

## 4 A wartime narrative of hope

### The *Freiburger Bonhoeffer-Kreis*'s 1943 memorandum as a blueprint for Europe

*Jorrit Steehouder and Clemens van den Berg*

#### Introduction

After the guns had gone silent in May 1945, the war-torn countries of Europe had to rebuild their cities and industries. But the war not only left tremendous physical and economic damage, as was illustrated by the massive loss of life, widespread destruction, and socio-economic impoverishment; it also left Europe in moral despair. Before, during, and after the war, many ideas about a new economic and political European order saw the light of day. These ideas were not only drafted by governments, but often originated from informal networks, such as resistance groups from across Europe, economic networks like the Mont Pèlerin Society or the European League for Economic Cooperation (ELEC), as well as religious groups within the so-called ecumenical movement, which aimed at active cooperation among Christian denominations since 1910.<sup>1</sup> Sometimes, different strands of thought (economic, religious, political) were linked through these networks. The networks' ideas can be conceptualised as 'blueprints', that is, as programmes of action, containing specific idioms on hope, renewal, and future, directed at creating a new political, economic and moral European order.

The German historian Walter Lipgens has illustrated how resistance groups from all over Europe drafted over a hundred such blueprints.<sup>2</sup> Together, these – and other – blueprints constituted the building blocks for a post-war European order. Although Lipgens may be lauded for disclosing these sources to other researchers, he did not thoroughly analyse the contents of these blueprints nor assess the influence they had on the actual process of European integration. Point in case here is a memorandum that was completed in January 1943 by the *Freiburger Bonhoeffer-Kreis* – a German resistance group from Freiburg. The memorandum was entitled *Politische Gemeinschaftsordnung: Ein Versuch des christlichen Gewissens in den politischen Nöten unserer Zeit* ('Political Community Order: An Attempt of the Christian Conscience in the Political Hardships of Our Time').<sup>3</sup>

This chapter conceptualises this memorandum as a blueprint, as it offers a valuable example of the interlinkage between political, economic, social, and religious thought. The aim is to study the emotional, spiritual, and moral rhetoric

that accompanied (and constituted) its core ideas and values. How did the merging of religious and political-economic thought in this memorandum produce visions of a post-war European order, and how was spiritual and moral rhetoric mobilised in its favour? By developing this new approach, which is explained in more detail in the following section, this chapter shows that European integration was not merely an economic and technocratic, but also an emotional and spiritual endeavour, supported by informal networks, such as the resistance groups that originated at the Albert Ludwig University in Freiburg after 1938, which would become known as the *Freiburger Kreise*.<sup>4</sup>

The *Freiburger Kreise* are of particular interest because they symbolise the interlinkage between German social-economic thought, Christian values, and the resistance against National Socialism. These interlinkages can be explored through studying emotional vocabulary and shed new light on the roots of the debate about the post-war German social-economic order. In order to do so, this chapter first deals with methodological considerations regarding the study of emotions in history, culminating in the key concept of *emotives*. Second, the chapter presents the historical roots of one specific *Freiburger Kreis*. Third, it singles out how the emotive of *family* is used in the memorandum. This emotive is of particular interest because it so well captures notions of responsibility, solidarity, and authority, which were also central in the debate about post-war economic reconstruction. Last, this chapter closes off by situating the *Kreis*'s ideas in their broader post-war context.

### **Studying informality and emotions in history**

The challenge of studying the influence of informal networks, both national and transnational, on the history of European integration has only recently been addressed by historians.<sup>5</sup> Yet, informal networks of various natures have played a major role throughout the history of European integration. Examples are the aforementioned Mont Pèlerin Society as well as commissions and study groups associated with the World Council of Churches (WCC), the body that eventually grew out of the ecumenical movement. Other such networks came into existence already prior to the Second World War, such as the Pan-European Movement founded in 1925 by the Austrian Count Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, who also wrote the famous *Pan-Europa* manifesto in 1923.<sup>6</sup> The ideas of Coudenhove-Kalergi would later serve as a basis for the French statesman Aristide Briand to launch plans for an economic, political and even 'moral union' of Europe within the League of Nations' General Assembly.<sup>7</sup>

These informal networks can be seen as 'safe havens' or 'laboratories' where intellectuals, politicians and religious leaders interacted and developed their ideas beyond the boundaries of existing institutions or paradigms. Moreover, informal networks were platforms where bonds of trust and solidarity between individuals were forged, and where friendships were established. Often these amities were built on shared ideas and values, and they were crosscutting the political, social, cultural and national domains.

However, the bulk of European integration historiography has dealt mostly with power-politics, interstate bargaining, path dependencies and state interests as defined by geopolitical and economic interests rather than the above-mentioned ideas and values, which have become a focus of research only recently.<sup>8</sup> Some studies have propagated the influence of ideas which defined “the universe of possibilities for action” in the immediate post-war era.<sup>9</sup> The influence of emotions, on the other hand, has been understudied – Alan Milward, for example, argues that emotions were only invoked at politically opportune moments.<sup>10</sup> However, drawing on the recent ‘emotional turn’ in history,<sup>11</sup> this chapter argues that not only ideas mattered in the history of European integration, but so did emotions surrounding these ideas.

Since it is impossible for historians to comprehensively reconstruct private and singular emotions in the past at any given time, this chapter offers a new methodological framework. The core of this framework rests on William Reddy’s concept of ‘emotives’, which he describes as “instruments for directly changing, building, hiding, intensifying emotions” and as “a dynamic tool that can be seized [...] in the service of various high-level goals”.<sup>12</sup> In other words: emotives concern a wavelength of expressions that summon feelings and emotions, which are socially, culturally, and politically considered recognisable and acceptable. These emotives possess a strong signalling function: stumbling across one triggers a range of associations, be it consciously or not. Emotives thus have both an *enabling* and *restrictive* function. By strategically applying them, they can be tailored in the service of certain goals, or be used to obstruct the advance of others. Hence, emotives must be seen as a mechanism of influence regarding both interests and ideas.

But why should the role of emotives be taken into account when studying international politics, and more particularly the history of European integration? And what does this new approach yield? Its benefits are threefold. First, emotives open up a new perspective for analysing and explaining the influence of ideas, the processes of socialisation with (new) norms, and the shifting of attitudes. Rather than viewing emotions as radically detached from rational decision-making, they must be seen as contributing factors to political decision-making.<sup>13</sup>

Second, studying emotives can help reveal the presence of norms, values and expectations of a society, as they imply the “affective glue” that can hold a society (or multiple societies) together.<sup>14</sup> Barbara Rosenwein argues that societies can be made up of one or more “emotional communities”, prescribing the “nature of affective bonds” and a “modus of emotional expression that [people] expect, encourage, tolerate, and deplore”.<sup>15</sup>

Third, revisiting the early history of European integration through analysing different blueprints and the implied emotives may help to explain why some blueprints prevailed over others, and consequently why European integration took the path which it did in the early 1950s. This new perspective uncovers a previously underexplored layer of the history of European integration, as it brings into focus the role of ideas, networks and emotions.

The question remains how these emotives can be studied. Historians of European integration often work with documents that were issued by governments, institutions and other formal actors, and which are less likely to express emotional vocabulary. It is more likely to find emotional expressions in sources produced by informal networks beyond formal structures, and in the personal correspondence of the individuals that were active in these networks. Nevertheless, it is important not to portray formal actors as being less emotional than those associated with informal networks. In fact, sometimes experts, diplomats or politicians were active members of informal networks. Rather, a distinction is to be made between the types of documents produced by formal and informal networks when it comes to emotional expressions.

Because of their informal character, national and transnational networks, acting prior to or outside of the formalisation of European institutions and bodies, could think freely about what an ideal Europe should consist of. The building bricks of this ideational architecture – so far understudied in European integration historiography – were carried forward by strategically deployed emotional vocabularies. Analysing those delivers new insights in how and why certain visions and blueprints for post-war Europe succeeded while others did not.

### **The historical roots of the *Freiburger Bonhoeffer-Kreis***

The *Freiburger Kreise* (Circles) constituted an important network where ties between the leaders of the German *Bekennende Kirche* (Confessing Church) and influential German economists were cemented. By investigating the memorandum that was drafted in 1943 by one of the Freiburg resistance groups – later known as the *Freiburger Bonhoeffer-Kreis* – as a blueprint, this chapter will review the ethical and practical framework the blueprint provided for both the role of Christian (in this case Lutheran) ethics and that of a social market economy in a new political era. Moreover, this blueprint shows that in this case, economic thought cannot be separated from deeper moral values and convictions.

In the wake of the 1938 *Kristallnacht* brutalities of the Nazi regime, some of the professors from Freiburg University's economics department came to "adopt an active political stance" and established the *Freiburger Konzil* in 1938.<sup>16</sup> Together with their spouses, their colleagues of the Faculty of Theology, and Confessing Church members, they united against the Nazi regime.<sup>17</sup> The Confessing Church – mainly consisting of Protestant ministers – was already established in 1933, opposing the foundation of a unified pro-Nazi *Reichskirche* by the National Socialists. The *Konzil* can therefore best be described as an intellectual community of theologians, historians, economists, jurists, and church ministers, all of whom shared Christian beliefs. Among the members of the group were the later famous economists Walter Eucken, Adolf Lampe, Constantin von Dietze and Franz Böhm, the conservative historian Gerhard Ritter and the theologians Erik Wolf and Otto Dibelius.

Because the members of the *Konzil* could not meet at the university, they used Lampe's residence for their first meeting in November 1938.<sup>18</sup> The *Konzil's* character was not first and foremost one of active resistance. Rather, its members saw a welcome opportunity to "clear their conscience" and discuss daily fears about the Nazi regime.<sup>19</sup> In these early days the members of the *Konzil* also discussed the foundations of Catholic social teaching, the Catholic perceptions of the state, the papal encyclicals, and the foundations of the national economy.<sup>20</sup> Present during the discussions about Catholic social thought and Catholic state perceptions was Wendelin Rauch, who in 1948 would become the Archbishop of Freiburg.<sup>21</sup> The predominantly Protestant members of the *Konzil* thus actively sought to connect with their Catholic counterparts and engage in discussions with them. The main question on everyone's mind in these early days of the *Konzil's* existence concerned the role and place of Christians in a world of terror. In what way should the churches and Christians support the resistance?

During the summer of 1942 several members of the *Konzil* felt it was no longer possible to stand by idly in the light of the crimes committed by the Nazi regime, as Ritter would later recall.<sup>22</sup> A person of influence in this regard was the renowned theologian and Confessing Church member Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Thanks to Bonhoeffer's vast contacts, he secured a position with the *Abwehr* (German military intelligence), enabling him to travel relatively freely outside Germany, where he met with resistance groups from all over Europe.<sup>23</sup>

One such meeting took place with George Bell – the Anglican Bishop of Chichester – and fellow German church minister Hans Schönfeld in Sigtuna, Sweden in May 1942.<sup>24</sup> Bell, an important figure in the ecumenical movement, notified Bonhoeffer about plans to convene a world church conference directly after the war.<sup>25</sup> This plan resulted from the aftermath of the First World War, when several national church denominations wrestled with reconciliation and wanted the church to speak with one voice to the world. Preparations for the formation of a World Council of Churches took place over the course of the war and were led from Geneva by Secretary-General Willem Adolph Visser't Hooft and his right-hand man, Schönfeld.<sup>26</sup>

After Sigtuna, Bonhoeffer contacted the members of the *Freiburger Konzil* and asked them to draft a memorandum on the possibilities of a post-war society based on Christian principles.<sup>27</sup> This memorandum was to serve as a basis for discussion at the planned world church conference. A small group of people within the *Konzil* started working on the memorandum, and they became known as the *Freiburger Bonhoeffer-Kreis*. Among them was – besides the aforementioned economists and theologians – also Carl Goerdeler, a former mayor of Leipzig who was already involved in other resistance groups plotting to overthrow the Hitler dictatorship.<sup>28</sup>

The document was drafted in utmost secrecy and completed by early January 1943. Only three copies of the memorandum were distributed, because the risk of being discovered was always present. One of the drafters, theologian Helmut Thielicke, buried his own copy of the memorandum in a grain field and was

never able to retrieve it again.<sup>29</sup> The only copy that survived the war was Gerhard Ritter's, who multiplied it in 1945 and distributed it.<sup>30</sup>

Despite these precautions, most of the members of the *Kreis* were arrested after the failed putsch and assassination attempt on Hitler at the Wolfsschanze on 20 July 1944. Shortly after, the Gestapo found a copy of the memorandum. Awaiting certain death in prison, most of the members were freed by the Allied forces marching on Berlin in spring 1945 – except Goerdeler and Bonhoeffer, who were both executed.<sup>31</sup> While the *Freiburger Bonhoeffer-Kreis* ceased to exist, their ideas lived on as a narrative of hope for post-war reconstruction. In the next sections, this chapter examines how the merging of German Protestantism with economic ideas found expression through a specific application of the emotive of the family.

### **The role of the emotive of family in the memorandum**

The memorandum consists of a main text in two parts, written by Gerhard Ritter, whose texts were informed by five preparatory studies by the other *Kreis* members, which were attached to the main text. Ritter shall therefore be referred to as the author of the memorandum, although one must bear in mind that its composition was very much a cooperative effort.

The first part of the memorandum analyses the causes of political chaos and the successful rise of National Socialism, and then provides Christian principles on which a new society should be built. In the second part, Ritter added to these principles some practical solutions on the structure of the state, the position of the church as well as some guiding principles on the functioning of the law, the economy and social security. The invocation of the emotive of the family linked the Freiburgers' idea of the family to terms like attachment, affection, trust, responsibility, and authority, all recurring themes in the memorandum.

The Freiburg concept of the family radically opposed everything the Nazi family ideal stood for. Family, from a National Socialist point of view, was strongly connected to the '*Blut und Boden*' ('blood and soil') ideology: one's ancestral bloodline and territory ought to be the prime factors in sustaining a worthy *Sippe* (the National Socialist term for an extended family sharing the same bloodline, roughly translatable to 'clan' or 'kinship'). Historian Lisa Pine quotes an interesting parable by Martin Staemmler, a Nazi pathologist and university professor in Breslau,<sup>32</sup> about a cuckoo and a nightingale changing nests, yet still being unable to acquire each other's singing skills. Used in German schools in the Hitler era, the parable ends with an all-revealing question: "What is more important: the race from which one stems or the nest in which one grows up?"<sup>33</sup> Other traits the Nazis liked to couple with proper family upbringing were physical strength and health, as evidenced by the many outdoor fitness activities by the *Hitlerjugend* for boys and the *Bund Deutscher Mädel* for girls.<sup>34</sup>

In short, different values and associations are evoked by the same word within existentially different thought systems because their cultural and political acceptability differs. This is the essence of an emotive.<sup>35</sup> It will now be demonstrated

how this emotive of the family features throughout the memorandum, and how it serves as a building block for a political community order.

### **The Freiburger thinking on a new political and economic order**

The memorandum's authors argued that, in the aftermath of the First World War, a radical change in moral responsibility had paved the way for the ascent of the totalitarian ideologies of Fascism and National Socialism. Instead of rulers' traditional answerability to God as their higher common authority, European states themselves – employing extreme nationalistic discourses – claimed such supreme authority, ultimately leading to the authoritarian state.

To overcome this development's now apparent terrible consequences, the memorandum pointed to two characteristics on which a state must build its authority: acting in responsibility to the rule of law (*Rechtsstaat*)<sup>36</sup> and resting on trust instead of “just silent and blind submission”, opening up a necessary space for freedom of consciousness and expression, including criticism of a regime.<sup>37</sup>

These conditions for the well-being of a state – trust, freedom, and responsibility – shared a main feature. Against the totalitarian state Germany had become at the time, disregarding the rule of law and individual liberties, they presented instead a conception of the state in which these liberties were embedded in a moral value system.

This moral value system built strongly on the authors' Lutheran tradition of German Protestantism. Shortly put, Ritter explained this as follows: God implanted a moral consciousness in his creatures. This places any societal order under the highest commandment of Christianity: to fear God above all as one's Lord, and to love God above all as one's Father. If God is the only final authority to judge a person's actions, then one is ultimately free from fear of fellow humans. Hence, Ritter wrote, “[t]o secure the true personal character of people against collectivism and anarchy is the central issue for a community order according to a Christian understanding”.<sup>38</sup> Thus, the presented idea of a community order, safeguarding individual freedoms, directly springs from the Lutheran theology behind it.

What, however, are the building blocks of such an order? There are two levels on which this community of responsible individuals takes form. The first level is that of the family, which is the most natural and fundamental unit of Christian social life. With reference to Luther's own teaching on the Fourth Commandment (in the Lutheran index), “Thou shalt honour thy father and thy mother”, Ritter notes that affective and penal features are exceptionally united in the relationship between parents and children and are exemplary for all moral community order.<sup>39</sup> A child fully knows his or her responsibility under parental authority. A family thus enables children to flourish, but it limits them as subjects to their parents' guidance and education.

The second level on which a new order must take form, according to the memorandum, was the way in which a political community should be structured

according to the principles of responsibility, freedom and trust. In other words: how can a political community also be a moral community (*sittliche Gemeinschaft*)? To this end, the memorandum provided both a social and economic framework for society as larger building blocks. According to this framework, the social fabric of society rests on the incorporation of social bodies in smaller communities and the reintroduction of a community of the people (*Volksgemeinschaft*), superseding all societal standings.<sup>40</sup> Economic policy rests on a strong legal framework to prevent citizens from being exploited as the “inanimate parts of a machine”.<sup>41</sup> Consequently, the state would act as the guardian of this legal framework.

Thus seen, the Lutheran idea of family does not only apply in a literal fashion, but bears a metaphorical charge: like a parent protects the liberties of his or her children, so the state should safeguard the liberties of its subjects, demanding obedience to its authority in return. Here, the political, economic and religious strands of thought meet and intertwine. Essentially, the proposed economic and social policies advocated in the memorandum derived directly from the ideas of German ordoliberalism, with its notions of individual responsibility. This view of liberalism, which came in fashion in the early 1930s, pursued the establishment of an economic and political system in which the state is embedded in a strong legal framework as the guardian of a free market economy, free competition, and no monopolies.<sup>42</sup>

Through ordoliberals such as Walter Eucken, Franz Böhm, Constantin von Dietze, and Adolf Lampe, the *Freiburger Bonhoeffer-Kreis* made a significant contribution to the post-war realisation of the German social market economy. Already in their 1936 ‘Ordo Manifesto’, Eucken and his colleagues denounced the historical fatalism and relativism in academia during the years prior to the National Socialist takeover in Germany, considering it a “sign of weakness” that intellectuals had not been able to “tackle the job of shaping events” but had instead retired to “the role of observer”.<sup>43</sup> According to them, it was intellectual laziness that led to economic monopolies and chaos in Germany.

The ordoliberals considered it “the most urgent task for the representatives of law and political economy [...] to work together in an effort to ensure that both disciplines regain their proper place in the life of the nation”.<sup>44</sup> Before the *Kreis* started drafting the memorandum in 1943, the academic foundation for its social and economic policy recommendations had already been laid out by the ordoliberals, for example in Böhm’s *Ordnung der Wirtschaft* (1937), and especially in Eucken’s *Die Grundlagen der Nationalökonomie* (1939).<sup>45</sup> The ordoliberals saw it as their intellectual duty to prevent another economic catastrophe (as witnessed in the 1930s) from happening. Not surprisingly, the social and economic layout of the memorandum strongly reflected the ordoliberal views of Eucken and his colleagues. What was new, however, was the merging of German Protestantism with the *Ordnungspolitik* advocated by Eucken and his associates.<sup>46</sup> This stood in sharp contrast with the ‘Ordo Manifesto’ of 1936, which argued for scientific reasoning “for the purpose of constructing and reorganising the economic system”.<sup>47</sup>



The ideas of a moral community – heavily influenced by German Lutheranism – harmonised with the practical social-economic framework offered by German ordoliberalism. The ordoliberals framed their social and economic recommendations for post-war Europe in a more powerful and emotional manner by embedding it in a Christian worldview. Their economic theory transcended into a narrative of a moral community, with a distinct Christian make-up of society, in which the family would be the cornerstone of social and economic life. In the social-economic part of the memorandum many examples of this linking of ideologies can be found.

For instance, Böhm and Eucken, whose contribution to the social-economic part of the memorandum was most significant, argued that the state's task was to create a social and economic structure where everyone would have the freedom of self-development.<sup>48</sup> Such a structure would ensure the superfluity of mass political movements and organisations to advocate individual rights. Political organisation of the masses, as witnessed in the 1930s, was seen as threatening the social fabric of society – of which the family was the most important body. By discouraging the mobilisation of the masses and the formation of cartels by industrialists, and by introducing local governance, Böhm and Eucken envisaged an organic make-up of the social body of the state, as opposed to an organised and mechanical one.<sup>49</sup>

Again, this particular view of a social fabric of society must be seen as contrary to the National Socialists' view, who wanted to mobilise the masses in favour of their political goals. The organic fabric of society which the *Freiburger Kreis* envisioned was built on trust, and the family was its bedrock.<sup>50</sup> This logic of trust (of the family and the community) and authority (of the state and the law), based on Christian principles, was also followed by a notion of self-responsibility. The state provided all citizens with the same legal and moral framework, giving them the freedom and self-responsibility they needed to develop and establish social relations with others.<sup>51</sup> In this way, the state should protect the conditions under which a political community could organically grow into a moral community.

In the economic domain, the task of the state was to shield people from the "demon of greed that perverts the moral relationship between people".<sup>52</sup> This mainly entailed the prevention of cartels, the abuse of economic power, and the task to ensure an environment in which free competition could be curbed to avoid the excesses of laissez-faire capitalism. The state was to be an *Ordnungsmacht* (ordering power), where freedom, based on trust and individual responsibility, formed the cornerstone. Ritter formulated this as a fundamental condition for the creation of a true moral community, in which economic relations would not harm, but rather enforce the social make-up of society:

Only where the possibility exists to create efficient work in free self-responsibility, a labour performance which one can proudly call one's own, a prospect exists of perceiving labour truly as a vocation to a useful case for the people as a whole, and as a service to one's neighbour.<sup>53</sup>

The *Ordnungsmacht*, which was so central in ordoliberalist thought, functioned in two ways. First, the state was restrictive in that it prevented economic cartelisation, mass political mobilisation, and the exploitation of labour. Moreover, state power itself was limited only to those policy areas where it would serve the general interest. Second, the state enabled individuals to self-development and free competition, while protecting them from the excesses of capitalism. The state provided its citizens with the means to build a community consisting of smaller social bodies, such as the family. It enabled the political community to become a moral community by upholding an ethical and legal framework based on Christian values. The economic section of the memorandum emphasised the importance of the state as a moral *Ordnungsmacht* by concluding “that no [economic] leadership is blessed and in the long run successful without real moral authority”, because “economic competition and free initiatives too [...] are not without moral dangers”.<sup>54</sup>

The ordoliberal state conception as a simultaneously restrictive and enabling *Ordnungsmacht* thus bears all the elements of a metaphorical family in the Lutheran sense: an authority that is built on mutual trust and individual liberties (in the economic realm: free business competition), ensuring that subordinate local communities can organise themselves and thrive.

### **A blueprint for a European order?**

For a new order of European states, the drafters of the memorandum offered some suggestions themselves, but the real influence of the memorandum on European integration is of a more indirect nature. In the main part’s second chapter, the authors included a section on foreign relations, in which clear notions of a European order can be found. The central concept – which has also been recognised by Walter Lipgens<sup>55</sup> – is that of a moral order under God for all:

For God, the nation-state is not a last or a highest; humanity as a whole supersedes it; and to organise it in a way that a general moral order [*sittliche Gesamtordnung*] comes into being remains, albeit practically infinitely far away, yet a goal to gradually strive towards.<sup>56</sup>

This general order could be structured within a framework of a “smaller federation of European states”. This European federation would “as a higher authority [*Oberinstanz*] settle European disputes [...] in a climate of assured rights, freedom and mutual trust”.<sup>57</sup>

Expanding on the building blocks of social and economic order, which would in turn be based on the family, the Freiburg intellectuals also envisioned their political community order to be established at the European level, and clearly considered a European federation a possibility for a future era of peace. In this federation, Germany was to work together with other countries, instead of against them. The drafters foresaw the central position Germany would have in a future Europe, and pleaded with the other nations for a ‘just peace’ (*Friede der Gerechtigkeit*),<sup>58</sup> instead of a new ‘*Diktatfrieden*’ (dictated peace) – which is

how they, and most of the German society at the time, interpreted the Versailles Treaty.<sup>59</sup>

The concept of an *Ordnungsmacht*, with its notions of economic freedom and competition, translated to an *Oberinstanz*, provides the blueprint for this European order. The responsibilities of this *Oberinstanz* would include, but not be limited to, safeguarding a just distribution of economic goods, protecting national minorities against violence by the majority, reduce the frequency of war by erecting international institutions, promote cooperation among nations, and restore obedience to the principle of *pacta sunt servanda*. Thus, the Freiburgers anticipated a post-war European order founded on a bedrock of trust and solidarity, which reiterate the characteristics of the Lutheran family ideal.<sup>60</sup>

This was very much in accordance with ordoliberalism. Ordoliberals base the principle of authority on the self-responsibility of the individual, and hold that the state should only take minimal initiative, for example when individuals or private organisations are not capable of solving their problems within the existing framework of the state. Thus, where possible, self-administration was prioritised over central authority. Interestingly enough, this notion of authority shows similarities with the present-day concept of subsidiarity that is found in the Treaties of the European Union (EU), and which holds that “decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizens of the Union”.<sup>61</sup> Though the principle of subsidiarity derives from Roman Catholic foundations, similar views of authority were held by other groups as well, explaining why the principle of subsidiarity was acceptable to others too. Moreover, it is not unlikely that the *Freiburger Kreis*’s members themselves were influenced by Catholic social teaching and the papal encyclicals, since the Roman-Catholic theologian Wendelin Rauch discussed its core principles amidst the *Kreis*.<sup>62</sup>

The question remains whether this memorandum lived up to its original intent, namely to serve as an input for discussing the German situation at a possible conference of the WCC. First of all, several authors rewrote and published parts of the memorandum after the war. The study on the rule of law by Böhm and Wolf found publication in the series *Evangelische Reihe* in 1946 as an appendix to a new book by Wolf, and Von Dietze published a book entitled *Nationalökonomie und Theologie* (National Economy and Theology) in the same series in 1947.<sup>63</sup> Second, from 22 August to 4 September 1948, the constitutive First Assembly of the WCC convened in Amsterdam, and its official report lists Ritter, Von Dietze and Wolf as members of the official delegation of the Evangelical Church in Germany.<sup>64</sup>

It does not become explicitly clear from this report how the memorandum itself was received or debated, but the memorandum’s important notion of ultimate responsibility to God alone returns as one of the strongest facets of the Report of Section III, on ‘The Church and the Disorder of Society’, chaired by Dutchman Connie L. Patijn. Its first paragraph is worth quoting in full:

The world to-day [sic] is experiencing a social crisis of unparalleled proportions. The deepest root of that disorder is the refusal of men to see and admit

that their responsibility to God stands over and above their loyalty to any earthly community and their obedience to worldly power. Our modern society, in which religious tradition and family life have been weakened, and which is for the most part secular in outlook, underestimates both the depth of evil in human nature and the full height of freedom and dignity in the children of God.<sup>65</sup>

This statement was informed by multiple preparatory essays and debates from different Christian traditions and builds on a certain polygenesis of ideas. Yet, all elements central to the *Freiburger* analysis come together in these few sentences: a loss of responsibility to God has led people to seek false authority elsewhere (in the secularist and totalitarian ideologies of the nation-state). Family life, the core community in society, has degraded (note also the metaphorical use of “children” here); and because every individual stands answerable to God alone, he or she can enjoy true freedom. Strikingly, this quote also seems to tread carefully between fear of underestimating the scope of human evil on the one hand and hope of underestimating people’s freedom and dignity as children of God.

The ordoliberal socio-economic framework within which the memorandum is embedded laid the foundation for the later German social market economy. Influential in this regard was not so much the memorandum of the *Freiburger Bonhoeffer-Kreis*, but rather the whole school of ordoliberalism which was strengthened in a setting of resistance against the National Socialists, mixed with German Protestantism and a Christian worldview. Eucken, as one of the most important ordoliberal economists, strongly incorporated his personal Christian convictions in developing his political economic thought.<sup>66</sup> Undoubtedly, these convictions were strengthened by the social-cultural milieu of the *Freiburger Kreise*.

After the war, the influence of German Protestantism contributed to the political acceptability of the social-economic reform which the ordoliberals proposed.<sup>67</sup> Later advocates of ordoliberalism, like Wilhelm Röpke and Alfred Müller-Armack – who coined the concept of a social market economy and would together with West-German Finance Minister Ludwig Erhard be responsible for its implementation – differed slightly from Eucken’s view. However, all of them subscribed to an emphasis on freedom, individual responsibility and a state protective of these virtues.<sup>68</sup> But where Eucken’s view of social and economic policy was a rule-oriented, non-discriminant, privilege-free order of economic competition, Müller-Armack and Röpke envisioned a slightly more active state, providing for more social policies.<sup>69</sup> Eventually, Erhard mediated between these academic opinions and brought them into political practice after 1949.<sup>70</sup>

## Conclusion

This chapter has shown how the emotive of the family ran as a connecting vein through the *Freiburger-Bonhoeffer Kreis*’s memorandum. Braiding economic,

social, political, and religious thought together, the Freiburger intellectuals created a distinct vision for a post-war order. This order consisted of three building blocks. The first and smallest of those was the family, used in a metaphorical way to explain the political community order at the level of the state: the second building block. In the eyes of the *Freiburger Kreis*'s members, the state ought to be responsible for structuring economic and political order in such a way that family life was shielded from concentrations of economic power. Only in this way could a political community organically evolve into a moral community. This community order, the memorandum argued, could then also be translated into a European order – a third building block of the post-war order.

The *Freiburger Bonhoeffer-Kreis* was a unique resistance network because theologians and economists joined forces to promote a powerful message: any authority that is exerted over human beings, whether this authority comes from the state or from divinity, would have to be a responsible authority, guaranteeing the freedoms of its subordinates. Although it is difficult to establish far-reaching conclusions for European integration history on the basis of a single blueprint, this chapter aimed to explicate the contours of the role played by informal networks that were active in wartime Europe. The new method applied here has shown how emotives can serve as a mechanism to tailor blueprints (ideas) to an intended purpose. In essence, emotives must be studied as mechanisms of influence, occurring through emotional and moral associations that accompany emotives, thereby battling associations held within another cultural or political environment.

This chapter provides a basis for studying more emotives in more blueprints from the late interwar, wartime, and early post-war years. If the process of searching for emotives in blueprints is repeated time and again, it is possible to reconstruct the components of the 'affective glue' that provided the conditions for European political and economic reconstruction. An analysis of the twofold use of emotives in battling other, contrasting blueprints, and in rallying support for the own blueprint's cause can help to understand why some blueprints were turned into political reality while others fell into oblivion. Charting both contestations and coalitions in this process remains a challenge for future research.

## Notes

- 1 Lipgens: *Europa-Föderationspläne der Widerstandsbewegungen*; Burgin: *The Great Persuasion*; Rouse and Neill: *History of the Ecumenical Movement 1*; Zeilstra: *European Unity in Ecumenical Thinking, 1937–1948*.
- 2 Lipgens: *Europa-Föderationspläne der Widerstandsbewegungen*.
- 3 The memorandum was later re-published as Thielicke: *In der Stunde Null*.
- 4 Goldschmidt: 'Die Entstehung der Freiburger Kreise'. Note that *Kreise* is the plural of the German word for 'circle' (*Kreis*).
- 5 Kaiser *et al.*: *Transnational Networks in Regional Integration*, 6; Kaiser: 'Bringing History Back in'; Kaiser: 'Bringing People and Ideas Back in'.
- 6 For Coudenhove-Kalergi's efforts to establish a united Europe, see Göhring: *Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi*.

- 7 Hewitson: 'The United States of Europe'.
- 8 Schwabe: 'The Cold War'; Rosato: 'Europe's Troubles'; Milward: *The Reconstruction of Western Europe*; Pierson: 'The Path to European Integration'.
- 9 Goldstein and Keohane: 'Ideas and Foreign Policy', 8.
- 10 Milward: *The Reconstruction of Western Europe*, 392–398; Parsons: 'Showing Ideas as Causes'; Hewitson and D'Auria: *Europe in Crisis?*
- 11 Eustace *et al.*: 'AHR Conversation'.
- 12 Reddy: *The Navigation of Feeling*, 105.
- 13 Hutchison and Bleiker: 'Theorizing Emotions in World Politics', 496; see in this respect also Costigliola: "'I React Intensely to Everything'".
- 14 Crawford: 'The Passion of World Politics', 122; Bar-Tal: 'Why Does Fear Override Hope?', 606; Koschut: 'Emotional (Security) Communities', 538–543.
- 15 Rosenwein: 'Problems and Methods', 8–9; Plamper: 'The History of Emotions', 252–253.
- 16 Rieter and Schmolz: 'The Ideas of German Ordoliberalism', 97.
- 17 Schulz: 'Adolf Lampe und seine Bedeutung', 240.
- 18 Thielicke: *In der Stunde Null*, 7.
- 19 Blumenberg-Lampe: *Das wirtschaftspolitische Programm der 'Freiburger Kreise'*, 18.
- 20 *Ibid.* These discussions on Catholic social teachings were mostly inspired by Pope Pius XI's encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno* of 1931, in which he called for a social order based on solidarity.
- 21 *Ibid.*
- 22 Thielicke: *In der Stunde Null*, 26.
- 23 Metaxas: *Bonhoeffer*, 369–371.
- 24 *Ibid.*, 358–359.
- 25 Thielicke: *In der Stunde Null*, 27; Goldschmidt: 'Die Entstehung der Freiburger Kreise', 11; Metaxas: *Bonhoeffer*, 397–404.
- 26 Visser 't Hooft: 'The Genesis', 701–710.
- 27 In his diary, Erik Wolf mentions the visit of Bonhoeffer on 9 October 1942, as noted by Schulin *et al.*: *Der 'Freiburger Kreis'*, 79.
- 28 Bethge: *Dietrich Bonhoeffer*, 872–874. Interestingly, Metaxas, in his recent Bonhoeffer biography, does not at all mention his contacts with the Freiburger Kreis that came to bear his name.
- 29 Thielicke: *In der Stunde Null*, 6.
- 30 Bethge: *Dietrich Bonhoeffer*, 873.
- 31 Thielicke: *In der Stunde Null*, 8; Bonhoeffer *et al.*: *Verzet en overgave*, 171–176.
- 32 Grüttner: *Biographisches Lexikon zur nationalsozialistischen Wissenschaftspolitik*, 165.
- 33 Pine: 'Family and the Third Reich, 1933–1945', 109–110; n. 128.
- 34 *Ibid.*, 86–87.
- 35 It would be interesting to compare in further research the Roman Catholic associations with the concept 'family' in the direct pre-war and war-time years. A starting point for such research could be the famous papal encyclical *Mit brennender Sorge* ('With Burning Concern'), issued by Pope Pius XI in 1937.
- 36 Law, in this sense, was not seen as a subject to the whims of the masses, but should take a "moral idea of justice (an 'eternal', 'divine' conception of law)" as its deepest layer. Thielicke: *In der Stunde Null*, 76, 79.
- 37 *Ibid.*, 76. "[ruhen] auf bloßer stummer und blinder Unterwerfung".
- 38 Thielicke: *In der Stunde Null*, 62–63. "Gegen Kollektivismus und Anarchie den wahren Personcharakter des Menschen zu sichern ist das zentrale Anliegen einer christlichen verstandenen Gemeinschaftsordnung".
- 39 *Ibid.*, 83.
- 40 *Ibid.*, 86.

- 41 Ibid., 91; “zum Arbeitseinsatz des Menschen als seelenloser Maschinenteil”.
- 42 For an in-depth discussion of the ideas of German ordoliberalism, see Bonefeld: ‘Freedom and the Strong State’.
- 43 Böhm *et al.*: ‘The Ordo Manifesto of 1936’, 19.
- 44 Ibid., 16.
- 45 Klump: ‘Der Beitrag der Freiburger Kreise zum Konzept der sozialen Marktwirtschaft’, 391–393.
- 46 Ibid., 393–395.
- 47 Böhm *et al.*: ‘The Ordo Manifesto of 1936’, 23.
- 48 Thielicke: *In der Stunde Null*, 86.
- 49 Ibid., 87–88.
- 50 Ibid., 88.
- 51 Ibid., 90.
- 52 Ibid., 91. “Die sittliche Gefahr alles Wirtschaftens ist der Dämon der Habgier, der die sittlichen Beziehungen unter den Menschen verdirbt”.
- 53 Ibid., 93.
- Nur wo die Möglichkeit besteht, in freier Selbstverantwortung ein tüchtiges Werk zu schaffen, eine Arbeitsleistung, die man mit Stolz sein eigen nennen darf, besteht Aussicht darauf, dass die Arbeit wirklich als Berufung zu einer dem Volksganzen nützlichen Sache, also als Dienst für den Nächsten, für die Gemeinschaft empfunden wird.
- 54 Ibid., 94. “[...] daß keine Führung von Segen und auf die Dauer erfolgreich ist ohne echte moralische Autorität”. “Auch Wettbewerb und freie Initiative [...] sind nicht ohne sittliche Gefahren”.
- 55 Lipgens: *Europa-Föderationspläne Der Widerstandsbewegungen*, 140.
- 56 Thielicke: *In der Stunde Null*, 95. “Vor Gott ist die Nation nicht ein Letztes und Höchstes; die Menschheit als Ganzes steht darüber; dieses Ganze so zu organisieren, daß eine sittliche Gesamtordnung entsteht, bleibt ein – wenn auch praktisch unendlich fernes, so doch annäherungsweise zu erstrebendes Ziel”.
- 57 Ibid., 96. “[E]ine engere Föderation aller europäischen Staaten’ ‘[...] als Oberinstanz zur Schlichtung europäischer Streitigkeiten [...] in einer Atmosphäre gesicherten Rechts, gesicherten Freiheit und gegenseitigen Vertrauens”.
- 58 The notion of a just peace is worth exploring further, because ecumenists and intellectuals in the Allied realm were discussing this simultaneously, in the so-called Commission on a Just and Durable Peace, chaired by John Foster Dulles. See Warren: *Theologians of a New World Order*, 99–103.
- 59 Thielicke: *In der Stunde Null*, 95.
- 60 Ibid., 95–101, also 122.
- 61 Sauter: ‘The Economic Constitution of the European Union’, 44.
- 62 Blumenberg-Lampe: *Das wirtschaftspolitische Programm der ‘Freiburger Kreise’*, 18.
- 63 Wolf: *Im Reiche dieses Königs hat man das Recht lieb*; von Dietze: *Nationalökonomie und Theologie*; see also Blumenberg-Lampe: *Das wirtschaftspolitische Programm der ‘Freiburger Kreise’*, 28.
- 64 Visser ’t Hooft: *The First Assembly of the World Council of Churches. The Official Report*, 239, 250.
- 65 Ibid., 74.
- 66 Goldschmidt: ‘Protestantische Wurzeln’, 256.
- 67 Klump: *Der Beitrag der Freiburger Kreise zum Konzept der sozialen Marktwirtschaft*, 384.
- 68 Glossner and Gregosz: *Formation and Implementation*.
- 69 Vanberg: ‘The Freiburg School’.
- 70 Peacock and Willgerodt: *Germany’s Social Market Economy*, 3.

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