of William's foreign policy until the end of his reign and was always, as one observer noted, privy to the *arcana imperii*: the secrets of the empire.[1] After William's death he was still active as a liaison between the ministries of the Maritime Powers during the War of the Spanish Succession. This chapter will reconstruct Portland's role in the negotiations at Ryswick. It will also focus on the interaction between the Partition Treaty negotiations and domestic political events in England, in particular on the connection to the debates in the Commons on the standing army.

I The Ryswick negotiations (1697)

The disagreement between William and Portland had been resolved by the first week of June 1697.[2] The King cunningly satisfied his sulking favourite with suitable employment. Negotiations for peace between the Allies and France in Ryswick got deadlocked that spring, and William decided to short-circuit the talks by dispatching his confidant, instructed to resolve the most difficult issues by dealing directly with Marshall Boufflers. Portland and Boufflers had met in 1695 during the siege of Namur. When the French army capitulated and was offered a free exit, Boufflers was arrested by Portland, pending an exchange with captured allied regiments.[3] Only when Boufflers could transmit the royal assurance that the regiments would be released did Portland give orders to release the marshal and give him a passport to travel to France via any route. This was a curious overture to a cordial friendship between Boufflers and Portland that was to last, and from which important political advantages would materialise.[4] William must have thought they could contribute to a speedy conclusion.[5] Moreover, Boufflers was a confidant of Mme de Maintenon, and thus represented the power behind the throne.[6]

On 1 July 1697 Portland sent a messenger to Boufflers to request an interview. A meeting took place at the village of Brucom, near Brussels, a week later. Portland arrived with several gentlemen, dismounted and conversed with Boufflers in a nearby orchard for some two hours. Portland told Boufflers that William considered Louis's preliminaries at Ryswick reasonable, and that he distanced himself from the obstructive Imperialists. Thus a separate peace was not impossible. Portland demanded that Louis recognise William and pledge not to assist James II. Lastly, Portland promised that Huguenots could only settle in the United Provinces with Louis's permission, but that a pardon to Jacobites would be left to English Parliament.[7] This suggests that Boufflers did not regard Portland as a British envoy, but rather as a personal representative of William. This is underlined by a last point of discussion, in which Portland stressed that Orange was part of William's sovereignty. Hence they were the envoys of two sovereign princes rather than spokesmen of two different alliances. This alarmed the other allies. Though Portland's mission had resulted in more flexibility from the French ambassadors at Ryswick, Heinsius wrote to

[1] Johnstone to Huntingdon 5 October 1697, HMC, *The Manuscripts of the ... the manor house, Ashby-de-la-Zouche* (London 1930), I, 299.
[2] See chapter 6.
[3] Stepney to Trumbull 26 August/5 September 1695, NA SP 105-54, fo. 163r.
[4] Boufflers to Portland 11 September 1695, Portland to Boufflers 19 October 1695, NUL Pw A 172, Pw A 174.
[5] William wrote to Heinsius that '… it is the more necessary to press the negotiations, and there is no better way than secret negotiations by ambassadors of the state …', 11 July 1697, Krämer, F.J.L., ed., *Archives ou correspondance inédite de la maison d'Orange-Nassau* Troisième serie (3 vols., Leiden, 1907-1909), I, 573.
[6] Gaultier to Portland 26 July 1697, NUL Pw A 159.
[7] M.E. Grew, *William Bentinck and William III (Prince of Orange). The life of Bentinck, Earl of Portland, from the Welbeck correspondence* (London, 1924), 284 ff.

Portland, the Imperial ambassadors demanded to know the contents of the discussions.[8] Both Heinsius and Portland made efforts to withhold from their allies the fact that more issues than the position of James had been discussed. The main goal was achieved; Portland conveyed the message that William was sincere in his efforts to make peace, and was likewise assured of the sincerity of Boufflers.[9]

A second meeting took place exactly one week later at the same place. The initial barrier of distrust had been removed, and thus the meetings had proved successful. Louis would go so far as to promise not to give any support to William's enemies, but James must not be named. Heinsius suggested to Portland that they should go along with French demands, as long as James was clearly indicated in the text.[10] Also, reciprocity had been accepted by the French, and thus since William was recognised as King, James was evidently not.[11] Portland and Heinsius worked in tandem on the fine-tuning of the draft articles.[12] Portland showed himself somewhat more lenient, rejecting Heinsius's proposal to insert a clause that Louis would not accept James's presence in France.[13]

The Ryswick talks were back in full swing when the third meeting took place on 20 July, at which both Portland and Boufflers had larger entourages but spoke alone.[14] Portland had insisted that at this stage, British ambassadors needed to be included in the talks.[15] At the fourth meeting on the 27th, Portland and Boufflers for the first time retired into a nearby house where the latter handed over a written statement from Louis. Portland was not allowed to retain it, but only to copy it. His demand that Louis would not give any support to James - though he was not mentioned - was accepted.[16] Boufflers' counter-demand - that Portland would put pressure on the other Allies to accept - could not easily be consented to. William had instructed the English and Dutch envoys in Vienna, barons Lexington and Heemskerck, to make clear to the unwilling Emperor that the war needed to be ended. Heinsius thought that Portland now had succeeded in his mission to break the deadlock, though he should keep in correspondence with Boufflers.[17] The ice was broken, a principal agreement was reached, and presents were exchanged.[18]

The confrontation between the Allies went less smoothly. On the 4th of August Portland travelled to The Hague to give a report of affairs to the Allied ambassadors. He unpleasantly surprised them with the French insistence on keeping Luxembourg and Strasbourg, for which they had offered expedients, much against the will of the Imperialists and Spaniards.[19] The English as well were concerned. On receiving the draft articles, Secretary of State Shrewsbury complained that William was not mentioned by name. Portland explained that this was not necessary, and as to the position of James, Portland decided to trust Louis's verbal promise - in retrospect a serious miscalculation.[20] Meanwhile the French had set a 31 August deadline for the Ryswick negotiations. Anxiously Portland and William waited, but the deadline

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[8] Heinsius to Portland 13 July 1697, 17 July 1697, NUL Pw A 1934, Pw A 1935; Hill to Shrewsbury 18 July 1697 NS, HMC, *Manuscripts of the Duke of Buccleugh and Queensberry* (2 vols., London, 1903), II-2, 487.

[9] Cf. William to Heinsius 11 July 1697, Krämer, *Archives*, 573-574; Heinsius to Portland 17 July 1697, NUL Pw A 1935.

[10] Heinsius to Portland 20 July 1697, NUL Pw A 1937.

[11] The fact that Britain's interest was taken care of by Dutch ambassadors (for French ambassadors would not recognise William's British representatives) caused some anxiety in Whitehall. Cf. Heinsius to William 20 July 1697, NUL Pw A 1936.

[12] E.g. Heinsius to William 20 July 1697, NUL Pw A 1936. Portland had been instructed to write to Heinsius, see his draft notes in NUL Pw A 2577.

[13] Heinsius to Portland 20 July 1697, NUL Pw A 1937. This is curious, for it was exactly what Portland pressed during his embassy in 1698.

[14] Hill to Shrewsbury 15/25 July 1697, Shrewsbury to Hill 16 July 1697, Jersey to Shrewsbury 2 August 1697, HMC *Buccleugh Mss*, II-2, 495, 497, 506.

[15] Heinsius to Portland 27 July 1697, NUL Pw A 1937.

[16] Portland to Shrewsbury 29 July 1697, W. Coxe, ed., *Private and original correspondence of Charles Talbot, Duke of Shrewsbury etc.* (London, 1821), 353; Hill to Shrewsbury 29 July 1697, HMC, *Buccleugh Mss*, II-2, 500.

[17] Heinsius to Portland 27 July 1697, NUL Pw A 1939.

[18] Boufflers to Portland 31 July 1697, NUL Pw A 177. A fifth meeting on 2 August likewise proceeded smoothly; Boufflers ordered the ambassadors in Delft to act constructively. Hill to Shrewsbury 5 August 1695, HMC, *Buccleugh Mss*, II-2, 523-524.

[19] NUL Pw V 68/20. Villiers to Shrewsbury 9 August 1697, HMC, *Buccleugh Mss*, II-2, 513.

[20] It was therefore logical that Portland should insist on this when he arrived in Paris in February 1698. It was the main test of Louis' sincerity. Portland to Shrewsbury 12 August 1697 (Het Loo), Shrewsbury to Portland 28 August 1697, Coxe, *Private correspondence*, 363-364.

passed with the issues still unresolved. The negotiations got stuck on Strasbourg. Louis refused to part with the city and forced the allies, mainly the Imperialists, to accept this by 20 September.[21] Clearly the ultimatum was too short, and was meant to divide the Allies.

On 3 September Portland contacted Boufflers again, expressing concern that the negotiations had reached another deadlock.[22] He referred to their recent conversations and observed that the talks in Ryswick were not proceeding well. He argued that although William did not want to separate himself from the allies, if the Emperor were to separate himself by his obstructive behaviour, it would be his own responsibility. Though Portland and Boufflers had reached an agreement on this matter, the French ambassadors now refused the Emperor extra time to join the agreement. On 9 September Portland and Boufflers met again to break the deadlock over the Imperialists' refusal to accept an expedient for Strasbourg. It was a tough discussion that lasted for almost five hours, in which Portland expressed doubt as to Louis's sincerity.[23] Portland demanded that the deadline be postponed, and the equivalent for Strasbourg enlarged ('…le premier indispensable, le second evident …').[24] Though Boufflers was sensitive to Portland's complaints about the uncompromising stance of the French ambassadors, no positive commitments could be made, and their meeting was fruitless. On 20 September William grudgingly accepted the French terms. Portland as well was dissatisfied with the way in which the negotiations had proceeded at Ryswick, writing to Shrewsbury:

> 'Sir; I congratulate you most truly that peace is at length made; such as it is; for, in my opinion, though it is not much to the advantage of France, who purchases it dearly enough, yet we might have had it in a better manner, without permitting France to assume that haughty demeanor which she has manifested since the last of August, had we not testified an immoderate desire, and even a necessity, of making this peace.'[25]

II The Paris Embassy (1698)

If by the spring of 1697 Albemarle seemed to have threatened Portland's position, by the summer the elder had re-established himself as the foremost in the King's favour. Portland received credit for being '…so successful an instrument in y^{e} effecting...' the peace.[26] The Junto Whigs were hailing their patron for his success which seemed to strengthen the Court's position in the parliamentary session.[27] Moreover, he was now a statesman with an international reputation. On his return to England in October 1697 Portland was a celebrated figure being ' ...very much courted'.[28] The King's confidence in him was undiminished; he gave him permission to prepare the parliamentary session, manage the ministers in his absence and deal with royal correspondence.[29] When William in the autumn decided to dispatch him to Paris as ambassador extraordinary, reactions were mixed. It was undoubtedly a distinguished appointment, but some considered it an 'honourable kind of banishment' as it would leave Albemarle to consolidate his position at court.[30] The Bishop of St David's thought that 'The year begins with the fall of a great favourite and great palace' - referring also to the fire that broke out in Portland's Whitehall

[21] NUL Pw A 2588.
[22] Portland to Boufflers 3 September 1697 (The Hague), Boufflers to Portland 8 September 1697, NUL Pw A 179, Pw A 180.
[23] Hill to Shrewsbury 9 September, 12 September 1697, HMC, *Buccleugh Mss*, II-2, 543, 547-548.
[24] NUL Pw A 2580.
[25] Portland to Shrewsbury 14/24 September 1697 (Het Loo), Coxe, *Private Correspondence*, 373-374.
[26] Bishop of Exeter to Portland 8 November 1697, NUL Pw A 1406. Cf. Gaultier to Portland 9 August 1697, Sunderland to Portland 10 August 1697, NUL Pw A 163, Pw A 1267.
[27] Montagu to Portland 27 July 1697, Guy to Portland 17 September 1697, NUL Pw A 939, Pw A 517.
[28] Ellis to Williamson 22 October 1697**,** NA SP 84-223, fo. 396r.
[29] Vernon to Williamson 19 October 1697, *CSPD 1697*, 434; William to Portland 27 October 1697, *RGP 23*, 210.
[30] Pringle to Carstares 10 February 1698, J. McCormick, ed., *State papers and letters addressed to William Carstares* (Edinburgh, 1774), 369; Hill to Shrewsbury 20/30 September 1697, HMC, *Buccleugh Mss*, II-2, 556-557. Cf. Van Leeuwen to Carstares 28 April 1698, McCormick, *State Papers.*

apartments which delayed his journey with several days.[31] Although William was eager to separate the quarrelling favourites, Portland's critics were probably mistaken, for it was precisely through his role as negotiator that he managed to maintain his position as William's most prominent favourite after 1697.

William's choice was also a logical one, as by sending Portland he was transmitting a clear signal to Louis that he desired a better mutual understanding. Portland received his instructions on 31 December. He left London on 10 January 1698, was received with much pomp in various cities on his way and arrived in Paris on the 20th.[32] He paid the King an informal visit some days later, and had private audiences with the Dauphin, the Dukes of Anjou, Berry and Burgundy, Monsieur, Madame and the Duchess of Burgundy. During his public entry into Paris Portland was attended by gentlemen of the horse, twelve pages, 56 footmen, twelve led horses, four coaches with eight horses and two chariots with six horses - a sight unseen since the Duke of Buckingham's embassy.[33] It was probably one of the most expensive embassies, costing William some £ 48,000.[34] The Parisians were duly impressed. While Portland had never been popular with his new compatriots, he soon established friendly contacts with many of his former enemies. Whereas men like Marlborough and Sunderland considered him 'dull' and 'wooden', Saint-Simon praised the good manners and judgement of the English ambassador.[35] The Sun King reciprocated the magnificent overture with commensurate splendour, receiving the ambassador with elaborate courtesies and granting him the unprecedented favour of free access. 'La Cour [d'Angleterre] a appris avec plaisir', Bonnet wrote, 'le bon acceuil qu'on a fait en France à Milord Portland.'[36]

However, it was widely believed that Louis was trying to blind the ambassador by the brilliance of his reception, of which Portland himself was aware: 'J'advoue', he wrote to William, 'que si tout ce que je voy en la personne du Roy, n'est pas sincère, c'est une comédie bien jouée.'[37] Portland was sceptical as to the usefulness of his mission as he distrusted French motives. Throughout his embassy he repeatedly requested permission to return, partly because he must have been uneasy about his absence from court. But he seemed to have genuinely doubted whether he was the most appropriate candidate for the embassy. He was obstinate and independently minded which frequently caused him to interpret William's wishes before receiving actual instructions.[38] Moreover, Portland foresaw the difficulties the King would run into with Parliament, and suggested that William should

> '… m'envoyer quelqu'un qui puisse mander en Angleterre l'estat véritable des affaires, et en qui les membres du Parlement puissent adjoutter un peu plus de foy qu'en ce que j'escriray qui sera consideré tousjours comme partant d'un homme attaché à V. M^té^ et qui ne dite que ce qu'elle souhaitte.'[39]

Portland's instructions were fairly generally stated, which gave him *carte blanche* in many respects. He was to ensure the French King of William's desire to maintain a stable peace. His additional and secret instructions stipulated in very general terms that he should endeavour to have James removed from St Germain, and to seek an understanding in case of the death of the Spanish King.[40] Portland's embassy started somewhat unfortunately with his obstinate insistence on the removal of James from St Germain.

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[31] Bishop of St David's to Huntingdon 6 January 1698, HMC, *Ashby-de-la-Zouche Mss*, I, 305; A. Boyer, *The History of the Life & Reign of Queen Anne* (London, 1722), appendix, 50; 4-11 January 1698, N. Luttrell, *A brief historical relation of state affairs from September 1678 to April 1714* (Oxford, 1857), IV, 327-330. Cf. Bonnet's dispatches of 14 and 17 January 1698, BL Add Ms 30000 B, fos. 1-6.

[32] NA SP 105-26; G.D.J. Schotel, ed., *H.W. Bentinck, Journal of the extraordinary embassy of his excellence the Earl of Portland in France* (The Hague, 1851).

[33] A. Boyer, *The history of King William the Third* (3 vols., London, 1702-3), III, 335 ff.

[34] Cf. D.B. Horn, *The British diplomatic service 1689-1789* (Oxford, 1961), 66; Boyer, *History of King William*, III, 340-341.

[35] Cf. Ch. 5.

[36] Dispatch Bonnet 4/14 February 1698, BL Add Ms 30000 B, fo. 31r.

[37] Portland to William 13 March 1698, *RGP 23*, 256.

[38] Cf. Louis to Tallard 5 May 1698, Tallard to Louis 8 May 1698, P. Grimblot, ed., *Letters of William III, and Louis XIV and of their ministers etc. 1697-1700* (2 vols., London, 1848), I, 448, 461.

[39] Portland to William 23 January 1698 (Dover), *RGP 23*, 220.

[40] *RGP 23*, 214-219.

The matter had been discussed between Boufflers and Portland before, but not resolved. Although the former had argued that Louis could not remove the exiled King formally, he might agree to do so afterwards as a sign of goodwill. Louis had never intended to do so, but Portland was still under the impression that he would comply with the demand to have James removed to Avignon or Italy, and regarded the matter as a litmus test of the King's sincerity.[41] The presence, moreover, of a number of Jacobites at court, provoked a bitter argument with Boufflers on the matter. '... j'ay receu touttes les marques d'honneur et de distinction imaginables', he wrote to William, but '... l'on admet tous les jours à la Cour les Anglois qui sont au Roy Jacques ... ca qui augmente ma méfiance ... si je laisse aller les choses sur ce piet, sans témoigner combien j'en suis sensible, que cela ne convenient pas à cette union et bonne intelligence que l'on m'asseure de vouloir establir et entretenir ...'[42] Boufflers insisted that Louis had never pledged to comply with William's demand. Though it was difficult for Portland to deny this, it increased his suspicions.[43]

William had permitted him to press the matter, but perhaps not with the tenacious obstinacy his envoy displayed. In an audience on the 17th of February, Portland insisted that the King remove James, and that William understood an agreement had been so made. He added that Parliament would doubt Louis's sincerity unless this demand were complied with, the more so since a number of suspects of the Assassination plot had been spotted in the direct environment.[44] On the first point Louis refused, arguing that an agreement had never been made, which was formally correct. The King agreed to look into the second point if Portland would provide him with the names of suspects. Portland had intimated that unless Louis complied with the demand, William might not pay the £50,000 pension to Mary of Modena, a threat that Louis dismissed since this requirement was actually inserted into the Ryswick articles.[45] William was dissatisfied with Portland's strong insistence on this matter - though he typically did not reprimand his emissary in the least - and feared that it proved an ill start of his embassy. Portland thought otherwise, arguing that Louis might feel compelled to be more flexible in other matters unless he intended to provoke a break with William.[46] Nevertheless Portland was now extremely sceptical about the usefulness of the mission: '... V. Ma té. voit quel fondament il y a à faire sur la paix et à quel point l'on peut croire des protestations quand les effets son contraire. V. Ma té. sçait que cecy ne doit pas me surprendre, m'y estant attendu depuis qu'elle m'a fait l'honneur de me destiner à cest employ.'[47]

Soon rumours spread about the contents of the talks, and Portland was suspected of trying to make matters public before he discussed them with the King. Obviously it would have been interpreted as a means to put pressure on the King, but Portland assured the French ministers that this was not his intention.[48] 'Il est très bon que ces bruits de refus procèdent des Jacobites et ne paroissent pas affectéz en partant de vos gens.'[49] Meanwhile Portland commenced a parallel correspondence with William, meant not to be seen by ministers: 'j'i mande le véritable estat des choses comme elles sont, mais si peut estre elle jugeoit qu'il vaudroit mieux pour l'intérest de ces affaires au Parlement que je ne fis pas voir si clairement le peu que je croys que V. Mté. à attendre d'ici ...'[50]

III The First Partition Treaty (1698-1699)

[41] Portland to William 16-18 February 1698 (Paris), ibid., 227-232.
[42] Portland to William 9 February 1698, ibid., 224.
[43] Portland to William 16-18 February (Paris), ibid., 227-232.
[44] Portland to William 16-18 February (Paris), ibid., 230.
[45] Louis to Tallard 16 May 1698, Grimblot, *Letters*, I, 485-486.
[46] Portland to William 7-8 March 1698 (Paris), *RGP 23*, 245.
[47] Portland to William 16-18 February 1698 (Paris), *RGP 23*, 232.
[48] Portland to William 1 March 1698 (Paris), ibid., 237-238.
[49] Portland to William 13 March 1698 (Paris), ibid., 255.
[50] Portland to William 13 March 1698 (Paris), ibid., 257.

On 14 March Marquis de Pomponne, the Secretary of State, and his son-in-law and heir apparent, the Marquis de Torcy, visited Portland and broached the subject of the Spanish inheritance in order to reach an understanding with William. They warned that Habsburg would be the dominant power in Europe again if the Emperor should inherit Spain, and expedients must be sought in order to prevent that eventuality. William and Portland must have discussed the matter thoroughly beforehand, though his instructions merely stated that he must sound out the King of France in case the King of Spain should die.[51] It has been assumed that Portland and Boufflers had broached the issue during their private talks at Halle in the summer of 1697. There is, however, no trace in Portland's draft notes, and apparently both William and Louis had anxiously tried to avoid the matter in the Ryswick talks.[52]

Portland had claimed to be wholly unaware of William's thoughts on the Spanish Succession and assured Pomponne and Torcy that their overture was unexpected. He was not instructed to deal on this matter but agreed to listen, not as an ambassador but as a private person, and convey their ideas to his master. 'Je n'ay pas voulu dire rien qui pust auqu'unement faire juger que je sceusse les intentions de V. M^{té}. particulièrement quant on ne s'ouvroit que si peu ou point; c'est pourquoy j'attendray pour sçavoir la volonté de V. M^{té}. sur la chose mesme.'[53] Of course Portland's aim was to let Louis make an overture.[54] By feigning a lack of knowledge (he even asked Pomponne and Torcy to explain the contents of the will of Philip IV) he surprised his opponents and forced them to lay their cards on the table. In consecutive meetings Portland subsequently baffled his opponents by his intimate and profound knowledge of affairs.[55] It took Louis several weeks to realise that Portland was playing tricks on him. In May he wrote to Tallard that the talks should be transferred to London; whereas Tallard was negotiating, Portland was only concealing William's thoughts and trying to sound out Louis's intentions.[56]

The Spanish Succession had been a source of concern for over three decades. The Spanish King, Carlos II, had been weak as an infant and repeatedly wavered on the brink of death. His childlessness caused the European powers considerable anxiety since a struggle over his inheritance seemed inevitable. Louis could claim the inheritance on behalf of the Dauphin, who was a son of his first wife, Marie Thérèse, a daughter of Philip IV. The Emperor had married a younger daughter of Philip IV and claimed the inheritance on behalf of his second son, the Archduke Charles. A third claimant was a great grandson of Philip, Joseph Ferdinand, Electoral prince of Bavaria. Both the French King and the Emperor had the means to back up their claims, and as early as 1668 they had agreed to make a treaty of partition dividing the Spanish Empire to avoid armed struggle. In 1689 the Maritime Powers pledged to support the claim of the Emperor, but changed circumstances after the Peace of Ryswick and the dissolution of the Grand Alliance necessitated a new agreement. Various initiatives had been undertaken; the Austrians and the French had sent their ambassadors, Count Harrach and the Duke d'Harcourt, to Madrid to induce the Spanish King, who by all accounts was dying, to make a final alteration to his will in favour of their sovereigns. It was at this critical moment that Louis made an overture to William. The Emperor was on the brink of concluding a favourable peace with the Turks and would soon be in a position to claim the full inheritance. The Bavarian pretender was no serious party in the negotiations, lacking the strength to bolster his claim alone; a direct agreement with the Spanish King would be contested by both the Maritime Powers and the Emperor. A direct deal with William to partition the Empire and act as joint guarantors of the treaty was thus the most obvious choice.[57]

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[51] '... il aura à sonder s'il n'y auroit pas moien de trouver des expédiens pour prévenir une geurre que la mort du Roy d'Espagne sans enfans pouroit causer'. Secret instruction in William's handwriting to Portland 8 January 1698, ibid., 219.

[52] See his notes in NUL Pw A 2574 ff.

[53] Account of Pomponne and Torcy 14 March 1698, Grimblot, *Letters*, I, 294 ff.; Portland to William 5/15 March 1698, *RGP 23*, 259-260.

[54] Louis thought that since he was a claimant and William not, it would be incorrect to do otherwise.

[55] Account of Pomponne and Torcy 14 March 1698, Grimblot, *Letters*, I, 298, in which they reported that Portland seemed 'really ignorant' of the will of Philip IV.

[56] Louis to Tallard 5 May 1698, Grimblot, *Letters*, I, 450.

[57] Cf. Louis to Tallard 16 May 1698, Grimblot, *Letters*, I, 476-477.

The talks were influenced by four factors. Firstly, the health of the King of Spain, which was particularly precarious during 1698 and 1699. This put immense pressure on the negotiations, since no one was certain what would happen should the King die during the talks. Secondly, the war in the Balkans was drawing to a close, the peace being in fact signed in 1699. This raised the prospect of a more active Imperial policy in the West, which was unfavourable to Louis. A third factor was the mutual perception of Louis and William of each other's strength. The devastating parliamentary sessions of 1698 and 1699 in England, in which Country decimated William's army and finances, were a particularly crucial element in the talks, though the results were paradoxical and unforeseen. Lastly, the negotiations were influenced by mutual distrust. If the parties were sincerely dealing with each other, they would need to exclude the possibility of reaching an agreement with other parties. The fear would linger, however, that one party might be secretly dealing with a third party, and these suspicions would cloud the negotiations.[58] It is difficult to overestimate the dynamics of these four factors, and it counts for something that powers that had been archenemies for three decades reached a basic agreement within six weeks after the first overture was made.

The talks continued for six months, and can be summarised by comparing the axioms of the contestants, and the manner in which an agreement was accordingly reached. From William's point of view, the Spanish and French crowns must never be united. He did not believe that having a French prince (rather than the Dauphin) on the Spanish throne would suffice to prevent an actual union. This was difficult to swallow for Louis, who believed that he had a legal right to the Spanish throne. Secondly, William insisted that the Spanish Netherlands must be connected to Spain, otherwise they would be indefensible. Navarra and Guiposcoa, on the south side of the Pyrenees, should remain in Spanish hands. This was also hard to swallow for France as it would imply an encirclement. Louis consistently strove to gain vital strategic positions to defend his territory: Navarra, Guiposcoa (as a gateway into Spain), Luxembourg or the Spanish Netherlands, and Milan, as a stepping stone into Italy. Obviously, what Louis considered vital defensive strongholds were perceived in London and The Hague as potential key offensive positions. Thirdly, the Maritime Powers needed to secure their trade in the Mediterranean and the West Indies through a number of safe ports. To this Louis objected for two reasons. Firstly, the Maritime Powers were not legal claimants and secondly, they would soon dominate the scene and destroy Spanish trade.

In early April Pomponne and Torcy came with their first concrete proposals. Having considered William's fear that France and Spain might come under one Bourbon crown, Louis proposed that his son the Dauphin renounce the inheritance in favour of one of his sons, the Duke of Anjou or Berry, who would be educated in Spain. The Spanish Netherlands would come under the sovereignty of the Elector of Bavaria, and the English and Dutch would receive guarantees for the safety of their trade in the Mediterranean. Louis tried to make it more attractive by granting some key compromises: ports for the Maritime Powers, the Spanish Netherlands for the Elector of Bavaria.[59] Portland dismissed the proposals on both legal and pragmatic grounds. Conversing as a 'private person', he argued that there were three pretenders, and there was no reason to suppose the Dauphin had a greater claim than the Archduke or the Electoral Prince. He then laid down what would become the basis of a final agreement: that the Electoral Prince should have the bulk of the inheritance, that the Low Countries must remain in strong hands and that the Maritime Powers needed tangible proof for the security of their trade. On the 2nd of April Portland first intimated that William might be willing to listen to proposals, and advised him to speak about it to Tallard. After this counteroffer (still by Portland as a 'private person'), both parties could now work towards a *via media*. Portland thus achieved an important diplomatic success: he forced Louis to renounce the bulk of the inheritance in favour of the Electoral Prince.

At this stage, William, Heinsius and Portland (who were the only ones informed of the substance of the talks) were in doubt as to whether to pursue the negotiations. It might be possible, Portland suggested to William, to prevent

[58] E.g. Tallard to Louis 16 July 1698, ibid., II, 72-78.
[59] Portland to William 2 April 1698 (Paris), *RGP 23*, 274-278.

> ‘les jalousies que la France pourroit donner, quant mesme V. M^té^. ne feroit point de propositions; cependant quant je verray les Ministres ici, je parleray sur le mesme piet et ne diray pas qu’il i ayt la moindre apparence que V. M^té^. propose ou répondre à leurs propositions, qui sont si esloignées de la raison, pour donner de la jalousie aus alliéz ...’[60]

It was a calculated risk. If France were sincere, she would press the talks nonetheless. If she were not, there was a danger that the Grand Alliance would be undermined. Either way, there was always a risk that Louis would strike a bargain with one of the other parties, and the ‘triumvirate’ decided to continue the talks and see where they might lead.[61]

Indeed, the way in which Louis perceived Dutch and English strength was crucial to the success of the Partition Treaties. If he regarded them as weak and indecisive (as he had thought, in fact, in 1688), he could gamble on Dutch aloofness and English domestic turmoil and claim the full inheritance. In many respects, the England of 1698 resembled that of 1688. It was headed by a weak monarch, distrusted by the political nation trying to clip his wings both militarily and financially. At his arrival in London late March 1698 Tallard informed Louis: ‘the King of England may still be reckoned of much importance, on account of his personal qualities, but this kingdom must be considered as a country destitute of resources for many years to come.’[62] William’s position would only weaken, and Louis could profit from the situation as he had with Charles II and James II: by binding William to his own interests by giving him subsidies, he could make it impossible for William to intervene.[63] Tallard however warned the King not to draw false conclusions; England still had the ability to act militarily.[64] The alternative would be to strike a sincere deal with William, on the basis that England and France could dominate the rest of Europe and force both Spain and the Emperor to accept the Partition Treaty. This option became less desirable when William’s position weakened further throughout 1698 and 1699, and Louis continued to waver between the two options. The leaders of the Maritime Powers argued along the same lines. All depended on strength, and Heinsius kept insisting that regardless of what avenue the talks might take, it was imperative to have a strong army and a strong fleet: whether Louis was sincere or not, ‘… the more we put ourselves in order, the easier the negotiations in Paris will be.’[65] The success, then, of the Partition Treaties hinged on the strength of the Maritime Powers.

When Louis realised that William would not accept the Dauphin as the sole heir he proposed two alternatives, one in favour of the Electoral Prince but with compensation for the Dauphin he knew was unacceptable to William, a second with the bulk for his grandson and favourable conditions for the Maritime Powers – obviously in an effort to tempt William. Portland dismissed both alternatives: neither one took the interests of the Maritime Powers into consideration.[66] William however created an opening and accepted the first alternative in principle, allotting the bulk of the inheritance to the Electoral Prince, but strove to improve the conditions. Tallard was optimistic and now believed a deal was possible.[67] Louis’s reasonable offers came as a surprise, and William, Portland and Heinsius seemed increasingly to

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[60] Portland to William 10 April 1698 (Paris), ibid., 280.
[61] Portland to William 10 April 1698 (Paris), ibid.
[62] Tallard to Louis 31 March 1698, 3 April 1698, Grimblot, *Letters*, I, 323, 343. Heinsius thought that in case the Spanish King were to die, the Dutch would be powerless to resist the French should they wish to claim the full inheritance. Heinsius to William 14 March 1698, Krämer, *Archives*, II, 62-63.
[63] This option was seriously considered by Louis, though Tallard warned him that the situation was not entirely the same, since William could also depend on Holland. Louis to Tallard 26 May 1698, Grimblot, *Letters*, I, 511-512; Tallard to Louis 2 June 1698, ibid., II, 13.
[64] Tallard to Louis 2 March 1699, ibid., II, 291-293.
[65] Heinsius to William 25 March 1698, Krämer, *Archives*, II, 77.
[66] Louis to Tallard 17 April 1698: First alternative: to cede to the Electoral Prince: Spain, Indies, Low Countries, Majorca, Minorca, Sardinia, Philippines, and other countries except for Naples, Sicily and Luxembourg for the Dauphin, Milan to Archduke; Second alternative: the whole inheritance for a French prince, with the Low Countries for the Electoral Prince, Naples and Sicily for Archduke and Tuscany ports. Milan for Savoy. Grimblot, *Letters*, I, 384-393; Portland to William 20 April 1698 (Paris), *RGP 23*, 287-290.
[67] Tallard to Louis 25 April 1698, Grimblot, *Letters*, I, 419-429.

consider the possibility that Louis might be sincere. The offer exceeded their expectations, and the stumbling blocks (Luxembourg and ports for the Maritime Powers in the Mediterranean and the West Indies) could be overcome in time.

In several audiences, throughout late April and May, Portland insisted on more concessions from the French in the Mediterranean and the West Indies. On 17 May Portland had a long private audience with the King in which they discussed the stumbling blocks to an agreement. Firstly, he argued that the Emperor would never be allowed to be dominant in Italy, and so Louis's fears in this regard were unfounded. Secondly, he demanded substantial strongholds in the Mediterranean and the West Indies to safeguard Dutch and English commerce. Thirdly, Luxembourg could not be restituted, indeed, the Barrier had to be enlarged. Lastly, the position of James remained a stumbling block to a good mutual understanding. 'Je suis très persuadé, Sire', he wrote to William, 'que V. M^{té}., tenant très ferme sur toutes les choses en question, elle aura contentement sur la pluspart, sinon tout. Je crois que l'on a une véritable envie de nouer avec vous'.[68] He added that Louis repeatedly said that if he and William would come to an agreement, the rest of Europe had to follow.[69] Portland's final audiences were concerned with bickering about fortified places in the Mediterranean and the West Indies, in which he consistently rejected the offers.[70] It would be intriguing to know what had been discussed in a meeting Portland had had in the King's closet just days before he left for London. To William he wrote that the discussion had been too important to entrust its report to paper.[71]

By now Portland's negotiations were no longer productive. He had tried to sound out the King as much as possible without giving too much away. Portland '...will not facilitate any thing. This comes rather from his obstinacy ... than from ill will', Tallard thought.[72] Louis found out soon enough it was easier and more advantageous to deal with William directly.[73] Louis was also convinced – and justly so – that Portland and Heinsius were more sceptical than William.[74]

Portland arrived in London on the 29th of June and reported immediately to the King in Kensington.[75] Rumours about his position and embassy were particularly confused during the summer. In July Tallard thought that Albemarle's favour was increasing, but he changed his mind by the autumn. After the conclusion of the treaty in November Portland had re-established himself as the pre-eminent favourite at court. Albemarle threatened to resign and sulked in the countryside for weeks.[76] Meanwhile, during the summer rumours had been spreading that William would dispatch his favourite immediately to Madrid on another embassy. This probably meant that the highly secret talks on the Spanish inheritance Portland had conducted in Paris had leaked, as Prior, secretary of the embassy, reported the rumour first from Paris. Secretary of State Vernon dismissed the report, as did Louis, who thought it was devised to thwart the negotiations.[77] Contemporary chroniclers both hailed and despised the ambassador. John Oldmixon published a poem praising Portland as 'Mighty in the Arts of Peace'.[78] Abel Boyer, in his 1703 *History*, was not unsympathetic to Portland but dismissed the embassy as futile and costly. Surprisingly, Paul

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[68] Portland to William 17 May 1698 (Paris), *RGP 23*, 308. 'Il me semble que l'on souhaitte de conclure tout de bon, mais l'on voudra faire tous les delays et les chicanes dont le ministère est capable et contre lesquels il sera nécessaire de se roidir et de ne pas relâcher d'abord du tout, quand même elle auroit dessein d'en faire quelque chose à la fin.' Portland to William 4 June 1698 (Paris), *RGP 23*, 331.

[69] Portland to William 17 May 1698 (Paris), *RGP 23*, 308; Louis seems to have thought that for that reason, William would clearly see that it was not in Louis's interest to support James. Louis to Tallard 16 May 1698, Grimblot, *Letters*, I, 486.

[70] Portland to William 4 June 1698 (Paris), *RGP 23*, 331-333.

[71] Portland to William 17 June 1698, ibid., 334-335.

[72] Tallard to Louis 8 July 1698, Louis to Tallard 4 July 1698, Grimblot, *Letters*, II, 56, 53.

[73] Louis to Tallard 5 May 1698, ibid., I, 446 ff.

[74] Tallard thought that 'Heinsius will incline [William] to war', Tallard to Louis 22 July 1698, Grimblot, *Letters*, II, 79.

[75] NA SP 105-26.

[76] Cf. Ch. 6.

[77] Louis to Tallard 24 July 1698, *Grimblot*, II, 81-83; Vernon to Prior 2 July 1698, Prior to Vernon 3 July 1698, HMC, *Calendar of the Manuscripts of the Marquis of Bath etc.* (Hereford, 1908), III, 225-227.

[78] J. Oldmixon, *A poem humbly addressed to the Right Honourable the Earl of Portland, &c. On his lordships return from his embassy in France* (London, 1698).

Rapin de Thoyras, who became tutor of Portland's son Woodstock in 1701, likewise criticised Portland's conduct.[79] Less surprising was the recurrence of anti-favourite rhetoric. As Portland's embassy resembled that of Buckingham, a familiar rumour resurfaced in the aftermath of his embassy. Portland, Bonnet reported, '... a témoigné de l'indignation pour des personnes qui débitoient qu'il seroit fait duc de Buckingham, apparemment parce que ce nom a toujours été fort odieux aux Anglois'.[80]

Meanwhile Portland took charge of the negotiations with Tallard in London and during the summer at Het Loo.[81] By this time the negotiations had slowed down again. Louis was convinced the delay was due both to Portland (who persuaded William to take a firmer line) and the Commons, who still discussed the matter of demobilisation.[82] Again, William, Heinsius and Portland realised that success would depend above all on the strength of the Maritime Powers: 'that all efforts are being made to make the Allies put themselves in a good posture of defence; this point is the most difficult, but the only one to bring this negotiation to a good end.'[83] Tallard reported to Louis in late July that Portland seemed eager for a deal.[84] The talks continued through July and August, both parties realising it was a skirmish for the final crumbs. The last major stumbling block, Milan, was overcome. On 8 September an agreement was reached. On 26 September Portland and Tallard signed the treaty, deputies from the States General followed some two weeks later.[85] It was only weeks before the conclusion that Portland confronted the ministers in London with a virtual *fait accompli*. He wrote that the talks were in a preliminary stage and that he was in need of their advice.[86] He instructed Vernon to disclose the contents of his message to only a very select group; Montagu, Somers, Shrewsbury and Russell were subsequently notified. His message took Vernon by utter surprise, though 'it was not doubted but your Lord[sp] would bee principally, if not solely relied on, that the nature of the business & the Secret that was to bee observed would necessarily require the putting it into the hands of one that was in the highest confidence with the King'.[87] The Secretary expressed concern about whether Louis was only 'amusing' them, but Portland seemed to think that an agreement could be solid if supported by force: 'Kings, princes and States do make and have ever made treaties and kept forces for the maintenance of them'.[88] Within days a commission under the Great Seal was sent to Holland, Portland urging that the utmost speed was required; should the King of Spain die, France had the power to put herself in the possession of all the territories.[89]

Indeed, Portland was concerned about the military potential because between December 1698 and April 1699 the Commons forced the King to reduce the army to almost unprecedented low numbers and send home his treasured Blue Guards, including Portland's horse regiment.[90] In despair, Portland wrote to Heinsius in January:

> 'The affairs have come this far here that a change in the Commons is not to be expected, and will be very difficult in the Lords, so that we cannot foresee very well which measure must be taken to redress matters, without great inconveniences one way or another, without our Lord God

[79] Boyer, *History of King William*, III, 340-341.
[80] Dispatch Bonnet 12/22 July 1698, BL Add Ms 30000 B.
[81] This was partly for practical reasons as well; William feared that too many audiences of Tallard might rouse suspicion, Tallard to Louis 8 May 1698, Grimblot, *Letters*, I, 461.
[82] Louis to Tallard 4 July 1698 and passim, Grimblot, *Letters*, II, 48-54.
[83] Heinsius to William 8 July 1698, Krämer, *Archives*, II, 231.
[84] Tallard to Louis 30 July 1698, Grimblot, *Letters*, II, 87-92.
[85] The First Partition Treaty allotted the bulk of the inheritance to the Electoral Prince, Milan to the Archduke and Naples and Sicily to the Dauphin. Cf. Grimblot, *Letters*, II, 483 ff.
[86] Portland to Vernon 24 August 1698 (Het Loo), NUL Pw A 1474.
[87] Vernon to Portland 2 September 1698, NUL Pw A 1482.
[88] Portland to Vernon 7 October 1698, NUL Pw A 1491.
[89] Portland to Vernon 5 September 1698 (Het Loo), NUL Pw A 1483.
[90] Cf. Ch. 6.

giving us the means in our hands which we cannot yet foresee, so great is the blindness of the people, and that which is required for their own preservation.'[91]

Prior voiced Portland's concern when he wrote: 'how do we think to be respected or make alliances, whilst we can not give one Man to any of our Neighbours upon occasion? ... our friends at St Germains are drinking the house of C[ommons] health'.[92]

IV The Second Partition Treaty (1699-1700)

In February 1699 Portland received the devastating news from the Elector of Bavaria of the death of his son, rendering the First Partition Treaty obsolete.[93] Portland must have been shocked, and almost upon receipt instructed his successor in Paris, the Earl of Jersey, to sound out Louis as to his opinion.[94] Jersey informed him that Louis seemed intent on renewing the treaty though 'wee must look over the mapp to see, what would be most convenient ... [this] made me thinck.'[95] The subsequent negotiations were mainly conducted between Portland and Tallard; though Heinsius was intimately involved, William seemed more reluctant to enter into the debates.[96] In fact, according to Tallard, Portland had 'tout la confiance du cette affaire. Il porte et determine le Roy son maistre à tout ce quil veut. Il est lié au Pensionnaire'.[97] This is also suggested by the hitherto unpublished correspondence between Portland and Heinsius, which provides further insights into the complexities of the talks and the parameters within which these were conducted.[98]

It was to be expected that Louis would once more claim the bulk of the inheritance for his son, as he had done at the start of the talks a year earlier. Portland had then brushed aside the argument and defended the claim of the Electoral Prince. Tallard must have sensed immediately that this time Portland was negotiating from a position of weakness; days after the death of the Prince, Portland visited Tallard to see whether he thought the Elector to be heir to the Prince his son. Louis rejected the Elector's claim on legal grounds, but also because the situation had changed; the Emperor had become stronger now that a peace with the Turks had been concluded. Louis asked for the Dauphin's part to be augmented with Milan, allotting the bulk of the Empire to the Archduke, with the exception of the Low Countries.[99] Portland and William discussed the matter in London, the latter expressing surprise as to 'why the pretensions of the Dauphin would have been enlarged because of the death of the Electoral Prince.'[100] Indeed, Portland complained to Tallard that Louis '... cherchoit a prendre de sy grands avantage de la mort du P^{ce} Electoral de Baviere quil seroit fort difficile d'en venir a une heureuse conclusion'.[101] He argued that if the Dauphin were to receive Milan as well as Naples and Sicily, the balance of power would be upset. Moreover, the proposed separation of the Spanish Netherlands from Spain was unacceptable.[102] An alternative was swiftly considered. In a memorial Portland handed to Tallard on 10

[91] Portland to Heinsius 20 January 1699 (Kensington), NA HA 3/01/19/2189. The French ambassador however warned Louis that despite the difficulties the English would '... give their last penny for their defence', Tallard to Louis 2 March 1699, Grimblot, *Letters*, II, 293.
[92] Prior to Portland 11 February 1699, NUL Pw A 1036.
[93] Max Emanuel to Portland 8 February 1699, NUL Pw A 48.
[94] Portland to Jersey 9 February 1699, NUL Pw A 1510.
[95] Extract from a letter of Jersey 15 February 1699, NA HA 3/01/19/2189.
[96] E.g. Portland to Heinsius 10 March 1699, ibid.
[97] Tallard to Louis 5 February 1700, AAE CPA 185, fo 21v. Cf. Tallard to Louis 22 April 1699, AAE CPA 180, fo. 214v.
[98] NA HA 3/01/19/2189. Japikse did not include this correspondence in his volumes. *RGP 23*, vii. Cf. L.G. Schwoerer, *No standing armies! The antiarmy ideology in seventeenth century England* (Baltimore/London, 1974), 158.
[99] Portland must have understood this was formally not the case. The First Partition Treaty stipulated that the Elector would inherit the Spanish Empire from his son, but since the prince had never been in the actual possession of the inheritance (since the King of Spain was still alive) there was nothing to inherit. Louis to Tallard 13 February 1699, Grimblot, *Letters*, II, 259-260.
[100] Portland to Heinsius 24 February 1699, NA HA 3/01/19/2189.
[101] Tallard to Louis 26 March 1699, AAE CPA 180, fo. 111r.
[102] Portland to Heinsius 24 March 1699, NA HA 3/01/19/2189.

March, he accepted that the Archduke would receive Spain, but that the Spanish Netherlands needed to be attached to it, and that Milan must fall into neither French nor Austrian hands.[103]

Heinsius genuinely feared that this time Louis might prefer a deal with Leopold if the Maritime Powers were to stick to their objections.[104] Portland had always been sceptical about the chances for the success of the treaties. He would have agreed with Sunderland who thought that '... the K. must treat with every body abroad as if all things went well here'.[105] But the domestic situation was deteriorating. On 20 March the Commons resolved to disband the Blue Guards, after having rejected William's plea to retain his cherished Dutch elite troops.[106] On the day that the Blue Guards embarked for Holland, Tallard raised his demands. 'The affairs in Parliament are as before', Portland wrote to Heinsius, 'the guards embark today … it becomes clear that [the French] regulate their measures according to the conduct of Parliament.[107] Two days later he wrote: 'The affairs in Parliament are getting worse and I fear the French will accordingly become more difficult'.[108]

Portland witnessed the breakdown of William's policy with abhorrence. Between March and May 1699 the Whig Junto finally collapsed, Country MPs made violent attacks on the government and the army was reduced to 7,000 troops. This was the situation in which Portland was instructed to negotiate a treaty about which he felt increasingly sceptical. There was a clear difference in opinion as to what line to take during the talks. William seemed intent on making more concessions, Portland, initially, held on to the principle of three claimants. In a memorandum he wrote: 'My opinion is that France will not break off the negotiations, but His Majesty does not want to hazard it.'[109] His professed dissatisfaction with William's policy preceded his letter of resignation by only five weeks. Only one day after his retirement, Tallard reported to Louis that '... every thing is in such a mess in this country that no one knows to whom to apply on the slightest matter, and there is no one in office who will regulate or decided, or sign any thing whatever'.[110]

William seems to have been surprised and suspicious about French eagerness to conclude the treaty.[111] Perhaps Portland realised better the drawbacks of this negotiation, Tallard concluding that '... on ne scauroit rien faire de plus avantageux pour les interests que de conclure un traitte avec luy dans cette conjunctur'.[112] In this light Portland's explanation to Sunderland that his resignation was simply due to an unwillingness to accept responsibility for William's policy gains significance.[113] He also realised - as he had warned William earlier - that he now personified a foreign policy to which the Commons were averse. They were not unwilling to maintain William's Blue Guards, if it were not that Portland's regiments were part of them.[114] Portland now realised that he would only harm the King's interest by remaining in office, explaining to William that '... circumstances ... had been found to cause him annoyance in his public career.' Only because of William's direct request did he consent to finish the Partition negotiations.[115]

Despite his retirement Portland thus agreed to conclude the negotiations on William's request. Indeed, it would be difficult for the King to find an alternative. There were more skilled diplomats, but none with the stature of the royal favourite. By now, Portland had developed into an experienced negotiator with a

[103] NUL Pw A 2677, Pw A 2678.
[104] NUL Pw A 2681.
[105] Sunderland to Portland 4 March 1699, NUL Pw A 1277.
[106] Schwoerer, *No standing armies!*, 172.
[107] Portland to Heinsius 29 March 1699, NA HA 3/01/19/2189.
[108] Portland to Heinsius 31 March 1699, ibid.
[109] Notes of Portland 24 March 1699, NUL Pw A 2683.
[110] Tallard to Louis 2 May 1699, Grimblot, *Letters*, II, 316.
[111] William to Portland 8 May 1699, *RGP 23*, 339.
[112] Tallard to Louis, 3 April 1699, AAE CPA 180, fo. 141r.
[113] Sunderland to Portland 20 March 1699, NUL Pw A 1279.
[114] Tallard to Louis 31 January 1699, Grimblot, *Letters*, II, 245.
[115] Tallard to Louis 15 May 1699, ibid., II, 329. Most observers, including Tallard, Vernon and indeed the King himself, attributed Portland's decision to retire to a personal grudge rather than a political decision. E.g. Tallard to Louis 2 May 1699, ibid., II, 319: 'It is not a national cabal that desires to drive him back to Holland. It is himself that is desirous to withdraw.'

profound knowledge of affairs. It was the one area in which Albemarle had had no experience at all, and no other diplomat could claim to represent both the Maritime Powers. Weeks after his retirement Albemarle tried to work himself into the Partition Treaty negotiations. His closest ally, the Earl of Jersey, had returned from his embassy to France and was appointed Secretary of State. In this new configuration Albemarle and Jersey could expect to oust Portland from the talks, and their failure to do so indicates the extent of the latter's control over the negotiations.[116] Portland must have been aware of the advantage his position as negotiator gave him over Albemarle; according to Tallard, it was Portland himself who 'begged' William to leave the negotiations to him.[117] Thus although Portland had now ostensibly been side-lined by his rival Albemarle, in actual fact his influence endured because of his position as negotiator.

The talks continued more or less without interruption, although they were transferred to Het Loo where William and his favourite had retreated to that summer. Tallard was surprised that the Earl was making so many difficulties, being convinced that the Maritime Powers were eager to reach a settlement at all costs. Despite mutual distrust the talks proceeded more swiftly now, in fact a basic agreement had been made as early as the 11th of June 1699. But it would take almost a year before the treaties were signed, which shows the instability of the agreement, but also the additional complexity as a result of the Emperor's involvement. Tallard frequently blamed William, but especially Portland, for delaying the talks, but it was the Emperor who made the most difficulties.[118] If the Spanish King were to die before an agreement had been reached, the Maritime Powers would have to support his claim. Hence Portland was overoptimistic when he assured Tallard in July that the Emperor had agreed to the principle of a partition and would seek an understanding with William.[119] In fact, while Tallard and Portland were fine-tuning the articles of Partition, most of the time was wasted waiting for the Imperialists. The Emperor regarded Italy as the most important part of the Spanish inheritance and refused to cede his claim over Milan, as Portland's courier to Vienna reported in early September. Tallard bitterly complained, however, that '... le Pensionaire et Mr Portland jettoient toujours dans des lieux communs et decidoient rien.'[120] Trying to speed up the talks, Tallard visited Portland at Sorgvliet in mid-September, days before the deadline for Imperial adherence to the treaty. Portland '... m'a replique que le roy son maistre ne pouvoit former d'advis qu'apres avoir eu connoissance des nouvelles qu'on attendoit mais qu'il scavoit bien que le sentiment de ce Prince etoit d'avoir encores une reponse de Vienna avant que de signer un traitte avec nous.'[121] Portland continued to reassure Tallard that the treaty would be signed within days, but Tallard suspected treachery. Quite likely William was unwilling to sign without Imperial support. Amsterdam certainly was, which also delayed Dutch adherence when the 25 September deadline came and passed. Word reached Vienna that Portland had said that the Emperor would either adhere or be left out, but either way the treaty would proceed.[122] Throughout the winter Portland kept on postponing signing the treaty for England, whilst Tallard kept on believing it was imminent.[123] Indeed, the Dutch accused the Imperialists of spinning out the negotiations whilst awaiting the King of Spain's death. The Imperialists contrariwise bitterly accused Portland whom they perceived as the 'author' of the Anglo-French rapprochement, 'of which he, through his talks with Boufflers, Tallard and the King, laid the foundation, through the warm reception received there [in Paris], which made him better French than beforehand'.[124]

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[116] Tallard to Louis 31 May 1699, AAE CPA 181, fo. 152r; Tallard to Louis 29 July 1699, AAE CPA 182 fo. 70r.
[117] Tallard to Louis 15 May 1699, Grimblot, *Letters* , II, 328-329.
[118] Tallard to Louis 26 March 1699, AAE CPA 180, fo. 114v.
[119] Tallard to Louis 29 July 1699, AAE CPA 182, fo. 73r.
[120] Tallard to Louis 13 September 1699, AAE CPA 183, fo. 65v.
[121] Tallard to Louis 17 September 1699, ibid., fo. 79v.
[122] Hop to Heinsius 16 September 1699, G. von Antal and J.C.H. de Pater, eds., *Weense gezantschapsberichten van 1670-1720* (2 vols., The Hague, 1929-1934), II, 111.
[123] E.g. Tallard to Louis 12 October 1699, AAE CPA 183, fo 169v.
[124] Hop to Heinsius 19 September 1699. Cf. Hop to Heinsius 22 May 1700, Antal and De Pater, *Weense gezantschapsberichten*, II, 114, 159.

The treaty was signed only in March 1700, and it allotted the bulk of the inheritance to the Archduke (Spain, the Indies, the Spanish Netherlands), with compensation for the Dauphin (Naples, Sicily, Finale and the Tuscan ports, augmented with Lorraine). The Duke of Lorraine would receive Milan in return.[125] It was a curiously complicated arrangement. The strengthening of France in Italy would increase the possibility of a war on that peninsula, whereas the Emperor lacked the means to defend the Spanish inheritance properly for his son. Moreover, the Elector of Bavaria felt slighted by the terms, whereas the Spanish King vehemently opposed a division. Portland had always objected to the latter point and continued support the claim of the elector. 'I pray to God', he confessed to Heinsius, 'to bless it [the treaty] and to prevent the inconveniences which will have to be feared from it, that through it a peace in Europe may be confirmed.'[126] When Carlos died in the autumn and left a will in favour of the Duke of Anjou, Louis decided to accept the will and reject the treaty.

V Impeachment (1701)

Having finished the negotiations, the Earl clearly prepared himself for the life of a landed aristocrat when he remarried in May 1700. Throughout the 1690s there were persistent rumours of an impending remarriage, and both his influence and wealth made him among the most desirable matches. There was a rumour in 1692 that Portland was to marry the daughter of the Duke of Newcastle. There is, moreover, circumstantial evidence that he might have had a mistress; the name of Stuarta Howard circulated for some time and some expected him to marry this lady-in-waiting of Queen Mary. Whatever truth there was in these rumours, between the autumn of 1698 and the spring of 1699 the liaison must have been broken off,[127] and Portland informed am acquaintance, the Duchess of Somerset, that a lady was recommended to him 'with the Character of all those quailitys that can be desierd in a wife'.[128] In May 1700 he married the widow of Lord Berkley of Stratton, Martha Jane Temple, the niece of the pro-Dutch diplomat Sir William, who brought with her a dowry of £20,000.[129] Meanwhile he devised a Grand Tour for his son Lord Woodstock in 1701.[130]

But his retirement was not to be undisturbed. When the particulars of the Partition Treaty came to the attention of the Commons soon after its conclusion they caused an uproar. Portland refused to answer any questions, stating that he needed permission of the King first, but on 15 March 1701 he agreed to explain in the Commons his involvement. Initially it was thought that only Jersey and Portland (the signatories of the 2nd Partition Treaty) had been implicated, but the matter became more confused when Portland mentioned that he had first asked the advice of several key ministers. He moreover stated that he had been called from his country house in Holland by the King, and had asked counsel from the ministers as to whether he should be employed in this matter.[131] Such a distortion of events irritated the Whig ministers, who argued that although they were notified of the talks, they had never been involved in them.

If William was unpleasantly surprised by the frontal attack on his foreign policy, the French were baffled by such parliamentary audacity. Tallard had thought that Portland had little to fear, 'car comme le droit incontestes jusqu'a present aux Rois d'Angleterre est celuy de faire des traittes et des alliances tout ce que peut faire le parlament, c'est de ne point ayder'.[132] But on 12 April Portland was formally charged with 'high crimes and misdemeanour' for concluding in an unconstitutional manner a treaty that would

[125] Though the treaty may seem uneven: unlike the Dauphin, the Archduke had no direct prospect of succeeding his father, and Habsburg would remain divided.
[126] Portland to Heinsius 23 April 1700, NA HA 3/01/19/2189.
[127] 24 September 1692, 27 September 1692, 11 December 1692, 20 December 1692, Luttrell, *Brief Historical Relation*, II, 574, 577, 643, 644; Clarges to Harley 22 September 1692, HMC, *Manuscripts of his grace the Duke of Portland preserved at Welbeck Abbey* (London, 1894), III, 501; NUL Pw A 2798; Lady Giffard to Martha Jane Temple 14 September 1698, BL Eg Ms 1705, fo. 23v; I am thankful to Ms Lynda Crawford of Nottingham University Library for alerting me to Ms Howard.
[128] Duchess of Somerset to Portland 26 May 1699, NUL Pw A 1013.
[129] 4 May 1700, Luttrell, IV, 641.
[130] Cf. BL Eg Ms 1706.
[131] Pembroke, Lonsdale, Marlborough, Somers, Halifax, Montagu and Vernon were mentioned.
[132] Tallard to Louis 14 June 1699, AAE CPA 186, fo. 135r.

involve Britain in a new war . With the exception of a captain of the guards, no one came to his defence. It was easy to see why. Saunière de L'Hermitage observed that even his friends did not have the courage to speak out, since the earl was generally hated as a foreigner.[133] Nor did he, after his resignation, have any influence and there seemed little point in enraging the majority. It would seem pointless to impeach a retired foreigner, but most observers realised that this was only a means to an end: 'le grand dessein n'étoit pas de perdre ce lord; on n'avoit debuté par lui que pour frayer le chemin à la destruction du Baron de Sommers, qui est redoutable aux Tories; au lieu que Mylord Portland n'a aucun partis'.[134] Hence the impeachment procedures fell prey to partisan struggle. Bonnet correctly stated that it was absurd to impeach Portland and not Jersey (the latter now inclining to the Tories): 'que ceci est une pure affaire de partis, et non un acte de justice'.[135]

As was expected, Portland's explanation rather enraged Parliament. In an attempt to regain the initiative, he carelessly referred to some older documents from 1698, thus bringing into the light the discussions on the First Partition Treaty which had clearly been conducted while the Junto Whigs were still in power. It was a serious miscalculation. The Tories now saw an opportunity to implicate the former Whig ministry and demanded copies of the correspondence of Vernon and Portland, which were brought in by the former (Portland claiming his were in Holland) to be translated by committee. On 26 April an address was sent to the Lords to impeach the four lords (Portland, Somers, Halifax and Orford).[136] Incredibly, the commission forgot to include Portland in its address to the King.[137] The Lords viewed the proceedings in the Commons with disdain, and considered the accusations against their fellow peers unjust. An address was sent to the King to halt the impeachment, and a constitutional deadlock was reached. In May the matter curiously faded away. The Commons failing to produce the actual articles of impeachment, the Lords decided to dismiss the charges against Portland on 24 June.

It was not the first time that Portland had been threatened with impeachment. In 1695 a commission had looked into charges of corruption, and had to conclude that his record was spotless. Portland had ridiculed the procedure, as he did in 1700 when rumours of new charges circulated:

> 'their threats have not prevented me from continuing in my sentiments and conduct, while I have done so out of the service of the King, having little to fear, the only reason they could find to accuse me was that my son had received a grant from the King, which is ridiculous.'[138]

He understood that his conflict with the Commons was not just about procedural misdemeanours. For a decade the Commons had loathed Portland's role in strengthening royal executive, muzzling Parliament by blocking the Triennial and Place Bills, and showing frequent disdain for the Members. During the impeachment procedures of 1701 Portland was directly confronted by the Commons for the first time, and they once more clashed over conflicting ideas about government and foreign policy.

Curiously, indeed, the actual substance of the partition treaties was never seriously discussed, although Portland did take the opportunity to speak of it in the Lords. The impeachment procedures serve to illustrate the contrast between a European-minded Portland and an introspective Parliament. Whilst the first clamour of war had started in the spring of 1701, bills for taxes and troops were neglected. Indeed, Tallard at some point suggested that Portland had purposely challenged the Commons to initiate a debate on foreign policy:

> 'l'on condamne fort Milord Portland a la cour d'avoir parlé quand tout estoit finy, et d'avoir donné lieu a un embaras ou le Roy son maistre est commis. D'autres disent que Milord Portland a agy de concert avec ce prince, a fin de faire voir qu'il ne s'estoit point libre a la france,

[133] Dispatch Saunière 12 April 1701, BL Add Ms 17677 WW, fo. 212.
[134] Dispatch Bonnet 1/12 April 1701, BL Ad Ms 30000 E, fo. 120v.
[135] Dispatch Bonnet 1/12 April 1701, ibid., fo. 121v.
[136] Dispatch Bonnet 15/26 April 1701, ibid., fos. 141 ff.
[137] Dispatch Bonnet 25/6 May 1701, ibid., fo. 156r.
[138] To Heinsius he confided that he had little to fear now that he had retired. Portland to Heinsius 23 April 1700 NA HA 3/01/19/2189.

> mais au contraire qu'il avoit garde toutes fortes de mesures avec l'Empereur, et ainsy les formes de ce Royaume en communiquant toutes choses a son conseil.'[139]

It is appropriate, therefore, that Portland's final public act was an important speech in the Commons in which he explained and defended his actions and the course of Williamite foreign policy:

> 'que le Traité de Partage n'avois pas produit le Testament de Charles Second, mais que c'etoit la faction françoise et le Cardinal Porto Carero qui s'etoient servis du pretexte que l'Espagne devoit se mettre à convert des menaces de la france, et que l'etat désarmé de l'Angleterre pour soutenir les Espagnols avoit facilité le Testament. Que la crainte de ce qui est arrivé, et les intelligences secretes des Negociations de la france pour avoir l'Espagne en faveur d'un de ses Princes, et le danger qu'elle ne dévint trop puissante, avoient été les motifs qui avoient inspiré le Traité de partage.'[140]

There was a significant sting in his argument. Not he, but the policies of Country and of the disbandment of troops had caused the will of Charles II to be altered in favour of the Duke of Anjou.

VI Last years (-1709)

When the Imperial ambassador Auersperg asked Portland how he could bear to retire after having been involved in public affairs for thirty years, he professed to have been reconciled to country life, '... but throughout all his talk and philosophising he involuntarily sighed deeply many times'.[141] After having served a demanding master for three decades Portland became emphatically attached to his retirement, not willing to 'meddle', as he frequently put it. But behind the scenes he remained actively interested in public affairs, a vocation perhaps better suited to his qualities and character. Portland's friendship with William had not appreciably lessened, but their interaction became less frequent. After a clearly emotional disruption in June 1699, their ordinary friendship had soon re-established itself. Portland now focused more on his family and estates, but frequently visited the King and there never was a break between the two men. Portland's retirement from daily political life was just what it purported to be: a retirement. Up until April 1700 he often spoke to the King on behalf of affairs connected to the Partition Treaty. In the winter of 1701 the King had confided to his friend, whilst strolling through the garden of Hampton Court that, his health declining fast, he did not think he would survive the winter.[142] No doubt Portland remembered this when only months later he was called to the King's deathbed.[143]

With the accession of Anne Portland lost his last office when she gave the rangership of Windsor to Edward Seymour. This was rather a blow to Portland, who was quite attached to the Lodge. The decision was probably inspired by Sarah Churchill, who loathed Portland, but perhaps also needed to assert herself as the new royal favourite.[144] Only a fortnight later, he left England to spend the summer at Sorgvliet, a pattern which would annually be repeated. The relationship further soured with a lawsuit, apparently initiated by Albemarle. Anne sued Portland for an alleged £91,000 fraud, which the Earl claimed were

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[139] Tallard to Louis 28 March 1701, AAE CPA 191, fo. 101.
[140] Dispatch Bonnet 17-18 March 1701, BL Add Ms 30000 E, fos. 92v-93r.
[141] Qu. in Grew, *Bentinck*, 369.
[142] *Biographia Brittanica, or, the lives of the Most eminent persons Who have flourished in Great Britain and Ireland etc.* (London, 1747), I, 732-723; G. Burnet, *History of his own time* (6 vols., London, 1725), V, 582.
[143] Portland arrived late, after the King's voice had failed, and - according to Burnet – William '... took him by the hand, and carried it to his heart with great tenderness.' *History*, V, 585. Another witness, William's physician Bidloo, gives a variation on this story. According to Bidloo William whispered some words into Portland's ear just before he lost consciousness. G. Bidloo, *Verhaal der laaste ziekte en het overlijden van Willem de IIIde etc.* (Leiden, 1702), 106. Unlike some historians have suggested, this was no reconciliation, since there had never been a break as such. It was a last farewell.
[144] 12 May 1702, Luttrell, *Brief historical relation*, V, 172; F. Harris, *A passion for government. The life of Sarah, Duchess of Marlborough* (Oxford, 1991), 87; Anne to Sarah 19 May 1702, H.L. Snyder, ed., *The Marlborough-Godolphin correspondence* (3 vols., Oxford, 1975), I, 66.

tallies bought during William's lifetime. After the hearings, in which his secretary Frederick Hennings, and his business associates John Smith and Francis Eyles came forward with favourable statements, the crown lost the lawsuit against Portland. In June 1704 he informed Robéthon that he had won 'finalemente facheux et grand proces qui mavoit causé my Ld Albemarle'.[145] Portland stayed in England and his visits to the Republic became even shorter after 1706 when he bought the estate of Bulstrode in Buckinghamshire. He was an exception, as the remnants of what had been the Dutch inner circle in England were now mostly dispersed. Athlone became commander-in-chief of the Dutch army under the allied command of Marlborough, and died in 1703. Nassau-Ouwerkerk became field marshal and succeeded Athlone. Zuylestein had retired to his estate in Utrecht. Albemarle accepted a post in the Dutch army as lieutenant general and would serve during the course of the War of the Spanish Succession.[146]

On the afternoon after William's death Portland – though 'fort abbatu' - attended the session in the House of Lords signalling his determination to perform his duties in Parliament.[147] He was still infrequently seen at court and was on speaking terms with Sidney Godolphin, First Lord of the Treasury, and the Duke of Marlborough, now commander-in-chief of the Allied forces. But his connections with the new administration were few, as it consisted mainly of former opponents such as Robert Harley and the High Tories, the earls of Nottingham and Rochester. 'Vous verrés', Portland wrote to Heinsius, '... les sentiments de baucoup de gens ici, lesquels ne seront pas du goût de baucoup de gens en Hollande, mais la nécessité évidente pourroit peut-estre contribuer à lever des difficultéz très grandes car un remède est indispensablement nécessaire ou l'armée ce perd et sur qui jetter les jeux.'[148]

In most of the Dutch provinces the stadholderate was once more abolished after William's death, the Nassaus remaining in office in the North. William's favourites consequently ceased to play a dominant role. Even before his retirement Portland had lost many connections of political significance in the United Provinces. He was no longer part of the inner decision-making core-group that was 'in the secret of the government'.[149] But he still had some important contacts. He was in close correspondence with Heinsius, and was related to Wassenaar-Duyvenvoorde who held a seat in the Holland *Ridderschap* and was a member of one of the most influential and affluent Dutch noble families.[150] Portland kept his seat in the *Ridderschap* and remained involved in faction struggle. His relationship with Albemarle remained strained, and in 1706 he clashed with his former rival Nassau-Ouwerkerk in a contest over offices after the death of the Lord of Catwijk in 1706.[151]

On occasion Portland was still involved in politics. In the summer of 1704, for instance, he discussed possible support for a Cevennois rebellion with the Savoyard ambassador Maffei.[152] Torcy still seems to have considered him as a negotiator for peace.[153] However, it seemed that by 1702 Portland's active political career had largely come to an end. Jean de Robéthon suggested to Heinsius that Portland might be willing to act as a tutor to the young Frisian Stadholder Johan Willem Friso, but the plan came to

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[145] D'Alonne to Portland 8 May 1703, 16 May 1704, NUL Pw A 317, Pw A 318; NA 1704 E 133/153/5, 1704 E 133/153/6; 27 June 1704, Luttrell, *Brief Historical Relation*, V, 439; Portland to Robéthon 27 June 1704 (Whitehall), BL Stowe Ms 222, fo. 253.

[146] Albemarle to Heinsius 11 April 1702, A.J. Veenendaal, ed., *De briefwisseling van Anthonie Heinsius 1702-1720* (20 vols., The Hague, 1976-2001), I, 88-89.

[147] Saunière to Heinsius 24 March 1702, Veenendaal, *Briefwisseling*, I, 28.

[148] Portland to Heinsius 4 December 1703 (Whitehall), Veenendaal, *Briefwisseling*, II, 566.

[149] Cf. G. de Bruin, *Geheimhouding en verraad. De geheimhouding van staatszaken ten tijde van de Republiek (1600-1750)* (The Hague, 1991), 352; R. Hatton, *Diplomatic relations between Great Britain and the Dutch Republic* (London, 1950), 21-29; J.G. Stork-Penning, 'The ordeal of states - some remarks on Dutch politics during the war of Spanish Succession', *Acta Historiae Neerlandica* II (1967).

[150] Though it should be remembered that the nobility of Holland was a relatively weak order. See for an analysis of the nobility: J. Aalbers, 'Factieuze tegenstellingen binnen het college van de ridderschap van Holland na de vrede van Utrecht', *BMGN* 93 (1978), 412-417 ff.

[151] See the extensive correspondence between Portland and Wassenaar-Duyvenvoorde, *RGP 24*, 459 ff. Cf. Wassenaar-Duyvenvoorde to Portland 17 July 1703, *RGP 24*, 469-471.

[152] 11 July 1704, Luttrell, *Brief historical relation*, V, 443-444; Stanhope to Harley 25 July 1704, NA SP 84-226, fo. 462.

[153] Meyercron to Portland 27 January 1703, NUL Pw A 928.

nothing.[154] However, his contacts on both sides of the Channel still rendered him useful. He was well informed, remaining in contact with politicians both in London and The Hague, and corresponded with an extensive network of agents, mainly former aides and secretaries. These were now also establishing lines of communication between the Allied ministries. René Saunière de L'Hermitage was a prolific supplier of information to Heinsius and the States General from London beginning in 1692 when he became an agent. He seems to have been a tutor to Portland's children and was acquainted with Jean de Robéthon, who had been recruited to monitor parliamentary affairs and was secretary to Portland in Paris.[155] In subsequent years Jean de Robéthon would become an agent for Hanover through whom Portland remained in touch with the electoral court.[156] Guillaume Lamberty likewise served as an agent for Hanover in The Hague from 1706, but had formerly been a secretary to Portland.[157] Abel Tassin d'Alonne had acted as secretary to Portland and was made Dutch Secretary to William through him afterwards. During the War of the Spanish Succession he was secretary to Heinsius and was active in the counter-espionage Black Chamber.[158]

Heinsius in particular regarded Portland an important medium between the Dutch and English ministries. The two men had habitually corresponded over the preceding years, a practice which was to continue throughout the rest of Portland's life on a regular basis.[159] This confidential correspondence acquainted Portland with the deliberations of Dutch policy makers, but vice versa provided the Grand Pensionary with a view of sentiments in Whitehall.[160] On occasion Heinsius asked Portland to support Dutch interests and obstruct Tory policy. In January 1703 he asked him to contribute to a speedy dispatch of English troops to the continent and prevent the sending of a fleet to the West Indies, but there is no evidence that Portland was able to comply with Heinsius's wishes.[161] Obviously Portland had to act with circumspection. When Heinsius requested detailed intelligence about Anglo-Dutch military co-operation 'with which he could be of use to the common good', he urged Portland not to let it be known that he had received documents from The Hague. Both men must have realised that Portland's hands were tied. The High Tories would certainly criticise the machinations of this 'Dutch Lord'.[162]

Portland's rapprochement with Marlborough materialised after the victory at Blenheim in August 1704, when the fortunes of the Allies had turned and support for the continental strategy was mounting. Nottingham was dismissed in 1704. Despite Portland's antipathy towards the Duchess of Marlborough, he drew closer to the Marlboroughs and Godolphin who were now dominating the ministry. Congratulating the Duke on his splendid victory, Portland approached Marlborough in September with the aim of establishing a regular correspondence. Heinsius, whose correspondence with Marlborough was of crucial importance for the functioning of the alliance, in particular hoped that Portland would frequently speak to the Duke during winter season in London. Marlborough must have found it useful to open an informal channel: 'Pray let me hear from you some times, and let me have your own thoughts, which I promise you shall be known to nobody but myself.'[163] On occasion, Portland would share

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[154] 'personne ne seroit plus propre que Md Portland a estre auprès de ce jeune prince et à le former aux affaires tant de la guerre, que de cabinet …', Robéthon to Heinsius 21 March 1702, 24 March 1702, Veenendaal, *Briefwisseling*, I, 11-12, 26.

[155] See his lengthy dispatches in BL Add Mss 17677; Dijkveld to Portland 26 October 1692, *RGP 28*, 302. Cf. Ch. 3.

[156] Robéthon also forwarded to Portland extracts of certain diplomatic correspondences, see for instance his letter of 19 September 1702 to Heinsius, Veenendaal, *Briefwisseling*, I, 430.

[157] L. and M. Frey, eds., *The treaties of the War of the Spanish Succession - An historical and critical dictionary* (London, 1995).

[158] K.M.M. de Leeuw, *Cryptology and statecraft in the Dutch Republic* (PhD thesis, Amsterdam, 2000), 2.

[159] Most of these letters have been published, either in *RGP 24* or Veenendaal, *Briefwisseling.*

[160] Heinsius frequently asked Portland to informally speak to ministers or ambassadors to consult them about certain matters or estimate their opinion and asked Portland to lobby, e.g. Heinsius to Portland 31 October 1702, 16 January 1703, *RGP 24*, 414-415, 420-421.

[161] Heinsius to Portland 16 January 1703, *RGP 24*, 420-421.

[162] Heinsius to Portland 27 November 1703, 7 December 1703, *RGP 24*, 435-436; Portland to Heinsius 4 December 1703 (Whitehall), Veenendaal, *Briefwisseling*, II, 566.

[163] Portland to Marlborough 13 September 1704 (The Hague), BL Add Ms 61153, fos. 214-215; Heinsius to Portland 26 December 1704, *RGP 24*, 437-438. Cf. B. van 't Hoff, ed., *The correspondence of John Churchill, first duke of Marlborough, and Anthonie Heinsius, grand pensionary of Holland 1701-1711* (Utrecht, 1951); Marlborough to Portland 27 July 1705, HMC, *Portland Mss*, IV, 212.

information on terrain in the Spanish Netherlands gathered during his campaigns in the 1690s, but more often his correspondence dealt with matters of diplomacy and contained advice on how to deal with Dutch politicians.[164] He had now established a regular correspondence with Marlborough at a time when the latter's relationship with the Republic was not improving due to the dispute over the government of the Spanish Netherlands. In the autumn of 1706 Portland even offered Marlborough the use of Sorgvliet, evidence that their relationship had become intimate and confidential.[165]

The former Anglo-Dutch favourite on occasion was able to smooth over friction between Allied commanders, mediating to prevent inevitable quarrels from escalating.[166] After an uneventful campaign in 1705 Marlborough, dissatisfied with the restrictions imposed by the Dutch general Slangenburg, wished to leave the army as early as August. Portland urged him to remain in the field, however, knowing his departure would have a negative effect and send a wrong signal.[167] After discussing the matter with Heinsius, Portland was able to persuade the Duke to do so.[168] Marlborough sought similar advice from Portland when his presence was requested in Vienna that autumn to concert the next campaign.[169] A more significant matter arose in 1706 when the Dutch and English established a Council of State responsible for the Government of the conquered Spanish Netherlands. The Imperialists, who had cleverly sowed dissension, resented this so-called Condominium.[170] Earlier that summer an Imperial offer to Marlborough to become governor of the Southern Netherlands had caused such an uproar in the Republic, that the Duke reluctantly and with ill grace had to decline the offer.[171] Though the matter had been thus resolved, the first cracks in the close relationship between Heinsius and Marlborough became visible.[172] Portland praised him for his

> 'prudence et moderation par laquelle vous avez fait eventer unne mine tres dangereuse, et dont l'effet nous auroit este dunne consequence fatale, vous vous estez acquis parce que vous avez fait Monsieur plus dhonneur, de consideration, et de confiance baucoup en refusant quen acceptant ce que vous estoit offert, c'est le sentiment de tous les honestes gens, et de vos amis …'[173]

It was during this period as well that Portland re-established contacts with members of the Whig Junto, such as Montagu, now Baron Halifax. In the summer of 1705 John Somers had asked Portland to intervene in the Galway-Fagel officers' dispute which was impeding the campaign in Portugal. He also expressed concern that the peace-party in the Republic was gaining strength, and warned Portland that this was no different in England. The two men clearly developed a mutual understanding that 'affairs are not in such a state that a reasonable and lasting peace can be hoped for.'[174] Thus, having been somewhat

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[164] E.g. Portland to Marlborough 1 August 1705 (The Hague), BL Add Ms 61153, fos. 218-219.
[165] Probably because in 1705 Marlborough's residence, the Mauritshuis, had been destroyed by fire.
[166] E.g. Albemarle to Heinsius 12 July 1703, Veenendaal, *Briefwisseling*, II, 337; Portland to Heinsius 20 January 1705 (Whitehall), Veenendaal, *Briefwisseling* IV, 35; Somers to Portland 21 June 1705 OS, *RGP 24*, 564-565; letter Galway 28 May 1705, NUL Pw A 1117.
[167] Portland to Marlborough 1 August 1705 (The Hague), BL Add Ms 61153, fo. 218; Marlborough to Portland 24 August 1705, 7 September 1705, HMC, *Portland Mss* (London, 1897), IV, 230, 242-243; Portland to Marlborough 12 September 1705, *RGP 24*, 560.
[168] Portland to Marlborough 12 September 1705, *RGP 24*, 560; Portland to Godolphin 18 September 1705 (The Hague), BL Add Ms 61118, fos. 73-74. Cf. D. Coombs, *The conduct of the Dutch. British opinion and the Dutch alliance during the War of the Spanish Succession* (The Hague, 1958), 115.
[169] Portland to Marlborough 26 September 1705 (The Hague), *RGP 24*, 560-561; Marlborough to Portland 1 October 1705, HMC, *Portland Mss*, IV, 249-250; Marlborough to Godolphin 6 October 1705, Snyder, *Correspondence*, I, 502; Marlborough to Heinsius 22 September 1705, Van 't Hoff, *Correspondence*, 214.
[170] R. Geikie and I.A. Montgomery, *The Dutch barrier 1705-1719* (Cambridge, 1930), 13 ff.
[171] A.J. Veenendaal, *Het Engels-Nederlands condominium in de Zuidelijke Nederlanden* (Utrecht, 1945), 29 ff.
[172] Veenendaal, *Condominium*, 35.
[173] Portland to Marlborough 15 July 1706 (The Hague), BL Add Ms 61153, fo. 222; Marlborough to Portland 22 July 1706, RGP 24, 560-561.
[174] Somers to Portland 21 June 1705 OS, 28 August 1705, *RGP 24*, 564-566.

sidelined during the first two years of the war, by the autumn of 1704 Portland was re-establishing contacts with key members in the ministry and the Whig Junto.

To what extent these indicated an expression of his political affiliation is unclear. Clearly Portland's concept of foreign policy remained what it had been before, as he explained to Robéthon: 'Je suis trop vieux pour changer, et trop imbeu des sentiments du feu Roij mon maistre pour en devier, hors que j'aijme mon Religion, et hais lesclavage.'[175] As during the 1690s, he was drawn into a partisan struggle against his will. 'je ne veux jamais estre ni Wigg ni Torij', he assured the Elector of Hanover, but added that circumstances required him to side with the Whigs.[176] Indeed, according to Geoffrey Holmes's analysis of division lists, Portland voted consistently with Whig peers.[177] In the years following 1705 Portland's support for the Whig Junto would become more outspoken, illustrated by three affairs: the Protestant Succession of the House of Hanover, the Union with Scotland and the Barrier Treaty. To the Junto Whigs, these matters were inseparable. The Townshend Treaty strengthened the alliance with the Dutch, which they thought necessary, the Protestant Succession was important for Hanover and was pro-Whig, and the Scottish Union would strengthen the Whig Party.[178]

Portland had been a strong supporter of the Protestant Succession and the House of Hanover, and remained in close contact with the Electress.[179] His son Woodstock was cordially received during his Grand Tour.[180] In December 1705 he voted in favour of the Bill for the Protestant Succession, a pro-Hanoverian measure supported by the Whig peers.[181] The Elector was naturally pleased, and Robéthon gave Portland permission to convey these sentiments to other members of the Whig Junto.[182] In 1716 George would elevate Portland's son to the dukedom as a reward for his services in promoting his succession.[183] The Protestant Succession was dealt with during a time when discussions about a Union between England and Scotland were speeded up. Portland had remained more than an interested observer of Scottish affairs after his retirement. In October 1700 the Duke of Queensberry asked Portland's '...advice and assistance in the present ticklish circumstances of affaires here ...'.[184] Scottish Secretaries of State were keen to remain in touch with Portland even after the death of William, and he showed an inclination to support the 'good party'.[185] Like the Whig Junto, Portland supported the Union when Carstares asked him his opinion in January 1706, months before the treaty was signed:

> 'Je crois la succession [of Hanover] establie une chose tres bonne;, 'mais je crois l'union meilleure, parce qu'elle comprend la succession, qu'elle est à l'advantage des deux nations, dont elle previent tous les differens à l'advenir; elle coupera pas la racine une bonne partie de vos division domestiques; et remediera peu a peu au manque d'argent dont l'Escosse se plaint.'[186]

The re-emergence of the political alliance of Portland and the Junto Whigs grew out of a common perception of foreign policy, but the personal relationships were also cordial. Portland kept up a correspondence with Somers, and Halifax seems to have regularly visited him at Bulstrode where,

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[175] Portland to Robéthon 5 September 1702 (The Hague), BL Stowe Ms 222, fo. 150r.
[176] Portland to the Elector and Electress of Hanover, 9 June 1706, NUL Pw A 1198.
[177] G. Holmes, *British politics in the age of Anne* (London, 1967), appendix A, 431.
[178] This complex connection is lucidly explained in Holmes, *British politics*, 82 ff. The Scottish Union was pushed by Whig peers and opposed by Tories, apprehensive of the incorporation of a Presbyterian entity.
[179] See their correspondence in BL Stowe Mss 222 and 223, and NUL Pw A 1189-1201.
[180] Sophia, Electress of Hanover, to Portland 13 January 1703, NUL Pw A 1193; Portland to Robéthon 2 February 1703 (Whitehall), BL Stowe Ms 222, fo. 182; George Louis of Hanover to Portland 7 March 1703 NUL Pw A 462.
[181] Portland to D'Alonne 11 December 1705 (Whitehall), Veenendaal, *Briefwisseling*, IV, 453.
[182] Robéthon to Portland n.d. 1706, NUL Pw A 1079, n.d. 1706 NUL Pw A 1080.
[183] R. Hatton, *George I. Elector and King* (London, 1978), 408.
[184] Queensberry to Portland 8 October 1700, NUL Pw A 373.
[185] Carmichael to Carstares 8 August 1700, Portland to Carstares 14 July 1702, Loudon to Carstares 4 December 1705, McCormick, *State Papers*, 601, 717, 739-740.
[186] Portland to Carstares 24 January 1706 (Whitehall), 11 April 1706, McCormick, *State papers*, 742, 749; Portland opposed the idea of a federal union.

undoubtedly, matters of policy were discussed as well.[187] It was perhaps his typical failing that his contacts were restricted almost exclusively to the Whig Junto, and that he maintained few contacts with the Tories. At the time, though, allying with Junto Whigs seemed sensible policy, as they were firm supporters of the Dutch Alliance, and were gaining control over the ministry between December 1706 and November 1708.

In Holland as well Portland was still active as an advocate for war. Wassenaar-Duyvenvoorde and Portland were, like Heinsius, in favour of prolonging the war until a favourable, stable and durable peace could be established. This 'cabal' within the *Ridderschap* was reinforced by Wassenaar-Obdam, commander-in-chief of the Dutch armed forces in the Spanish Netherlands.[188] The war-faction tended to have close relations with the Whigs in England and regarded the Anglo-Dutch alliance as an axiom in Dutch foreign policy.[189]

As war aims between the Maritime Powers were diverging, in May 1706 Marlborough had drawn up a memorandum to invite the Dutch to guarantee the Hanoverian Succession. It became the basis for a mutual agreement in which the Dutch signed the guarantee and the English promised to support a Barrier Treaty.[190] This deal for a Barrier Treaty, initially meeting with the satisfaction of both parties, was to divide the Allies over the years after 1706, a process in which Portland was to play his final mediating role.[191] The years between 1706 and 1708 were marked by stagnating negotiations over the Barrier, and Portland was frequently asked by both sides to intervene or smooth over difficulties.

Despite his occasional lobbying Portland displayed no desire to become openly involved, 'il m'est aijse de ne me mesler de rien, ce que vont mieux que de mexposer au blasme sans pouvoir esperer de faire du bien'.[192] But perhaps he was feeling the strain of old age. He spent more time at Bulstrode and less in London, even during parliamentary sessions. To Heinsius he wrote in the spring of 1708 '… que nostre âge augmente et que nos forces diminuent à mesure.'[193] From early 1709, his ever-neat handwriting started to become uncertain. But his interest in events never waned. His correspondence with Heinsius continued, with Somers intensified. In January 1708 he left Bulstrode for London at Heinsius's request to talk to 'plusieurs gens' in relation to the coming campaign.[194] Undoubtedly, his being sidelined from active politics was something he regretted, confiding to Somers in early 1709: '… je suis asteur ici comme le mauvais serviteur de l'Evangile qui avout soulé son talent en terre, ou il ne profitoit rien.'[195]

Over September and October 1709 he still corresponded intensively with the Junto Whigs and Marlborough on the Barrier Treaty and negotiations for peace with the French.[196] Only weeks later he fell ill with pleurisy at Bulstrode.[197] After lying twelve days on his sickbed, he died on 4 December at 5 o'clock in the morning.[198] Ten days later, his corpse, having been brought to London, was 'carried with great funeral pomp, from his house in St James's square to Westminster Abbey, and there interred in the vault under the east window of Henry the VIIth's chapel'.[199] The funeral took place with magnificent

[187] E.g. Portland to Somers 13 February [1708?] (Bulstrode), SHC Somers Mss 371/14/K/14; Halifax to Portland 19 February 1708, *RGP 24*, 566-567.
[188] Cf Aalbers, 'Factieuze tegenstellingen', 421-423.
[189] Ibid., 419-20.
[190] Geiki, *The Dutch barrier*, 38 ff. ' je suis bien aise que vous trouves vos gens assez disposés pour la barrière, car c'est le véritable fondament pour establir une bonne et solide amitié parmy les deux nations de notre part, comme je croye que doit estre de leur part le traitté de guarantie.', Heinsius to Portland 19 February 1709, *RGP 24*, 452.
[191] Cf. Geiki, *The Dutch barrier*, 47.
[192] Portland to Somers 15 April 1709 (Bulstrode), SHC Somers Mss 371/14/K/24.
[193] Portland to Heinsius 4 June 1708 (Bulstrode), Veenendaal, *Briefwisseling*, VII, 297.
[194] Portland to Heinsius 3 January 1708 (Bulstrode), ibid., 4.
[195] Portland to Somers 8 February 1709 (Bulstrode), SHC Somers Mss 371/14/K/16.
[196] Portland to Somers 7 September 1709 (Whitehall), SHC Somers Mss 371/14/K/26; Portland to Marlborough 13 September 1709 (Whitehall), BL Add Ms 61153, fos. 239-240; Townshend to Portland 1 October 1709, *RGP 24*, 568.
[197] Luttrell, *Brief historical relation*, VI, 513.
[198] 2nd Earl of Portland to d'Alonne 25 November OS 1709, BL Eg Ms 1705, fo. 37.
[199] *Biographia Brittanica*, I, 733. Portland was buried next to Schomberg. A vault stone with the names was inserted in 1868 but is now no longer visible, for the place is now a RAF chapel. I am thankful to the librarian of Westminster Abbey for the references.

pomp; there were some 50 carriages, numerous riders, and a great number of nobles attended the service.[200]

VII Conclusion

This chapter has analysed Portland's position after his retirement, during which he was still active as a diplomat. The King refused his offer of resignation in 1697 and employed him during the First Partition Treaty negotiations. When the talks over the Second Treaty were in full swing, the retired favourite still managed to sideline Albemarle completely. With the accession of Anne in 1702 both Anglo-Dutch favourites were definitely sidelined. But Portland still maintained important contacts and correspondents, and managed to gain the confidence of both the English and the Dutch. He assured John Somers that '... je me flatte de n'estre pas partial et d'estre avec vous dans le mesme zele pour le bien publicq.'[201] Earlier, the Lord Treasurer had described Portland as '... a great friend to both sides'.[202] After 1702 Portland thus remained an active proponent of Anglo-Dutch co-operation, consistently supporting the 'war-factions' in both Holland and England. His intimate knowledge of affairs, his experience and close personal relationships made him eminently suitable for such a task, and his ad-hoc advisory interventions helped to smooth out mutual misunderstandings and difficulties. His untimely death at a moment when the relations between the Dutch and English were optimal, prevented him from playing a more challenging role when the pro-Dutch Whig government fell and a less well-disposed regime came to power in 1710.

The threat of impeachment in 1701 has illuminated the drama of the apparently natural life cycle of the favourite. During the debates in the Commons, one MP

> '... could not but reflect upon the instability of humane affairs that that great Lord that so lately had so many obeysances from the Gent of this house so many respects paid him that even gent of good quality thought it a high honour to drink chocolate with his footmen and that now this great man had not one freind to speak him this was in imitation of the history of Sejanus this caused some heats and reflections'.[203]

But unlike this illustrious favourite of the Roman Emperor Tiberius, who was charged with high treason and executed, Portland emerged unscathed and acquiesced to his voluntary retirement, and even remained influential behind the scenes. Portland never 'fell' as a favourite, and he still commanded influence with the King in the field of foreign policy making.

The analysis of Portland's negotiations also yields a conclusion of a wider significance. Portland became the main instrument in changing the direction of William's foreign policy. For almost three decades William had believed in a Balance of Power strategy, but now he was reverting to an older concept of a system of collective guarantees. This chapter has analysed this major transformation in William's foreign policy, one that has hitherto received little attention. Older historiography has sought to explain the failure of this policy in the persistent animosity between William and Louis. More recently historians have rather emphasised mutual misunderstanding.[204] This chapter has challenged both views. William and Louis genuinely aimed at reaching an understanding. What seems clear from Portland's correspondence, is that neither mutual stubborn enmity nor a misunderstanding had caused the failure of the Partition Treaties. Rather, it was the direct link between William's weakening position in England which made him an unreliable and undesirable partner to Louis.

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[200] Saunière to Heinsius 17 December 1709, Veenendaal, *Briefwisseling*, IX, 515.
[201] Portland to Somers 22 April 1709 (Bulstrode), SHC Somers Mss 371/14/K/23.
[202] Godolphin to Marlborough 4 February 1709, Snyder, *Correspondence*, III, 1220.
[203] R. Cocks, *The Parliamentary Diary ... 1698-1702*, D.W. Hayton, ed. (Oxford, 1996), 76-79.
[204] Troost, *Stadhouder-koning Willem III*, 292. Troost mainly refers to the ideas of Andrew Lossky and Ragnild Hatton.

Conclusion

Descended from a regional Orangist baron's family in Overijssel, Portland rose to found one of the foremost noble lineages in the United Provinces and England. He became the servant and closest friend to a man whose career was continuously in the ascendant, and he seized opportunities where and whenever they presented themselves. Portland was recognised as William's favourite in the United Provinces, one among a small circle of aides and confidants to whom provincial and local management was delegated. In this configuration Portland was closest to the Prince, but he held fewer public responsibilities than men like Fagel, Dijkveld or the Prince of Waldeck, who were probably more influential and capable in their respective areas of influence, politics, diplomacy and military matters. In fact, a not unsympathetic contemporary wrote with some justification that Portland was '... of no deep Understanding, considering his Experience.'[1] But Portland owed his privileged position to his capacity to become involved in almost every area of stadholderly and royal business, and to his tremendous staying power and ability to adapt to changing circumstances.

As page to the Prince he gained the confidence of his master, and managed to formalise the privilege of proximity and control over access through his appointment as chamberlain in 1672. During the Dutch War he gained experience in military logistics and local and provincial government. Between 1677 and 1688 he redirected his career and developed into a diplomat, in particular during his missions to England and Germany. Portland had been the foremost in the Prince's favour, but between approximately 1687 and 1688 he developed into one of the most influential and instrumental aides and played a pivotal role in the preparation for the invasion of England in 1688. After the Glorious Revolution he once again turned to military planning, but soon extended his activities to parliamentary and military management. In England he acquired more power both in absolute and relative terms, as his responsibilities widened and competitors were marginalised.

This thesis has made clear that three views commonly held about Portland are in need of adjustment. Firstly, the view that Portland was merely a willing executive to a strong King and owed his position mainly to their friendship, cannot be sustained. Portland possessed a quality crucial to a courtier and favourite: the capacity to adapt. Both in 1672 and in 1688 he managed to emerge through turbulent changes followed by large-scale warfare as William's main confidant. In 1677 he redirected his career when the war ended. When he failed to do so at the end of the war in 1697, he felt obliged to retire. The exact relationship between the King-Stadholder and his favourite must to a great extent remain subject to conjecture. Their correspondence is relatively scarce, but from two separate bodies of letters of 1690 and 1698, concerning the magistrates' controversy and the Paris Embassy, Portland's role can be fairly reliably reconstructed. Portland was often a driving force behind William when the latter was hesitant to exploit opportunities. He pushed him to take maximum advantage of the situation in the spring of 1689. Portland was privy to William's thoughts and was one of the very few in England whom the King could unreservedly trust. Their exceptionally close friendship formed the basis for close co-operation and confidence, institutionalised by Portland's position as Groom of the Stole, which provided physical nearness to the King and the ability to control access - in themselves sources of power. But Portland's willingness to take on duties was crucial in the maintenance of that power. The complex and numerous responsibilities of governing, especially after 1688, became too much for one man - even William - to handle, although he anxiously tried to supervise even the details of his government. By employing Portland, William was able to solve this dilemma.

Related to the first point, this thesis has challenged a second perception commonly held about the extent of Portland's influence. Portland was neither a non-entity, as Stephen Baxter supposed, nor an all-powerful favourite, as Nicolaas Japikse asserted. Portland started off his career in England dealing with military and diplomatic affairs and gradually acquired more power and influence in other spheres, such as parliamentary management and financial affairs. His influence in matters not related to the war effort was marginal. There is, for instance, no evidence of his involvement in

[1] J. Macky, 'Characters of the Court of Great Britain', in: J. M. Gray, ed., *Memoirs of the life of Sir John Clerk* .... 1675-1755 (London, 1895), 58.

ecclesiastical appointments. At no point did he manage to monopolise any aspect of royal policy. The army was a field in which the King personally took control. Portland was outranked by such men as the Duke of Schomberg, but managed to encroach upon the responsibilities of the Secretary-at-War and the Secretaries of State. Parliamentary management was left to the Marquises of Halifax and Carmarthen, until Portland gained some control over it through the Earl of Sunderland. Ostensibly Portland was influential in ministerial management, although in practice he delegated most business to his aides, William Carstares and the Earl of Sunderland. In the United Provinces, William's provincial managers did most of the work, although Portland became a conduit for the Stadholder. Lastly, it seems clear that Portland did not devise policy or strategy, but acted rather as an executive to whom the King delegated substantial power and room for manoeuvre. Thus Portland was deeply involved in most aspects of government, but hardly in the capacity of a 'favourite-minister'. He often let the particulars of government slip out of his hands to those of his aides, but he intervened at key moments when the royal prerogative was threatened, the ministry in crisis, or the war effort hampered. He therefore travelled to The Hague when Amsterdam refused to acknowledge the Stadholder's prerogative and sponsor the war effort in 1690. He supported the military campaigns of Ginckel in Ireland and Hugh Mackay in Scotland to defend the Williamite settlement by force. Although Portland was involved in the conduct of policy and acted as one of William's principal advisers, it is difficult to see that he added anything specific. Essentially he executed and implemented royal policy and gave it force and substance, rather than giving direction to or formulating it.

Portland's gradual accumulation of responsibilities contradicts a third notion of him prevalent in much of the relevant literature, namely that he was William's influential favourite until about 1694 and was thereafter gradually replaced by Albemarle. Although between 1694 and 1699 the two favourites achieved something of a balance of power, Portland maintained the upper hand over his rival until the end of his career. More importantly, rather than seeing his power slowly erode, between about 1695 and 1697 Portland reached the zenith of his influence. During this period his responsibilities in the army and the diplomatic services were combined with ministerial and parliamentary management. From about 1695 he was in control of powerful ministries in the three kingdoms.

This thesis has built on the presupposition that the nature of William's King-Stadholdership was essentially supranational and must be understood within an international context. A perspective which pays more attention to the interconnectedness of the various parts of his realms has led to a reinterpretation of what seem solely domestic issues. Both the States of Holland and the English Parliament tried to remove Portland from their Assemblies on the grounds that he was a foreigner. What has been argued here is that the xenophobic attacks against Portland in England, but also in the United Provinces, were utilised in order to criticise the King. It was also the expression of a genuine concern on both sides of the Channel that the personal union would prove disadvantageous. Indicative for the connection between William's realms, Dutch domestic resistance died down after the Battle of the Boyne in 1690, although anti-Orangist pamphleteers still had their work translated and shipped to England. Such a supranational perspective was adopted by the Dutch scholar and pamphleteer Ericus Walten, when he warned Portland that the Williamite settlement was challenged both in the United Provinces and Britain.[2]

Such an international perspective also exposes patterns in the nature and conduct of Portland's policy. He became involved in the 1690 magistrates' controversy in the United Provinces because the Irish campaign required the help of Amsterdam. Although he tended to openly confront his political opponents he was frequently obliged to compromise because circumstances elsewhere required his attention. Hence he tried to settle the controversy quickly and reached a compromise with the Amsterdammers. Portland's lenient stance towards the Scottish and Irish rebels was the result of William's desire to end domestic resistance and focus on the continent. In 1691 he supported the Earl of Breadalbane's mission to pacify the Scottish Highlands. He also encouraged General Godard van Reede van Ginckel to offer concessions in order to bring the Irish campaign to an end and make resources available for the continental war effort. Such a supranational perspective

[2] E. Walten, *Brief aan sijn Excellentie, de Heer Graaf van Portland, &c* (The Hague, 1692).

was also manifest in, for instance, William's refusal to repeal the Navigation Act when Amsterdam made such a request in 1689. Likewise, Portland opposed the Scottish Darien scheme. In both cases, the King-Stadholder's dual position would be compromised. Moreover, Darien also antagonised the Spaniards at a time when Portland was negotiating the Partition Treaty.

An analysis of Portland as a favourite in various kingdoms has yielded a better insight into his role, but also into the way in which he was perceived. Imposing specialist studies sometimes still suffer from an introspective stance when they fail to take into account the wider international concerns of William's policy. These studies have fallen short in four aspects. Modern historians have too easily accepted contemporary anti-favourite rhetoric. Patrick Riley did so when he depicted Portland as an ignorant and lazy foreigner uninterested and uninformed about Scottish affairs. J. Simms dismissed Portland as a 'mere courtier' having had no influence or involvement in the politics and war in Ireland. But such criticism cannot be sustained once the scope of Portland's activities is surveyed. Secondly, historians have too eagerly presented Portland as a partisan politician. Riley saw Portland as a fervent Presbyterian, and Horwitz depicted him as a Whig. Neither characterisation will do, as Portland was a court politician rather than a party leader, and in fact was frequently criticised by Whigs and Presbyterians for supporting their political opponents. He supported Breadalbane's mission and Mackay's strategy in spite of opposition from the Presbyterian ministry under his tutelage. Thirdly, the images of Portland as a Dutchman and of William being aided by 'Dutch favourites' are distortive. William surrounded himself with an international aristocratic circle, which not only held material interests in various countries but served a dynasty rather than a nation. This was certainly the case for Portland, but also for men like Waldeck, Schomberg and Leinster. In Portland's view, they were concerned with '... l'intérest de toutte l'Europe'.[3] A last point of critique is that many analyses dealing with the reign of the King-Stadholder still implicitly adopt a national perspective by focusing on only one part of his realms, or neglecting relevant source material.[4] In this thesis an attempt has been made to study Portland's role on the British Isles as well as in the United Provinces and on the continent.

In this thesis the essence of Portland's role has been captured by the term 'Anglo-Dutch favourite', a man central in the King's administration, closest in his confidence and being concerned with the various parts of his realms. It has been argued that this was a unique figure. The favourite was a re-emerging phenomenon, not seen since the reign of Charles I (who relied on Buckingham, Strafford and Laud), as his sons had mainly depended on experienced parliamentary managers (such as Clarendon and Danby). But in several respects, the Anglo-Dutch favourite was also a new phenomenon. This thesis has interpreted its rise against the background of the unique situation and developments in England during the 1690s.

Firstly, the fiscal-military state developed in response to the requirements of the Nine Years War. A prominent feature of this development was the growth of the army and the diplomatic service. At the beginning of the Nine Years War, Portland immersed himself in military planning and took the field as an officer. He corresponded with Allied commanders and was present at Anglo-Dutch conferences on naval co-operation. He channelled requests for posts in the army, and as the diplomatic service expanded, he was responsible for appointments. He also maintained an informal correspondence with diplomats at key locations. Another aspect of the fiscal-military state was the necessity to generate revenue in order to sustain the war effort on the continent. As funds were needed to maintain the army, Portland intervened when they were lacking, as he did for instance in 1696. The King needed to gain control over finance through the careful management of Parliament. In England Portland was to some extent responsible for managing the King's expanding clientele, in particular placemen in Parliament that would support royal policy. Often the allocation of political office or civil service positions was delegated to his own aides, such as the Earl of Sunderland and William Carstares, but Portland was personally involved in ministerial management in all the three kingdoms. In the United Provinces as well, Portland continued for a while to be a dispenser of the Stadholder's favours. As Parliament was increasingly adopting a more assertive attitude, Portland frequently pushed William to uphold his prerogatives; he did so during the Convention debates in the

[3] Portland to William 22 March 1690 (Kensington), *RGP 23*, 153.
[4] For example, Simms studied the correspondence between Ginckel and Portland but (understandably) ignored all letters in Dutch.

spring of 1689, the magistrates' controversy in the spring of 1690 and the Triennial and Place Bill debates in 1693. Through the parliamentary manager Sunderland and the Whig Junto, Portland supervised the mustering of parliamentary support for royal policy.

Secondly, the specific requirements of the anomalous 'Dual Monarchy' demanded a liaison, someone to oversee the various parts of William's realms, the more so because between 1688 and 1697 the 'composite monarchy' was at war. This primarily entailed maintaining relationships between London and The Hague. Being the only Dutchman to receive a peerage in 1689, Portland was deliberately chosen by William to perform a co-ordinating role. Portland established and maintained effective and powerful political groups at the head of the three kingdoms. The Melville, Johnstone and Queensberry administrations in Scotland were under his control, even though the specifics of daily government escaped both his attention and comprehension. The Capel administration in Ireland was firmly connected to a particularly effective and coherent Whig administration in England, upheld by Portland through his political liaison with Sunderland. By 1695 he was thus patron of powerful Court parties in the three kingdoms managed by his aides. He carved out a comparable role in the United Provinces, although the constitutional constellation was radically different from that of Britain. Portland actively established, maintained and supervised an Orangist 'party', contacting a multitude of regents in the Holland towns that would support William's policy and were likewise reliant on his patronage. There were few or no Dutchmen who advised William on his English policy, and Portland remained the only Dutchman to delve into English domestic politics as well as maintaining the link with the continent.

The Anglo-Dutch favourite embodied for many the evils of the Williamite settlement. Perceived as a 'vice-stadholder' in the United Provinces, a 'Dutch Prince of Wales' in England and a 'Superintendent' of Scottish affairs, Portland was accused of implementing a policy that trampled on liberties and privileges. He was continuously attacked in Parliament over the standing army, but also for upholding an unpopular alliance. Nevertheless, Portland remained a tireless advocate of an anti-French alliance, showing himself a hawk at key moments. A supporter of the continental war, he clashed with the Court Tories over their blue water strategy in 1692. He became inextricably involved in a conflict with Country which initiated a vehement anti-standing-army campaign after the war. In 1701 he quarrelled with Parliament over the Treaties of Partition. Hence opposition against the favourite targeted precisely those areas in which the favourite had become the instrument of royal policy: the continental strategy and the strengthening of the King-Stadholder's prerogative. Critiques of the 'Dutch counsels' and the favourite became part of a wider political discourse employed to criticise the court. Portland was accused of a standard repertoire of vices attributed to foreigners and favourites: pamphleteers accused him of sodomy, a parliamentary commission investigating the East India Company corruption scandal aimed at exposing him as corruptible, in parliamentary debates about the Welsh and Irish grants he was accused of excessive greed. His strenuous support for the continental war incited criticism as well; he was seen as encouraging the King to maintain a pro-Dutch policy in spite of the drawbacks for England. He was also seen as the evil genius behind the King's vetoing of the Place and Triennial Bills, designed to strengthen Parliament and weaken the King's prerogatives.

The aspects which were inextricably connected to the Portland's responsibilities and which explain the re-emergence of the favourite in 1689, also elucidate the reasons for his retirement as these elements lost significance precisely as a result of the end of the Nine Years War. Between 1697 and 1699 several of the pillars supporting Portland's position were torn down. Firstly, Albemarle encroached upon some of his responsibilities. Secondly, within two years the Whig Junto had crumbled and was replaced by a moderate Tory coalition, led by men with whom Portland had neglected to establish a relationship. Thirdly, mounting opposition to foreigners was fanned by a pamphlet war and targeted William's favourites during the Irish Resumption debates. Although his political influence diminished, the enormous grants of land in Ireland caused an uproar that mobilised a powerful anti-court opposition. Fourthly, the end of the war had also triggered the demobilisation of the standing army. Portland had been involved in the maintenance of an apparatus comprising more than 100,000 troops in both countries, absorbing millions of pounds each year. In this sphere he wielded substantial power by extending his patronage to officers, supervising military commanders and preparing military campaigns. This dramatically changed after 1697 when the

English army was reduced to a minimum of some 10,000 troops. Lastly, Portland's maintenance of diplomatic links with the Allies and communication with the Allied commanders now became redundant. Moreover, the liaison with the Dutch that had been important during the war was losing significance. It is no coincidence that Portland expressed his wish to retire precisely at the end of the war in 1697, and ultimately did so as the challenge to his position became most vehement from various corners in 1699. Throughout 1698 and 1699 Portland's position with the King remained secure, but his effectiveness as a favourite diminished. His crumbling influence and the mounting parliamentary uproar combined with a genuine personal desire to attend to family affairs, contributed to his unequivocal decision to retire in 1699.

Nevertheless he never fell from power; Ganymede did not become Phaeton. He was still involved in the Partition Treaty negotiations. Drawing on his experience, Portland after his retirement occasionally acted as liaison between the Maritime Powers to smooth over frictions during the War of the Spanish Succession.

The central question posed in the introduction was how Portland's role as a key member of William's entourage within the context of the Dual Monarchy and during the Nine Years War should be interpreted. This thesis has shown how these elements were inextricably connected. Throughout the 1670s and 1680s Portland was the *primus inter pares* amongst William's favourites, but not necessarily the most influential. The Prince was well served by experienced parliamentary managers, diplomats and military commanders, though Portland remained a key favourite due to his intimacy with the Prince. But it was not until 1689 that Portland substantially monopolised power and sidelined competitors for William's favour. As most Dutch confidants left London, Portland's influence became paramount. He was involved in all the key aspects of William's reign: diplomacy, warfare, parliamentary management and intelligence, defending and sustaining the Williamite settlement both domestically and abroad. Most importantly, he played a pivotal role in maintaining links with Scotland, Ireland and the United Provinces. Indeed, his career reached its zenith during the Nine Years War. It was precisely for this reason that Albemarle succeeded him during the interbellum as a favourite with clipped wings, and that the renewal of hostilities in 1702 saw the re-emergence of a favourite very much in the Portland mould. The Marlboroughs and Godolphin, like Portland and Sunderland, again secured royal support for the growth of the standing army, parliamentary management, the continental war, the expanding diplomatic service and the maintenance of the Anglo-Dutch coalition. The similarity of the roles of Marlborough and Portland, both favourites involved in maintaining an alliance between the British Isles and the United Provinces during large-scale warfare, calls for a re-interpretation of the former's role as well. Portland was instrumental in mobilising resources in the three kingdoms and the republic to enable William to conduct the war. Understandably, then, his position quickly weakened at the end of the war as his role became redundant. Hence it can be concluded that the two central questions more or less overlap, as Portland's role as Anglo-Dutch favourite of the King-Stadholder was directly connected to the war on the continent and the Anglo-Dutch alliance.

Appendix I: Genealogical Table

source: D. Schwennecke, ed., *Europäische Stammtafeln IV Standesherrliche Häuser* (Marburg, 1981), I, tables 12 & 17



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Appendix II

Portland's possessions, taxation made in 1709. Source: BL Eg Ms 1708

State and inventory of all the goods in England

- May 1689 Theobalds with park and lands, valued on a yearly rent of £1,916:10. The house would now be worth £44,079:10
- In April 1698 received various lands in the freehold of Westminster in Middlesex, yearly income of £9,800, though if more houses would be built even £25,068:10. Would now be worth £376,027:10
- In May 1696 as donation of the Crown: Grantham in Lincolnshire, lordship Penrith in Cumberland, Rudheath and Dracklow in Chester, Ferrington in Norfolk, Burstall Garth, Hornsey, Thwing, Barnsley and Leven in Yorkshire, Pevensy in Sussex, together a revenue of £4,332:3:2.25 per year. Would now be worth £86,643:3:9
- March 1695 ground and houses for 42 years, £2,000 yearly, is worth £3,000
- Has bought the lordship of Bulstrode, would be worth £20,000 now at sale
- Annuities £1,900 yearly, worth £30,400
- Gave Woodstock the amount of £115,000 at his wedding
- Left £150,000 in bonds
- Movables £25,000

Total £850,150:3:9 (ƒ9,351,664:17:0 in Dutch currency)

Account of possessions in Holland, English translation ff 279-280

- Lordships of Rhoon and Pendrecht, total value now ƒ198,583:8
- House in Voorhout, bought for ƒ48,000, extended and repaired between September 1699 and August 1704, total value now ƒ124,987:10
- Sorgvliet, bought for ƒ21,000 valued at ... [note '373,269:7 still at Sorgvliet)
- Farmhouse behind Sorgvliet ƒ10,642:9
- Old seat of Emelaer above Amersfoort ƒ23,756
- Two seats lying under the jurisdiction of Houten en Goij and Wijck te Duurstede ƒ15,300
- Weibnum bond ƒ8,000
- Bonds of Lord of Schoonheten dated 26 February 1706 ƒ16,000
- Likewise bond 17 January 1708 ƒ7,500 [In both cases no interest as yet paid]
- Annuities ƒ4,000
- Bond Lord of Lec 13 June 1701 ƒ70,000
- Various interests and bonds ƒ311,000
- Bonds ƒ275,000, ƒ266,900, ƒ106,000, ƒ94,000

Total is ƒ1,562,669:7 (£ 142,060 in English currency)

Total: ƒ10,914,334 in Dutch, or £992,212 in English currency

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Samenvatting

Vanaf 1672 raakte de Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden verwikkeld in een krachtmeting met het naar expansie strevende Frankrijk, geïntensiveerd door de alliantie tussen Engeland en de Republiek na de totstandkoming van de 'personele unie' onder Willem III tussen 1689-1702. Na de Negenjarige Oorlog (1688-1697) en de Spaanse Successieoorlog (1702-1713), waarbij de Grote Alliantie (voornamelijk Engeland, de Republiek en het Keizerrijk) met succes de territoriale ambities van Lodewijk XIV wist te beteugelen, stabiliseerde de situatie zich met de Vrede van Utrecht. De periode 1672-1713, die wel eens een veertigjarige oorlog is genoemd, was van groot belang in de ontwikkeling van het Europees statenstelsel, waarbij Frankrijk en Engeland naar voren waren gekomen als grootmachten, en staten als de Republiek definitief naar het tweede plan terugvielen. Tevens is de Glorieuze Revolutie in 1688/9 van grote invloed geweest op de Engelse constitutionele ontwikkeling.

De grote tegenspeler van Lodewijk XIV, Willem III, werd gedurende zijn gehele leven bijgestaan door een klein aantal trouwe adviseurs, waarvan de belangrijkste zonder twijfel Hans Willem Bentinck, eerste graaf van Portland (1649-1709), was. Hij was nauw betrokken bij de formulering en uitvoering van Willems beleid. Hij was de telg van een Overijssels adellijk geslacht, werd page, en later kamerheer van Willem III, en verwierf een groot aantal invloedrijke ambten, op zowel militair, politiek als diplomatiek gebied. Tot zijn *retirement* in 1699 was hij verantwoordelijk voor het bestuur van Schotland, had grote invloed op het bestuur in Ierland, bleef de belangrijkste liaison tussen de Engelse en Staatse bestuurders, en was betrokken bij de voornaamste diplomatieke missies en de logistieke voorbereidingen voor de continentale veldtochten.

In dit onderzoek, dat de vorm van een politieke biografie heeft gekregen, is de rol van Portland zowel in de Nederlandse als Britse politiek alsmede zijn positie aan het hof bestudeerd. Tevens werd een bijdrage geleverd aan de voortdurende discussie over de Nederlands-Britse betrekkingen in deze periode. Gepoogd is Britse en Nederlandse historiografische tradities te integreren, en een analyse te geven van de financiële, logistieke, militaire, politieke en diplomatieke activiteiten van deze markante staatsman, tegen de achtergrond van zowel interne Staatse en Britse (Engelse, Schotse en Ierse) politieke ontwikkelingen en besluitvormingsprocessen als internationale machtsverschuivingen.

Het proefschrift bestaat uit zeven hoofdstukken, gegroepeerd in drie delen die corresponderen met de fasen van Portlands carrière. Het eerste deel behandelt Portlands vroege carrière. Hoofdstuk 1 kijkt naar de beginfase van Portlands favorietschap, en behandelt de jaren in de Republiek tot 1688. Het hoofdstuk analyseert zijn verantwoordelijkheden als politicus, diplomaat en officier. Het volgende hoofdstuk is in principe een *case study*, en analyseert zijn politieke, diplomatieke en militaire activiteiten tijdens de Glorieuze Revolutie van 1688/9. Het besteedt ook aandacht aan de wijdere internationale context waarin de invasie plaatsvond.

Het tweede deel vormt de kern van het boek en behandelt de jaren 1688 tot 1697, het hoogtepunt van Portlands carrière als Engels-Nederlandse favoriet. De driedelige structuur bespreekt de macht, politiek en perceptie van de Engels-Nederlandse favoriet. Hoofdstuk 3 analyseert Portlands invloed aan het hof, in het leger, in de diplomatieke dienst en in het parlement. Het behandelt ook zijn invloed in Schotland, Ierland, Engeland en de Republiek, en meer in het algemeen zijn rol als favoriet. Hoofdstuk 4 bestudeert Portlands politieke activiteiten tijdens de Negenjarige Oorlog. Het is niet zozeer een chronologische verhandeling, maar concentreert zich op de kernzaken die de aard van zijn activiteiten en invloed belichten, alsmede zijn rol in de formulering van Willems politiek. Hoofdstuk 5 bespreekt de rol van Portland in de ontwikkeling van een specifieke 'Williamite' ideologie, en de politico-theoretische oppositie, zoals verwoord in pamfletten en parlementaire debatten.

Het derde en laatste deel houdt zich bezig met Portlands laatste jaren. Hoofdstuk 6 analyseert de oorzaken achter zijn terugtrekking uit de actieve politiek, eerst in 1697 en toen definitief in 1699. Het vormt een vervolg op de hoofdstukken 3 tot en met 5, omdat het de erosie van Portlands macht blootlegt, en het afnemen van zijn politieke activiteiten en de groeiende oppositie tegen de favoriet laat zien. Het zevende hoofdstuk, tot slot, gaat over zijn doorgaande diplomatieke activiteiten gedurende het laatste decennium van zijn leven. Hij bleef betrokken bij onderhandelingen met betrekking tot de Vrede van Rijswijk (1697), de Spaanse Verdelingsverdragen (1698 en 1700) en het Barrièreverdrag (1709).

Geconcludeerd kan worden dat een aantal visies op Portlands carrière onjuist blijken te zijn. Ten eerste, dat Portland slechts een uitvoerende kracht was onder een sterke koning, en zijn positie slechts

dankte aan de vriendschap van Willem III. Gebleken is dat Portland, ambitieus en hardwerkend, zich in toenemende mate inwerkte in alle aspecten van het regeringsbeleid en zich langzamerhand onmisbaar maakte. Ten tweede is structuur en reliëf gegeven aan een carrière die door historici vaak in clichés werd getypeerd. Portland was geen almachtige favoriet noch een zwakke figuur. Hij begon zijn carrière in Engeland als militair en diplomatiek 'manager', maar verwierf gaandeweg meer invloed in andere sferen, zoals parlementair management en financieel beleid. Hiermee is tevens een derde misvatting ontkracht, namelijk dat Portland vanaf 1694 langzaam maar zeker werd gemarginaliseerd door zijn rivaal, Arnold Joost van Keppel. Portlands carrière bereikte juist een hoogtepunt tussen 1695 en 1697.

De redenen voor Portlands opkomst zijn gezocht in een aantal unieke omstandigheden van de jaren 1690. Ten eerste de opkomst van de fiscaal-militaire staat als gevolg van de Negenjarige Oorlog. Hierdoor kwam een oorlogsmachine op gang die veel coördinatie vereiste. Portland hield zich bezig met logistieke militaire planning en had een strakke greep op de diplomatieke diensten. Bovendien ontwikkelde zich in Engeland de parlementaire monarchie, die parlementair management nodig maakte, zodat Willem III de dure oorlog kon bekostigen. Portland speelde een belangrijke rol hierin. De tweede specifieke omstandigheid van de jaren 1690 was de 'Dual Monarchy', het samengaan van de drie koninkrijken Engeland, Ierland en Schotland met de Republiek onder de feitelijke leiding van Willem III. Portland speelde een belangrijke rol in de coördinatie van Willems rijken, onderhield onderlinge contacten en benoemde zetbazen op sleutelposities. Dit proefschrift argumenteert dat de regering van Willem III in een werkelijk internationale context bestudeerd dient te worden.

De Engels-Nederlandse favoriet belichaamde voor de oppositie de ongewenste aspecten van Willems regering. Portland werd in de Republiek door velen gezien als een 'vice-stadhouder', een 'Nederlandse Prins van Wales' in Engeland, en een opzichter van Schotse zaken in het noordelijke koninkrijk. Zodoende werd Portland het brandpunt van kritiek van een ontevreden oppositie die vreesde dat Willem III de vrijheden en privileges van de politieke natie aantastte.

Het is dan ook te begrijpen dat de neergang van Portland samenhangt met genoemde factoren. Het einde van de Negenjarige Oorlog, het ontbinden van het leger en de irrelevantie van de Brits-Nederlandse unie na 1697 maakte dat Portlands activiteiten spoedig in belang afnamen. Hoewel hij als diplomaat actief bleef, besloot hij zijn functies neer te leggen, tegen de wensen van de koning in.

Portlands positie is samengevat in de term Engels-Nederlandse favoriet, een unieke figuur die opkwam tijdens de Brits-Nederlandse 'unie' en weer naar de achtergrond verdween na de feitelijke desintegratie daarvan. In feite keerde de Engels-Nederlandse favoriet terug in Marlborough, wiens rol tijdens de Spaanse Successie-oorlog vergelijkbaar was met die van Portland.

Curriculum Vitae

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