‘We have an Infrastructure for Peace... ...but do we have peace?’

Infrastructures for peace and multidimensional everyday peace in Nepal

PhD dissertation
Jeannine Suurmond

‘We have an Infrastructure for Peace... but do we have peace?’ – Infrastructures for peace and multidimensional everyday peace in Nepal

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Cover image: A user choosing a service provider from a list of mediators in a community mediation office in Sarlahi district, Nepal. Photo taken by Suurmond, September 2011

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‘We hebben een Infrastructuur voor Vrede... maar hebben we vrede?’
Infrastructuren voor vrede en multidimensionale dagelijkse vrede in Nepal

(met een samenvatting in het Nederlands)

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Jeannine Marianne Suurmond

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Promotor:

Prof. dr. G.E. Frerks

Other members of the assessment committee:

Prof. dr. J. Corveleyn

Prof. dr. J. Demmers

Prof. dr. C. Finkenauer

Prof. dr. H.J. Giessmann

Prof. dr. ir. D.J.M. Hilhorst

Prof. dr. J. Kennedy

Prof. dr. A.C.G.M. Robben

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Acronyms

CFA	Confirmatory Factor Analysis
CIEDP	Commission of Investigation on Enforced Disappeared Persons
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Accord
CPN	Communist Party of Nepal
DFID	Department for International Development, United Kingdom
EFA	Exploratory Factor Analysis
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH
INGO	International non-governmental organisation
LPC	Local Peace Committee
MoPR	Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NPC	National Planning Commission
NPTF	Nepal Peace Trust Fund
NTTPI	Nepal Transition to Peace Initiative
PTSD	Post-traumatic stress disorder
SCORE	Social Cohesion and Reconciliation (Index)
SeeD	Centre for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development
STPP	Support of Measures to Strengthen the Peace Process
TAF	The Asia Foundation
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNMIN	United Nations Mission in Nepal
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VDC	Village Development Committee
ZFD	Ziviler Friedensdienst

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Introduction

‘Those who love peace must learn to organize as effectively as the war hawks’, proclaimed Martin Luther King in Los Angeles in 1967, speaking out against American involvement in the Viet Nam war.¹ It was an appeal to those in the civil rights movement to proactively plan and work for peace. In recent years, King’s words inspired efforts to promote the concept of ‘infrastructures for peace’.

Hailed as a new frontier in peacebuilding (Brand-Jacobsen, 2013), infrastructures for peace are the institutions, mechanisms, resources, and skills through which conflicts are resolved and peace is sustained within a society (UNDP, 2020). The concept represents a shift in approach as to how societies and states conceive of and deal with conflict – from reactive and ad hoc crisis-management, to preventative, proactive, and long-term peacebuilding (van Tongeren, 2011a). This is important, because warfare continues to devastate human lives, societies, resources, and the environment (Hoeffler, 2017; Iqbal, Bardwell & Hammond, 2019) as freedom and peacefulness in the world are steadily deteriorating (Freedom House, 2019; Institute for Economics and Peace, 2019). Infrastructures for peace has been adopted as a policy framework by the United Nations (UNDP, 2013); the Economic Community of West African States (Government of Ghana, African Union, ECOWAS & UNDP, 2013); governments including Kenya (Chuma & Ojielo, 2012; Kumar & De la Haye, 2012) and Ghana (Awinador-Kanyirige, 2014; Ojielo, 2007); and international peacebuilding organisations, such as the Global Alliance for Ministries and Infrastructures for Peace.²

In the peace and conflict studies field, we still do not have a comprehensive understanding of why states, groups, and individuals engage in acts of violence (Victoroff, 2005; Webel, 2007), nor of the interventions that could successfully transform this tendency. The emerging ‘theory’ of infrastructures for peace suggests that violence can be prevented, and peace supported, with peace infrastructures.³ The underlying assumption, or hypothesis, predicts that societies and countries with a strong infrastructure for peace will be more resilient against violence, and experience more peace (Editorial, 2012; Giessmann, 2016; UNDP, 2020). So far, the empirical evidence is mixed.

Most case studies in the literature focus on the more formal UN- and government-established infrastructures for peace, such as ministries for peace and local peace committees. In comparison, informal infrastructures for peace, including traditional conflict resolution practices, are under-researched (Kovács, 2018). Little is known about the actual realities, choices, and challenges of those whose lot is supposed to be improved by infrastructures for peace, especially at local level. Which peace initiatives are included in the concept, and what infrastructures for peace exactly do, remains unclear. No study has yet been explicitly dedicated to the new reality these structures aim to achieve, i.e. the ‘for peace’ part of ‘infrastructures for peace’. Political peace, rather than for

¹ Full quote: ‘Those of us who love peace must organize as effectively as the war hawks. As they spread the propaganda of war we must spread the propaganda of peace. We must combine the fervor of the civil rights movement with the peace movement. We must demonstrate, teach and preach, until the very foundations of our nation are shaken. We must work unceasingly to lift this nation that we love to a higher destiny, to a new plateau of compassion, to a more noble expression of humaneness’. *The Casualties of the War in Viet Nam*. February 25, 1967, The Nation Institute, Los Angeles.

² The non-government organisation (NGO) Pro Public, my partner organisation in Nepal from 2011 to 2016, set up and hosted for several years the secretariat of the Asia-Pacific Alliance for Ministries and Infrastructures for Peace, the Asia branch of the Global Alliance for Ministries and Infrastructures for Peace (<http://www.gamip.org/>).

³ Preferences vary for use of the terms ‘peace infrastructure’, ‘peace architecture’, or ‘peacebuilding infrastructure’. While, like the UNDP (2020) and Lederach (2012; 1997), I understand these terms to be interchangeable, I mostly adhere to ‘infrastructures for peace’ in this dissertation in recognition of those thinkers and advocates with whom I first engaged with on this issue.

instance personal peace, has until now drawn the greatest attention. A conceptual framework on which to base the relationship between peacebuilding interventions and people's everyday peace experience is lacking. The infrastructures for peace debate appears to reflect the divide in the wider peace and conflict studies field between the different scientific disciplines, top-down and bottom-up perspectives, and statebuilding versus peacebuilding priorities (Bright & Gledhill, 2018).

The topic is empirically relevant, because the theoretical lens of infrastructures for peace can help make visible the 'peace system' of a society or country, thus render it researchable. Conflict and peace scholars have long discussed the nature and importance of peace systems (Fry, 2013; Johansen, 1978; Mitrany, 1944). In highlighting the institutional and organisational capacities within such systems, the concept of infrastructures for peace reifies and concretizes these systems and, as such, facilitates the operationalization of hitherto more elusive, related, concepts like 'peace'. The data such research produces can help fill the current peacebuilding data gap.

One example of the peacebuilding data gap is the limited knowledge on local context and dynamics that is currently hampering peacebuilding policymaking and practice (Mack, 2014). To be effective, peacebuilding interventions ought to be based on an understanding of the nature and impact of violence on individual citizens, of the drivers of violence and peace, and of citizens' priorities for peace and security. Yet the data necessary to develop such an understanding are scarce.⁴

Development data in war-affected states are often scattered, sparse, and have varying levels of depth, breadth, and quality (Carpenter, Slater & Mallett, 2012), making it difficult for both governments and donors to design peacebuilding policies based on evidence and monitor their impact. Much of the policy and programme decisions regarding international peace missions and peacebuilding programmes, as well as local peace initiatives, tend to be motivated by conceptual assumptions, personal experience, and political interests, rather than robust evidence (e.g. Brounéus, 2008). In addition, most attempts to monitor the implementation of (inter)national peace commitments and efforts are one-sided, concentrating on political achievements, without directly linking these to tangible improvements in citizens' daily lives.⁵ A data-based framework can bridge the gap between peacebuilding as it is envisioned by policymakers, and its implementation and reception by the people on the ground.

Adding pressure are the mounting calls for peacebuilding organisations to show the impact and results of their attempts to achieve complex goals in ever-changing environments (Diehl & Druckman, 2010; Neufeldt, 2017; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2013). The lack of evidence of where peacebuilding interventions have led to positive outcomes, such as a clear reduction in violence or increased collaboration was recently called 'one of the greatest challenges we face as a field' (Peacebuilding Evaluation Consortium, 2018, p. 1). A complication in this regard is the limited exchange of knowledge and methods between the different disciplines represented in the peace and conflict studies field, which has been flagged as detrimental to peace efforts (Bright & Gledhill, 2018). More interdisciplinary exchange (Charbonneau & Parent, 2012), and more solid methodological examples, tested approaches, and proof of concepts for the monitoring and evaluation of interventions (Scharbatke-Church, 2011) are called for. Expanding the

⁴ As also recognized by the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative which has sought to help fill this gap by making the results of population-based studies in areas affected by mass violence available online (<http://www.peacebuildingdata.org/>).

⁵ The Peace Accords Matrix Barometer Initiative, hosted by the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies of the University of Notre Dame, is an attempt to improve the monitoring of the implementation of peace agreements, but is limited to the political level (<https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/barometer>).

methodological toolbox and the variety and availability of quantitative data to allow for replication, comparison, and prediction, could advance the current state of the field.

The country of study, Nepal, is often cited as an example in the debate on infrastructures for peace. Nepal is transitioning from ten years of armed conflict to peaceful democratic politics. It was one of the few countries in the world to have a ministry for peace and local peace committees, set up to support the peace process. The country has been described as a liberal peacebuilding success story (Martin, I., 2008), but few people seem to actually experience peace (Lundqvist, 2015). It has been suggested that these contrasting perspectives might be due to the disjuncture between the top-down perspective of the liberal peacebuilding model and the bottom-up perspective of everyday life experiences (Mac Ginty, 2010; Richmond, 2009), a claim that remains to be substantiated. Much of the conflict and peace academic research in Nepal takes a top-down perspective, focusing on the peace process or an aspect of it, rather than the day-to-day realities of the people (Lundqvist, 2015). Among government, donors, civil society, and citizens, questions of how to recover from the impact of the violence; how to reconcile the government, ex-combatants, victims, and people; and how to prevent future violence, continue to be pertinent.⁶ Acquiring a more robust understanding of what accounts for the different perceptions of peace in Nepal is thus of value for those striving to support the country's peace.

Adopting a pragmatic research approach (Salkind, 2010), this dissertation researches peace and peacebuilding priorities through the lens of infrastructures for peace, with the overall aim of contributing to better and evidence-based peacebuilding practice. Instead of concentrating on top-down, liberal peacebuilding initiatives or bottom-up, local processes, it proposes a 'third way': A systemic interpretation of infrastructures for peace with a focus on peace needs. Central is the interface between institutions, organisations, and individuals that aim to support peace, and the actual, multidimensional peace experience of people, in order to better understand how peaceful relations with oneself, others, one's community, and the state can be strengthened. At the heart of this research thus lies the relationship between people with a need for peace, and people who provide services to meet peace needs. As will be shown, the very idea of infrastructures for peace offers a useful approach to 'listen to the system' (Meadows, 2001). Rather than focusing on a single or a few peace interventions on just one level (e.g. political), the concept of infrastructures for peace spotlights all those institutional and organisational capacities in society that actually implement the main epistemological goal of conflict and peace studies, 'peace by peaceful means'. Drawing on literature on infrastructures for peace and the meaning of peace, in particular systems theory and human needs theory, Nepal figured as a single case study for the application of my theoretical framework. Two overarching research questions are investigated: (I) How can peace systems be understood through the concept of infrastructures for peace?; and (II) What are peacebuilding priorities in Nepal, given the diverging perspectives on the state of peace in the country? These questions are answered based on the findings relating to six sub-questions, discussed in six research articles. These articles comprise the body of this dissertation. Table 1 offers a summary.

⁶ See for instance: Sewa Bhattarai, 'The mental scars of violence. A world apart, Nepal and Colombia struggle with the mental health burden of conflict'. *The Nepali Times*, 25 October 2019; Human Rights Watch, 'Nepal: Transitional Justice Proving Elusive. Term Extensions Do Not Cure Act's Fundamental Problems'. News Release, 13 February 2018; Deepak Adhikari, 'Fears of violence as Nepal cracks down on Maoist splinter group'. *Al Jazeera*, 2 October 2018.

Table 1 Summary of research articles

Focus: Infrastructures for peace		
<i>Article 1: Like yeast that leavens the dough: Community mediation as local infrastructure for peace</i>		
Authors: Suurmond, J.M. & Sharma, P.M.		
Status: Published article in the Journal of Peacebuilding and Development, 7(3), 2012.		
Research questions	Method	Conclusion
Can community mediation committees in Nepal be considered as infrastructures for peace?	Qualitative secondary analysis, using infrastructures for peace literature and institutional reports and outcome evaluations of community mediation programmes funded by different donors.	Community mediation appears to be a successful example of a 'hybrid' (international-local) infrastructure for peace, depending on the definition used. Further conceptual clarification is needed.
Focus: The peace sector and infrastructures for peace		
<i>Article 2: Serving people's need for peace: Infrastructures for peace, the peace sector, and the case of Nepal</i>		
Authors: Suurmond, J.M. & Sharma, P.M.		
Status: Published book section in Unger, Lundström, Planta & Austin (eds.). Peace Infrastructures: Assessing Concept and Practice. Berlin: Berghof Foundation, 2013.		
Research questions	Method	Conclusion
What exactly are infrastructures for peace and what is their goal? How does Nepal's Infrastructure for Peace look like? Do Nepal's infrastructures for peace contribute to peace?	Qualitative secondary analysis, using infrastructures for peace literature, institutional reports, and outcome evaluations of various infrastructures for peace in Nepal.	Infrastructures for peace can be understood as those structures that facilitate the delivery of peace services to meet people's peace needs. Nepal's Infrastructure for Peace consists of many formal and informal structures, and appears to be partially effective overall.
Focus: Peace needs		
<i>Article 3: Assessing psychosocial conditions for social reintegration of former Maoist combatants and communities in Nepal</i>		
Authors: Suurmond, J.M., Poudel, B.R. & Böhm, M.		
Status: Forthcoming in the Journal of Conflict, Security and Development.		
Research questions	Method	Conclusion
Is there a relation between inner and outer peacefulness?	Qualitative and quantitative. Questionnaire for 223 ex-combatants and interviews with 213 host community stakeholders between November 2012 and August 2013 in the districts of Dang, Makwanpur, Rupandehi, Surkhet, Bardiya, Banke, and Kapilvastu.	Ex-combatants who were likely to suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) demonstrated lower readiness to reconcile with former enemies. There thus appears to be a connection between these inner and outer peacefulness indicators.
Focus: Peace needs		
<i>Article 4: Selected chapters from 'Predictors of peace and violence in Nepal, an empirical study of peace needs and peace services'</i>		
Authors: Suurmond, J.M., Sharma, P.M. & Lordos, A.		
Status: Report presented by Suurmond to the government and (inter)national peacebuilding community in Nepal, June 2016. Published by Pro Public (hardcopy and online) and shared online by Seed.		
Research questions	Method	Conclusion
What is the Nepalese experience of everyday peace? Where in Nepal can 'a need for peace' be identified? Which groups in Nepal	Qualitative and quantitative. Questionnaire comprised of psychological instruments, the SCORE Index, including human	The Nepalese experience of peace appears to consist of five dimensions: intrapersonal, interpersonal, intercommunity,

experience violence? Which peace needs predict violent action tendency?	security scales, for 1,177 respondents surveyed in Kanchanpur, Achham, Banke, Rolpa, Kapilvastu/Rupandehi, Kaski, Kathmandu, Dhanusha, Saptari, and Panchthar during March and April 2015.	citizen-state, and material peace. The experience of peace and violence differs between demographic groups, with certain groups appearing to have particularly strong peace needs. Reduced intrapersonal peace predicts violent action tendency.
Focus: Peace services and infrastructures for peace		
<i>Article 5: Infrastructures for peace and the role of peace services in Nepal</i>		
Authors: Böhm, M., Poudel, B.R., Sharma, P.M. & Suurmond, J.M.		
Status: Published conference proceeding. International Conference on Political Transition, Non-violence and Communication in Conflict Transformation, 24–26 January 2017. Prince of Songkla University, Thailand.		
Research questions	Method	Conclusion
What does peace mean to Nepalese people? What infrastructures for peace and peace services do people turn to, and why? Which infrastructures for peace are available? Which ones do people desire? Are people willing to pay for these?	Qualitative and quantitative. Interviews about peace services and infrastructures for peace with the abovementioned 1,177 people in Kanchanpur, Achham, Banke, Rolpa, Kapilvastu/Rupandehi, Kaski, Kathmandu, Dhanusha, Saptari, Panchthar during March and April 2015.	Respondents defined feeling at peace as a state of well-being. Different kinds of peace services depending on the level at which conflict occurred (intrapersonal, interpersonal, or intercommunity) are used. Various infrastructures for peace are available. People have specific ideas about the peace services they desire, for which most are willing to pay.
Focus: Peace needs and peace services		
<i>Article 6: Blessing or burden? The impact of peace services on peace and violence in Nepal</i>		
Authors: Suurmond, J.M., Sharma, P.M. & Lordos, A.		
Status: Published article in the Journal of Peacebuilding and Development, 12(1), 2017.		
Research questions	Method	Conclusion
What is the relation between Nepalese people's multidimensional experience of peace, the third-party support they seek when they suffer from conflict, and violence? How can third-party peace efforts improve people's experience of peace?	Qualitative and quantitative. Combining the interview and questionnaire data of the abovementioned data set.	Active peace services, such as mediation, are linked to increased peace experience in different dimensions and lower tendency for violence. Passive peace services, like information-sharing, are associated with reduced intrapersonal and intercommunity peace and higher violence tendency.

When studying a certain phenomenon in various forms over time, we can identify themes, patterns, and interconnections that may result in a theory of the phenomenon under research (Simons, H., 2009). In these instances, theory is primarily heuristic and driven by practical experiences. This is how my so-called 'peace needs–peace services approach' emerged. Since no other peace and conflict study has systematically examined the interface between peace interventions and peace experience from an offer-need angle, I could not learn from the findings and methodologies of other researchers. Most contributions to the literature by other authors have focused on a single example of infrastructures for peace, for instance, local peace committees (Glowacki & Gönc, 2013; Odendaal, 2010; Tandukar, Upreti, Paudel, Acharya & Harris, 2016; van Tongeren, 2013), rather than the multiple infrastructures for peace that are part of a country's overall peace system.

The methodology developed in this research produces more comprehensive data sets than conflict analysis methods more commonly used in peace and conflict practice and research, such as expert interviews, focus group discussions, or the tools of development agencies. However rigorous those studies are, their methodologies do not allow for predicting or testing the impact that peacebuilding programmes have on the overall peace process and the state of peace in a country, due to their limited sample sizes and the qualitative nature of the data they generate. The data set collected in this research makes it possible to conduct both quantitative and qualitative analyses, allowing for the testing of assumptions (hypotheses) as well as for contextualizing and interpreting findings. The diagnostic and predictive analyses enable the impact of peace efforts to be quantified and understood. The resulting knowledge can be used to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of peacebuilding.

The consequence of writing a dissertation based on a series of research articles is that the logical flow of the text is not as obvious as it would be, had I written chapters of the same book instead. This can be explained by the fact that each study addresses a concrete professional challenge encountered in the course of my work in Nepal and that the articles were written for different audiences. I aim to improve the reader's experience by reducing as much as possible overlap in the text, contextualizing the articles, providing additional theoretical, empirical, and methodological details, and highlighting the common thread that weaves the articles together. In so doing, I also narrate my epistemological journey as a researcher and demonstrate how the results of this work give value to the concept of infrastructures for peace.

The dissertation tells the story in three acts. Chapter 1, 2, and 3 provide theoretical, empirical, and methodological context. Chapter 4 presents the six articles. Chapter 5 concludes with a discussion of the findings; theoretical, empirical and methodological contributions; policy and programme implications; and future directions.

Chapter 1: Theoretical foundations

This chapter provides an introduction and background to the theoretical concepts that underpin my research and articles, to facilitate a deeper understanding for the reader. The main topic under investigation is the relationship between violence prevention and peace efforts by third parties in the context of infrastructures for peace, and people's experience of peace, conflict, and violence in various dimensions of their lives, for the purpose of improving peacebuilding practice.

Two peace and conflict studies schools of thought influenced my research: infrastructures for peace, including systems theory, and the meaning of peace, including human needs theory. First I will briefly elaborate on the state of the peace and conflict studies field. I will then discuss three phases in the infrastructures for peace literature, highlighting the themes that are particularly relevant to this study. I will place my infrastructures for peace approach within the debates of the second and third phase, pointing out the systems origins of the concept and examine the meaning of peace from a human needs angle.

The multidisciplinary field of peace and conflict studies

The ontological goal of peace and conflict studies, as scholars generally agree, is the study of violent conflict as a basis for understanding how such conflict can be prevented, managed, and its effects mitigated without resorting to violence (Galtung, 1996; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2006; Wallensteen, 2001). This dissertation, while embedded in peace and conflict studies, is particularly inspired by the discipline of peace studies.

Peace studies, also called irenology,⁷ has ancient roots. Almost all of the world's religions profess to offer a path towards inner and outer peace (Groff & Smoker, 1996). Philosophers such as Plato and Kant,⁸ in contrast to the tradition of modern realism initiated by Machiavelli and Hobbes, recognized the importance of peace for individual as well as political well-being. In the last century, nonviolent political change movements led by Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King and the establishment of the United Nations generated widespread hope that oppression, wars, and violence could be transformed with nonviolent means. The vision driving these historical events – peace by peaceful means – became the foundation of peace studies as an independent field of scientific inquiry with its own theories, research tools, and discussion fora in European and American institutions in the 1950s (Barash & Webel, 2017). The discipline has since expanded rapidly and counts now at least 400 colleges and universities around the world according to the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies of the University of Notre Dame.⁹

Founding scholars of peace studies emphasized a focus on peace by peaceful means as opposed to polemology, the study of war, or conflict resolution with violent means (Boulding, 1978a; 1985;

⁷ From the Greek word *eirini*, which means peace.

⁸ Plato, for instance, lets the Athenian stranger say in *Laws* (Book 1, p. 628): 'The highest good, however, is neither war nor civil strife – which things we should pray rather to be saved from – but peace one with another and friendly feeling'. *Plato in Twelve Volumes*, Vols. 10 & 11 translated by R.G. Bury. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd. 1967 & 1968. Kant wrote in *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophic Sketch* (1795): 'But the homage which each state pays (at least in words) to the concept of law proves that there is slumbering in man an even greater moral disposition to become master of the evil principle in himself (which he cannot disclaim) and to hope for the same from others'.

⁹ Website of the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, United States: <https://kroc.nd.edu/about-us/what-is-peace-studies/> [accessed 9 January 2020].

Galtung, 1996). More recently, researchers studying conflict in more established disciplines such as international relations, political science, sociology, education, economy, military studies, strategic studies, psychology, anthropology, and history, have begun to focus on peace as well, attempting to understand what peace is; the structures, attitudes, and institutions that underpin it; and the motives that drive people to work for it (Coleman, 2012).¹⁰ Subfields such as peacebuilding, conflict management, conflict resolution, conflict transformation, reconciliation, human rights, and (critical) security studies emerged. To accommodate these different approaches, and occasionally heated debates between their representatives, some scholars proposed that the use of one common label, 'peace and conflict studies', could, to a certain extent, unite these perspectives (Boulding, 1978a; Ramsbotham et al., 2006). This overarching label has become internationally accepted.¹¹

However, the peace agenda today continues to reflect the differences in a rhetoric that ranges from the narrower discourse of post-conflict reconstruction to broader debates on peaceful coexistence. Tensions between the multiple disciplines within the field of peace and conflict studies remain, and exchange between them is limited (Charbonneau & Parent, 2012). Scholars have flagged that this lack of sharing of knowledge, methods, and findings is likely to be to the detriment of peace efforts (Bright & Gledhill, 2018).

A recent review by Bright and Gledhill (2018) suggests that the peace and conflict literature is siloed between studies of war and war-making and studies of peace and peacemaking; international relations and political science; and perspectives of other disciplines such as psychology, anthropology, and law. Studies on violence by men in American institutions as well as international relations seem to dominate the discourse. The authors make the argument that this skewed representation is actually preventing the field as a whole from achieving its normative goal: the reduction of violent conflict and the proliferation of peace. Chetail and Jütersonke (2015), in addition, observe a divide between international and local perspectives. They assert that this biased state of affairs appears to 'thankfully' be changing, 'as there would otherwise be the risk of perpetuating a rather one-sided debate on the institutional dynamics of peacebuilding' (p. 2).

My studies helped me identify opportunities to bring balance to, and increase exchange between, the various voices represented in the field. The first opportunity lies in using systems approaches to peace and conflict, an application of which is the infrastructures for peace conceptualization described here. The second opportunity are the new sources of data becoming accessible, such as the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) data,¹² Global Peace Index data,¹³ and Social Cohesion and Reconciliation (SCORE) Index data,¹⁴ as made available with this research. Chapter 5 discusses how my dissertation contributes to these opportunities in more detail.

¹⁰ See section 3 of Routledge *Handbook of Peacebuilding*, edited by Roger Mac Ginty (2015), for examples of how these disciplines approach peacebuilding.

¹¹ The jury is still out on the question of whether the conflict resolution field and the peace research field are actually one academic field, or even one discipline, as for example described by Dahl (2012) in 'Oil and Water? The Philosophical Commitments of International Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution'. *International Studies Review*, 14(2), 240–272; and Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall (2005).

¹² The Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) Data Project is a multi-level data collection effort that catalogues major nonviolent and violent resistance campaigns around the globe from 1900–2013:

https://www.du.edu/korbel/sie/research/chenow_navco_data.html.

¹³ The Global Peace Index (GPI) ranks independent states and territories according to their level of peacefulness:

<http://visionofhumanity.org/indexes/global-peace-index/>.

¹⁴ The Social Cohesion and Reconciliation (SCORE) Index is a tool designed to measure social cohesion and reconciliation as two indicators of peace in multi-ethnic societies around the world: <https://www.scoreforpeace.org/>.

Against this academic backdrop, I engaged in the infrastructures for peace debate. It is possible to roughly distinguish three phases of development in the infrastructures for peace literature, each of which can be broadly delineated by thematic focus: Origins and advocacy (...–2012); definitions (2012–2015); and case studies, international versus local, and dissociative strategies (2015– ...). In the following section, rather than providing a historical overview, I will briefly summarize these phases, relating each to my own epistemological development.

Phase I: Origins and advocacy (...–2012)

The majority of contributors to the infrastructures for peace debate recognize that it was John Paul Lederach, renowned peace scholar and practitioner, who first coined the term ‘infrastructures for peace’ (Editorial, 2012; Giessmann, 2016), although it has also been attributed to peacebuilding practitioner Tobi Dress (Kumar, 2012, p. 398). In 1997, Lederach wrote (p. xvi): ‘I have a rather modest thesis. I believe that the nature and characteristics of contemporary conflict suggest the need for a set of concepts and approaches that go beyond traditional statist diplomacy. Building peace in today’s conflicts calls for long-term commitment to establishing an infrastructure across the levels of society, an infrastructure that empowers the resources of reconciliation from within that society and maximizes the contribution from outside’. According to him, cultivating an ‘infrastructure for peacebuilding’ involves not only ending something that is not desired, such as armed conflict, but also the building of relationships that in their totality form new patterns, processes, and structures, such as respect and cooperation (*Ibid.* p. 84-85). This requires a focus on a wider system that observes and understands multiple and interdependent change processes unfolding simultaneously, in other words: ‘a *systemic approach* [italics added] to change that includes, but looks consistently beyond, intervention projects and intense investment to end armed conflict’ (Lederach, 2012, p. 10).

The time was apparently ripe for the idea of infrastructures for peace. Several other scholars have in fact spoken to the topic before, or simultaneously to, Lederach. Johan Galtung, like Lederach a pioneer of the conflict transformation school of thought, proposed in 1976 (p. 297-298) his now authoritative definition of peacebuilding, reasoning: ‘Peace has a structure different from, perhaps over and above, peacekeeping and ad hoc peacemaking... The mechanisms that peace is based on should be built into the structure and be present as a reservoir for the system itself to draw up... More specifically, *structures must be found that remove causes of wars and offer alternatives to war in situations where wars might occur* [italics original]’. In 1996, Notter and Diamond opined (p. 3): ‘When we say peacebuilding, we mean creating the tangible and intangible conditions to enable a conflict-habituated system to become a *peace system*. Peacebuilding can be done, therefore, before, during, or after violence erupts. To build peace, you must have a viable infrastructure or foundation on which to build it, thus *the activities of peacebuilding are about creating infrastructures*’ [italics added]. In addition, other scholars who have been, and still are, promoting systems approaches to peacebuilding and conflict transformation have long thought along similar lines, as I will show in more detail in the section on my peace needs–peace services approach. For several years after the concept was raised by Lederach, the topic lay relatively dormant.

Interest in infrastructures for peace began to increase when UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan highlighted the significance of establishing infrastructures for peace in his 2006 progress report on

the 2001 Report on the Prevention of Armed Conflict (p. 16): ‘Essentially, the aim should be the creation of a sustainable national *infrastructure for peace* [italics added] that allows societies and their governments to resolve conflicts internally and with their own skills, institutions and resources’. To place this in context, in the 2001 report, Annan had announced an approach to peacebuilding that emphasized the importance of building local capacity for conflict resolution for domestic peace. This was partly a response to the successes and failures of peace operations, for instance in Rwanda and former Yugoslavia, as well as the increasing critique of the ‘liberal peacebuilding paradigm’ (Hughes, Öjendal & Schierenbeck, 2015). As Paris (2010) notes, efforts to promote liberal democratic governing systems and market-oriented economic growth, both integral to the prevailing liberal peacebuilding model, had shown to be more difficult and unpredictable than initially expected, in some cases producing destabilizing side effects. Critics of the liberal peacebuilding model noted its tendency to neglect local context and needs, and its reliance on top-down and technocratic measures (Campbell, Sabaratnam & Chandler, 2011; Mac Ginty, 2008; Richmond, 2006). This shift of attention from international to national conflict resolution was upheld by Annan’s successor Ban Ki-Moon, who, reporting to the Security Council on enhancing mediation and its support activities in 2009, stated (p. 16), ‘Given the promise it holds for States to resolve inter-group tension without recourse to violence, the development of national and local mechanisms for addressing grievances and reducing tension through mediation, facilitation and dialogue has received surprisingly little attention’.

In 2010, the UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, in partnership with the Nairobi Peace Initiative-Africa, the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding, and the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, hosted an experience-sharing seminar on infrastructures for peace in Kenya. Representatives of governments, civil society, political parties and UN country teams from 14 African countries participated. Several governments, including those of Kenya and Ghana, presented their efforts towards setting up infrastructures for peace in their respective countries.¹⁵ This meeting produced one of the widest accepted definitions today (arguably because it was adopted by the UN): ‘Infrastructure for peace is a dynamic network of interdependent structures, mechanisms, resources, values, and skills, which through dialogue and consultation, contribute to conflict prevention and peacebuilding in society’ (Kumar & De la Haye, 2012, p. 14).

In 2011, Kai Brand-Jacobsen, director of the Peace Action, Training and Research Institute of Romania, requested Paul van Tongeren and me, among others, to provide input for the All Party Parliamentary Group on Conflict Issues of the British Parliament, who were preparing for a debate in parliament on conflict prevention in the context of the British Government Stabilisation Overseas Strategy. Paul van Tongeren, former Secretary-General of Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, was leading the establishment of a global network to enhance infrastructures for peace internationally as part of a broader campaign for a Global Peacebuilding Strategy.¹⁶ Infrastructures for peace were to be discussed during that parliamentary debate.

This invitation marked the beginning of my active and concrete reflections on, and engagement with, the infrastructures for peace concept. In the Global Peacebuilding Strategy proposal (van Tongeren,

¹⁵ The Government of Ghana presented a policy paper entitled ‘National Architecture for Peace in Ghana’ produced by the Ministry of Interior in 2007 and the Government of Kenya presented a ‘National Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management’, issued by the Office of the President in 2009.

¹⁶ One of the objectives of the Global Peace Building Strategy, developed by Paul van Tongeren and Scilla Elworthy, was the establishment of infrastructures for peace in ten countries by 2016.

2011c), the section on infrastructures for peace drew a parallel with the health sector – just as every country has a ministry of health to promote sound health planning and to deal with problems, crises, and unexpected national health emergencies, so, it proposed, governmental focal points for peace and bureaus, offices, or ministries for peacebuilding and peace planning should be established. The concept of infrastructures for peace, in this reading, highlights the institutional and organisational capacities within a peace system. Brand-Jacobsen pointed out that in every field of human activity, including health, education, and security, infrastructure has been developed to enhance operational capacity and effectiveness. Having learned from past experiences, we now make long-term investments into building institutional and human resource capacities and infrastructure, combined with social awareness, legitimization, and support. A similar trend in peacebuilding is necessary in order to shift us from the prevailing small-scale, ad hoc, and largely reactive interventions and engagements, to preventative and more effective conflict transformation and peacebuilding.¹⁷

This advocacy perspective was my understanding of infrastructures for peace when I travelled to Nepal in 2011 to take up the position of peacebuilding advisor to the Nepalese NGO Pro Public; Forum for the Protection of Public Interest, on behalf of the Civil Peace Service of the German development agency ZFD/GIZ. The Civil Peace Service, funded by the German government, dispatches international experts to local partner organisations in order to support the peacebuilding efforts of these organisations.¹⁸ Pro Public is one of the oldest NGOs in Nepal, founded in 1991 by a consortium of environmental lawyers, journalists, economists, engineers, consumers, and women rights activists.¹⁹ Over the years, its focus has been on good governance, conflict transformation and peacebuilding, public interest litigation, protection of natural and cultural heritage, gender justice, and consumer protection. From June 2011 to June 2016, I lived with my family in Kathmandu. As peacebuilding advisor, it was my responsibility to support and co-develop the programmes and activities of Pro Public.

The concept of infrastructures for peace was inspiring, as it promised to increase the peace in our societies by strengthening and improving the coordination between the organisations and institutions active in peacebuilding and nonviolent conflict transformation. It offered an alternative, less harmful, and arguably more effective and efficient approach to peace than the prevailing conflict strategies, captured with the terms ‘security approach’ (Galtung, 2004) and ‘pacification’ (Francis, 2010). I think many of us, activists, believed that having more infrastructures for peace in the world would mean more peace. Yet there were hardly any theoretical papers or systematic studies with empirical evidence to support this belief. The few articles that existed were mostly produced for the purpose of advocacy. These articles showcased apparently successful case studies around the world, including the peace commissions in Nicaragua, the Northern Region Peace Advocacy Council in Ghana, and the Wajir Peace and Development Committee in Kenya (van Tongeren, 2011a; 2011b; 2012). The main goal of these papers was to convince governments and donors that peace is important, not only morally but also economically;²⁰ and therefore should be

¹⁷ For example in his TEDxCluj talk, *Paradigm shift from war to peace* of July 2, 2010.

¹⁸ Civil Peace Service website: <https://www.ziviler-friedensdienst.org/en>.

¹⁹ Pro Public website: <http://propublic.org/>.

²⁰ Van Tongeren (2011a) related the 90% increase of foreign direct investment in Ghana between mid-2008 and mid-2009 to the containment of tension and prevention of violence during the 2008 national elections by Ghana’s infrastructures for peace; and the peaceful constitutional referendum in Kenya of 2010 – in contrast to the 2007 elections – to Kenya’s infrastructures for peace.

planned for.²¹ In Nepal, I was particularly interested in understanding Nepal's 'peace system'; what kinds of peace existed; who the different actors supporting peace in Nepal were; how successful their efforts were and why; and whether the structures they set up or managed could be regarded as infrastructures for peace (as reflected in Chapter 4, articles 1 and 2).

Phase II: Definitions (2012–2015)

One year after my arrival in Nepal, the director of Pro Public, Prakash Mani Sharma, and I presented the concept of infrastructures for peace to the National Planning Commission (NPC) of the Government of Nepal.²² In a memorandum to one of the member-secretaries of the Commission, I wrote: 'The concept [of infrastructures for peace] implies a systems approach to peace. We do not regard violent conflict as a one-off event, but as a process of destruction that can be transformed by effectively functioning and appropriate mechanisms. Infrastructures for peace therefore involve a shift from crisis reaction to preventative and curative action, for which preparation and planning is required'.²³ Not long after, the NPC included infrastructures for peace in its 13th Periodic Plan 2013–2016.²⁴ This plan laid out the government strategy for development of the country for the period 2013–2016.

At this time, a second phase of infrastructures for peace literature had emerged, mostly concerned with establishing a common conceptual understanding. Contributors to this phase explored the various types of infrastructures for peace, their functions and limits, and the roles of different stakeholders. Representative of this phase are the articles and chapters in the 2012 Special Issue on Infrastructures for Peace of the *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development* and the 2012–2013 *Berghof Handbook on Peace Infrastructures*, to which I contributed. I will highlight the three most influential new definitions at present, including, as noted by Kovács (2018) in his recent review of the debate, my own.

I had started my activities on infrastructures for peace in Nepal using the definition produced at the UNDP meeting in Kenya: 'Infrastructure for peace is a dynamic network of interdependent structures, mechanisms, resources, values, and skills, which through dialogue and consultation, contribute to conflict prevention and peacebuilding in society' (Kumar & De la Haye, 2012, p. 14).²⁵ In the course of my work, however, I encountered several limitations to this definition. Its wording restricts the scope of infrastructures for peace activities to 'dialogue' and 'consultation'; equates

²¹ In other words, be a policy priority. See for example the European Union factsheet: ECDPM (2012). *Strengthening national capacities for mediation and dialogue: National dialogue platforms and infrastructures for peace*. Factsheet, EEAS Mediation Support Project. Brussels: European External Action Service, November 2012. Available at: <https://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Eeas-Strengthening-Capacities-Mediation-Dialogue-Platforms-Peace.pdf> [accessed 10 January 2020].

²² The NPC, headed by the Prime Minister, is the apex advisory body of the Government of Nepal for formulating a national vision, periodic plans, and policies for development. Website: https://www.npc.gov.np/en/introduction_history%20.

²³ Memorandum 'Input on infrastructures for peace for the strategic plan of the National Planning Commission of the Government of Nepal' to Mr. Bushal, member-secretary, from Pro Public and ZFD/GIZ, 28 June 2013, p.1.

²⁴ The Nepali translation of 'infrastructures for peace' proposed by Pro Public and adopted by the NPC in its Approach Paper to the 13th Periodic Plan 2013–2016, is *shantikolaagi purbadhar* (Chapter 7(14), p. 283). In Nepali, *shanti* refers to peace, tranquillity, and calm; *kolaagi* means for; and *purbadhar* means infrastructure, which can both refer to hardware (buildings, tools, resources) and software (skills, attitudes, values). The English translation of the relevant clause is: 'An Infrastructure for Peace development programme will be conducted for the promotion of sustainable development'. The Approach Paper is available in Nepali:

https://www.npc.gov.np/images/category/13th-Plan_nep.pdf and unofficial English translation:

https://www.npc.gov.np/images/category/13_plan_Approach_paper_english.pdf [both accessed 21 January 2020].

²⁵ A slightly adapted version of this definition would later become part of the rationale for the involvement of the UN, especially the UNDP, in various types of infrastructures for peace in over 40 different conflict-affected countries (UNDP, 2013).

conflict with violence; and implies a 'should' in the part 'dynamic network of interdependent structures...'

To begin with, dialogue and consultation were just two of the many peacebuilding activities that existed in Nepal. There was also peace education in schools, peace rallies, peace radio shows, peace exhibitions, forum theatre, memorials for victims in war-affected districts, community mediation, schools as zones of peace, restorative dialogues between ex-combatants and victims, psychosocial counselling following the 2015 Gorkha earthquake, religious peace practices and festivals, and civil resistance initiatives, for example in response to the India-Nepal border blockade of 2015 and 2016 (whether the latter can be considered within the prerogative of infrastructures for peace is a question I touch on in the third phase section, below). Thus, the peacebuilding landscape in Nepal offered a much larger range of activities than those captured by the UNDP definition. There did not seem to be substantial reasons for restricting the concept of infrastructures for peace to just two activities. Why had only dialogue and consultation been included? A possible explanation might be found in the fact that many of the participants to the Kenya meeting were state and UN representatives. Since dialogue and consultation are trademark activities of the liberal peacebuilding practice, promoted and implemented by states and the UN, the definition could well be a reflection of the identity of its creators.

Second, implied in the term 'conflict prevention' is the idea that conflict is bad and should be avoided. Liberal peace theory tends to perceive conflict as a problem that needs to be prevented and fixed, and peacebuilding as one of the tools through which the Westphalian nation-state order can be maintained (Ghani & Lockhart, 2008). There is however well-established consensus among conflict transformation and peace theorists that conflict is a natural phenomenon arising from social interactions, and even desirable, in so far as it leads to improvement and learning. Adaptive peacebuilding, for instance, recognizes that conflict is a normal and necessary element of change. The focus is on supporting the ability of communities to cope with and manage this process of change without violence (de Coning, 2018). Conflict ('contradiction' according to Galtung) is regarded as an integral part of the human experience and, when well-handled, as an opportunity for growth, equality, adaptation, and innovation. It only turns violent and destructive when we fail to transform it (Galtung, 1996; Lederach, 2015). That means that violence is just one of many imaginable responses to conflict, a fact that the tendency to equate violence with conflict, prevalent in policymaking and donor circles, obfuscates. The UNDP definition therefore unnecessarily contributes to conceptual confusion. Furthermore, the goal – conflict prevention – is neither achievable nor automatically desirable, whereas, at least from a peace studies perspective, *violence prevention*, in the broad sense of the word (including the use of conflict to perpetuate domination), is.

Finally, it is not obvious why an Infrastructure for Peace, like the one in Nepal, should be 'a dynamic network of interdependent structures'. The advantage of some of the infrastructures for peace, like women's groups in rural Nepalese villages (Sajjad, 2013), is that they are more or less unconnected to other institutions and can thus operate under the political radar, free from political (and male) interference. Moreover, being part of a network and coordinating such a network, as I learnt working with various umbrella organisations in Nepal, can absorb a lot of resources in terms of energy, time, and money without it necessarily being a worthwhile investment.

The UNDP definition and the one proposed by Hopp-Nishanka have an emphasis on interconnection in common. In *Berghof Handbook on Peace Infrastructures*, lead author Hopp-Nishanka (2012b, p. 3) writes: 'Peace infrastructures consist of diverse domestic, inter-connected forms of engagement between conflict parties and other stakeholders. Their organisational elements can be established at all stages of peace and dialogue processes, at all levels of society, and with varying degrees of inclusion. The objective of peace infrastructure is to assist the parties (e.g. through capacity building or advice), the process (e.g. through mediation between the conflict parties or facilitation of public participation), or the implementation of process results (e.g. through monitoring and coordination of agreement implementation)'. In this article (and subsequently, for example in 2016), Hopp-Nishanka frames the concept within the parameters of the nation-state ('domestic'), linking infrastructures for peace to national-level processes and highlighting the possible roles of government. Her interpretation implies, even advocates, for government involvement in implementation.

Pro Public and I had engaged government representatives in our efforts from the outset, yet the functioning of the state apparatus was marred by competition between political parties, corruption, and frequent turnover of civil servants (German Contribution to the Peace Process in Nepal, 2014). The Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction (MoPR) was infamous for its weak implementation of policies, programmes, and other responsibilities (Government of Nepal, 2010). Nepal's 'formal' infrastructures for peace (those structures set up by the government to support the national peace process such as the MoPR, Local Peace Committees (LPC), Nepal Peace Trust Fund (NPTF), and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)) did not easily qualify as examples of peacebuilding good practice if only because of their poor service delivery (see Chapter 4, article 2). Some of these institutions even perpetuated discrimination and violence, de facto disqualifying themselves as infrastructures for peace. In a commentary describing the origin and evolution of his perspective on infrastructures for peace, Lederach (2012) warned of bureaucracies' tendencies towards rigidity, competition, self-perpetuation, and diminished creativity, which appeared to ring true for Nepal (Lawoti, 2012; Sharma, 2012). Various NGOs in Nepal have more expertise and experience than the government in running different types of infrastructures for peace. The question of legitimacy too, seemed to tip in favour of NGOs, some of which, like in many other countries in transition or suffering from violent conflict, play strong roles in basic service delivery, with more public trust and adequacy than the government (DiCaprio, 2013). I therefore focused on specific and restricted roles for government, notably in oversight, monitoring, and coordination, rather than in implementation (Chapter 4, article 2).²⁶ In addition, I had started to learn about other non-state, and sometimes age-old, mechanisms that contributed towards peacebuilding and violence prevention.

The traditional dispute resolution methods practiced in villages by villagers for villagers, and the community-based initiatives implemented by NGOs and funded by donors, appeared to be more dynamic, efficient, and effective compared to the infrastructures for peace managed by the state. The indigenous justice mechanisms I witnessed in action as I worked with Pro Public staff across the country, including the *Badghar* system in the mid-west of Nepal²⁷ and the *pancha bhaladmi* in eastern Nepal,²⁸ seemed to respond rapidly and flexibly to community needs, if not to everybody's

²⁶ One idea my colleagues and I discussed at the time was 'shadow alignment', outlined by Rose and Greeley (2006) in their *Education in Fragile States: Capturing Lessons and Identifying Good Practice for the DAC Fragile States Group Service Delivery Workstream*. In this scenario, service provision is started at the community or NGO level, but structures are built in such a way that the state can inherit it, if appropriate, and once it is able.

²⁷ A traditional system of community governance and conflict resolution used by Tharu communities.

²⁸ A council of elders who arbitrate disputes in their communities, mostly in eastern areas of Nepal.

satisfaction (Coyle & Dalrymple, 2011). Pro Public quite successfully managed and implemented the community mediation committees to resolve community conflicts, with funds from The Asia Foundation (TAF) (Coyle & Dalrymple, 2011),²⁹ as well as the dialogue facilitator pools to support the integration of Maoist ex-combatants into communities, with funds from STPP/GIZ (2013), NPTF, and USAID (Pro Public, 2017).³⁰ Just like doctors in villages can, to a certain extent, continue to heal people despite a dysfunctional health ministry, local peacebuilders could continue to build peace to a certain extent in their own communities, despite a weak peace ministry. The concept of infrastructures for peace would be incomplete without the wisdom, knowledge, and practices of these citizen-practitioners.

However, Hopp-Nishanka's definition focused on top-down infrastructures for peace rather than these equally important bottom-up ones. It was couched in formal, institutional language that is commonly used to describe government-led peace processes, in lieu of the more informal and metaphorical language in which indigenous leaders tend to recount their traditional peace practices (for example, Ungunmerr explaining *dadirri*, 1988).³¹ To facilitate the inclusion of people-driven practices, I needed to be able to speak about infrastructures for peace with Nepalese people across the formal-informal and Nepali-English language barriers.

By now, the Government of Nepal had adopted infrastructures for peace as a policy priority and requested us to help implement the corresponding objectives. We did not have the data necessary to develop and provide policy advice and assistance, a problem commonly encountered by scholars and practitioners in developing countries, as previously noted. To gain a more comprehensive understanding of Nepal's Infrastructure for Peace, more research was needed.

The peace needs–peace services approach

My own definition of infrastructures for peace sought to offer a theoretical and methodological interpretation suitable for our purposes. I wished to understand what the Nepalese experience of political, community, interpersonal, and intrapersonal peace was, and of which elements that experience consists. In addition to the already well-recognized government- and donor-supported infrastructures for peace, I also wanted to know what kind of third-party support people actually use when they suffer from various types of conflict, and what effect these third-party support services have on their experience of peace (Chapter 4, articles 4-6). Given the many different, at times conflicting, views on the state of peace in Nepal (see Chapter 2), I sought to measure people's experience of peace, rather than collect additional hunches and opinions.

As can be seen in my research articles, I started with a structural approach and over time shifted to a more social constructionist view. In line with Anthony Giddens' influential structuration theory (1984), I reasoned that individuals and structures co-create one another: the autonomy of individuals is influenced by structures, and structures are maintained and adapted through the exercise of agency. Human behaviour can be understood by studying the processes that take place at the interface between the actor and the structure. According to Norman Long (1999), whose interface approach builds on structuration theory, the main focus of this perspective are social

²⁹ P. 39-42: 'Pro-Public Community Mediation Centres (TAF co-ordinated)'.

³⁰ Chapter 2 describes the indigenous, donor-funded, and state mechanisms in more detail.

³¹ Miriam-Rose Ungunmerr, from the Aboriginal peoples of the Daly River region (Northern Territory, Australia), 1988: 'When I experience *dadirri*, I am made whole again. I can sit on the riverbank or walk through the trees; even if someone close to me has passed away, I can find my peace in this silent awareness. There is no need of words. A big part of *dadirri* is listening'. *Dadirri: Inner Deep Listening and Quiet Still Awareness*. Available at: <http://www.miriamrosefoundation.org.au/about-dadirri/dadirri-text> [accessed 13 January 2020].

situations in which actors with different rationalities encounter each other. Correspondingly, actors and their living environments are at the centre of the analysis (Gerharz, 2018).³² Following this approach, I concentrated on both sides of the ‘encounter’, or ‘interface’, in peacebuilding: the user (receiver) and provider (giver). To be able to study this interface, my articles operationalized peace experience, peace services, and infrastructures for peace, of which the theoretical foundations are described below.

Peace needs: The meaning of peace and human needs theory

Two questions guided the development of my approach. The first, as first raised in Chapter 4, article 2, was: **What does the ‘for peace’ part of ‘infrastructures for peace’ mean?** There was no conceptual clarity among colleagues, donors, or the government on what ‘peace’ meant, a reflection of the state of the field. In peace and conflict studies, there is no consensus on the meaning of peace, but it is widely recognized that peace means different things to different people. Understandings of peace tend to be shaped by a certain domain of scientific inquiry. As a political phenomenon,³³ peace is very different than as a psychological phenomenon,³⁴ or as a cultural, economic, spiritual, or even environmental phenomenon.³⁵ Overall, there is a trend in peace and conflict research, away from the idea that peace is simply the absence of war involving elite- and national-level processes, towards a more holistic view that encompasses everyday peace experiences (Autesserre, 2010; Groff & Smoker, 1996; Mac Ginty, 2014). Obviously, different definitions of peace complicate responses to demands for results and impact, because assessments and evaluations of peacebuilding efforts will be hard to compare (Newman, 2009). Moreover, focusing on just one definition of peace (e.g. political) and leaving another one out (e.g. psychological) renders invisible the potential effects of a peace intervention meant to improve one type of peace on other types of peace. Analysis, learning, improvement, and innovation become difficult.

In addition, given that the main focus of peace and conflict research is on ‘conflict’ including post-conflict settings, rather than ‘peace’, peaceful contexts tend to be excluded from the study of peace, while they possess valuable information (as if studying diseases without considering what a healthy body looks like).³⁶ Existing peace capacities and contributors risk going under the radar, which could expose even the most peaceful societies to future violence (Mahmoud & Makoond, 2017). Whereas liberal peace theorists consider viable institutions one of the conditions for peace, ‘everyday peace’ theorists point to the many peaceful places where state institutions are absent. Some of Nepal’s most remote Himalayan villages, for example, have weak or no state presence at all. Like the everyday peace indicators project (Mac Ginty, 2014; Mac Ginty & Firchow, 2016), I asked villagers in Nepal about their experience of peace (Chapter 4, article 5). According to Mac Ginty (2014), if everyday peace is truly to be the locally grounded, agency-oriented, bottom-up and informal

³² Long understands social interface situations to be complex and multiple in nature, containing within them many different interests, relationships, and modes of rationality and power.

³³ Peace as a political phenomenon is usually understood as the absence of war, a balance of powers, order, or stability. See for example Martin’s (2005) ‘Critical analysis of the concept of peace in international relations’. *Peace Research*, 37(2), 45-59; and Mikulan & Cepoi’s (2017) ‘The importance of the political order for peace’. *Journal of Aggression, Conflict and Peace Research*, 9(1), 24-37.

³⁴ See for example Christie (2011) ‘Peace Psychology: Definitions, Scope, and Impact’. *The Encyclopaedia of Peace Psychology*, 2, 802-806; and Coleman and Deutsch (eds., 2012) *Psychological Components of Sustainable Peace*. New York: Springer-Verlag.

³⁵ Refer for instance to the work of political scientists such as Oliver Richmond and Håvard Hegre; legal scholars like Hans Kelsen and Christine Bell; economists including Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler; and environmental and geographic researchers such as Tobias Ide, Jürgen Scheffran, and Jonas Østergaard Nielsen.

³⁶ One exception is Kemp, Graham & Fry (eds., 2004). *Keeping the Peace: Conflict Resolution and Peaceful Societies around the World*. New York: Routledge.

alternative to international peacebuilding, it needs to be conceptualized as a personal, rather than a political, experience of peace. Yet the tendency of some scholars to equate infrastructures for peace with statebuilding (as signalled by Kovács (2018) and Verzat (2014)), raises the risk of negating local agency: 'Recent efforts by institutional actors and the attendant theory construction is more concerned with the structures themselves and the projection of state power [...] This way, the local takes central place but its agency remains denied' (Kovács, 2018, p. 268-269). While it may not be possible, or even desirable, to pin down peace in a widely acceptable definition, I believed it was still worthwhile to try to achieve a more holistic, yet workable understanding.

As van Iterson Scholten (2020) aptly observed, the one constant across these peace levels is that there is always a 'me' on one side of the relationship. Even if peace is conceptualized as a set of ever-wider circles of harmonious, dialogical relationships, leading all the way up to government institutions and the natural environment, in the centre there is always an individual who has all these relationships. From this perspective, peace is fundamentally about individual human beings and their agency.

In my research articles 3–6, I decided to study this 'me' as a reflection of multidimensional peace in Nepal and 'local agency' as the everyday act of choosing third-party conflict support, in agreement with Leonardsson and Rudd's (2015) description of the local.³⁷ Since I was interested in knowing whether peace had actually been achieved in Nepal, as a psychologist, my starting point was human needs. 'Psychology, with its focus on individuals, usually at the micro level, informs us of *the extent to which peace has been achieved* [italics added], that is when basic needs are met for survival and wellness. These needs include having a range of life options rooted in viable identities, and having basic rights, which are not only civil and political' (Galtung, 2010, p. 21-22). Since human needs, including the need to survive, are felt inside human beings, as opposed to ideologies, this view is people-oriented (Galtung, 2003).

I reasoned that, in peacebuilding, as in any other human exchange, the relationship at the centre of all dynamics is that of 'giver' and 'receiver': In every interaction, there is someone with a need and someone who provides something to meet that need. In the optimal scenario, both parties hold both roles, resulting in a fair and reciprocal exchange of resources such as effort, attention, time, money, goods, or opportunities (a discussion of some of the questions this might raise follows below). The relationship is unique. All other actors, however important, are only stakeholders and not shareholders. Thus, in accordance with human needs theory (Burton, 1990; 1991; Galtung, 2003; Maslow, 1943; Rosenberg, 2003),³⁸ we can consider ourselves and others as means ('satisfiers' in Max-Neef's terminology and 'strategies' in Rosenberg's) to meet our own and other people's needs, for instance for safety and security, belonging, identity, justice, survival, and freedom; some of the basic human needs proposed by conflict scholar John Burton (1990). Burton, among other human

³⁷ Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015, p. 833: 'these critiques [of liberal peacebuilding operations] see the local as the use of countless everyday practices that transmit critical local agency through a diversity of spheres from the very personal to the transnational level. As described by Roberts, the everyday 'refers to the ways people make their lives the best they can, manipulating with whatever tools and tactics are at their disposal the surrounding natural, social, economic and political structures, local and global, that empower or constrain their lives (Roberts, *Post-conflict Peacebuilding*, p. 413)'.

³⁸ Based on the number of publications that appeared in recent years, conflict and peace scholars seem to have taken a renewed interest in human needs theory. See for instance Bradshaw and Lötter's (2019) 'Re-Evaluating Burton's Human Needs Approach from Critical Theory Perspectives.' *International Journal of Peace Studies*, 24(1), 63-80; Mitchell and Avruch's (2013) *Conflict Resolution and Human Needs: Linking Theory and Practice*. Taylor and Francis; Danesh's (2011) 'Human Needs Theory, Conflict, and Peace: In Search of an Integrated Model.' In: D. J. Christie (Ed.), *Encyclopaedia of Peace Psychology*. Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell; and Park's (2010) 'Opening the Black Box: Reconciling Needs Theory through Psychoanalysis and Critical Theory'. *International Journal of Peace Studies*, 15(1), 1-26.

needs theorists, argues that the main cause of protracted conflict is people's unyielding drive to meet their unmet needs on the individual, group, and societal level. By contrast, Rosenberg (2003) is of the view that conflict occurs at the level of strategies rather than needs. It is our attachment to certain strategies, some of which may be harmful for others, that creates conflict, because the world is sufficiently abundant to meet everyone's basic human needs.

Concentrating on peacebuilding, I initially identified 'peace needs' in relation to the experience of direct conflict, and 'infrastructures for peace' in relation to third-party conflict support (Chapter 4, article 2). Over time however, and partly as a result of my study on Nepalese definitions of peace (Chapter 4, article 5), my definition of peace needs developed into a multidimensional concept, including structural conflict (Chapter 4, articles 4 and 6), which correspondingly would require multidisciplinary strategies, e.g. peace *and* development.

The basis of my multidimensional conceptualization of peace needs was Johan Galtung's 'positive and negative peace' (Chapter 4, articles 4 and 6). His distinction between positive peace, denoting the presence of well-being (fulfilment, cooperation, harmony) and negative peace, referring to the absence of suffering and violence (war, rape, poverty) is by all standards the best known conceptualization of peace in peace and conflict studies.³⁹ Negative peace has been defined as the absence of violence in all forms, including cultural (legitimizing structural and direct violence), structural (institutionalized violence), and direct violence (Galtung, 1996). Positive peace includes, and extends beyond, negative peace. One interpretation of positive peace is the fulfilment of human needs (Burton, 1990).⁴⁰

With regard to operationalizing peace needs, I discovered that there is currently no philosophical or international relations theory connecting states of outer peace with in-depth psychological states of inner peacefulness (Galtung, 2007). Whereas personal peace is generally treated in the literature as an individual-level psychological and social phenomenon, political peace tends to be regarded as a collective, most often national-level, political process.⁴¹ Some peace and conflict researchers have proposed categorizations of – rather than linkages between – the various existing theories of peace and war. Rapoport (1992), for example, combines political approaches to peace (a balance of power) with legal approaches (peace through law) and psychological approaches (personal pacifism). Others categorize peace depending on unit of analysis. Adolf (2009) distinguishes between individual, social (interpersonal), and collective (intergroup) peace. The psychologist Webel (2007) also proposed a tripartite theory of peace, including the realm of inner, psychobiological peace; the realm of outer peace, the socio-political, domestic, and international peace; and intersubjective or interpersonal peace, human interaction in daily life and work. Peace can thus be regarded as a multilevel phenomenon. Aiming for an as holistic as possible interpretation of peace, and to achieve more data granularity, I opted to include an additional level of analysis. In Chapter 4, article 6, I adopted four

³⁹ Perhaps Jane Addams was the first to use the terms negative and positive peace in her 1907 book *Newer Ideals of Peace*. Martin Luther King also mentioned them in his Letter from a Birmingham Jail in 1953, writing 'negative peace which is the absence of tension' and 'positive peace which is the presence of justice'.

⁴⁰ In peacebuilding practice, working for negative peace thus implies building and strengthening those parts of society that reduce or eliminate suffering and violence. Practically, one can imagine peace zones, safe havens, peacekeeping, civilian policing, civil resistance, anti-bullying and anti-racism campaigns, and suicide watch posts. Working for positive peace, in turn, implies building and strengthening those parts of society that foster well-being, conceivably psychotherapy and other healing practices, peer mediation in schools, peace education, conflict coaching, interreligious dialogue, restorative justice, collaborative decision-making processes, political dialogue, and good offices.

⁴¹ Interestingly so, as if political and national groups are not made up of individuals.

categories in which conflict can manifest – with slightly different labels – identified by Cheldelin and colleagues (2003): intrapersonal, interpersonal, intragroup, and intergroup.

My first attempt to measure people's experience of peace can be found in Chapter 4, article 3, where we study the connection between lack of inner peace, operationalized as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and interpersonal peace, operationalized as ex-combatants' readiness to reconcile. In later publications, I measured multiple levels of negative and positive peace experience ('dimensions' in Chapter 4, articles 4 and 6). While selecting the corresponding indicators for each level of analysis was an a priori, theoretical decision, their salience, or lack thereof, was a posteriori tested with statistical analyses.⁴²

To assess the dimension of citizen-state peace, I found, among other indicators, the concept of human security helpful, as conceptualized by UNDP in its 1994 Human Development Report. Human security can be considered as an application of human needs theory (Galtung, 2003). In the report, UNDP associates human security with 'well-being', 'freedom from fear', 'freedom from want', and with 'how people live and breathe in a society, how freely they exercise their many choices, how much access they have to market and social opportunities – and whether they live in conflict or in peace'. Human security thus refers to whether an individual has all that is necessary (e.g. food, physical security, health, finances) to feel satisfied with his or her life at a personal, local level.⁴³ For the dimension of intercommunity peace, I researched the sociological and psychological literature for affective and cognitive processes, ideologies, group dynamics, and social factors that give rise to exclusion, violence, and oppression, as well as those that inhibit them. To assess the dimension of interpersonal peace, which concerns human interaction in daily life or work, I looked at absence of aggression and destructive competition in personal relationships and presence of harmony and cooperation. The last dimension, intrapersonal peace, was interpreted as having a sense of inner well-being and psychological resilience as well as an absence of reduced mental health.

These multiple dimensions of negative and positive peace – intrapersonal, interpersonal, intercommunity, and citizen-state – so I expected, interact with one another. On the one hand, being and feeling at peace is a challenge, even inconceivable, when we live in desperately poor and war-ridden cultures, and when others with whom we interact are hostile, ultracompetitive, and violent. On the other hand, our ability to behave peacefully towards our family members, community, and even government officials may be impaired when we suffer from inner turmoil, trauma, or aggression. In articles 4 and 6 (Chapter 4), I aimed to uncover aspects of these interactions and propose strategies for remediating areas of concern in light of current practices.

Peace services and infrastructures for peace: systems theory

The second leading question, as raised in Chapter 4, articles 1 and 2, was: **What are infrastructures for peace?** Working in peacebuilding, my focus was on the added value of this field, rather than other development fields. Theoretically, I had entered the infrastructures for peace debate with a systems perspective, focusing on the principles, dynamics, and components that describe how a system works and researching the parts that make up the whole. A number of the forerunners of peace and conflict studies, including Kenneth Boulding, Johan Galtung, and Hans Gottinger, were

⁴² In addition to the a priori selected dimensions, a fifth dimension appeared this way, that of 'material peace' (see Chapter 4, article 4).

⁴³ *Human Security Handbook* by the UN (2016), detailing the indicators, is available here: <https://www.un.org/humansecurity/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/h2.pdf> [accessed 19 February 2020].

also founders of general systems theory (Mesjasz, 1988).⁴⁴ The development and application of systems theory was part of their effort to create holistic and interdisciplinary methodologies and more dynamic and detailed models enabling researchers to identify, and eventually to control, the processes leading to the outbreaks of war (Boulding, 1978b; Dedring, 1976; Galtung, 1969; 1985).

Systems theory can be considered as a problem solving paradigm in that it considers how the different attributes of an entire system work together to achieve the objective of a system, which is to solve a problem, such as war, with a balanced solution satisfying the needs and interests of as many as possible stakeholders. There is a long tradition of peace systems thinkers. David Mitrany (1944), for example, commonly regarded as one of the originators of the functional approach to world government in international relations, had already proposed a 'Global Peace System' in the early 1940s, while World War Two was still on-going. In a pamphlet, Mitrany advocated for a transformation of how people thought about the international world order and suggested that the prevention of war required a new approach to planning for the international organisation of peace in the post-war world. His ideas influenced those working on the charter of the new United Nations, in particular in the establishment of its specialized agencies (Anderson, 1998). Subsequent international relations, biological, peacebuilding, conflict resolution, and anthropological perspectives described and highlighted the advantages of a peace system over military security (Johansen, 1978); the multiple layers such a system should encompass, including global, regional, national, and local (Irwin, 1989); the different institutions, communities, individuals, and activities constituting the already existing global peace system that 'work together whether awkwardly or gracefully, for a common goal: a world at peace' (Diamond & McDonald, 1996, p. 1); focal areas in the construction of a global peace system, including strengthening international norms and institutions against war, eliminating the conditions that give rise to war and violence, and supporting and encouraging alternative means of international conflict transformation (McElwee, 2003); the importance of gender parity in governance for the establishment and maintenance of a global peace system (Hand, 2003); the characteristics of peace systems in peaceful communities around the world (Kemp & Fry, 2004); and the significance of having a transformative vision, and an understanding of global interdependence and social identity (Fry, 2013).⁴⁵ These days, systems approaches are part of the trend towards holistic, multidisciplinary, and adaptive peacebuilding, in which single approaches are no longer deemed adequate to the task (de Coning, 2018; Martin, M., Bojicic-Dzelilovic & Benraïs, 2018; Ricigliano, 2011).

In the infrastructures for peace debate, one of the roles Lederach (1997) envisioned for infrastructures for peace was to transform a war-system into a peace-system. Another author explicitly took a systems perspective: Dress (2005), in his 'Designing a Peacebuilding Infrastructure: Taking a Systems Approach to the Prevention of Deadly Conflict'. Instead of comparing infrastructures for peace to the health sector, he compared them to the global military infrastructure (p.2): 'As a general rule, throughout the last five decades there has been a global military infrastructure in a constant state of preparedness for war. It is augmented by global military bases and universities, security alliances and worldwide intelligence and counterintelligence

⁴⁴ Out of systems theory developed modern day complexity theory and the idea of Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS), see for example Grobman, G.M. (2005) 'Complexity Theory: a new way to look at organizational change.' *Public Administration Quarterly*, 29(3/4), 350-382.

⁴⁵ Wiberg (2005) observes in 'Peace Research: Past, Present, Future' that while the debate on the creation of peace systems was initially theoretical and normative, it increasingly has begun to focus on empirical cases (available here: <https://www.uibk.ac.at/peacestudies/downloads/peacelibrary/peaceresearch.pdf>). A similar trend appears to be visible in the infrastructures for peace debate.

networks. War planning entails massive amounts of data gathering, strategic and state-of-the-art thinking and planning, and enormous resources and budgets. Peace planning, however, shares no such stature, often appearing to be accidental, *par hazard* [italics original], rather than analysed, scrutinized and reasoned. This lack of a systems approach to conflict prevention is one of the primary reasons that every new armed conflict seems to come as a surprise to the international community'. For Dress, such a peacebuilding infrastructure could prevent the destruction of war by averting armed conflict and planning for peace.

Most, if not all, global peace system authors agree that the state should be part of the peace system, a notion that has been affirmed by the majority of contributors to the infrastructures for peace debate. Obviously, when a state or any other institution does not serve its citizens, but only the people in power (manifesting for example in corruption) there can be no political peace. According to liberal peace theorists, who heavily influence current ideas of political peace, peace is a political and economic phenomenon that is found in democratic institutions and free markets rather than individuals, as mentioned above. In this research, the dimensions of citizen-state peace and material peace, including the concept of human security, can be used as a proxy measure for the performance of the state in this regard.

The assumptions of interconnectedness, holism, and dynamic causality in systems theory (Ricigliano, 2003) meant that to understand Nepal as a system, characterized by a challenging peace process and relatively high poverty, one must follow the causal chains wherever they lead. The purpose is to obtain a deeper understanding of Nepal, rather than presuming drivers of conflict and players that should be incorporated into the peace process. Systems analyst Donella Meadows (2001) describes how intervention should start with 'listening to the system', to identify where change is already happening in the system and nurture that change in the direction of more peaceful, less violent pathways. In my mind, the very idea of infrastructures for peace offers a useful approach to 'listen to the system'. It renders visible those institutional and organisational capacities in society that actually help to resolve conflicts non-violently and contribute to peace (and by extension those that do not). Instead of a focalized view of issues, for example of political conflict, the lens of infrastructures for peace helps to see them as aspects of a totality.

In Nepal's overall peace system, I initially identified three levels of analysis (most of the following text is copied from Chapter 4, article 2, p. 3-4):⁴⁶ The peace sector (macro level), the infrastructures for peace (meso level), and the peace services (micro level). The peace sector was 'that part of society that deals with the demand [or need] for peace'... It encompasses ministries, donors, national and international NGOs as well as the Infrastructure for Peace (I4P), constituted by the infrastructures for peace and the peace service providers. From this point of view, a Ministry of Peace would be part of the peace sector in the possible roles of enabler, planner, regulator, policymaker, financier, and coordinator, but only be an infrastructure for peace when it delivers a peace service that meets a peace need. The same applies to donors or NGOs working for peace.

Peace needs–peace services approach definition

My definition of infrastructures for peace is: *'The structures, resources, and processes through which peace services are delivered at any level of a society.'*

⁴⁶ In the interest of brevity, I will only highlight the main features of my model here. Chapter 4, especially articles 2, 4-6, offer a more in-depth presentation.

Infrastructures for peace here are the structures, resources, and processes that actually serve to increase people's experience of peace in various dimensions of their lives. They can be established by anyone, international actors, the state, or citizens. Formal infrastructures for peace have a physical structure, a degree of organisation, stability, mandate, resources, training, and are recognised as such by their beneficiaries, or 'users'. Examples include community mediation committees, local peace committees, peace radio stations, peace agreement monitoring mechanisms, religious institutions, and zones of peace. By contrast, informal infrastructures for peace are those that emerge on an ad hoc basis, do not require a physical structure, and operate without funds. Examples include the many traditional dispute resolution mechanisms in Nepal, some of which take place in open air or under a tree. Together, they make up the Infrastructure for Peace (I4P) of a society.

Peace services are the services 'offered by peace service providers with the goal of addressing peace needs' of their users (e.g. mediation by mediators to improve neighbour relations). They can include direct services including counselling, dialogue facilitation, and mediation, as well as indirect services such as information provision, education, training, and monitoring. Although there is some overlap, one can distinguish between preventative, curative, and palliative peace services. Preventative peace service providers seek to prevent violence, for example by increasing peace skills and knowledge, contributing to a culture of peace, and establishing a firm Infrastructure for Peace (I4P). Curative peace service providers, such as conflict resolution and transformation practitioners, mediators, and psychological trauma counsellors, help people to heal from painful conflict. Palliative peace service providers aim to reduce harm once violence has erupted, for example by managing demilitarised zones or conducting shuttle mediation. All articles in Chapter 4 of this dissertation are either an exploration or an application of this approach.

Critique and way forward

To date one author has expressed critique. While it belongs to the third phase in the literature, I share and respond to it here, so as to complete the discussion of my approach. Kovács (2018, p. 129), wrote: 'Their approach is not without problems, however. Peace needs—also termed as "peace demand"—are met through "peace services" delivered by "peace service providers" (Suurmond and Sharma, 2013, p. 4). The image conjured up is that of a 'peace market' where supply meets demand. The trouble with the application of free market ideas to peacebuilding is the same as with applying it to other domains: it assumes that the articulation of the 'demand' arises autonomously, not from power structures and cultural biases. However, in practice the supplier often has the means—power, influence—to shape demand, or the 'beneficiaries' may simply express demands for which there is a ready supply. Individuals and communities in conflict and post-conflict settings often take what they can, while external actors—international organisations as well as the state—experiment with their latest theories of change. Non-governmental organisations and members of marginalised communities can and do learn the language of development and peacebuilding. While such language may often be used to manipulate externals, this is not the only reason it is used. Cultural factors may come into play. Thus in the Philippines, people in rural communities may say what they take the externals want to hear out of a mixture of hospitality to guests, respect to whoever it was that referred the external to them, and shame at being seen as backwards, thus losing face. It is no surprise, then, that community consultations often result in

confirming the preconceived notions of external actors. Peace infrastructures seem to be a case in point.’

To this, I have three responses. First, the language in which I formulated my definition is indeed that of exchange (offer and demand/need). However, exchange of services and ‘free market ideas’ are not the same. If it were, all relationships in the world could be characterized as free market relations. Thus, contrary to Kovács’ claim that my definition promotes free market ideas; I do not adopt a normative socio-economic philosophical stance. The language of exchange, following human needs theory, is simply the language of day-to-day social dealings between people, thus familiar to most in Nepal, if not everyone in the world.

Second, I agree with Kovács that demand for peace services is often (unduly) influenced by providers. For me, this observation however highlights the importance of more accurate and representative demand analyses, rather than reason to halt such analysis or to leave it to the enablers and providers (donors or the state, in many cases) altogether. Acknowledging and understanding that the approach used to assess peace needs is influenced by external factors (i.e. the providers’ own interests and context) does not remove the need for assessment, nor does it provide an argument for excluding the needs expressed by citizens themselves. The question then becomes: How to reduce the influence of providers in assessing the peace needs of citizens? Kovács does not offer suggestions in this regard. The research method I used for articles 4-6 (Chapter 4), a substantial anonymous population survey consisting of carefully calibrated instruments coupled with open questions (mixed methods), conducted by an independent NGO in accordance with academic research standards with the single purpose of gathering information⁴⁷ may actually be the closest we can come in terms of reducing demand and social desirability bias. That said, a contextual analysis of the relationships between providers and users, including of their rhetorical-discursive strategies, would certainly contribute explanatory value to the data collected.

Third, the statement by Kovács seems to assume that peace services are provided by third parties, external agents with their own set of incentives (NGOs, donors, government). While this is partly true, it ignores a large share of peace services provided by citizens to themselves, for example, by communities to their own members. In such cases, studying the peace services provided by the community to the community could offer a non-, or at least less-, skewed picture of the peace needs of that community and their satisfaction with the peace services provided. The course of my research eventually led me to do this (Chapter 4, article 5).

The above critique resembles some of the critique human needs theory has received: essentialist, de-contextualised, power-blind, and a-historical (Mitchell & Avruch, 2013; Park, 2010). On a common sense level, the existence of needs is undeniable, but on a deeper level, their ontological status is debated. Ideologies, propaganda, (fake) news, belief-systems, and worldviews, influence our experience of our needs. Some of our needs, including for safety, identity, and freedom, are particularly dependent on how we perceive reality, making us vulnerable to deception, manipulation, and exploitation. In relationships marked by unequal power, those with less power are prone to defer to the needs of the more powerful (e.g. Kovács’ ‘external actors’), with resentment likely to build. Some may try to hold on to their attachment to the powerful person at

⁴⁷ The purpose of the survey was explained to the respondents as follows: ‘We are currently conducting a national survey that aims to map the needs and concerns of society in Nepal. The goal of the study is to inform the public debate with updated and accurate information’.

the cost of their own survival.⁴⁸ In addition, the value of needs, or in other words, their relation to good and bad, right and wrong, is unclear. Some needs, for instance for power and control (whether these are actually basic human needs is subject of debate), may be morally wrong when there is no other way to satisfy them but through other people's abuse and oppression.

'Both Hopp-Nishanka's and the UNDP's definitions rest on institutionalist grounds. Suurmond and Sharma's peace-needs-based approach represents a departure from these', writes Kovács (2018, p. 128). Indeed, the main difference between my definition and the other definitions is that it takes a people- and results-centric perspective. The focus is on the needs and wishes of the supposed beneficiaries of peace interventions and what is actually working for them, *in addition to* the ambitions and desires of donors, governments, and the UN. The systemic character of the definition allows for adaptability and flexibility concerning the roles of various actors, leaving open the option for every possible combination of roles – hybrid or not – between international actors, government, and citizens, depending on their unique context.

Integrating the above, a theoretical way forward lies in the incorporation of power dynamics and context when investigating the interaction between peace service provider and user. This is also espoused by the interface approach, referred to above: 'Via the observation and the characterisation of the actions of actors interacting at the interface, one can comprehend their particular rationalities. Here the differences, power structures, and discontinuities in rationalities become clear. The analysis of this negotiation is always seen in the context of its structural interrelations, since cultural, political, and economic factors influence the actions of individuals, just as their individual knowledge does' (Gerharz, 2018, p. 3). Relevant questions would include: Why have certain peace needs manifested? Is there balance in the user-provider relationship, or does one party gain at the expense of the other? Is the relationship transparent or is it based on deception? Who stands to benefit from a peace service, and why? The answers could provide additional direction for decisions regarding infrastructures for peace and related services.

Besides critique, Kovács (2018, p. 128-129) also offered positive appraisal: 'The advantages of this [Suurmond and Sharma's] perspective are manifold. First, it directs attention to what they call "peace needs", allowing for a freer, and more inclusive contextual definition of peace. Communities and individuals have the capacity to imagine and formulate ideal states of being and to assess what is required to achieve that, though factors such as conflict, polarisation, path dependency, cultural traits such as values and constructs such as ideologies, limit the creative space such imagination requires. This is one reason why external assistance in peacebuilding may be legitimate and valuable—it can open up creative space and provide raw material for idea generation. Second, a needs-based approach can be open-ended, so conducive to more emancipatory bottom-up processes as was the case in Nicaragua and Kenya's Wajir district'.

Since first published (Chapter 4, article 2), my 'peace needs–peace services' approach has gone on to inform others. Researchers who have referenced my work include Giessmann (2016) investigating infrastructures for peace globally for the UNDP; Irene (2016) researching infrastructures for peace in Nigeria; Uçarlar (2016) in Turkey; Davis (2016) in Myanmar; Kovács (2018) in the Philippines; Kansiime (2018) in Western Uganda; Richmond and Mac Ginty (2019); and van Iterson Scholten (2020). Taking stock of the discussion, Kovács and Tobias (2016, p. 3) observed: 'The definitions

⁴⁸ As is the case with Stockholm syndrome.

offered by the UNDP, Hopp-Nishanka, and by Suurmond and Sharma represent very different theoretical approaches and, broadly speaking, capture the tussle in the field currently’.

During the time I spent developing my approach and doing the research, the theoretical debate on infrastructures for peace continued. In terms of chronology, my last article (Chapter 4, article 6) can be considered as part of the third phase of the infrastructures for peace literature. In this phase, authors started to publish more robust case studies.

Phase III: Case studies, international versus local, and dissociative strategies (2015–...)

The third, on-going phase in the literature provides increasingly robust case study analyses and new theoretical angles. Peace structures investigated in the context of infrastructures for peace now encompass local peace committees and councils, peace secretariats, peace ministries, national dialogue platforms and conferences, civil society networks, transitional justice mechanisms, insider mediation, early warning-early response, interstate and UN-affiliated peace and mediation structures, and informal infrastructures for peace in countries including South Africa (Giessmann, 2016; Odendaal & Spies, 1997; Odendaal, 2010; van Tongeren, 2011a; 2011b); Nicaragua (Lederach, 1997; 2012; Mouly, 2013; Odendaal, 2010); Nepal (Böhm, Poudel, Sharma & Suurmond, 2018; Odendaal, 2010; Suurmond & Sharma, 2012; 2013; van Tongeren, 2011a; 2011b; 2013);⁴⁹ Sri Lanka (Hopp-Nishanka, 2012a; Siebert, 2013); Colombia (Paladini Adell, 2012; 2014; Pfeiffer, 2014); Kenya (Chuma & Ojielo, 2012; Hedditch, 2016; Odendaal, 2010; van Tongeren, 2013); Ghana (Odendaal, 2010; 2012; van Tongeren, 2011b; Verzat, 2014); Costa Rica (van Tongeren, 2011a; 2011b; 2013); Turkey (Sunca, 2016; Uçarlar, 2016); Ethiopia (Glowacki & Gönc, 2013); Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Northern Ireland, Sierra Leone (Odendaal, 2010); Peru (Ober, 2012); Kyrgyzstan (Danielak, 2013); Guyana, Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, Sierra Leone, Lesotho (Kumar & De la Haye, 2012); Timor-Leste, Solomon Islands (Richmond, 2013c); Sudan/South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Uganda, Afghanistan (van Tongeren, 2013); Lebanon (Siebert, 2013); Tunisia (Giessmann, 2016); Zimbabwe (Dube & Makwerere, 2012); Myanmar (Davis, Q., 2016; Garnett, 2016); Syria (Akdedian, 2016); and the Philippines (Kovács, 2018).⁵⁰ The focus of the theoretical debate has shifted away from definitions to local peacebuilding versus international/ liberal/ statebuilding perspectives of infrastructures for peace. New voices have introduced fresh theoretical topics, including security and social defence. To conclude this chapter, I will present and comment on some of these debates and point out linkages with my approach.

Kovács (2018) recently compared and contrasted the infrastructures for peace debate with the (liberal) statebuilding debate. His treatise can be read as a defence of the conflict transformation origins and purpose of the concept of infrastructures for peace. According to him, the realist view that a stable and efficient state is the best guarantor of peace, and that one can build peace through ‘building’ states, coupled with a liberal hegemonic, Wilsonian, view of integrating weak states in the capitalist economy, has overshadowed transformative approaches focusing on relations and institutions (also Newman, Richmond & Paris, 2009). These top-down interventions have been

⁴⁹ My work cited here can be found in Chapter 4, articles 1, 2, and 5.

⁵⁰ Some authors, like Odendaal, van Tongeren, and Giessman, have provided overviews of different cases and are therefore mentioned multiple times.

juxtaposed with the peacebuilding approaches preferred by conflict transformation theorists and practitioners, according to whom the role of third parties should be on supporting internal actors and coordinating external peace efforts, with sensitivity to local culture and long-term timeframes (Galtung, 1996; Lederach, 1997; 2015). The liberal peace has often been pursued for unjust ends and done harm to local realities and peace initiatives (Call & Wyeth, 2008; Murithi, 2009; Paris, 2004; 2010; Richmond, 2010). Kovács (2018) contends that for infrastructures for peace to remain relevant, the concept should not be equated with statebuilding.

From a systems perspective, this makes sense in situations where the state uses its monopoly on violence and access to resources to dominate and oppress certain groups for the benefit of others. Unfortunately, this seems to be the case in most countries around the world, and increasingly so. Globally, government oppression is on the rise. The democratization processes that started before the cold war are reversing. Research by Freedom House (2019) shows that between 2005 and 2018, the share of Not Free countries in the world rose to 26%, whereas the share of Free countries declined to 44%. The challenge of shifting current realities towards the vision of a peace system within the Westphalian nation-state paradigm is high, as pointed out by Peter Wallensteen in his well-known 'Understanding Conflict Resolution' (2002). According to Wallensteen, peace is difficult to achieve in the existing international system mainly dominated by sovereign states, because, traditionally, states are the main actors engaged in competition for maximizing national and/or individual interests. This priority may override providing governance services to the satisfaction of citizens at home, as envisioned in an alternative model suggested by Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein (2009).⁵¹ Worse, state structures can be used as means to perpetuate hegemony and protect the power and privileges of the elites, risking a clash of interests between the state and its citizens (Ayoob, 2007; Demmers, 2017).⁵² As a result, infrastructures for peace may be facing pressure to become a covert or overt mechanism of oppression and domestication, and turn into an 'infrastructure for pacification' (Kovács, 2018, p. 268) or even an infrastructure for violence. Illustrative of the latter, and of the related complexity, is Akdedian's study (2016) on infrastructures for peace in Syria.⁵³ However, although it may not be easy to make the distinction, the violence of oppressors is not the same as the violence of the oppressed. As Freire writes (2014, p. 82): 'Inasmuch as the violence of the oppressors makes of the oppressed persons forbidden to be, the response of the latter to the violence of the former is found infused with a yearning to seek the right to be'. In other words, there is a moral line between defensive and offensive violence.

The most obvious alternative to the liberal peace interpretation of infrastructures for peace is the bottom-up perspective provided by those who consider the concept as part of the 'local turn' (Richmond, 2010). Local turn theorists understand peacebuilding as an essentially local process.

⁵¹ Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein (2009) proposed an overhaul of the international global system through the transformation of its basic units, Westphalian nation-states, into voluntary, competitive service companies; with citizens having the right to abandon these companies should they be dissatisfied with their services.

⁵² According to Ayoob (2007, p. 101), the major problem is that standards for effective statehood are set by Western Europe and the United States, states that have successfully completed their state-building process. They can therefore afford to adopt liberal standards in relations to their populations, because they are reasonably secure in the knowledge that societal demands will not run counter to state interests and will not put them in jeopardy. However, these standards are in the Third World often in contradiction with the imperatives of state making. Demmers speaks to the tensions inherent to the current global context, writing (2017, p.81): 'The fundamental contradictions in the structures of the modern state system, capitalism, and global governance produce incompetent states that cannot accommodate needs and demands from society'.

⁵³ Akdedian's study, examining infrastructures for peace in Syria over the past two decades, shows how they were independent of, but cooperated with, the state in the early 2000s, to subsequently become absorbed by local Islamic power groups and the religious-political opposition to Bashar al-Asad's regime.

Subsequently the locus of discussion should shift from the international to the local, while concerted efforts should be made to foreground local voices (Hughes et al., 2015) with all the fragmentation, contestation, and incoherency that these may represent (Simons, C. & Zanker, 2014). The starting point of any peacebuilding engagement thus should be, according to Fontan (2012, p. 33), 'understanding what needs, realities and initiatives are endogenous to that environment'. The international peacebuilding communities must commit to a 'new pair of lenses... to logistically accompany a process [of peace] that is already underway' (p. 108). In the context of infrastructures for peace, Lederach has voiced a similar view. According to him, international peacebuilders need to take the time to look, and get to know, the local infrastructures for peace, lest we run the risk of adopting a 'low view of context' (2012). The research upon which articles 4-6 (Chapter 4) are based, aims to do this. Adding direction, and resonating with Freire's 'education as self-reliance' (1992, p. 129), De Coning (2013) argues that international peacebuilding should be geared towards stimulating and facilitating capacity of societies to self-organize. In apparent endorsement, the peace services results of article 6 (Chapter 4), suggest that the success of these services may depend on their ability to increase the agency of their users.

A number of authors have suggested that the concept of infrastructures for peace can bridge the divide between the liberal and the local, and peacebuilding versus statebuilding approaches, referring to 'hybridity' (Kumar & De la Haye, 2012) and 'peace formations' (Richmond, 2013b; 2013c).⁵⁴ Hopp-Nishanka (2016) proposed that infrastructures for peace can become a way to transform the state. More radically, Richmond (2013a, p. 28) argued that 'ultimately the state itself should become the peace infrastructure'. As will be clear by now, my own perspective is context-dependent: In some cases, (part of) the state will be an infrastructure for peace; in other cases, hybrid constructions between state and civil society will be appropriate; in again other cases it may be apt to disconnect the state from the infrastructures for peace.

If the theoretical framework of infrastructures for peace is that of conflict transformation, as Lederach (1997; 2012), Hopp-Nishanka (2016), and Kovács (2018), among others, espouse, then conflict transformation is the means of infrastructures for peace, towards the desired end of a new reality, in which violence is minimized, basic human needs are met, and well-being, mutual understanding, reconciliation, and cooperation are increased (Lederach, 2015). Kennedy (2016) emphasizes that the means of infrastructures for peace should be consistent with their desired end. The bulk of the literature, including my own research articles, is limited to associative, dialogue-based, activities for infrastructures for peace, such as consultation and mediation. But when dialogue is undesired or impossible, or used to manipulate, destabilize, and oppress (be it by the state or local structures and actors), how can infrastructures for peace refrain from becoming a perpetrator or enabler? What logically follows is that infrastructures for peace should be associative when possible, yet dissociative when necessary.

Ghimire (2016) explicitly connected infrastructures for peace to violence reduction. According to him, infrastructures for peace can contribute to negative peace (traditionally the prerogative of the legal and security sectors), for example by providing community security, local mediation, neighbourhood watch, 'crime stoppers', and early response mechanisms. This resonates with what I

⁵⁴ Richmond conceptualizes infrastructures for peace as an encounter between the international liberal peace model and local forms of peace, warning that peace infrastructures will remain part of the liberal and neoliberal peace project if they are driven by external actors or even state elites, rather than embedded in local peace formation dynamics.

wrote in the funding proposal for my research in 2014: ‘While infrastructures for peace thus have the goal of violence reduction in common with security and legal institutions, they differ with respect to their end goal. Security and legal institutions focus on achieving and maintaining ‘negative peace’ (absence of violence), but infrastructures for peace also strive to achieve and strengthen ‘positive peace’ (collaborative and supportive relationships). Figure 1 illustrates the relations between the legal, security, and peace sectors and how they differ in emphasis, and provides examples of overlapping mechanisms’.

Figure 1 Overlapping relationships between the legal, security, and peace sectors

In 2015-2016, I began to consider dissociative roles (‘services’), for infrastructures for peace in nonviolent social and political change, but my field research was nearing completion and consequently the topic was not included in my articles. At around the same time, Hopp-Nishanka – reiterating van Tongeren (2011b) – clearly separated infrastructures for peace from resistance and social defence (2016, p. 13): ‘it needs to be said that infrastructures for peace are not for every context; in some cases, engaging a predatory and autocratic state, or a local government dominated by warlords and criminals, through collaborative infrastructures for peace might be pointless. In such situations, support for human rights defenders, strengthening of local peace constituencies in civil society or community building with the aim of improving local livelihoods could be more appropriate’. Yet in the same publication, Kennedy (2016) explicitly linked nonviolent civil resistance to the concept of infrastructures for peace, making the case for anarchism and nonviolent social defence to become a priority of research and development of peace infrastructures, in order to enable a ‘post-liberal peace’ to emerge.

If infrastructures for peace directly intervene in structural, cultural, and direct violence to support the oppressed, discriminated, and abused in their struggle for survival and freedom, are they still infrastructures for peace? There appears to be theoretical basis for it in the peace and conflict studies literature, including in the work of conflict transformation scholars. Early inspirer of peace studies, Martin Luther King, pointedly wrote (1958, p. 207): ‘To accept passively an unjust system is to cooperate with that system; thereby the oppressed become as evil as the oppressor. Non-cooperation with evil is as much a moral obligation as is cooperation with good’. Galtung (2007) observed that freedom is both a consequence of conflict *and* a condition for its transformation. Hence, oppression and conflict transformation cannot coexist. Adam Curle (1971), a Quaker conciliator who inspired Lederach, posited that non-cooperation and resistance can be strategies for empowering oppressed minorities or disempowered majorities, by seeking constructive and efficient ways to attain justice, human rights, and democracy without recourse to violence. Non-cooperation with oppression, by escalating tensions, can force open space for dialogue in unbalanced power relations. Nonviolent resistance and conflict transformation share the same goal: ‘social change and increased justice through peaceful means’ (Lederach, 1996, p. 15). Francis (2002; 2010) observed that the real requirement for peace is a rejection of militarism and a return to the paradigm of nonviolence, and nonviolent resistance, as a starting point. While the role of civil resistance has been acknowledged by these and other peacebuilders (Dudouet, 2017; Fisher & Zimina, 2009; Kriesberg & Dayton, 2017; Schirch, 2004), peace and conflict researchers are yet to seriously consider it.⁵⁵

Accepting Ghimire’s proposition, as well as Kennedy’s and my own, that infrastructures for peace have the objective of furthering both negative and positive peace through conflict transformation, one can imagine that infrastructures for peace would need to repudiate domination tactics like deception, coercion, and manipulation, also internally. Dissociative roles would be non-cooperation with and non-violently resisting a government, institution, organisation, gang, or person pursuing warfare, oppression, or coercive control, in order to protect those on the receiving end, as well as to preserve the chance of transformation for both the oppressor and the oppressed. Once space for conflict transformation has opened up, associative roles could include facilitating dialogue, consultation, mediation, healing, reconciliation, and collaboration.

A national Infrastructure for Peace would thus need awareness and dexterity in skill in order to be able to effectively respond to changing political and social realities. Including both associative and dissociative strategies in the concept of infrastructures for peace can lift them out of bystander roles, preventing infrastructures for peace from becoming infrastructures for domestication and violence and thus from defeating their own purpose, increasing their legitimacy and integrity. The means of infrastructures for peace become more consistent with their desired end: peace by peaceful means.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ Dudouet recently invited more dialogue between civil resistance and peacebuilding scholars in her *Powering to Peace: Integrated Civil Resistance and Peacebuilding Strategies*, published by the Berghof Foundation.

⁵⁶ Recognizing that there are situations in which violence may well be justified. For the concept of infrastructures for peace, however, violence is a conceptual boundary. When infrastructures for peace partake in violence, they cease to be infrastructures for peace and become something else.

Chapter 2: The empirical puzzle

‘One could say that we have an Infrastructure for Peace, but do we have peace?’

– Participant of roundtable meeting on Infrastructures for Peace, hosted by the National Planning Commission, Government of Nepal, in Kathmandu in August 2012.

Advocates for infrastructures for peace maintain that countries with strong infrastructures for peace will experience less violence and more peace. In the early literature on infrastructures for peace (first phase), Nepal is regularly mentioned as a positive example (Siebert, 2013; van Tongeren, 2011a; 2011b), because until recently it used to be one of the few countries in the world with a ministry for peace; local peace committees to support the peace process in almost every district; and multiple structures mandated to support peace in communities.

Indeed, at initial glance, and compared to other countries, Nepal has not returned to war and does have an elaborate Infrastructure for Peace in place, consisting of both formal and informal infrastructures for peace. Moreover, Nepal’s peace process, following ten years of armed insurgency against the state by Maoist groups, has been hailed as a success by various commentators. Ian Martin, former head of the United Nations Political Mission in Nepal (UNMIN), called the Nepal peace process ‘a success story’ (2008).⁵⁷ Chairperson of the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN), Pushpa Kamal Dahal, declared in 2018 that the peace process of Nepal is the ‘new peace model for the world’.⁵⁸ The United States Institute of Peace asserts that ‘[Nepal’s peace process] is a story not of a breathtaking sprint toward justice and stability, but of how peace can take root slowly, almost imperceptibly’ (Rausch, 2017). Denskus (2009) considers Nepal to be a liberal peace success story in the making.

How is it possible then, that other commentators and studies suggest that few people in Nepal actually experience peace? Accusations of a failure to address root causes of the conflict have come from observers within the media (Brown, S. & Felbab-Brown, 2012), INGOs (Carranza, 2012), and academia (Lundqvist, 2015). Nepal has been described as a ‘no war, no peace’ society (Mahato, 2011).⁵⁹ According to Thapa and Ramsbotham (2017), opinion differs as to whether Nepal is ‘post-conflict’ or if the past ten years of transition represent another phase of struggle, animated by the attempt to radically overhaul a system that has marginalised large sections of society. Galtung’s (2013) assessment of the situation in Nepal in February 2013 was that there is negative, but not positive peace.

Thus, on the one hand, Nepal has been framed as a peacebuilding success story, and on the other hand as a weak, or at least incomplete, peacebuilding case. How can these contrasting perspectives be understood? As noted in the previous chapter, Richmond (2009) and Mac Ginty (2010), among others, have suggested that part of the explanation might be found in the disjuncture between the

⁵⁷ Ian Martin, ‘Nepal: A remarkable peace’. *The Guardian*, 28 August 2008. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2008/aug/28/nepal.humanrights> [accessed 24 February 2020].

⁵⁸ Pushpa Kamal Dahal, ‘Nepal’s peace process a new model for world: CPN Chair Prachanda’. *The Rising Nepal*, 13 September 2018. Available at: <http://www.therisingnepal.org.np/news/25852> [accessed 24 February 2020].

⁵⁹ Rubeena Mahato, 2011. ‘No war, no peace. No surprise that we have all forgotten the fifth anniversary of the Comprehensive Peace Accord this week’. *Nepali Times*, Issue 579, 18–24 November 2011. Available at: <http://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=18717#.XlNe0WgzblV> [accessed 24 February 2020].

top-down perspective of the liberal peacebuilding model and the bottom-up perspective of everyday experiences of life in Nepal. As Lundqvist (2015) points out, dissatisfaction among the Nepalese with the work of peacebuilding and development agencies, as well as with the socio-economic and political conditions of their everyday lives, raises the question whether the liberal peacebuilding approach in Nepal has been the most appropriate. Had the focus of these agencies not mostly been on political peace, including statebuilding, security, and the demands of the political elite, but more on the peace needs of the citizens, including intrapersonal and material, the state of peace in Nepal might have been less contested.

My articles demonstrate how I investigated the puzzle of seemingly contradicting views on peace in Nepal as well as the country's infrastructures for peace, attempting to bring balance to the scholarly discourse that has mostly been concerned with top-down, liberal peacebuilding perspectives and practice. My lead empirical question was: Given the diverging perspectives on the state of peace in the country, what are peacebuilding priorities in Nepal? In Chapter 3, on methodology, I explain how I went about answering this question. This chapter describes the peace and conflict context in, and from which, my research arose.

'One could say that we have an Infrastructure for Peace...'

Positioned between India and the Tibet Autonomous Region of China, Nepal is home to 125 castes and ethnic groups speaking more than 90 languages and adhering to unique cultural, religious, and social customs and practices (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2012). Many communities, who inhabit Nepal's Himalaya mountains, hills, and plains, have developed their own dispute resolution systems. The practice of resolving conflicts through dialogue facilitated by respected people has been part of Nepalese social tradition for centuries. At least 30 unique traditional ways of resolving conflict with third-party support are known (Dahal & Bhatta, 2008; Upreti, 2011). Most of these, what one could consider as 'first tier' conflict mechanisms, pre-date the formal court system and semi-judicial organisations, such as police and local administration, by hundreds of years.

Traditional conflict resolution

The indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms of Nepal have not been systematically documented, and academic literature on them is rare. Upreti (2011, p. 4-5) offers a brief overview,⁶⁰ which I copy here (including original references and with English slightly edited for readability):

Historically, before the unification of Nepal, community organisations to resolve conflict, called *kulari* and *yug*, existed in some parts of Nepal. During the Licchavi period, from the fifth to the ninth century, traditional institutions, such as the *panchali* (a local mediator looking after social issues such as marriage); *birtawal* (local elite person with land entitlement bestowed by the rulers in recognition of services); *lingual* (who settled disputes related to land and irrigation); *mapchowk* (dealing with disputes between men and women); *mukhiya* (village chiefs); *bichari* (local legal administrators); and *pancha-bhaladmi* (a committee of selected village elders), were active in the Kathmandu valley (Sharma, 2004).

⁶⁰ Upreti has documented the local conflict resolution practices in land, water, and forest resources in detail, as part of his PhD research in Dolakha district.

During the time of the Rana regime (1845-1951), *pancha-bhaladmis* (five local elite-members from the community responsible for dealing with local disputes); *dware*, *thari*, *birtawal*, and *mukhiya* (all involving local community chiefs and tax collectors) were active in conflict resolution. In addition, *jhankris*, i.e. mediums and shamans, were also resolving disputes (Upreti, 2004) [fortune-tellers reappear as peace service providers in Chapter 4, article 6].

A local conflict resolution system called *Ghatu* (responsibility assigned to a trusted individual by the community to resolve social disputes) also existed. When local people engaged in a dispute would make a complaint, the *Ghatu* would invite villagers as witnesses to a meeting, interrogate the disputants to find the actual cause of the conflict, seek the opinions of local people, and use 'truth revealing materials' (having spiritual values), which consisted of a water-filled cup, a lit oil-lamp, and flowers. The disputants then would touch the 'truth revealing materials' to prevent themselves from giving false information. The *Ghatu* would then ask the witnesses to touch the 'truth revealing materials', after which he would give a verdict. The disputants often accepted the decision, so that they could maintain their social relations (as all neighbours attending the meeting were asked to abide by the decision). They obeyed him also out of fear of the sin of not abiding by the decision. If one of the disputing parties disagreed with the decision of the *Ghatu* or felt that they were the victim of a poor verdict, he or she was referred to court. This method of dispute settlement existed in modified form until recently.

In the Kaski district of Western Nepal, *Tamudhin* (a gathering of Gurung people, led by the *jimmuwal/mukhiya*), *Magar-samaj*, and *Thakali-samaj* were active in resolving conflict in their communities. Likewise, the *Mukhiya system* (chiefdom) in lower Mustang and the *Raja system* in upper Mustang and Dhapa in Manang district were common arrangements of local conflict resolution at village levels. Similarly, *Majhi*, an indigenous community of fishermen and boatmen residing along the Tamakoshi River, still has a system of electing a leader known as *Mijhar* to take care of the community, settle disputes, and guide young people. All members of the community are supposed to respect his decisions. This is one of the most organized societies in terms of leadership and dispute resolution. *Guthi* (a type of cooperative of the Newar caste-ethnic group) is another powerful community institution resolving local conflicts in Nepal.

A lot of these traditional forms and customs are still used today, alongside the formal justice system. Like many countries that have adopted the Western nation-state model, either as a product of foreign rule or, as in the case of Nepal, to preserve political autonomy (Burghart, 1984), multiple conflict resolution systems thus co-exist.

Not much information is available about the actual day-to-day practices of Nepalese in the use of third-party support for conflict resolution and peacemaking. Most of the few resources documenting the traditional conflict resolution mechanisms suggest that they remain the preferred method of dispute resolution for the majority of Nepalese (Dahal & Bhatta, 2008; Kaplan, 1995; Khadka, 1997; Saferworld, 2016; Upreti, 2011). Authors seek explanations in citizens' familiarity with them, cultural acceptability, and their accessibility, given the extreme geography of the country, poor infrastructure, and high centralization of the government in the capital city of Kathmandu. They offer mixed evidence as to the impact of traditional conflict resolution mechanisms, associating them with restored peace and harmony in communities, but also with partisanship, coercion, non-

adherence to basic human rights standards, and reinforcement of existing power structures (Coyle & Dalrymple, 2011; Dahal & Bhatta, 2008; Kaplan, 1995; Upreti, 2004).

The formal justice system, governance, and economy

The formal justice institutions can be considered the ‘second tier’ of conflict resolution mechanisms in Nepal. Originally founded on Hindu philosophy and religious texts (Pokhrel & Karim, 2017), the legal system features in many Nepal country analyses as supporting the discrimination of large parts of the population based on caste, ethnicity, religion, gender, or regional provenance (Aitken, 2010; International Crisis Group, 2010; von Einsiedel & Salih, 2017).

According to the *Guide to Government in Nepal* published by TAF (2012, p. 66), this system is part of Nepal’s historical legacy: ‘Historically, the government was conceived as a tool for controlling territory and managing citizens rather than serving them’. A shift from loyalty- and repression-based governance, hallmarks of authoritarianism (Hanson, 2013), to democracy-like service provision as envisaged by the people’s movements *Jana Andolan I* of 1996 and *Jana Andolan II* of 2006 (Pyakurel, 2011; Subedi & Bhattarai, 2017), is yet to occur. A ‘mind-set of control’ continues to shape the current system, manifesting for example in the type of incentives for bureaucrats.⁶¹ The Government of Nepal has revoked and amended discriminatory laws; and improved the availability and quality of its legal services. Yet issues of capacity, accountability, affordability, transparency, independence, and accessibility, especially for remote and marginalised communities, remain (Saferworld, 2016).

In much of the political and peacebuilding literature on Nepal, structural violence – the systematic constraint on human potential due to political and economic exploitative structures (Galtung, 1969; 1996) – is believed to be built into the design of Nepalese society. The Hindu caste system justifies the centralization of power in the hands of high caste men at the expense of meaningful participation in decision-making by women, younger generations, and lower caste groups (Keane, 2007; World Bank, 2006b).

Nepal continues to be one of the least-developed countries with 28.6% of Nepal’s population being ‘multidimensionally poor’, the strongest indicators of which are lack of nutrition and education (Government of Nepal, 2018, p. viii). According to a review by von Einsiedel and Salih (2017), two of the most important structural causes of violent conflict in Nepal are endemic poverty and group inequality, both of which show a strong association with the outbreak of civil war in cross-country studies. With a per capita GDP of around USD 200 in the early 1990s, statistically, Nepal faced a civil war risk almost twice as high than a country with a per capita GDP of USD 2,000.⁶² In 1996, the year armed conflict started, 42% of the population lived under the national poverty line (World Bank, 2006a). International aid accounts for the majority of the national development budget, whereby Nepal is dependent on aid (loans and grants) for basic service delivery and social and economic infrastructure development (International Alert, 2006). Despite having received foreign aid for more than 60 years from governments, multilaterals, and INGOs, amounting to USD 11 billion between

⁶¹ TAF (2012, p. 66): ‘One [ingrained trait of control] is the *jagir* mentality, where bureaucrats historically received land grants for helping rulers control the people, not for serving them’.

⁶² For Nepal’s historical GDP per capita figures, refer to: http://www.indexmundi.com/nepal/gdp_per_capita_%28ppp%29.html [accessed 24 February 2020]. For more information about the civil war risk associated with certain GDP per capita levels, see Humphreys and Varshney (2004). *Violent Conflict and the Millennium Development Goals: Diagnosis and Recommendations*, CGSD Working Paper No. 19, August 2004, p. 9.

1980 and 2008,⁶³ progress in Nepal's development is still found wanting (Karkee & Comfort, 2016). The April 2015 Gorkha earthquake and the economic blockade of the border with India from November 2015 to February 2016, the time of the constitution-writing process, have since further strained Nepal's economy (Qayyum, 2016).

Nepal transitioned from absolute Hindu monarchy to multiparty democracy in 1990, a result achieved by *Jana Andolan I* (Parajulee, 2000). With democracy, the country also ushered in political instability: Between 1996 and 2016 there have been 22 governments.⁶⁴ The high government turnover has been linked to the absence of economic development and the inefficient use of domestic revenues (Pradhan, G., 2009). These social, economic, and political conditions often figure in analyses of the Maoist insurgency of 1996–2006 (Kievelitz & Polzer, 2002; The Carter Center, 2014; von Einsiedel & Salih, 2017).

The Maoist insurgency

In 1996, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist, CPN-M) declared an armed rebellion against the government. The leaders framed their 'People's War' against the state in terms of inequality and class resentment and with the explicit purpose of redistributing power and establishing a new democratic socio-economic system and state (Bhattarai, B. R., 1998). Over the next decade, the insurgency expanded across the country, attacking police posts and other government bases. More than 13,000 people were killed, 1,300 went missing, and thousands of others were displaced (OHCHR, 2012). The economic cost of this conflict, in terms of lost output, has been estimated at about 3% of Nepal's GDP of 2009 (Pradhan, G., 2009).⁶⁵ In February 2005, citing the elected government's inability to end the insurgency, the king seized absolute power in a coup supported by the army. This created a tripartite conflict between the 'democratic' political parties, the Maoists, and the military-backed monarchy (International Crisis Group, 2005). Just over a year later, a second mass uprising known as the *Jana Andolan II*, led by a joint alliance of the democratic parties and the Maoists, forced the king to relinquish direct rule (Human Rights Watch, 2007). The event marked the beginning of a peace process among the mainstream parties and the Maoists. A ceasefire agreement was signed in May 2006 and a Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) signed in November that same year (The Carter Center, 2014).

Why the Maoists declared war against a democratic government during a time when Nepalese citizens enjoyed unprecedented economic and political freedom, remains topic of discussion (Davis, P. K., Larson, Haldeman, Oguz & Rana, 2012). Most of the analyses of the Maoist insurgency use the 'inequality' and 'grievance' hypotheses to explain the rise and success of the movement (Basnett, 2009; Kievelitz & Polzer, 2002; The Carter Center, 2014; von Einsiedel & Salih, 2017). Others adopt social movement theory, positing that the Maoists' ideological construction of 'oppressor (state) versus oppressed (people)' successfully drew people's sympathy and support, and that the CPN-M was effective in terms of leadership, resource mobilization, opportunity-taking, and strategic decision-making (Davis, P. K. et al., 2012).

⁶³ According to the Nepal Peace and Development Strategy 2010-2015, published by Nepal's international development partners in January 2011, Nepal received USD 11 billion in international development aid between 1980 and 2008.

⁶⁴ Manish Jha (2016). '22 governments in 26 years'. *Nepali Times*, 29 July–4 August 2016, #819. Available at: <https://archive.nepalitimes.com/regular-columns/Economic-Class/22-%20governments-in-26-years,757> [accessed 25 February 2020].

⁶⁵ According to World Bank country figures, Nepal's GDP in 2009 was USD 12.85 billion. In addition to these direct costs, Pradhan argues that lost tourism revenue, disruptions in trade and commerce, and a significant toll on children represent some of the significant indirect costs of the conflict.

During the insurgency, especially in rural districts of Nepal like Lamjung and Kaski (US embassy, 2006), both formal and informal conflict resolution mechanisms, including the police, courts, community and religious elders, and leaders linked to traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, were replaced by the Maoist 'People's Courts' or the Royal Nepal Army. According to Aitken (2010), both these groups more or less actively sought to be the de facto providers of security and justice.

Semi-formal justice mechanisms

The notions of conflict transformation and peacebuilding allegedly entered the mainstream development discourse in Nepal around 2000–2001, while Maoist groups were still fighting the government and the country was opening up to foreigners (Bhattarai, P., 2013). In his analysis, criticizing the peacebuilding initiatives in Nepal for politicization and not benefiting the people who need support the most, Bhattarai argues that the donor/NGO-initiated peacebuilding programmes are mainly comprised of educational, advocacy, and campaigning activities conducted via trainings, workshops, and socio-political dialogues, and focusing on community mediation, empowerment of youth, women, ethnic groups, and victims of conflict. A limited number of activities provide immediate social and economic support for communities and individuals.

Following the signing of the CPA in 2006, donors increasingly started to fund informal justice mechanisms.⁶⁶ In particular, they supported new, non-governmental conflict resolution mechanisms, primarily paralegal and community mediation committees, thus adding a 'third tier' of conflict resolution to the increasingly complex matrix of formal and informal justice mechanisms. In the early days, donors, including TAF⁶⁷ and the Department for International Development (DFID) of the United Kingdom,⁶⁸ stated that they were motivated by a perceived security and justice vacuum at the local level following the dissolution of the Maoist governance structures and withdrawal of the Royal Nepalese Army, an argument that has been challenged (Aitken, 2010).

Even though these new mechanisms have received criticism, most of the evidence, especially on community mediation, seems to suggest that many have constructively transformed relationships in communities including asymmetric ones (Aitken, 2010; Coyle & Dalrymple, 2011; Lederach & Thapa, 2012). With the Local Governance and Community Development Programme II implemented by the Ministry of Federal Affairs and General Administration from mid-2013 onwards, the government aimed to roll out community mediation all over the nation.⁶⁹ However, the expansion of these mechanisms appears to come at a cost. According to Upreti (2011), one of the consequences of the introduction of these semi-formal mechanisms, coupled with the expanding reach and formalization of the courts, police, and administrators, has been the marginalisation of the informal traditional conflict management practices across the country.

⁶⁶ Including the community mediation programme supported by John Paul Lederach, funded by TAF, and implemented by local partners including my partner organisation Pro Public.

⁶⁷ The Asia Foundation (2014, p. 1): 'Mediation is able to fill this void in judicial assistance by providing immediate, affordable, and locally accessible dispute resolution services'. *Community Mediation in Nepal*. Available at: <https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/CommunityMediationinNepal.pdf> [accessed 25 February 2020].

⁶⁸ House of Commons International Development Committee (2010, p. 22): 'In a post-conflict state such as Nepal it is highly likely that formal delivery mechanisms, including local government systems, will have broken down'. *DFID's Programme in Nepal: Sixth Report of Session 2009-2010*, Vol. 1. Available at: <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmintdev/168/168i.pdf> [accessed 25 February 2020].

⁶⁹ See the website of the Local Governance and Community Development Programme – II of the Ministry of Federal Affairs and General Administration: <http://lgcdp.gov.np/program-components> [accessed 25 February 2020].

Government-led peace process support structures

A 'fourth tier' of conflict resolution mechanisms to support political peacemaking was added to this picture when 'a loose amalgam of support structures fell into place' (Whitfield, 2008, p. 26), during the peace negotiations between the Maoists and the government in the run up to the signing of the peace agreement in 2006.

In August 2004, the government formed the High Level Peace Committee and the Peace Secretariat (Government of Nepal, 2007). The primary purpose of the secretariat was to buttress the peace process, serving as the main coordinating body for the initiation and management of the peace talks, both formal and informal.⁷⁰ When the peace agreement was signed, the secretariat became the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction (MoPR) (Sapkota, 2017).

Describing Nepal's architecture of peace from the point of view of government, Sapkota (2017, p. 25) writes:

'The NTTPI [Nepal Transition to Peace Initiative] was established in 2005 at a time when there was no other initiative in place to support a dialogue process that could bridge official and non-official representation, i.e. at the 'Track 1.5' level, connecting Track 1 and Track 2 [...] The NTTPI was most active from late 2005 to 2013. Although not all the agreements reached with the help of the NTTPI were implemented, when dialogue was struggling the NTTPI often brought actors together to try to re-open channels of communication, restore trust and create an environment for formal talks'.

The CPA promised the end of violence and set out priority areas for social, economic, and political development. It also envisioned the establishment of multiple peace process support structures, some of which, like the National Peace and Rehabilitation Commission, an inclusive national body meant to oversee the implementation of the CPA, never saw daylight (Government of Nepal, 2006). Instead, the MoPR was mandated to manage the peace process, including peace negotiations and agreements, peace mechanisms (e.g. national commissions and local committees), support to conflict-affected people (including the internally displaced), reconciliation, and social and physical reconstruction (Tandukar et al., 2016).

To support the MoPR, the government and seven donors established the Nepal Peace Trust Fund (NPTF) in January 2008. According to Sapkota (2017, p. 25):

'The NPTF was a multi-donor funding mechanism to support reconstruction and peace promotion activities. It was managed by the MoPR with participation from other relevant government ministries and donors. The presence of the international community gave it legitimacy and it was highly successful in mobilising the required funds. Its operational modality, however, could have been more transparent and the funding priorities more inclusive, and because ultimate executive authority remained with the MoPR, the NPTF was in practice a partisan body and neither parliament nor civil society have had any oversight role over it'.

The local peace committees (LPC), set up by the MoPR in practically all districts of Nepal, were tasked with assisting in the implementation of the CPA and promoting the peace process until the promulgation of the new constitution (see Chapter 4, article 2). Their terms of reference stipulated

⁷⁰ Annapurna Post (2005). *Peace Secretariat*. Issue 255 (08 July 2005 - 14 July 2005). Available at: <http://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=561#.XISne2gzblV> [accessed 25 February 2020].

their responsibilities to monitor the implementation of the MoPR's Relief and Reconstruction Programme; to support data collection on conflict-affected individuals, families, and structures; to facilitate constructive conflict transformation processes in situations of political and social conflict; to work on reconciliation, healing and trust-building; to monitor political and social developments at the local level, and to disseminate information on issues that affect local peace processes (Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction, 2009). Sapkota writes (2017, p. 24):

'LPCs were envisaged as inclusive local authorities to manage post-conflict issues and promote peace, providing a strong, locally-led institution to implement the CPA. Because the National Peace and Rehabilitation Commission was never formed, the LPCs ended up effectively being district branches of the MoPR despite their stated role as autonomous peacebuilding mechanisms. Some LPCs worked well while others did not. In districts where there was effective leadership and an understanding of its role and mandate, the respective LPC became an impartial moral authority, trusted by district heads to resolve contentious issues; where the LPCs were overtly partisan, they failed to work'.

The MoPR and the LPCs were dissolved by the government in July 2018. At that time, the LPCs were assisting the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the Commission of Investigation on Enforced Disappeared Persons (CIEDP) in information gathering and collection of cases.

The CPA referenced the TRC and CIEDP as two transitional justice mechanisms. Set up in 2015, they were tasked with investigating and addressing war-time related human rights violations. Their mandate explicitly mentions reconciliation as an objective (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Nepal, 2018).⁷¹ Both commissions however struggled to do their work against shifting political alliances and poor funding, even as they received over 60,000 cases (Thapa, T., 2018). According to the 2016 Country Report on Human Rights Practices in Nepal published by the United States government, the victims' groups and monitoring organisations criticized the commissions for a lack of outreach, failure to explain how they planned to use information provided by victims, and not recognizing the difficulty many victims faced in traveling to district headquarters to register complaints (United States Department of State, 2017). Other factors that have contributed to a lack of victim trust in the transitional justice process include accusations that the commissions have been unsuccessful in protecting victim confidentiality, reports of occasional interference and intimidation by security forces, a lack of gender-sensitive procedures, and continued politicization by political parties (Naughton, 2018). As of now, conflict victims seem to have chosen to adopt a strategy of critical engagement to work with the commissions. Despite the flaws of the commissions, according to Bandhari (2017), conflict victims see them as the best opportunity to address conflict-era injustices. As part of our collaboration on infrastructures for peace in Nepal, Pro Public and I trained members of the transitional justice commissions in restorative dialogue, in an attempt to address the concern voiced by victims that the transitional justice process would just be an opportunity to whitewash political actors and key party figures implicated with human rights abuses, rather than producing justice and genuine reconciliation.⁷²

⁷¹ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Nepal (2018) website: 'To create environment conducive for sustainable peace and reconciliation by enhancing spirit of mutual good faith and tolerance in the society upon bringing about reconciliation'.

⁷² The movie *Raamro Aakha Ma (In the Eyes of the Good)* documents part of that work. It is available on the YouTube channel of ZFD/GIZ: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RqA2OydkXgg>.

Peace process support by donors

Besides being part of, and cooperating with, these government-led structures, donors sought to strengthen the peace process in other ways, with jointly coordinated initiatives and community-based programmes. In 2011, on behalf of Nepal's development partners, the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator presented the Nepal Peace and Development Strategy 2010–2015, a coordinated peacebuilding and development framework identifying ways in which Nepal's development partners (chiefly the bilateral agencies) could work together with the government to support the implementation of the CPA. The strategy marked a feat of coordination between international agencies in Nepal. It aimed to improve impact and synergy, highlight priorities, and avoid duplication of efforts, gaps, and missed opportunities to support peacebuilding in the aftermath of the insurgency (Nepal's international development partners, 2011). The sense of unison it represented, however, did not materialize in practice. Lack of buy-in from the government, which had remained mostly outside of the consultation process that led up to the strategy, and weak operationalization of joint analyses and strategies have been mentioned as reasons (Pandey, 2011).

One of the peace process support programmes by donors, relevant for the research in this dissertation, was GIZ's Program Support of Measures to Strengthen the Peace Process (STPP/GIZ), funded by the German government. STPP/GIZ worked for years on improving living conditions in cantonments where about 19,600 Maoist ex-combatants were interned, making available basic services such as drinking water, sanitation facilities, accommodation, medical care, and vocational training. Monitored by UNMIN, these ex-combatants waited for political agreement to be reached on the terms of their release. Almost six years after the signing of the CPA, in early 2012, the government offered the ex-combatants three options: integration into the national army, rehabilitation, or voluntary retirement. Most of the ex-combatants (15,630) set out for the villages after receiving a golden handshake (Bhandari, 2017). In 2012 and 2013, I led the Pro Public team in the first of four baseline studies for STPP/GIZ assessing the challenges and opportunities faced by the ex-combatants and the communities in which they chose to settle. Part of these data is presented in Chapter 4, article 3. Based on the findings, we developed programme recommendations for the social and economic integration of ex-combatants for STPP/GIZ. Consequently, STPP/GIZ requested us to implement one recommendation – the establishment of dialogue facilitator pools – comprised both of ex-combatants and community members in order to pre-empt violence, resolve conflict, and increase social cohesion. Initially this work encompassed four districts that were absorbing substantial numbers of ex-combatants. In 2013, NPTF decided to enable the expansion of this work to six more districts. In 2014, USAID funded work in three more districts, bringing the total number of project communities to 16. Evaluations of this work have generally been positive (Gutsche, 2014;⁷³ Pro Public, 2017; Schreiner & Schraewer, 2017).

Developments in recent years

Following the Gorkha earthquake in spring 2015, political leaders promulgated a new constitution, creating a geography-based federal state. The constitution was critically received, notably by the United Democratic Madheshi Front, who enforced a months-long economic border blockade with the tacit support of India (International Crisis Group, 2016). In July 2016, I left Nepal. The Peace Accord Matrix, a tool to assess the implementation of peace agreements around the world hosted

⁷³ Gutsche, H. (2014). Reference letter for Pro Public. Kathmandu, Nepal.

by the University of Notre Dame,⁷⁴ suggests that at that time 72% of the Nepal CPA had been implemented.⁷⁵

Recent developments include the formation of governments at the federal, provincial, and local levels in early 2018 following the first local elections in twenty years. Political parties are still struggling to amend the constitutional provisions that remain contentious among the disgruntled parties and ethnic groups.⁷⁶ The inclusion of women and minorities continues to figure in the national consciousness as the transitional justice process – and reckoning with the past – is yet to come (Adhikari, 2016). Nevertheless, the government has declared the peace process ‘completed’ and requested the United Nations’ political office to wind up.⁷⁷ The MoPR and LPCs, two high profile infrastructures for peace in Nepal, were dissolved.⁷⁸

In January 2019, nine foreign embassies in Nepal and the UN issued a joint statement calling for meaningful consultations with victims and a process that would put victims’ interests first and uphold international law standards.⁷⁹ In February 2019, the government let the tenure of the Commission of Investigation on Enforced Disappeared Persons and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission expire. As noted by Human Rights Watch (2019), the government then rushed through a process to appoint new members, allowing only one week for nominations and one day for consultations with victims’ groups. In the article, Human Rights Watch South Asia director Meenakshi Ganguly remarks, ‘For 12 years and counting, Nepal’s rulers have tried to railroad conflict victims into accepting a transitional justice process designed largely to protect those responsible for abuse’. These events may be a harbinger of more challenging times ahead.

‘...but do we have peace?’

Over the course of 2011 and 2012, the director of Pro Public, Prakash Mani Sharma, and I discussed the concept of infrastructures for peace with various government representatives, donors, and NGOs involved with peacebuilding in Nepal and the broader Asia-Pacific region, as well as with citizens in different districts.⁸⁰ Responding to the elicited interest, the National Planning Commission (NPC) hosted a roundtable meeting on the topic in Kathmandu in August of 2012. During this

⁷⁴ Available at the website of the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame: <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/comprehensive-peace-agreement> [accessed 25 February 2020].

⁷⁵ Internationally, the incomplete implementation of intrastate peace agreements seems to be the rule rather than the exception. See for instance: Miek Boltjes (ed., 2007) *Implementing Negotiated Agreements. The Real Challenge to Intrastate Peace*. T.M.C. Asser Press.

⁷⁶ Pradhan (2018) ‘Amendments on back burner as country marks constitution day’. *The Kathmandu Post*, 19 September 2018. Available at: <https://kathmandupost.com/valley/2018/09/19/amendments-on-back-burner-as-country-marks-constitution-day> [accessed 25 February 2020].

⁷⁷ Giri (2018) ‘Peace process ‘complete’, govt asks UNDP for a drawdown’. *The Kathmandu Post*, 13 June 2018. Available at: <https://kathmandupost.com/national/2018/06/13/peace-process-complete-govt-asks-undpa-for-a-drawdown> [accessed 25 February 2020].

⁷⁸ From the perspective of strengthening Nepal’s Infrastructure for Peace, the dissolution of especially the MoPR seems to be a missed opportunity. While originally set up to support the peace process, the ministry, as suggested in article 2 (Chapter 4), could have transformed into an enabler and steward of the peace sector. The ministry did not function optimally, but no other government body has the required mandate and powers, while the need for peace services in Nepal remains and other infrastructures for peace – which could benefit from government support and coordination – within the sector continue to exist.

⁷⁹ *Transitional Justice: Statement by the International Community*. Nepal, 24/01/2019 - 07:01, UNIQUE ID: 190124_3: https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/nepal/57038/transitional-justice-statement-international-community_en [accessed 25 February 2020].

⁸⁰ Including in pilot studies in Dhanusha, Sarlahi, and Kathmandu; and the Asia-Pacific Mediation Leadership conference in Bangkok in December 2011.

meeting, I presented our ideas for Nepal to the government and the donor community.⁸¹ One of the Nepalese participants asked, 'One could say that we have an Infrastructure for Peace, but do we have peace?' The general sense in the room seemed to echo those commentators who opine that there is peace for some people in Nepal, but not for others.

As aforementioned, dialogues on peacebuilding are complicated by differing understandings among participants of the meaning of peace, and which efforts contribute to it. In my exchanges with government and donors in Nepal, some voiced the view that any development work, for example vocational training, can be considered as peacebuilding. Others stated that peacebuilding is only that which delivers direct support to the implementation of the peace agreement. Again others focused on violence prevention and reduction ('negative peace'), whereas especially the peacebuilding practitioners were inspired by Galtung's positive peace, focusing on social cohesion, nonviolent conflict resolution, and the restoration of community relationships. In an infrastructures for peace pilot study in the districts of Dhanusha and Sarlahi in 2014 (not included in my articles), I asked community mediators what organisations and structures in their villages they believe contribute to peace. Out of the 320 people, 222 (69%) gave development-related responses, mentioning community and women's development programmes, schools/colleges, industrial and agricultural development, employment opportunities, and the fulfilment of basic needs. The other 30% or so responded community mediation, local peace committees, community police office, mother groups, and the full implementation of the CPA.⁸²

Following the inclusion of infrastructures for peace as a development priority in Nepal's 13th Periodic Plan (2013–2016) in July 2013, the NPC directed the concerned ministries to develop policies and plan accordingly. We subsequently provided a presentation on infrastructures for peace for over 50 officials in the ministry on 20 August 2013, at the request of the MoPR. The joint-secretaries, presiding over the meeting, expressed the wish for follow-up discussions on how the concept can be integrated in the policies and plans of the government.

The Nepal government, multi- and bilateral partners, and (I)NGOs were committed to making infrastructures for peace and peace services available. However, in the current context, there was no agreement on what peace actually is and where in Nepal there was a need for peace. Little was known about which formal and informal infrastructures for peace were actually in use and why, and how effective they were.⁸³ As a result, decision-makers missed necessary information on which to base decisions concerning investments in infrastructures for peace. To provide for this, we surveyed citizens across the country.⁸⁴

⁸¹ Participants to the meeting included representatives of MoPR, NPC, Nepal Peace Trust Fund, UNDP, German, Swiss, Danish, Finnish, and Norwegian embassies, European Union mission, GIZ, DFID, Danida, JICA, USAID, Koica, ADB, and Pro Public.

⁸² Infrastructure for Peace (I4P) Questionnaire and Tabulation of Results. Pro Public, December 2014.

⁸³ The participants to the Infrastructures for Peace meeting in the NPC agreed on the existence of a peacebuilding data gap in Nepal: 'There is the need for an assessment of what exists in terms of infrastructures for peace in order to determine what is missing. In this regard, it needs to be considered how different initiatives and structures coordinate and add up. An analysis of root causes of conflict should be treated more prominently as it is often unclear whether peacebuilding structures actually adequately address them' (minutes, 28 August 2012).

⁸⁴ In the foreword of our resulting 2016 research report (of which Chapter 4, article 4 contains sections), Yuba Raj Bhusal, former member secretary of the NPC, wrote: 'We in the NPC readily agreed with their proposal [to strengthen Nepal's Infrastructure for Peace] since we already have some infrastructures for peace, such as the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction, the Local Peace Committees, and Community Mediation Committees, in place. In spite of these institutional infrastructures, however, we still suffer from conflict and violence. Violence and conflict consequently hamper the entire socio-economic development efforts. The NPC therefore decided to make Infrastructure for Peace a national priority by including a programme to strengthen it in Nepal's 13th Plan (2013-2016). We invited Pro

The articles in this dissertation either explore a specific aspect of infrastructures for peace or develop my overarching approach to it. In addition to being topical contributions in themselves, articles 1-3 can be regarded as exploratory and preparatory steps towards the research presented in articles 4-6 (Chapter 4). These first studies laid the foundation for the 'peace needs–peace services' approach adopted for the broad-based population study in Nepal. The next chapter provides background to the methodologies used, after which the articles will be presented.

Chapter 3: Methodology

This chapter explains the methodological underpinnings of my research, including the theoretical assumptions, design, and methods. The various methods used are described in the articles that make up the main body of this dissertation, thus most will not be repeated here. Instead, I will explain the overall research design, highlighting the peace needs–peace services approach and corresponding methodology I developed, since article word count restrictions only allowed concise descriptions. Adopting the embedded case study design, I have taken a pragmatic approach to the research questions, which I will explain below.

Theoretical presuppositions, research design, and methods

My research drew on concepts and techniques from multiple disciplines. Originally trained as a psychologist, I have also investigated discourse analysis as a method of studying conflict⁸⁵ and spent 15 years working as a peace and conflict researcher-practitioner in different countries. I am not only concerned with topics of a psychological nature (behaviour, emotional and cognitive processes, trauma, conflict resolution, healing, reconciliation), but also of a social, political, and economic kind (social cohesion, legitimacy, human security, poverty, Nepal's peace process, and power). My ontological and epistemological assumptions were pragmatist, and I adopted a mixed methods approach to generating data. This means that my dissertation combines both a positivist paradigm with a more realist ontology and an empiricist epistemology, and a postmodernist constructivist paradigm with a less realist ontology and a constructivist, critical, epistemology.⁸⁶

The pragmatic research approach refers to studies that adopt different paradigms in accordance with the varying nature of the questions (Teddle & Tashakkori, 2009). Creswell (2014, p. 124 and p. 35-36) describes the ontology for pragmatism as 'singular and multiple realities', e.g. researchers combine methods, which 'contributes to seeing the problem from multiple angles and perspectives'. Epistemology, in his view, is 'practicality', e.g. researchers collect data by 'what works' to address the research question. The assumption that collecting diverse types of data provides the best and most comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon under investigation, rather than either quantitative or qualitative data alone, undergirds the inquiry (Teddle & Tashakkori, 2009).

Methodological pluralism seems to be a scientific trend that, according to Creswell and Plano Clark (2011), started in the late 1980s as a response to the increasing complexity of research problems and evidence finding. This appears to be in line with De Coning (2018), who, when particularly looking at international peacebuilding, observes a pragmatic turn away from the determined-design neo-liberal approach and towards new and alternative peacebuilding approaches. From a methodological perspective, this dissertation can be considered part of the on-going pragmatic peacebuilding trend.

⁸⁵ Suurmond, J.M. (2005). *Our Talk and Walk: Discourse Analysis and Conflict Studies*. Conflict Research Unit, working paper 35. The Hague: Clingendael Institute. Available at: https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/20051000_cru_working_paper_35.pdf [accessed 26 February 2020].

⁸⁶ The hotly debated incompatibility thesis postulates that the positivist epistemological framework that undergirds quantitative studies is incompatible with the interpretative paradigm that supports qualitative studies (e.g. Teddle & Tashakkori, 2009). This dissertation occupies multiple positions on the research paradigm continuum, which has positivism/postpositivism at one end and constructivism at the other end, and therefore does not concur with the thesis of incompatibility.

In order to study Nepal's peace system in depth, I adhered to the embedded case study design. This is an empirical form of inquiry appropriate for descriptive studies, where the goal is to describe the features, context, and process of a phenomenon. An embedded, as opposed to a holistic, case study, is a case study containing more than one sub-unit of analysis (Yin, 2009). Units of analysis in this research included institutions, community members, ex-combatants, districts, regions, religions, castes, classes, and interactions.

My research project commenced with two conceptual, qualitative studies relying on secondary sources. These were followed by two empirical studies, both containing quantitative and qualitative survey questions. Figure 2 illustrates that my design was partially sequential and partially concurrent, including both explanatory and exploratory phases, and can thus be considered *complex* (Schoonenboom & Johnson, 2017).

Figure 2 Complex methodological design of the study

In the notation of Morse (1991), concurrence is symbolized by a '+' between components (e.g. QUAN + qual). Sequentiality is symbolized with a '→' (QUAL → quan). The capital letters indicate that a component is primary, whereas the lower case letters suggest that a component is secondary or supplemental (Schoonenboom & Johnson, 2017). A complex design allows for the development of an instrument such as a survey (Creswell, 2014), identification of variables, and explanation of relationships between variables.

As can be seen in the above figure, my design starts out with an exploratory first phase in which the qualitative findings of conceptual research, analysing secondary materials on the topic of community mediation, infrastructures for peace, and peacebuilding in Nepal, inform the second phase. The second phase consists of a survey among ex-combatants and semi-structured interviews with communities both containing quantitative and qualitative components, in order to investigate linkages between inner and outer peace indicators and explore the operationalization of the concept of peace. These findings in turn inform and guide the methodological design of the third phase, which again involves a quantitative and qualitative study that operationalizes infrastructures for peace, peace services, peace needs, and explores and explains these concepts. Finally, the last phase (not pictured), is the synthesizing phase. This phase analyses the findings from all phases in their totality, the synthesis of which is presented in Chapter 5.

Drawbacks of the mixed method approach, as mentioned by Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004), include the difficulty for one researcher to carry out both qualitative and quantitative research, especially in a concurrent research design; the probability of needing a research team; the skills challenge for the researcher, who has to become versed in different methods and approaches; and the likelihood that the study is more expensive and time consuming. To become a mixed method researcher, I indeed went through a steep learning curve. The Pro Public management and staff,

notably article co-authors Prakash Mani Sharma (chair) and Babu Ram Poudel (executive director), offered knowledge and experience in regard to conflict resolution in Nepal, as well as essential operational support. While formulation and baseline studies as well as programme evaluations were among my responsibilities as peacebuilding advisor, advanced statistics were not. For these components of my research, I teamed up with article co-author and SCORE Index developer, Alexandros Lordos (PhD clinical psychology and Seed's head of learning and innovation), who taught me advanced statistical methods and helped with data analysis (Chapter 4, articles 4 and 6); and article co-author Maya Böhm (PhD clinical psychology), a ZFD/GIZ colleague who contributed to data analysis and writing (Chapter 4, articles 3 and 5). The entire research process spanned five years, equalling the length of my stay in Nepal.

Operationalization and techniques

The idea of collecting, and reflecting on, my work experiences in the form of a dissertation emerged in the course of my work in Nepal. Case-selection was therefore self-evident. Using Nepal as a case study, the two overarching research questions this dissertation explores, as mentioned in the introduction, are:

- I. How can peace systems be understood through the concept of infrastructures for peace?
- II. Given the diverging perspectives on the state of peace in the country, what are peacebuilding priorities in Nepal?

The above questions can be answered through the findings relating to six sub-questions that guided my research endeavours. On the basis of these sub-questions, I will now explain the methodologies used.

1. Can community mediation committees in Nepal be considered as infrastructures for peace? (Article 1)
2. What exactly are infrastructures for peace and what is their goal? How does Nepal's Infrastructure for Peace look like? Do Nepal's infrastructures for peace contribute to peace? (Article 2)

These first two studies were exploratory and based on qualitative secondary research. The intention of these articles was to serve both as the theoretical foundation for my empirical studies and the basis from which the project could develop. I commenced these studies in the first year of my stay in Nepal, during which I acquainted myself with the local peacebuilding landscape. Theoretically, the first study was motivated by the claim that the concept of infrastructures for peace had emerged from bottom-up peacebuilding, reconciliation, and conflict transformation (Kovács, 2018; Lederach, 1997). Later interpretations had an institutionalist flavour (Hopp-Nishanka, 2013; UNDP, 2013), that I sought to balance.

At the time of study, community mediation in Nepal did not have structural state involvement and was, for this reason, a new type of case in the literature. Although the then-available definitions of infrastructures for peace did not explicitly conceive of government involvement as a defining criterion, the available case studies seemed to imply it was. I analysed documents, notably institutional reports and outcome evaluations of various community mediation programmes funded by different donors. As part of my job, I also engaged in discussions on access to justice in Nepal,

which community mediation was meant to increase, and the related challenges and opportunities with these donors. Because Pro Public ran a community mediation programme in multiple districts, I had the opportunity to train numerous community mediators in mediation, to speak with them as well as to disputants who had used their services, and lead an internal evaluation of the programme. These experiences facilitated the analysis and interpretation of the secondary data to assess community mediation in Nepal, and explore community mediation as an infrastructure for peace. Article 1 demonstrates the potential of non-governmental infrastructures for peace in supporting peace and underlines the continuing conceptual uncertainty.

In the process of researching community mediation, the results of which suggested that it is a successful example of a 'hybrid' (international-local) infrastructure for peace, I encountered numerous other conflict resolution mechanisms that seemed to qualify as infrastructures for peace (some of which are described in Chapter 2). In donor discussions on how to best support Nepal's peace process and in trying to understand Nepal's wider peace system, I felt constrained by the lack of availability and scarcity of robust peace and conflict data. My own conceptual approach to infrastructures for peace had started to emerge from my research and reflections on the academic debate, a process described by the grounded theory approach (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The grounded theory approach states that the exact nature of the problem may be unknown at the start of a research project. Problem formulation can therefore become one of the outcomes of a study, as the problem becomes evident from the collected evidence and data. Article 2 presents a first version of my 'theory': the 'peace needs– peace services approach'.

Article 2 was my first attempt to map Nepal's Infrastructure for Peace. My approach advocates for a functional perspective – the aim of peacebuilding is to actually increase peace. The article was also a response to the need for conceptual clarity regarding infrastructures for peace and the call for more research (van Tongeren, 2011). Aiming to contribute to both, it proposes a systems approach to infrastructures for peace, drawing a more comprehensive picture of Nepal's Infrastructure for Peace and exploring stakeholder roles and infrastructures for peace at different stages of conflict.

Having concentrated so far on the provider side, meaning those who make available and establish infrastructures for peace and peace services, article 3 was my first attempt to understand the receiver- or user-side by way of investigating people's experience of peace. Specifically, this study focused on the relation between indicators of inner and outer peace among Maoist ex-combatants, using quantitative and qualitative survey questions.

3. Is there a relation between inner and outer peacefulness? (Article 3)

Article 3 presents an empirical study on the psychosocial conditions faced by ex-combatants from the Maoist People's Liberation Army and host community stakeholders in Nepal in 2012 and 2013, and specifically investigates the relation between post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in ex-combatants and their readiness to reconcile and integrate into community life.

In early 2012, following political agreement on the terms of their release, ex-combatants began to leave the cantonments they had been stationed in since the signing of the peace agreement in 2006. This event marked their separation from the command structure of the Maoist People's Liberation Army and resulted in that army's dissolution. At the request of STPP/GIZ, I designed and, together with Pro Public staff, conducted a broad baseline study encompassing focus group discussions, key informant interviews, and a survey to assess different characteristics of the host communities and

the groups of ex-combatants who chose to settle in those communities, to develop peacebuilding and development programme recommendations. In addition to testing the ex-combatants for PTSD using an adapted version of the scale developed by Breslau, Peterson, Kessler and Schultz (1999) and readiness to reconcile (Stammel, Neuner, Böttche & Knaevelsrud, 2012), the study examined ex-combatants' factional ties, and identified their specific needs as well as those of the host communities in terms of livelihood, education, health, and security. The perceptions, capacities, and concerns of the ex-combatants and the host communities; the challenges relating to peace; and local conflict transformation capacities and infrastructures for peace, were also researched.

The mixed methods study included quantitative and qualitative data generated through a study among 223 ex-combatants, most of whom were known to STPP/GIZ, and 213 host community stakeholders conducted between November 2012 and January 2013 in the districts of Dang, Makwanpur, Rupandehi, and Surkhet and in August 2013 in the districts of Bardiya, Banke, Kapilvastu, and Rupandehi. Article 3 contains a selection of the results. The study consisted of a questionnaire, which ex-combatants completed during group meetings, and interviews with members of the communities in which the ex-combatants had chosen to settle. All ex-combatants residing in each research community participated (total population sampling). Community members were selected using a purposive sampling procedure by the Pro Public research team in cooperation with field research teams, STPP/GIZ field staff, and the secretaries of the Village Development Committees (VDCs) and Community Development Committees. For the surveying process, Pro Public and I recruited twenty researchers, ensuring relative political neutrality and gender balance in each research team. All researchers underwent a two-day research training provided by us.

Various challenges were encountered in the course of the research. To locate the ex-combatants, for instance, we used STPP's database containing contact details of those ex-combatants who had participated in STPP/GIZ programmes in the cantonments. Some of that information was however out-dated. In order to trace these individuals, the research teams were instructed to contact the relevant authorities in the communities (VDC office) or other ex-combatants (snowball method). This way, we discovered that in the district of Sunsari, for example, a group of ex-combatants not only lived in Singhiya VDC, but also in the adjacent VDC of Mahendranagar; and in Saptari district, the ex-combatants had not only settled in Piparaha-Paschim, as listed in the database, but also in the adjacent district of Udaipur. In a few cases, for example in Sunsari and Saptari, we identified other ex-combatants in the same community, whose names were not included in the database. Landslides posed another challenge, rendering the research team in Surkhet unable to travel for a few days, for instance.

The reason why this survey format was the method of choice was because of the sparseness of data on ex-combatants and the breath of information requested by STPP/GIZ. The quantitative data moreover allowed for statistical analyses between variables related to the inner experience of peace (PTSD) and outer peacefulness (willingness to reconcile and contribute to the community). Findings demonstrated a link between ex-combatants who were likely to suffer from PTSD and lower readiness to reconcile, thus identifying a connection between these inner and outer peacefulness indicators. Article 3 formed the basis for my operationalization of 'peace needs', explored in article 4.

Peace needs–peace services methodology

Having related one aspect of inner peacefulness with an aspect of outer peacefulness, I wanted to more thoroughly and comprehensively understand people's experiences of peace in multiple dimensions, as well as the link between people's experience of peace and third-party peace(building) efforts.

Consequently, my next sub-questions were:

4. What is the Nepalese experience of everyday peace? Where in Nepal can 'a need for peace' be identified? Which groups in Nepal experience violence? Which peace needs predict violent action tendency? (Article 4)
5. What does peace mean to Nepalese people? What infrastructures for peace and peace services do people turn to, and why? Which infrastructures for peace are available? Which ones do people desire? Are people willing to pay for these? (Article 5)
6. What is the relation between Nepalese people's multidimensional experience of peace, the support services they seek when they suffer from conflict, and violence? How can third-party peace efforts improve people's experience of peace? (Article 6)

Investigating these links required an understanding of people's experience of 'peace' and 'infrastructures for peace' as empirical concepts. In order to render these terms useful for quantitative purposes, I aimed to conceptualize them as specific and measurable phenomena, rather than references to a diffuse spectrum of religious, political, or social beliefs. As set out in Chapter 1, usage of the term 'peace' can be traced back to ancient religious texts, while the term 'infrastructures for peace' originates in academic and UN peacebuilding thinking dating back to the second half of the last century. As further demonstrated, both terms have been used inconsistently and are characterized by a multitude of definitions. The on-going uncertainty surrounding 'peace' and 'infrastructures for peace' as distinct concepts poses a further barrier to their incorporation into the empirical study of conflict and peace. My methodological question was: How to empirically study peace and infrastructures for peace? What to look for in 'reality'? How do you know peace when you see it (Call, 2008)? This required an operationalization of peace and infrastructures for peace, a deconstruction into "observable, empirical elements signifying different aspects of the 'whole'" (Lund, 2014, p. 228).

This second empirical study features mixed methods research undertaken across Nepal. It includes the development of measures and indicators to capture the complex dynamics relating to the interface between individual peace experience, conflict, violence, and third-party peace(building) efforts. The aim of this research was to not only identify peace and peace services and 'peace deficits', but also to conclude with a new framework with which user-oriented peacebuilding can be analysed. Correspondingly, a mixed methods approach was adopted, allowing for stronger analytical and statistical claims to be made (Halkier, 2003; Højjer, 2008). The validity of these assertions can be tested in replication studies.

The resulting population survey investigates individuals' understanding and experience of peace and conflict; the effects of violence on their daily lives; the services they seek when they experience painful conflict and a lack of peace; and what they would like to see happen in the future. The survey consisted of a questionnaire comprised of socio-psychological scales, the SCORE Index including

human security scales, and peace services and infrastructures for peace questions for 1,200 respondents across Nepal. In addition, 400 stakeholder interviews, including peace service providers, probed perceptions regarding violence and peace, the functioning of infrastructures for peace, and the effectiveness and challenges relating to peace services.

Broad-based population research, like market studies and polling, is routinely undertaken in politics, health, education, and business.⁸⁷ In business, market studies are used to collect data about and from customers in order to fill information gaps to reduce risks and arrive at the best possible business decisions (McQuarrie, 2015). Market research has a ‘customer orientation’ as it concerns the process of collecting and analysing information about the customers one wants to reach. The data that are collected on people’s needs, wants, and reasons for making certain choices but not others, provide basis for identifying problem areas and opportunities for service development, improvement, and provision (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2008). Market studies can also be tools for change and advocacy. They can impact policy discussions and thus influence the role of governments and the functioning of markets, including the balance between supply and demand, standards for service provision, and remedies for unfair behaviour and corruption. When applied to peacebuilding, the information that can be gathered through this approach can be helpful in developing national peacebuilding strategies and plans; reducing peacebuilding risks; designing and fine-tuning interventions; improving monitoring and evaluation; facilitating coordination between stakeholders; tracking dynamics over time; identifying entry points and locations for interventions; diagnosing and forecasting peace and violence trends; and stimulating innovation. Figure 3 shows how I conceptualized the peace needs–peace services population study. Although the results of the stakeholder interviews are not included in this dissertation due to resource restrictions, I do integrate this research component (highlighted in blue) in the current discussion in order to provide a complete picture of the research design and process.⁸⁸

⁸⁷ See for example the Pew Research Center, ‘a nonpartisan fact tank that informs the public about the issues, attitudes and trends shaping the world’ at: <https://www.pewresearch.org/> [accessed 27 February 2020].

⁸⁸ All answers to the 50 interview questions have been analysed, categorised, and presented in figures and tables in a 60-page report.

Figure 3 The peace needs–peace services study

Because articles 4-6 (Chapter 4) only briefly report on it, I will describe the methodology in more detail in the next section.

Peace needs: Negative and positive everyday peace

To measure peace needs, we de facto created a ‘Peace Needs Index’ from a total of 76 indicators selected in the design phase of the study. Based on an extensive and multidisciplinary literature review and consultations with Pro Public and Seed staff, ZFD/GIZ colleagues, and conflict and peace studies scholars and practitioners in Nepal, these indicators were selected to gain insights on people’s experience of peace in different dimensions of their lives. A number of the indicators, in particular those to measure intercommunity and citizen-state (political) peace, were derived from the Social Cohesion and Reconciliation (SCORE) Index.⁸⁹

Other well-known instruments to measure states of peace are the Global Peace Index⁹⁰ and the South African Reconciliation Barometer.⁹¹ At the time of study, these two indices measured peace at the national level but told little about the human experience of peace and violence, my topic of research. The SCORE Index appeared to be the most appropriate tool for our research purposes, because it examined reconciliation and social cohesion between groups as everyday experiences (Seed, 2015). Table 2 gives an overview of the indicators selected per peace dimension, which made up the first part of the questionnaire. A more comprehensive indicator list, including sources and example items, can be found in Annex 1.

⁸⁹ The Social Cohesion and Reconciliation (SCORE) Index is a tool designed to measure social cohesion and reconciliation as two indicators of peace in multi-ethnic societies around the world: <https://www.scoreforpeace.org/>.

⁹⁰ The Global Peace Index (GPI), produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), ranks independent states and territories according to their level of peacefulness: <http://visionofhumanity.org/indexes/global-peace-index/>.

⁹¹ The South African Reconciliation Barometer (SARB), hosted by the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, is a public opinion survey with the aim to provide a nationally representative measure of South African citizens’ attitudes to national reconciliation, social cohesion, transformation and democratic governance: <https://www.ijr.org.za/south-african-reconciliation-barometer-survey-2019/>.

Table 2 Theorized peace dimensions and indicators

Peace dimension	Indicator	Peace dimension	Indicator
Intrapersonal peace	Anxiety	Intercommunity peace	Negative stereotypes
	Depression		Intergroup anxiety
	PTSD		Perceived threats
	Substance use		Cultural distance
	Physical aggression		Social distance
	Verbal aggression		Positive feelings
	Hostility		Dehumanization
	Anger		Attitudes towards violence
	Interpersonal manipulation		Attitudes towards revenge
	Criminal tendency		Attitudes towards forgiveness
	Erratic lifestyle	Citizen-state peace	Intergroup contact
	Callous affect		Active discrimination
	Optimism		Passive discrimination
	Pessimism		Community social support
	Social competence		Neighbour communities social support
	Family coherence		Attitudes towards men
	Problem-solving		Attitudes towards women
	Self-restraint		Community conflicts
	Self-motivation		Media consumption
	Emotion regulation		Economic policy priorities
	Self-confidence		Social policy priorities
	Self-deprecation		Socio-political priorities
	Mindfulness		Perceptions about different social groups in Nepal
	Self-kindness		In-group identification
	Common humanity		Personal life satisfaction
	Victimization		Trust in institutions
Interpersonal peace	Competing		Representativeness of institutions
	Collaborating		Local civic life satisfaction
	Avoiding		National civic life satisfaction
	Compromising		Freedom from corruption
	Accommodating		Personal security
	Perspective-taking		Economic security
	Empathic concern		Political security
	Spouse social support		Food security
	Family social support		Health security
	Friends social support		Environmental security
			Community security
			Perceived government support
			State model preference
			Opinions regarding centralization

For most of these indicators, an average of 3 to 5 questionnaire items that relate to different aspects of the construct were included in the survey, which were then aggregated to form a composite scale. Internationally validated psychometric instruments were used as much as possible. We created original questionnaire items and scales in cases where no such instruments were available, or for indicators that were specific to the Nepal context (examples below).

Peace services and infrastructures for peace

The second part of the questionnaire gauged people's understanding of peace, their experience of peace, the choices people make when they seek support in order to feel more at peace, peace services use, and (informal and formal) infrastructures for peace. To give an impression of the questions developed, Table 3 shows a selection of the questions pertaining to intrapersonal peace services.

Table 3 Example of intrapersonal peace and peace services questions

Constructs	Questions
The meaning of peace	In which situations do you feel (not) at peace?
Intrapersonal peace (IP)	How often do you experience painful feelings, like anxiety, guilt, or depression?
IP service use	Do you seek support for dealing with these feelings? If yes:
IP service providers	Who do you go to for support, and why?
Type of IP services	What does this person do to support you?
Impact of IP service	How much does this support help you?
Frequency of use	How often did you seek support from this person in the last year?
IP service availability	Which of the following IP peace service providers exist in your community?
Desired IP services	Which IP services would best benefit the community?
Willingness to pay	Would you be willing to pay for these services if needed?
Amount willing to pay	How much would you be willing to pay?

Similar questions were designed for disputes with family and friends (interpersonal dimension) and disputes with the community (intercommunity dimension). Questions were adapted to each dimension. For example for the interpersonal peace dimension, I included the option of the VDC secretary in the list of possible peace service providers, because VDC secretaries sometimes mediate family disputes. For disputes within the village/municipality, I added political actors and traditional justice providers to the list of peace service providers to capture the reality of Nepalese citizens living in rural areas. Because conflicts between citizens and the state transcend the personal relationship, different questions were developed for this dimension. For instance, I asked which institutions help to prevent violence in the community; who in the community is advocating against discrimination and exclusion; and how many times the respondents experienced a dispute with a government agency in the last two years. Both the questionnaire and the interview protocol included demographic questions.

Additionally, key stakeholder interviews with peace service enablers and providers were conducted. The interview protocol included an organisational assessment of the infrastructures for peace in which some of the interviewees worked. Questions pertained to the roles of the individuals, their organisations, their main activities, and their perceptions of peace, conflict, and violence in the community. A definition of peace services (peace services are services that help people feel more at peace and reduce painful disputes and violence) was shared and discussed with the interviewees. Table 4 shows a selection of the questions asked.

Table 4 Selection of questions for peace service enablers and providers

Construct	Question
Peace services	What peace services do you provide? What do you believe is their main value? How did you become involved in the delivery of these services? How much time do you proportionally spend on providing peace services? Have you had training relevant to the delivery of these services? Do you have access to related information and knowledge? Which sources?
Peace service users	Which groups of people make most often use of your peace services? Why do you believe they come to you for support? How many people have made use of your services this year? Where do they come from? Were you able to service all of them, why (not)? For which problems did they seek assistance? What do you usually do when you receive a request for support? How satisfied do you think the people were with your services? How would you describe the impact of your services?
Infrastructures for peace	When was your organisation established? Number of staff? Budget? Which peace services does your organisation provide? How many staff members provide peace services full time? Do you engage in other activities, which ones? Is your organisation a member of professional networks, which ones? With which other organisations do you collaborate? What have been your main sources of funding in the last three years? How much budget have you spent on peace services last year? Do you have a formal mandate to provide peace services? Who provides it? Which challenges do you face in the delivery of your peace services? Do you sometimes refer people to other peace service providers? Which? To which extent does your organisation represent different social groups? How do you think your peace services are valued by the community?
Conflict and peace	Compared to last year, have there been more/less village disputes, why? Do you think there will be more or less disputes next year, why? What are the three most important problems relating to peace in your village? How do you think these could be solved? Which organisations/institutions in your community contribute to peace? Which organisations/institutions are obstacles to peace? Which peace services would you like to have in your community, why? How are you planning to contribute to peace in the next two years? Which constraints do you foresee? How might these constraints be addressed?

Summarizing, the first component of the survey served to answer research sub-question 4 about peace needs ('demand'). This part of the questionnaire included various socio-psychological instruments, the SCORE Index including human security indicators, and self-developed scales and questions. The second component of this study sought to answer sub-question 5 about peace services and infrastructures for peace ('offer'). It consisted of self-developed questions examining respondents' perceptions of peace, peace services, and their use in relation to intrapersonal, interpersonal, intercommunity, and citizen-state conflicts. Both these parts of the questionnaire served to answer the final research question on the relationships between peace needs, peace

services, and violence and peace (sub-question 6). The third (unpublished) component, the stakeholders and providers interviews, functioned as organisational capacity assessments of existing infrastructures for peace and as a triangulation method for the peace and conflict perceptions collected with the population survey.

Research process⁹²

The peace needs–peace services survey encompassed 1,200 respondents and 400 stakeholders in 40 communities in ten districts across Nepal: Kanchanpur, Achham, Banke, Rolpa, Kapilvastu/Rupandehi, Kaski, Kathmandu, Dhanusha, Saptari, and Panchthar. Data collection took place between March and April 2015 and was, with the exception of 23 questionnaires, completed just before the Gorkha earthquake.⁹³ The research process is illustrated in Figure 4.

Figure 4 Research stages

The sample frame for the survey was designed to ensure results could be reported for different districts and villages within the country, and for distinct demographic and social groups, with sufficient statistical confidence.⁹⁴ Purposive sampling was used to select districts, villages, and identity groups based on the Nepal 2011 Census. Informed by data from the Nepal Central Bureau of Statistics and risk analyses by the DFID-GIZ Risk Management Office and UN Resident Coordinator's Office, districts were identified based on two parameters. The first parameter was whether they formed 'hotspots' (areas with high potential for violence, based on crime rates and reported tensions along political, religious, ethnic, or caste lines).⁹⁵ The second parameter was their location (east-west, hill-flatlands). Villages and towns were selected based on their conflict potential and location (urban-rural). Identity groups were selected on the basis of caste, ethnicity, gender, religion, geography, and political party affiliation. Using voter lists and VDC data, random sampling was used to select respondents within the identity groups. In this way, it was ensured that the final sample was both representative of the groups we wanted to research and randomly selected.

⁹² This section relies substantially on text from our research report 'Predictors of Peace and Violence in Nepal: An empirical study of peace needs and peace services', available at: https://www.scoreforpeace.org/files/publication/pub_file//PB_Nepal15_PredictorsOfPeaceAndViolenceInNepal_20181221.pdf.

⁹³ The original sample size was 1,200, but 23 interviews were lost due to the Gorkha earthquake. This earthquake struck Kathmandu and surrounding districts on 25 April 2015. With a magnitude of 7.8 on the Richter scale, it killed 9,000 people, injured nearly 22,000 people, and destroyed more than 500,000 homes. Hundreds of aftershocks with a magnitude higher than four, followed.

⁹⁴ Minimizing the margin of error (less than 5%).

⁹⁵ Kapilvastu and Rupandehi were merged in order to include the Muslim community that lives on both sides of the border between these two districts.

In addition, a total of 400 interviews with key peace service enablers and providers were conducted in the research districts and villages. District-level interviewees were senior staff members of the District Administration Offices, District Development Committees, LPCs, District Police Offices, and representatives of (I)NGOs working for peace. These informants were selected because the head of the District Administration Office, the Chief District Officer, is in charge of peace and security in the district; the District Development Committee, led by the Local Development Officer, is responsible for development activities in the district; the LPC was the main body of the state responsible for peace process-related activities in the district; and the District Police Office is in charge of district security. At village/municipality level, interviewees included the VDC secretary, who is in charge of the VDC; the chairperson of the LPC, mandated to support the peace process at local level; senior staff of the VDC police office, responsible for local security, and mediators providing mediation services and leaders of informal infrastructures for peace and/or traditional justice mechanisms, as described in Chapter 2.

Interviews were thus only conducted at the district and village levels. I had originally planned for twenty additional interviews at the central level, in Kathmandu, with NPC officials (regarding infrastructures for peace in the approach paper), MoPR (regarding infrastructures for peace and LPCs), the main political parties, donors (e.g. Swiss aid supporting NTTP, DFID and Danida regarding community mediation), and (I)NGOs such as TAF and International Alert on financing or implementing infrastructures for peace. Unfortunately I had to cancel these interviews due to the Gorkha earthquake, which interrupted and redirected our planning.

The SCORE index was calibrated in order to customize the index to the particularities of Nepal. During a week-long workshop attended by the research director of SeeD, the chairperson of the Nepal Institute for Conflict Management, Peace, and Development, myself and Pro Public staff, we reviewed and changed existing indicators and added new ones. Several adaptations were made, of which I will give two examples. The first example relates to corruption. Nepal was among the highest scoring countries on the 2015 Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International.⁹⁶ Additional questions were therefore included to address the themes of political party corruption and civil service corruption. The second example relates to identity groups. To be able to assess intercommunity peace, a number of Nepalese identity groups were selected. Nepal is a collectivistic society, as analysed by Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov (2010). This means that Nepalese citizens tend to have a close, long-term commitment to the member group, be that a family, extended family, or extended relationships. Moreover, they often belong to multiple groups. Traditional group identities, such as those based on caste, ethnicity, and religion, exist alongside contemporary group identities, such as political party and region of residence. As mentioned above, we selected those identity groups for which intergroup tensions had been reported. For example, at the time of research, a source of contention was the restructuring of the state. Political groups such as the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), as well as ethnic groups like the Limbu, Madheshi, and Tharu were advocating for ethnic-based federalism. In order to capture these dynamics, questions to assess self-identification along the dimensions of caste, ethnicity, religion, political party, and region were incorporated.

⁹⁶ In 2015, Nepal scored 27 on perceived level of public sector corruption, a scale ranging from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean). The score placed Nepal in position #130 out of 168 countries and territories. See: <https://www.transparency.org/cpi2015>.

The survey questionnaires were translated from English into Nepali, Maithili, Awadhi, Tharu, and Limbu by members of Pro Public's network. The translations were checked by professional translators and different versions piloted in the demographically distinct areas of Kirtipur, Samakushi, and Kalanki (Kathmandu); Kupondole (Lalitpur); and Katungi (Bhaktapur). Based on the results, I made several adaptations. Because the original self-report methodology of the psychological scales created confusion, I transformed all self-report statements to interview-style questions. For example, the Buss-Perry aggression scale item 'some of my friends think I'm a hothead' was rephrased to 'do some of your friends think that you are a hothead?' In addition, idioms were adapted to the local context and language. The same Buss-Perry item, for example, was eventually rephrased to 'do some of your friends think that you quickly become angry?' During the pilot study, respondents expressed impatience and fatigue with the duration of the questionnaire. To prevent this from becoming a problem in the main study, I reduced response options for various scales (from five to three); offered the respondents financial compensation by way of incentive; and instructed the researchers to take minimum one ten-minute break, for which they were provided a budget to buy tea and snacks for the respondents.

The Pro Public team and I recruited thirty Nepalese researchers on the basis of their work experience, training, and political neutrality. All researchers participated in four days of research training, which I developed and provided with support of the Pro Public team. Each survey team consisted of one researcher from Kathmandu and two researchers from the respective research districts. At least one of the team members was female, and one a native local-language speaker. The teams were equipped with research guidelines, materials in Nepali and the local language, and endorsement letters from MoPR and the Local District Officer.

The questionnaire was administered face-to-face in the mother tongue of the participants by researchers who are also native speakers over the course of on average 2.5 hours. The lead researcher assigned an interviewer to make first contact with each of the households selected by personal visit or by phone. Suitable respondents were considered to be any capable adult member (aged 18-65) of the household, who were interviewed by one or two researchers alone. In order to increase comfort, the research teams rotated the role of interviewer to match the gender of the respondent. To meet the primary ethical standards of research, all respondents provided informed consent before participating in the survey and statements to this effect were read before the interview started. Several measures to, as much as possible, prevent and reduce social desirability bias were taken (Larson, 2019). Researchers emphasized that none of the information provided by the interviewees would be shared and personal details would not be disclosed. In addition, a coding system was used to maintain the anonymity of the respondents. The interview was thus confidential and anonymous. Researchers assured the interviewees repeatedly that there were no right or wrong answers, especially concerning questions prone to social desirability bias, such as self-reported personality traits, socio-economic status, and personal behaviour such as substance use and aggression. As soon as respondents expressed discomfort with a question, the researcher would halt the interview and inquire whether the respondent wanted to continue.⁹⁷ In the data analysis, social desirability bias was checked for by cross-referencing data (e.g. economic status, class, and caste).

After each interview, questionnaires were reviewed for accuracy and completeness. Every research team was visited at least once by the Pro Public/GIZ monitoring team, including myself. The data

⁹⁷ No instances of respondents choosing to opt out during the interview were reported by the research teams.

were tabulated and qualitative questions scored in the computer programmes IBM SPSS Statistics 21 and Microsoft Excel by the Pro Public senior research team researchers in Kathmandu in June and July 2015, under my supervision. The following August, I spent a week at the SeeD office in Nicosia, Cyprus, to begin the data analysis. Data were analysed using SPSS and AMOS software.

Data analysis approaches

In a complex research design, it is possible to combine traditional approaches to data analysis, such as text analysis and descriptive statistics, with approaches specific to mixed methods research, as is the case in this study. For instance, data transformation refers to the process of converting data from one format or structure into another, to allow for comparison between quantitative and qualitative data (Srnrka & Koeszegi, 2007). In this research, I created variables from the peace needs–peace services survey (Chapter 4, articles 4-6), e.g. ‘frequency of use of traditional justice mechanisms’, that can be compared with topics and categories identified in the qualitative data (including articles 1-2), e.g. ‘informal infrastructures for peace’. Furthermore, qualitative data (content analysis of interviews) were transformed, by counting the occurrences of codes and assessing their relative importance (categorizing themes for example in terms of ex-combatants’ willingness to contribute to their host communities, or interpersonal peace service providers). This enabled a comparison of sets of data in quantifiable terms.

In the first, sequential phase of the research (refer to Figure 2), topics and themes from information sources identified in the process of writing articles 1 and 2, were used for instrument development, the ex-combatants and host communities survey. In the second phase, the quantitative data and qualitative data collected with the survey (article 3), in addition to the qualitative data of the first phase (articles 1 and 2), informed the qualitative and quantitative design of the peace needs–peace services population survey (articles 4-6).

Peace needs–peace services data analysis

As briefly described in articles 4 and 6 (Chapter 4), processing of the peace needs data from the second survey began with checking whether all composite scales did in fact work well as coherent variables. We used a step-wise procedure, testing first the internal consistency within each scale using the Cronbach’s α coefficient (values between 0.7–0.8 were considered acceptable, following Field (2014)), and second, conducting an Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA). EFA allows researchers to investigate concepts that are not easily measured directly –such as ‘peace’– by collapsing a large number of variables into a few interpretable underlying factors. This makes it possible to identify patterns in the data. In statistical terms, factor analysis is a technique for identifying whether the correlations between a set of observed variables stem from their relationship to one or more latent variables in the data (Field, 2014). A ‘factor’ is a set of observed variables that have similar response patterns. For example, people’s responses to questions about income, education, and occupation may all be associated with the latent variable socioeconomic status. In the EFA, which is not guided by pre-existing hypotheses, we included all the variables to see which would load on which dimension. The results were confirmed with a Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA), the third step. Contrary to EFA, in CFA one pre-specifies the model one expects to fit the data best and assesses its fit. CFA enables us to confirm that the constructs are uni-dimensional, which means that items that were supposed to load on them do so without loading on any other factors (Brown, 2006).

The relationships between dimensions, indicators, and observed items can be accounted for by a second-order factor model, where the global dimension is the second-order factor and the indicators are the first-order factors.⁹⁸ First-order factors are derived directly from the observed data. A good fit of the expected model and favourable comparisons with the fit of other plausible models will suggest that the relationships between second- and first-order factors and first-order factors and observed items are as hypothesized. Whether a solution comprises a good fit to the data is determined by various cut off criteria for statistical indices (e.g. Hu and Bentler, 1999).

The second-order factor model approach was followed for the construction of the peace dimensions. We thought of intrapersonal, interpersonal, intercommunity, and citizen-state peace as higher-order factors (referred to as dimensions), which are made up of lower-order factors, for example, anxiety for intrapersonal peace; empathic concern for interpersonal peace; negative stereotypes for intercommunity peace; and civic life satisfaction for citizen-state peace. These, in turn, are measured by a number of observed items: the specific questions asked in the survey. To illustrate, Figure 5 (adapted from Seed, 2015) demonstrates the relationships between citizen-state peace as a global dimension (second-order factor), corruption, civil life satisfaction, and trust in government institutions, as examples of indicators (first-order factors) that constitute the global dimension, together with examples of items that make up each indicator.

Figure 5 The relationship between dimension, indicators, and observed items

On the basis of this analysis, we identified five, instead of the theorized four, peace dimensions: intrapersonal peace, interpersonal peace, intercommunity peace, citizen-state peace, and material peace, presented in selected sections of the research report (Chapter 4, article 4). In these sections, we disaggregated the peace needs results by relevant characteristics, including gender, caste, district, region, and economic class. Using analyses of variance, we then tested whether there were

⁹⁸ Second-order factor models are typically used in instances where theoretical concepts are measured by several related constructs, each of which is measured by multiple items. An example is the Five Factor Model of personality traits (Big Five). See DeYoung, Peterson & Higgins, 2002. Higher-order factors of the Big Five predict conformity: Are there neuroses of health? *Personality and Individual Differences*, 33(4), 533–552.

significant differences between the scores of these groups. The findings suggest that certain groups and/or regions appear to have more pressing peace needs than others. Table 1 in article 6 (Chapter 4) theoretically breaks down the indicators into negative and positive peace categories. In this article, material peace (the fifth dimension) was excluded from the analysis for the sake of theoretical clarity, as we were investigating the link between peace dimensions and peace services, rather than development services.⁹⁹

The dimensions of active and passive peace services, reported in article 6 (Chapter 4), were conceived in a similar way. By adding up the number of times respondents reported a certain type of support, I calculated scores for each of the peace service items. I then ran an exploratory factor analysis including peace services from all levels: intrapersonal, interpersonal, and intercommunity. Items which failed to significantly contribute to any peace service dimension were sequentially excluded from the model, until all remaining items were significant. Only those were included in further analysis. A two-dimensional solution emerged that appeared to be based on the content of the peace service, rather than the level at which they were offered. More contextual information on peace services is provided in article 5 (Chapter 4), which reports quantitative and qualitative data on Nepalese understandings of peace, peace service use, peace service providers, peace preferences, and willingness to pay.

To understand underlying dynamics, such as drivers of violence and peace in Nepal, we used predictive modelling techniques including hierarchical linear regression and structural equation modelling. These analyses revealed a dynamic between certain aspects of people's peace experience and their tendency to use violence (Chapter 4, article 4) as well as a dynamic between people's peace experience, their propensity for violence, and their peace services use (Chapter 4, article 6). In uncovering the factors that drive violent tendency and peace experience, these predictive findings provide direct entry points for interventions to either interrupt (e.g. prevent violence) or amplify (e.g. peace experience) these pathways. As a last step in the data analysis, the findings were discussed within Pro Public and ZFD/GIZ in order to contextualize and interpret the data, and to aid the development of relevant programme recommendations.

Limitations

There are several methodological limitations to the research presented in this dissertation, of which I will note two here (more are mentioned in the articles as well as in the section on future directions, Chapter 5). First, the cross-cultural adaptation and psychometric validation of the psychological scales and instruments used warrants further testing. As far as I know, none of the scales selected have been validated in Nepal. In selecting standardized tests, my intention was to adequately capture hypothetical constructs with universal applicability. However, most of the instruments had not previously been used in Nepal. Even though we translated the tests into native languages and piloted these, problems may have occurred with words that have multiple meanings or expressions that seem impossible to translate to local idiom, of which I noted an example in this chapter. Once translated, the tests are no longer truly standardized, possibly reducing validity.

⁹⁹ As a result, there are slight variations in factor loadings between the indicators reported in articles 4 and 6. Changes in loadings are to be expected when different scales are included in the analyses. For the current purpose, the loadings are less important than the evidence that these scales constitute a dimension.

Second, the current research, although aiming to understand Nepal's peace system in a comprehensive and holistic manner, necessarily presents a limited picture of that system including of the interface between 'users' and 'providers'. Because of practical constraints, I was for instance not able to analyse and report on the key stakeholder interview data. The organisational assessments of formal and informal infrastructures for peace, containing the perspectives of peace service providers, are therefore not represented in this dissertation (see footnote 84). For the same reason, I did not embark on the originally planned interviews with government and donor representatives at the central level, in Kathmandu. These interviews could have shed more light on the impact of peacebuilding initiatives by their institutions on people's everyday peace experience, a topic of obvious interest to those who wish to ensure that their resources are well spent and their efforts are effective.

Chapter 4: The articles

Article 1: Like yeast that leavens the dough? Community mediation as local infrastructure for peace in Nepal

Jeannine Suurmond & Prakash Mani Sharma

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Introduction

Internationally, discussions between academics, practitioners, policy makers and others about the concept of Infrastructure for Peace (I4P) are ongoing. There seems to be general agreement that I4P can consist of different components (such as ministries for peace, local peace committees and early warning platforms), which, through dialogue and problem solving, aim to contribute to peacebuilding and conflict prevention in a society. Yet some authors describe I4P in broad terms (Kumar 2011; Van Tongeren 2011), while others attempt to delineate the boundaries of the concept, for example by relating I4P to national-level peace processes and, more explicitly, to government involvement (Hopp-Nishanka 2012).

This briefing discusses community mediation in Nepal. Depending on how I4P is understood, community mediation might be considered as an I4P in itself, as a component of it or as falling outside the scope of the concept.

Community mediation is one of the informal mechanisms through which disputes are settled in Nepal. It complements the formal justice system and quasi-judicial bodies, as well as traditional justice mechanisms. Regardless of variations in style, community mediation generally is a process through which impartial mediators help disputing parties improve their relations and reach a mutually satisfactory agreement. In Nepal, mediators tend to be recruited from the diverse social groups that make up a community. Because multiple mediators work together on a case, they can reflect and transcend community fault lines of gender, caste, ethnicity and religion, a point recognised by John Paul Lederach in reference to the community mediation programme coordinated by The Asia Foundation (TAF): '[Mediators function like] "critical yeast" – a group of improbable relationships crossing social divides, just large enough in number and unique enough in its formation to create a sustainable, new space of interaction' (Lederach and Thapa 2012, 11).

After providing some political and juridical context, the briefing will describe community mediation as practiced in Nepal in more detail and conclude with several observations about community mediation as a potential component of a national infrastructure for peace.

Political and Juridical Context

Ten years of violent conflict between the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and the government formally came to an end with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2006. The violence between 1996 and 2006 left more than 13,000 people dead and thousands of others displaced. Since the conclusion of the CPA, Nepal has seen the abolition of its monarchy, a new interim constitution, six different governments, the rise of various ethnic identity movements and four extensions of the mandate of its constituent assembly before its final dissolution in May 2012, effectively stalling the constitution-writing process. At the time of writing, the main political parties are negotiating a way out of the impasse.

The formal justice bodies in Nepal are the Supreme Court, the appeal courts and the district courts (75 in total). Quasi-judicial bodies include the district administration offices, the village development committees, municipal offices, and local police offices. Their inaccessibility, complicated legal procedures and the poor quality of services are among some of the most frequently mentioned complaints (DFID, DanidaHUGOU and UNCT 2011; USAID 2009). Another challenge is the overburdening of the courts; in March 2012, in the Supreme Court alone, 10,420 cases were pending.

Complementing or replacing the formal system are the indigenously evolved informal justice mechanisms present in most communities, like *mukhiya*, *anjuman* or *pancha bhaladmi*.¹ Typically combining elements of dialogue facilitation, arbitration, and mediation, they tend to be easily accessible and cost efficient, and produce prompt results. Yet they too have received criticism for being biased and corrupt, breaching human rights norms and perpetuating social inequalities (Pro Public 2012; Chhetri and Kattel 2004). Other informal justice mechanisms are the community mediation programmes operating with various degrees of success.

The most important legal provisions relating to community mediation are the Mediation Act of 2011, the district development committee (DDC) and village development committee (VDC) guidelines of 2010, and the Local Self-governance Act (LSGA) of 1999. The Mediation Act, although not yet implemented, aims to recognise court-referred mediation, local government mediation and community mediation as legal ways of resolving disputes. The DDC and VDC guidelines encourage local government bodies to provide grants to community mediation centres. The LSGA created an institutional basis for settling disputes at the local level by decentralising the right to adjudicate (and later also to mediate) to the VDCs and the municipalities. In their efforts to support the government in the full implementation of the LSGA,² local NGOs and donors introduced components of social justice and human rights in the dispute resolution processes, for example as part of professional trainings for mediators.

Community Mediation in Nepal

Building on Nepal's age-old tradition of resolving conflicts via dialogue, community mediation developed and expanded throughout the last 16 years. Today, various community mediation programmes are present in about 50 of the 75 districts.³ The overarching goal of community mediation is to offer access to justice to those otherwise excluded from the formal system. The programmes seek to promote human rights norms and empower individuals by training them as mediators. Generally the approach has been that local NGOs establish mediation centres at the village and district levels, with financial and technical support of donors. Among the community mediation programmes running are: the paralegal committees set up by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Children's Fund; the Madheshi mediation committees supported by the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID); the community mediation centres established by the Community Mediation Capacity for Peaceful and Harmonious Society Project/Japan International Cooperation Agency (COMCAP/JICA) or supported by the Danish International Development Assistance/Human Rights and Good Governance Unit (DanidaHUGOU); and the community mediation centres set up by Pro Public and other NGOs in cooperation with TAF.⁴ The nature of the mediation tends to be programme-specific.

It can represent a rights-based approach, as in the paralegal committees, involve a group, as in the Madheshi mediation, or resemble the interest-based style, as in the programmes supported by TAF, COMCAP/JICA and DanidaHUGOU.

Common to these programmes are their level and reach. Community mediation processes tend to happen at the grassroots level, addressing disputes between neighbours, family members and relatives. While community mediation might deal with practical consequences of the peace process (such as land disputes resulting from the failure of the political parties to endorse the land reforms stipulated in the CPA), usually the main focus is on local conflicts. Typical cases relate to land boundaries, mistreatment and assault, discrimination, money lending and the destruction of crops. Local government officials might at times be involved, but usually trained mediators guide the process. While the availability of research on the long-term impact of the community mediation programmes is limited, and a thorough discussion of their successes and challenges is beyond the scope of this briefing, several observations can nevertheless be made. The overall dispute settlement success rate seems to be high –generally around or above 70%. For instance, under the Madheshi community mediation programme implemented by the Human Rights and Community Development Academy Nepal and local NGOs and supported by DFID in six Terai districts, 2,355 cases were registered in the period 2008-2010, of which 69% were successfully mediated (Rai 2010). The community mediation centres set up over the past three years by the Centre for Legal Research and Resources Development in four districts with the support of the Access to Justice Project of UNDP had registered 3,488 cases by March 2012, of which 70% were resolved (Bista 2012). By September 2011, in TAF's community mediation network, 19,144 cases had been registered in altogether 12 districts. Of these, 86% were successfully settled (Lederach and Thapa 2012).

Some programmes have been criticised for being discriminatory, reinforcing existing hierarchies or being influenced by political parties (Coyle and Dalrymple 2011). When tensions are exacerbated, discrimination is perpetuated and resources are wasted, the negative impact of community mediation on the development of a community might be seen. Additional concerns relate to the sustainability of mediation services and the often limited coordination with the formal justice sector (Bista 2012; DFID, DanidaHUGOU, and UNCT 2011).

On the other hand, high satisfaction among users due to the free-of-cost services and fair, efficient, independent and neutral processes is widely reported (Bista 2012; COMCAP 2012; Coyle and Dalrymple 2011). In many cases, the community mediation centres are receiving logistical and/or financial support from the VDCs, or have been 'adopted' by them, which allows the centres to virtually run without any donor involvement. Most of the Madheshi community mediation centres, for example, had received support from the VDCs through funds provided by the central government in 2010. Practically all community mediation centres established by Pro Public/TAF are now independently managed by the VDCs, although in some cases support is still provided in the form of training and/ or practice-sharing meetings. The positive impact of community mediation on development might be observed in: the empowerment of women and marginalised groups as they become respected mediators in the village; an increased sense of confidence among villagers in their ability to resolve their own disputes; and the development of increasingly horizontal rather than vertical power relations in the community (Lederach and Thapa 2012; Coyle and Dalrymple 2011; Sharif 2010). Sometimes community mediation has a direct impact on development, for example when it relieves the burden of quasi-judicial mechanisms. One VDC secretary pointed out that his

involvement in the development projects of the village had increased since mediators relieved him of the time consuming task of resolving local disputes (COMCAP 2012, 5).

Conclusion

Community mediation centres are physical infrastructures run by trained mediators who, through dialogue and mediation, attempt to contribute to peace and social harmony. As the case of Nepal illustrates, community mediation is a potentially powerful way to increase the capacity of communities to resolve their own conflicts in the short term, while challenging existing hierarchies and empowering marginalised groups in the long term. In the ongoing political vacuum and the absence of an effectively functioning judiciary, community mediation can be a relief to villagers engaged in a dispute, who otherwise have few options for redress. Community mediation can be regarded as ‘peacebuilding from the bottom-up’, for example when it addresses inequality and discrimination, issues that motivated the political conflict in Nepal in 1996 and continue to be pressing.

According to broad definitions of I4P that emphasise dialogue as a means and conflict prevention and peacebuilding as goals, community mediation might therefore be regarded as an I4P or a component of it. Community mediation as it is currently practised in its various forms in Nepal, however, seems to fall outside the scope of definitions that prioritise structural government involvement in an I4P and direct links to the national peace process. In order to determine more conclusively whether community mediation is an I4P or a component of it, a more thorough exploration of the boundaries of the concept is required. Building on the ongoing discussions, relevant questions would concern the nature and extent of the possible role of government in the various components of I4P, the type of conflicts I4P or its components should address, and the composition and purpose of an I4P at various stages of national conflict, as well as during peacetime.

Awaiting the crystallisation of the concept, and for the reasons mentioned above, it would be advisable to consider community mediation as part of a potential national I4P for Nepal.⁵ Such an I4P could consist of, for example: formal components, including the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction and the local peace committees; traditional components, such as the indigenous justice mechanisms; and informal components, including community mediation.⁶ Like yeast that leavens the dough, and like mediators who create a new space of interaction, a Nepal Infrastructure for Peace could give rise to something new, too: a progressively peaceful country, today and beyond the national conflict and peace process.

JEANNINE M. SUURMOND is seconded as technical advisor to the NGO Pro Public by the Ziviler Friedensdienst/ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit.

PRAKASH MANI SHARMA is Executive Director of Pro Public; Forum for the Protection of Public Interest, Kathmandu.

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Van Tongeren, P. 2011, 'Infrastructures for Peace' in Nan, SA, Mampilly, ZC & Bartoli, A eds, *Peacemaking: From Practice to Theory*, New York: Praeger: 400–419.

¹ Coyle and Dalrymple provide the following definitions: *anjuman* is a committee of three men from within the Muslim *samaaj*, or membership-based ethnic society, who are responsible for resolving disputes within the Muslim community; the *mukhiya* system refers to the dispute resolution practices of the Thakali communities of north-central Nepal; and *pancha bhaladmi*, a traditional informal justice system operating in areas of eastern Nepal, are a fixed council of five elders from the community who would form in order to arbitrate disputes in their community (2011, iv–vi).

² Clauses 33 and 101 relating to mediation have still to be enacted.

³ Based on the February 17, 2009, figures compiled by the Nepal Alternative Dispute Resolution Coordination Group.

⁴ Pro Public became an implementation partner of TAF in 2003. The other partners of TAF are Service to Underprivileged Sectors of Society, the Centre for Legal Research and Resources Development, the Rural Women's Unity and Development Centre and the Institute for Governance and Democracy.

⁵ Pro Public translates I4P as *shantiko laagi purbadhar* in Nepali, which seems to resonate well with local politicians, policy makers, NGO staff and community mediators.

⁶ As suggested by various participants during a meeting on I4P in Nepal, hosted by the government of Nepal and initiated by Pro Public with the support of ZFD/GIZ, in Kathmandu in August 2012, in which representatives of ministries, embassy officials and international donors participated.

Article 2: Serving people's need for peace. Infrastructures for peace, the peace sector, and the case of Nepal

Jeannine Suurmond & Prakash Mani Sharma

in:

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Available at: https://www.berghof-foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Handbook/Dialogue_Chapters/dialogue10_comment_suurmondsharma.pdf

Introduction

'How can we live together in peace?' is a question in the minds and hearts of many Nepalese people as they try to come to terms with the violence of the past and present while attempting to lay the foundations for a peaceful future.

The question is especially pertinent given that different models for the future design of the state are being discussed as part of the ongoing formal peace process. So far, no one model has been able to elicit support from across the political spectrum. With almost half the population living below the poverty line, a widely felt sense of frustration about the lack of political progress adds uncompromising urgency to the discussion.

The present volume of the Berghof Handbook Dialogue Series explores the potential and boundaries of the concept of 'peace infrastructure' or 'Infrastructure for Peace (I4P)'. In this and other literature on the topic,¹ Nepal is often cited as an example, typically because of its Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction as well as the local peace committees that have been established by the government in practically every district.

While inspired by the attempts in the Handbook and other publications to define what Infrastructures for Peace (I4Ps) are,² our experiences in Nepal have deepened our understanding of what they do. The way we see it, the added value of the idea of Infrastructures for Peace (I4Ps) is that it focuses attention on the needs they aim to satisfy. Looking through this lens, those infrastructures that are actually already serving peace in a society become visible. This makes it possible to identify gaps and overlaps in services as well as any lack of policy and coordination in the peace sector.

In this paper, using the case of Nepal, we want to show how a perspective based on people's peace needs (a 'user perspective') may help clarify the concept of Infrastructure for Peace (I4P) and its components, as well as their place in society. We will also reflect on practical implications and potential developments in Nepal's peace sector.

Infrastructures for Peace from the Perspective of Peace Needs

The Berghof Handbook, which contains much of the latest thinking regarding the conceptualisation of Infrastructure for Peace (I4P), attests to the fact that the concept is increasingly attracting the attention of policy-makers, academics, and practitioners in the field of peacebuilding and conflict transformation. The International Civil Society Network on Infrastructures for Peace and the UNDP Infrastructures for Peace Portal (both established this year) aim to contribute to advocacy and comparative learning, while the universities of Manchester and Denver have recently initiated research programmes on the topic.

¹ For example the Journal of Peacebuilding and Development, Vol. 7, No. 3, 2012: Special Issue on Infrastructures for Peace.

² Two definitions: (1) 'Peace infrastructures consist of diverse domestic, inter-connected forms of engagement between conflict parties and other stakeholders. Their organisational elements can be established at all stages of peace and dialogue processes, at all levels of society, and with varying degrees of inclusion. The objective of peace infrastructure is to assist the parties (e.g. through capacity building or advice), the process (e.g. through mediation between the conflict parties or facilitation of public participation), or the implementation of process results (e.g. through monitoring and coordination of agreement implementation)' (Hopp-Nishanka 2013a, 4); (2) 'Infrastructures for Peace are a dynamic network of interdependent structures, mechanisms, resources, values and skills which, through dialogue and consultation, contribute to conflict prevention and peace building in a society' (developed during the Infrastructures for Peace seminar organised by UNDP and civil society in Kenya in 2010, cited in Kumar/de la Haye 2011).

Still, consensus regarding the scope and definition of the term remains to be achieved. Research on how and why Infrastructures for Peace (I4Ps) contribute to peace, and what the roles of and practical implications for different actors might be, is limited. Despite these constraints, advocacy efforts promoting the concept are well underway, including here in Nepal.³

We are currently studying the components of Nepal's Infrastructure for Peace (I4P). Although still work in progress, the perspective we take may help move forward the international discussion. Descriptive rather than normative, it is akin to a market analysis with a focus on the available peace services offered by the components (we call those 'infrastructures for peace') and the existing peace needs (demand), while attempting to identify gaps and overlap.

Our starting assumption is that peace is an ideal state of being, dependent on the fulfilment of various peace needs. Examples of peace needs include freedom from violence, social harmony, and inner tranquillity,⁴ while the prevalence of a given peace need varies among people and across societies. The second assumption is that a peace need becomes acute, or direct, when people fail to resolve a conflict constructively on their own and suffer the ensuing violence, for example in the case of individual trauma (intrapersonal conflict), drawn-out marriage disputes (interpersonal conflict), and rising tensions between community members (intragroup conflict) or nation-states (intergroup conflict). The third assumption is that failure to effectively satisfy an acute peace need leads to more violence: the condition of the person with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder worsens; spouses start abusing each other; community members expel others; and war between nation-states is declared. The fourth assumption is that peace services can help address peace needs and thereby prevent violence, and that the appropriate type of peace service depends on the particular peace need. Our final assumption is that peace service delivery is the business of infrastructures for peace.

In the Berghof Handbook, the term 'peace infrastructure' is generally used to refer to a totality, an overarching infrastructure. The terms 'components', 'peace structures', or 'elements' are used to indicate the parts of that peace infrastructure.⁵ Our terminology, however, intends to underline the notion that 'peace infrastructure' or 'Infrastructure for Peace (I4P)'⁶ refers to the sum of its elements as well as describes single parts of that system (Brand-Jacobsen 2013, recognised in Hopp-Nishanka 2013b, 56). Because the single parts tend to be complex units that can function more or less independently of the overall Infrastructure for Peace (I4P), we consider them as infrastructures in their own right. In line with this, and for lack of an adequate alternative, we use the term 'infrastructures for peace' (lower-case) to indicate the parts and the term 'Infrastructure for Peace (I4P)' (upper-case, with the acronym for purposes of clarity) to indicate their sum. The emphasis of this paper is on the parts.

³ Internationally, a UN resolution calling on the UN to support infrastructures for peace in governments was finalised at the Nesting Peace Summit organised by the Global Alliance for Ministries and Infrastructures for Peace in Geneva, September 2013. The International Civil Society Network on Infrastructures for Peace was launched in early 2013, and several alliances have been set up to promote the concept (the African Alliance for Ministries and Infrastructures for Peace and the Asia-Pacific Alliance for Ministries and Infrastructures for Peace). In Nepal, the National Planning Commission has included infrastructures for peace in their 13th Approach Paper 2013-2016 (available in Nepali at: www.npc.gov.np/new/uploadedFiles/allFiles/TYP2070-full.pdf (accessed 29 August 2013)). The director of the Nepal Peace Trust Fund participated in the Nesting Peace Summit mentioned above.

⁴ These are just a few examples of peace needs that can be derived from Galtung's positive and negative peace definitions and his breakdown into cultural, structural, and direct peace, as well as Nepalese understandings of the word ('shanti').

⁵ Although this distinction is not consistently applied: see for example p. i of the Handbook Dialogue (Unger et al. 2013), where as examples of peace infrastructures are mentioned individual elements like peace committees, a Ministry for Peace and Reconstruction, a Peace Secretariat, and a High Peace Council.

⁶ As used by Dialogue lead author Hopp-Nishanka and Brand-Jacobsen (2013, 8) respectively.

We define *infrastructures for peace* as the structures, resources, and processes through which peace services are delivered at any level of a society. It is helpful to make a distinction between formal and informal infrastructures for peace. Formal infrastructures for peace have a physical structure, a degree of organisation, stability, mandate, resources, training, and are recognised as such by their beneficiaries, or 'users'. Examples include community mediation committees, local peace committees, peace radio stations, peace agreement monitoring mechanisms, religious institutions, and zones of peace. By contrast, informal infrastructures for peace are those that emerge on an ad hoc basis, do not require a physical structure, and operate without funds. Examples include the many traditional dispute resolution mechanisms in Nepal. Together, they make up the Infrastructure for Peace (I4P) of a society.

Figure 1 shows a nested picture of where we see the place of infrastructures for peace in the broader peace sector of a country, borrowing from a model long-used in other development fields (e.g. economy, finance, and health).

Figure 1: The different levels of the peace sector

The *peace sector* is that part of society that deals with the demand for peace, or peace needs. It encompasses ministries, donors, national and international NGOs as well as the Infrastructure for Peace (I4P), constituted by the infrastructures for peace and the peace service providers. From this point of view, a Ministry of Peace would be part of the peace sector in the possible roles of enabler, planner, regulator, policy-maker, financier, and coordinator, but only be an infrastructure for peace when it actually delivers a peace service. The same applies to donors or NGOs working for peace.

Peace services are the services offered by peace service providers, working in the infrastructures for peace, with the goal of addressing peace needs. They can include direct services like counselling, dialogue facilitation, and mediation, as well as indirect services such as information provision,

education, training, and monitoring.⁷ Although we recognise there is some overlap, one can distinguish between preventative, curative, and palliative peace services.⁸ Preventative peace service providers seek to prevent violence, for example by increasing peace skills and knowledge, contributing to a culture of peace, and establishing a firm Infrastructure for Peace (I4P). Curative peace service providers, like conflict resolution and transformation practitioners, mediators, and psychological trauma counsellors, help people to heal from painful conflict. Palliative peace service providers aim to reduce harm once violence has erupted, for example by managing demilitarised zones or conducting shuttle mediation. A state in transition and recovering from violent conflict, like Nepal, may have more need than a well-functioning democratic state for curative infrastructures for peace: mediation platforms for political actors, truth and reconciliation commissions, or community mediation committees to compensate for the existing judicial vacuum. Well-functioning democratic states may host more preventative infrastructures for peace, such as academic studies in peace and conflict, or think tanks advising the government on a peaceful foreign policy.

Figure 2 suggests several infrastructures for peace, roughly organised by the type of services they provide, that may be available at varying levels of peace in a society. It is beyond the scope of this diagram to segment the infrastructures for peace according to the level at which they function (i.e. the level at which the peace need occurs, for example intrapersonal or intergroup). We suppose that preventative services can be offered on a continuous basis, while the type of curative and palliative services offered at a given point in time would depend on the peace needs of the day.

Figure 2: Possible infrastructures for peace and types of services over time

⁷ Much like the services mentioned by Hopp-Nishanka in the Berghof Handbook Dialogue (2013a, 6).

⁸ Extrapolating from Galtung (1996, 1).

The peace needs perspective combines a systems approach (Dress 2005, 1) with a functional approach to peace.⁹ A systems approach to peace focuses on the way individual components (infrastructures for peace) relate to the whole (the goal of peace in a society). Dress argues that this provides an opportunity to address the fragmentation in the conflict prevention and peacebuilding field, by drawing attention to the need to *plan* for peace. A functional approach highlights infrastructures that are actually functioning in the service of peace at all levels of society. This allows for evaluating them on the basis of merit¹⁰— and possibly for withdrawing their status as infrastructure for peace should they fall short of fulfilling their mandate.

What do we see when we look through this lens at Nepal? After providing a brief background to the political and social situation, the following section gives an overview of the main actors and describes their roles in the peace sector as well as some of the infrastructures for peace. Given the limited scope of this paper, as well as the preliminary stage of our research, we refrain from giving a typology of the country's peace needs.

Actors and Infrastructures for Peace in Nepal's Peace Sector¹¹

Despite the political and social change in recent years, many people in Nepal continue to suffer from violence. Poverty, lack of education, and unequal access to education, employment and political representation fuelled the political violence of the mid-1990s and still contribute to tensions today. Positions in society are still mostly determined by caste, ethnicity, and gender. About 44% of the population lives below the poverty line (República 2013). More than 40% of women and 25% of men are illiterate (Government of Nepal 2012, 4). The justice system is weak and inaccessible to many people due to prohibitive costs, geographical distance, and long waiting periods.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2006 formally ended the violent conflict between the government of Nepal and the then Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), but its rather slow implementation is an obstacle to achieving political sustainability and economic growth. While the Maoist People's Liberation Army has by and large been dismantled, fundamental issues relating to state restructuring, transitional justice, inclusion, impunity, and land reform are still unresolved.

At the time of writing, a technocratic interim government was leading the country towards new constituent assembly elections scheduled for 19 November 2013. The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (a breakaway faction of the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)), headed an alliance of 33 parties that boycotted the elections and obstructed election preparations. Once in place, the new constituent assembly will have to draft the constitution, a task the previous assembly failed to accomplish in its four-year tenure. The new constitution will probably propose a federal structure for the country. Discussions in the past about the possible shape of the future federal state suggest that the country is divided over the subject, making the eventual implementation of any model risky.

⁹ Inspired by Kemp and Fry's finding that '[a] peaceful society is a society that has oriented its culture and cultural development toward peacefulness. It has developed ideas, mores, value systems, and cultural institutions that minimize violence and promote peace – a *cultural technology of peace*' (Kemp 2004, 10; original emphasis).

¹⁰ An outcome-level evaluation can be assisted, for example, by the Indicator Module developed by Search for Common Ground, the United States Agency for International Development, and the United States Institute of Peace, 2013. Available at: <http://dmeforpeace.org/learn/training-modules-design-monitoring-and-evaluation-peacebuilding> (accessed 30 August 2013).

¹¹ The Nepali term *Pro Public* has so far been using (and that has been adopted by the NPC) is *shanti kolaagi purbadhar*. In Nepali, *shanti* refers to 'peace', 'tranquillity', and 'calm'; *-kolaagi* means 'for'; and *purbadhar* means 'infrastructure', which can both refer to 'hardware' (buildings, tools, resources) and 'software' (skills, attitudes, values).

Our impression is that many of Nepal's peace needs remain unaddressed because of the limited availability of professional peace services. Among the infrastructures for peace that do exist, most appear to have limited scope and capacity and operate quite independently of each other, missing opportunities to detect and pre-empt tensions before they escalate and failing to provide recourse where there is violence.

Figure 3 offers an overview of the policy-makers, funders, and implementers in Nepal's peace sector, as well as some of the formal infrastructures for peace they have enabled and/or established. It is beyond the scope of this diagram to show which infrastructures for peace have been established by whom, which peace needs they seek to address, and who the peace service providers and the users are.

Figure 3: Actors in Nepal's peace sector

Note 1: Pending political agreement, the constituent assembly (to be established after the elections) might double as interim parliament.

Note 2: The Peace Fund for Non-Governmental Actors, administered by the NPTF, is expected to fund peacebuilding projects by NGOs following the elections, some of which would set up new infrastructures for peace.

Note 3: The Conflict Management Division is located within the MoPR, while the Peace Focal Points are located within various ministries.

In the international discussion on Infrastructures for Peace (I4Ps), the MoPR is frequently cited as an example of a component (van Tongeren 2011; Hopp-Nishanka 2013a, 8; Siebert 2013, 34-35). Given the ministry's current functions and broad range of responsibilities, we agree with this view. In addition to the coordination of national peace efforts, including overseeing the implementation of the peace agreement and setting up local peace committees, a peace fund, and transitional justice mechanisms, it also took over some of the functions of the earlier Peace Secretariat. As a result, the ministry also delivers peace services like negotiation support and advice to political parties and the government. The MoPR therefore currently has the double role of being an infrastructure for peace in itself while also being a policy-maker for the peace sector. Most of the peace advisory services are provided by its Conflict Management Division. Through its Peace Focal Points, the ministry advises other ministries on relevant peace and development policies. Some of the issues inhibiting the success of the MoPR (and thus of the peace services it is supposed to deliver) relate to its unclear mission and mandate, inadequate organisational and staff competencies, and limited budgetary resources (Government of Nepal 2010, 7-19). We speculate that actors in the peace sector with a double role, like the MoPR, will be especially likely to encounter conflicts of interest and/or be confronted with the limits of their capacity (compare e.g. a health ministry that would care for patients).

In addition, it has been argued that the MoPR's credibility, legitimacy, and effectiveness have been reduced by a lack of inclusiveness (notably in the consultation processes that led to the creation of the ministry, see Thapa 2007, 60).

The MoPR manages the Nepal Peace Trust Fund (NPTF, chaired by the MoPR minister) and makes up the executive committee of the UN Peace Fund (chaired by the UN Resident Coordinator) together with a donor representative and the chair. Given that NPTF's main task is to fund peace initiatives, we consider it to be an enabler in the peace sector but not an infrastructure for peace.¹²

Local peace committees were set up in almost all of Nepal's 75 districts and are supervised and funded by the MoPR with NPTF funds. The committees are supposed to serve as links between the communities and the national peace process. They are headed by actors with a double role: political party representatives tasked with the delivery of peace services. These services include assisting in the local implementation of the CPA; collecting data on conflict-affected individuals, families and structures; facilitating constructive conflict transformation processes in situations of political or social conflict; and working on reconciliation, healing and trust-building. However, their effectiveness has been hampered by challenges such as political party dominance, a lack of local involvement, miscommunication, an unclear mandate, and a lack of capacity (Carter Center 2011, 7-11).

An ordinance calling for the immediate creation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission was signed by the president in March 2013, but the Supreme Court suspended it two weeks later, citing problems with the mandate and the structure of the commission (including the possibility of amnesty for human rights violators). Among other committees that still need to be established according to the CPA are the High Level Peace Committee and the Commission of Inquiry into Forced Disappearances.

¹² Although we understand that in practice the NPTF provides informal peace services to political parties on an irregular basis.

The Nepal Transition to Peace Initiative, funded by the United States Agency for International Development and Switzerland and managed by The Asia Foundation, provides peace support for political party and other key leaders. It aims to strengthen the ability of the political parties and government to participate effectively in the peace process and to establish informal and confidential dialogue processes to address the concerns of all stakeholders (Siebert 2013, 35; The Asia Foundation 2011, 1).

Community mediation committees have been established in 457 of the almost 4,000 Village Development Committees of Nepal (COMCAP/JICA 2013). Although not initiated by the government, most of them have some form of (local) government participation.¹³ The committees aim to offer villagers mediation services in accordance with human rights norms and to empower individuals in the community by training them as mediators. Donors have either set up mediation committees themselves¹⁴ or through NGOs.¹⁵ Some committees have been criticised for being discriminatory, reinforcing existing hierarchies or being influenced by political parties. Yet more often users report high satisfaction due to the free-of-cost services and fair, efficient, independent, and neutral processes (Suurmond/Sharma 2012, 83).

Dialogue facilitator pools were set up in four communities of Nepal to ease the process of integrating Maoist ex-combatants into host communities by the NGO Pro Public with financial and technical support from GIZ's Supporting Measures to Strengthen the Peace Process. This initiative is expected to be expanded to six additional communities with financial support from the Peace Fund for Non-Governmental Actors once the elections have taken place. Another example is the core group of national- and local-level facilitators that was formed with support of UNDP's Conflict Prevention Programme in order to take forward dialogue processes through national and local ownership.

Early warning mechanisms include the website nepalmonitor.org, set up by Peace Brigades International Nepal, which gathers information about human rights violations across the country. The Election Commission, in cooperation with security agencies, has ordered the development of a mechanism for the purpose of monitoring election-related violence.

Because they provide the service of peace education and information, we include two examples of radio stations functioning as infrastructures for peace: the Media for Peace project of Radio Nepal, and Radio for Peacebuilding by the INGO Search for Common Ground (SFCG). The first, supported by Japan, aims to promote peacebuilding in the country by providing people with accurate, impartial, and fair information on the peace process as well as with other relevant news.¹⁶ The second project, funded by the Royal Norwegian Embassy and implemented by SFCG in partnership with Antenna Foundation Nepal, the Far Western Media Development Center and three local FM stations, was recently concluded. It produced and broadcast two radio programmes covering conflict issues, increasing awareness of the peace process among young people.¹⁷

¹³ In some cases local government officials are members of an advisory committee for the community mediation committee and/or they provide a physical space for the mediators. In other cases community mediation committees are supervised by the District Development Committees and supported by the Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development.

¹⁴ For example, the United Nations Children's Fund, UNDP, Japan International Cooperation Agency's Strengthening Community Mediation Capacity for Peaceful and Harmonious Society Project.

¹⁵ For example, The Asia Foundation, Danish International Development Assistance, and the UK Department for International Development's Enabling State Programme.

¹⁶ Media for Peace project [Online]. Available at: http://radionepal.gov.np/about_inner.php?pid=8 (accessed 29 August 2013).

¹⁷ Radio for Peacebuilding [Online]. Available at: www.sfcg.org/programmes/nepal/ (accessed 29 August 2013).

Informal infrastructures for peace include, apart from the traditional dialogue practices unique to many communities in Nepal, ad hoc mechanisms such as the Accountability Watch Committee and the Community Service Centers (UNRCHCO 2012, 8-9).

Implications and Observations

We conclude our paper by briefly reflecting on the implications of the peace need perspective on infrastructures for peace and possible future developments in the peace sector in Nepal.

Conflicts are ubiquitous and, according to the perspective outlined in this paper, peace needs are too. As a consequence, formal and/or informal infrastructures for peace (and therefore a more or less coordinated Infrastructure for Peace (I4P)) can probably be found in every society, in war or peace. Infrastructures for peace can be planned or spontaneous; they can be established by the people themselves or by (inter) national agencies and institutions; and they can anticipate or respond to arising peace needs.

If our assumptions bear scrutiny, the added value of the peace needs perspective is that it allows for analysing the formal and informal infrastructures that contribute (or are supposed to contribute) to peace, and thus of the Infrastructure for Peace (I4P) as a whole. The same applies to the various actors involved at the macro, meso and micro levels of the sector and to the actual peace needs of the population, making possible the identification of mismatches between offer and demand. The results of such analyses could be used to clarify roles, address gaps in the coordination or allocation of resources, identify the overlap of direct and indirect services, and support demand-driven programme design. This in turn could enhance the coordination of actors in the sector and the quality of services, and make the countrywide management and service delivery more efficient, boosting the Infrastructure for Peace (I4P). Finally, the results can also provide foundation and direction for normatively charged discussions about Infrastructures for Peace (I4Ps).

What is next for the peace sector in Nepal? The National Planning Commission (NPC) has included a programme on Infrastructure for Peace (I4P) in its recent 13th Approach Paper 2013-2016. This might mean that in the near future the NPC will take responsibility for mainstreaming infrastructures for peace across the ministries, with the MoPR assuming the task of designing and implementing a national programme. Both developments will be challenging given that state institutions do not enjoy the broad trust of the public due to the protracted political crisis and their inability to fulfil basic functions. Although various attempts to improve the effectiveness of the MoPR are underway, the current scope of this ministry remains limited.

The most critical short-term programmatic priorities appear to be adequate early warning/early response mechanisms to prevent direct violence, curative peace services to help bridge the most acute conflict lines, and services addressing the pervasive structural violence. Their availability is limited, while the country has embarked on a testing path towards elections and is yet to confront some of the most divisive aspects of the peace process.

In the long run, should the MoPR be given a mandate extending beyond the peace process, we imagine that the ministry might outgrow some of its current functions as infrastructure for peace: leaving the delivery of certain peace services to specialists, and intensifying its role as enabler and steward of the peace sector, for example by developing standards and policies and coordinating the

efforts of implementers. Whether or not an extended ministry for peace will continue to oversee the local peace committees (whose mandate, too, would have to be renewed) will depend on future analyses of their advantages and drawbacks. One structural caveat remains the double role of political actor and peace service provider played by their leadership. While these committees constitute a nationwide framework in the peace sector and their effectiveness seems to be improving, the question remains whether it is better to try to remedy the existing structure, or start anew.

Given their current level of interest in Nepal's peace sector and the many challenges relating to alignment of practices, we envisage that donors will continue to play an important but ad hoc role in setting up infrastructures for peace. Obviously, the transitory nature of the contribution of most of Nepal's peace sector enablers (MoPR, donors, and international and national NGOs) is an impediment to the sustainability of peace service delivery.

To begin tackling some of the challenges mentioned above, the government of Nepal could draft a national roadmap that would formally establish Nepal's peace sector and Infrastructure for Peace (I4P) and recognise the diverse infrastructures for peace. Such a roadmap would outline strategic priorities for scaling up the Infrastructure for Peace (I4P), the implementation of which the government could facilitate in conjunction with donors and international and national NGOs. It is clear that this would imply a commitment to a change of direction, rather than the comprehensive attainment of all tasks from the start.

'How can we live together in peace?' In Nepal, the concept of Infrastructure for Peace (I4P) is bringing into focus people's peace needs as the starting point for formulating an answer.

Acronyms

CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
MoPR	Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NPC	National Planning Commission
NPTF	Nepal Peace Trust Fund
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SFCG	Search for Common Ground
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
ZFD	Civil Peace Service Program (GIZ)

About the Authors

Jeannine Suurmond is technical advisor for the Civil Peace Service Program of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (ZFD/GIZ), and supports the peacebuilding and community mediation programmes run by the NGO Pro Public in Kathmandu, Nepal. Together with Pro Public, she advises the National Planning Commission and the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction on Infrastructure for Peace (I4P). Before coming to Nepal, she provided mediation

support for track 1 and 2 intrastate peace processes in Asia, Africa and the Pacific as research analyst for Kreddha, the International Peace Council for States, Peoples, and Minorities. Prior to that, she worked as a consultant for the Clingendael Institute and co-founded the Pax Ludens Foundation for Training and Research in Conflict Resolution, both in the Netherlands. She holds an MA in Psychology from the Free University of Amsterdam and various certificates in mediation, conflict transformation, and peacebuilding from institutions including Inmedio, the Transcend Peace University, and the Peace Action Training and Research Institute of Romania (PATRIR).

Prakash Mani Sharma is one of the founding members and the executive director of the Nepalese NGO Pro Public, and heads its Access to Justice Department. Having extensive experience with establishing a variety of infrastructures for peace in Nepal, he is currently advising the government on the topic with the support of ZFD/GIZ. Recently, he helped to set up the Asia-Pacific branch of the Global Alliance for Ministries and Infrastructures for Peace. He is also one of the founding members and an executive member of the Community Mediation Society in Nepal. He has overseen the implementation of the community mediation project by Pro Public in different districts of Nepal since 2003, as well as the dialogue facilitator pools created to facilitate the integration of ex-combatants into the communities. Mr. Sharma holds an LL.M in Comparative Law from India (1990) and an LL.M in Environmental and Natural Resources Law from the USA (1999). He is a senior advocate and council member of the Supreme Court Bar Association in Nepal. Mr. Sharma has been practising public interest law since 1989 and successfully represented the public in various public interest litigation cases brought to the Supreme Court, in order to protect and promote the human rights of disabled persons, children, women, and other socially marginalised groups.

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Article 3: Assessing psychosocial conditions for social reintegration of former Maoist combatants and communities in Nepal

Jeannine Suurmond, Babu Ram Poudel & Maya Böhm

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Abstract

While the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration literature emphasizes that social reintegration of ex-combatants is key to sustainable peace, few analyses exist, leading to limited understanding of reintegration dynamics and subsequently ad hoc program design. We examined the psychosocial conditions faced by 223 ex-combatants from the People's Liberation Army and 213 host community stakeholders in Nepal in 2012 and 2013, specifically investigating the relation between Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), factional ties, and Readiness to Reconcile in ex-combatants. Despite ex-combatants' positive attitudes and perceptions of their host communities, many struggled to generate an income. Ex-combatants who were likely to suffer from PTSD reported lower readiness to reconcile with former enemies. Having factional ties did not impact willingness to reconcile, but was associated with reduced PTSD. Most community stakeholders positively regarded the arrival of these ex-combatants. However, a minority expressed alarm about political differences, war grievances, and ex-combatants' problematic behaviour. Critical activities identified to facilitate social reintegration are psychosocial trauma support and counselling, social interaction and peace education programs, and continued socio-economic support for both communities and ex-combatants.

Keywords: Social reintegration, ex-combatants, host communities, reconciliation, PTSD, transitional justice

Introduction

The 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement formally marked the end of the 'People's War' against the Government of Nepal. Initiated a decade earlier by the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), CPN (M), the war was mostly fought between its armed wing, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), and state forces. As a result of the violence, between 13,000¹ and 16,278² people died. An estimated 200,000 people were displaced³ and over 1,300 remain disappeared until today.⁴ The disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of the Maoist combatants was one of the main foci of the Peace Agreement, which envisaged their transformation into citizens.⁵ Although the PLA has been dismantled and the ex-combatants were released into society in 2012, former PLA combatants and host communities continue to grapple with challenges related to their reintegration.⁶

Many societies recovering from armed conflict face the challenge of disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating former combatants. Although research is limited, the existing track record of DDR programs, often assisted by the United Nations, is mixed.⁷ Traditional practices have been critiqued for not taking into account ex-combatants' post-war transition challenges,⁸ and privileging former combatants while neglecting the needs of host communities.⁹ Criticism from mental health researchers relates to the lack of support for ex-combatants struggling with psychological problems.¹⁰ The UNDP states: 'Psycho-social reintegration support and counselling is a critical, but often overlooked, component of DDR'.¹¹

The reintegration of combatants, following disarmament and demobilization, is often the most challenging phase of the DDR process, yet crucial for the prevention of war reoccurrence and

sustainable peace. Most available analyses of DDR programs focus on the economic aspect of reintegration,¹² including in Nepal.¹³ Compared to economic and political aspects of reintegration, social reintegration particularly relies on human relationships.

As combatants transition to civilian roles, they need to successfully become part of a familiar or new community, while the community needs to accept and include them.¹⁴ Essentially, reintegration can be seen as 'the process whereby former combatants and their families and other displaced persons are assimilated into the social and economic life of (civilian) communities'.¹⁵ In practical terms, ex-combatants increase their interactions with the community and reduce their contact with and reliance on their former militia network.¹⁶

Unlike economic reintegration, no agreement exists on what determines social reintegration and how a DDR program's success or failure in that regard can be identified.¹⁷ One commonly accepted indicator of successful social reintegration has been the extent to which ex-combatants are delinked from their war factions, a goal of DDR programs.¹⁸ Factional ties, that is, keeping close social connections with other ex-combatants after the end of an armed conflict and the official disintegration of the armed group, may hinder reintegration,¹⁹ but some research has cast doubt on the utility of this as an indicator for social reintegration.²⁰ Instead, Kaplan and Nussio suggested that social reintegration be understood as a level of community participation: 'Participation can help ex-combatants feel socially fulfilled and accepted by their communities and can reduce their need to maintain social connections to their former armed group networks and bosses'.²¹ Still, little is known about the factors that account for successful reintegration at the micro level, to which there are two important sides.

On the one hand, the success of social reintegration depends on the 'absorptive capacity' of a community to accept ex-combatants; and, on the other hand, on how ex-combatants interact with the communities in which they settle, which in turn depends on their mental health. Community members may be wary of ex-combatants, because of security concerns and the additional strain their presence places on local resources like land and water.²² Communities may not be able to provide opportunities for their members to participate in economic, social, and political affairs of the community, and their social cohesion may be weak.²³ Moreover, vocational or economic programs that aim to support the social reintegration of ex-combatants may inadvertently contribute to stigmatization of ex-combatants if they target participants on the basis of (ex-combatant) identity rather than needs or merit.²⁴

For ex-combatants, interacting with community members may mean exposing oneself and facing security-dilemma risks from armed groups²⁵ as well as having to deal with stigma, jealousies over demobilization benefits, and grievances between perpetrators and victims that further hamper reconciliation.²⁶ In Nepal, many ex-combatants settling into communities allegedly felt impeded by their past identity as '*ladaku*' –combatants-²⁷ and being seen as a '*panch-lakhe*', a half-millionaire as a result of the payments they received.²⁸

The challenge of bridging the relational divide, captured with the term 'reconciliation', is faced both by ex-combatants and communities. Reconciliation has been defined as a state of 'mutual acceptance by members of formerly hostile groups' or as the 'process through which a society moves from a divided past to a shared future'.²⁹ Although reconciliation lies at the heart of living together peacefully after violent conflict, and, as Willems and van Leeuwen write, is 'deeply interconnected

with social integration',³⁰ it is not often assessed in the context of DDR. Reconciliation requires an identity shift: From excluding to including the other's identity, without regarding it as a negation of one's own.³¹ From a psychological perspective, the readiness of an individual to reconcile can be broken down into the 'reduction of feelings of anger and revenge,' [...] 'the ability to take the opponent's perspective', reduction of 'avoidance of the [former] opponent', [...] 'openness to positive relationships with the opponent', [and] renunciation of violence'.³² Genuine reconciliation thus requires substantial psychological resources and capacities, which not every person is likely to be able to access.

The connection between traumatization and reconciliation has been explored in various post-war contexts.³³ PTSD symptoms have been linked to lower readiness to reconcile and more feelings of revenge in former Ugandan and Congolese child soldiers;³⁴ to a lower sense of community and interdependence in a sample of Rwandans after the genocide;³⁵ and to low levels of agreement to reconciliation in a sample of genocide survivors in Rwanda, yet with high levels of agreement to reconciliation in perpetrators of that genocide.³⁶ Thus, most studies indicate that higher levels of PTSD symptoms go together with more feelings of revenge, less openness to interaction, and less agreement to reconcile.

Previous research has shown that a significant portion of ex-combatants suffer from mental-health issues, including Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), caused by repeated exposure to severe psychological distress.³⁷ Additional markers for vulnerability include serious injuries, illiteracy, low levels of education, persistent unemployment, as well as estrangement from families, and conflicts with community members.³⁸ For ex-combatants with PTSD, reintegrating into civilian society, let alone contributing to reconciliation within their communities, will likely be difficult. In Nepal, the armed conflict has had significant negative effects on mental health, especially anxiety, as Luitel and colleagues demonstrated: they reported a prevalence of 9.6 per cent for PTSD in a random sample.³⁹ For populations exposed to torture, refugees, and former child soldiers in Nepal, PTSD-rates were higher.⁴⁰

The association between psychological well-being and reconciliation in adult ex-combatants in Nepal has to our knowledge not yet been the focus of research. For almost six years after the end of the war, an estimated 20,000 verified Maoist army combatants -the overwhelming majority of the PLA- were confined to 28 cantonments and camps across the country. Once political agreement on the terms of their release was reached in 2012, they were asked to choose either integration into the Nepalese National Army, rehabilitation -with education and training- or retirement with monetary compensation.⁴¹ Out of 17,052 combatants who participated in this process, more than 15,600 ex-combatants then chose voluntary retirement.⁴² They were to settle back into communities, a social reintegration process that was expected to be challenging for both sides. At the time, no one knew how the host communities perceived the former combatants and whether they would welcome them. Neither was it clear if the ex-combatants would find ways to build social relationships with the other community members; reconcile; and participate in and contribute to community life; nor whether they were suffering from mental health issues and how their psychological state might influence their reintegration.

Robins and colleagues reported that 'a fraction' of ex-PLAs was suffering from symptoms of PTSD, and that impaired mental health was a risk for further stigmatization, but they did not make a connection with reconciliation.⁴³ The research on former child soldiers of the armed conflict in Nepal

by Kohrt and colleagues demonstrated an association between higher symptom severity of PTSD and more difficulties in social reintegration.⁴⁴ Comparable research on adult former combatants is lacking so far.

Objective

Aiming to make an empirical contribution to the literature on social reintegration and the case literature on Nepal, we researched psychosocial factors of both ex-combatants and their host communities. We specifically investigated readiness to reconcile in ex-combatants, hypothesizing that Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and factional ties would correlate negatively with Readiness to Reconcile. We also assessed the conditions for social reintegration of ex-combatants by finding out who belonged to their primary social network, how they felt received by the communities, and to which extent they were willing to contribute to the welfare of their communities, as well as what the opinions, concerns, and hopes of key members of their host communities were.

Materials and methods

Sampling

The presented research was part of the Nepal-German Support of Measures to Strengthen the Peace Process project (STPP) supported by GIZ, on behalf of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). GIZ, the German Development Cooperation, was the only organization allowed by the Maoist leadership to work inside the cantonments. The STPP project, designed to improve the living conditions in the cantonments and camps and surrounding communities by making available basic services -drinking water, sanitation, health- and by offering skills and vocational training, encompassed 19,600 ex-combatants in all of the 28 locations as well as 35,000 members of the adjoining communities.

After the closing of the cantonments, the project refocused on supporting 30,000 members of 30 host communities and 7,500 ex-combatants including their dependents, who settled there.⁴⁵ The Nepalese organization Pro Public, supported by a peace advisor from ZFD/GIZ,⁴⁶ contributed to the project by assessing different aspects in those host communities that had to absorb the largest groups of ex-combatants and developing program recommendations based on the findings. The quantitative and qualitative data reported are part of the research data collected by Pro Public.

We report data from two moments of collection in communities in seven districts that were receiving comparatively large numbers of ex-combatants (groups of 20+ individuals). Data were collected between November 2012 and January 2013 in the districts of Dang, Makwanpur, Rupandehi, and Surkhet and in August 2013 in the districts of Bardiya, Banke, Kapilvastu, and Rupandehi. For this purpose, Pro Public recruited four researchers from each district, each of whom underwent a two-day residential research training.

Using the STPP database, which contained, at times out-dated, contact details of ex-combatants as a guideline, ex-combatants in the communities were identified with the snowball method. Because we wanted to examine the entire population of ex-combatants in each community, efforts were made to invite all former combatants present to participate in the study (total population sampling).

The ex-combatants received the questionnaires in group meetings, the goals of which were to meet every ex-combatant face-to-face, discuss the aims of the study, answer questions, and offer assistance with filling in the questionnaire. Data of 223 former combatants could be used for the present analysis (with $n=45$ from data collection in August 2013).

The principal source of the community data was face-to-face interviews with key stakeholders in the host communities; 213 of which were conducted in the same timeframe. Interviewees were selected based on a purposive sampling procedure by the Pro Public research team in cooperation with the field research teams, STPP field staff, secretaries of Village Development Committees (VDCs), and Community Development Committees. Key stakeholders included district and village level officials representing various offices, local political leaders from different parties, police officers, chairpersons and coordinators of local peace committees, (I)NGO staff, teachers, journalists, business leaders, and elders.

All interviewees provided informed consent before participating in the survey and questions to this effect were asked before the interview started. The procedures followed were in accordance with the Helsinki Declaration of 1975, as revised in 2000.

Instruments

Using structured and open questions, we gathered information on ex-combatants' life situation, including education, sources of income and challenges, length of time spent in the PLA, and current political affiliation, previous ties to the communities, how ex-combatants felt that their community perceived them, social relations including factional ties, and willingness to contribute to the community.

To assess readiness to reconcile, we used the questionnaire for readiness to reconcile by Stammel, Neuner, Boettche and Knaevelsrud.⁴⁷ The questionnaire consists of three subscales - openness to interactions, absence of feelings of revenge, openness to conflict resolution- and allows for the calculation of a total score as well as subscale-scores. Validity and reliability have been reported as satisfactory with Cronbach's Alpha between 0.74 and 0.90 in the original sample. The questionnaire has been developed for use with victims of human rights violations and has been used with refugees and victims of war-related rape in Germany.⁴⁸ To our knowledge, it has not been used in samples of combatants or ex-combatants. To assess readiness to reconcile with the former opponents or enemies in ex-combatants of the PLA in Nepal, the questions were rephrased to investigate feelings, attitudes, actions and ideas regarding 'royalists or -former- members of the army/police'. Additionally, the original Likert-format was changed into a yes-no-format for simplification and consistence with the other instruments in the survey. The second item ('I also listen to -opponent groups- music') was omitted, because it does not apply to the Nepalese context of PLA and state forces. With these changes, scale sum values between 0 and 6 (openness to interaction; absence of feelings of revenge) and 0 and 5 (openness to conflict resolution) resulted, with higher values indicating higher openness, or absence of feelings of revenge respectively. For the assessment of readiness to reconcile we weighed the scales with the number of items and then created a sum score, ranging between 0 and 3 with higher values representing higher overall readiness to reconcile. All scales were negatively skewed and not normally distributed. Cronbach's coefficients for openness to interaction and absence of feelings of revenge were acceptable with

$\alpha=0.714$ (interaction), $\alpha=0.758$ (revenge), however less good for the total scale with $\alpha=0.687$ and critical for openness to conflict resolution with $\alpha=0.451$.

As a short screening for PTSD, we used the screening tool by Breslau, Peterson, Kessler and Schultz.⁴⁹ The scale includes seven items, five from the numbing/avoidance cluster, and two from the hyper arousal cluster of the DSM-IV. The scale has been used in civilian, primary care, and a veteran sample, including a study in rural China.⁵⁰ In our study, the time frame for symptoms was the time of the interview (point-prevalence). The first item was explicitly linked to the time in the PLA by rewording it to 'Do you avoid being reminded of your time in the PLA by staying away from certain places, people or activities?' Resulting scores ranged between 0 and 7 with higher values representing more symptoms and thus a higher likelihood of PTSD. Breslau and colleagues recommended a cut-off-score of 4 and above to identify cases of PTSD. Cronbach's α in our sample was 0.811.

Following Humphreys and Weinstein, we calculated a variable to measure factional ties of the participants.⁵¹ For this, we combined data on who participants said they were spending most time with and who they turned to in case of need. If a participant had indicated ex-combatants for both variables, factional ties would get the value '2'; if he or she had indicated ex-combatants for one of the variables, it would be '1'; and if ex-combatants were not mentioned for either variable, factional ties would take on the value '0'.

For measuring how ex-combatants felt received by their communities, we used their indication of whether they felt positively, neutrally, or negatively received.

The questionnaire was translated into Nepali by the research team.

The key stakeholder interviews investigated community perceptions regarding the former combatants and the state of their reintegration; attitudes towards the ex-combatants; and obstacles to and suggestions for supporting ex-combatants' social reintegration in their community. Questions included: 'Compared to last year, do you think [name of community] has become a better place? Why yes/no?'; 'What do you think about the arrival of ex-combatants in [name of community]?'; 'Do you think it is easy or difficult for the members of the community to accept the ex-combatants, why?'; 'Do you think the ex-combatants are being treated differently by the community members? Why?'; 'Are you expecting anything from the former combatants, and if so, what?'; 'Are you interacting with (some of the) ex-combatants in [name of community]? If yes, for which reasons?'; 'What do you think might be obstacles to the integration of ex-combatants into the community?'; 'What do you think is needed for the successful integration of ex-combatants in [name of community]?'

The interviews had the duration of about 1,5 hours and were conducted in Nepali or the local language by an interviewer accompanied by a note taker. The notes were later translated into English, transcribed, coded, and analysed in Microsoft Excel. The content analysis had a quantitative component, counting the number of times interviewees answered 'yes' or 'no', and a qualitative component sorting the narrative answers into categories and determining overarching themes. For example, responses to the question about obstacles to reintegration like 'political ideology', 'political beliefs', and 'different ideology' were categorized as 'political differences'.

The data analysis was conducted according to the coding steps proposed by Corbin and Strauss.⁵² The quantitative and qualitative results are illustrated with quotes from ex-combatants and community stakeholders, some of which were edited for readability in English.

Results

Former Maoist combatants

At the time of participation, the 223 participants were residing in the districts of Dang (23%), Rupandehi (22%), Makwanpur (20%), Surkhet (15%), Banke, Bardiya (both 8%) and Kapilvastu (4%). Age, gender, ethnicity, number of dependents, and level of education are displayed in Table 1.

Table 1: Demographic characteristics of the sample (n=223)

Age, years, Mean (Sd.)	27.3 (4.2)
Gender	n (%)
Female	54 (24.2)
Male	168 (75.3)
Missing	1 (0.4)
Ethnicity	n (%)
Thakuri	2 (0.9)
Newar	1 (0.4)
Janajati / Adivasi	107 (48.0)
Dalit	66 (29.6)
Chhettri	38 (17.0)
Brahmin	9 (4.0)
Number of dependents, Mean (Sd.)	5.5 (2.9)
Education	(n, %)
Illiterate / no education	6 (2.7)
Literate	2 (0.9)
Primary	54 (24.2)
Lower secondary	48 (21.5)
Secondary	62 (27.8)
Higher secondary	47 (21.1)
Bachelor degree	3 (1.3)
Master's degree	1 (0.4)

The majority of participants had chosen voluntary retirement from the government (82%), one person had chosen rehabilitation, and 34 stated that they had not received any support from the government (15%).

Of all participants, 74 per cent indicated that they were currently unemployed, 2 per cent that they were semi-employed, 21 per cent self-employed and 2 per cent employed. Another 1 per cent reported waged labour as a source of income.

However, asked about how they were currently managing their household expenditures, approximately half of the participants stated agriculture or animal husbandry (49%), 24 per cent stated waged labour, 11 per cent self-employment, and 8 per cent the voluntary retirement package.

As biggest current challenges, 74 per cent stated their insufficient income, 47 per cent health problems. Tensions with other community members were indicated by 9 per cent of the participants as biggest current challenge. Illustrative is this quote by one ex-combatant: 'They have a negative attitude towards us, because we have been engaged in warfare'.

Asked about their current ties to the community, 40 per cent stated that it was the place where they had been born and 15 per cent stated that they had family ties to the community. Another 26 per cent had been linked with the community by the PLA.

Time in the PLA and political affiliation

The participating ex-combatants had spent between three and 14 years in the PLA ($M=7.96$, $Sd=2.45$) and were between seven and 33 years old when joining ($M=18.06$, $Sd=4.01$). The majority were affiliated with the Unified Communist Party of Nepal - Maoist (UCPN-M) at the time of participation in this study (61%), fewer supported the Communist Party of Nepal- Maoist (CPN-M). Approximately a quarter of the participants stated they were neutral or not following any party (26%).

Social networks and factional ties of the ex-combatants

The participants could indicate who in the community they were spending most time with. They could indicate up to five groups of people. Family members were most often pointed out (84%), followed by neighbours (58%), ex-PLAs (38%), friends other than former PLA members (16%), and community leaders (14%).

Participants were also asked to indicate who they turned to in case of need. It was possible to indicate priorities, i.e. assigning ranks to people mentioned. For 80 per cent it was the family they turned to first, for 4 per cent each friends from PLA or a community mediation centre. However, on the second rank participants most often named friends from the PLA (41%) and on the third rank they most often named friends not connected to the PLA (20%). In total, family was mentioned by 84 per cent, ex-PLAs were mentioned by 49 per cent, friends other than ex-PLAs by 34 per cent, and community leaders by 24 per cent.

As described above, an indicator for factional ties was computed from both variables. This was possible for 216 cases. Strong factional ties, meaning that participants named ex-combatants both for spending most time with and addressing needs, were calculated for 29 per cent. Weaker factional ties, meaning participants either indicating ex-combatants for addressing needs or spending most time with them, were stated by 31 per cent, whereas no factional ties were reported by 40 per cent.

Perception of the community and willingness to contribute to the community

The vast majority of participants felt that the host community perceived them positively (88%). Asked for specification, a large proportion stated that they had good relations with the

community, with one ex-combatant describing his reception with: 'They welcomed us with thoughts of harmony'.

When asked whether they would be interested to contribute to the community, 98 per cent reported that they were. Of these, with multiple answers possible, about half voiced interest in contributing by becoming a community mediator (51%), almost half chose the option of contributing by participating in community projects like reforestation, waste cleaning, or road maintenance (50%), 34 per cent participation in peacebuilding programs or, more broadly, the peacebuilding process, 20 per cent wanted to contribute by helping to improve safety and security in the community, and 14 per cent chose the option of organizing cultural or social events. 'I promised them that I will not engage in war again', said an ex-combatant, describing why he thinks the community has a positive perception of him. Asked directly whether they had thought about contributing to establish peace in the community, 88 per cent of the ex-combatants stated that they had, 6 per cent that they had not.

Indication for Post-traumatic Stress Disorder

Using a cut-off of four or more symptoms reported, a total number of 29 participants (13%) fulfilled the criteria for a probable PTSD at the time of participation.⁵³ No significant differences in PTSD scores between men and women were found.

Readiness to reconcile

With a mean value of 2.41, readiness to reconcile was generally high in the sample ($n=194$). This was especially true for the subscales of absence of feelings of revenge ($M=5.35$, $n=196$) and openness to interaction ($M=5.16$, $n=205$). Across participants, openness to conflict resolution had a mean value of 3.26 ($n=205$). There were no significant differences between men and women.

Association of readiness to reconcile with PTSD and factional ties

The more PTSD-symptoms participants indicated, the lower was their readiness to reconcile (Table 2). Using the cut-off-value of four or more symptoms, the group with an indication for PTSD scored significantly lower regarding total readiness to reconcile using the Mann-Whitney U-Test ($U=1086.50$; $p<.001$; $r=-.31$) as well as significantly lower on the subscales openness to interactions ($U=1433.00$; $p=.001$; $r=-.23$), absence of feelings of revenge ($U=1286.50$; $p<.001$; $r=-.30$), but not openness to conflict resolution ($U=1726.50$; $p=.071$; $r=-.13$).

Table 2: Correlations between readiness to reconcile, PTSD, age of joining and time spent in PLA (Spearman correlation coefficients, $n=189$)

	Age of joining PLA	Time spent in PLA	Readiness to reconcile	Openness to interactions	Absence of revenge	Openness to conflict resolution
PTSD symptoms	-.003	-.030	-.289**	-.286**	-.376**	-.060
Readiness to reconcile	.026	.059	-	.603**	.530**	.797**

Openness to interactions	.044	.115	.603**	-	.307**	.214**
Absence of revenge	-.033	-.080	.530**	.307**	-	.151*
Openness to conflict resolution	.015	.051	.797**	.214**	.151*	-

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$; Cases with missing data in any of the scales were excluded from the analysis.

Neither age at time of entry into the PLA, nor duration of association with the PLA, was significantly associated with PTSD or readiness to reconcile (Table 2).

Comparing groups of participants based on factional ties with the Kruskal Wallis test, participants did not differ in regard to readiness to reconcile depending on their strength of factional ties, $H(2)=0.309$, $p=.857$. This also applied to the subscales, openness to interactions, $H(2)=3.543$, $p=.170$, absence of feelings of revenge, $H(2)=3.957$, $p=.138$, and openness to conflict resolution, $H(2)=3.118$, $p=.210$. The Kruskal Wallis test revealed differences in PTSD symptom severity depending on the strength of factional ties, $H(2)=13.108$, $p=.001$. In pairwise comparisons, the group with the lowest factional ties differed significantly from both the group that indicated contact with ex-PLA in one ($U=1694.00$; $p=.008$; $r=-.23$) and both categories ($U=1331.00$; $p=.001$; $r=-.28$); with the group without factional ties reporting the highest number of PTSD symptoms. The two groups indicating factional ties did not differ significantly in regard to PTSD symptoms ($U=1305.00$; $p=.484$; $r=-.07$).

Key community stakeholders

In each of the seven communities, at least 30 community stakeholders were interviewed. Of the in total 213 interviewees, 71 represented government offices (administration, health, forest, irrigation, education, agriculture); 37 represented civil society (NGOs or intellectuals); 34 represented political parties (various); 20 were from business and industry; 13 were associated with the police; 12 were educators; 11 represented the judiciary and legal professions; six were mediators or traditional justice leaders; five represented the media; and four health care institutions. Of all interviewees, 69 per cent had interacted with the ex-combatants in their communities, whereas 31 per cent had not.

Thoughts, opinions, and concerns about the arrival of ex-combatants

Asked openly about their thoughts about the arrival of the ex-combatants in their community (multiple responses were possible), a majority shared positive opinions about the arrival of former combatants in their communities. As can be seen in Diagram 1, about half of the interviewees considered the arrival of the ex-combatants as a natural, positive part of the peace process, with a small quarter appreciating the ex-combatants for their contribution to the nation.

Diagram 1 What are the community stakeholders' positive views on the arrival of ex-combatants?

However, a minority of stakeholders regarded the arrival of the ex-combatants in their community more apprehensively, as illustrated in Diagram 2.

Diagram 2 What are the community stakeholders' concerns about the arrival of ex-combatants?

The most often mentioned concern was a prevailing atmosphere of fear in the community, followed by suspicions regarding the future behaviour of ex-combatants based on their different ideological views and experiences. As one interviewee noted: 'They are a political army.'

Community acceptance and treatment of ex-combatants

Most stakeholders (65%) thought that it would be easy for their community to accept the former combatants, with a substantial majority (78%) believing that the former combatants were treated by the community members like any other member. Many of these interviewees expressed appreciation for the behaviour of ex-PLAs: 'Ex-combatants have realized the mistakes of the past'; 'they stay out of disputes'; 'they contribute to the vocational labour force and development'; and 'ex-PLAs are contributing to peace, social harmony, and reconciliation'. A community mediation centre coordinator described the sense of relief in the community at the ex-PLAs' return: 'With men and youth back in the community and their families, it has become a lot easier in the household, cultural, social, construction tasks and likewise. Hence, the acceptance of the ex-combatants.' Indeed, several stakeholders highlighted that 'the community doesn't harbour negative feelings towards them.' Some interviewees emphasized their common humanity: 'The ex-PLAs belong to the same community'; 'they are Nepalese citizens'; 'there is no point for treating ex-combatants in mediocre manner'; and 'ex-PLAs are human beings too'. Others provided fear-based responses: 'The community doesn't have the audacity to treat them differently, as they fear the ex-combatants' and 'they fear that different treatment towards the ex-PLAs might encourage them to go back to the war'. Neutral observations were: 'The ex-combatants have returned to their own families and communities' and 'the ex-combatants are engaged in their own business'.

About a third of the stakeholders thought that there were difficulties with accepting former combatants, with 15 per cent believing that the ex-combatants were treated differently from other community members. Several emphasized the plight of victims of the war: 'There are victims in the community who are not able to forget the past', as well as community wariness: 'The fear of the armed struggle is still in people's minds'. Others noted actual problematic behaviour: 'Ex-combatants should stop creating an environment of fear and terror'; and 'ex-combatants should leave behind their arrogant behaviour'. The impression of a chairperson of a Local Peace Committee was: 'Ex-combatants have spent a major chunk of the money they received in splurges, rather than wise investment of such. Now they have ego and inordinate pride about their money.' Again others feared future difficulties, because 'the ex-PLAs might return to war'; 'their political beliefs are untrustworthy'; and 'their culture is different from that of the community'. A few interviewees pointed out that there was a lack of interaction between community members and ex-combatants.

Community stakeholders' expectations from the ex-combatants

Almost all stakeholders had expectations of the ex-combatants, including participation in economic and social activities, such as 'To utilize their existing skills to earn an income'; 'the wise utilization of their Voluntary Retirement packages'; 'to become involved in vocational and developmental activities'; and 'to be engaged in social works for welfare of the community members'. Interviewees expected leadership from the ex-PLAs: 'To help lead society down the correct path and to aid the peace process'; 'to contribute to raising awareness in society'; 'to come forward as leader and be a role model because they believe in their leadership for socio-economic and political transformation'. They also hoped the ex-PLAs would contribute to peacekeeping: 'To maintain the peace and social harmony in the community'; 'to be responsible and law abiding citizens and follow the rules and regulations of the country'; and 'to not to be a reason for the recurrence of armed conflict'.

Obstacles to reintegration

A majority of the interviewees saw obstacles on the path to reintegration of ex-combatants, as shown in Diagram 3.

Diagram 3: What stands in the way of reintegration?

The most often mentioned obstacle for successful integration (by nearly half of the interviewees) concerned political, cultural, and ideological differences. A representative of an alliance of Non-Governmental Organizations linked these differences to the highest echelon of political leadership: 'The U-CPN Maoist wants to have control over ex-combatants, blocking them to enter into another political party. The ideology of the party itself has disturbed the integration process.'

Others who did not foresee difficulties on the path of reintegration mentioned that the ex-combatants had returned to their families without any prejudice; that they belonged to the community; and that they did not have a negative mentality for revenge, but rather for reconciliation.

Recommendations for successful integration

To ensure the successful integration of ex-combatants, almost everyone mentioned income-generation opportunities and support for ex-combatants (Diagram 4).

Diagram 4 What is needed for successful reintegration?

Suggestions for economic reintegration included initiating various kinds of agricultural and animal husbandry projects; establishing SMEs and cooperatives; providing foreign employment support; and access to finance.

Recommended vocational trainings related to farming (fruit and vegetables, poultry, fish, cotton); animal husbandry (including veterinarian skills); establishing SMEs and cooperatives; and services (electricity, cycle maintenance, tailoring, and beauty).

Ideas for social interaction and peace education programs spanned the areas of governance (good governance, leadership development, democratic education); law (legal education, human rights, gender discrimination); peacebuilding (mediation, conflict resolution, peace education, reconciliation, healing from the past); and sports (involving ex-combatants). In addition, a small minority recommended psychological counselling.

Several interviewees (12%) emphasized that, regardless of the type of program, reintegration programs should be inclusive (including disqualified and female ex-combatants as well as community members, especially the poorest) and needs-and demand-based. The head of a District Irrigation Office, for example, said: 'The word 'unite' is itself good. The integrating and uniting of PLAs must be done together'. More practically, an executive of a District Health Office echoed this view: 'Reintegration could be made easier by concentrating on bringing community and ex-combatants together, by bringing programs of social welfare and likewise based on need and demand.'

Discussion

In the sample of Nepalese former combatants of the People's Liberation Army who had moved from cantonments to communities that year, attitudes towards their communities were generally positive. To a large extent, ex-combatants felt well received and wanted to contribute to

their communities, for example by supporting community projects or becoming community mediators. Many had also considered directly contributing to community peace. The majority had very few or no feelings of revenge and was open to interactions with their former enemies in the army and the police. Most ex-combatants had completed at least lower secondary school, yet were unemployed. They indicated to spend most time with family members and other ex-PLAs. There was evidence for PTSD in only a small minority of the participants.

Most of the stakeholders in the communities where these ex-combatants settled had similarly positive attitudes. They regarded the arrival of former combatants as a positive and necessary development, did not think that the ex-combatants were treated differently from other community members, and believed that it would be easy for their communities to accept them. Most community stakeholders echoed what the ex-PLAs had expressed about themselves: that they were willing to contribute to the community, and had the expectation that the ex-combatants would refrain from violence and become constructive members of the community, even leaders.

However, a more apprehensive minority associated mistrust, uncertainty, and sense of threat, as well as the on-going suffering of the victims of war, with the arrival of the ex-combatants. Notably, most interviewees saw obstacles on the path of reintegration. A mix of issues, encompassing economic, psychosocial, and political aspects of reintegration were mentioned: Political, cultural, and ideological differences; the poor financial and educational situation of ex-PLAs; war-related grievances, fear, and mistrust; problematic behaviour of ex-PLAs in the communities; lack of state support and progress; and lack of community resources and development. The top three community recommendations for reintegration support were income generation projects and support, vocational trainings, and social interactions and peace education to bridge divides.

On the basis of these results it can be concluded that some of the important preconditions for a successful social reintegration of Maoist ex-combatants into communities were positive. Thus, at the time of study, several months following their release into society, the majority of ex-PLAs in this sample mostly did not meet the vulnerability criteria mentioned in the literature. Most of the ex-combatants were not estranged from family; did not demonstrate PTSD symptoms; were literate; had at least lower secondary education; and did not experience conflicts with community members or indicated a lack of social participation.⁵⁴ However, at that time, this sample did meet the vulnerability criteria of unemployment and factional ties (more on this below). The finding that, in Nepal, ex-combatants allegedly felt impeded by their ex-PLA identity in becoming accepted by the communities⁵⁵ is not generally corroborated by our data, but could be reflected by their unemployment and/or true for those communities for which a minority of stakeholders reported concerns about the ex-combatants.

The host communities neither seemed to meet many of the –what could be called– ‘community vulnerability criteria’ identified in the literature. Most community stakeholders were not wary of the ex-combatants; did not seem to have security concerns;⁵⁶ were not worried about local resources; did not stigmatize the ex-PLAs or indicate jealousy over demobilization benefits;⁵⁷ and expected and wanted the ex-combatants to constructively participate in various roles in the community.⁵⁸ Besides political differences and income-generation, a minority did express concerns about security, grievances between perpetrators and victims, and lack of state support and political progress as obstacles to the reintegration process. This finding resonates with Subedi and Jenkins,

who identified as one of the challenges for community acceptance of ex-combatants in Nepal the lack of transitional justice and post-war reconciliation, as yet uncompleted components of the peace process.⁵⁹

Psychosocial community conditions for social integration and reconciliation

Looking at the overall acceptance and treatment by communities of the ex-PLAs, a generally positive albeit somewhat mixed picture emerges. Apart from neutral responses, stakeholders either expressed appreciation for ex-combatants' behaviour and a sense of common humanity and hope (the majority), or critique of ex-combatants' behaviour and a sense of fear, dread, and sympathy with war victims (the minority). From a psychological perspective, the appreciation-common humanity responses indicate a pathway for social reintegration and reconciliation. Gratitude expressions have been shown to increase pro-social behaviour by enabling individuals to feel socially valued.⁶⁰ To be appreciated by community members for their performance as citizens rather than ex-combatants will likely stimulate more of such behaviour, and thus the transformation of ex-combatants into citizens as envisioned in the Peace Agreement. In addition, the common humanity responses indicate an ability to include the other's identity without regarding it as a negation of one's own⁶¹ and to take the opponent's perspective,⁶² two important indicators of reconciliation.

In contrast, the critique-fear, dread, and victim sympathy responses signal needs for protection, trauma healing, restoration, and justice. Indeed for victims of war, safety is an utmost priority, lest they be re-traumatized.⁶³ As long as these needs are not addressed, it is likely that ex-PLAs will continue to be seen as perpetrators. Such stigma will stand in the way of their adoption of a civilian identity and thus social integration, and of developing the inclusive attitudes, perceptions and feelings required for genuine reconciliation. Moreover, research has associated enemy images with the (re-)occurrence of violence,⁶⁴ the existence of which are facilitated by an absence of meaningful interactions, pointed out as a concern by several interviewees, to challenge assumptions between parties.⁶⁵ We therefore recommend trauma-informed care programs for victims of war, which identify and limit potential triggers to reduce re-traumatization, protect their mental and emotional health, and support healing, as well as the implementation of the truth and reconciliation process as set out in the Peace Agreement to provide long-due restoration and justice. For those ex-combatants showing anti-social behaviour, counselling is recommended. In addition, social interaction programs around subjects meaningful to the communities as a whole, such as the suggested peace education, can provide opportunities for building familiarity and trust and for getting to know one another beyond political, cultural, and ideological divides.

PTSD and Readiness to Reconcile

Turning to the ex-combatants, this study found that those ex-combatants who were likely to suffer from PTSD at the time of participation were reporting lower openness to interaction and more feelings of revenge, compared to those who did not meet the screening criteria for PTSD. There is mixed evidence on the relation between PTSD and readiness to reconcile, with some studies showing a connection similar to the one observed here.⁶⁶ Overall, the association was moderate, with the absence of feelings of revenge somewhat stronger related. This may be due to the PTSD-symptoms used in the screening tool, which were from the numbing/avoidance and hyper arousal clusters.⁶⁷ On the basis of this evidence, and in line with other authors, we too recommend the

inclusion of mental health support in efforts to reintegrate former combatants, as a measure to strengthen reconciliation and social reintegration.⁶⁸

Economic reintegration

Even though the findings indicate that a majority of ex-combatants was not suffering from PTSD and had peaceful attitudes towards their former enemies, their life situation was far from trouble-free. Most of the participating ex-combatants were in financially difficult situations with a majority stating insufficient income as the major challenge they were facing, a finding corroborated by the community stakeholders. Most of the participants were students when they joined the PLA, many of them children.⁶⁹ Income generation and qualification for jobs other than military are acknowledged as important economic pillars of the reintegration process. In Nepal, where unemployment is generally high, this may pose an even more difficult task to accomplish.⁷⁰ As Bogati pointed out, the majority of former combatants in Nepal remain without employment skills until today, 'leading to anger and frustration' for them.⁷¹ Robins and colleagues found that 95 per cent of the ex-combatants they researched perceived economic issues to be their biggest need.⁷² Economic reintegration is intertwined with social reintegration. Possibly, since the present study was conducted, and the economic resources at the disposal of many ex-combatants in the form of the voluntary retirement package and other measures of support have run out, the lack of economic integration of ex-combatants has reduced their and their host communities' openness to socially integrate and reconcile of 2012 and 2013. To better understand the link between economic and social reintegration, future studies could investigate the effect of economic hardship on the psychosocial conditions of ex-combatants and their communities.

Social networks and factional ties

The results point to the family as the primary reference group for social interaction of the ex-combatants in this study. Family members were the ones former combatants spent most time with and also the ones they turned to in case of need. This suggests that intervention measures targeting social reintegration could benefit from involving family members and also that family members might need support in the process of community (re-)integration, as they are the ones primarily consulted by former combatants in times of need.

More than half of the ex-combatants participating in this study indicated to still be in touch with their former comrades, either by spending most of their time with them or approaching them in case of need, or both. This is not surprising, the more so because in 2012 and 2013 they had just moved out of the cantonments. Then, and still now, many ex-combatants are living close to each other. However, the assumption that factional ties have a negative influence on social reintegration and reconciliation was not supported by the results of our study, confirming Kaplan and Nussio's notion that it may not be an effective indicator of social reintegration.⁷³ Rather, participants reporting no factional ties were more likely to suffer from PTSD. In line with this finding, de Vries and Wiegink have argued that ties to other former combatants might give stability and not necessarily indicate a lack of integration into civilian life.⁷⁴ Also, social support from veteran friends might be perceived as relatively beneficial, with higher social support from other ex-combatants connected to lower levels of post-traumatic stress.⁷⁵ Robins and colleagues reported many ex-combatants upholding their links to former comrades and political activity, and argued that this kind of involvement might actually prevent them from taking up arms in the Nepalese context.⁷⁶ It is not

possible to assess whether involvement in extremist activities or inclination towards taking up arms again is connected to factional ties on the basis of our data. However, it can be concluded that readiness to reconcile with former enemies as assessed in this study seems to be unrelated to it. In fact, findings from studies in other countries corroborate the rather positive perception of social reintegration in this sample. Also in communities in Sierra Leone and Angola, the majority of ex-combatants felt well received or accepted.⁷⁷

The association of readiness to reconcile with other factors of social reintegration, like feeling positively received and wanting to contribute to the communities, could not be sufficiently assessed in the context of this study. One reason was the high rate of positive reception and willingness to contribute. The group of participants who felt negatively received by their community or who did not want to contribute to their community was so small that statistical tests could not be applied. We assume that readiness to reconcile and social integration is a reciprocal process: Lower feelings of revenge and higher openness to interactions facilitate relationship-building and increase willingness to contribute to community wellbeing; whereas experiencing positive social relationships and acceptance -feeling well received- likely increases readiness to reconcile. This process would benefit from more research, especially of longitudinal nature.

Limitations

This research was part of a project tailored to find entry points for supporting both ex-combatants and communities with the social reintegration process. Dimensions of mental health were not the main focus. Hence, PTSD was only screened for and we did not assess traumatic experiences or other dimensions of mental health. More information might have made a more differentiated analysis of the relationship between traumatization and readiness to reconcile possible. For example, we did not assess torture, a vulnerability indicator strongly related to PTSD, which might also influence someone's readiness to reconcile.⁷⁸ In regard to the readiness to reconcile questionnaire, a potential limitation is that it was developed for use in victim populations and has not been used with ex-combatants before. However, similar questions have been used with former child-soldiers and sentenced prisoners. Future research could explore the applicability of the questionnaire we used for different populations.

The questionnaires were translated by the research team and used in this translated form for the first time. Validation of questionnaires was beyond the scope of this study. However, the Cronbach coefficients were satisfactory for both the questionnaire for readiness to reconcile and the screening tool for PTSD. The former questionnaire has recently been revised, with the subscale of openness for conflict resolution changed, due to internal consistency and interpretability issues.⁷⁹ Looking at the screening results for PTSD, relatively low levels of PTSD in Nepal have also been reported in a study by Axinn and colleagues and others.⁸⁰

Our study involved face-to-face interviews with stakeholders and group meetings during which ex-combatants filled in questionnaires. The tendency to provide socially desirable responses, compromising the validity of instruments, may have occurred, despite researchers assuring respondents and interviewees from the outset that their names would not be placed on the surveys themselves and would never be associated with findings. Data collection took place in the context of a DDR program and participants may have entertained prospects of benefits. Various studies however suggest that social desirability plays little role in self-report measures of well-being,⁸¹ with

the contamination of self-report well-being measures by social desirability estimated at less than 10%.⁸² Following Eysenck in assuming that it is common for societies to emphasize that their members act in an agreeable and pleasant manner, even when an individual is experiencing a negative mood or an adverse situation,⁸³ the ex-PLAs in our study might have underreported PTSD and over-reported readiness to reconcile. Indeed, perhaps the PTSD rate in our sample (13%) is on the low side compared to the rates in other samples of returning soldiers.⁸⁴ However, the number is higher than the before mentioned PTSD rates of a random population sample and corresponds with the rates of populations exposed to torture, refugees, and former child soldiers, both in Nepal.

Conclusions

By exploring the psychosocial conditions of former combatants of the PLA and their host communities in the process of social reintegration in Nepal, we hope to contribute to knowledge about the factors that are relevant for both ex-combatants and communities recovering from violence. This study shows that in the year following the release of former combatants into Nepalese society, psychosocial conditions for their social reintegration were by and large positive, yet conditions for economic reintegration challenging. Moreover, a community minority signalled alarm at the political differences, past grievances, and ex-combatants' behaviour. Given the obstacles to social reintegration identified by the host communities, their priorities for reintegration support, the concerns expressed by ex-combatants, and the on-going challenges ex-combatants and their host communities in Nepal face today, continued socio-economic support for both communities and ex-combatants, psychosocial trauma support and counselling, social interaction and peace education programs, and the political implementation of the transitional justice and reconciliation process seem warranted. In addition, based on the identified connections between PTSD and readiness to reconcile, and PTSD and factional ties, we believe that social reintegration and DDR programs would benefit from addressing mental health issues of former combatants more thoroughly and from drawing on the positive aspects of veteran networks, like social support.

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Authors

Jeannine Suurmond (MA Psychology) works as an international consultant specialized in conflict resolution, mediation, and peace process facilitation. In Nepal, she cooperated for the Civil Peace

Service of GIZ with the NGO Pro Public. Jeannine is a PhD candidate at Utrecht University and a certified Nonviolent Communication trainer.

Babu Ram Poudel is Program Manager of Pro Public and responsible for the organization's peacebuilding and conflict transformation projects. Having worked on various social, political and governance issues from 2003 to 2009, he has focused on peacebuilding initiatives from 2010 onward. Babu Ram has a Master's degree in Sociology.

Maya Böhm, Dr. rer. med., is a psychologist. Her research interests are political violence, psychotraumatology and dealing with the past. After working on the effects of political imprisonment on family systems, the research reported here was part of her engagement with the Civil Peace Service of GIZ in Nepal.

¹ Do and Iyer, 'Geography, Poverty, and Conflict in Nepal'.

² BBC News, 'Nepal Government raises conflict death toll'. 22 September 2009.

³ Singh et al., 'Conflict induced internal displacement in Nepal'.

⁴ UNOHCHR, *Nepal Conflict Report*.

⁵ Nepal Government and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), *Comprehensive Peace Accord*, clause 4.4.

⁶ Subedi and Jenkins, 'The Nexus Between Reintegration of Ex-combatants and Reconciliation'; Luna, 'Everyday realities of reintegration'.

⁷ Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis, *Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Programs*.

⁸ Özerdem and Podder, 'The Long Road Home'.

⁹ Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer, *The Transition from War to Peace*.

¹⁰ Maedl et al., 'Psychological Rehabilitation of Ex-combatants'.

¹¹ UNDP, *Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration*, 49.

¹² Sharif, *A Critical Review of Evidence*.

¹³ For example, see Subedi 'Conflict, Combatants, and Cash'.

¹⁴ Hazen, 'Understanding "Reintegration" within Postconflict Peacebuilding'.

¹⁵ Özerdem, 'Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration', 962.

¹⁶ Sharif, *A Critical Review of Evidence*.

¹⁷ Bowd and Özerdem, 'How to Assess Social Reintegration'.

¹⁸ Humphreys and Weinstein, 'Demobilization and Reintegration'.

¹⁹ Spear, 'Disarmament and Demobilization'.

²⁰ Humphreys and Weinstein, 'Demobilization and Reintegration'.

²¹ Kaplan and Nussio, 'Community Counts', 133.

²² Hazen, *Social Integration of Ex-Combatants*.

²³ De Vries and Wiegink, 'Breaking up and Going Home?'

²⁴ Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer, *The Transition from War to Peace*.

²⁵ Nussio, 'How ex-combatants talk about personal security'.

²⁶ Sharif, *A Critical Review of Evidence*.

²⁷ Chautari, *Political Risk and Ex-Combatants*.

²⁸ Robins, Bhandari and ex-PLA working group, *Poverty, stigma and alienation*.

²⁹ Bloomfield, Barnes, and Huyse. *Reconciliation after violent conflict: A handbook*, 12.

³⁰ Willems and van Leeuwen, 'Reconciling reintegration', 333.

³¹ Kelman, 'Reconciliation as Identity Change'.

³² Bockers, Stammel and Knaevelsrud, 'Reconciliation in Cambodia', 72.

³³ For example, see Karstoft et al., 'Community integration after deployment'; Kohrt et al., 'Social ecology of child soldiers'; and Odenwald et al., 'Screening for posttraumatic stress disorder'.

³⁴ Bayer, Klasen and Adam, 'Association of trauma and PTSD symptoms with openness to reconciliation and feelings of revenge'.

³⁵ Pham, Weinstein and Longman, 'Trauma and PTSD symptoms in Rwanda'.

³⁶ Schaal et al., 'Mental health 15 years after'. Attitudes towards forgiveness, trust, empathy, future orientation, justice, revenge and the use of violence were included into the measure of attitudes towards reconciliation.

³⁷ Maedl et al., 'Psychological Rehabilitation of Ex-combatants'.

³⁸ Annan et al., 'Civil War, Reintegration, and Gender'.

- ³⁹ Luitel et al., 'Conflict and mental health'.
- ⁴⁰ Kohrt et al., 'Comparison of mental health'; Tol et al., 'Political violence and mental health'.
- ⁴¹ Bogati, 'Assessing Inclusivity'.
- ⁴² Subedi, 'Conflict, Combatants, and Cash', 248: 'Out of the 19,602 ex-combatants, 2,456 were missing (absent) and 94 were reported dead at the time of update and re-verification held in November–December 2011.'
- ⁴³ Robins, Bhandari and ex-PLA working group, *Poverty, stigma and alienation*, 36.
- ⁴⁴ Kohrt et al., 'Comparison of mental health'.
- ⁴⁵ GIZ, *From Armed Conflict to Civilian Responsibility*.
- ⁴⁶ ZFD is an acronym of Ziviler Friedensdienst, Civil Peace Service. The peace advisor was co-author Jeannine Suurmond.
- ⁴⁷ Stammel et al., 'Construction of a questionnaire'.
- ⁴⁸ Eichhorn et al., 'Readiness to reconcile and post-traumatic distress'.
- ⁴⁹ Breslau et al., 'Short screening scale'.
- ⁵⁰ Kimerling et al., 'Utility of a short screening scale'; Washington et al., 'PTSD risk and mental health care engagement'; Zhou et al., 'The Effect of Maternal Death'.
- ⁵¹ Humphreys and Weinstein, 'Demobilization and Reintegration'.
- ⁵² Corbin and Strauss, *Basics of Qualitative Research*.
- ⁵³ As in Breslau et al., 'Short screening scale'.
- ⁵⁴ Kaplan and Nussio, 'Community Counts'; Humphreys and Weinstein, 'Demobilization and Reintegration'; Maedl et al., 'Psychological Rehabilitation of Ex-combatants'; Annan et al., 'Civil War, Reintegration, and Gender'.
- ⁵⁵ Chautari, *Political Risk and Ex-Combatants*; Robins, Bhandari and ex-PLA working group, *Poverty, stigma and alienation*.
- ⁵⁶ Hazen, *Social Integration of Ex-Combatants*.
- ⁵⁷ Sharif, *A Critical Review of Evidence*.
- ⁵⁸ De Vries and Wiegink, 'Breaking up and Going Home?'
- ⁵⁹ Subedi and Jenkins, 'The Nexus Between Reintegration of Ex-combatants and Reconciliation'.
- ⁶⁰ Grant and Gino, 'A Little Thanks Goes a Long Way'.
- ⁶¹ Kelman, 'Reconciliation as Identity Change'.
- ⁶² Bockers, Stammel and Knaevelsrud, 'Reconciliation in Cambodia'.
- ⁶³ Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, *Trauma-Informed Care*.
- ⁶⁴ Psychologists for Social Responsibility, *Enemy Images*; Staub, *The Roots of Evil*.
- ⁶⁵ Kelman and Fisher, *Herbert C. Kelman*.
- ⁶⁶ Bayer, Klasen and Adam, 'Association of trauma and PTSD symptoms with openness to reconciliation and feelings of revenge'; Eichhorn et al., 'Readiness to reconcile and post-traumatic distress'; Pham, Weinstein and Longman, 'Trauma and PTSD symptoms in Rwanda'.
- ⁶⁷ In the study conducted by Eichhorn and colleagues (ibid.) more feelings of revenge were correlated only with higher reported hyper-arousal symptoms.
- ⁶⁸ Other authors who have recommended this are for example Willems and van Leeuwen, 'Reconciling reintegration' and Robins, Bhandari and ex-PLA working group, *Poverty, stigma and alienation*.
- ⁶⁹ The participatory study by Robins and colleagues, ibid., also pointed this out.
- ⁷⁰ For a discussion of unemployment rates in Nepal, see e.g. Chandan Sapkota, 'Remittance pitfalls', Kathmandu Post, 20 September 2016, OPED. <http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2016-09-20/remittance-pitfalls.html> [Accessed 19 December 2019].
- ⁷¹ Bogati, 'Assessing Inclusivity'.
- ⁷² Robins, Bhandari and ex-PLA working group, *Poverty, stigma and alienation*.
- ⁷³ Kaplan and Nussio, 'Community Counts'.
- ⁷⁴ De Vries and Wiegink, 'Breaking up and Going Home?'
- ⁷⁵ Jain et al., 'Peer Support and Outcome for Veterans'; Laffaye et al., 'Relationships among PTSD symptoms, social support, and support source'.
- ⁷⁶ Robins, Bhandari and ex-PLA working group, *Poverty, stigma and alienation*.
- ⁷⁷ Humphreys and Weinstein, 'Demobilization and Reintegration'; Porto, Parsons and Alden, *From soldiers to citizens*.
- ⁷⁸ The association of torture with PTSD was shown for example in the meta-analysis by Zachary Steel and colleagues, 2009, 'Association of torture and other potentially traumatic events with mental health outcomes among populations exposed to mass conflict and displacement: a systematic review and meta-analysis.' *JAMA*, 302(5), 537–549; as well as the study on child soldiers in Nepal by Brandon Kohrt and colleagues, 'Social ecology of child soldiers'.
- ⁷⁹ See Stammel et al., 'The Readiness to Reconcile Inventory.'
- ⁸⁰ Axinn et al., 'Gender, traumatic events, and mental health disorders'.
- ⁸¹ Caputo, 'Social Desirability Bias in self-reported wellbeing Measures'; Veenhoven, 'Questions on Happiness'; Dawes et al., 'Social desirability does not confound reports of wellbeing'.
- ⁸² Caputo, 'Social Desirability Bias in self-reported wellbeing Measures'; Konow and Earley, 'The Hedonistic Paradox'.

⁸³ Eysenck, *Happiness: Facts and myths*.

⁸⁴ For example, see Dami et al. 'Combat exposure and PTSD', who found 24.6% PTSD prevalence in a sample of military combatants in North East Nigeria; and Schaal et al., 'Posttraumatic stress disorder', who identified 50% PTSD prevalence in combatants from the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.

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Article 4: Selected chapters from 'Predictors of peace and violence in Nepal. An empirical study of peace needs and peace services'

Jeannine Suurmond, Prakash Mani Sharma & Alexandros Lordos

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Introduction [adapted]

This report presents the findings of a survey conducted in March and April 2015 among 1177 respondents in 40 villages and towns, located across the Terai-Pahad belt. The research took place in the districts of Kanchanpur, Achham, Banke, Rolpa, Kapilvastu/Rupandehi, Kaski, Kathmandu, Dhanusha, Saptari, and Panchthar.

In 2013, the National Planning Commission of Nepal included in its 13th Approach Paper 2013-2016 a program to strengthen 'Infrastructures for Peace'. To support the government and other stakeholders in the design and implementation of this program, the NGO Pro Public, Forum for the Protection of Public Interest, carried out the present study together with the Cyprus-based think tank SeeD.

Inspired by the concept of 'infrastructures for peace', the approach is based on the understanding that (a) when people are caught in painful emotions, disputes, or violence, they have peace needs; and that (b) by servicing peace needs, violence can be prevented or reduced and the experience of peace in different dimensions of life increased. In the current study, these dimensions encompassed intrapersonal peace, interpersonal peace, intercommunity peace, citizen-state peace, and material peace.

The main objectives of the study were to gain a greater understanding of the drivers of peace and violence in Nepal by exploring the existing relations between peace needs and peace services for Nepalese people. In particular, the research focuses on whether the peace needs (or demand) are met by service providers (the offer), and what the impacts are in terms of violence and peace. To assess this we used a violence index, a violent action tendency measure, and peace dimensions.

The methodology draws on academic literature from multiple disciplines and recent policy-oriented research on peacebuilding, as well as quantitative research methods. The results allowed for the identification of various drivers of peace and violence in Nepal. General and district/group-specific recommendations, based on the data and restricted to peacebuilding practices, are provided.

Chapter 3 and articles 5 and 6 (Chapter 4) of this dissertation describe the methodology used for this study, including the design of the questionnaire, the sampling and data collection processes, and the characteristics of the research sample. In this section, Chapter 5, below, presents the construction of the peace dimensions and the peace scores per district, gender, class, caste, and region. Chapter 6 explains how the violence index was constructed and provides the violence scores for the same five categories. Chapter 9 presents the results of the predictive analyses, including drivers of peace and violence in Nepal. Chapter 10 discusses selected findings and recommendations for practitioners and policy-makers in the peacebuilding field.

Chapter 5: The peace dimensions

In this chapter, we explain how we constructed the peace dimensions in order to answer research question 1: 'What are peace needs?' We then present the peace scores according to district, gender, class, caste, and region, reporting only statistically significant between-groups differences.

The construction of the peace dimensions

We theorized various indicators for four peace dimensions: Intrapersonal peace, interpersonal peace, intercommunity peace, and citizen-state peace. Through statistical construct validation, we tested whether those indicators were indeed relevant for the corresponding dimension and whether they cross-loaded on multiple dimensions (e.g. on intrapersonal *and* interpersonal peace). Specifically, we looked for those factors that had a significant and unique relation with the dimensions. In order to do this, we first checked the internal consistency of the scale of each indicator (Cronbach's Alpha Coefficient; values between 0.7-0.8 were considered acceptable) and then carried out an exploratory factor analysis to assess whether items measuring one construct also loaded onto another construct despite high internal consistency. Factor analysis is a statistical technique for identifying whether the correlations between a set of observed variables stem from their relationship to one or more latent variables in the data (Field, 2014). In the exploratory factor analysis, we let go of theory and included all the variables to see which would load on which dimension. The results were confirmed with a confirmatory factor analysis. On the basis of this analysis, we identified five, instead of the theorized four, peace dimensions: Intrapersonal peace, interpersonal peace, intercommunity peace, citizen-state peace, and material peace.

The meaning of the numbers

The numbers presented in this chapter for the peace dimensions, the violence index, and the peace service dimensions are mean values, or rather scores, on each of the dimensions or indicators. All scores range between 0 and 10, where 0 and 10 mean different things depending on the valence of the indicator. The name of the indicators or the dimensions suggests their valence. For example, if we take the variable 'trust in governmental institutions', then higher scores (scores closer to 10) will indicate more trust towards institutions; whereas in the example of the violence index, higher scores (scores closer to 10) indicate a greater propensity for violence. For the overall peace score, higher numbers represent higher peace.

The results demonstrated that the optimal solution involved measuring intrapersonal peace by 15 indicators. Some of the indicators we had theorized would load onto this dimension (such as spouse support and life orientation (optimism vs pessimism) did in fact not, and were therefore excluded from the model. Below, we describe the dimensions' characteristics on the basis of our data analysis.

Intrapersonal peace appears to refer to the extent that one is at peace with oneself. This includes being in a sound mental and emotional state, feeling included and fairly treated, and tolerating diversity. Figure 1 shows the 15 factors and the strength of their relationship to intrapersonal peace. The closer their value is to 1, the stronger the relationship. A negative value indicates an inverse relationship to the dimension. The loadings suggest that depression and anxiety are the strongest inverse components of intrapersonal peace. An alternative name for intrapersonal peace could be 'absence of psychological distress', given the components of the factor. For purposes of this research, we assumed that when people are free from extreme sadness, anxiety, low self-esteem, or anger, they are free from psychological distress and therefore at peace with themselves.

Figure 1: Indicators of intrapersonal peace and their loadings

Intrapersonal peace seems to refer to how one relates with other individuals in one's own environment, to the psychological qualities that enable peaceful interpersonal relations (e.g. frankness and mindfulness), and to whether one is supported by the members of his/ her environment. Figure 2 presents the indicators of interpersonal peace along with their loadings. As seen in the figure, 'village members support' and 'neighbor villages support' are the two strongest indicators of interpersonal peace.

Figure 2: Indicators of interpersonal peace and their loadings

Intercommunity peace appears to refer to how open one is to peaceful relations with members of other groups and/or communities. Figure 3 presents the indicators of intercommunity peace and how they load on the dimension. The strongest inverse indicators of intercommunity peace are intergroup anxiety and social distance.

Figure 3: Indicators of intercommunity peace and their loadings

Citizen-state peace appears to refer to the nature of the relationship between the citizen and the state. The indicators of citizen-state peace are presented in Figure 4 along with their loadings on the dimension. The strongest indicators of the citizen-state peace were national civic life satisfaction and trust in governmental institutions.

Figure 4: Indicators of citizen-state peace and their loadings

Material peace refers to whether one has all that is necessary (e.g. food security and physical security) to feel satisfied with life at a personal and a local level. The indicators of material peace are presented in the figure below along with their loadings on the dimension of material peace. As can be seen, the strongest indicators of material peace are food and economic security.

Figure 5: Indicators of material peace and their loadings

Together these findings led to the following dimensions of the experience of being at peace, summarized in Figure 6.

Figure 6: Peace dimensions and indicators

In conclusion, our answer to research question 1: ‘What are peace needs and which factors determine intrapersonal, interpersonal, intercommunity, and citizen-state peace?’ is: Peace needs are the indicators constituting the peace dimensions that emerged from the factor analysis. Thus, in this sample peace needs fall into five categories: Intrapersonal, interpersonal, intercommunity, citizen-state, and material. The two most important peace needs/factors of intrapersonal peace in this study are reduced depression and anxiety. The two most important peace needs determining interpersonal peace are the support of village members and of neighboring village members. For intercommunity peace, the two strongest peace needs are reduced intergroup anxiety and social distance, while for citizen-state peace they are national civic life satisfaction and trust in government institutions. Finally, food and economic security are the strongest peace needs determining material peace.

To explore the peace needs of different groups in Nepal, we in turn ran analyses of variance (ANOVAs) to test whether there were significant differences between the peace dimensions scores of various groups. The following section presents the results of these between-groups analyses for each of the five peace dimensions by district, gender, class, caste, and region.

Overall peace score

The peace score of this sample, calculated as the average score of the districts on the five peace dimensions, is a moderate score of 6.2 on a 0-10 scale (where '0' represents not at all being at peace and '10' very much at peace).

Comparison of peace scores by district

Generally, scores on intrapersonal and intercommunity peace were relatively high, on interpersonal peace and on material peace neutral, and on citizen-state peace low. We found statistically significant differences between the districts on all five peace dimensions. Figure 7 shows the peace dimensions scores per district.

Figure 7: Peace dimension scores by district

Regarding **intrapersonal peace** the biggest discrepancies across districts are between Kanchanpur and Kathmandu where the scores are very high (8 on a 0-10 scale) and Saptari and Banke, where scores are around 6.5. More specifically, Banke scored highest on depression, sense of injustice, anxiety and lack of behavior regulation, whereas Saptari scored highest on lack of emotion regulation, argumentativeness, indifference, anger, and PTSD. These indicators are the reason why of all districts, Saptari and Banke have the lowest scores on intrapersonal peace in this study.

As far as **interpersonal peace** is concerned, the district Kaski was the district with the highest scores (nearing 7 on scale ranging from 0 to 10). The district Kanchanpur scored lowest on this dimension

(around 5.5 on a 0-10 scale), followed by Kathmandu. Kaski scored highest on the indicators village/town member support, neighboring villages' support, and self-kindness. It was one of the highest scoring districts on mindfulness. Kathmandu and Kanchanpur scored the lowest, or were among the lowest scoring districts, on the indicators village/town member support, social competence, and frankness.

Moving on to **intercommunity and citizen-state peace**, one of the most noteworthy findings is that the capital district of Kathmandu is found to have the lowest scores across districts on the citizen-state dimension of peace, and to be on the lower end for intercommunity peace too. With regard to the latter dimension of peace, intercommunity peace, Kathmandu only scored higher than Achham district. Kathmandu (as well as the districts Kaski and Achham) scored substantially lower than the districts of Panchthar and Banke in particular. The intercommunity peace scores for the latter two districts are remarkably high (around 8 on a 10-point scale), thus showing very peaceful intercommunity relations. The mean average of the lowest scoring districts, by contrast, is at about 6 out of 10 which indicates lukewarm intercommunity relations. The most noteworthy differences across districts occurred on the following indicators of intercommunity peace: Intergroup anxiety, social distance, and negative stereotypes (Panchthar scored lowest), social threats (Kathmandu scored highest), dehumanization (Achham scored highest), intergroup contact (Achham scored lowest), and intergroup trust (Panchthar scored highest).

Kathmandu, which is the district that scored lowest on citizen-state peace (slightly below 4 on a 10-point scale), was significantly different from districts Dhanusha and Achham. These two districts scored highest on citizen-state peace, with an average score of 5.2 out of 10. The indicators causing Kathmandu to be scoring so low on citizen-state peace were trust in governmental institutions, trust in local institutions, perceptions of corruption, and perceived government support.

Finally, with respect to **material peace**, the district Kaski stands out as the district with the highest levels, whereas the districts of Rolpa, Banke, Kanchanpur, and especially Achham scored the lowest on this peace dimension. The material peace levels in Kaski in fact are rather high (approximately 7), whereas the scores for the districts that are at the lowest end are around 5 (on a 0-10 scale). The indicators of material peace on which Kaski outweighed the remaining districts (and particularly the ones that scored the lowest) were food and health security, as well as personal life satisfaction and local-level civic life satisfaction.

Comparison of peace scores by gender

Figure 8 presents the scores of male and female respondents on each of the five peace dimensions. As can be seen, intrapersonal peace, followed by intercommunity peace, are the peace dimensions on which the respondents regardless of their gender scored the highest. Citizen-state peace is the peace dimension on which both genders scored the lowest. Apart from this dimension, we found differences between the two genders on all other dimensions of peace. More specifically, women scored higher than men on every dimension of peace except citizen-state peace. The highest discrepancy between gender scores occurred for interpersonal peace.

Figure 8: Peace dimension scores by gender

On the specific indicators for **intrapersonal peace**, men scored significantly higher than women on depression, anxiety, sense of injustice, emotion and behavior dysregulation, PTSD, social exclusion, tolerance of diversity, self-esteem, problem-solving deficits, and negative affect. Differences between the scores of men and women on argumentativeness, anger, psychopathic traits and indifference were statistically non-significant.

Women scored significantly higher than men on all indicators for **interpersonal peace**, including neighboring village support, village support, friends support, mindfulness, social competence, civic engagement, information consumption, social competence, self-kindness, and frankness.

On the indicators relevant to **intercommunity peace**, men scored significantly higher than women on social distance, intergroup anxiety, overall trust, and overall contact between groups. An explanation for this could be that men are more likely to engage in contact with other groups because they are less bound to household responsibilities. In turn, this increased contact has consequences that are positive in some cases (increased trust, an expected outcome of positive contact), but negative in other cases (increased intergroup anxiety and increased social distance, which are both expected outcomes of negative contact). Given that the overall intercommunity peace is lower in men than in women, the negative consequences appear to be more prevalent than the positive. No significant differences were found between the scores of men and women on social threats, negative stereotypes, and dehumanization.

Of the **citizen-state peace** indicators, the scores of men for perceived corruption were significantly higher than those of women. No significant differences were found between the scores of men and women on trust in local institutions, trust in government institutions, national civic life satisfaction,

and perceived support from the government. Both men and women scored highest on trust in local institutions and lowest on perceived corruption.

Significant differences were found between the scores of women and men on two of the indicators for **material peace**: Personal life satisfaction and physical security, on which men scored significantly lower than women.

Comparison of peace scores by class

Figure 9 presents the scores of the three groups of the category 'self-identified economic class' on each of the five peace dimensions. It should be noted that we excluded the third group (upper class) from the between-groups analysis, because of its small sample size (n for each group: Lower class: 349 respondents; middle class: 797 respondents, and upper-class: 22 respondents). That means we only compared the peace dimensions of the lower and middle class.

As can be seen in the figure, citizen-state peace was the dimension of peace on which all three groups scored lowest and which had the smallest discrepancies between the groups. The peace dimension for which the greatest discrepancies occurred was material peace: Those identifying themselves as lower class, scored significantly lower on material peace than those identifying themselves as middle class.

Small but significant differences for those identifying themselves as lower class and those identifying themselves as middle class were found for the intrapersonal and the intercommunity peace dimensions. Regarding **intrapersonal peace**, the indicator-level group comparison yielded significant differences between the two groups for depression, anxiety, sense of injustice, lack of emotion regulation, social exclusion, problem-solving deficits, negative affect, and lack of self-esteem, with the lower class scoring significantly higher than the middle class on those.

Regarding **intercommunity peace**, between-group differences were found for intergroup anxiety, intercommunity contact and intercommunity trust indicators. People identifying themselves as lower class were less trusting of other communities, more anxious to meet other communities, and also reported having had less contact with them.

Significant between-group differences were found for almost all indicators of **material peace**. Those individuals perceiving themselves as belonging to the middle class, scored significantly higher on economic, food, and health security, as well as on personal life satisfaction than those individuals identifying themselves as belonging to the lower class.

Figure 9: Peace dimension scores by class

Comparison of peace scores by caste¹¹⁷

Figure 10 presents the scores of each of the main **castes** in Nepal (Brahmin, Chettri, Vaishya, and Sudra) on all peace dimensions in this sample. Citizen-state peace was the dimension of peace on which all castes scored lowest. Of all castes, the one that stands out is the Sudra caste. People identifying with the Sudra caste scored lowest across all peace dimensions, apart from citizen-state peace.

With regards to **intrapersonal peace**, Sudras had the lowest score (7 on a 10-point scale). This score is significantly lower than the scores of all other groups, which had an average of 7.5 out of 10. The indicator-level analysis showed that Sudras scored significantly higher on depression, anxiety, social exclusion, negative affect, and reduced self-esteem, compared to people identifying with the other castes.

Brahmins scored highest on **interpersonal peace** and Sudras the lowest. The other two castes ranked in between. Chettris scored significantly higher than Vaishyas and Sudras, and Vaishyas scored significantly lower than Brahmins. The indicators responsible for the discrepancies between castes, were social competence and information consumption (Brahmins scoring higher than every other caste) and civic engagement (Brahmins scoring higher than Sudras and Vaishyas). Vaishyas scored lower than Brahmins and Chettris on self-kindness.

As far as **intercommunity peace** is concerned, the only group that stood out was the Sudras. They scored lower on this dimension than all other castes. The indicators that differentiated Sudras from

¹¹⁷ As briefly mentioned in Chapter 2, the people of Nepal are socially categorized according to caste. The four main castes are Brahmin, Chettri, Vaishya, and Sudra. These castes are comprised of a number of sub-castes, each of which is associated with certain occupations. The caste system was, and in many places continues to be, hierarchical. Brahmins belong to the highest, most privileged caste. Sudras belong to the lowest caste.

the other castes were intergroup contact and intergroup anxiety. Respondents identifying with the Sudra caste, reported being more anxious to meet people from other communities and that they have had less contact with people from other communities, than respondents identifying with the other castes.

Citizen-state peace was the peace dimension for which the fewest and the smallest inter-caste differences were observed. The only small, but significant, difference we found was between Vaishyas and Brahmins (Vaishyas scoring lower). Vaishyas, more specifically, scored lower than Brahmins and Chettris on trust in local institutions and trust in government institutions, but did not differ significantly from Sudras.

Sudras were followed by Chettris for **material peace**, with the latter group scoring significantly higher than the first on this dimension. Both groups scored significantly lower than both the Brahmins and the Vaishyas. At the indicator level, Sudras and Chettris scored lower than the other two groups on food and health security, whereas Sudras scored lower than all other castes on personal life satisfaction.

Figure 10: Peace dimension scores by caste

Finally, we provide an overview of the different peace dimensions by region.

Comparison of peace scores by region

Figure 11 shows the means of the scores of people living in Nepal's hills (Pahad) versus people living in the flatlands (Terai) on all five peace dimensions. As can be seen, people of both regions scored lowest on the citizen-state dimension of peace: Both groups scored below 5 on a 10-point scale. In terms of low levels, citizen-state peace is followed by material and interpersonal peace for both people living in the hills and people living in the flatlands.

There are some discrepancies between people of both regions with respect to their peace scores. The largest differences were found for intrapersonal and interpersonal peace: People living in the hills scored significantly higher on these than people living in flatlands.

Regarding **intrapersonal peace**, people living in the flatlands scored higher than people living in the hills on the indicators of depression, anxiety, lack of emotion and behavior regulation, anger, PTSD, indifference, psychopathic traits, and lack of tolerance for diversity.

Regarding **interpersonal peace**, people living in the hills scored higher than people living in the flatlands on having the support of members of their own village, members of neighboring villages, and friends, as well as on frankness.

Inhabitants of the flatlands scored higher than those inhabiting the hills on **intercommunity and citizen-state peace**. The indicators accounting for the difference in intercommunity peace were social distance, social threats, intergroup trust and intergroup contact. This means that inhabitants of Nepal's flatlands experienced lower social distance and lower social threats towards other communities, as well as more trust towards and more contact with them. The indicators responsible for the between-regions discrepancy for citizen-state peace were trust in governmental and trust in local institutions, with people in the flatlands scoring higher on both.

Figure 11: Peace dimension scores by region

Highlight: Intercommunity peace between Pahad and Terai

We had a closer look at intercommunity peace between various groups in Nepal. Key indicators of the intercommunity peace dimension were intergroup anxiety, social distance, dehumanization, negative stereotypes, trust, threat perception, and intergroup contact towards other groups. Annex 1 contains example items for each.

Scores below 6 (on a scale 0-10) suggest a low level of intercommunity peace towards another group, while scores above 8 suggest a high level of intercommunity peace towards another group. Scores in between indicate a neutral/ambivalent state of peace towards another group.

Figure 12 shows the level of intercommunity peace between two regions in Nepal, the hills (Pahad) and the flatlands (Terai). As can be seen, people living in Terai experience more intercommunity peace towards people living in the hills, than vice versa.*

Figure 12: Intercommunity peace between Pahad and Terai

* This survey was administered before the promulgation of the constitution and the subsequent border blockade

Highlight: Intercommunity peace between religions

An analysis of religious groups revealed that Hindus scored rather low on intercommunity peace towards Christians and especially Muslims, while Muslims and especially Christians scored relatively high towards Hindus. The small sample size of Christians (n=16), however, prevents us from drawing firm conclusions based on their scores. Overall, Muslims received the lowest scores, as can be seen in Figure 13.

Figure 13: Intercommunity peace between Hindus, Buddhists, Christians, and Muslims

Intercommunity peace scores towards other individuals of the same religion (i.e. the scores of one Hindu towards another Hindu, or a Muslim towards another Muslim) were high for every religion: All approximately around 9.

Highlight: Intercommunity peace between political parties

We also looked at the intercommunity peace levels of supporters of different political parties. Table 1 displays the highest and lowest scores for supporters of each political party.¹¹⁸ As can be seen, the supporters of the three largest parties of Nepal who participated in this study, including supporters of the UCPN-Maoist party (based on the 2013 elections), as well as of the Rastriya Prajatantra party, feel close to Hindus and Pahadis, but distant from Muslims. Due to the relatively small sample size of the supporters of Madheshi political parties (n=38), we are not able to draw conclusions from their scores.

Table 1: Intercommunity peace estimations of political party supporters towards other groups

Supporters of these parties/groups...	...score high (>8) on intercommunity peace towards...	... but moderate to low (<6,5) on intercommunity peace towards...
Nepali Congress party	Hindus Pahadis Chettris	CPN-Maoist Splinter Parties' supporters Muslims
CPN-UML party	Hindus Pahadis	Madheshis Muslims
UCPN-Maoist party	Hindus Pahadis	Muslims
Rastriya Prajatantra party	Hindus Pahadis	Madheshis UCPN-Maoist supporters CPN-Maoist splinter parties' supporters Muslims
Madheshi political parties (n = 38)	Hindus Madheshis Yadavs	UCPN-Maoist supporters Magars Newars CPN-Maoist splinter parties' supporters (all scores < 6)

¹¹⁸ The term 'Madheshis' refers to the inhabitants of Madhesh ('the middle country'), the flatlands of Nepal bordering India (Terai). Inhabitants of the hills are called 'Pahadis'. 'Magars' are an ethnolinguistic group of Nepal who mainly live near Nepal's north-central Dhaulagiri mountain massif. 'Newars' are the historical inhabitants of the Kathmandu valley. 'Yadavs' are a grouping of communities in south Nepal that have claimed descent from the mythological king Yadu. For more information, see: Gellner, D., Pfaff-Czarnecka, J. & Whelpton, J. (Eds., 2012). *Nationalism and Ethnicity in a Hindu Kingdom. The Politics and Culture of Contemporary Nepal*. London: Routledge.

Highlight: Frequency of reduced peace experience

Respondents reported how often they had experienced reduced peace like painful feelings, disputes, and/or discrimination for longer than two weeks in the last two years. As can be seen in Figure 14 (in %), the majority had not had those experiences. Most often reported were 'painful feelings', followed by 'disputes with family or friends.'

Figure 14: Frequency of reduced peace experience

Highlight: Personal conflict experience

Respondents also indicated with whom they personally experienced most conflict. As can be seen in Figure 15 (in %), most conflicts seem to have occurred between respondents and their spouse or intimate friend, followed by conflicts with neighbors.

Figure 15: Parties to personal conflict

Chapter 6: The violence index

This chapter describes how we constructed the violence index and presents the violence scores according to the same five categories as the peace scores: By district, gender, class, caste, and region. Only significant results of these between-group analyses are reported.

The construction of the violence index

Created in the style of socio-economic indexes and based on theory, the index relates to the propensity of an individual to resort to violent behavior. Five types of violence constituted the violence index: Physical violence, political violence, substance use (understood as violence against oneself), active discrimination (derogatory behaviors towards members of other groups), and community disputes, along with criminal tendency (an individual's tendency to engage in criminal behavior). The indicators comprising the violence index are shown in Figure 16.

Figure 16: Violence index and indicators

Overall violence score

The average score on the violence index across the 10 districts was low: 0.86 on a scale from 0 to 10 (where '0' represents not violent at all, and '10' very violent).

Comparison of violence scores by district

Figure 17 presents the scores of each of the 10 districts on the overall violence index (first set of columns) and the scores of each district on the various indicators of the index. Overall, the district with the lowest violence score was Kaski (0.5, on a 0-10 scale). The two districts with the highest scores were Banke and Kapilvastu (both 1.1).

The indicator that elicited the highest scores was community disputes, while physical violence was the indicator of the violence index on which most districts scored lowest.

We found significant differences across districts on almost all indicators, community disputes and political violence causing the largest discrepancies. Apart from substance use and criminal tendency, Kaski scored lowest, or was one of the lowest scoring districts, for all indicators. Kapilvastu and Banke scored significantly higher than all or most other districts on community disputes and political violence. Dhanusha, Kapilvastu, and Kanchanpur were the districts that scored higher on intergroup discrimination.

Figure 17: Violence index scores by district

Comparison of violence scores by gender

The overall scores on the violence index were 1.0 for women and 0.7 for men (on a 0-10 scale).

Figure 18 shows the scores of the two genders on each of the indicators of the index.

There are a few differences between men and women. These were found for the indicators community disputes, criminal tendencies and substance use. Women scored higher than men on all of these. There were no other gender differences for the remaining indicators.

Figure 18: Violence index scores by gender

Comparison of violence scores by class

The overall violence score of people identifying themselves as belonging to the lower class was 0.9. The score of people identifying themselves as middle class was 0.8. The score of those identifying themselves as upper class was 1.0. None of these inter-class differences on the overall violence score was significant and there was no substantial discrepancy between the two classes whose sample size allowed for comparison (lower and middle class) on any of the indicators either (figure 19).

Figure 19: Violence index scores by class

Comparison of violence scores by caste

Figure 20 shows the scores of each of the main castes in this sample for all the indicators that make up the violence index. There are only a few differences across castes on these variables. The two that stand out from the rest are the Vaishyas and the Sudras. Vaishya is the caste that reports the lowest score on community disputes, in contrast to Sudras who report the highest score on this indicator. Compared to all other groups, the Vaishyas also score lowest on intergroup discrimination, while the Sudras score highest on substance use.

Figure 20: Violence index scores by caste

Comparison of violence scores by region

Figure 21 presents the means of the scores of people living in the hills (Pahad) versus people living in the flatlands (Terai) on all the indicators of the violence index.

Figure 21: Violence index scores by region

Though small, there were some statistically significant differences between the two regions on the following: People living in the flatlands scored higher than people living in the hills on community disputes, intergroup discrimination, and political violence; whereas people in the hills scored higher than people in the flatlands on substance use.

Highlight: Perceptions of violence

When asked about their perceptions of violence in their village or town, only 17 percent of the respondents indicated that they thought there had been more violence in their village or town this year compared to last year.

The majority (77%) of the respondents believed that less violence had taken place in their village or town.

'In Rolpa mostly cases like domestic violence and suicide are higher in rate. In order to reduce these sort of things, education and self-awareness is a must' –District Police Officer, Rolpa

'Domestic violence and violence within the so-called lower caste groups still prevail in the society. In my opinion, because of increasing awareness and education, violence has more or less been reduced in this area. Apart from this, poverty and alcoholism are the main problems that still exist in our society.'
- VDC Secretary, Kapilvastu

Only 19 percent of the respondents thought that violence in their village or town is bound to increase next year, compared to 73 percent of the respondents who said that violence will decrease.

'Violence has decreased in our community, because youth have gone abroad for foreign employment' – Secretary Local Peace Committee, Dhanusha

When asked between whom violence happened most often in

'Because of alcohol drinking, violence happens upon the people. Also, people don't get justice from the concerned bodies'–Member, Local Peace Committee Achham

their village or town, most respondents indicated that they thought violence occurs most often between husband and wife and between family members, followed by political parties and neighbors.

Figure 22 provides an overview of respondents' perceptions of parties to violence in percentages.

Figure 22: Perceived parties to violence

Chapter 9: Predictive results and discussions

The first goal of the predictive analysis was to test hypothesis 1: **The more peace there is, the less violence there is.** We performed multinomial logistic regression analysis with the five peace dimensions as predictors and collective action tendency as the outcome variable. In statistical terms, predictors are variables used to predict the value of another variable. We only report results that are statistically significant. Where they were marginally significant, we report ' $p < 0.1$ '. This means that a relationship between variables was found, but that the statistical evidence for it was weaker than for the other reported relationships (for which $p < 0.05$).

Collective action tendency is a self-report measure that indicates what respondents are willing to do in order to effect social and political change: Nothing at all (i.e. passive tendency), social and political means of action but definitely excluding violence (i.e. nonviolent action tendency), or all available means of action, including violence if necessary (i.e. violent action tendency). We used this as outcome variable instead of the violence index, because relating the abstract peace dimensions to the multi-construct violence index would lead to unclear, hard to interpret results.

Figure 23 shows the results of the regression analysis.

Figure 23: Peace dimensions and collective action tendency

As can be seen, reduced levels of intrapersonal peace differentiate individuals with violent action tendency from individuals with nonviolent action tendency, who are otherwise similar in terms of interpersonal, intercommunity, citizen-state and material peace.

Discussion

These findings could mean that exposure to the same interpersonal, sociopolitical, or material stressors is processed in different ways by people experiencing high intrapersonal peace, who deal with such challenges through nonviolent activism, in contrast to people who are experiencing low intrapersonal peace and therefore convert interpersonal, material, and sociopolitical stressors into violent socio-political action. Alternatively, the latter might have less access to different ways of responding to stressors or advocating for what they want. Individuals experiencing low intrapersonal peace, may be unable to react in nonviolent ways. When looking at what predicts passive tendency, it appears that the main drivers are reduced levels of interpersonal and intercommunity peace. In other words, disengagement from the social context, whether within the community or across communities, seems to translate into lack of interest in achieving any kind of social or political change.

What specific factors account for this result? We took a closer look at which indicators of the five peace dimensions are predictors of violence by performing a similar analysis with collective action tendency as outcome variable for all of them. To explore this more broadly, we additionally included several other variables (including revenge propensity, life orientation, and kindness towards others). Due to the large number of potential predictor indicators, a stepwise remove methodology was utilized, whereby candidate predictors were sequentially removed from the model until only significant predictors remained.

Figure 24: Predictor indicators and collective action tendency

As shown in Figure 24, it is indeed possible to unpack the findings of the previous analysis into a more nuanced understanding of factors that predispose to different types of collective action tendency. Looking first at predictors of violent action tendency, we see that increased anxiety but also increased psychopathic traits are specific components of intrapersonal peace that are associated with violence. Furthermore, reduced information consumption, increased contact with other groups, civic discontent, desire for revenge, and insecurity at the level of the community are all factors that seem to predispose towards violent choices when facing collective action dilemmas. As for specific predictors of passive tendency, relevant interpersonal and intercommunity factors include intolerance of diversity, reduced personal life satisfaction, reduced village support, increased social distance to outgroups, reduced trust of outgroups, and reduced kindness towards others. Additionally, there appears to be a pathway from national civic life satisfaction and personal optimism to passive collective action choices.

In conclusion, we can partly confirm hypothesis 1: While it is not the case that all dimensions of peace are equally important in predicting violent action tendency, it does appear that intrapersonal peace serves to differentiate nonviolent active citizens from those who are ready to choose violent means of action. Based on this sample, we can therefore say that when intrapersonal peace is high, violent action tendency is low.

Chapter 10: Discussion and recommendations

This chapter highlights a selection of the findings, with a focus on peace needs.

Finding 1: Peace needs

This sample scored moderate to high on the overall experience of peace. More specifically, the scores on intrapersonal and intercommunity peace were relatively high, while scores on material and interpersonal peace were moderate. The lowest scores were found for the citizen-state peace dimension. The strongest indicators of the peace dimensions were the following peace needs: Absence of depression and anxiety (for intrapersonal peace); support of village members and members of neighboring villages (for interpersonal peace); absence of intergroup anxiety and social distance (for intercommunity peace); national civic life satisfaction and trust in governmental institutions (for citizen-state peace); and food and economic security (for material peace). Low national civic life satisfaction and low intrapersonal peace predicted higher willingness to use violence as means of social and political change.

Discussion

Knowing which factors are associated with the experience of peace, allows those interested in peacebuilding to make informed decisions about the dimension of peace they wish to contribute to (differently said: the peace needs they wish to address), for which reasons, and by which means.

Depression and anxiety are the most important indicators of **intrapersonal peace**. Moreover, anxiety and psychopathic traits, as components of intrapersonal peace, appear to subserve different pathways to violence. On the one hand, increased anxiety as a predictor of violence suggests a pathway of elevated threat perception leading to defensive behaviors and from there on to violence.

On the other hand, strong psychopathic traits as a predictor of violence suggest a pathway from lack of empathy and self-centeredness to disregard for the needs of others, and from there on to violence as a tool of expedience in the service of one's goals. From a peacebuilding perspective, supporting individuals in their ability to develop and maintain supportive and empathic relationships to decrease anxiety and soften psychopathic traits could be a way to contribute to intrapersonal peace. While providing support for people suffering from depression, anxiety, and psychopathy generally is the responsibility of the mental health sector, awareness of these factors is relevant for peacebuilders too, for the following reasons: (1) Reduced intrapersonal peace, especially anxiety and psychopathic traits, predicts violent action tendency; (2) the field of peacebuilding has developed tools, like empathic listening, that can relieve anxiety and other mental health symptoms; and (3) in villages where mental health services are not available, peacebuilding services like community mediation may be present.

Many, if not most, of Nepal's inhabitants originate from relatively isolated communities in rural areas. This is likely why having the support of one's own village members and members of neighboring villages seems crucial for **interpersonal peace** in Nepal. Social distance is one of the two strongest predictors of **intercommunity peace** in Nepal. Strongly associated with social distance is intergroup anxiety, the other most significant predictor of intercommunity peace in Nepal. The country is a kaleidoscope of social groups, home to 125 ethnicities and castes and 123 different languages (National Census, 2011). Being a collectivistic society, according to Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov (2010), group identities determine the daily life of Nepalese informing the terms and content of interactions with others. This may explain why social distance from outgroups and intergroup anxiety are so important in the experience of intercommunity peace in Nepal. Contact with outgroups seems to increase the risk for violent action tendency. It could suggest a relative inability to benefit from intergroup contact to reduce prejudice, perhaps due to a lack of in-depth communication with members of outgroups with which people come into frequent contact (a connection which would have to be investigated further in future studies). In addition, the desire to take revenge for perceived past hurts appears to serve as a powerful motivator for violence.

From a peacebuilding point of view, intercommunity peace could be strengthened by measures that reverse the negative effect of intergroup contact and reduce social distance between groups. Dialogue facilitation, for example, could increase the chances that intergroup contact will be a positive experience for all parties involved.

National civic life satisfaction and trust in governmental institutions are the two most decisive factors in the relationship between Nepal's **citizens and their state** as conceptualized in this study. Without these, it will be difficult for the Nepalese to have a sense of peace in this dimension of life. Nepal is widely perceived to be suffering from corruption and weak institutions. It is therefore not surprising that citizen-state peace received the lowest scores of all peace dimensions. Reduced civic life satisfaction at the national level is a predictor of violent action tendency. To mitigate this, peacebuilders could strengthen nonviolent action tendency, for example by increasing awareness of nonviolent means for social change in the traditions of Kingian and Gandhian nonviolence. Alternatively, peacebuilders could contribute to constructively channeling the frustrations surrounding civic life dissatisfaction and national institutions in Nepal, for example by communicating grievances through media and advocacy campaigns in ways that bridge the gap between citizens and state, reduce polarization, and ultimately prevent violence.

Food security and economic security are the two most important factors determining respondents' sense of **material peace**. Both indicators refer to the ability to meet survival needs. These results are to be expected in a country in which more than 25% of the population lives below the poverty line (Asian Development Bank, 2016) and reliable sources of income are hard to come by. Although satisfying survival needs such as food and income is not the main goal of peacebuilding, practitioners can support the processes by which people are trying to survive, for example by facilitating dialogue on sensitive topics such as resource distribution and management. There is also a role for peacebuilding in preventing violent conflict from devastating infrastructure development and local resources, by mainstreaming conflict sensitivity principles in humanitarian response programs or responding early to conflicts as intermediaries or mediators.

District-specific recommendations

Of all districts surveyed, Saptari and Banke both scored lowest on intrapersonal peace. Banke scored highest on depression, sense of injustice, anxiety and lack of behavior regulation, whereas Saptari scored highest on lack of emotion regulation, argumentativeness, indifference, anger, and PTSD. As far as we know, community mediation services are available in 49 of Saptari's 114 villages; and in Banke in 29 of its 47 villages and one municipality, in addition to dialogue facilitation services in two locations. Most community mediators and dialogue facilitators are trained in empathic listening, a crucial skill in mental health care. Moreover, some of the dialogue facilitators in Banke have received additional training in recognizing, supporting, and referring people with mental health issues from the Transcultural Psychosocial Organization (TPO) Nepal, yet their outreach is limited. To investigate whether people who received the service of empathic listening in these districts had fewer symptoms of mental distress, was beyond the scope of this study and should be further examined in order to identify which peacebuilding interventions would be best placed to address such issues.

In those villages where mental health services are absent but community mediators and dialogue facilitators (or any other professional peace service providers for that matter) are available, the latter could be mobilized as first line responders to at minimum provide mental health first aid. Should mediators and dialogue facilitators indeed take on such extra tasks, they might need coaching and support for themselves, important to consider when designing peacebuilding programs. Moreover, the connection between intrapersonal peace and readiness to use violence indicates that when dealing with violent behavior or the prevention of it, intrapersonal aspects of human wellbeing should be targeted.

The district Kanchanpur scored lowest on interpersonal peace, followed by Kathmandu. Indicators accounting for these low scores were village member support, social competence, and frankness. The low scores of these districts on village member support are not surprising, given the fact that Kanchanpur is home to one of the fastest growing populations in the country due to migration from the hills and neighboring Tharu communities, and Kathmandu has seen an influx of newcomers the last 50 years. While most peacebuilding programs are implemented outside of Kathmandu, the city hosts a wealth of peacebuilding trainers and experts, who could be mobilized for programs aiming to strengthen the urban social fabric. Were we to repeat this survey now, however, it is not sure that we would find similar low scores for Kathmandu on village member support. The April and May 2015 earthquakes brought many citizens of the city together in unforeseen ways, sharing food and shelter and helping each other to rebuild homes. Kanchanpur, by contrast, was not affected by the

earthquakes. The district is home to various professional peace service providers. Examples include the community mediators in 13 of Kanchanpur's 21 villages/towns and a peacebuilding network committee set up in 2011. Because in peacebuilding honest self-expression is a key skill when forging mutually satisfying relationships, these service providers are a potentially useful source for those wishing to strengthen interpersonal peace in Kanchanpur in general and frankness and social competence in particular.

Achham scored lowest on intercommunity peace. Accounting for this result are the indicators dehumanization and constructive intergroup contact, on which Achham scored respectively highest and lowest. This district was heavily affected by the armed conflict in Nepal of 1996-2006, which killed, displaced, and wounded several hundreds of its inhabitants. In addition, Achham has a legacy of socio-economic exploitation, for example via bonded labor, while gender and caste-based discrimination continue to be prevalent today. Although lack of constructive intergroup contact is not necessarily a concern in itself, it rapidly gains in conflict potential when coupled with dehumanization. If you have little or no contact with others, it is easier to maintain the idea that they are less worthy than you. Although our study does not confirm this, various scholars link dehumanization with increased violence such as human rights violations, war crimes, and genocide. It is thought that the psychological process of dehumanization can be mitigated or reversed through humanization efforts: The development of empathy; the establishment of personal relationships between conflicting parties; and the pursuit of common goals (de facto opposite goals of military training). To our knowledge, community mediation is not available in Achham, but other, more ad hoc peacebuilding initiatives, for example focused on youth, have taken place. Peace services such as mediation and dialogue facilitation could support healing and reconciliation, while community envisioning processes and follow-up could encourage different groups to unite behind common goals. Peace or empathy musea, such as the museum designed by philosopher Roman Krznaric (which opened in London in 2015), and peace education in schools could increase skills in empathy.

On the citizen-state peace dimension, Achham scored highest and Kathmandu lowest. The indicators explaining Kathmandu's comparatively low score were lack of trust in governmental institutions and local institutions, lack of government support, and perceptions of corruption. As capital city, Kathmandu hosts the government and most of the national institutions. Its citizens are therefore more exposed to media reports on corruption and government institutions than Nepalese living outside of the city. Peacebuilders could consider contributing to citizen-state peace in Kathmandu by supporting citizens in voicing their concerns and frustrations in constructive ways, thereby increasing the likelihood that they will be heard and removing reasons to resort to violence.

Achham scored lowest on material peace, with lack of economic security and food security accounting for this result. The main occupation for the majority of people in Achham is agriculture, but lack of employment opportunities in the mountains and hills motivates a large number of people to move to the flatlands and India in search of work. Of all districts, the number of migrant workers from Achham is especially high. Tens of villages in Achham experience acute food security crises every year. Peacebuilders can strengthen the ways in which inhabitants of the district are trying to survive, for example by supporting women's groups with collaborative decision-making and planning processes to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of meetings. Peacebuilders can also help avert the escalation of poverty levels by preventing violent conflict from occurring, which could destroy lives, assets, infrastructure, markets, institutions, and social networks.

General recommendations

In order to increase the relevance and effectiveness of peacebuilding programs in Nepal, we advise practitioners to take the peace needs identified in this study explicitly into account when designing, planning and implementing peacebuilding programs including baseline studies and monitoring and evaluation plans.

Because reduced intrapersonal peace is associated with violence, mainstreaming intrapersonal peace into peacebuilding interventions seems warranted. More specifically, the pathway from psychopathy to violence can be addressed by building empathy; while the pathway from anxiety to violence can be addressed by reducing the tendency to make hostile attributions regarding the intentions of others and removing situational threats. Relevant peace services are therefore Nonviolent Communication (NVC) trainings for teachers, peacemakers, and psychosocial workers, because NVC explicitly teaches the skill of empathizing with ourselves and others. Community mediation and dialogue facilitation services providers are advised to focus on reducing stereotypes and intergroup anxiety between conflicting parties by creating mutual trust and explore ways in which intergroup contact can be beneficial for peace as opposed to detrimental.

Alongside government development efforts, peacebuilding practitioners could help constructively channel the frustrations surrounding national civic life dissatisfaction in Nepal to address the link between reduced national civic life satisfaction and violent action tendency. This could be done by communicating grievances through media and advocacy campaigns in ways that bridge the gap between citizens and state, reduce polarization, and ultimately avert violence. In addition, professionally trained dialogue facilitators, for example those associated with the Nepal Transition to Peace Institute in Kathmandu, could assist conflict parties in reframing polarized discussions to jointly held dilemmas of how to meet the needs of everyone involved. Talks about the new constitution, for instance, could with the support of dialogue facilitators build mutual trust by shifting focus from zero-sum bargaining on issues such as electoral constituencies, provinces, and citizenship; to collaborative problem-solving for meeting the needs of everyone to feel safe and represented.

Article 5: Infrastructures for peace and the role of peace services in Nepal

Maya Böhm, Babu Ram Poudel, Prakash Mani Sharma & Jeannine Suurmond

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Abstract

The concept of Infrastructures for Peace (I4P) has been given considerable attention by peacebuilding researchers and practitioners over the last years. While it has not yet been conclusively defined, it is generally accepted that infrastructures for peace, encompassing different levels of society, can support peace both in acute conflict situations and in the long run. In Nepal, following the armed conflict fought between the Maoist People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the state from 1996 to 2006, the framework of I4P has found its way into government policies. We would like to briefly report on this and other developments relating to I4P in Nepal, including a selection of the existing I4Ps for greater illumination.

As Suurmond and Sharma (2013) have argued earlier, approaching I4P from a 'user perspective', that is, asking participants on a micro-level about aspects of peace, is a promising and insightful angle to look at the topic. So while we will paint a picture of infrastructures for peace on different levels in Nepal, we will also present results from a study on peace needs and peace services conducted in 2015. Defining peace as the absence of internal and external violent conflict (negative peace) and a state of wellbeing (positive peace), people in Nepal were asked where and who they go to restore their sense of peace on different levels; in other words, which peace services they access. The results of the study, that incorporated data of 1177 participants, show that people preferred different kinds of peace services depending on the level at which the conflict occurred (intrapersonal, interpersonal, or inter-community). In addition, participants had specific ideas about which peace services would be beneficial for addressing certain kinds of conflicts. Building on these results, we will discuss ways forward for I4P in Nepal.

Keywords: I4P, Infrastructures for Peace, Peace Services, Nepal

Introduction

Recent peacebuilding literature emphasizes the importance of taking into account local perspectives, traditions, and practices when designing strategies to contribute to peace, as opposed to importing international, 'external' peacebuilding interventions (e.g. Paffenholz, 2013). One concept that is often cited to promote this view is Infrastructures for Peace (I4P, see for example Van Tongeren, 2012). First conceptualized by John Paul Lederach in the 1980s, it has received considerable attention, especially from academics and policymakers. The description regularly cited for I4P is the following, based on the definition developed at the first African seminar on I4P, organized by the UNDP in Kenya in 2010:

'Infrastructures for peace are a network of interdependent systems, resources, values and skills held by government, civil society and community institutions that promote dialogue and consultation; prevent conflict and enable peaceful mediation when violence occurs in a society' (UNDP 2013).

The I4P concept can be applied both to acute conflict situations and post-conflict-situations, but is not limited to them. Instead, we understand it as a concept applicable to societies and countries across the globe. We believe that it makes sense to ask more openly: what are the structures,

mechanisms, resources, values and skills that contribute to peace in this given context?¹ In post-conflict transition, the concept might be of great support for finding access points to building sustainable peace (Giessmann, 2016). Also in Nepal, I4P gained momentum after the armed conflict. Several official infrastructures for peace, such as the Ministry for Peace and Reconstruction (MoPR), Local Peace Committees (LPCs) or the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the Commission for the Investigation of Enforced Disappeared Persons (CIEDP) were created in response to dealing with the aftermath of the armed conflict. When looking at infrastructures for peace in Nepal, we do this with the recent armed conflict in mind. However, we direct our attention to peace in the perceptions of the general population in their daily life. In the framework of I4P, the focus is on internal capacities and local approaches to supporting peace. This, together with our interest in how peace is and can be supported in the long-term, led to the research questions presented here.

Even though Infrastructures for Peace are generally described as systemic and operating on multiple levels, conceptualizations differ. On the one hand, there are descriptions of I4P that focus more on institutions and structures that provide top-down peace services, such as ministries for peace and formal infrastructures (e.g. Hopp-Nishanka, 2012). On the other hand, grassroots peacebuilding and informal infrastructures are frequently mentioned as examples as well (e.g. Suurmond & Sharma, 2013).

Suurmond and Sharma have proposed understanding infrastructures for peace as offering peace services, hence, structures that can meet peace needs (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Different levels of the peace sector (Suurmond & Sharma 2013, 3)

If we are looking at infrastructures for peace through this lens, the step to considering the recipients of peace services, the users of infrastructures for peace, is a small one. This is the angle that we are coming from in this paper.

¹ In line with this idea, the Global Alliance for Ministries and Infrastructures for Peace (GAMIP; gamip.org) is supporting the global establishment of ministries and departments of peace.

We will describe infrastructures for peace in the Nepalese context briefly and then present results from a study recently completed by Pro Public and Seed (2016). In this, we will focus on peace services, because we sought to investigate which peace services, and hence which infrastructures for peace, people in Nepal are actually using. In addition, we believe that identifying local definitions of peace, peace needs, and peace services opens access points for practitioners and researchers.²

1. The Nepalese Context

Nepal, enclosed between China and India, is a country with roughly 26 million inhabitants. It is a country with a rich diversity of cultures and languages. The majority of people in Nepal are Hindu, with smaller proportions of the population identifying as Buddhist, Muslim and Christian (see e.g. Nepal Census, 2011). Even though known for its high mountain peaks, Nepal's 75 districts in its newly demarcated seven provinces stretch across great geographical diversity from north to south and east to west. Most people in Nepal work in agriculture, and many people have to go abroad for work, sending remittances back to Nepal (UN Data 2014).

Until Nepal became a democratic federal republic in 2008, the country faced a decade-long armed conflict and political unrest. The Communist Party of Nepal – Maoist (CPN-M), later with its armed wing, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), launched a so-called people's war in 1996 to fight the established political system. The Nepal Royal Army, police and armed police force were on one side of the conflict, the combatants of the PLA on the other; and many people of Nepal were between the lines. More than 13,000 people lost their lives. An estimated 1,300 people disappeared due to government or Maoist forces. Many people were displaced and some have, until today, not returned to their old homes. Private and public infrastructures, such as schools, government offices and bridges, were destroyed (for more information see Nepal Institute for Policy Studies, 2013; UN OHCHR, 2012). A Peace Accord ended the armed conflict formally in late 2006, marking the start of a peace process that continues till this day.

In September 2015, driven by political developments after the earthquakes, the new constitution was promulgated. With the introduction of this new constitution, especially in regard to the new province-borders that were delineated in it, protests emerged. They reached a violent stage between protesters and police, and the trade with India, essential in regard to many goods of daily consumption in Nepal, was significantly held up. The resulting shortage of goods, especially fuel which is used both for transport and cooking, was a painful burden for most people of Nepal.

At the personal level, conflicts in Nepal tend to happen most often between family members, in-laws, neighbors, and other community members. Topics of dispute are for example land boundaries, transactions, assault, defamation, domestic quarrels, property and alimony, community forests, irrigation, and agriculture (Governance Facility, 2016; Stein, 2013). For many women, violence is part of their lives. According to a study conducted in six districts by the Nepalese government (2012), almost half of the women interviewed (48%) reported that they had experienced violence at some time in their lives, and 28% had experienced violence in the past 12 months. In terms of mental health, depression and anxiety are highly prevalent in Nepal, especially among disadvantaged groups and those living in difficult conditions in the high hills (Luitel et al. 2013; Risal et al. 2016). Although

² Although focusing on Nepal here, we hope to contribute to comparing and learning across contexts, as is the idea of networks like the Global Alliance for Ministries and Infrastructures for Peace (GAMIP) and its regional affiliates, such as the Asia-Pacific Alliance for Ministries and Infrastructures for Peace (APAMIP).

accurate information about suicide rates is not available, the World Health Organization projected the suicide rate for Nepal in 2015 to be among the highest (7th) in the world.³

1.1 Government-initiated Infrastructures for Peace in Nepal

In 2006, amidst the arrangements for a new form of government, the parties to the peace talks in Nepal decided to establish structures to support the imminent peace process. The Ministry for Peace and Reconstruction (MoPR) was established in 2007 (for an overview, see for example Thapa, 2007). Because of the MoPR, Nepal is often cited as an example for I4P, as it is one of the few countries in the world with a Peace Ministry.

Since 2008, the MoPR has been providing interim financial assistance and services in a so-called Interim Relief and Rehabilitation Program. Other agencies, like the Nepal Peace Trust Fund (NPTF) and the local peace committees (LPCs) were also established in 2007, as supporting agencies of the Nepal peace process by the government of Nepal.

The Nepal Peace Trust Fund (NPTF) received funding from the Nepalese government and international donors. It financed projects in different areas relevant to the peace process – for example the integration of ex-combatants, security and transitional justice or peacebuilding initiatives (this included for example projects on voter education, dialogue and mediation projects and peace initiatives via media). In 2014, with an envisioned end of the NPTF in 2017, the focus was slightly changed and currently only two projects, both related to addressing the effects of the armed conflict, are implemented.

The Local Peace Committees (LPCs) were set up to be local structures for promoting peace. In an LPC, so was the idea, local actors from political parties, non-governmental organizations and citizens could come together to exchange, receive support to transform conflicts, and keep peace. Their first task was to provide compensation to conflict victims in the 75 districts. However, there were accounts of insufficient support and power struggles, leading to more diminished effects than originally envisioned (e.g. Carter Center, 2011). In addition, existing local peace initiatives had not been integrated into the LPCs, leading to frustration, and they were sometimes seen as politicized (Odendaal, 2010). The future of the LPCs is unclear, as according to their mandate, they are supposed to dissolve once there is a functioning local government structure in place. Local elections have been announced for May 2017, 20 years after the last local elections (Himalayan Times 2017).⁴

Envisioned in the CPA in 2006, the two commissions of the transitional justice process, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the Commission for the Investigation of Enforced Disappeared Persons (CIEDP) were established in 2015 with an initial two-year mandate. They became active last year and their mandate has recently, in February 2017, been extended by one additional year. There are continuous discussions around their work, including requests for amendments by victims groups and international criticism, for example by the international center for transitional justice (ICTJ). The regulations have been criticized by the commissions themselves as well, so the process of their implementation can be seen as ongoing.

The National Planning Commission of Nepal included a program to strengthen infrastructures for peace in the government plan for the period 2013-2016 after being introduced to the concept. This

³ http://gamapserver.who.int/gho/interactive_charts/mental_health/suicide_rates/atlas.html (Accessed on March 29, 2017).

⁴ Update: Following the 2017 local elections in Nepal, which were held in three phases in May, June and September, the MoPR and LPCs were dissolved.

was positive and showed the government's dedication to a strong and sustainable peace process. At the same time it has been noticed that in Nepal that infrastructures for peace on different levels, be it the MoPR, the LPCs or the commissions related to the transitional justice process, do not receive sufficient attention or funding. Only recently, the staff of the CIEDP for example, was cut down to a number of 20 from 25 officers for collection and investigation of cases (at this point, according to the Himalayan Times, the CIEDP had received a number of 2,793 of 'complaints'; the TRC more than 55,000 as reported on August 6, 2016). The MoPR, unlike other ministries, never had offices in the districts and is thus depending on other ministries and structures, like the LPCs.

1.2 Other Infrastructures for Peace in Nepal

Other infrastructures for peace in Nepal, which are not funded by the government, include informal justice mechanisms, like traditional methods of conflict resolution, and information sharing initiatives like NepalMonitor, an online mapping platform of human rights and security incidents, that informs subscribers by text message and via social media and can be fed into by individuals reporting incidents (nepalmonitor.org).

Mediation has been practiced in judicial institutions and local governance institutions and in rural communities in Nepal for several years (for a recent introduction, see Khanal & Thapa, 2014). An estimated 10,000 community mediators have been trained by NGOs and INGOs across the country.⁵ Various civil society organizations have been involved in implementing community mediation services and have cooperated with local bodies like village development committees and municipalities to establish centers for resolving disputes at the community level. Due to the variety of actors in the field, and in the absence of a comprehensive assessment of mediation services across implementing organizations, the numbers of mediators and mediated cases can only be estimated. In 2012, mediation services were available in a majority of districts, but far from being accessible to everybody (Suurmond & Sharma, 2012). Legally, mediation has been endorsed with the Mediation Act of 2011, together with official rules and regulations. Mediation is differentiated into three forms of mediation in Nepal: court-referred, court-annexed and community mediation. Community mediation is now seen as beneficial also at the ministerial level. The government, especially the Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Government (MoFALD), is working on defining the processes and procedures in agreement with the provisions of the Mediation Act and Rules. MoFALD stated that community mediation was one of the core functions of the local bodies and aims to make community mediation available everywhere in Nepal (Mukti 2017). The mediators themselves often work voluntarily.

Theatre has since long been used in Nepal to address political issues on community level, both by local theatre groups and by local and international NGOs. Dirnstorfer (2016) described street drama in its connection to the democracy movement, theatre of the oppressed, as a way of opening dialogues about community conflicts such as domestic violence, and, more recently, playback theatre as a form of addressing issues of the transitional justice process and the effects of the armed conflict in Nepal.

Another dialogue structure is provided by community dialogue programs, such as dialogue projects inviting ex-combatants and community members to come together (examples are the Support of

⁵ Number estimated on the basis of personal communication with Community Mediators Society Nepal and Center for Legal Research and Resource Development Nepal.

Measures to Strengthen the Peace Process (STPP) project supported by GIZ or the currently ongoing program 'From combatants to peacemakers' by Pro Public, funded by USAID. Community members and ex-combatants who resettled in the communities are participating in trainings to become dialogue facilitators and subsequently organize dialogues, large-scale peace events, mediation and basic psychosocial referral. Community dialogues on various topics relating to peace and reconciliation have been, and still are, organized by different local organizations and initiatives in many communities across Nepal. These are often funded by international organizations such as Search for Common Ground or the United States Institute of Peace. A couple of examples are dialogues between youth and government officials or dialogues between security personnel and civil society (Search for Common Ground 2017; United States Institute of Peace 2017).

2. Peace Needs and Peace Services in Nepal – Some Results from an Empirical Study

In April and March 2015, the Forum for Protection of Public Interest - Pro Public, a Nepalese NGO, in collaboration with the Cyprus-based think tank SeeD (Center for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development) collected data for a study on peace and violence in Nepal with support from the Civil Peace Service Program of the German Development Cooperation (ZFD/GIZ). The study was inspired by the I4P-concept and aimed to explore peace needs and peace services as experienced by the people. Data from 1177 respondents in 40 villages and towns across Nepal was used for analysis (Figure 2).⁶ Based on the data by the Nepal Central Bureau of Statistics, the Risk Management Office of DFID - GIZ and the UN coordinator's office, districts for sampling were identified based on two parameters: Areas that formed potential 'hotspots' in terms of potential for violence and location in terms of covering diverse geographical location (hills-plains/east-west/urban-rural).

Purposive sampling was used to select identity groups. Factors included here were caste, ethnicity, gender, religion, geography and political party affiliation. Within identity groups, random sampling was used to choose respondents (for a more detailed process description, see Pro Public & SeeD, 2016).

Data collection was done by researcher teams of three, consisting of one researcher from the capital and two researchers from the respective district. The questionnaires were administered face-to-face in the mother tongue of the participants by a native speaker researcher. The gender of interviewer and interviewee was matched to increase comfort.

Figure 2: Sampling districts across Nepal

⁶ Due to the earthquake in April 2015, 23 questionnaires were lost.

A total of 1177 household surveys were included in the analysis. Roughly equal numbers of men and women participated (51.8% men, 47.8% women, 0.3% other). The majority of participants were between 18 and 35 years old (44.4%), followed by participants between 36 and 55 years of age (40.6%) and 56 years or above (15.0%). Respondents households consisted of one to 15 people ($M=6.4$; $Sd=2.9$) and they stated to have between no up to 12 dependents ($M=3.4$; $Sd=2.7$). The table below presents demographic data on education level, main source of income, and religious affiliation below (Table 1).

Level of education, <i>n</i> (%)	
No education / beginners only	225 (19.1)
Primary school / incomplete	46 (3.9)
Primary school / completed (1-5)	104 (8.8)
Lower secondary school (6-8)	122 (10.4)
Secondary (9-10)	129 (11.0)
SLC & equivalent	162 (13.8)
Intermediate & equivalent	154 (13.1)
Graduate & equivalent	100 (8.5)
Post-graduate & equivalent	25 (2.1)
Main income source, <i>n</i> (%)	
Farming & animal husbandry	379 (32.2)
Regular job	232 (19.7)
Business	194 (16.5)
Inheritance & pension	191 (16.2)
Wage labor	181 (15.4)
Religion, <i>n</i> (%)	
Hindu	843 (71.6)
Buddhist	148 (12.6)
Kirat	88 (7.5)
Christian	16 (1.4)
Other	8 (0.7)

Table 1: Demographic data of participants

For this contribution, as stated earlier, we will focus on the peace services people use in order to further explore infrastructures for peace in Nepal and as a concept. More specifically, our question will be: which peace services do people use to restore their sense of peace? To start this exploration, we will report on when respondents of this survey felt at peace, so that we may come closer to defining peace from the user perspective. We will then report on whether they believed there were enough people qualified to support them in (re-)gaining peace on different levels and which new peace services they saw as most important to have in their communities.

2.1 Concepts of Peace

Participants were asked to indicate whether they felt at peace in various situations. They were read 24 options, including one open answer option, and were asked to choose five to indicate when they felt at peace. The three situations most often chosen were the following:

- 1) 'When your family is happy' (89.0%)
- 2) 'When you don't have any worries' (82.7%)
- 3) 'When you have done a good job' (68.6%)

The same went for situations when they did not feel at peace. The three situations chosen by a majority of participants for not feeling at peace were:

- 1) 'When you are feeling confused, sad, angry, or stressed' (81.6%)
- 2) 'When there are disputes in your family' (76.6%)
- 3) 'When there are disputes in your community' (60.4%)

2.2 Peace Services

If we understand peace services to be part of infrastructures for peace and directly experienced by people, it makes sense to try and assess the kind of peace services people know and are actually using. Because peace services will most likely be used by someone when he or she is experiencing a conflict, this was how we approached the research question. Respondents were asked how they had usually resolved conflicts in the last few years. Because we were assuming that conflicts on different levels would call for different peace services, we asked about:

- 1) Situations in which respondent felt unhappy (Intrapersonal peace)
- 2) Situations of conflict with own family (Interpersonal peace)
- 3) Situations of conflict with community (Intercommunity peace)

Hence, the interviewers provided options on who the respondent had usually gone to for support and advice regarding a conflict and why. In addition, they asked if the respondent had ever gone to a specific peace service provider on a list, such as community mediation center, LPC etc. to more specifically assess use of 'formal' service providers.

Intrapersonal Peace Service Providers

When asked how they were usually dealing with feeling 'unhappy inside' over the last few years, almost half of the participants told the interviewer that they had kept quiet and dealt with it by themselves (46.5%). Regardless of their answer to this question, participants could still indicate who they usually went to for support and advice. Among the respondents, a majority named their spouse, family members, and friends in relation to intrapersonal peace. The top three of people most often mentioned, can be regarded as primary, secondary and tertiary peace service providers; indicating their importance for getting support to (re-)gain intrapersonal peace (Figure 3).

Even though spouse, family members, and friends were the three most often mentioned, there were differences in regard to how often they were usually consulted. While 66.7% of all respondents stated that they 'always' went to their spouse when experiencing feelings of unhappiness, this applied to 46.9% in regard to family members and 22.4% in regard to friends. Friends, in comparison,

were consulted 'sometimes' by a majority of respondents (56.3%), whereas 42.3% sometimes consulted their family members and 13.8% sometimes went to their spouse in case of intrapersonal conflict.

Figure 3: Peace service providers for intrapersonal peace (as in Pro Public & SeeD, 2016, p. 39)

The most important reasons participants gave when asked why they were going to the person they had indicated for support were that this person understood them, the person kept what they said confidential, the person was easy to contact, and the person gave good advice.

To assess the use of peace services that we considered as potentially relevant, respondents were asked if they had ever participated in a specific service or event to bring inner peace to themselves. Because not all peace services may have been available to respondents, we are only reporting on those who stated that they knew this specific peace service was available in their community (see Figure 4 for a summary of availability and use of services).

Of 133 participants who knew that psychosocial counseling/psychotherapy was available in their community, the majority (68.7%) stated that they had never used this kind of service for gaining intrapersonal peace (21.6% 'sometimes'; 6.7% 'often').

Of 779 participants who knew that music/dance/cultural programs and festivals were available in their community, the majority (63.9%) stated that they had sometimes used this kind of service for gaining intrapersonal peace (19.8% 'often'; 15.5% 'never').

Of 335 participants who knew that learning how to meditate was available in their community the largest group (43.5%) stated that they had never used this kind of service for gaining intrapersonal peace (37.5% 'sometimes'; 16.4% 'often').

Of 299 participants who knew that yoga classes were available in their community the majority (53.2%) stated that they had never used this kind of service for gaining intrapersonal peace (29.4% 'sometimes'; 14.4% 'often').

Of 301 participants who knew that peace lectures by non-religious persons like academics or social workers were available in their community, the majority (59.1%) stated that they had sometimes used this kind of service for gaining intrapersonal peace (5.6% 'often'; 33.2% 'never').

Of 197 participants who knew that rehabilitation services (e.g. for substance users or victims of domestic violence) were available in their community the majority (76.1%) stated that they had never used this kind of service for gaining intrapersonal peace (16.2% 'sometimes'; 5.1% 'often').

Of 342 participants who knew that learning how to resolve conflicts without using violence was available in their community the most (47.7%) stated that they had sometimes used this kind of service for gaining intrapersonal peace (17.0% 'often'; 32.2% 'never').

Of 263 participants who knew that learning how to effectively communicate was available in their community the biggest group (46.0%) stated that they had sometimes used this kind of service for gaining intrapersonal peace (8.7% 'often'; 43.3% 'never').

Of 1036 participants who knew that social dialogue groups (like women groups, youth clubs) were available in their community the largest group (44.6%) stated that they had sometimes used this kind of service for gaining intrapersonal peace (15.5% 'often'; 38.5% 'never').

Figure 4: Services available in the communities with indication of use for intra-personal conflict (in %)

For the total group of participants, assuming that these services or actions were possible for all, using walking/exercising for intrapersonal peace was used sometimes by most people (41.5%, 34.4% 'often'; 21.8% 'never'); spending time in nature was used sometimes by a majority (50.6%, 25.3% 'often'; 22.1% 'never'); and going to a religious place was also used sometimes by a majority (55.9%, 24.9% 'often'; 16.7% 'never').

Interpersonal Peace Service Providers

Given three options on how they had usually resolved conflicts with their family over the last few years, most participants stated that they had used peaceful discussion among family members (93.5%). However, 35.3% had also usually used help from outsiders and 9.5% said that they had argued until one person had won to resolve family conflicts.

As with intrapersonal peace, participants were invited to state whether they went to particular persons or institutions when they were in conflict with a family member. As is visible in Figure 5, participants most often went to other family members, friends or relatives for advice and support when in conflict with a family member. Here, the person most often 'always' consulted was another family member (53.6%), while relatives, friends or neighbors were announced to be 'always' consulted by around 15% of participants. In these cases 'sometimes' consulted were most often relatives (50.7%), friends (47.9%), and neighbors (46.6%).

Figure 5: Peace service providers for interpersonal peace (as in Pro Public & SeeD, 2016, p. 40)

The most important reasons for choosing the persons they had indicated as first source of support were that this person understood them, was easy to contact, and gave good advice.

To assess the use of peace services that we considered as potentially relevant, respondents were asked if they had ever participated in a specific service or event to settle disputes with their family.

Because not all peace services may have been available to respondents, we are only reporting on the cases that stated that they knew this specific peace service was available in their community (for a summary of services available and used see Figure 6).

Of 500 participants who knew that community mediation centers were available in their community the majority (69.3%) stated that they had never used this kind of service for gaining interpersonal peace (26.9% 'sometimes'; 2.8% 'often').

Of 353 participants who knew that paralegal committees were available in their community the majority (86.4%) stated that they had never used this kind of service for gaining interpersonal peace (10.8% 'sometimes'; 2.0% 'often').

Of 877 participants who knew that police was available in their community the majority (73.4%) stated that they had never used this kind of service for gaining interpersonal peace (24.7% 'sometimes'; 0.9% 'often').

Of 343 participants who knew that a court was available in their community the majority (84.3%) stated that they had never used this kind of service for gaining interpersonal peace (13.1% 'sometimes'; 1.5% 'often').

Of 570 participants who knew that a Local Peace Committee (LPC) was available in their community the majority (78.1%) stated that they had never used this kind of service for gaining interpersonal peace (20.4% 'sometimes'; 1.1% 'often').

Of 472 participants who knew that a dialogue group/social dialogue group was available in their community the majority (71.2%) stated that they had never used this kind of service for gaining interpersonal peace (23.9% 'sometimes'; 2.3% 'often').

Of 125 participants who knew that a psychosocial counseling center was available in their community the majority (79.2%) stated that they had never used the service of a psychosocial worker for gaining interpersonal peace (17.6% 'sometimes'; 2.4% 'often').

Of 165 participants who knew that a forum theatre group was available in their community the majority (81.1%) stated that they had never used this kind of service for gaining interpersonal peace (15.2% 'sometimes'; 1.2% 'often').

For the total group of participants, we are reporting on the following other services:

The VDC secretary or executive officer was never approached for interpersonal conflicts by the majority (70.4% 'never'; 25.6% 'sometimes'; 2.6% 'often').

Teachers were never approached for interpersonal conflicts by the majority (84.2% 'never'; 12.8% 'sometimes'; 0.7% 'often').

Traditional dispute mechanisms were never approached for interpersonal conflicts by the majority (73.4% 'never'; 19.5% 'sometimes'; 6.2% 'often').

Religious leaders were never approached for interpersonal conflicts by the majority (78.7% 'never'; 17.7% 'sometimes'; 1.8% 'often').

High-status people in the community were never approached for interpersonal conflicts by approximately half of the participants (50.7% 'never'; 34.8% 'sometimes'; 13.3% 'often').

Community organizations were never approached for interpersonal conflicts by the majority (74.2% 'never'; 22.3% 'sometimes'; 1.7% 'often').

Figure 6: Services available in the communities with indication of use for interpersonal conflict (in percentage)

Intercommunity Peace Service Providers

To find out about which peace service providers participants had experienced using in their community they were asked not about their personal involvement in community disputes but rather for their impression on how community conflicts were usually resolved. Similar to interpersonal conflict, respondents were invited to indicate whether community conflicts were usually resolved peacefully, by arguing, or with the support of trusted people. The majority of respondents stated that conflicts in their community were usually resolved by peaceful discussion (86.2%). As multiple answers were possible and the categories were not seen as exclusive, a majority stated that conflicts were resolved with the involvement of a third party (79.6%). However, 19.6% stated that they were usually solved by arguing ('shouting, threatening or blaming') until one side was winning.

Participants were then asked where people from their community would usually go to for resolving conflicts. Again, they could indicate whether people would go to these people or institutions for resolving an intercommunity conflict 'always', 'sometimes', or 'never'.

Participants stated in 63.9% of the cases that people would sometimes go to the police when they were in a community conflict, and in 18.4% that people would always go to the police in that case. A

large number of participants mentioned social workers as people that community members would sometimes go to in case of a conflict (61.4%; 14.8% 'always'). Regarding the VDC secretary, more than half said that people would sometimes go (58.0%) and 15.5% would always go to receive support in a community conflict (Figure 7).

Figure 7: Peace service providers for interpersonal peace (as in Pro Public & SeeD, 2016, p. 42)

Asking the participants why they thought their community members would use the peace service provider they had mentioned, they assumed that it was because they gave good advice, were trustworthy, were knowledgeable and that they were skilled in 'solving problems like these'.

Because we were interested in finding out who the respondents thought was the most important person or institution in their community for community conflicts, we invited them to indicate the three persons that people would most often go to. The responses somewhat correspond with those mentioned above. More than half of all respondents named the police as those community members would most often go to for help, followed by the VDC secretary (43.3%) and political actors (37.6%).

Person most often sought for help	Yes (<i>n</i> ; % of <i>N</i> =1177)
Police officer	631; 53.6
VDC secretary	508; 43.3
Political actor	442; 37.6
Social worker	410; 34.8
Community mediator	403; 34.2
Traditional justice leader	298; 25.3
Dialogue facilitator	171; 14.5
Representative of community organization	121; 10.3
Lawyer	101; 8.6

Paralegal committee member	99; 8.4
Local Peace Committee member	57; 4.8
Religious leader	49; 4.2

Table 2: Indication of persons community members most often go to for help with disputes

2.3 Availability of Qualified Support

Respondents were asked to indicate whether they believed that there were enough people available in their community one could go to in case of lack of intrapersonal peace / feeling unhappy, lack of interpersonal peace / disputes with family or friends, and lack of intercommunity peace. Around a third of participants stated that there were not enough qualified people. For intrapersonal peace, 30.2% stated that there were not enough qualified people, for interpersonal peace 32.7% stated that there were not enough qualified people and for intercommunity peace, it was 37.6%. Explorative Chi-Square tests of cross tabulation revealed that there was a significant connection between estimations. People who stated that there were not enough people to resolve conflicts on an intrapersonal level were also more likely to say that there were not enough people to resolve conflicts between family members or friends ($\chi^2 (1)=374.67$; $p<0.001$). They were also less likely to say that there were enough qualified people to support in resolving community disputes ($\chi^2 (1)=321.10$; $p<0.001$). A significant association was also found for the latter, community disputes, with estimating enough qualified people to resolve interpersonal disputes ($\chi^2 (1)=343.75$; $p<0.001$).

2.4 New Peace Services

For all three assessed areas of peace, intrapersonal, interpersonal, and intercommunity peace, the researchers asked respondents to choose one service from a list that they saw as most important to act towards strengthening peace in their community.

For intrapersonal conflicts, almost half of all respondents said that support in dealing with substance abuse would be the most important new service to introduce in their community for people feeling unhappy (48.2%). The other services, in order of importance for the whole group of participants were: learning how to resolve conflicts (16.6%); support dealing with domestic violence (16.3%); psychosocial counseling / psychotherapy (7.1%); meditation (4.8%); learning how to communicate (3.2%); dealing with anxiety / fear (1.6%); healing from depression / trauma (1.5%); other (0.6%).

Asked whether they themselves would use this most important new service mentioned, the majority said that they would (84.1%). Asked whether they would be willing to pay for this service in case it were the only way to make it available, the majority said yes (79.1%), a small proportion was not sure (5.4%), and 14.0% were not willing to pay even in that case.

For interpersonal conflicts, the most important new service chosen was learning how to solve conflicts without using violence, which was picked by around a quarter of all participants (24.6%). Other new services wanted were, in order of percentage of respondents choosing them: support to help family members or friends to find a solution (15.8%); more information about how to handle conflicts and bring peace (11.3%); advice from someone knowledgeable (11.0%); help in preventing violence (10.8%); a place where different groups in our community could meet (9.3%); learning how to have an effective conversation (6.4%); support to heal broken relationships (6.0%); learning how to meditate / do yoga (2.5%); psychosocial counseling (2.2%).

Also here, the majority indicated they would use the new service (90.0%). Paying for this new service in case it was the only way to make it available was approved by 79.9%; whereas 4.2% said 'maybe', and 14.3% would not pay for the new service.

For intercommunity conflict, a little less than a third of all respondents said that the most important new service to introduce would be teaching children how to resolve conflicts without using violence (29.1%). The other wanted services were, in order of percentage of participants: Helping people with trauma, substance abuse, depression, anxiety and stress (24.7%); reconciling different community groups (15.0%); teaching adults to better understand each other and handle conflicts non-violently (8.8%); supporting more constructive community dialogues (7.1%); protecting people from violence (4.7%); lobbying and advocating against exclusion and discrimination (2.5%); monitoring violence (1.6%); helping leaders / politicians to improve their communication (1.0%).

As in the two other areas, most of the participants were imagining that they would use the new service (94.5%). The majority was willing to pay for the new service they were wanting (84.6%), a small proportion was unsure (4.2%), and 10.3% were not willing to pay.

3. Discussion

When people are not feeling at peace, how do they respond and where do they go? Results from a big survey in Nepal confirm that there are indeed 'systems, resources, values and skills' that contribute to peace in everyday lives of people. Coming from a 'user perspective' we can say that the respondents of this survey find ways to address their experience of conflict on different levels.

Respondents mainly defined feeling at peace as what scholars call 'positive peace' – a state of well-being, not the mere absence of violence. The respondents' choice of situations when they felt at peace, tells us that they did not primarily associate it with the absence of violence and physical insecurity. They did, however, connect it to the absence of negative feelings. Jones and colleagues (2013) reported, based on a qualitative analysis of responses from South and South-East Asia, that a little more than half of their participants defined peace in terms of positive peace, most often as 'harmony'. Slightly fewer of their participants preferred to define peace as negative peace. These authors, too, reported mention of emotions, both the absence of negative feelings and the presence of positive feelings as a personal indicator for peace for their respondents. The mention of family and community points to the importance of social ties for feeling at peace. Yang, Bekemeier and Choi (2016) only recently reported from a qualitative study on concepts of sociocultural health, which somewhat relates to our operationalization of intrapersonal peace, that their participants defined good health also as 'peace in the family'. Still, in the context of our study, which took place against the backdrop of an ongoing transitional justice process and an armed conflict that lies only ten years back, as well as the high number of women who experience violence in Nepal, we could have imagined more mention of negative peace indicators.

Even though peacebuilders have mainly focused on conflict between people, we found it important to assess how people are dealing with conflicts within themselves too. This can be described as absence of intrapersonal peace, or feeling unhappy. One reason for including this level was that armed conflict, or basically violence at any level, can lead to reduced wellbeing and impaired mental health. This linkage has been shown many times, also in Nepal (see for example Luitel et al., 2012). Conversely, reduced psychological wellbeing may be connected to an increase in violence. For

example, loss of psychological resources, such as self-perception and self-value, has been linked to support for political violence and ethnocentrism (Hobfoll, Canetti-Nisim & Johnson, 2006).

The reliance on the closest social relationships, spouse, family members, and friends, for support in situations of internal conflict corresponds to a repeatedly found connection between mental well-being and social support (e.g. Milner et al., 2016). Looking at professional support for intrapersonal peace, an obvious service coming to mind would be psychosocial counseling or psychotherapy. Our results show that only a minority of our participants was aware of this kind of service in their community, and it is very likely that this is because mental health care is scarce in Nepal (Luitel et al., 2012). Even of those respondents that seemed to have access, only a small proportion stated to have used these services. However, other services we consider to be infrastructures for peace, such as social dialogue groups, were more widely known and used by more than half of the concerned participants. Traditional ways of coming together, with a joint purpose or simply enjoying time together, as in festivals, cultural events, music and dance, also contribute to intrapersonal peace in the perception of respondents. Interestingly, from participants' point of view, services that relate to the interpersonal level, such as learning how to communicate more effectively and learning how to resolve conflicts without the use of violence, seemed to contribute to intrapersonal, not interpersonal peace. This is interesting, because offering learning opportunities touches both on peace education in schools and private initiatives that could be of economic interest for providers (also see below regarding 'new services'). Taken together, we see a mixture of traditional and community-based opportunities for gaining intrapersonal peace, happiness, and stability, together with more targeted services, like non-violent conflict resolution or dialogue groups. Clearly, close relationships play the most important role for this level of peace.

Interpersonal peace and community peace have been more in the focus of peacebuilders. Looking at interpersonal peace, respondents in this study indicated that their close social contacts were the most important peace service providers, similar to the area of intrapersonal peace. Here, however, we see a professional service as a secondary peace service provider appear: The social worker as a supporter in times of interpersonal conflict. Traditional justice providers were also mentioned. Their existence and importance for the resolution of conflict in Nepal has often been, sometimes critically, discussed (see for example Upreti, 2014). It is interesting that participants mentioned traditional justice providers as secondary service providers, but when asked more directly, a majority stated to never have used them. For intercommunity conflict, traditional justice mechanisms were mentioned by approximately a quarter of the respondents. Even though other peace services seem to be more appealing to many, it can be assumed that they have their place in the scope of providers in Nepal. A question for further research could be whether there are developments in regard to their use and involvement in the communities in Nepal and what the implications of their use are for their clients and the communities.

Community mediation services were used both for interpersonal conflicts/family disputes and community conflicts, however, not as often as might be expected. Especially in regard to community conflicts, mediators seem less present than government service providers, like police officials and VDC staff. However, they were mentioned by the respondents, and around 12% had used them in the past for support in interpersonal conflicts. They seem to be established as peace service providers to a certain degree in Nepal (for earlier discussions see also Stein, 2013; Suurmond & Sharma, 2012). In addition, they have for some time been in the process of being more and more

institutionalized, with a Mediation Act introduced in 2014 and a number of institutions like the Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development, and the Community Mediators' Society working on promoting community mediation.

The finding that political actors are often approached for community conflicts demonstrates how large an influence political parties have on the local level – despite the absence of local level elections to this date. We assume that there is some overlap with the group of high-status people in the communities that were mentioned by almost half of the participants to be consulted in cases of interpersonal conflict. When attempting to strengthen community infrastructures for peace in Nepal, considering this group of peace service providers will be an important aspect. While we are aware of projects, including our own, where this is already being done, the quantitative data from this study underpins its relevance.

Looking at the differences in use of peace services between interpersonal and community conflict, it seems that for the latter, respondents leave the realm of personal support. This might at least in part be due to the change in operationalization by the researchers – the interviewers asked not for personal peace service use in this section, but rather which ones community members were using in case of a conflict. In addition, family members and other closer social connections were not mentioned in the list. Looking back, it would have been interesting to know whether they would also have been mentioned as primary service providers. However, respondents stated the involvement of a third party much more frequently for community conflict (79.6% versus 35.3%) and also mentioned involving formal structures like the police more often for conflicts in the community. We think it reasonable to assume that for conflicts that move away from our intimate circle and involve people that we are less close to, we are approaching peace service providers that are further away from this kind of relationship. Rather, as community life might be based more on rules and official structures; and community conflicts are more likely perceived as breaking those rules, people will be more likely to approach institutions and people who hold places in this community space.

More information on the use of peace services can be derived from respondents' ideas about new peace services. Taken together, learning how to solve conflicts nonviolently seems to be a peace service that, in the eyes of the participants, applies to conflicts within oneself as well as conflicts with close social networks and wider social networks. This is also a service that many people indicated they were willing to pay for, if it were the only way to make it available. Interestingly, 'learning' something is not a direct peace service, as it will not target a conflict directly (in comparison to mediation, for example), but respondents were making a clear link to keeping or re-establishing peace. By asking for learning opportunities, we imagine they are envisioning being able to deal with conflicts by themselves, transforming their approach to conflicts – a beautiful piece of information for peacebuilders who like to speak of, for example, local agency and sustainability. In fact, if there is a considerable number of people in Nepal who would like to learn peaceful conflict transformation; and are ready to pay for it, it could be promising to further investigate the possibility of offering this kind of a service locally and in economically self-sustaining ways (Pro Public & Seed, 2016). Another topic that clearly emerges from the ideas about new services is dealing with substance abuse, which participants seem to make a link to not only intrapersonal conflicts, but also to intercommunity conflicts.

In conclusion, infrastructures for peace that are usually highlighted in the literature seem to have less importance in the everyday peacemaking activities of people in Nepal than existing social

networks and intimate relationships. In addition, structures and providers that are not primarily the focus of peacebuilders in Nepal, such as social workers or VDCs, play an important role. It seems important to take this information into account when wanting to strengthen mechanisms for conflict resolution or transformation on the local level. Similarly, as people seem to frequently resort to the formal structures of VDC secretaries and police officers, supporting them with capacity-building or other forms of support to further enable them to take on this role might be an effective strategy to support peace on the local level. The LPCs, often cited as an example of infrastructures for peace in Nepal and other countries, seem to be less important for dealing with conflicts than expected. A little less than half of the respondents had access to or knew of LPCs in their vicinity, and of those, only around a fifth had approached them for support to interpersonal conflict. For intercommunity conflict, one area that LPCs were intended to cater to, the rate was even lower. If the explanation for the low use of this infrastructure on the local level is to be found in reasons that have been discussed previously (Odendaal, 2010; Suurmond & Sharma, 2013) it must be investigated if LPCs are to remain instated to support peace on a local level.

What could be the reasons for participants of the study, and, most probably, many more people in Nepal, to only rarely make use of infrastructures for peace that were initiated by the Government of Nepal? Apart from the obvious practicability and utility of going to your family and friends for immediate support, we can consider the information that participants gave when they were asked why they would go to a specific peace service provider. Across all three levels of conflict, respondents said that they went to someone because he or she gave 'good advice'. That means, people like getting useful support, however we would need to investigate further as to what 'good advice' constitutes. Also, it would be interesting to know how people choose their preferred peace service provider – would they actually be trying out different peace service providers, comparing them, and making a decision? This, too, could be interesting to look at if one were to expand our knowledge on the use of peace services. Factors like trust, confidentiality and easy access were also mentioned and should be taken into account when planning peace services.

As a last point, we would like to briefly discuss the perceived availability of qualified peace services. It is positive that the majority of respondents felt that there was sufficient capacity in their communities to support people in times of conflict, be it intrapersonal, interpersonal, or between community members. However, the results also show that a proportion of the participants felt that there were no such services available, or that they were not sufficient. That this perception went across categories with significant connection could be a hint to a group of people that have no access to appropriate peace services. In this light, 30% of participants is quite a high proportion and a further reason to think about how to make peace services accessible for as many people as possible. We believe that coming closer to local definitions of peace and finding out more about what constitutes useful and supportive peace services is a promising direction to take in supporting infrastructures for peace.

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Article 6: Blessing or burden? The impact of peace services on peace and violence in Nepal

Jeannine Suurmond, Alexandros Lordos & Prakash Mani Sharma

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Abstract

Recent literature highlights the potential of infrastructures for peace for peacebuilding and violence prevention. An increasing number of studies examine cases of infrastructures for peace, yet little is known about the services individuals actually use when facing conflict. This study investigates local agency in the context of infrastructures for peace in Nepal. Adopting a quantitative approach, we explore the relationship between use of third party support for dealing with conflict ('peace services') and individual experiences of peace and violence. Results show that the more respondents reported use of services that actively engage their recipients in dealing with their conflicts, such as mediation, the more peace they experienced in different dimensions of their lives and the lower their propensity for violence was. In contrast, the more respondents reported use of services that require only passive involvement and do not directly focus on the conflict at hand, such as sharing information, the less intrapersonal and intercommunity peace they experienced and the higher their propensity for violence was. Encouraging the use of active peace services could allow more people to enjoy their benefits and ultimately prevent violence and strengthen peace. Future research could further explore the linkages between everyday use of third party support and people's experience of peace and violent behaviour, including direction of effect.

Keywords: infrastructures, peace, violence, services, needs, agency, Nepal, quantitative, impact, peacebuilding

Introduction

The concept of infrastructures for peace has gained traction with governments, academics, multi- and bilateral organisations, and practitioners (Giessman 2016; Van Tongeren 2013). It has been recognised and used as a framework to design peacebuilding and conflict prevention interventions. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), for example, framed its crisis prevention and recovery activities towards building infrastructures for peace (UNDP 2013). Several governments, including those of Ghana and Nepal, integrated infrastructures for peace in national policies and plans.

The *who, what, why, when, where and how* of infrastructures for peace is a topic of ongoing discussion (Kovács & Tobias 2016). An often cited definition is the following: 'Infrastructures for peace are a network of interdependent systems, resources, values and skills held by government, civil society and community institutions that promote dialogue and consultation; prevent conflict and enable peaceful mediation when violence occurs in a society' (UNDP 2013). Infrastructures for peace are said to be embedded in the 'local turn' in peacebuilding, which emphasises the importance of local agency, including customs, culture, structures, history, and practices (Richmond 2012). Few studies, however, investigate the local as having agency in its own right (Paffenholz 2015).

The present study aims to enrich the body of research by exploring local agency in the context of infrastructures for peace in Nepal. If we regard infrastructures for peace as infrastructures that deliver services to people with the goal of contributing to peace and preventing violence, it makes sense to ask which services people actually use to restore their sense of peace when they suffer from conflict and what their impact is on violence. More specifically, we hypothesise that the use of

third party support services for dealing with conflict increases people's experience of peace in various dimensions of their lives and reduces their propensity for violence.

Two key features of Nepal motivated the selection of the country as our case study. In 2013, the government of Nepal designated infrastructures for peace as one of the national development goals to garner support for strengthening peace and harmony in the country (Government of Nepal 2013). Yet little data, based on which the government and other stakeholders could track progress towards this goal, are available. Nepal is also home to a variety of infrastructures for peace at diverse levels of society. Among those are traditional justice mechanisms, community mediation committees, and pools of dialogue facilitators. Others were established as a result of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that formally ended the armed conflict between the government and the Unified Communist Party of Nepal in 2006, such as the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction, the local peace committees, and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Apart from a small number of studies on mental health care and traditional justice practices, we know little about the services the Nepalese turn to in practice when they struggle with conflict. Astrological predictions and advice, for instance, are frequently sought by Nepalese who face conflict, disease, disaster, or important life-decisions (Toffin 2014).

In this paper, we will first describe the 'peace needs–peace services approach' that forms the basis of our argument, followed by our operationalisation of the approach. We then show that individuals' experience of peace and propensity for violence varies with the type of support services they receive. Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings for infrastructures for peace theory and practice, and suggest avenues for future research.

'The Peace Needs and Peace Services Approach'

The peace needs–peace services approach focuses on the support that people seek when they suffer from conflict. Market studies investigate the existing needs ('demand') and available offerings ('supply') in order to inform business development decisions. This type of research is interesting for peacebuilders too, because it can produce bottom-up data that help us better understand the challenges, resources, and choices of a population as a whole.

Infrastructures for peace are here defined as the 'structures, resources, and processes through which peace services are delivered'; and peace services are those services 'offered by peace service providers with the goal of addressing peace needs' (Suurmond & Sharma 2013, 4).

Individuals, communities, and states have peace needs when they are destabilised by conflict and experience reduced negative and/or positive peace (Suurmond et al. 2016). Peace needs can arise in all the dimensions of human life in which negative and positive peace manifest. The dimensions in which conflict can occur are commonly categorised as intrapersonal, interpersonal, intragroup, and intergroup (see for example Cheldelin et al. 2003). Infrastructures for peace hence encompass a multitude of providers who service individuals or groups with various peace needs. Providers can offer their peace services within the framework of an infrastructure for peace, such as dialogue facilitation offered by a truth and reconciliation commission to support healing and reconciliation, or independently, as in the case of a trusted elder providing advice to conflicting neighbours.

Studies and reports have linked peace services to increased peace and reduced violence, but, rather problematically, to the opposite too. On the one hand, peace services have mitigated peace needs and prevented violence. Peace education, for example, has been associated with reduced aggression and bullying in schools (Santos et al. 2011; Slee & Mohyla 2007). Restorative dialogue has been linked to decreased symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in victims of crime and recidivism rates of offenders (Sher-man & Strang 2007). Mediation has been related to more equality and social inclusion in communities (Lederach & Thapa 2012), as well as to an increased likelihood of long-term reduction of tension between conflicting parties (Beardsley et al. 2006). On the other hand, peace services appear to have exacerbated peace needs and violence in some cases. In Côte d'Ivoire, for example, the services delivered by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission reportedly escalated tensions between opposing camps (IRIN 2014). In Nepal, traditional justice providers have allegedly reinforced patterns of exclusion and marginalisation (Coyle & Dalrymple 2011). In the next section, we explain how we investigated the relation between peace services, peace, and violence.

The Sites: 40 Villages Across the Flatlands and Hills of Nepal

Data were collected through a survey implemented by the Nepalese NGO Pro Public with support from the Civil Peace Service programme of the German Agency for International Cooperation (ZFD/GIZ) in Nepal and the international NGO SeeD over the course of March and April 2015. The survey encompassed 40 villages and towns located in 10 districts across the country (Map 1).

Map 1: Sampling Districts

Source: Nepal Department of Measurement, 2016

We adopted a disproportionate stratified sampling approach, using the 2011 Nepal census as the sampling frame and the census enumeration area (EA) as the primary sampling unit. In total, 40 EAs out of 40,000 were used, and 30 households were selected from each EA based on their violence potential (high) and locality type (formal urban, formal rural, and informal areas, hill/flatlands, and

East/West). The sparsely populated mountain districts were excluded due to budgetary reasons. We assessed violence potential using expert advice from the UN Resident Coordinator's Office, the Department for International Development-GIZ Risk Management Office, and the Nepal Institute for Conflict Management, Peace, and Development. Households were also selected (stratified) on the basis of their ethnic, gender, caste, political, and religious identity. We focused on those identity groups for which intergroup tensions had been reported in our conflict assessment. The secondary sampling unit was the household from which individuals were randomly selected on the basis of voter lists and data provided by local administrative offices. Suitable respondents were considered to be any capable adult member of the household.

A total of 1,177 respondents were included in the analysis.¹ The number of male and female respondents was roughly equal (52% men, 48% women). The majority of the respondents were of age 18 to 35 (44%) or of age 36 to 55 (41%) and 15% of the total sample was of age 56 and above. Overall, 29% of the respondents self-identified as belonging to the lower economic class, 69% as belonging to the middle class, and 2% identified themselves as upper class.

Measuring Peace Services in Multiple Dimensions

The use of peace services was assessed with questions inquiring whether respondents seek support from someone external to their situation for dealing with painful emotions such as confusion, shame, regret, guilt, stress, anxiety, and depression (intrapersonal peace service use) and conflicts with family and friends (interpersonal peace service use). Intercommunity peace service use was assessed slightly differently in order to include the perceptions of respondents without personal experience of this type of conflict. Respondents were asked about their impression of how conflicts between members of their community are usually resolved. Again different questions were developed to assess peace services for the citizen-state dimension, for the reason that conflicts between citizens and the state transcend the personal relationship.² Services for this dimension were excluded from our analysis however, due to the qualitative nature of the corresponding set of answers.

Those respondents who affirmed that they seek external, third party support for dealing with painful emotions subsequently were asked to indicate what this third party does to support them, choosing from a list of services. Conflicts with family and friends were assessed in a similar way. Respondents who reported that community conflicts are usually resolved through third party support also reported what such a third party does to help warring community members. It was possible to answer these questions for a maximum of three third parties.

The list of peace services from which respondents could choose focused on services for acute conflict situations. Although no exhaustive inventory of services that can be delivered through infrastructures for peace yet exists, we derived clues from current definitions. Services that have been mentioned include dialogue, consultation, mediation, capacity-building, advice, coordination, and monitoring (UNDP 2013; Hopp-Nishanka 2013). Moreover, we included services based on our review of general peacebuilding literature (partly discussed in the approach), and mental health care and traditional justice practices in Nepal (e.g. World Health Organization [WHO] & Ministry of Health 2006; Upreti 2014).

Technical terms were translated into lay language. The service of mediation, for example, was described as 'helping everyone find a solution together' and the service of arbitration as 'making

decisions'. Assuming that conflicts on different levels would call for different peace services, we developed separate lists for each. All lists included an open response option and respondents could select multiple services from each list.

For services to restore intrapersonal peace, respondents could report that their supporter 'just listens to me' (listening); 'tells me what to do' (instructing); 'helps me understand my problem better' (deepening understanding); 'gives me information' (sharing information); 'connects me with other people who have similar experiences' (connecting); 'forecasts my future' (forecasting the future); 'gives me medication' (supplying medicine); and 'tells me what I should do to avert bad luck' (advising on averting bad luck).

Service options for interpersonal peace were 'just listens to me' (listening); 'tells me what to do' (instructing); 'helps me find a solution together with my family/friend to our conflict' (mediating); 'gives me information' (sharing information); 'forecasts my future' (forecasting the future); 'connects me to others with similar experiences' (connecting); 'helps me to talk to my family/friend without shouting' (facilitating dialogue); 'suggests ways to avoid bad luck' (advising on averting bad luck); 'teaches me how to resolve conflicts without using violence' (teaching conflict resolution); and 'teaches me how to communicate more effectively with my family/friend' (teaching effective communication).

For intercommunity peace services, respondents could choose between 'just listens to all parties' (listening); 'makes a decision' (arbitrating); 'gives advice' (giving advice); 'helps everyone to talk to each other in a constructive way' (facilitating dialogue); 'helps everyone understand each other better' (deepening understanding); 'brings the case to court' (litigating); and 'helps everyone find a solution together' (mediating).

Measuring Peace Needs in Multiple Dimensions

In order to operationalise our definition of peace needs, we drew inspiration from the goals of infrastructures for peace repeatedly cited in the literature:³ peace, violence prevention, reconciliation, constructive relations, resilience, security, inclusion, justice, and social cohesion (e.g. Kovács & Tobias 2016; Giessman 2016; Unger et al. 2013; Lederach 2012). Galtung (1996) suggests that, just like health is an ideal state of being, dependent on the absence of disease and the presence of a well-functioning immune system, so is peace dependent on the absence of violence (negative peace) and the presence of well-being, non-violent conflict resolution skills, harmony, and order (positive peace).

The above informed our selection of indicators to capture the experience of negative and positive peace. The indicators represent our operationalisation of peace needs in each of the intrapersonal, interpersonal, intragroup, and intergroup dimensions. Casting the net as wide as possible within the limitations of our research, we identified indicators relating to social cohesion, human security, and reconciliation (SeeD & UNDP 2015); social psychological obstacles and catalysts of negative and positive peace (Cohrs & Boehnke 2008); conservation of resources theory (Hobfoll et al. 2006); mental health (Anderson & Kiehl 2014; Coid et al. 2013; Morley 2015); and resilience (Wagnild & Young 1993; Van Metre 2014).⁴

As can be seen in Table 1, this resulted in a total of 58 indicators: 21 indicators for the intrapersonal dimension, 10 for the interpersonal dimension, 17 for the intercommunity dimension, and 10 for the

citizen-state dimension⁵ (totalling 31 reverse indicators for negative peace and 27 indicators for positive peace). Each indicator was assessed with a total of three to five relevant questionnaire items. Because the concept of negative peace is characterised by the absence rather than the presence of distinguishing features, it was measured through reverse indicators. All instruments were contextualised to the context of Nepal.⁶

Table 1: Indicators and Instruments

	Negative peace		Positive peace	
	Indicators	Instruments	Indicators	Instruments
Intrapersonal dimension	- Anxiety - Depression - PTSD - Substance use	Adult Self Report Inventory	- Mindfulness - Self-kindness - Common humanity	Self-Compassion Scale
	- Anger - Frankness - Argumentativeness	Buss Perry Aggression Questionnaire	- Problem-solving - Behaviour regulation - Emotion regulation	Barkley Deficits in Executive Functioning Scale
	- Psychopathic traits	Self-Report Psychopathy Scale	- Personal life satisfaction	SCORE Index
	- Negative affect	Self-developed. Sample item: 'Are you currently in a situation in which you have feelings of anxiety?'	- Optimism	Life-Orientation Test Revised
	- Pessimism	Life-Orientation Test Revised		
	- Self-deprecation	Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale	- Self-esteem	Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale
	- Personal insecurity	SCORE Index		
Interpersonal dimension	- Victimization	Self-developed. Sample item: 'Have you ever been the victim of assault?'	- Compassion	Interpersonal Reactivity Index
	- Sense of injustice	Buss Perry Aggression Questionnaire (hostility items)	- Spouse social support - Family social support - Friends social support	Perceived Social Support Protocol
	- Competing conflict style	Thomas Kilman Conflict Mode Instrument	- Collaborative conflict style	Thomas Kilman Conflict Mode Instrument
			- Social competence - Family coherence	Resilience Scale for Adults
Intercommunity dimension	- Passive discrimination - Social threat perception - Social distance - Dehumanization - Intergroup anxiety - Negative stereotypes - Cultural distance - Positive attitudes towards violence - Intergroup mistrust - Social exclusion	SCORE Index	- Positive feelings towards outgroups - Intergroup contact - Positive attitudes towards forgiveness - Tolerance of diversity	SCORE Index
	- Village social support		Self-developed. Sample item: 'How much are community resources like drinking water, equally shared in your village?'	
	- Community conflicts	Self-developed. Sample item: 'How frequently have you personally experienced disputes over money lending your community?'	- Neighbouring village social support	Self-developed. Sample item: "How much do the neighbouring villages participate in the festivals organized by your village?'
Citizen-state dimension	- Perceived corruption - Political insecurity - Economic insecurity - Food insecurity - Health insecurity	SCORE Index	- Support from local government institutions	Self-developed. Sample item: 'How much can you rely on the VDC/municipal office for help if you have a serious problem?'
			- Trust in government institutions - Civic engagement - Civic life satisfaction local - Civic life satisfaction national	SCORE Index

In order to explore the relation between peace service use and violence prevention, we assessed people's propensity for violence independently of their peace needs. To this end, we used a violence index created on the basis of three different questions. Conceptualising violence as harming or hurting (Galtung 1996), the questions were: 'Are you willing to use violence in order to change the conditions in your community or broader society?'; 'To what extent do you feel like causing harm to this group or their possessions?'; and 'Do you sometimes hit another person?'

Translations, Data Collection, Analysis

The questionnaire was translated from English into Nepali, Maithili, Awadhi, Tharu, and Limbu. The translations were checked by professional translators and different versions piloted in the demographically distinct areas of Kirtipur, Samakushi, and Kalanki (Kathmandu); Kuponhole (Lalitpur); and Katungi (Bhaktapur). Lessons learned from these pilots were reflected in the final survey design.⁷

Thirty researchers participated in four days of training prior to conducting the survey. Each research team consisted of one researcher from Kathmandu and two researchers from the district. At least one of the team members was female and one a native local-language speaker. The questionnaire was administered face-to-face in the mother tongue of the participants, by researchers who are also native speakers over the course of on average 2.5 hours. The lead researcher assigned an interviewer to make the first contact with each of the selected households by personal visit or by phone. The research teams rotated the role of interviewer to match the gender of the respondent in order to increase comfort. All respondents provided informed consent before participating in the survey and statements to this effect were read before the interview started. A coding system was used to maintain the anonymity of the respondents. Every research team was visited at least once by the Pro Public monitoring team.

Raw scores for peace services, peace needs, and propensity for violence were calculated per respondent. To create the variables for the predictive analysis, we conducted factor analyses to determine underlying patterns among the different peace services and peace needs, and constructed a violence index. The resulting independent variables of active and passive peace services and the dependent variables of four peace dimensions as well as the violence index, were then utilised in structural equation modelling in order to determine what relationship existed, if any, between them. In all cases, a 99% confidence level was used to assess the significance of the findings. The results of the factor analyses are presented below.

Constructing the Peace Service Dimensions

By adding up the number of times respondents reported a certain type of support, we calculated scores for each of the peace service items. We then ran an exploratory factor analysis including peace services from all levels: intrapersonal, interpersonal, and intercommunity.⁸ Factor analysis makes underlying patterns in the data visible so that relationships between data can be interpreted and understood. This statistical technique clusters together items or indicators that vary in tandem into overarching dimensions, while allowing for the possibility that the dimensions themselves are partially correlated. Items which failed to significantly contribute to any peace service dimension were sequentially excluded from the model, until all remaining items were significant. Only those were included in further analysis. A two-dimensional solution emerged that was based on the content of the peace service, rather than the level at which they were offered.

Table 2 shows both dimensions with 11 items each and the strength of their relationship to the underlying dimensions. 'IntraPS', 'InterPS', and 'ComPS' stand for 'intrapersonal peace service', 'interpersonal peace service', and 'intercommunity peace service' respectively. The closer the value of the indicator is to 1, the stronger the relationship to the underlying dimension.

Looking at the nature of the items, the first dimension seems to refer to a more top-down style of support that does not require the user to become actively involved in resolving his or her conflict. For this reason, we labelled it 'passive peace services'.

The second dimension appears to relate to a more deliberative, problem-focused style of support that actively engages the user, and was therefore labelled 'active peace services'.

In conclusion, in seeking third party support for dealing with painful emotions and conflicts, participants tended to differ not on what level they seek services (e.g. whether they seek services to mitigate intrapersonal emotions or community conflict), but rather on the nature of the services being sought (e.g. whether they were services that encouraged active or passive engagement with the issue at stake). The resulting two variables, active and passive peace services, were used as independent variables in the predictive analysis.

Table 2: Exploratory Factor Analysis of Peace Services

	Passive peace services	Active peace services
InterPS Advising on averting bad luck	.86	
InterPS Forecasting the future	.84	
InterPS Connecting	.84	
InterPS Sharing information	.83	
InterPS Teaching conflict resolution	.79	
InterPS Teaching effective communication	.78	
IntraPS Forecasting the future	.74	
IntraPS Connecting	.74	
IntraPS Supplying medicine	.72	
IntraPS Advising on averting bad luck	.68	
IntraPS Sharing information	.65	
InterPS Mediating		.84
InterPS Instructing		.77
IntraPS Deepening understanding		.55
ComPS Deepening understanding		.53
ComPS Mediating		.51
IntraPS Listening		.51
IntraPS Instructing		.49
ComPS Giving advice		.46
ComPS Arbitrating		.46
InterPS Listening		.35

ComPS Listening		.25
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Constructing the Peace Dimensions and the Violence Index

After checking the internal consistency of the scale of each indicator (Cronbach's alpha coefficient for the items comprising the indicator; values greater than 0.65 were considered acceptable), we tested whether our selection of indicators, representing peace needs, to measure the intrapersonal, interpersonal, intercommunity, and citizen-state dimensions indeed empirically contributed to four separate dimensions, using the same procedure as described above.

Table 3 shows the results of the exploratory factor analysis. As can be seen, the analysis yielded a four-factor solution, including dimensions for intrapersonal, interpersonal, intercommunity, and citizen-state peace. The closer the value of the indicator is to 1 or -1, the stronger the relationship to the underlying dimension. A negative value indicates an inverse relationship to the dimension.

Thirteen indicators contributed to the first dimension. Looking at the characteristics of the indicators, it appears that all 13 relate to the extent that one is at peace with oneself. This includes being in a sound mental and emotional state and feeling included and fairly treated. In an attempt to best represent the indicators, we therefore labelled this dimension 'intrapersonal peace'.

Table 3: Exploratory Factor Analysis of Peace Needs

	Intrapersonal peace	Interpersonal peace	Intercommunity peace	Citizen-state peace
Depression	-.81			
Anxiety	-.76			
Emotion regulation	.66			
Sense of injustice	-.59			
Behaviour regulation	.59			
Anger	-.51			
PTSD	-.51			
Argumentativeness	-.46			
Self-esteem	.45			
Problem-solving	.43			
Social exclusion	-.41			
Negative affect	-.40			
Psychopathic traits	-.28			
Village social support		.73		
Neighbouring village social support		.67		
Friends social support		.55		
Civic engagement		.43		
Social competence		.42		
Mindfulness		.33		
Frankness		.33		
Family social support		.30		

Compassion		.27		
Intergroup anxiety			-.74	
Negative stereotypes			-.72	
Dehumanization			-.67	
Intergroup trust			.59	
Positive feelings towards outgroups			.53	
Social threat perception			-.49	
Civic life satisfaction national				.88
Civic life satisfaction local				.66
Perceived corruption				-.30
Trust government institutions				.25

Nine indicators contributed to a second dimension, pertaining to how one relates with other individuals in one's own environment, to the psychological qualities that enable peaceful interpersonal relations and to whether one is supported by the members of one's environment. This dimension was labelled 'interpersonal peace'.

The six indicators that contributed to the third dimension refer to how open one is to peaceful relations with members of other groups and/or communities. This dimension was labelled 'intercommunity peace'. Four indicators contributed to the final, fourth dimension. Because this dimension relates to the nature of the relationship between the citizen and the state, we labelled it 'citizen-state peace'. The factor analysis thus confirmed that most of our selected indicators, or peace needs, cluster into four categories. These peace dimensions were used as dependent variables in the predictive analysis. The fifth dependent variable for this analysis was the violence index. Scores for each of the questions relating to the propensity of an individual to display violent behaviour were aggregated into an average overall score.

To test our hypothesis that the use of peace services would increase people's experience of peace in various dimensions of their lives and reduce their propensity for violence, we used structural equation modelling (SEM). SEM is a technique for representing, estimating, and testing a network of relationships between variables (e.g. regressions, correlations). In this case, both active and passive peace services were modelled as independent variables and the different peace dimensions and the violence index as dependent variables. We furthermore assumed that active and passive peace services would be correlated, insofar as respondents were likely to utilise both categories of services in their daily lives. The results are shown below in Figure 1. The figure shows a structural equation model of peace services, peace dimensions, and propensity for violence (standardised estimates; $N = 1,177$). The single-headed arrows represent regression coefficients; the double-headed arrows represent correlation coefficients. The closer the value of the coefficients is to -1 or 1 , the stronger the negative or positive relationship between the variables (all significant at $p < 0.01$).

Figure 1: Peace Services, Peace Dimensions, and Propensity for Violence

The specified model was found to display excellent fit (chi square = 3.39, df = 4, $p = 0.49$). The non-significance in this case implies that the specified model does not significantly differ from the underlying structure of the empirical dataset.⁹ As can be seen, the use of peace services significantly predicts people's experience of peace and propensity for violence. Specifically, the more respondents report active peace services use, the more intrapersonal, interpersonal, intercommunity, and citizen-state peace they experience and the lower their propensity for violence is.

In marked contrast, the more respondents report passive peace services use, the higher their propensity for violence is and the less intrapersonal and intercommunity peace they experience. Passive peace services do not predict any change in the levels of interpersonal peace and citizen-state peace.

The correlation between active and passive peace services suggests that most people report use of both kinds of services. The benefit of active peace services, however, seems to be partially cancelled out by the negative impact of passive peace services, as demonstrated by the negative relationship between passive peace services use and intrapersonal peace, intercommunity peace, and propensity for violence.

Discussion

This study demonstrates that people in Nepal use services that can be delivered through infrastructures for peace, such as mediation and consultation, to more or less effectively restore

their sense of peace when facing conflict. We can therefore say that people in Nepal exercise agency in the context of infrastructures for peace.

The specific purpose of this research was to test the hypothesis that use of third party support for dealing with conflict would increase people's experience of peace in various dimensions of their lives and reduce their propensity for violence. Our findings confirm the hypothesis, albeit with an important qualification. The more respondents reported the use of services that actively engage their users in dealing with their conflicts, the more intrapersonal, interpersonal, intercommunity, and citizen-state peace they experienced and the lower their propensity for violence was. Remarkably, the more respondents reported use of services that require only passive involvement and do not directly focus on the issue at hand ('passive peace services'), the less intrapersonal and inter-community peace they experienced and the higher their propensity for violence was. It seems that active peace services are a blessing for their users because they effectively meet peace needs, whereas passive peace services aggravate peace needs and in so doing add to their users' burdens.

An explanation for the difference in impact between passive and active peace services could lie in their content. Passive peace services, including advising on averting bad luck, forecasting the future, connecting, sharing information, teaching conflict resolution, and teaching effective communication, have in common that they do not require users to actively attend to their own conflicts. By contrast, active peace services, including mediating, deepening understanding, giving advice, instructing, listening, and arbitrating, more deliberately encourage users to engage with their issues. The role of the user, passive or active, as well as the focus of the service, directly on the problem or not, thus varies depending on the service category.

The findings can be understood in the light of literature on individual agency. Agency is an actor's or a group's ability to make purposeful choices (Samman & Santos 2009). The relationship between agency and well-being in multiple dimensions of life is well established (Welzel & Inglehart 2010). Lack of agency, or external locus of control, has been linked to reduced psychological well-being (Griffin 2014), as well as to dependent and fragile societies (De Coning 2016). Perhaps active peace services have a beneficial effect because they increase the ability of their users to imagine constructive alternatives to violence as a means for achieving one's goals ('conflict literacy' (Galtung 2000)). In other words, having agency in conflict may be conducive to increased peace with oneself and others. The effectiveness of peace services, and therefore infrastructures for peace, may thus depend on their ability to increase the agency of the individuals, communities, or countries they aim to serve. A first step in exploring this relation in more detail could be to review case studies of infrastructures for peace from the perspective of agency.

Alternatively, the difference in impact between peace services might be due to their focus of attention. Active peace services appear to be oriented towards tackling their users' challenges head on. Possibly, they are effective simply because they resolve the problem. Passive peace services, which do not appear to concentrate on the issue at hand, may leave people's problems unaddressed or addressed insufficiently, with undesirable outcomes as a result.

The finding that passive peace services include 'advising on averting bad luck' and 'forecasting the future' suggests that people turn to traditional service providers for support. This is in line with previous studies that identified traditional healers and religious leaders as primary mental health care providers in Nepal (e.g. Pradhan et al. 2013). As with peace services, no systemic data regarding

the effectiveness of such mental health services in Nepal are available (Luitel et al. 2015). Because our results show that traditional methods for mitigating emotional turmoil and conflict may do more harm than good, it is worthwhile to further examine this link given their widespread use.

Unlike use of active peace services, passive peace services use did not predict interpersonal and citizen-state peace in our sample. In the case of interpersonal peace, it might be due to competing effects of passive peace services, where the mere act of interacting with the passive service provider provides a boost to interpersonal functioning, which is then lost due to the detrimental effects of problem avoidance, as earlier discussed. In the case of citizen-state peace, the lack of association may be due to lack of relevance. Perhaps these passive services are meant for private issues and do not extend towards the domain of state-related grievances. It remains to be seen whether results would be similar if peace services specific for the citizen-state dimension are included in the analysis.

A role for infrastructures for peace in peacebuilding and violence prevention hence seems to lie in the delivery of active peace services. Our study provides empirical evidence for the theory that mediation, arbitration, and consultation and counselling, in as far as they encompass giving advice, listening, instructing, and deepening understanding, are services to be delivered by infrastructures for peace. Moreover, our results raise questions about the value of passive peace services in responding to acute contexts. It is important to recall here that our methodology focused on situations in which active peace needs required immediate relief. It is plausible, and studies confirm, that passive peace services such as ‘teaching conflict resolution’ do in fact contribute to violence prevention, provided that they are offered in less pressing circumstances.

Based on our findings, policy-makers, practitioners, and donors in Nepal are advised to shift the balance between the use of active and passive peace services in favour of the former. Allowing more people to experience the benefit of active peace services could prevent violence and increase the experience of peace of Nepalese citizens. Such a shift can be encouraged by establishing referral systems between passive and active peace service providers (e.g. astrologers and mediators), increasing access to active peace services; and lowering the barriers to active peace services through financing and marketing campaigns. The continuation of community mediation in the villages and municipalities seems warranted. When determining the impact of peace services, individual agency and service focus could be included as indicators in monitoring and evaluation plans.

A key limitation of this research is that it is not possible to establish direction of effect. Our data could tell the reverse story: individuals who already enjoy high levels of peace, and are not predisposed to violence, use active peace services more frequently than individuals with the opposite profile, who resort to passive peace services. Should this be the case, an explanation could be that individuals who experience high levels of peace are less afraid to directly tackle their conflicts than individuals experiencing low levels of peace, who may fear increasing their discomfort this way. In order to conclusively clarify the direction of effect, additional investigation and in particular longitudinal research is recommended.

This study has gone some way towards enhancing our knowledge of the peacebuilding landscape in Nepal, including individual preferences in terms of when and where people seek support for dealing with conflict, which local peace capacities exist, and whether the received services are effective. Replications of this research in other countries could test the robustness of our peace needs–peace services approach and operationalisation, and assess the generalisability of the findings. Some of the

passive peace services in this study, such as fortune-telling, are perhaps typical for Nepal. It would be interesting to see whether similar results are found in countries where, for example, the Catholic practice of ‘hearing confessions’ is used to address personal matters of conflict and peace.

There is much still to learn about everyday peace services use and violence. To more conclusively establish the relation between third party support and violence prevention, self-report data like ours could be triangulated with behavioural data from criminal records and studies on the belligerence of communities and countries. Expanding our knowledge of people’s experience of peace and violent behaviour on the one hand and the impact of peace services on the other, so we believe, is a promising avenue for deepening our understanding of infrastructures for peace.

JEANNINE SUURMOND (PhD candidate, Utrecht University) is senior researcher for the Center for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development (Seed) and Nonviolent Communication trainer in Cambodia. Previously, she worked for ZFD/GIZ with Pro Public in Nepal and for Kreddha, a Dutch NGO active in the mediation of intrastate conflicts.

ALEXANDROS LORDOS is senior fellow at Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health, Harvard University and research director at Seed. He holds a PhD in Clinical Psychology from the University of Cyprus.

PRAKASH MANI SHARMA is executive chair of Pro Public: Forum for the Protection of Public Interest, and Supreme Court senior advocate in Kathmandu, Nepal. He holds various master’s degrees in law, including from the Lewis and Clark College, Portland, USA and the University of Delhi, India.

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¹ The original sample size was 1,200, but 23 interviews were lost due to the Gorkha earthquake. This earthquake struck Kathmandu and surrounding districts on 25 April 2015. With a magnitude of 7.8 on the Richter scale, it killed 9,000 people and destroyed more than 500,000 homes. Hundreds of aftershocks with a magnitude higher than 4 followed.

² For instance, we asked which institutions help to prevent violence in the community; who in the community is advocating against discrimination and exclusion; and how many times the respondents experienced a dispute with a government agency in the last two years.

³ We did not identify a previous operationalisation of the 'for peace' part of 'infrastructures for peace' (the needs-side) in the literature on infrastructures for peace.

⁴ Two well-known instruments, the Global Peace Index and the Pillars of Peace framework, measure negative and positive peace from the national rather than individual perspective.

⁵ We changed the wording of the two categories 'intragroup' and 'intergroup' dimensions of human interaction identified by Cheldelin et al. (2003) to 'intercommunity' and 'citizen-state' to more adequately capture the content of the indicators.

⁶ This included adjustments to the wording of items to ensure that they would be effectively understood. For example, the Buss-Perry aggression scale item 'some of my friends think I'm a hothead' was rephrased to 'some of my friends think I quickly become angry'.

⁷ For example, we transformed all self-report statements to interview-style questions because the former created confusion, and offered the respondents financial compensation to prevent impatience with the duration of the questionnaire from becoming a problem in the main study.

⁸ Using Maximum Likelihood Estimation with Promax Rotation.

⁹ Additional statistical information is available from the authors upon request.

Chapter 5: Findings and contributions

The aim of this research was to contribute to better, evidence-based, peacebuilding by increasing understanding of peace systems through the relation between peacebuilding interventions and people's everyday peace experience. The theoretical framework builds upon this nexus. It draws on conflict and peace studies theory, especially infrastructures for peace, peace, human needs, and systems theory. Adopting a pragmatic research approach and Nepal as a single case study, I was particularly interested in how the use of the concept of infrastructures for peace in peacebuilding could lead to improvements in people's experience of peace. My questions therefore inquired into the space where the infrastructure for peace meets the individual who is suffering from conflict, that is, the interface between people with a need for peace and those people who offer a service to meet that need.

The six studies comprising this research explore different aspects of peace systems. The key findings are briefly summarized below, after which I will answer the two main questions, based on the literature review, articles, and empirical findings: (I) How can peace systems be understood through the concept of infrastructures for peace?; and (II) Given the diverging perspectives on the state of peace in the country, what are peacebuilding priorities in Nepal? The chapter concludes with a discussion of the theoretical, empirical, methodological, and policy and programme contributions this dissertation makes, and suggestions for future research.

Overview of key findings

1. Can community mediation committees in Nepal be considered as infrastructures for peace? (Article 1)

Study 1 made a first foray into exploring whether the concept of infrastructures for peace includes non-state peace infrastructures, such as community mediation, a topic of debate in the literature. The study has shown that, overall, community mediation is a useful mechanism for settling conflicts between villagers in Nepal. The dispute settlement success rate as reported by mediators, partner organisations, and donors is generally high, around or above 70%. More long-term effects of community mediation include the empowerment of women and marginalised groups as they become respected mediators in the village; an increased sense of confidence among villagers in their ability to resolve their own disputes; and the development of horizontal relationships. However, while some community mediation programmes have been hailed for their free-of-cost services and fair, efficient, independent, and neutral processes; other programmes have been criticized for being discriminatory, reinforcing existing hierarchies, or being influenced by political parties.

According to the broad definitions of infrastructures for peace suggested in the literature, community mediation can be regarded as an infrastructure for peace in itself and/or as a component of an overarching Infrastructure for Peace. However, community mediation as it is practiced in its various forms in Nepal at the time of writing seems to fall outside the scope of definitions that prioritize structural government involvement in an infrastructure for peace and direct links to the national peace process.

2. What exactly are infrastructures for peace and what is their goal? How does Nepal's Infrastructure for Peace look like? Do Nepal's infrastructures for peace contribute to peace? (Article 2)

Study 2 presented the 'peace needs–peace services approach'. Using Nepal as a case, the study illustrated how the concept of infrastructures for peace can help us understand the workings and dynamics of a wider peace system as well as the added value of functional rather than normative interpretations of the concept.

The peace needs–peace services approach is akin to a market analysis with a focus on the available peace services offered by the components ('infrastructures for peace') and the existing peace needs of the Nepalese people (demand) in different dimensions in life (intrapersonal, interpersonal, intragroup, intergroup). Infrastructures for peace are defined as 'the structures, resources, and processes through which peace services are delivered (e.g. mediation committees) at any level of society', the sum of which constitutes a country's nationwide Infrastructure for Peace. Here, the goal of infrastructures for peace is to meet peace needs. Peace needs arise when people fail to resolve a conflict constructively on their own and consequently suffer. Thus, peace is conceived as an ideal state of being that can be disturbed by direct or structural conflict.

This approach has underlined that Nepal's peace sector encompasses the Government of Nepal, policymakers, multi- and bilateral agencies, (I)NGOs, and formal and informal infrastructures for peace, peace services, and users. The country is home to a wide variety of infrastructures for peace, most of which, according to the literature review, experience challenges in their functioning. Some of them, notably the community mediation committees, fulfil their mandate of peace more effectively than other infrastructures for peace. Actors in the peace sector with a double role of political *and* peace service provider, such as in the MoPR and the LPCs, are especially prone to encountering conflicts of interest and/or be confronted with the limits of their capacity.

3. Is there a relation between the inner and outer peacefulness? (Article 3)

The two previous studies focused on the provider side, meaning those who establish infrastructures for peace and provide peacebuilding services. Study 3 sought to understand the receiver-, or user-, side by way of investigating people's experience of peace and the relation between inner and outer indicators of peacefulness. Based on empirical data collected from a sample of 223 former Maoist combatants, study 3 has established that there is a connection between PTSD (as an indicator of inner peacefulness), and readiness to reconcile with former enemies (as an indicator of outer peacefulness). Those ex-combatants who demonstrated higher risk of PTSD, reported lower openness to interaction with former enemies and more feelings of revenge, compared to those who did not meet the screening criteria for PTSD. Thus, there seems to be a connection between inner peace and outer peace. Factional ties, i.e. ties with other ex-combatants, were unrelated to readiness to reconcile, but negatively related to PTSD. The findings suggest that ex-combatants' inner sense of peace has ramifications for their relations with the people and communities surrounding them.

4. What is the Nepalese experience of everyday peace? Where in Nepal can 'a need for peace' be identified? Which groups in Nepal experience violence? Which peace needs predict violent action tendency? (Article 4)

Having established a link between an indicator of inner peacefulness and an indicator of outer peacefulness, study 4 sought to more comprehensively understand people's experiences of peace. Surveying 1,177 respondents in 40 villages located in ten districts across Nepal, this study has shown that peace in Nepal can be broken down into five dimensions: intrapersonal peace, interpersonal peace, intercommunity peace, citizen-state peace, and material peace. The overall peace score for this sample, calculated as the average score of the respondents on the indicators of these five peace dimensions, was a moderate 6.2 on a 0-10 scale. On this scale, higher scores mean higher peace: '0' represents not at all being at peace and '10' being very much at peace. However, this number is rather abstract and, while useful at higher level for tracing evolution and making country comparisons, does not provide the granularity needed for peacebuilding design.

Such granularity is provided by the individual peace dimension scores. Scores on intrapersonal and intercommunity peace were relatively high. Scores on material and interpersonal peace were moderate. The lowest scores were found for citizen-state peace. Each of the five dimensions was comprised of multiple indicators. The strongest indicators were absence of depression and anxiety (for intrapersonal peace); support of village members and members of neighbouring villages (for interpersonal peace); absence of intergroup anxiety and social distance (for intercommunity peace); national civic life satisfaction and trust in governmental institutions (for citizen-state peace); and food and economic security (for material peace).

Significant differences in peace experience were observed between districts. For example, the results of the demographic group analyses indicated that of all ten research districts, a need for intrapersonal peace was especially present in Saptari and Banke. More specifically, Banke scored highest on depression, sense of injustice, anxiety, and lack of behaviour regulation, whereas Saptari scored highest on lack of emotion regulation, argumentativeness, indifference, anger, and PTSD. A need for intercommunity peace was identified in the districts of Kathmandu and Achham. Kathmandu scored highest on social threat perception, while Achham scored highest on dehumanization and lowest on intergroup contact.

Several other groups emerged with significant findings. Men, for example, seem to have more need for peace than women, who scored higher than men on every dimension of peace, except citizen-state peace. Not surprisingly, those identifying themselves as very poor or poor, scored significantly lower on material peace than those identifying themselves as middle class. People identifying with the Sudra caste, the lowest caste in Nepal, scored lowest across all peace dimensions, apart from citizen-state peace.

The general sample scored low on violence tendency. The indicator of violence that elicited the highest scores was community disputes. The two districts with comparatively the highest propensity for violence were Banke and Kapilvastu (both a still low 1.1, on a 0-10 scale). These districts scored higher than all or most other districts on community disputes and political violence. Dhanusha, Kapilvastu, and Kanchanpur scored higher on intergroup discrimination.

Regarding the relation between the peace dimensions and violent action tendency, predictive analysis showed that low intrapersonal peace differentiates individuals with violent action tendency from individuals with nonviolent action tendency, who are otherwise similar in terms of interpersonal, intercommunity, citizen-state, and material peace. More specifically, violent action tendency is predicted by the peace needs/indicators increased anxiety, psychopathic traits,

intergroup contact, and revenge propensity, as well as reduced information consumption, national civic life satisfaction, and community security.

5. What does peace mean to Nepalese people? What infrastructures for peace and peace services do people turn to, and why? Which infrastructures for peace are available? Which ones do people desire? Are people willing to pay for these? (Article 5)

Study 5 focused on understanding the link between people's experience of peace and third-party peace(bulding) services they select to increase their experience of peace. Adopting the peace needs–peace services approach, the study investigated local definitions, capacities, preferences, and approaches to supporting peace. To contribute a user perspective to the theoretical debate on the meaning of peace, study 5 first inquired after people's perception of peace. Drawn from the same sample as study 4, the data showed that people in Nepal tend to define feeling at peace not primarily as absence of violence and negative feelings but rather as 'positive peace', i.e. a state of well-being.

The study then explored which peace services, and hence which infrastructures for peace, people in Nepal are using. According to the peace needs–peace services approach, peace services are those services offered by peace service providers with the goal of addressing peace needs. In this study, peace services were operationalized as third-party support for emotionally painful and/or conflict situations. Findings identify the different kinds of peace services used, depending on the dimension in which users experience emotional pain and conflict: intrapersonal, interpersonal, or intercommunity. Notably, and in contrast with the liberal peacebuilding focus on political actors, the most important providers of peace services for intrapersonal and interpersonal peace were spouses, family members, friends, and relatives. Thus, rather unsurprisingly, people rely on their intimate circles for support with personal conflict, rather than formal infrastructures for peace. Reasons were, as respondents indicated, that this person understood them, kept what they said confidential, was easy to contact, and gave good advice. Traditional justice providers were also mentioned as interpersonal peace service providers, but not as the most important ones. The main providers of peace services for intercommunity peace were VDC secretaries, police officers, and social workers. The most important reasons for community members to choose certain intercommunity peace service providers, as reported by the respondents, were the good advice they give, being trustworthy and knowledgeable, and skilled in 'solving problems like these'.

In the perception of the respondents, traditional ways of coming together, festivals, cultural events, music and dance, contribute to intrapersonal peace too. The most often mentioned available peace services in the community were music/dance/cultural programmes and festivals; social dialogue groups (such as women groups, youth clubs); community mediation committees, LPCs, the police office, political parties, traditional justice mechanisms, and social workers.

Around a third of respondents stated that there were not enough qualified people available in their community to support intrapersonal, interpersonal, and intercommunity peace.

In relation to respondents' preferences for new peace services in their communities, one issue that emerged was substance abuse. The intrapersonal peace service most wanted by the respondents was rehabilitation support for substance abusers, which they linked to reduction of intrapersonal as well as intercommunity conflict. Asked whether they would be willing to pay for this service if it were the only way to make it available, an overwhelming majority confirmed they would. For

interpersonal peace, the most important new service desired was learning how to resolve conflicts without using violence. Again, an overwhelming majority indicated willingness to pay for this. For intercommunity peace, about a third of the respondents said that the most important new service to introduce would be teaching children how to resolve conflicts without using violence, for which a large majority was willing to pay.

Infrastructures for peace that are usually highlighted in the literature, such as ministries for peace and LPCs, seem to have less importance in the everyday peacemaking of people in Nepal than existing social networks and intimate relationships. In addition, structures and providers who are not primarily the focus of peacebuilders in Nepal, such as social workers or VDCs play a key role, as well as the police. The LPCs in contrast, are less important for conflict resolution than expected. The finding that learning how to solve conflicts nonviolently is one of the most desired peace services suggests that respondents imagine being able to constructively deal with conflicts by themselves, and wish to increase their agency in this regard.

In conclusion, when people in Nepal experience conflict on different levels, they find support to deal with this experience. People exercise agency and choice in selecting and using third-party services, some of which, as results show, are delivered through infrastructures for peace. People in Nepal are not only recipients of liberal peacebuilding interventions, but also consumers, and as such choose what services they use. Their range of choice and preferences are broader than the liberal view anticipates.

6. What is the relation between Nepalese people's multidimensional experience of peace, the support services they seek when they suffer from conflict, and violence? How can third-party peace efforts improve people's experience of peace? (Article 6)

Using data collected from the same population sample as studies 4 and 5, study 6 demonstrated that the use of third-party support for dealing with conflict can either increase or decrease people's experience of peace in various dimensions of their lives and either increase or decrease their propensity for violence, depending on the type of service received. The more respondents reported the use of services that actively engage their users in dealing with their conflicts ('active peace services'), the more intrapersonal, interpersonal, intercommunity, and citizen-state peace they experienced and the lower their propensity for violence was. Active peace services included mediating, deepening understanding, giving advice, instructing, listening, and arbitrating.

Remarkably, the more respondents reported use of services that require only passive involvement and do not directly focus on the issue at hand ('passive peace services'), the less intrapersonal and intercommunity peace they experienced and the higher their propensity for violence was. Passive peace services included advising on averting bad luck, forecasting the future, connecting, sharing information, teaching conflict resolution, and teaching effective communication, which suggests that people turn to traditional service providers for support. This is in line with previous studies that identified traditional healers and religious leaders as primary mental health care providers in Nepal (Pradhan, Sharma, Malla & Sharma, 2014). As with peace services, no systemic data regarding the effectiveness of such mental health services in Nepal are available (Luitel et al., 2013).

Most respondents report use of both kinds of services. Future research could establish direction of effect. As the results show that traditional methods for mitigating emotional turmoil and conflict may do more harm than good, it is worthwhile to further examine this link given their widespread

use. A role for infrastructures for peace in peacebuilding and violence prevention seems to lie in active peace services.

(I) How can peace systems be understood through the concept of infrastructures for peace?

One of the main objectives of this dissertation was to examine Nepal's peace system through the lens of infrastructures for peace. Chapter 1 has shown that there is theoretical basis for a systems interpretation of the concept of infrastructure for peace. Systems thinking regards the world not as a jumble of independent parts but as systems of relationships, focusing on interactions and links between parts or subsystems. In the ideal scenario, the various attributes of a system together to achieve the objective of that system. In the case of a peace system, this is to prevent violence and foster peace. Understanding peace in a holistic and multidimensional way, the boundaries of a peace system, including infrastructures for peace, can thus be defined by what does not contribute towards negative and positive peace.

The concept of infrastructures for peace highlights the institutional, organisational, and capacity attributes of a peace sector, including the policies governing the organisations and institutions, funding flows to and fro, services provided, and service beneficiaries. Looking through the lens of infrastructures for peace, the relationships between those who explicitly aim to contribute to peace (policymakers, funders, enablers, and service providers) and the recipients of their strategies (users) become apparent, revealing the peace sector component within a peace system. In addition to the peace sector, a peace system encompasses other sectors and initiatives when these contribute to negative and positive peace, for instance education and poverty-alleviation. Thus, this interpretation of peace includes development and 'structural peace'. Figure 6 shows the peace system map that emerged from this research. An expanded version of Figure 1 in article 2 (Chapter 4), it now includes the overall peace system as well as the peace needs that lie at its heart.

Figure 6 Peace system map

Using this map, my studies investigated several aspects of the peace system in Nepal, including the peace sector and the infrastructures for peace (especially articles 1, 2, and 5), peace services (especially articles 5 and 6), and peace needs (articles 3, 4, and 6). Themes that arose in the course of these studies include the meaning of peace (and hence the purpose of infrastructures for peace and the overall *raison d'être* of the peace system); the connection between the individual and the system in terms of the relation between inner and outer peacefulness; peace service effectiveness; and the role of agency. Below I will discuss how these different themes relate to the concept of infrastructures for peace.

*The concept of infrastructures for peace invites reflection on the purpose of the peace system, because it highlights the *raison d'être* of the institutions, organisations, and structures that comprise the peace sector.*

Chapters 1 and 2 have demonstrated that consensus on what 'peace' means, either within the field of peace and conflict studies, or in the country of study, Nepal, is elusive. This research examined the meaning of peace in two ways: by asking the people in Nepal when they feel at peace and by testing an everyday peace operationalization of the theoretical constructs of negative and positive peace developed by Galtung (1996). As article 5 has shown, most Nepalese, when asked when they feel at peace, first and foremost associate peace with a sense of well-being, before the absence of painful feelings and conflict. They thus mainly understood feeling at peace as 'positive peace'.

The theoretical concepts of negative and positive peace guided the selection of indicators for measuring everyday peace in Nepal. The analyses presented in articles 4 and 6 suggest that people in Nepal experience peace as a multidimensional phenomenon. Everyday peace in Nepal – as shown in Figure 7 – encompasses five different dimensions: citizen-state, intercommunity, interpersonal,

intrapersonal, and material (article 4), each composed of different indicators, or ‘peace needs’, as shown on the left side of the diagram. Combining the analyses of both articles, those indicators that most strongly capture the everyday peace experience of the respondents are noted between brackets. People’s own understanding of what it means to feel at peace is shown on the right.

Figure 7 The meaning of peace in Nepal

The most important peace needs or, statistically speaking, the strongest indicators of intrapersonal peace in Nepal are reduced depression and anxiety, together with effective emotion regulation. The most important peace needs determining interpersonal peace are support from village members, neighbouring village members, and friends. For intercommunity peace, the four strongest peace needs are reduced intergroup anxiety, dehumanization, social distance, and negative stereotypes; while for citizen-state peace they are national and local civic life satisfaction, trust in government institutions, and corruption. Finally, food and economic security are the strongest peace needs determining material peace.

From the five peace dimensions, material peace stands out because it refers to basic survival needs, rather than psychological and relational qualities. The fact that it showed up as a distinct dimension of the Nepalese everyday peace experience confirms the importance of basic needs satisfaction for people’s ability to experience peace.¹²⁵ While scores on the overall peace dimensions give an impression of people’s general experience on that dimension, the indicators making up that

¹²⁵ A finding relevant to the peace versus development debate. For more information on this debate, refer to Hughes (2016). ‘Peace and Development Studies’. In: Ramovic, J., Pogodda, S. & O.P. Richmond (2016), *The Palgrave Handbook of Disciplinary and Regional Approaches to Peace*, 139-153. London: Palgrave Macmillan; and Barnett (2008). ‘Peace and Development: Towards a New Synthesis’. *Journal of Peace Research*, 45(1), 75-89.

dimension provide the level of detail needed for developing policies and programmes aiming to increase everyday peace.

The internal attributes of a system affect its external attributes. In the Nepal peace system, one manifestation of this is the connection between inner and outer peacefulness.

The two empirical studies provided evidence for the notion that people's inner experience of peace influences their outer peacefulness, including propensity for violence. Data collected from the first survey revealed a connection between increased symptoms of PTSD and decreased readiness to reconcile with former enemies among ex-combatants in Nepal (article 3). Data from the second survey demonstrated a link between low intrapersonal peace, particularly the indicators increased anxiety and psychopathic traits, and violent action tendency (article 4).

A pathway for strengthening interpersonal, community, and citizen-state peace therefore seems to spring from intrapersonal peace. This finding resonates with U-theorist Scharmer's (2016): 'The issues outside are a mirror of the issues inside',¹²⁶ and Gandhi's (1913, p. 241) observation that 'we but mirror the world. [...] If we could change ourselves, the tendencies in the world would also change'. The pathway from inner to outer peacefulness underscores the importance of intrapersonal peace service providers (as identified in article 5) for the success of the overall peace system and provides logic for including inner peacefulness as a selection criterion for lead roles, such as decision-making and service provision, within the peace sector.

The concept of infrastructures for peace helps make visible all those individuals that are part of the peace sector, including formal and informal peace service providers and users.

Looking through the lens of infrastructures for peace, we discover where people go for support when they suffer from conflict and hope to increase their sense of peace; who it is that provides the support; and whether the available offer meets the demand. According to the empirical data presented in article 5, people in Nepal resort to various peace service providers when they experience a lack of peace, defined here as an absence of negative peace, painful feelings and/or prolonged suffering from conflict (Figure 8). Peace services were thus operationalized as support for emotionally painful and/or conflict situations from third parties. Data show that when embroiled in conflict, most people in Nepal seek out someone to support them.

¹²⁶ Otto Scharmer (2016). *Theory U - Learning from the future as it emerges*. TedxTalk, available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GMJefS7s3lc&t=1009s> [accessed 21 March 2020].

Figure 8 Peace needs and peace service providers in Nepal

As can be seen in the above figure, among the most important everyday peace service providers in Nepal are spouses, family members, relatives, and friends, because these individuals cater both to intrapersonal and interpersonal peace. In so doing, it is possible that they are indirectly supporting intercommunity and political peace too, given the previously established link between inner and outer peacefulness. Some of these service providers are even directly involved in community conflict resolution. As one respondent observed, 'Different groups such as the paralegal committee, mothers' groups, and youth groups have been taking control of conflicts in the village and as a result the conflicts have significantly decreased'. Traditional justice providers are also called upon to support interpersonal peace.

Also worth noting is the fact that none of the respondents mentioned the government- or donor-established infrastructures for peace commonly referenced in the literature, in relation to the intrapersonal, interpersonal, and intercommunity peace dimensions. The infrastructures for peace that are usually highlighted seem to have less importance in the everyday peacemaking of people in Nepal than existing social networks and intimate relationships. Other providers and structures that are not primarily the focus of peacebuilders in Nepal, such as social workers, VDC secretaries, and police officers, play an important role in community peacemaking. Political peace services were researched on the basis of secondary sources (article 2), not explicitly as part of the services people know and are actually using, and are therefore not reported here. Peace services provided by

political actors and government representatives, however, were mentioned by respondents as some of the most important service providers for resolving community conflicts. Offer seems to meet demand for two-thirds of the respondents, as they believed that there are enough qualified people available in their community to support intrapersonal, interpersonal, and intercommunity peace.

The concept of infrastructures for peace helps us understand whether the peace sector, and thus to some extent the peace system, is effective in achieving its objective.

As mentioned in Chapter 1, one of the underlying assumptions of the early infrastructures for peace advocacy was that the more infrastructures for peace exist, the more peace there will be. Although it was not the explicit focus of this research, it is possible to speak to this assumption based on a combination of the data collected, especially the secondary data on community mediation (article 1) and peacebuilding (articles 2 and 5), discussing strengths and weaknesses of Nepal's infrastructures for peace, as well as the primary data on the impact of peace services use (article 6). As the first two articles demonstrate, some of the attributes of the peace system in Nepal indeed appear to be successful in achieving their goal, such as the community mediation committees, but most if not all of the infrastructures for peace in Nepal experience challenges (articles 2 and 5). Besides organisational and financial difficulties, the evidence points towards the larger danger of providers using infrastructures for peace to forge power instead of peace, under the disguise of a peace mandate. While this especially appears to be a risk for government-established infrastructures for peace ('double hatting' peace service providers), it is possible that this behaviour could explain the negative influence of passive peace service providers on everyday peace, as shown in article 6, too.

Article 6 zoomed in on one particular relationship in the peace system: between the persons with needs for peace on the one hand and the persons who (aim and/or claim to) meet needs for peace on the other hand. The active peace services offered by these third parties, occasionally delivered through infrastructures for peace, appear to address people's peace needs and prevent suffering and violence.¹²⁷ Passive peace services, however, achieve almost the opposite, increasing violence tendency and reducing intra- and intercommunity peace. As such, they might disqualify as peace services. In Figure 9, the difference in effect is shown with green and red arrows. Green arrows symbolize a positive correlation, red arrows a negative correlation.

¹²⁷ As mentioned in Chapter 3, material peace was excluded from this analysis for the sake of internal validity, as it probes basic survival needs rather than relational qualities like the other peace dimensions.

Figure 9 The effect of active and passive peace services on violence and peace in Nepal

Importantly, this study focused on acute situations, in which painful feelings and conflict required immediate support or relief. It is not known what the effect of, for example, the passive peace services of ‘teaching conflict resolution’, ‘sharing-information’, or ‘fortune-telling’ are on longer term violence prevention. Other research has shown that peace education for example, can be effective in the reduction of aggression and violence (Akgun & Araz, 2014; Cairns & Salomon, 2011; Sagkal, Turnuklu & Totan, 2016; Topçu Kabasakal, Sağkal & Türnüklü, 2016). The findings here indicate that passive services, when received by an individual with an acute peace need, do not contribute to a reduction of violence tendency and peace. As suggested in article 6, a possible explanation for the difference in effect may be that active peace services increase their users’ agency, whereas passive peace services do not. Previous literature has shown (de Coning, 2016; Welzel & Inglehart, 2010) that having agency in conflict seems to be conducive to increased peace with oneself, others, and society. The effectiveness of peace services, and therefore of infrastructures for peace, may thus hinge on their ability to increase the agency of the individuals, communities, or countries, they aim to serve. A peace service provider bent on power is more likely to undermine the agency of his or her service users than a service provider with a collaborative peace agenda. From this perspective, there may be infrastructures for peace on every street corner, but if the service providers seek to exploit the relationship, the less peace there will be. The infrastructure for peace has become something else.

Combining the above findings on the challenges, functioning, and impact of infrastructures for peace and peace services, the conclusion is that Nepal’s peace system is partially effective. Future research, comparing Nepal’s state of peace in relation to its Infrastructure for Peace (including its top-down and bottom-up formal and informal infrastructures for peace) with those of other countries, could shed more light on the hypothesis –the more infrastructures for peace there are, the more peace there will be– implied by the concept.

When increasing agency and freedom is the main objective of infrastructures for peace, they also become infrastructures for structural violence prevention and reduction.

Contributors to the infrastructures for peace debate agree that the purpose of infrastructures for peace is violence prevention and peacebuilding (see Chapter 1). While they so far have mostly concentrated on associative services like dialogue, mediation, and consultation for achieving these goals, some authors (notably Kennedy, 2016) have begun to consider civil resistance and non-cooperation as a possible additional infrastructure for peace services.

The peace needs–peace services approach developed in this study makes transparent that peacebuilding always happens in relationships, i.e. one institution or person tries to affect another person or people and vice versa. While it is uncommon in peacebuilding to think along the lines of users and providers, the distinction between these two parties is helpful because it recognizes that users exist and that the main goal of peacebuilding is to impact them. As this research illustrates, the beneficiary, or user, can then become the yard stick by which the success of an intervention is measured. Everyday peace in this research was operationalized as a personal, rather than a political, experience of peace; the criterion identified by Mac Ginty (2014) for a truly locally grounded, agency-oriented, bottom-up and informal alternative to liberal peacebuilding. This is in accordance with critical theory that regards peacebuilding as a means of emancipation, liberation, and strengthening of local agency (Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015).

When the ‘beneficiaries’ of peacebuilding interventions understand that they are party to a relationship, they gain agency. Depending on the quality of the relationship, i.e. whether it heals or harms their peace, they may then choose to accept, withdraw from, oppose, or negotiate it. As in any commercial exchange, users have the freedom and right to disengage from a ‘service’ that is imposed on them, even more so when their well-being is at stake and their disengagement does not harm themselves or others. Awareness of the relational foundation of peacebuilding can empower end-users to abandon other people’s warfare-disguised-as-peacebuilding strategies earlier, in favour of more wholesome sources of support.

The concept of infrastructures for peace, as interpreted in the peace needs–peace services approach, hence provides rationale for the argument that civil resistance and non-cooperation with violence and oppression ought to be included as peace services that can be provided by infrastructures for peace. Such ‘dissociative’ peace strategies can be a way to empower the exploited or oppressed conflict party, with the ultimate purpose of (re)creating the conditions for ‘associative’ peace strategies, as proposed by Galtung’s Transcend approach (Graf, Kramer & Nicolescou, 2006) as well as Curle (1971). Refusing to enable manipulation, violence, and oppression will help infrastructures for peace to stay true to their peacebuilding mandate rather than becoming ‘infrastructures for pacification’ (Kovács, 2018). The same applies to the overall peace system. In practice, this means that infrastructures for peace should sometimes oppose the state when the hegemony of the state is the cause of suffering, in order to preserve the possibility of democracy and dialogue.

(II) Given the diverging perspectives on the state of peace in the country, what are peacebuilding priorities in Nepal?

The second main objective of this study was to better understand peace and peacebuilding priorities in Nepal through an empirical analysis of the everyday peace experience of the Nepalese people; their opinions about infrastructures for peace; peace service use, preferences, and impact; and

drivers of peace and violence in Nepal, for the purpose of informing peacebuilding policy and programme design.

In Nepal, the quality of people's peace experience differs between, and within, the dimensions of their lives, across districts, genders, castes, economic classes, and regions.

This finding can explain why there is no broad consensus on the state of peace in Nepal among commentators. As discussed in Chapter 2, certain individuals, notably political leaders and other stakeholders of Nepal's peace process, have declared Nepal a liberal peacebuilding success story, whereas others, including (I)NGO representatives and the respondents surveyed by Lundqvist (2015), appear to be more sceptical. As mentioned above in the section on the meaning of peace (and as article 4 has shown), the peace experience of the Nepalese people appears to consist of different dimensions. Scores on and within these dimensions vary. Possibly, those individuals who have declared Nepal's peace process a success and those who beg to disagree are either referring to different dimensions of peace, for instance political peace and personal peace and are thus comparing apples with pears; or they are referring to the same dimension of political peace yet have a qualitatively different experience of that dimension, which should manifest in different scores for this dimension were they to be surveyed with the peace needs–peace services methodology.

This research allows strategic peacebuilding priorities to be identified on the basis of three sources of information: 1. The peace needs of the people; 2. People's own peace services priorities; and 3. The peace needs and peace services that are associated with reduced violence and increased peace.

Each of these options is discussed below.

1. Peacebuilding priorities based on the peace needs of the people. Article 4 explains and demonstrates this priority setting method in detail. Here, I will just highlight main findings and give two examples. The demographic groups scoring lowest on the peace dimensions are logical priorities for interventions as they have the highest, hence most pressing, peace needs. Those indicators that most strongly predict these low peace scores provide the specifics needed for designing suitable interventions.

In the sample used, the following groups had the lowest peace scores: Men; members of the Sudra caste; people from poor economic classes; people living in the flatlands (Terai) for intrapersonal and interpersonal peace, and people based in the hills (Pahad) for intercommunity and citizen-state peace; and inhabitants of the districts of Achham, Kanchanpur, Banke, Kathmandu, and Saptari. The map of Nepal below shows which of the research districts (highlighted in blue) scored lowest on a particular peace dimension (coloured dot).

Map 1 Research districts with lowest peace dimension scores

The indicators mostly strongly predicting these low scores can be regarded as the most urgent peace needs. To give just two examples: Achham scored lowest on intercommunity peace, due to its respectively highest and lowest scores on the indicators dehumanization and constructive intergroup contact. Although lack of intergroup contact is not necessarily a concern in itself, it rapidly gains conflict potential when coupled with dehumanization.¹²⁸ Reversing dehumanization through humanization efforts (for instance by developing empathy, establishing relationships between conflicting parties, and helping them pursue common goals), as well as dialogue facilitation to increase the chances that intergroup contact will be a positive experience for all, could therefore be relevant initiatives for increasing intercommunity peace in this district.

Kathmandu scored lowest on citizen-state peace. The indicators explaining this score were distrust in governmental institutions and local institutions, lack of government support, and perceptions of corruption. The finding resonates with the notion, mentioned in Chapter 2, that the Government of Nepal has authoritarian characteristics. Relevant peacebuilding priorities would be increasing trust in institutions and government support and reducing corruption, e.g. through democratic and anti-corruption reforms; supporting citizens in communicating and standing up for their grievances; and strengthening government transparency and accountability.

2. Peacebuilding priorities based on the peace services and infrastructures for peace preferred by the people. Peacebuilding actors who value locally grounded alternatives to liberal peacebuilding, like critical theorists, may wish to develop interventions that are ‘from’ the people rather than ‘for’ the people. In this case, the perspectives and preferences of the people who will be affected by their interventions, even if some of their suggestions may not increase peace and reduce violence in practice (e.g. passive peace services), can provide basis for priority setting.

¹²⁸ Researchers have long linked dehumanization with increased violence, including human rights violations, war crimes, and genocide. See for example the work of Philip Zimbardo, David Moshman, and Herbert C. Kelman.

In this research, such priority areas can be identified based on the shortage of peace service providers indicated by respondents; the peace services respondents say they would like to be able to access, and the peace services they would be willing to pay for, as reported in article 5. Analysing these data in the same way as in the previous section, that is, per demographic group, is of obvious interest to government, donors, and practitioners wishing to base their peacebuilding priorities on this type of data. Although the data allow for it, I have however not reported them at this level of detail in my articles, and will consequently confine this section to a more general description.

Around a third of respondents stated that there were not enough qualified people available in their community to support intrapersonal, interpersonal, and intercommunity peace, suggesting that offer does not meet demand. The communities, to whom these respondents belong, could be a peacebuilding priority.

Table 5 provides an overview of the most wanted peace services.

Table 5 Most desired peace services

Intrapersonal peace services	Interpersonal peace services	Intercommunity peace services
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support for dealing with substance abuse • Learning nonviolent conflict resolution • Support for dealing with domestic violence 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Learning nonviolent conflict resolution • Support for family collaborative problem-solving • Information on peace and conflict 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Teaching children nonviolent conflict resolution • Support for people suffering from trauma, addiction, and depression • Reconciling community groups

An overwhelming majority of respondents was willing to pay for support with dealing with substance abuse as well as for learning nonviolent conflict resolution. A majority indicated willingness to pay for nonviolent conflict resolution education for children.

Having people pay for the services they use could be a way to improve the sustainability (often desired by donors) of peacebuilding efforts. Financial commitment is a way to increase buy in, as well as agency and choice in terms of capacity to opt out of a relationship. Users' willingness to pay could be a quality control measure, providing information about the relevance, acceptance, and appropriateness of the available services. Moreover, there appears to be potential for other peace service providers besides the government and donors, such as companies specializing in peace education for schools or mediation, to upscale and expand the outreach of peace services.

3. Peacebuilding priorities based on the peace needs and peace services that are associated with reduced violence and increased peace. The third way to identify peacebuilding priorities is on the basis of the results of the predictive analyses presented in article 4 and article 6.

The predictive results described in article 4 suggest that the more intrapersonal peace someone experiences, the less likely he or she is to use violence as a means for change. In contrast, of the 76 indicators used in this research, increased anxiety, psychopathic traits, revenge propensity, and intergroup contact, as well as reduced information consumption, national civic life dissatisfaction,

and community insecurity predispose towards violent action choices. Moreover, as article 3 has shown, PTSD is connected to reduced willingness to reconcile. Based on these findings, peacebuilding priorities could focus on reducing anxiety, psychopathic traits, revenge propensity, and PTSD; supporting people to constructively engage with other groups; and increasing intrapersonal peace, information consumption, national civic life satisfaction, and community security.

Specific peacebuilding priority-setting depends on what we consider to be the most likely theoretical and/or contextual explanation for these findings. Take for example anxiety, psychopathic traits, and PTSD, which are indicators of the intrapersonal peace dimension. Why are these indicators linked to violent action tendency? An answer may be found in clinical psychology research: when people experience high anxiety, they generally shy away from social interactions, but they also tend to express intense and out of proportion anger and aggression (Chung et al., 2019; Keyes, McLaughlin, Vo, Galbraith & Heimberg, 2016). In particular, anxiety has been linked to two forms of aggression: impulsive-reactive-hostile-affective aggression and controlled-proactive-instrumental-predatory aggression. Neumann, Veenema & Beiderbeck (2010) associate these two forms of aggression with differences in how our brains mediate anxiety. The distinction is relevant to the discussion in Chapter 1 about the heterogeneity of violence, particularly in regard to its motivation ('defensive' and 'offensive'), and the different roles of infrastructures for peace ('associative' versus 'dissociative' peace services).

The first form of aggression tends to arise as a type of 'self-defence', e.g. in the face of perceived injustice, abuse, or oppression (e.g. Gilligan, 2003). Upon the realization that one has been abused, for example, externalized anger can propel one to change an exploitative situation, either with nonviolent or violent means (this could also explain why national civic life dissatisfaction, intergroup contact, and lack of community security are drivers of violence in Nepal). In this case, a peacebuilding priority would be to change or adapt the system surrounding the individual (family, community, or political) so that it more adequately meets the needs of the individuals concerned, for example through anti-discrimination and good governance campaigns and reforms, intergroup reconciliation, and civilian policing programmes in communities. When the external reasons for people to become violent are removed, their sense of well-being is likely to increase. However, this type of aggression is also seen in people with depression or PTSD (Neumann et al., 2010), suggesting a link with an individual's internal cognitive-affective system. Given the empirical evidence regarding PTSD and readiness to reconcile provided in this dissertation and the association between PTSD, anxiety, and aggression in the literature, it would therefore make sense to provide for support for dealing with traumatic experiences and PTSD symptoms in reconciliation and community cohesion programmes.

The second form of aggression tends to be observable in persons with personality disorders (e.g. psychopathy),¹²⁹ but may also be found in individuals without noticeable emotional or social deficits (Neumann et al., 2010). This type of aggression is used to establish domination over others by coercing them into submission (Howard, 2015; Zeigler-Hill & Marcus, 2016). Whilst treating individuals with personality disorders and protecting those around them is first and foremost the

¹²⁹ Psychopathy is one of the dark triad traits. The others are narcissism and Machiavellianism. For a discussion of 'dark' versus 'light' personality traits, refer to Kaufman, Yaden, Hyde & Tsukayama (2019). 'The Light vs. Dark Triad of Personality: Contrasting Two Very Different Profiles of Human Nature'. *Frontiers in Psychology*, 10. Available at: <https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.00467/full>.

mandate of mental health professionals and protective services, peacebuilding practitioners can contribute by looking after those who are dependent on their aggressors. They can provide safe spaces and teach self-defence practices like setting boundaries, responding to (verbal) abuse, and protecting oneself and one's family. Various peacebuilding programmes and tools can relieve light to moderate mental health symptoms. Should constructive behavioural change on the part of the aggressor be deemed a possibility,¹³⁰ peacebuilding priorities would be to build that person's capacity to empathize with others, maintain collaborative rather than exploitative relationships, and control his or her violence. Nurturing light personality traits, including empathy, mindfulness, honesty, and humility (Kaufman, Yaden, Hyde & Tsukayama, 2019; Wayment & Bauer, 2018) may increase an aggressor's intrapersonal peace experience and as such, reduce his or her tendency for violence. Relevant peace services are peace education programmes like those developed by Peaceful Schools, Roots of Empathy, and the Centre for Nonviolent Communication, because they explicitly teach the values and skills of humanization, empathy, honesty, collaboration, and conflict resolution.¹³¹ The focus here is on transforming people's internal violent system while protecting the people around them, in order to increase general well-being.

To give an example for an indicator of the interpersonal peace dimension, what could explain the link between reduced information consumption and violent action tendency? Frustration-aggression theory (Gilbert & Bushman, 2017) is possibly relevant. In Nepal, reasons for low information consumption could be information unavailability, media distrust, or illiteracy. Each of these could signal a frustration with the state of current affairs, which in turn could be a motivator for (probably type one)¹³² aggression. Depending on the most likely scenario, peacebuilding priorities range from increasing media access, availability, and literacy; to fact-checking, peace journalism, and inclusive reporting. Thus, the most plausible explanations for drivers of violence, in this research anxiety, psychopathy, PTSD, reduced information consumption among others, can guide intervention design.

Other predictive results include the findings reported in article 6 and referred to above. These show that use of active peace services increases people's peace experience and reduces their tendency to become violent, whereas passive peace services use is associated with a more or less opposite effect. This finding suggests that peace services provided through infrastructures for peace should be active when dealing with acute conflicts or painful emotions, because services that do not deliberately encourage users to engage with their issues and deal with the problem directly may aggravate people's suffering.

Peacebuilding priorities could thus focus on increasing the availability of active peace services and supporting a behavioural shift among citizens, away from passive peace services use towards active peace services use in order to address acute peace needs. Depending on other considerations, those demographic groups with the highest use of passive peace services could take priority. The relevant data are not reported in this dissertation, but to give an example from our report written for the peacebuilding community in Nepal (Pro Public & SeeD, 2016): Among the top frequent users of

¹³⁰ Such a possibility might exist when an individual has low levels of dark traits. In clinical psychology, it is commonly believed that psychopaths, narcissists, and other individuals with strong dark traits tend to be resistant to treatment and that long-term behavioural improvement is rare. See for example Anderson & Kiehl (2014). 'Psychopathy: developmental perspectives and their implications for treatment'. *Restorative neurology and neuroscience*, 32(1), 103–117; and Hermann, A.D., A.B. Brunell & J.D. Foster (Eds., 2018), *Handbook of Trait Narcissism: Key Advances, Research Methods, and Controversies*. Cham: Springer.

¹³¹ Although caution is advised. The language provided by these programmes can be used for deceit and manipulation.

¹³² Berkowitz (1989) argued that the frustration-aggression hypothesis is most relevant to hostile, and not instrumental, aggression. See his 'Frustration-aggression hypothesis: Examination and reformulation'. *Psychological Bulletin*, 106(1), 59.

passive peace services are inhabitants of the districts of Achham (scoring high on 'giving medication') and Saptari (scoring high on 'forecasting the future'), as well as the members of the lowest caste in Nepal, the Sudras (scoring high on 'forecasting the future' and 'advising on averting bad luck').

Contributions

Theoretical contribution

This dissertation has argued that there is no comprehensive theoretical or conceptual framework on which to base the relationship between peacebuilding interventions and people's everyday peace experience. Furthermore, there is little consolidated analysis or theory of what actually determines people's everyday peace experience and tendency to engage in violence, nor consensus on the determinants of peacebuilding priority setting and effectiveness. Recognizing that this hampers peacebuilding in practice, this dissertation has provided theoretical arguments for the conceptualization of peace systems including peacebuilding policies, programmes, and infrastructures for peace, on the basis of people's actual experiences of peace. The concept of infrastructures for peace is not new, but the interpretation developed in this study is. My main theoretical contribution lies in the furthering of the infrastructures for peace school of thought, within the wider field of peace and conflict studies. My dissertation contributes to this body of literature in four ways (based on Combs, 2011).

First, the peace needs–peace services approach, as developed in this dissertation, articulates the logic of infrastructures for peace theory beyond the contrasting paradigms of 'liberal peacebuilding' and the 'local turn in peacebuilding'. Identifying infrastructures for peace as part of peace systems in which both the local and the international have roles to play, this dissertation joins ranks with pragmatic peacebuilding theorists and those that conceive of infrastructures for peace as a way to bridge top-down and bottom-up peace efforts and statist versus emancipatory approaches to peacebuilding (Kumar & De la Haye, 2012; Richmond, 2013; Siebert, 2013).

By introducing a systems interpretation of infrastructures for peace, building upon the insights of Johan Galtung and John Paul Lederach and complementing the perspectives of Dress (2005), Brand-Jacobsen (2013), and van Tongeren (2012), I have not only studied the coexistence of institutional, top-down, and informal, bottom-up infrastructures for peace, but also linkages and overlaps between them. In an attempt to examine the totality of the peace system in Nepal, I have taken into account the multiple institutions, structures, actors, needs, and informal capacities that each have bearing on aspects of people's experience of peace, ranging from inner peace to outer peace and from personal to political peace. To this end, this study brought together political science concepts such as trust in institutions, civic life satisfaction, corruption, media consumption, and human security; clinical psychology concepts of anxiety, depression, self-esteem, psychopathy, aggression, and victimization; social psychological concepts such as stereotyping, intergroup contact, social distance, and dehumanization; and conflict studies concepts such as conflict style, revenge, exclusion, and discrimination. The instruments used to research these concepts originate from these respective fields, enabling the analysis of interdisciplinary relationships and various data types.

In this way, I have shown how systems approaches, like the one developed in this dissertation, can provide new traction and purpose to interdisciplinary dialogues within the peace and conflict studies

field, the lack of which has been flagged as damaging to peace efforts (Bright & Gledhill, 2018). Since systems approaches are part of the trend towards holistic and multidisciplinary peacebuilding (de Coning, 2018; Martin, Bojicic-Dzelilovic & Benraïš, 2018; Ricigliano, 2011), strategies to instigate change in such systems require insights from all relevant disciplines represented in the field.

Dialogues between political scientists, international relations researchers, psychologists, anthropologists, economists, and development theorists exploring and exploiting the details of this kaleidoscope may lead to new perspectives and improvements of conflict and peace interventions.

In underlining the functional aspects of infrastructures for peace, I have offered a perception in line with systems theory, which views the study of war and peace as not exclusively pro- or anti-state. The peace needs–peace services approach brings into focus the purpose of infrastructures for peace, including the needs they are supposed to address. Whereas the liberal peace has been criticized for neglecting local context and needs, as pointed out by Mac Ginty (2010), this dissertation has focused on everyone’s needs for peace as a way forward.

Second, I have introduced the new constructs of ‘peace needs’, ‘peace services’, and ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ infrastructures for peace. In order to be able to research the relation between institutions, organisations, and individuals that aim to support peace in Nepal and the actual peace experience of the Nepalese, I needed an interpretation of infrastructures for peace that would allow me to systematically describe its empirical manifestations. To this end, I introduced a new model of infrastructures for peace (visualized in article 2 as well as above) and described the relationships among constructs, linking infrastructures for peace with the very concrete third-party support (peace services that can be provided through formal or informal infrastructures for peace) people seek when they are struggling with painful feelings and conflict (peace needs).

Moreover, explicitly connecting theory on the meaning of peace to theory on infrastructures for peace, this dissertation has identified relationships between peace needs, peace services, and infrastructures for peace; between inner and outer determinants of everyday peace; and between peace service use and people’s everyday peace experience and violence tendency. The resultant discussion is not only of actors and infrastructures, so far the main focus of the infrastructures for peace literature, but also of different levels, goals, and sites, bringing concreteness and tangibility to the concept.

Contributors to the infrastructures for peace debate are yet to scrutinize the, until now rather abstract, formulations of the purpose of infrastructures for peace, i.e. ‘conflict transformation’ (Kovács, 2018), ‘conflict resolution and sustaining peace’ (UNDP, 2013), and ‘systemic change’ (Lederach, 2012). As Kennedy (2016) has pointed out, the literature is unclear what precisely is meant by systemic change, other than the theoretical recognition that state and non-state actors converge and that local initiatives are important. The point was elaborated by Githaiga (2017, p. 224-225): ‘Further research on how peace is conceptualised in other I4Ps [infrastructures for peace] will promote the explicit conceptualisation of peace which will tailor peacebuilding more effectively towards the kind of peace desired by the people in the conflict-affected area. [...] A broader process of conceptualising peace would contribute to analysis on whether the kind of peace being built is the kind of peace locally desired.’ This dissertation has made a beginning, by relating ‘needs’, a concept central to another academic debate, human needs theory, to infrastructures for peace, and presenting the first empirical taxonomy of peace needs.

Third, I helped advance theory formation regarding the conceptualization of peace. I researched people's own understandings of peace, and operationalized the constructs of negative and positive peace. Negative and positive peace are widely accepted definitions in peacebuilding, yet the peace and conflict studies field tends to take war recurrence as a primary indicator of peacebuilding success or failure (Call, 2008). The consequence of such a war-centric approach is that it renders most of the population invisible. According to Richmond (2007, p. 2), those who advocate it often put emphasis on statebuilding, as well as preserving order and stability in post-armed conflict environments: 'Where theorists do attempt to engage with peace as a concept, they often focus upon units such as states and empire as its main building blocks, thus broadly discounting the role and agency of individuals and societies in its construction and sustainability'. This dissertation supports the notion mentioned in Chapter 1, that peace as a political phenomenon is indeed something different from peace as a psychological, economic, or cultural phenomenon, yet has shown that people experience all of these 'peaces' at the same time.

By incorporating a psychological dimension in this research on infrastructures for peace, it became possible to analyse the role of attitudes, emotions, and behavioural tendencies in peace, conflict, and violence. In particular, the impact of psychological aspects of peace and violence was investigated in two separate ways – as a factor determining the successful integration of ex-combatants, and, more comprehensively, as a factor determining everyday peace and propensity for violence. This is an advance from the published conflict and peace studies literature, in which psychology still occupies marginal space.

This dissertation has confirmed a connection between individuals' inner and outer peacefulness, a link already identified in psychology (Bailey, Henry & Von Hippel, 2008; Coid, Ullrich & Kallis, 2013; Zimbardo, 2007), but not yet in international relations theory (Galtung, 2007). The identification of this relationship, together with the key drivers of conflict and peace uncovered in my studies, contributes towards theory formation concerning the causes of the tendency of states, groups, and individuals to engage in acts of violence and peace (Victoroff, 2005; Webel, 2007).

Fourth, this dissertation has extended the theory of infrastructures for peace to phenomena to which it hitherto had not been applied: that of informal infrastructures for peace, peace services, and everyday peace. Compared to formal infrastructures for peace, often established with the support of the United Nations and governments, the actual realities, choices, and challenges of those whose lot is supposed to be improved by them, remains under-investigated. As noted by Kovács (2018, p. 261): 'While so-called informal peace infrastructures are recognized in the literature (Hopp-Nishanka, 2013; Suurmond & Sharma, 2013) and even seen as in some ways superior (Odendaal, 2010), they are not seriously considered'. This research gives academic attention to the local in relation to infrastructures for peace, remedying a scholarly discourse that appears to have been overly concerned with top-down, liberal peacebuilding perspectives and practice.

By making visible what is not seen, i.e. those peace service providers people actually resort to for support and the impact of that support on people's peace experience, this dissertation helps fill the deficiency in what local might mean (Mac Ginty, 2015). It shows not only that local and informal infrastructures for peace exist, but that people have knowledge about those in their vicinity; hold opinions about their functioning; make conscious choices in selecting them; actually use them; and are affected by them when it comes to their everyday experience of peace and violence tendency. As such, this dissertation provides a starting point for peacebuilding engagements, which, according

to local turn theorists like Fontan (2012, p. 33) should begin with ‘understanding what needs, realities and initiatives are endogenous to that environment’. By incorporating local infrastructures for peace and experiences into the international peacebuilding debate, I have helped to render visible a very concrete realm of interaction between international, state, and local peacebuilding actors and engendered new perspectives on their roles.

In short, the infrastructures for peace I have researched should be understood not only as formal infrastructures for peace, requiring for instance institutionalisation within a government administration (van Tongeren, 2012), ‘a high level of government involvement’ and a ‘structured, systemic character’ (Hopp-Nishanka, 2012, p. 4), but also as local manifestations that actually increase people’s sense of peace. This enables an understanding of peace beyond the notion of political peace and does more justice to the complexity of actual peacemaking and peacebuilding: ‘a complex and multidimensional exercise’ (Knight, 2003, p. 241) and ‘a messy business’ (Johanson, Milante, Rawet, Selmi & Sjöström, 2019, p. 4), ‘with unpredictable outcomes’ (Newman, 2009, p. 46).

Empirical contribution

My findings and conclusions connect to three empirical debates in the peace and conflict field: the peacebuilding data gap, the state of peace in Nepal, and the effectiveness of infrastructures for peace and peacebuilding interventions.

The peacebuilding data gap. The first contribution of this dissertation lies in the empirical, bottom-up, data it provides, which can help fill the data gap in the empirical literature that is hampering peacebuilding practice (e.g. as identified by Brounéus, 2008; Mack, 2014). As argued in the introduction, data can improve peacebuilding practice, and bridge the gap between peacebuilding as it is envisioned by policymakers, and its implementation and reception by the people on the ground. In a bid to address the data gap, the current research has collected population data on various topics relevant to peacebuilding.

Using the lens of infrastructures for peace to make the peace sector visible, this research examined different features of the peace system in Nepal. As a result, this dissertation presents data on the Nepalese experience of peace and tendency for violence (articles 4 and 6); the impact of peacebuilding interventions and peace services use (articles 1, 2, and 6); the relationship between inner and outer peacefulness (articles 3 and 4); the functioning of formal and informal infrastructures for peace in Nepal (articles 1, 2, and 5); and Nepalese priorities for infrastructures for peace (article 5).

The data on the multidimensional everyday peace and violence tendency in Nepal are publicly accessible on Seed’s website ‘Score for Peace’.¹³³ This allows conflict scholars to study peace and peace scholars to study conflict, which opens up another avenue for interdisciplinary dialogue within the peace and conflict studies field. In the absence of high quality development data in war-affected states, the data can furthermore be used for evidence-based peacebuilding.

The state of peace in Nepal. The second empirical contribution this dissertation makes is the case study of Nepal (Yin, 2009). While Nepal’s government-established infrastructures for peace were already on the academic map, this dissertation has added Nepal’s other infrastructures for peace,

¹³³ <https://www.scoreforpeace.org/en/nepal/2015-General%20population-47> [accessed 27 March 2020].

peace services, and peace needs. As evident in my empirical puzzle, scholars agree that Nepal has a variety of infrastructures for peace, but whether the country is at peace remains contested. By way of illustration, Chapter 2 opened with a quote from a participant to the roundtable on Infrastructures for Peace in 2012, 'One could say that we have an Infrastructure for Peace, but do we have peace?'

My research addresses the gap between the academic peace and conflict research in Nepal that takes a top-down perspective, focusing on the peace process or an aspect of it, and the day-to-day realities of the people. Peace in Nepal is not homogenous: Different people experience different levels of peace in different dimensions of their lives. In demonstrating that the majority of citizens experience low citizen-state peace and that they moreover have barely any connection to state-provided infrastructures for peace services, this dissertation substantiates the claim that the differing perspectives on the state of peace in Nepal are due to a disconnect between liberal peacebuilding and everyday peace. If development agencies had focused more on the pressing peace needs of citizens in addition to those of the political elite, including the citizen-state peace indicators of civic life satisfaction, trust in institutions, and perceived corruption, the state of peace in Nepal might have been less contested. Quite possibly, Nepal's overall peace score, as calculated in this research, would have been higher if a multidimensional systemic peacebuilding approach, encompassing both liberal and everyday peace, had been adopted. The data provided by my research give direction on how to bridge this divide for government, donors, civil society, and citizens.

The effectiveness of infrastructures for peace. The empirical data in this study provide mixed evidence for the success of infrastructures for peace. As described in Chapter 1, the emerging 'theory' of infrastructures for peace states that violence can be prevented and peace supported with peace infrastructures (Kovács, 2018). The underlying hypothesis predicts that societies and countries with a strong infrastructure for peace will be more resilient against violence, and experience more peace (Editorial, 2012; Giessmann, 2016; UNDP, 2020). Whereas various case studies in the literature provide some evidence for this claim, findings are mixed (e.g. Akdedian, 2016; Hedditch, 2016), including my own. Mixed evidence is found for the success of Nepal's infrastructures for peace. The empirical contribution of this research is that active, but not passive, peace services contribute to increased peace and reduced violence tendency.

Based on the attributes of active peace services, I seek an explanation for this difference in terms of agency and problem-solving ability (article 6), which active peace services, such as mediation and advice, may support but passive peace services, such as teaching and fortune-telling, may not. This is in accordance with critical theorists who postulate that peacebuilding should be a means of emancipation, liberation, and strengthening of local agency (Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015), the latter which is considered essential if peacebuilding is to be transformative (Hughes, Öjendal & Schierenbeck, 2015; Peterson, 2012). In fact, as this research shows, the Nepalese themselves wish to increase their agency in matters of conflict and peace (article 5, 'wanted new peace services').

This dissertation therefore nuances the underlying hypothesis of the infrastructures for peace advocacy efforts: In as much as the infrastructures for peace increase people's agency in conflict and support problem-solving, individuals will be less prone to violence and experience more peace. A way to increase the effectiveness of infrastructures for peace may therefore be to reject services that undermine the agency of conflict parties, such as passive peace services. This more specific

interpretation of infrastructures for peace may help inform decisions in war-affected countries, where it is clear that the general assumption of policy makers and practitioners is that infrastructures for peace should be established.

Methodological contribution

The main methodological contribution of this research has been the development of a method for investigating everyday peace and infrastructures for peace in a systematic and quantitative way, combining and applying concepts from multiple disciplines represented in conflict and peace studies, including negative and positive peace, violence, and infrastructures for peace. Being a broad-based population research methodology inspired by market studies, the method makes it possible to collect comparative data on peace systems, peace, conflict, and violence at national, district, and local levels. As mentioned in the introduction, the peace and conflict studies field is lacking solid methodological examples, quantitative data, tested approaches, and proof of concepts for monitoring and evaluation of interventions (Scharbatke-Church, 2011). The peace services–peace needs methodology expands the methodological toolbox. Increasing knowledge of how to assess peace arguably contributes to ‘making the important measurable, instead of the measurable important.’¹³⁴

The large size of the data collected with this method allows for the testing of assumptions, for instance about the drivers of violence and peace and the appropriateness of certain peacebuilding interventions, an option the conflict analysis tools more commonly used by donors, such as the UNDP Conflict and Development Analysis,¹³⁵ the USAID Conflict Assessment Framework,¹³⁶ or the GIZ Peace and Conflict Assessment,¹³⁷ do not offer. The latter are challenged when it comes to empirically linking potential drivers of violent conflict and peace with desired peace outcomes, especially at national level, based as they are on limited input from experts, focus groups, or interviewees. As a result, the conclusions such assessments produce tend to be motivated by assumptions, rather than tested working hypotheses.

Not much has yet been written about methodology in relation to infrastructures for peace. Most empirical contributions to the literature have focused on single case studies of infrastructures for peace, rather than the various infrastructures for peace that are part of a country’s peace system. Gathering data is all the more difficult since there is no broadly accepted set of measurable peace indicators, and therefore no precise understanding of what different peacebuilding interventions, or infrastructures for peace for that matter, aim to achieve. Recent years have seen an expansion in the number of indexes and indicators on which stakeholders base their policies and intervention programmes, but every peace index measures a particular type of peace, telling a unique story depending on the indicators, sample, and length of the study.

¹³⁴ The McNamara Fallacy, named for Robert McNamara, the US Secretary of Defence from 1961 to 1968. The fallacy refers to making a decision based solely on data that can be easily measured; disregard what cannot be easily measured; presume that what cannot be easily measured is not really important; and finally, saying that what cannot be easily measured does not really exist. Handy (1995). *The empty raincoat: Making sense of the future*. Arrow Books.

¹³⁵ The UNDP Guide to Conflict and Development Analysis is available here:

http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/documents/cpr/documents/prevention/CDA_complete.pdf [accessed 27 March 2020].

¹³⁶ The USAID Conflict Assessment Framework Version 2.0 is available here: https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnady739.pdf [accessed 27 March 2020].

¹³⁷ The BMZ/GIZ/KFW Factsheet on the Peace and Conflict Assessment methodological framework is available here:

https://www.bmz.de/en/zentrales_downloadarchiv/themen_und_schwerpunkte/frieden/Peace_and_Conflict_Assessment_Factsheet.pdf [accessed 27 March 2020].

This is the first peacebuilding study that systematically examines both demand (peace needs) and supply (services used to address these needs) with mixed methods. By attempting to quantify 'peace needs', interpreted as the everyday experiences of peace in multiple dimensions of human life, this research in effect produced a diagnostic tool for determining the peacefulness of a society: a 'Peace Needs Index'. The distinguishing feature is that the conceptualizations of the constructs of negative and positive peace have been empirically derived through statistical analysis, rather than through qualitative analysis and value judgment.

The method adheres to standard sampling, administration, and scoring procedures. The scores provide reference points for evaluating the behaviour it measures. Because testing gathers information about peoples' attitudes, behaviours, abilities, and opinions, they are critical for a decision-making process that is more sensitive to the specific needs of individuals than decisions based on human judgment. The instruments, like the PTSD test, must meet certain psychometric properties and criteria in order to be considered as reliable information devices. Potential determinants of peace and violence can be identified based on the coefficients showing the highest correlations among indicators. As shown in this dissertation, such statistical analysis can yield conclusions such as: 'This is how peace is experienced by... [people] in ...[village/district/country]' and 'these are the risk factors that predispose [men/women/political leaders] to violence in [location]' and 'these are the factors that increase political peace and/or everyday peace' and 'the infrastructures for peace service of [intergroup dialogue] fosters [reconciliation] between [government, ex-combatants, victims]', and 'in this [village] the peace service of [trauma-healing/mediation/conflict resolution training] is most likely to [prevent violence/increase peace]'. Thus, the methodology allows for changing the order of the typical baseline studies conducted by donors. The starting points are the empirical relations and patterns revealed in the data, rather than presumed conceptual linkages between conflict causes, programme interventions, and outcomes in terms of peace and violence.

Using the proposed metrics to analyse peace, it is possible to calculate village, district, and country level peacefulness and understand risks relating to peace and violence. As shown in this research, demographic groups e.g. based on district, gender, or religion, can be ranked for their peace needs. Index ranking can give an impression of the peacefulness of a group, society, or country by the relative state of everyday peace and violence and facilitate for instance cross-country comparisons. However, there is a risk of oversimplifying a complex reality and the related problems and solutions. It is therefore recommendable to examine the individual indicators, constituting the rather crude overall index score, for a more detailed understanding of the picture at all times, as this dissertation shows.

Policy and programme contribution

This section returns to the original motivation of the research – contributing to better and evidence-based peacebuilding practice. By presenting a model that helps explain the determinants of peace and violence, this dissertation contributes to the policy debate in three ways. First, because an analysis was conducted at national level, all estimates are relevant to the policymaking community of Nepal, where the model was applied. The identification of peace needs, drivers of peace and violence, and citizens' infrastructures for peace priorities offers concrete entry points for peacebuilding. Second, by measuring a range of individual variables, this dissertation has provided estimates of their importance at national and district level, which can subsequently be used by

decision-makers. Third, the model can be implemented in other countries, which would allow for the development of policies based on the relative importance of individual indicators in each country.

This research is neither an evaluation of formal and informal infrastructures for peace, nor of the performances of government, donors, and international stakeholders during a peace process. Several of the findings, however, do provide basis for recommendations relevant for these and other peacebuilding actors, who wish to contribute to violence prevention and peacebuilding.

1. *Adopt the peace needs–peace services methodology to strengthen systemic and evidence-based peacebuilding.* To increase the relevance and effectiveness of peacebuilding and monitor and demonstrate impact, governments, agencies, and organisations could use the peace needs–peace services methodology as a tool to structure policy considerations and define and track development priorities.
2. *Mainstream intrapersonal peace into peace interventions.* Because reduced intrapersonal peace is a driver of reduced outer peacefulness as well as of violence propensity, mainstreaming intrapersonal peace into peacebuilding interventions seems warranted. Given the crucial role of informal intra- and interpersonal peace service providers in everyday peacebuilding, supporting people's intimate circle could increase outer peacefulness and reduce violence.
3. *Increase the use of active, rather than passive, peace services.* Peacebuilding practitioners, policymakers, and donors are advised to shift the balance between the use of active and passive peace services in favour of the former to allow more people to experience the benefit of active peace services and bolster peace and nonviolence. This could be aided by establishing referral-systems between active and passive peace service providers (i.e. astrologers and mediators); making available more active peace services; and by lowering the barriers to active peace service providers through financing and marketing campaigns. The findings provide rationale for the continuation of increasing access to peace services based on collaborative principles, such as community mediation.
4. *Introduce political neutrality and high intrapersonal peace as selection criteria for peace service providers.* Having political responsibilities and experiencing low intrapersonal peace ought both to be disqualifiers for peace service provider roles, for the reason that the first is linked with abuse of office and the second with reduced outer peacefulness and thus probable reduced service effectiveness. Prevent double-hatting, i.e. government agencies and political actors taking on peace service provider roles. Instead, the government could assume the roles of enabler and steward of the peace sector, for example by developing standards and policies. The same applies to local elites, i.e. political actors appointed on LPCs.
5. *Incorporate dissociative peace strategies into the concept of infrastructures for peace.* Although so far associative services such as dialogue, mediation, and consultation are more commonly mentioned in the infrastructures for peace literature than boundary setting, nonviolent resistance, and non-cooperation, the aim of infrastructures for peace is negative and positive peace. The concept of infrastructures for peace therefore does not exclude dissociative peace services as ways to empower the exploited or oppressed conflict party, with the deeper goal of

(re)creating the conditions for associative peace services. If donors wish to contribute to lasting changes in power dynamics they could invest in not only building up the supply side of peace, by making available infrastructures for peace, but the demand side as well, e.g. focusing on the critical education of users of formal and informal infrastructures for peace and increasing their ability to recognize manipulation and hold service providers accountable.

Future directions

This research has cast the net wide, attempting to understand the wider picture of how infrastructures for peace and peace services within a peace system relate to multidimensional everyday peace. In the absence of prior peacebuilding market studies, this study, while informed by multidisciplinary research and practice, also contained an element of freewheeling. The assertions made here will therefore benefit from verification through replication. Future studies could test whether the model holds validity in other societies and countries.

New research could also zoom in on specific components of the model, for example refining the constructs of 'peace needs' and 'peace services'. Another possibility is to closer examine the relationships between peace services and multidimensional peace and violence tendency, as well as between inner and outer peacefulness, revealed in this research. Longitudinal studies could confirm the direction of effect in these relationships, more conclusively answering the question of cause and consequence. Longitudinal research, moreover, can allow for the identification of population trends in peace and violence. One could utilize several years of peace needs–peace services data to statistically analyse what can be learnt from the most peaceful villages, districts, even countries.

No doubt the results presented in this dissertation are a reflection of the distribution of power, freedom, and repression in the day-to-day lives of the respondents in Nepal. While certain questions gauged identity prevalence and perceptions regarding these themes, this study did not comprehensively evaluate the findings from this perspective. Adding a stronger contextual component to the peace needs–peace services approach and methodology could more robustly situate the findings in political and systemic context. These are some of the next steps that could be taken to improve our understanding of the interface between peacebuilding and people's actual experience of peace, and the contribution of infrastructures for peace to peace.

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Annex 1: Peace dimensions, indicators, instruments, components, example items

Dimensions	Indicators	Instruments	Components	Example items
Dimension 1: Intrapersonal peace	Psychopathology	Adult Self Report Inventory (ASRI-4, Gadow, Sprafkin & Weiss)	Anxiety Depression Post-traumatic stress disorder Substance use	Is it difficult for you to stop worrying? Do you feel depressed or very sad? Did you experience or have you seen a severe traumatic event and does it still bother you? Do you get into trouble because of alcohol use (family conflicts, arrests, decreased work, etc.)?
	Aggression	Buss Perry Aggression Questionnaire (Bush & Perry, 1992)	Physical aggression Verbal aggression Hostility Anger	Do you sometimes want to hit another person? Do you disagree with other people? Do you think that life is treating you unfairly? Do you sometimes feel so angry, you are about to explode?
	Psychopathy	Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (Paulhus, Neumann & Hare, in press)	Interpersonal manipulation Criminal tendencies Erratic lifestyle Calm affect	Do people usually know it when you are lying? Have you been arrested? Do you believe that rules are made to be broken? Are you often rude to other people?
	Life-orientation	Life-Orientation Test Revised (Scheier, Carver & Bridges, 1994)	Optimism Pessimism	Do you believe that good things happen more often than bad things? Do you believe that bad things happen more often than good things?
	Resilience	Two components of the Resilience Scale for Adults (Hjemdal, Friborg, Martinussen & Rosenvinge, 2001)	Social competence Family coherence	Are you good at making new friends? Are the bonds between your family members strong?
	Self-regulation	Barkley Deficits in Executive Functioning Scale (BDEFS, 2011)	Problem-solving Self-restraint Self-motivation Emotion regulation	Is it more difficult for you to learn new skills than it is for others? Do you usually say what you want whenever you want? Do people sometimes tell you that you are lazy? Do you usually stay upset longer than most other people?
	Self-esteem	Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (1965)	Self-confidence Self-deprecation	Are you just as smart as most of the other people? Do you believe you are a failure?
	Self-compassion	Self-Compassion Scale (Raes, Pommier, Neff & Van Gucht, 2011)	Mindfulness Self-kindness Common humanity	When you are unhappy, are you interested in finding out why you feel that way? Do you accept your own limitations and mistakes? When you face problems, do you remind yourself that this is normal and that everybody has problems in life?
	Victimization	Self-developed		Have you, or a member of your family, been victim to bullying?
	Conflict style	Thomas Kilman Conflict Mode Instrument (Thomas & Kilman, 1974)	Competing Collaborating Avoiding	Do you usually insist on getting your way? Do you try to deal with everyone's concerns as well as your own? Do you sometimes let others take responsibility for solving a problem?
Dimension 2: Interpersonal peace				

	Empathy	Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI, Davis, 1983)	Compromising Accommodating Perspective-taking	Do you propose a middle ground? Do you try not to hurt the other person's feelings? Do you try to understand what everybody wants, before you make a decision in a conflict?
	Social support	Perceived Social Support Protocol (PhenX Toolkit, 2015)	Empathic concern Spouse social support Family social support Friends social support	When you see someone being abused, do you feel you want to protect them? How much does your spouse or partner really care about you? How much can you rely on them for help if you have a serious problem? How much do they understand the way you feel about things?
Dimension 3: Intercommunity peace	Negative stereotypes	SCORE Index (UNDP & SeeD, 2012)		Do you think 'Muslims are greedy' is a correct description?
	Intergroup anxiety	SCORE Index (UNDP & SeeD, 2012)		Would you feel comfortable being with UCPN (Maoist) supporters?
	Perceived threats from outgroup	SCORE Index (UNDP & SeeD, 2012)		Do you believe that increasing numbers of Pahadis will mean fewer job opportunities for your group?
	Cultural distance	SCORE Index (UNDP & SeeD, 2012)		Which groups do you feel similar to/different from in terms of festivals and rituals?
	Social distance	SCORE Index (UNDP & SeeD, 2012)		Would you accept members of your family married to a Sudra?
	Positive feelings	SCORE Index (UNDP & SeeD, 2012)		How negative or positive do you feel towards 'Madheshis'?
	Dehumanization	SCORE Index (UNDP & SeeD, 2012)		Do you think people from the Far-West are capable of making decisions?
	Attitudes towards violence	SCORE Index (UNDP & SeeD, 2012)		What are you willing to do in order to change the current conditions in your community or society?
	Attitudes towards revenge	SCORE Index (UNDP & SeeD, 2012)		Agree/disagree: 'if another person hurts you first, it is all right to get back at him or her'?
	Attitudes towards forgiveness	SCORE Index (UNDP & SeeD, 2012)		Agree/disagree: 'without forgiveness a conflict can never be resolved'?
	Intergroup contact	SCORE Index (UNDP & SeeD, 2012)		How often do you have actual contact with Brahmins?
	Active discrimination	SCORE Index (UNDP & SeeD, 2012)		In the last two years, have you made a negative joke about Buddhists?
	Passive discrimination	SCORE Index (UNDP & SeeD, 2012)		To what extent have you felt socially excluded or isolated because of your level of education?
	Attitudes toward men and women	Self-developed		Do you agree or disagree with the statement 'women are more caring than men'?
	Community conflicts	Self-developed		How frequently would you say that you personally experience disputes over money lending your community?
	Community and intercommunity social support	Self-developed, based on Perceived Social Support Protocol (PhenX Toolkit, 2015)	Community social support Neighbouring communities social support	How much are community resources, like drinking water and forests, equally shared in your village/town? How much do the neighbouring villages participate in the festivals organized by your village/town?
Dimension 4: Citizen-state peace	Media Consumption	SCORE Index (UNDP & SeeD, 2012)		How often do you watch the local news on TV?
	Economic and social policy priorities	SCORE Index (UNDP & SeeD, 2012)		How important is resolving unemployment?

Social and political priorities	SCORE Index (UNDP & SeeD, 2012)		How important is promulgating the new constitution?
The future political model	SCORE Index (UNDP & SeeD, 2012)	Acceptability	How acceptable is a unitary state with decentralized governance?
		Preference	To what extent do you think Nepal should become an absolute monarchy?
Perceptions on social groups in Nepal	SCORE Index (UNDP & SeeD, 2012)	Centralization	How centralized do you think the country should be?
Ingroup identification	SCORE Index (UNDP & SeeD, 2012)		To what extent do you agree/disagree that 'the different groups in Nepal should be seen as an asset to the country'?
Personal life satisfaction	SCORE Index (UNDP & SeeD, 2012)		Do you agree/disagree with the statement 'Overall, I am glad to be [identity]'?
Trust in & represent. of institutions	SCORE Index (UNDP & SeeD, 2012)		How satisfied are you with your level of education?
Civic life satisfaction (local)	SCORE Index (UNDP & SeeD, 2012)		To what degree do you trust the central government?
Civil life satisfaction (national)	SCORE Index (UNDP & SeeD, 2012)		How satisfied are you with the effectiveness of your VDC?
Personal security	SCORE Index (UNDP & SeeD, 2012)		How satisfied are you with the effectiveness of the national government?
Economic security	SCORE Index (UNDP & SeeD, 2012)		To what extent do you feel safe from violence in your daily life?
Political security	SCORE Index (UNDP & SeeD, 2012)		To what extent do you feel financially secure for the future?
			To what extent do you feel safe to express your political vies when you are among people who have different views?
Health security	SCORE Index (UNDP & SeeD, 2012)		To what extent do you have sufficient access to basic medical services?
Food security	SCORE Index (UNDP & SeeD, 2012)		To what extent have you or a family member actually experienced food shortage?
Community security	SCORE Index (UNDP & SeeD, 2012)		To what extent do you feel discriminated against because of your community identity?
Freedom from corruption	SCORE Index (UNDP & SeeD, 2012)		Thinking of Nepal, do you think that politicians are receiving bribes from companies and corporations?
Government social support	Self-developed, based on Perceived Social Support Protocol		How much can you rely on the VDC/municipal office for help if you have a serious problem?

Annex 2: Summary in Dutch

‘We hebben een Infrastructuur voor Vrede... ...maar hebben we vrede?’

Infrastructuren voor vrede en multidimensionale alledaagse vrede in Nepal

‘Zij die van vrede houden, moeten leren zich net zo effectief te organiseren als de oorlogshaviken’, verklaarde Martin Luther King in Los Angeles in 1967. Hij sprak zich uit tegen de Amerikaanse betrokkenheid bij de oorlog in Vietnam. Het was een oproep aan degenen in de *Civil Rights Movement* om proactief te plannen en te werken voor vrede. De afgelopen jaren inspireerden Kings woorden pogingen om het concept van 'infrastructuren voor vrede' te promoten. In de vrede- en conflictliteratuur worden infrastructuren voor vrede beschreven als de instellingen, mechanismen, middelen en vaardigheden waarmee conflicten worden opgelost en vrede gehandhaafd binnen een samenleving. Het concept beoogt een verschuiving in de manier waarop samenlevingen en staten met conflicten omgaan: van veelal reactieve, kleinschalige en ad-hoc crisisbeheersing naar preventieve, effectievere en lange-termijn conflictoplossing en vredesopbouw. Dit is belangrijk, want in onze tijd verwoesten oorlogen nog immer levens, terwijl de vrijheid en vreedzaamheid in de wereld verslechteren. Infrastructuren voor vrede worden als beleidskader gehanteerd door onder andere de Verenigde Naties; de Economische Gemeenschap van West-Afrikaanse Staten; de overheden van Kenia en Ghana; en internationale vredesorganisaties.

Vrede- en conflictonderzoekers hebben nog altijd niet volledig doorgrond waarom landen, groepen en individuen geweld plegen, noch welke interventies deze tendens succesvol zouden kunnen transformeren. De opkomende ‘theorie’ van vredesinfrastructuren suggereert dat geweld kan worden voorkomen en vrede ondersteund door infrastructuren voor vrede. De onderliggende hypothese voorspelt dat samenlevingen en landen met een sterke vredesinfrastructuur beter bestand zullen zijn tegen geweld en meer vrede zullen ervaren. Tot dusver is het beschikbare empirische bewijs gemengd.

De meeste case-studies richten zich op de door de VN en regeringen opgezette infrastructuren voor vrede, zoals ministeries voor vrede en lokale vredescomités, niet op informele infrastructuren zoals traditionele conflictoplossingsmethoden. Er is weinig bekend over de realiteit, keuzes, uitdagingen en perspectieven van degenen wier lot verbeterd zou moeten worden door infrastructuren voor vrede, vooral op lokaal niveau. Welke vredesinitiatieven het concept behelst en wat infrastructuren voor vrede precies doen, is ook nog niet helder. Er is tot nog toe geen studie gewijd aan de nieuwe realiteit die deze structuren beogen te creëren: het ‘voor vrede’ -deel van ‘infrastructuren voor vrede’. Politieke vrede, in plaats van bijvoorbeeld persoonlijke vrede, heeft tot nu toe de meeste aandacht gekregen. De precieze betekenis van vrede blijft onderwerp van discussie, zowel in onderzoekskringen als in de vredesopbouwpraktijk. Een conceptueel kader waarbinnen de relatie tussen vredesopbouw en de alledaagse vredeservaring van mensen kan worden gesitueerd, ontbreekt.

Daarnaast is er een data lacune, die, zo hebben onderzoekers gewaarschuwd, ten koste gaat van vredesinitiatieven. Deze lacune toont zich onder andere in de beperkte kennis van de lokale context en dynamieken die momenteel vredesopbouw hindert. Beleids- en programmabesluiten met betrekking tot internationale vredesmissies en vredesopbouwprogramma's, evenals lokale vredesinitiatieven, zijn veelal gebaseerd op conceptuele aannames, persoonlijke ervaring en politieke belangen in plaats van robuust empirisch bewijs en beproefde werkhypothesen. Een op data-gebaseerd kader zou de geïdentificeerde kloof tussen vredesopbouw zoals beleidsmakers die voor ogen hebben en de uitvoering en ontvangst ervan door de mensen ter plaatse, kunnen overbruggen.

In het debat over infrastructuur voor vrede wordt Nepal, het land van onderzoek, vaak als voorbeeld aangehaald. Nepal is in een transitie van tien jaar gewapend conflict naar vreedzame democratische politiek. Het was een van de weinige landen ter wereld dat een ministerie voor vrede en lokale vredescomités had, opgezet om het vredesproces te ondersteunen. Nepal wordt beschreven als een succesverhaal voor liberale vredesopbouw, maar weinig Nepalezen lijken daadwerkelijk vrede te ervaren. Er is gesuggereerd dat deze contrasterende perspectieven het gevolg zijn van een kloof tussen het *top-down* perspectief van het liberale vredesopbouwmodel en het *bottom-up* perspectief van alledaagse levenservaringen, al moet deze bewering nog worden onderbouwd. Veel van het academische vrede- en conflictonderzoek in Nepal heeft een *top-down* perspectief, gericht op het vredesproces of een aspect daarvan, in plaats van op de dagelijkse realiteit van de mensen. Vragen over hoe te herstellen van de gevolgen van het geweld; hoe de regering, ex-strijders, slachtoffers en mensen met elkaar te verzoenen; en hoe toekomstig geweld te voorkomen, blijven relevant. Het verkrijgen van een beter begrip van de verschillende percepties in Nepal is dus waardevol voor degenen die de vrede in het land willen bevorderen.

Dit proefschrift onderzoekt vredesinitiatieven en vredeservaring door de lens van infrastructuur voor vrede, met als doel bij te dragen aan betere en op feiten gebaseerde vredesopbouw. In plaats van te concentreren op *top-down*, liberale vredesinitiatieven of op *bottom-up*, lokale processen, stelt het een derde weg voor: een systematische interpretatie van infrastructuur voor vrede met een focus op vredesbehoeften. Centraal staat de *interface* tussen instellingen, organisaties en individuen die vrede willen ondersteunen en de daadwerkelijke, multidimensionale vredeservaring van de mensen, om beter te begrijpen hoe vreedzame relaties met onszelf, anderen, de gemeenschap en de staat kunnen worden bevorderd. Het concept van infrastructuur voor vrede belicht, zo betoog ik, alle institutionele en organisatorische capaciteiten in de samenleving die het belangrijkste epistemologische doel van vrede- en conflictstudies in de praktijk verwezenlijken: 'vrede via vreedzame middelen'.

Mijn theoretisch kader is gebaseerd op de literatuur over infrastructuur voor vrede en de betekenis van vrede, in het bijzonder de systeemtheorie en de menselijke behoefteleer. Volgens de systeemtheorie kunnen we door middel van het identificeren van gedragspatronen en de onderliggende structuren en relaties, betere en langdurige oplossingen voor hardnekkige problemen vinden. De menselijke behoefteleer stelt dat alle mensen dezelfde universele basisbehoeften hebben en dat, wanneer die niet worden vervuld, de kans groot is dat er conflict ontstaat. Het land Nepal, waar ik gedurende vijf jaar verbleef, figureert als casestudy. Mijn twee overkoepelende onderzoeksvragen zijn: (I) Hoe kunnen vredesstelsels worden begrepen door middel van het concept van infrastructuur voor vrede? en (II) Wat zijn de vredesopbouwprioriteiten in Nepal, gezien de uiteenlopende perspectieven op de staat van vrede in het land? Gebruikmakend van een

pragmatische onderzoeksaanpak en gemengde onderzoeksmethoden, beantwoord ik deze vragen aan de hand van zes deelvragen in zes artikelen. Deze artikelen vormen de kern van dit proefschrift.

Het eerste artikel, in 2012 gepubliceerd in het *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development*, verkent het concept van infrastructuur voor vrede aan de hand van de vraag of gemeenschapscommissies voor conflictbemiddeling in Nepal als zodanig kunnen worden beschouwd. Volgens brede definities van infrastructuur voor vrede, die nadruk leggen op de dialoog als middel tot conflictpreventie en vredesopbouw, kunnen deze gemeenschapscommissies, zo concludeer ik, worden beschouwd als een infrastructuur voor vrede op zich en/of als onderdeel van een overkoepelende Infrastructuur voor Vrede. De gemeenschapscommissies lijken echter buiten de definities te vallen die structurele betrokkenheid van de overheid bij een infrastructuur voor vrede en een directe verbinding met het nationale vredesproces benadrukken.

In het tweede artikel, dat in het Berghof Handboek nr. 10, *Peace Infrastructures: Assessing Concept and Practice* in 2013 verscheen, presenteer ik mijn theoretische kader, de 'vredesbehoefte–vredesdienstenbenadering'. Dit artikel illustreert hoe het concept van infrastructuur voor vrede kan helpen de werking en dynamiek van een breder vredessysteem te begrijpen. De vredesbehoefte–vredesdienstenbenadering is vergelijkbaar met een marktanalyse. Het richt zich op de beschikbare vredesdiensten die worden aangeboden en de bestaande vredesbehoefte van de burgers in verschillende levensdimensies (intrapersoonlijk, interpersoonlijk, intragroep en intergroep). Ik definieer infrastructuur voor vrede als 'de structuren, middelen en processen waardoor vredesdiensten kunnen worden verleend, op elk niveau van de samenleving', waarvan de som de nationale Infrastructuur voor Vrede van een land vormt. Het doel van infrastructuur voor vrede is om in vredesbehoefte te voorzien. Deze ontstaan wanneer mensen er niet in slagen een conflict op te lossen en daar vervolgens onder lijden. Vrede wordt dus opgevat als een na te streven staat van zijn, die door conflicten kan worden verstoord. Toegepast op Nepal, laat deze benadering zien dat het land een grote verscheidenheid aan infrastructuur voor vrede kent, waarvan de meeste niet optimaal lijken te functioneren. Sommige, zoals de gemeenschapscommissies voor conflictbemiddeling, vervullen hun vredesmandaat effectiever dan andere infrastructuur voor vrede. Vooral actoren in de vredessector met een dubbele rol, zoals het Ministerie van Vrede en Wederopbouw en de Lokale Vredescomités, zijn vatbaar voor belangenconflicten en/of worden geconfronteerd met de grenzen van hun capaciteit.

Het derde artikel, dat binnenkort wordt gepubliceerd in het *Journal of Conflict, Security, and Development*, onderzoekt de relatie tussen innerlijke en uiterlijke indicatoren van vrede. Op basis van een empirische steekproef van 223 voormalige maoïstische strijders, stel ik vast dat er een verband bestaat tussen posttraumatische stressstoornis (PTSS, als een indicator van innerlijke vrede) en bereidheid tot verzoening met voormalige vijanden (als een indicator van uiterlijke vrede). De ex-strijders die een hoger risico op PTSS hadden, rapporteerden een lagere openheid voor interactie met voormalige vijanden en meer wraakgevoelens dan degenen die niet voldeden aan de screeningscriteria voor PTSS. De bevindingen suggereren dat de innerlijke vredeservaring van ex-strijders gevolgen heeft voor hun relaties met de mensen en gemeenschappen om hen heen.

Het vierde artikel bestaat uit een selectie hoofdstukken uit het rapport '*Predictors of peace and violence in Nepal, an empirical study of peace needs and peace services*' gepubliceerd door mijn partnerorganisatie Pro Public en door mij gepresenteerd aan de vredesopbouwgemeenschap in Nepal in 2016. Deze studie, die 1177 respondenten in veertig dorpen in tien districten in Nepal

omvat, toont aan dat vrede in Nepal lijkt te bestaan uit vijf dimensies: intrapersonlijke vrede, interpersoonlijke vrede, vrede tussen gemeenschappen, vrede tussen burgers en de staat en materiële vrede. Deze dimensies bestaan op hun beurt uit verschillende indicatoren. Op basis van de vredesscores van de respondenten kunnen vredesopbouwprioriteiten worden vastgesteld. Zo werden tussen districten, geslachten, regio's, kasten en economische klassen significante verschillen in vredeservaring waargenomen. De resultaten van deze demografische groepsanalyses gaven aan dat bijvoorbeeld van alle tien onderzoeksdistricten vooral in Saptari en Banke behoefte bestond aan intrapersonlijke vrede. Om specifieker te zijn, Banke scoorde het hoogst op depressie, gevoel van onrechtvaardigheid, angst en gebrek aan gedragsregulatie, terwijl Saptari het hoogst scoorde op gebrek aan emotieregulatie, argumentativiteit, onverschilligheid, woede en PTSS. In Kathmandu werd met name de behoefte aan vrede tussen de staat en de burger geïdentificeerd, gezien de lage scores op vertrouwen in lokale en overheidsinstellingen als ook in steun van de regering en hoge scores op corruptieperceptie. Over het algemeen scoorden respondenten laag op de neiging tot geweld. De geweldindicator met de hoogste scores was gemeenschapsgeschillen. De twee districten met relatief de hoogste neiging tot geweld waren Banke en Kapilvastu. Voorspellende analyses toonden aan dat individuen met lage intrapersonlijke vrede eerder geneigd zijn tot gewelddadig gedrag dan individuen die anderszins vergelijkbaar zijn in termen van interpersoonlijke, intercommunautaire, burger-staat en materiële vrede. De neiging tot gewelddadig gedrag wordt voorspeld door de specifieke vredesindicatoren verhoogde angst, psychopathische eigenschappen, contact tussen groepen en wraakgevoelens; evenals verminderde informatieconsumptie, ontevredenheid met het nationale burgerleven en onveiligheid in de gemeenschap.

Het vijfde artikel, gepubliceerd als onderdeel van het verslag van *The International Conference on Political Transition, Non-violence and Communication in Conflict Transformation* in 2017 door The Prince of Songkla University in Thailand, poogt het verband tussen vredeservaring en de vredesinspanningen door derde partijen, die mensen benaderen om hun ervaring van vrede te vergroten, beter te begrijpen. De studie, die een toepassing is van de vredesbehoefte–vredesdienstenbenadering, onderzocht lokale definities, capaciteiten, voorkeuren en vredesbenaderingen in Nepal. Om een *bottom-up* gebruikersperspectief toe te voegen aan het theoretische debat over de betekenis van vrede, onderzocht deze studie allereerst de lokale percepties van vrede. Het resultaat, gebaseerd op dezelfde steekproef als de voorgaande studie, toonde aan dat mensen in Nepal vrede niet primair definiëren als afwezigheid van geweld en negatieve gevoelens, maar eerder als 'positieve vrede', d.w.z. een staat van welzijn. Uit verdere bevindingen bleek dat mensen hun toevlucht nemen tot verschillende soorten vredesdiensten, afhankelijk van de dimensie waarin ze emotionele pijn en conflict ervaren: intrapersonlijk, interpersoonlijk of intercommunautair. In tegenstelling tot de liberale vredesopbouwfocus op politieke actoren, bleken echtgenoten, familieleden en vrienden de belangrijkste verleners van vredesdiensten voor intrapersonlijke en interpersoonlijke vrede te zijn. Dus, niet verwonderlijk, mensen vertrouwen op hun intieme kring voor ondersteuning bij persoonlijke conflicten, in plaats van op formele infrastructuur voor vrede. Aangegeven redenen waren dat deze personen begripvol, betrouwbaar en gemakkelijk te bereiken waren en goed advies gaven. Ook traditionele conflictoplossingsdienstverleners werden genoemd als interpersoonlijke vredesdienstverleners, maar niet als belangrijkste. De belangrijkste verleners van vredesdiensten voor intercommunautaire vrede waren secretarissen van Village Development Committees (VDCs), politieagenten en maatschappelijk werkers. Redenen voor de gemeenschapsleden om te kiezen voor deze

dienstverleners waren omdat ze goed advies gaven en betrouwbaar, deskundig en bekwaam in het 'oplossen van dit soort problemen' waren. De vaakst genoemde beschikbare vredesdiensten in de gemeenschap waren muziek-/dans-/en culturele programma's en festivals, sociale dialooggroepen (zoals vrouwengroepen en jeugdclubs), gemeenschapscommissies voor conflictbemiddeling, lokale vredescommissies, het politiebureau, politieke partijen, traditionele conflictoplossingsmechanismen en maatschappelijk werkers. Ongeveer een derde van de respondenten vond dat er in hun gemeenschap onvoldoende gekwalificeerde mensen waren om intrapersonlijke, interpersoonlijke en intergemeenschappelijke vrede te bevorderen. De voor de respondenten belangrijkste gewenste intrapersonlijke vredesdienst, die zij in verband brachten met de vermindering van zowel intrapersonlijke als intergemeenschappelijke conflicten, was rehabilitatieondersteuning voor drugsverslaafden. Voor interpersoonlijke vrede was de belangrijkste gewenste dienst het leren oplossen van conflicten zonder geweld. Een derde van de respondenten had een voorkeur voor training in geweldloze conflictoplossing voor kinderen als nieuwe dienst om vrede tussen de gemeenschappen te ondersteunen. Een grote tot zeer grote meerderheid was bereid voor bovengenoemde diensten te betalen, mocht het de enige manier zijn om ze beschikbaar te maken. Infrastructuren voor vrede die doorgaans in de literatuur worden benadrukt, zoals ministeries voor vrede en vredescomités, lijken dus een minder belangrijke rol te spelen in de alledaagse vredestichting in Nepal dan bestaande sociale netwerken en intieme relaties. Daarnaast spelen structuren en aanbieders die niet primair de focus zijn van vredesopbouwers in Nepal, zoals maatschappelijk werkers en VDC's, een belangrijke rol, evenals de politie. De lokale vredescomités daarentegen zijn minder belangrijk voor conflictoplossing dan verwacht. De bevinding dat het leren van het geweldloos oplossen van conflicten een van de meest gewenste vredesdiensten is, suggereert dat respondenten zelf constructief met conflicten willen kunnen omgaan. Dus, mensen in Nepal zijn niet alleen ontvangers van liberale vredesopbouwinterventies, maar ook consumenten en als zodanig kiezen zij welke diensten ze gebruiken.

Het zesde artikel, gepubliceerd in het *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development* in 2017, toont aan dat de vredeservaring van mensen in verschillende levensdimensies, als ook hun neiging tot geweld, varieert met het type ondersteuning dat zij ontvangen van derde partijen voor het omgaan met conflicten. Gebruikmakend van dezelfde steekproef als voorgaande artikelen, bleek dat hoe meer respondenten gebruik maakten van diensten waarbij zij actief betrokken worden bij het oplossen van hun conflicten ('actieve vredesdiensten'), hoe meer intrapersonlijke, interpersoonlijke, intercommunautaire en burger-staat vrede ze ervoeren en hoe minder geneigd ze waren tot geweld. Tot de actieve vredesdiensten behoren verdieping van begrip, advies geven, instrueren, luisteren en bemiddelen. Echter, hoe meer respondenten gebruik maakten van diensten die alleen hun passieve betrokkenheid vereisen en zich niet rechtstreeks op het probleem richten ('passieve vredesdiensten'), hoe minder intrapersonlijke en intercommunautaire vrede ze ervoeren en hoe groter hun neiging tot geweld was. Passieve vredesdiensten zijn advies over het afwenden van pech, voorspellen van de toekomst, verbinden met andere mensen, delen van informatie en onderwijzen van conflictoplossing en effectieve communicatie. Dit resultaat suggereert dat mensen zich tot traditionele dienstverleners wendden wanneer zij een gebrek aan vrede ervaren, een bevinding in lijn met eerdere studies waarin traditionele genezers en religieuze leiders werden geïdentificeerd als de primaire geestelijke gezondheidszorgverleners in Nepal. De meeste mensen meldden het gebruik van beide soorten diensten. Een rol voor vredesinfrastructuren bij vredesopbouw en geweldpreventie lijkt dus vooral te liggen in het verlenen van actieve vredesdiensten.

Op basis van deze artikelen, tezamen met mijn theoretische analyse, heb ik de volgende antwoorden geformuleerd op de hoofdvragen:

(I) Hoe kunnen vredesstelsels worden begrepen via het concept van infrastructuur voor vrede? Zoals dit proefschrift laat zien, maakt het concept van infrastructuur voor vrede de institutionele, organisatorische en capaciteitskenmerken van de vredessector – onderdeel van een breder vredesstelsel – zichtbaar, samen met bijbehorende aspecten zoals het regeringsbeleid voor deze organisaties en instellingen, de financiering, hiaten en overlapping in de geleverde diensten, als ook de begunstigden. Als we door de lens van vredesinfrastructuur kijken, wordt een web van relaties tussen beleidsmakers voor vredesopbouw, financiers, formele en informele dienstverleners en gebruikers die tezamen de vredessector vormen, waarneembaar. De interne kenmerken van een vredesstelsel beïnvloeden de externe kenmerken. In Nepal is dit bijvoorbeeld zichtbaar in het verband tussen innerlijke en uiterlijke vrede. Het concept van infrastructuur voor vrede nodigt uit tot reflectie over het exacte doel van het vredesstelsel, omdat het de bestaansreden van de instellingen, organisaties en structuren waaruit het vredesstelsel mede bestaat, benadrukt. Tevens helpt het ons te begrijpen of het vredesstelsel effectief is in het bereiken van zijn doel. Mijn bevindingen nuanceren de onderliggende aanname van infrastructuur voor vredesactivisme: in zoverre de infrastructuur de capaciteit voor vrede van mensen vergroten en het oplossen van problemen ondersteunen, zullen ze minder geneigd zijn tot geweld en meer vrede ervaren. Een manier om de effectiviteit van vredesinfrastructuur te vergroten is daarom geen diensten aan te bieden die de zelfstandigheid en capaciteit van conflictpartijen ondermijnen, zoals passieve vredesdiensten. Een andere manier is om infrastructuur voor vrede, naast conflictbemiddeling en dialoog, ook een rol te laten spelen in geweldspreventie en verzet tegen onderdrukking. Door zowel associatieve (bijv. mediation) als dissociatieve (bijv. verzet) vredesdiensten op te nemen in het concept van infrastructuur van vrede, kan worden voorkomen dat infrastructuur voor vrede, infrastructuur voor geweld worden. Deze specifiekere interpretatie van vredesinfrastructuur kan beleidsbeslissingen in landen die door oorlog getroffen zijn en waar het duidelijk is dat er wordt aangenomen dat infrastructuur voor vrede moeten worden opgericht, verrijken.

(II) Wat zijn de vredesopbouwprioriteiten in Nepal, gezien de uiteenlopende perspectieven op de staat van vrede in het land? In Nepal verschilt de kwaliteit van de vredeservaring van mensen tussen en binnen hun levensdimensies, districten, geslachten, kasten, economische klassen en regio's. Dit kan verklaren waarom er onder commentatoren geen brede consensus bestaat over de staat van vrede in Nepal. Mogelijk verwijzen degenen die het vredesproces in Nepal tot een succes hebben verklaard en degenen die het daar niet mee eens zijn, naar verschillende dimensies van vrede, bijvoorbeeld politieke vrede en persoonlijke vrede en vergelijken dus appels met peren. Een andere mogelijkheid is dat ze verwijzen naar dezelfde dimensie van politieke vrede, maar een kwalitatief andere ervaring van die dimensie hebben. Dit zou zich dan in verschillende scores voor deze dimensie moeten uitdrukken, zouden deze mensen onderzocht worden met de vredesbehoefte–vredesdienstenmethodologie.

Met dit onderzoek kunnen strategische prioriteiten voor vredesopbouw worden vastgesteld op basis van drie informatiebronnen: 1. de vredesbehoefte van de mensen; 2. de vredesdienstenvoorkeuren van de mensen; en 3. de vredesbehoefte en -diensten die verband houden met verminderd geweld en meer vrede.

Ten eerste, in de gebruikte steekproef hadden de volgende groepen de laagste vredesscores en dus de meeste vredesbehoeften: mannen; leden van de Sudra-kaste; mensen uit arme economische klassen; mensen die in de vlakten (Terai) wonen voor intrapersoonlijke en interpersoonlijke vrede; mensen die in de heuvels (Pahad) zijn gevestigd voor intercommunautaire en burger-staat vrede; en inwoners van de districten Achham, Kanchanpur, Banke, Kathmandu en Saptari. Om een concreet voorbeeld te geven, Kathmandu scoorde het laagst op burger-staat vrede, vanwege hoge scores op wantrouwen in overheids- en lokale instellingen, gebrek aan overheidssteun en perceptie van corruptie. Relevante prioriteiten voor vredesopbouw zijn dus het vergroten van het vertrouwen in instellingen en in overheidssteun, alsmede het terugdringen van corruptie, bijvoorbeeld door middel van anticorruptiemaatregelen en democratische hervormingen.

Ten tweede, de meest gewenste vredesdiensten waren rehabilitatieondersteuning voor drugsverslaafden en geweldloze conflictoplossingstraining, ook voor kinderen. Deze, door de mensen zelf gewenste diensten, zouden dus aangemerkt kunnen worden als vredesopbouwprioriteiten. Het aanbod lijkt niet aan de vraag te voldoen in de gemeenschappen van de respondenten die aangaven dat er een gebrek is aan gekwalificeerde krachten om de vrede te ondersteunen. Deze gemeenschappen zouden dus tevens een vredesopbouwprioriteit kunnen zijn. Een meerderheid was bereid te betalen voor bovengenoemde nieuwe diensten. Mensen laten betalen voor de diensten die zij gebruiken, zou een manier kunnen zijn om de duurzaamheid van vredesopbouwspanningen te verhogen. Financiële commitment kan *buy-in* vergroten, evenals de keuzevrijheid om uit een zakelijke relatie te stappen mocht die niet naar tevredenheid verlopen. De betalingsbereidheid van gebruikers kan een maatstaf voor kwaliteitscontrole zijn, die informatie verschaft over de relevantie, acceptatie en geschiktheid van de beschikbare diensten. Bovendien lijkt er, naast de overheid en donoren, potentieel te zijn voor andere vredesdienstverleners, zoals bedrijven die gespecialiseerd zijn in vredeseducatie voor scholen of conflictbemiddeling, om het aanbod in Nepal op te schalen en uit te breiden.

Ten derde, de voorspellende resultaten suggereren dat hoe meer intrapersoonlijke vrede iemand ervaart, hoe kleiner de kans is dat hij of zij geneigd is tot geweld. Van de 76 indicatoren die in dit onderzoek zijn gebruikt, zijn een hoge mate van angst, psychopathische eigenschappen, wraakneiging en intergroepscontact, evenals lage informatieconsumptie, ontevredenheid met het nationale burgerleven en gemeenschapsonveiligheid gerelateerd aan gewelddadige actiekeuzes. PTSS hangt samen met een verminderde bereidheid tot verzoening. Op basis van deze bevindingen zouden vredesopbouwprioriteiten kunnen zijn: het verminderen van angst, psychopathie, wraakneiging en PTSS; mensen ondersteunen om constructief met andere groepen om te gaan; en het vergroten van de intrapersoonlijke vrede, informatieconsumptie, tevredenheid met het nationale burgerleven en de gemeenschapsveiligheid. De hier relevante specifieke prioriteitstellingen voor vredesopbouw, zoals ik in mijn dissertatie laat zien, hangen af van de meest waarschijnlijke theoretische en/of contextuele verklaringen voor deze bevindingen. De resultaten van de voorspellende analyses laten verder zien dat het gebruik van actieve vredesdiensten de vredeservaring van mensen vergroot en hun neiging om gewelddadig te worden vermindert, terwijl passieve vredesdiensten een min of meer tegenovergesteld effect hebben. Dit suggereert dat vredesdiensten die worden aangeboden door infrastructuur voor vrede om met acute conflicten of pijnlijke emoties om te gaan, actief de zelfstandigheid en motivatie dienen te versterken, omdat diensten die gebruikers niet aanmoedigen om zich met hun problemen bezig te houden, het leed van deze gebruikers en de mensen om hen heen kunnen verergeren. Vredesopbouwinitiatieven

dienen zich dus te richten op het vergroten van de beschikbaarheid van actieve vredesdiensten en het ontmoedigen van het gebruik van passieve vredesdiensten. Die demografische groepen die het vaakst gebruik maken van passieve vredesdiensten kunnen hierbij voorrang krijgen.

De belangrijkste theoretische bijdrage die dit proefschrift levert, is het bevorderen van het infrastructuur voor vredesdebat binnen het bredere veld van vredes- en conflictstudies. Het biedt theoretische argumenten voor de conceptualisering van vredesstelsels, waaronder beleid, programma's en infrastructuur voor vrede; op basis van de werkelijke ervaring van vrede van mensen, geoperationaliseerd als negatieve en positieve multidimensionale vrede. De vredesbehoeften–vredesdienstenbenadering articuleert de logica van de infrastructuur voor vredesstelsels waarin zowel het lokale als het internationale rollen hebben te spelen. Daarbij onderstreep ik het belang van de productieve en functionele aspecten van infrastructuur voor vrede. Relevante concepten en methoden uit de politieke wetenschappen, sociale psychologie, klinische psychologie en conflictstudies worden samengebracht, waardoor de relaties tussen velden, interventieniveaus en gegevenstypen kunnen worden geanalyseerd. De nieuwe constructen van 'vredesbehoeften', 'vredesdiensten', 'formele' en 'informele' infrastructuur voor vrede worden geïntroduceerd en hun relevantie uitgelegd. Door vredesdienstverleners en gebruikers te identificeren, besteed ik academische aandacht aan de interpretatie van vrede door de mensen en hun dagelijkse vredeservaring in relatie tot infrastructuur voor vrede in Nepal. Daarmee corrigeer ik een wetenschappelijk discours dat zich eenzijdig bezig lijkt te houden met *top-down*, liberale vredesopbouwperspectieven en praktijken. 'Behoeften', een concept dat centraal staat in een ander academisch debat, *human needs theory*, verbind ik met infrastructuur voor vrede. Door Galtung's negatieve en positieve vredesconcepten als menselijke ervaring te operationaliseren, presenteer ik een eerste empirische taxonomie van vredesbehoeften. Mijn onderzoek bevestigt dat er een relatie is tussen de innerlijke en uiterlijke vredeservaring van individuen, een verband dat al in de psychologie is geïdentificeerd, maar nog niet in internationale betrekkingen. De identificatie van deze relatie, samen met de aandrijvers van conflicten en vrede die in mijn studies aan het licht zijn gekomen, dragen bij tot theorievorming over de redenen voor landen, groepen en individuen om hetzij vreedzaam, hetzij gewelddadig gedrag te vertonen.

Dit proefschrift draagt bij aan drie empirische debatten: de data lacune in vredesopbouw, de staat van vrede in Nepal en de effectiviteit van infrastructuur voor vrede en vredesopbouwinterventies. De empirische gegevens die door dit onderzoek zijn gegenereerd en waarvan een deel op internet publiek beschikbaar is,¹ helpen de gegevenslacune te verkleinen en zo een op feiten gebaseerde vredesopbouwpraktijk te bevorderen. Door Nepal als casestudy te selecteren, zet dit onderzoek Nepals vredesdiensten en vredesbehoeften op de academische kaart. Zoals de resultaten laten zien, ervaren verschillende mensen in Nepal verschillende niveaus van vrede in verschillende dimensies van hun leven. Vrede in Nepal is dus niet homogeen. De bevindingen bevestigen de eerder genoemde bewering dat de verschillende meningen over de staat van vrede in Nepal te wijten zijn aan een discrepantie tussen het oogpunt van liberale vredesopbouw en alledaagse perspectieven. Er zijn gemengde bewijzen voor de effectiviteit van de vredesinfrastructuur in Nepal. Hoewel door de staat opgezette, formele infrastructuur voor vrede leken te voorzien in de politieke vredesbehoeften van de leiders van het land, speelden ze nauwelijks een directe rol in de alledaagse

¹ Score for Peace: <https://www.scoreforpeace.org/en/nepal/2015-General%20population-0>.

vredeservaring van de Nepalese burgers. Daarnaast dragen actieve vredesdiensten, zoals bemiddeling en advisering, bij tot meer vrede en minder geweld; maar passieve vredesdiensten, zoals onderwijs en waarzeggerij, niet. Deze resultaten nuanceren de hypothese van infrastructuur voor vrede: zolang de infrastructuur voor vrede de zelfstandigheid van mensen vergroot en het oplossen van problemen ondersteunt, zullen individuen minder geneigd zijn tot geweld en meer vrede ervaren.

De belangrijkste methodologische bijdrage van dit onderzoek is een methode om alledaagse vrede en infrastructuur voor vrede op een systematische en kwantitatieve manier te onderzoeken. Door concepten uit de meerdere disciplines vertegenwoordigd in vredes- en conflictstudies te combineren en toe te passen, maakt mijn onderzoeksmethodiek het mogelijk om gegevens over vrede, conflicten en geweld op nationaal, midden en lokaal niveau met elkaar te vergelijken. Door 'vredesbehoeften', een interpretatie van negatieve en positieve vrede als multidimensionale alledaagse ervaring, te kwantificeren, heeft dit onderzoek in feite een diagnostisch hulpmiddel geproduceerd voor het bepalen van de vreedzaamheid van een samenleving: een '*Peace Needs Index*'. Het onderscheidende kenmerk is dat de conceptualisaties van negatieve en positieve vrede empirisch zijn afgeleid door statistische analyse, in plaats van door kwalitatieve analyses of conceptuele aannames. De methodologie maakt het dus mogelijk om de studies zoals gewoonlijk uitgevoerd door donoren, om te keren: het uitgangspunt zijn de empirische relaties en patronen die door de data worden onthuld in plaats van de veronderstelde verbanden tussen conflictorzaken, programma-interventies en resultaten in termen van vrede en geweld. Hoewel aanvankelijk bedacht en getest in Nepal, heeft de in dit onderzoek ontwikkelde methodologie het potentieel om bij te dragen aan data- en vraaggestuurde benaderingen van infrastructuur voor vrede en nationale vredesopbouwprocessen in andere landen.

Dit onderzoek draagt bij aan het beleidsdebat door zowel nationale als districtsramingen te geven van conflict, geweld en vrede in Nepal; concrete ingangen voor vredesopbouw voor te stellen; en de mogelijkheid te bieden om het model in andere landen toe te passen, waardoor beleidsconclusies kunnen worden getrokken op basis van het relatieve belang van de individuele indicatoren in elk land. Voor besluitnemers en vredeswerkers doet dit proefschrift, gebaseerd op de onderzoeksresultaten, de volgende aanbevelingen: Pas de vredesbehoeften–vredesdienstenmethodologie toe om empirisch onderbouwde keuzes te kunnen maken en systematische vredesopbouw te bevorderen; neem maatregelen ter bevordering van intrapersonlijke vrede, als ook zorg voor (informele) intra- en interpersoonlijke vredesdienstverleners, op in vredesinterventies; vergroot de beschikbaarheid van actieve in plaats van passieve vredesdiensten; voer politieke neutraliteit en een hoge mate van intrapersonlijke vrede in als selectiecriteria voor vredesdienstverleners die werken in infrastructuur voor vrede; en integreer, naast de in de literatuur reeds aanvaarde associatieve vredesstrategieën (zoals dialoog en conflictbemiddeling) ook dissociatieve strategieën (zoals non-coöperatie met onderdrukking) in het concept van infrastructuur voor vrede.

Toekomstig onderzoek zou zich kunnen richten op het repliceren van de vredesbehoeften–vredesdienstenbenadering om de gedane beweringen te verifiëren en de voorgestelde nieuwe constructen te testen en te verfijnen. Een sterkere kwalitatieve onderzoekscomponent zou de bevindingen dieper kunnen gronden in politieke en systemische context. Longitudinale studies kunnen de richting van het effect in de ontdekte relaties met meer zekerheid vaststellen.

Annex 3: Author biography

Jeannine Suurmond obtained a master's degree in culture and religion psychology from the Free University of Amsterdam in 2004, with a minor in international relations from the University of Amsterdam. She has specialized certifications in mediation, peacebuilding, and nonviolent communication. Currently working as freelance consultant, Jeannine has supported state- and civil society-led peacemaking and peacebuilding processes in various countries during the last 15 years, living in the Netherlands, Germany, India, Nepal, Cambodia, and Thailand.

After graduation, Jeannine consulted for the Clingendael Institute of International Relations and co-founded the Pax Ludens Foundation for Training and Research, both in the Netherlands. From 2005 to 2010, she worked for Kreddha: the International Peace Council for States, Peoples and Minorities, providing mediation and research support for intrastate peace processes in Asia, Africa, and the Pacific. Among her topics of research were power-sharing and autonomy arrangements, the exercise of international relations and security competencies by autonomous entities, and conflict resolution mechanisms for indigenous peoples and extractive industries. In 2011, Jeannine joined the civil peace service program of the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ) in Nepal. She advised the Government of Nepal on peacebuilding policy, and implemented ex-combatant integration, community mediation, and restorative dialogue programs, including the infrastructures for peace studies in this dissertation, together with the NGO Pro Public. Based in Cambodia from 2016 to 2018, Jeannine worked as researcher for the Centre for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development (SeeD), helping to design new applications and developing the theoretical foundations of the social cohesion and reconciliation (SCORE) index.

Jeannine has published in peer reviewed journals, policy papers, and newspapers, and has lectured at University College Utrecht, University of Amsterdam, Webster University Leiden, Tribhuvan University in Kathmandu, and Thammasat University Bangkok. She has provided trainings for, among others, the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction, Japan International Cooperation Agency, Supreme Court Bar Association, German Development Cooperation, Kurve Wustrow, Collective Campaign for Peace, and Sai Global Management College (Nepal); the Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum, Transcultural Psychosocial Organization, Cambodian Centre for Mediation, Heinrich Böll Foundation, and Women Peacemakers (Cambodia); the Shandao Social Service Centre (China); and the King Prajadhipok's Institute, Awakening Leadership Training Program, and Spirit in Education Movement (Thailand).