DNB Working Paper

No. 602 / July 2018

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DeNederlandscheBank

EUROSYSTEEM

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* Views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect official positions of De Nederlandsche Bank.

Working Paper No. 602

July 2018

De Nederlandsche Bank NV
P.O. Box 98
1000 AB AMSTERDAM
The Netherlands

Herding behavior of Dutch pension funds in asset class investments*

Ian Koetsier^a and Jacob Bikker^b

^a *Utrecht University, The Netherlands*

^b *De Nederlandsche Bank, The Netherlands and Utrecht University, The Netherlands*

23 July 2018

Abstract

This study investigates asset herd behavior for Dutch pension funds from 1999 to 2014 using quarterly data. We find considerable asset class herd behavior, which is more intensive for the more ‘exotic’ sub-asset classes, such as private equity and emerging market shares. We find higher buy herd behavior in sub-asset class markets, which are affected by the stock market and debt crises. The extent of pension fund’s herd behavior is affected by financial market, macroeconomics circumstances and returns. We find destabilizing effects of herd behavior for shares and private equity on the sell side, for fixed-interest investments on the buy side and for real estate on both the buy and sell side. We find stabilizing effects of herd behavior for shares and private equity on the buy side, for fixed interest investments on the sell side and for other investments on both the buy and the sell side. For crises, we find evidence that destabilizing behavior is concentrated on the buy side, whereas sell herd behavior mostly has a stabilizing effect.

Keywords: Herd behaviour, (de)stabilising, pension funds, asset classes.

JEL-classifications: G23, G24.

* Corresponding author: Ian Koetsier, Utrecht University, Utrecht School of Economics, Adam Smith Hall, Kriekenpitplein 21-22, 3584 EC Utrecht, The Netherlands; E-mail: i.koetsier@uu.nl. The views expressed here are solely those of the authors and do not in any way represent the views of the affiliated institutions.

1. Introduction

Institutional investors manage a substantial part of global financial assets; their behavior is likely to have a significant impact on financial market sentiment (de Haan and Kakes, 2011). Herd behavior by institutional investors is believed to undermine financial stability. Herd behavior occurs when investors imitate the investments of other participants.¹ Institutional investors' herding may move securities away from their price equilibrium and lead to abnormal volatility (Chang *et al.*, 2000), whether this occurs in practice remains highly debated in academic as well as policy circles. Institutional investors are often seen as long-term investors, which trade based on fundamentals. Furthermore, they can 'wait-out' short-term market volatility because they are non-leveraged and have long-investment horizons.² This type of behavior has a stabilizing effect on financial markets.

The sheer size of the pension fund industry suggests that herding by pension fund managers can have a significant impact on prices (Jame, 2011). Furthermore, pension funds gain importance over time due to population aging (see Figure 1) and, as a consequence, pension funds' assets increase as a percent of GDP. However, the literature on pension fund herding is limited. Most studies investigate herd behavior on the level of institutional investors (Nofsinger and Sias, 1999; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2000; Sias, 2004; Choi and Sias, 2009; Broeders *et al.*, 2016) or mutual funds (Grinblatt *et al.*, 1995; Wermers, 1999).

[Insert Figure 1]

The theoretical rational herding literature identifies several reasons for herd behavior. Firstly, investigative herding occurs when investors follow the same signals (Froot *et al.*, 1992; Hirshleifer *et al.*, 1994). Secondly, investors might also infer information from each other's trades (Bikhchandani *et al.*, 1992; Banerjee, 1992; Sias, 2004), and decide to follow the fund which they believe to be better informed. Thirdly, fund managers herd together due to reputational concerns relating to underperformance versus other funds (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990) and peer-reviewed regulatory benchmarks. Fourthly, investors can prefer securities with specific characteristics (Del Guercio, 1996; Falkenstein, 1996; Gompers and Metrick, 2001). Although there seem to be numerous theoretical reasons for pension fund herding, the empirical evidence on pension fund herding is mixed. Most empirical studies only find modest evidence of herding in equity

¹ According to some scholars, pension funds are more likely to herd compared to individuals due to the close-knit nature of the institutional investor community, which might exacerbate price movements and increase volatility (Thomas *et al.*, 2014).

² Long-term investments are also benefit institutional investors, as they can take advantage of long-term risk premia (G20/OECD, 2013).

investments for U.S. mutual funds and U.S. pension funds (Lakonishok *et al.*, 1992; Grinblatt *et al.*, 1995; Wermers, 1999; Jame, 2011). Cai *et al.* (2012) also find considerably higher herding in corporate bonds.

We make use of a unique dataset of De Nederlandsche Bank (the Dutch Central Bank), which is the Dutch pension funds' supervisor. This supervision dataset contains quarterly data on all holdings and returns of Dutch pension funds for multiple asset classes from 1999 to 2014. Our database includes 20 different asset groups. There are four main asset classes: shares and private equity, real estate, fixed-interest investments and other investments. The underlying sub-asset classes for shares and private equity are shares, emerging market shares, mature market shares and private equity. The underlying sub-asset classes for real estate are direct and indirect real estate investments. We also distinguish between bonds, credits, mortgage loans, index-linked bonds, short-term receivables from banks and sovereign bonds for fixed-interest investments; whereas the underlying sub-asset classes for other investments are liquid capital, commodities, hedge funds and others. Our dataset includes three major crises (the dot.com bubble, the financial crisis, and the European sovereign debt crisis). As a result, we can observe changes in behavior during multiple crisis-periods. This is important because market circumstances might lead to different behavior (Christie and Huang, 1995). In addition, our study includes both stock market crises as well as a sovereign debt crisis, which potentially leads to different conclusions about herd behavior and their impact on stability. Until now, there is only limited knowledge on the trading behavior during the recent financial crisis and European sovereign debt crisis.

Dutch pension funds present an interesting case because the number of empirical studies on herding for pension funds in continental Europe is limited. Currently, there is considerable regional bias in the herding literature towards the U.S. and the U.K. Our findings for Dutch pension funds broaden the understanding of herd behavior beyond the findings for predominantly the Anglo-Saxon systems. Moreover, Dutch pension funds manage vast asset holdings amounting up to 1,256 billion Euros at the end of 2014.³ Its pension system can be representative for other systems with large second pillars or will be in the future when other systems increasingly move into this direction due to aging and public finance concerns (García and Ferruz, 2015). In addition, Dutch pension funds invest a significant share of their assets abroad with almost no investments restrictions.⁴ Thus, pension funds' behavior is not restricted by regulatory limits on the holdings in asset and sub-asset classes.

Policymakers must be aware that the trading behavior of long-term investors is not without consequence for macroeconomic stability and future economic growth. It is generally accepted that herding can lead to a situation in which market prices cannot reflect all the information so that the market becomes

³ It has a mature second pillar because most pension funds were founded in the 1950s and 1960s

⁴ This restriction applies to investments in the company of the plan sponsor (see for details, section 3).

unstable and moves towards the inefficient outcomes (García and Ferruz, 2015).⁵ If pension funds herd together and suppress their own beliefs, then their behavior is destabilizing. All of this is at the center of the active policy debate on the risks that the behavior of non-bank financial institutions poses for financial stability (Haldane, 2014; Blake *et al.*, 2014). Thus, non-leveraged institutions also can have an adverse effect on financial stability. Notably, in times of crisis, pension funds' herding potentially leads to high costs for society as herding behavior could potentially amplify boom-bust cycles. Furthermore, the allocation of pension funds' investments is vital for long-term growth; misallocation could be very costly for society as well as (future) beneficiaries.

Our study will contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we choose the asset class as our unit of analysis. We analyze asset classes because pension funds' strategic asset allocations are mostly based on asset classes. Second, our study distinguishes between multiple asset classes contrary to most studies which only focus on equity. There are numerous theoretical reasons why differences in herd behavior exist between different asset classes (*e.g.*, liquidity, trading costs and opaqueness). Previous studies often focus on equity investments, and ignore essential asset classes, such as bonds. Third, we solely focus on pension funds. Treating institutional investors as a homogeneous group could be problematic because the behavior of the entire group of institutional investors could blur the trading behavior of pension funds.^{6,7} Fourth, our study includes multiple crises, like the Dot.com crisis, the financial crisis, and the European debt crisis. It includes both stock market crises and a sovereign debt crisis.

Section 2 provides an overview of the theoretical reasons for herd behavior and the current state of the empirical literature. Section 3 shows the structure of the Dutch pension system. Section 4 presents the methodology and our sample. In section 5, we show the results of our analyses. This section includes the results for the LSV herding measure, the regression results, and analysis on the stability question. Section 6 concludes our study.

2. Literature review

Institutional investors, amongst them pension funds, are generally believed to be informed investors. These investors are believed to have a stabilizing effect; they are “stabilizing speculators” according to Friedman

⁵ Herding could potentially be stabilizing if it leads to the swift incorporation of new information in asset prices (Nofsinger and Sias, 1999).

⁶ It does not only blur the differences in herd behaviour between different categories of institutional investors, the sheer size of institutional investors in trading can also lead to an underestimation of herding. A high share of trading within the group of institutional investors will automatically lead to the non-existence of herding as buys and sells must equal on the market level.

⁷ The choice for studying mutual fund behaviour is often driven by the fact that portfolio data on mutual funds is often publicly available (Raddatz and Schmukler, 2013).

(1953). They trade based on rational expectations, in accordance with the efficient market hypothesis. However, one cause why the efficient market hypothesis will not hold is the occurrence of herd behavior. Chiang and Zheng (2010, p. 1911) define herding as “correlation in trades resulting from interactions between investors.” García and Ferruz (2015, p. 1804) identify herding “when investors decide to imitate the decisions of other participants in the market or market movements.” In addition, Nofsinger and Sias (1999) note that this trading occurs over a specific period, the so-called herding interval. In our study, we define herding as the trading into the same direction (*e.g.*, purchases or sales) during a specific quarter.

The theoretical literature identifies two main types of models, irrational and rational herding models. The irrational models mostly stem from the work of Devenow and Welch (1996). They focus on the psychology of the investor, and the behavioral aspects why investors will follow each other. We mainly focus on the rational models as these are regarded most applicable for pension funds. In these models, herd behavior results in an inefficient equilibrium due to the incomplete impounding of (price) information. They identify numerous possible causes of herding. First, investigative herding occurs when investors follow the same signals, especially when they receive these signals simultaneously (Froot *et al.*, 1992; Hirshleifer *et al.*, 1994). A second possibility is that investors infer information from each other’s trades (Bikhchandani *et al.*, 1992; Banerjee, 1992; Sias, 2004), so-called informational herding. This strategy allows funds to use private information of more informed investors. A third possibility is that fund managers herd together due to reputational concerns. Principle-agent problems hamper the evaluation of a fund’s performance. Therefore, managers stay with the crowd to avoid possible underperformance (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990). The convex payoff structures of fund managers also contribute to this. Another reputational concern is non-compliance with peer-reviewed regulatory benchmarks, which results in similar investment practices to avoid underperformance. A fourth possible cause of herding occurs when investors prefer securities with similar characteristics, like risks and returns (Del Guercio, 1996; Falkenstein, 1996; Gompers and Metrick, 2001). In a somewhat similar vein, investors copy trading strategies (Froot *et al.*, 1992; Gompers and Metrick, 2001).^{8,9}

The empirical literature on herd behavior consists of studies focusing on individual investors (*e.g.*, Lakonishok *et al.*, 1992; Grinblatt *et al.*, 1995; Sias, 2004) and on the aggregate market (*e.g.*, Christie and Huang, 1995; Chang *et al.*, 2000). We focus on herd behavior of individual institutions, in our case, pension funds. The empirical evidence on herd behavior for these institutions is mixed. In a seminal paper,

⁸ Pension funds engaged in feedback strategies are investing in assets with specific characteristics (high or low past-returns).

⁹ The exact identification of the underlying theoretical reasons of herding is almost impossible in a real-life situation. This study looks at the occurrence of herding, and, in addition, it is our belief that the theoretical reasons are not mutually exclusive.

Lakonishok *et al.* (1992) find no evidence of herd behavior, except for small capitalization stocks.^{10,11} The mean herding measure is only 0.027, which means that 52.7% of money managers were changing their holdings of an average stock in one direction and 47.3% in the opposite direction. Jame (2011) confirms their results for a more recent period.¹²

Most U.S. studies on herd behavior, however, focus on mutual funds. Grinblatt *et al.* (1995) find only weak evidence of herding for stocks on the buy and the sell side for U.S. mutual funds.¹³ Wermers (1999) shows for U.S. mutual funds that herding is concentrated in the smaller capitalization stocks (especially, on the sell side).¹⁴ Furthermore, mutual funds with specific characteristics exhibit different behavior. The evidence of herding in emerging market is more convincing than in developed countries. For Poland, Voronkova and Bohl (2005) find that the average herding measure of Polish pension funds is equal to 0.226.¹⁵ This finding is primarily attributed to a stringent investment regulation and high market concentration (Voronkova and Bohl, 2005).

The empirical studies above concentrate on equity trading behavior. However, other types of assets possess different characteristics, and this can result in different herd behavior. Cai *et al.* (2012) investigate herding in U.S. corporate bonds among bond fund managers. Their main finding is that corporate bond herding at 0.15 is substantially higher than the stock market herding. Raddatz and Schmukler (2013) focus on the herd behavior of Chilean pension funds in equity and different types of domestic bonds¹⁶ from 1996 to 2005. They find considerable heterogeneity in the level of herd behavior between asset classes. Herding is more prevalent in corporate and financial institution bonds, followed by equity, mortgage bonds, and government bonds (Raddatz and Schmukler, 2013). According to their findings, herding is influenced by opaqueness, risk and fund characteristics, but mainly caused by regulation. For the U.K., Blake *et al.* (2014) split the holdings of U.K. pension funds into different asset classes: U.K. equities, international equities, U.K. fixed-interest bonds, international fixed-interest bonds, U.K. index-linked bonds, cash/alternatives, and property.¹⁷ Their main finding is that pension exhibit herd behavior in subgroups defined by size and sector type.

¹⁰ For the smallest quintile stocks, our herding measure is 6.1%, while for the largest stocks it is only 1.6% (Lakonishok *et al.*, 1992).

¹¹ Their study uses the holdings of 769 U.S. tax-exempt funds (mostly pension funds), managed by 341 different institutional money managers.

¹² He investigates the herd behavior of U.S. pension funds using weekly and quarterly data from 1999 to 2008. The average herding measure is equal to 0.013 and 0.019 for the weekly and quarterly herding, respectively.

¹³ Grinblatt *et al.* (1995) use quarterly data on equity holdings for 155 mutual funds from 1975 to 1984.

¹⁴ Wermers (1999) investigates the stock investments of U.S. mutual funds. His data covers the period from 1975 to 1994.

¹⁵ Voronkova and Bohl (2005) investigate the behavior of 17 pension funds in Polish stock market for the 1999-2002 period.

¹⁶ Domestic corporate bonds, domestic financial institution bonds, domestic government bonds and domestic mortgage bonds.

¹⁷ Blake *et al.* (2014) investigate 189 defined benefit pension funds using monthly data from 1987 to 2012.

The empirical evidence on herd behavior of Dutch pension funds is limited. Most studies indirectly investigate herd behavior by testing for rebalancing. Rebalancing means that a pension fund adjusts her asset allocation towards the strategic asset allocation.¹⁸ Kakes (2006) finds that bonds and equity transactions reflect rebalancing behavior, especially for industry-wide funds.¹⁹ Bikker *et al.* (2010) investigate rebalancing in equity investments.²⁰ They find that pension funds only rebalance around 39% of the excess equity returns per quarter. Rubbaniy (2013) directly tests herd behavior for Dutch pension funds²¹. The study distinguishes between stocks, bonds, money market papers and investment & money market funds. The average herding measure is 0.081, which is considerably higher than for the U.S. pension funds. He argues that this higher measure results from the concentration of asset management in a limited number of firms, and that small funds mimic large pension funds. Broeders *et al.* (2016) find empirical evidence of herding behavior in the equity and bond allocation for 39 large Dutch pension funds. Koetsier and Bikker (2017) also find substantial herd behavior in sovereign bond investments. They conclude that the extent of herding is influenced by macroeconomic, financial and institutional circumstances.

Numerous studies find that the market circumstances matter for herd behavior in equity investments, amongst these studies, Christie and Huang (1995), Chang *et al.* (2000) and Lao and Singh (2011). For the Netherlands, there are some studies, which mention pension fund's herd behavior in crisis periods, such as Kakes (2006), de Haan and Kakes (2010) and Rubbaniy (2013). These studies mainly find indications of stabilizing behavior for pension funds' trading.

In summary, empirical studies on pension fund herding find evidence of modest herd behavior. However, these studies investigate herd behavior by institutional investors (*e.g.*, Nofsinger and Sias, 1999; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2000; Sias, 2004; Choi and Sias, 2009) or by mutual funds (*e.g.*, Grinblatt *et al.*, 1995; Wermers, 1999). In addition, the herding literature almost exclusively investigates the behavior in equity investments and Anglo-Saxon countries (*e.g.*, Lakonishok *et al.*, 1992; Grinblatt *et al.*, 1995; Wermers, 1999). This potentially leads to an underestimation of herd behavior (see Voronkova and Bohl, 2005; Cai *et al.*, 2012). Therefore, our study moves beyond mutual funds or institutional investors, individual securities, and Anglo-Saxon countries, and investigates herd behavior by Dutch pension funds in multiple asset classes.

¹⁸ By testing for rebalancing, they test for the existence of negative/positive feedback trading, which can be regarded as a form of herding whereby investors follow returns.

¹⁹ Kakes (2006) investigates the 77 largest Dutch pension funds for the period 2002-2005.

²⁰ The study of Bikker *et al.* (2010) uses quarterly data for 748 Dutch pension funds over the period 1999Q1-2006Q4.

²¹ Rubbaniy (2013) uses monthly data from April 2003 to January 2009 for 81 Dutch pension funds.

3. The Dutch pension system

The Dutch pension system consists of three pillars. The first pillar provides a flat-rate, pay-as-you-go public pension (In Dutch: *Algemene Ouderdomswet*). The second pillar consists of a funded pension scheme, financed by upfront contributions by employers and employees. The third pillar consists of a voluntary, privately managed pension scheme. Dutch pension funds are the largest institutional investors in the Netherlands (Bruil *et al.*, 2015). Therefore, we focus on the second pillar of the Dutch pension system because the Dutch pension funds predominantly are included in this pillar.

Participation in the second pillar is quasi-mandatory. Consequently, 5.5 million workers currently pay premiums into a second pillar pension fund to receive benefits in the future. The Minister of Social Affairs and Employment can declare collective bargaining agreements binding, when this happens, the pension arrangements in the bargaining agreement are binding for the whole sector. This *de facto* makes the second pillar mandatory for most Dutch employees. The second pillar is funded *ex-ante*, and these contributions are invested by pension funds for return reasons. The broad coverage and the long history of pension funds result in vast asset holdings of Dutch pension funds compared to Dutch GDP, equaling 159%²² of GDP in 2014.

The second pillar consists of industry-wide, company and occupational funds. The industry-wide funds manage most investments, and they have most participants. All pension funds are separate legal entities, which assures that pension provision is not affected by the failure of a sponsor-company. Therefore, pension funds also have a separate governing body. The governing board of a pension fund consists of representatives of the sponsor's company and pension fund's participants (often represented by union members). The board decides, for example, how to allocate the investments over assets classes (the so-called, strategic asset allocation). They are also responsible for all pension funds' investment decisions, even if these decisions are made by asset managers.

De Nederlandsche Bank (the Dutch Central Bank) is responsible for Dutch pension fund supervision. The Dutch pension regulation is based on the prudent person principle. Article 135 of the Dutch Pension Law (In Dutch: *Pensioenwet*) only specifies one occasion where there are investment limits. Investments in a sponsor company are limited to 5% of pension fund's investments, and if the sponsor is part of a group, the investments in the group are limited to 10% of pension fund's investments (Pensioenwet, 2015). Thus, Dutch pension funds are almost free in their investment decisions. Therefore, we can observe the 'real' behavioral patterns because pension funds are not guided by explicit regulatory constraints.

²² Numbers from OECD (2017).

4. Data and methodology

4.1. Herding measure

This study will use the Lakonishok *et al.* (1992) (hereafter, LSV) herding measure. This measure provides indicative evidence of ‘true’ herding (International Monetary Fund, 2014).²³ It indicates the extent to which pension funds trade in the same direction in a specific asset class in each quarter.²⁴ A high value shows that a disproportionately large number of pension funds trade in a direction (*i.e.*, buys/sells an asset class). The LSV herding measure includes a correction for the general market circumstances. If all pension funds together are purchasing or selling more assets in a particular quarter, then the measures are adjusted accordingly for this general trend.

Following Lakonishok *et al.* (1992), the LSV herding measure is defined as:

$$HM_{it} = |p_{it} - p_t| - AF_{it} \quad (1)$$

where

$$p_{it} = \frac{B_{it}}{B_{it} + S_{it}} \quad (2)$$

B_{it} is the number of pension funds that are buying assets in an asset class in each quarter (net buyers). S_{it} is defined in a similar fashion only for the number of sellers (net sellers). Thus, p_{it} gives the proportion of buys of total trades for a specific (sub-)asset class in each quarter (see Table 3 for the main and sub-asset classes). This portion is deduced by p_t , which is the expected portion of buys by pension funds in each quarter. In our case, we use the portion of buys over the pension funds’ whole asset holdings to account for fluctuations in the quarter-by-quarter investment decisions. In this way, our measure incorporates general market circumstances. An additional advantage is that the measure also copes with the fluctuations in pension funds’ premium inflows. The adjustment factor (AF_{it}) gives the hypothetical outcome of the LSV herding measure with the number of trades and market circumstances that occur in a specific quarter.²⁵ Using a binominal distribution, the adjustment factor determines the sum of all possible outcomes in terms of purchases and sells times their probability of occurrences.²⁶

²³ Pension funds are a more homogeneous group compared to institutional investors. An investor’s subgroup exhibits herd behavior but, at the highest aggregation level, sells and buys must balance. Therefore, we focus on a specific group of investors and not on the market. Furthermore, by focusing on pension funds, we limit the risk of having a group, which is too large compared to the market. When a certain class of institutional investors buys (sells) a specific asset class, another class of institutional investors is more likely to exhibit the opposite behavior because buyers as well as sellers are present in this group.

²⁴ More specifically, it indicates whether trading in the same direction exceeds trading in a situation of independent and random trading behavior.

²⁵ The AF_{it} corrects the LSV measure when there are only a limited number of trades or an odd number of traders.

²⁶ For a step-by-step explanation of the adjustment factors, see appendix 8.1 of Koetsier and Bikker (2017).

The herding measure (HM_{it}) is calculated for every (sub-) asset class and quarter, because the market circumstances and number of trading pension funds differ over time and across markets. If the measure is positive, it indicates more trading in a certain direction (*e.g.*, purchases and sales) than would be expected in a situation of random and independent trading behavior. When the measure is negative (which is possible), it indicates that pension funds trade less in the same direction than expected in case of random and independent trading behavior.

Wermers (1999) notes that differences exist between buy and sell herding. This is not reflected in the standard LSV measure. Therefore, we define buy and sell herding as:

$$BHM_{it} = HM_{it} | p_{it} > p_t \quad (3)$$

$$SHM_{it} = HM_{it} | p_{it} < p_t \quad (4)$$

Following Wermers (1999), we recalculate the adjustment factor for buy and sell herding based on the above conditions. The LSV herding measures, amongst them overall, buy and sell herding, will be presented in the results section and used for regression analysis.

4.2. Econometric methodology

This study tries to give a more comprehensive analysis of the existence of herd behavior and investigates the possible factors influencing pension fund's herd behavior. We conduct pooled OLS and LSDV regressions to assess, which factors contribute to asset class herd behavior. The LSDV estimations²⁷ provide some advantages over the pooled OLS, as it enables the use of quarterly variation and it includes sub-asset class and time fixed-effects.²⁸ Although the fixed-effects reduce the omitted variable bias considerably, all cross-sectional variation is not exploited. We expect different behavior on the buy and sell side. Therefore, we take buy (BHM_{it}) and sell LSV herding measures (SHM_{it}), as our dependent variables. We estimate the regressions for our asset classes: shares and private equity, other investments, real estate investments and fixed-interest investments. We present our specification using the buy herding measure (BHM_{it}). We use the same specification for the SHM_{it} . Our preferred specification will take the following form:

$$BHM_{it} = \alpha + \gamma_1' ME_t + \gamma_2' FM_t + \gamma_3' PF_{it-1} + \gamma_4' IR_{it} + \gamma_5' I_{it} + \gamma_5' PR_{it-1} + \varphi_i + \theta_t + v_{it} \quad (5)$$

Our regression analysis includes variable on pension fund characteristics, the macroeconomic environment, and the financial market sentiment, which influences the extent of herding. We include a vector of pension fund characteristics (PF_{it-1}). The size of the pension fund (logarithm of total assets) may influence the in-

²⁷ Following Raddatz and Schmukler (2012) and Koetsier and Bikker (2017), we include fixed effects using the Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) method. Our database includes 63 quarters, which allows us to estimate our fixed effects specification with a very small asymptotical bias (the bias is of the order $[1/T]$). On average, the time dimension includes 55 quarters per (sub-) asset class-pension fund combination.

²⁸ We test whether panel is stationary using Levin–Lin–Chu (2002), Im–Pesaran–Shin (2003) and Pesaran (2007).

house analyzing-capacity. Larger pension funds are more likely to be able to analyze information and, they are, therefore, less likely to follow others²⁹. We include the lagged ratio active over inactive pension fund members. A low ratio might negatively influence the ability to recover after problematic losses. Therefore, these pension funds might stay close to other funds. The distance to the strategic asset allocation presents the need for rebalancing. A larger distance leads to more intensive trading behavior, which can influence the herd behavior.

We include a vector of macroeconomic indicators (ME_t). The Dutch pension funds predominately invest their holdings in European countries. Therefore, we include the Eurozone economic growth and inflation rate. The state of the financial markets (FM_t) is also influencing the extent of herd behavior. We include the VIX index, approximating global risk aversion. Our expectation is that, if risk aversion increases, pension funds herd more intensively. Furthermore, we include the change of the average Eurozone government bond rate. This change reveals whether pension funds herd additionally in adverse or positive bond market circumstances.

Our study also investigates the influence of returns and the market indices on herd behavior. The return of sub-asset class market index (IR_{it}) gives insights in whether pension funds follow contemporaneous returns (see Table 19, for the relevant market index per sub-asset class). This practice is also known as positive feedback trading. The level of the sub-asset class index (I_{it}) might determine the extent of herd behavior. For example, Christie and Huang (1995), Chang *et al.* (2000) and Lao and Singh (2011) show the influence of market circumstances on herd behavior. To make the indices comparable, we set the average level of the index equal to 100. Thus, a level above 100 indicates an above average level of the index in our sample period. We also include the lagged pension fund's sub-asset returns (PR_{it-1}). These returns differ per pension fund and sub-asset class. Table 1 provides the summary statistics of the indicators included in the regressions per asset class. We also conduct a correlation exercise for the indicators in the regression per asset class, which is presented in Table 2.

[Insert Table 1 and Table 2]

²⁹ This variable is included with a lag to avoid endogeneity problems, as positive returns on investments could automatically lead to an increase in both the strategic bond allocation and total investments during the same period (Bikker *et al.*, 2010).

4.3. Data

This study makes use of supervisory data provided by De Nederlandsche Bank, the supervision authority of Dutch pension funds³⁰. It includes all Dutch pension funds for the period from 1999Q1 to 2014Q4.³¹ We have 154,344 sub-asset class-quarter observations. Pension fund's behavior is likely to differ between asset classes because of differences in trading costs, opaqueness, and liquidity.³² The dataset contains the quarterly market values of these (sub-) asset class holdings³³ and the quarterly rate of return.³⁴ Table 3 shows the summary statistics of the (sub-) asset class holdings. The wide variety of assets in the asset allocation of the Dutch pension funds makes it a necessity to include multiple asset classes in our analysis. Otherwise, our study might incorrectly assess the magnitude and the existence of herd behavior for Dutch pension funds. In addition, the asset class level also is a logical unit of analysis. Firstly, the asset class level is important for regulatory reasons in the Netherlands.³⁵ Secondly, the strategic asset allocation assigns different desired shares of asset class holdings. After combining assets into broader classes, investors then make portfolio allocation decisions at the category level instead of the level of the individual asset level (Das *et al.*, 2015).

[Insert Table 3]

In the regression analysis, we use shares and private equity, other investments, fixed-interest investments and real estate. The sub-asset classes are included under these asset classes.³⁶ Figure 2 reveals the Kernel density function for the buy herd behavior in these asset classes. The most variation in buy herd behavior is observed for shares and equity investments and other investments. Most buy herd behavior is concentrated around the LSV herding measure of 0.10. Figure 3 shows the estimates of sell herd behavior for the different

³⁰ This study focusses on pension funds, and not on asset managers and consultants. This is motivated by the decision-making power of the pension fund's board. The board decides how to divide the investments across asset classes and is responsible for all pension funds' investment decisions, even if these decisions are made by external asset managers.

³¹ Our results are likely to underestimate 'real' herding due to the relatively low data frequency. In high-developed financial markets, herding might also occur within shorter time intervals (Kremer, 2011). Therefore, quarterly holdings could hide herding and price-effects during short-time horizons. Puckett and Yan (2008, p.4) note that "the market's ability to absorb large trade imbalances engendered by institutional herds is more limited over shorter time horizons." Therefore, our results should be interpreted as a conservative estimation of pension fund's herding.

³² Notice that an asset class also contains assets with different risk profiles.

³³ The market values of holdings include the dividend claims for stocks and the accrued interest for fixed-interest investments.

³⁴ There is no representative problem because the dataset includes all Dutch pension funds. Furthermore, our dataset does not suffer from survivor bias because it also includes the discontinued pension funds.

³⁵ Pension funds must report their asset holdings based on asset classes to De Nederlandsche Bank (the Dutch pension supervisor).

³⁶ Table 20 provides an overview of the asset classes and their respective time period.

asset classes. The variation is roughly equal across the different asset classes, although the peaks of the density function differ across asset classes.

[Insert Figure 2 and Figure 3]

5. Results

5.1. Herd behavior

5.1.1. The extent of herd behavior

We calculated the different LSV herding measures and, following Wermers (1999), made a distinction made between buy and sell herding. These measures are calculated for 20 sub-asset groups. These various types of assets differ in importance in the pension funds' portfolios.

Table 4 reveals that LSV herd is more pronounced in the more exotic asset classes. The sub-assets classes, underlying the asset class shares and private equity, are shares, emerging market shares, mature market shares and private equity. For the shares and private equity asset class, the buy herding measure shows the LSV herding measure of 0.10, whereas sell herding equals 0.06. Shares reveal buy herding behavior of 0.10, and private equity reveals 0.15 buy herd behavior. As expected, Dutch pension funds exhibit more intensive herd behavior in shares of emerging market than in mature markets. This is explained by the more unstable macroeconomic and financial market conditions in emerging markets or a lack of information.

The sub-asset classes related to real estate, which are direct and indirect real estate investments, show a considerable difference between sell and buy herd behavior. Direct real estate investments show very pronounced sell herd behavior. The LSV sell herding measure equals 0.17 for these investments. One potential explanation is the crisis on the Dutch property market. This explanation is reinforced by the more intensive sell herd behavior in mortgage loans. There is also a significant discrepancy between buy and sell herd behavior in indirect real estate investments, but the sell herd behavior in this sub-class is not very intensive. When we use the holdings excluding derivatives³⁷, we find considerably higher herd behavior. The extent of herd behavior increases by around 0.03. However, the relative differences between the extent of asset class herd behavior remain relatively constant. For example, the extent of herd behavior in private equity at 0.10 remains consistently higher than the extent of herd behavior in shares at 0.15.

³⁷ The same analysis is repeated excluding the derivative position of the pension funds. These positions are obtained for different reasons than return reasons (*e.g.*, hedging).

Lakonishok *et al.* (1992), Grinblatt *et al.* (1995) and Jame (2011) find a LSV herding measure in equity investments of 0.03. This is considerably lower than our measure of 0.08. This might be caused by differences in the investor base, Dutch pension funds versus U.S. mutual funds. Rubbaniy (2013) also finds a LSV herding measure of 0.08 for shares. Cai *et al.* (2012) find corporate bond herd behavior of 0.15. We find somewhat lower herd behavior for credits, a relatively comparable sub-asset class.

[Insert Table 4]

Christie and Huang (1995), Chang *et al.* (2000) and Lao and Singh (2011) find that herd behavior depends on market circumstances. Our sample period includes three major crisis episodes: the Dot.com crisis, the financial crisis, and the European debt crisis. We do not have all sub-asset classes for our entire sample period 1999Q1-2014Q4. Therefore, we focus on the primary asset classes and the sub-asset classes, which are most likely to be impacted by the crisis. For example, sovereign bond investments are an interesting sub-asset class during the European debt crisis, whereas shares are interesting for the Dot.com and financial crisis.

Our study finds indications of rebalancing during a major financial crisis, see Table 5. Dutch pension funds exhibit intensive buy herd behavior in the (sub-) asset classes, which are presumed to have experienced the most significant value declines during a crisis. During the Dot.com crisis, buy herding for shares increases to 0.14 compared to 0.10 over the entire sample period. Buy herd behavior is also considerably more intensive at 0.14 than sell herd behavior at 0.06 over this period. This finding is in line with previous empirical evidence for the Netherlands by studies of Kakes (2006), de Haan and Kakes (2010) and Rubbaniy (2013). These studies, however, do not include the financial crisis and the European debt crisis. In the financial crisis, the difference between buy at 0.08 and sell herd behavior at 0.06 for shares is considerably less. There seems to be less intensive rebalancing in this crisis period. The sovereign bond investments give indications of rebalancing behavior in the European debt crisis. Buy herd behavior in sovereign bonds is two times more intensive equaling 0.08 than sell herd behavior which equals 0.04 in the European debt crisis.

Table 5 generally shows the same results for the holdings excluding derivatives. However, there are some exceptions. First, the intensity of herd behavior seems to be somewhat higher than for total holdings. The weighted averages are indeed higher for most specifications. A possible explanation is the dampening function of these derivatives when price changes occur. Second, during the financial crisis, we find higher sell herd behavior at 0.12 in shares than for total holdings at 0.06. In contrast to earlier results, sell herd behavior in shares is slightly more intensive equaling 0.12 than buy herd behavior being 0.11. Furthermore,

the intensity of sell herd behavior for the asset class, shares and private equity, is more intensive during the European debt crisis.

[Insert Table 5]

5.1.2. Herding and pension funds' similarities

Scharfstein and Stein (1990) indicate that pension funds' managers stay close to relatively similar pension funds. Rubbaniy (2013) also find similar herd behavior for similar pension funds. Thus, herd behavior might be more pronounced within these groups. This study uses three ways to divide pension funds based on their similarities: 1) pension fund size, 2) the risk-based supervisory class of a pension and 3) the type of pension funds. Firstly, we divide pension funds into three categories based on their size. The sample is divided into three equal portions for small, medium and large pension funds. Secondly, the Dutch central bank makes a distinction between pension funds based on supervisory importance, which relates to the systematic relevance of the pension fund. These four categories closely related to the size of a pension fund but these groups are not of equal size (class 1 includes the smallest funds, whereas class 4 includes the largest funds). Thirdly, we distinguish between three types of pension funds, namely occupational, company and industry-wide pension funds. Company pension funds represent the largest share of pension funds in our sample.

There are different opinions on whether large or small pension funds exhibit more herd behavior. McKenna and Kim (1986) show that large pension funds are less likely to quickly respond to changes in the market, which makes them less likely to form a herd. However, they are also more likely to invest in less liquid, more opaque investment (sub-) classes, which can result in more pronounced herd behavior. Our study reveals that medium-sized and large pension funds exhibit more intensive herd behavior (see Table 6). Small pension funds herd less intensively than other funds. For all crises, we find comparatively higher asset class herd behavior for large pension fund than for small pension funds. Buy herding of small (large) pension funds equals 0.05 (0.14) during the Dot.com crisis, 0.08 (0.10) during the financial crisis and 0.04 (0.08) during the European debt crisis. Generally, buy herd intensity is approximately two times more intensive for large pension funds. A similar pattern can be observed for sell herding behavior. The medium-sized pension funds are commonly between the small and large pension funds in terms of herding intensity. These findings contrast with the findings of Bikker *et al.* (2010) and Bikker (2017). They find that small pension funds follow large pension funds.

Dutch pension funds do not seem to suffer from market impact costs when buying or selling, which enables medium-sized and large pension funds to herd together in asset classes. A possible explanation is the geographical diversification of Dutch pension funds in large asset classes. The lower herd behavior of small pension funds is related to their investment portfolio. Our data show that these funds are less likely to

have holdings in sub-asset classes, like commodities or hedge funds. Their investments mainly include standard products and asset classes, which mitigates the necessity to herd. No additional information needs to be inferred from the trades of others, as information on standard assets is widely available. Their investments in standard products are partly a necessity, as only large funds have the scale to invest in illiquid assets such as property (Blake *et al.*, 2014).

[Insert Table 6]

We investigate whether supervisory attention is related to the extent of herd behavior in Table 7. Dutch pension funds are divided into pension funds' supervisory classes. Pension funds in class 1 require the least supervision, whereas the pension funds in class 4 require most intensive supervision. The supervision class is closely related to the pension fund's size. Contrary to our earlier estimates on pension fund's size, there is no equal number of pension funds in each supervisory class. During the Dot.com crisis, we find more pronounced sell herd behavior for the pension funds in supervisory class 4. The weighted herding measure is equal to 0.15 for buy herding and 0.18 for sell herding. This is considerably more intensive herd behavior than for pension funds in supervision class 1, which show a LSV herding measure of 0.08 for both buy and sell herding. During the financial crisis, we observe a considerable difference between the supervision classes 1-3 and class 4. Class 4 shows a weighted LSV herding measure of 0.14 for buy herding and of 0.24 for sell herding. When we compare this to the LSV herding measure of supervision class 1, buy herd behavior is two times more intensive and sell herding six times more intensive in class 4 than in class 1. In European debt crisis, we find even more pronounced herd behavior in supervision class 4. The weighted LSV herding measure equals 0.21 for buy herding and 0.35 for sell herding. Our findings also reveal that, for the more exotic asset classes such as private equity, herd behavior is also very intensive in supervisory class 3.

[Insert Table 7]

Different types of pension funds might exhibit different extends of herd behavior. In Table 8, we distinguish between occupational, industry-wide and company pension funds. Company pension funds make up most of our sample. During the Dot.com crisis, the occupational pension funds exhibit strong buy herd behavior equaling 0.15. For occupational and company pension funds, we find evidence of intensive buy herd behavior in shares compared to sell herd behavior in shares, whereas the sectoral pension funds reveal equal buy and sell herd intensity. In general, the industry-wide pension funds exhibit the most intensive sell herd behavior in the Dot.com crisis. The sell herding measure equals 0.18 for industry-wide

funds, whereas the LSV sell herding measure only equals 0.09 for occupational and 0.10 for company pension funds. The industry-wide funds, on average, are the largest pension funds in our sample. Our previous findings showed that large pension funds engage in more intensive herd behavior. For the financial crisis, we find relatively similar behavior across the types of pension funds. Industry-wide pension funds do not seem to sell herding in sovereign bonds, whereas they do exhibit buy herd behavior with a LSV herding measure of 0.09. Company pension funds also exhibit buy herd behavior in sovereign bonds with a herding measure of 0.09. However, occupational funds do not seem to herd in this sub-asset class on both the buy and the sell side. There seems some indicative evidence that pension funds might contribute to the stabilization of the sovereign bond markets. Our findings also reveal differences in herd behavior for hedge funds' investments with intensive sell herd behavior by occupational and industry-wide pension funds than company pension funds.

[Insert
Table 8]

5.1.3. Sensitivity analyses for the LSV herding measure

We are aware that the LSV herding measure has some limitations.^{38,39} Our sensitivity analysis tries to account for these limitations. Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000) indicate that the LSV herding measure fails to assess the extent of herding, as it disregards the Euro values of trades. Wermers (1999) notes that the LSV herding measure might reflect the tendency of several funds to make small portfolio adjustments in the same direction at the same time. One way to overcome this limitation is to include transactions of sufficient size, as suggested by Andreu *et al.* (2014) and Frey *et al.* (2014). Following Lee and Radhakrishna (2000), we use a hard cut-off. In our case, we increase the proposed threshold from 50,000 to 500,000 Euros⁴⁰ because our investigation focusses on (sub-) asset classes.

³⁸ Pension fund regulation underwent a major overhaul in 2007. For example, a fixed discount rate was replaced by a discount rate which relates to the zero-coupon interbank swap yield curve. We use the data of the new regulatory framework from 2006Q4 onwards. Kakes (2006) notes that the behavior of pension funds might already have changed in anticipation of this new regulation. In other words, pension funds start to adjust themselves before the introduction of the new regulation. We do investigate the possible impact of the different regulatory regimes on their behavior. For this analysis, we also change the date on which the regulation comes into effect, as pension funds might adjust their behavior in anticipation of the new law.

³⁹ We estimate the LSV herding measure for a fully balanced and semi-balanced sample to address the possibility of survivor bias. The results are highly similar to our previous results.

⁴⁰ Lee and Radhakrishna (2000) use a cut-off of 50,000 dollar for large stocks. We increase the threshold to 500,000 Euros because our (sub-) asset classes represent larger holdings than individual stocks.

The high threshold for included transactions leads to a higher level of LSV herd behavior in Table 9.⁴¹ We find indications that behavior can be stabilizing, as, for investments in shares, we find considerably higher buy herd behavior at 0.19 compared to our previous findings for the Dot.com crisis. The discrepancy between the intensity of sell and buy herd behavior increases, in favor of buy herd behavior. The reader may also note that the weighted LSV herding measure is considerably higher for the specification with a 0.5 million Euros transaction threshold. The weighted herding measure equals 0.17 for buy herding and 0.15 for sell herding, whereas the herding measure equals 0.12 for both buy and sell herding when no transaction size threshold is included. For the financial crisis, we find comparable results for the no-transaction threshold analysis and the minimal transition of 500,000 Euros analysis. In general, the stabilizing behavior seems less pronounced in the financial crisis than in the Dot.com crisis. For the European debt crisis, we also find similar results for the no transaction threshold and a minimal transition of 500,000 Euros for sovereign bond investments.

We estimate our herding measures based on the weighted transactions in Table 10, which does not exclude the transaction below 500,000 Euros. Note that the threshold approach can be misleading if institutions split their trades to hide a superior information advantage (Kremer, 2011). The weighted herding measures result in some minor changes. The buy herd behavior for real estate investments increases from 0.02 to 0.06. For commodity investments, we also find higher buy herd behavior at 0.08 and lower sell herd behavior at 0.03. Our previous findings reveal for both buy and sell herding an LSV herding measure of 0.06 in commodity investments.

[Insert Table 9 and Table 10]

Wylie (2005) indicates that the LSV herding measure must be applied in a situation with no short-selling constraint. A short-selling constraint prevents pension funds to engage in sell herding when they have no asset holdings of a (sub-)asset class to begin with. Therefore, it leads to potential underestimation of sell herding. In the Dutch Pension Law, there are no constraints on short-selling. This is confirmed by the data of the asset holdings, which indicate negative holdings for some pension funds in certain asset classes. However, short selling might be regarded as (socially) undesirable by pension funds.⁴² Besides, there might be sub-asset classes in which there are missing markets, which makes short-selling of certain assets impossible. Therefore, we estimate the herding measures for all (sub-)asset classes introducing a minimum percentage of (sub-)asset class holdings (see Table 11). A minimum percentage of total assets must be

⁴¹ We study following behavior. Consequently, we are also interested in smaller transactions. However, the larger transactions have the potential to influence market prices, whereas this is not the case for small transactions.

⁴² There is a long history of aversion to short sales: England banned short-selling for much of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, while in 1803, Napoleon declared short sellers to be enemies of the State (Jones, 2015).

allocated in a (sub-)asset class. In our case, the minimum cut-offs are 0.5%, 1%, 2.5% and 5% of total asset holdings.⁴³ Especially, the results for sell herding are expected to be influenced by the (societal) short-sell constraint.⁴⁴ Our findings reveal no considerable differences between the sell herding measures across the different minimum requirements. The weighted LSV herding measure is relatively stable between 0.08 and 0.09 for the different holding requirements. Interestingly, there are some (sub-)asset classes where the LSV herding measure decreases after an increase in holdings, whereas we would expect an increase of the LSV sell herding measure. The notable exception is herd behavior in real estate investments. Sell herd behavior increases from 0.08 for total holdings to 0.12 for a minimum of 5% of holdings. This pattern is also observed for direct and indirect real estate investments. Thus, a pension fund first should acquire real estate, and only then it is able to sell these types of assets. Consequently, there might be an underestimation of sell herd behavior in the asset class. Another sub-asset class that shows an increase in herd behavior is the category others in other investments. This means that the short-selling constraint is binding for real estate investments and for other investments.

[Insert Table 11]

The LSV herding measure is unable to capture inter-temporal trading patterns. However, we do expect that herd behavior is concentrated within the quarter, as it is a short-term phenomenon. Consequently, the Sias (2004) measure potentially underestimates herding, as it only captures the correlation between trading quarters. Lobão and Serra (2002) note that the LSV herding measure is unable to disentangle the determinants of herding. We already noted in section 2 that the theoretical reasons are not necessarily mutually exclusive. However, we can distinguish between unintentional and intentional herd behavior, following the approach by Holmes *et al.* (2013). To investigate the intentional or unintentional herd behavior, it is necessary to have an integrated approach which addresses all potential causes of herding simultaneously. In the next paragraph, we will conduct regression analyses, which determine the underlying factors of herd behavior.

5.2. Regression analyses

Most studies only investigate herd behavior in equity investments. Although equity investments are a significant asset class, it only covers 35% of the investment portfolio of Dutch pension funds. Fixed-interest

⁴³ There are many small Dutch pension funds. Consequently, a cut-off approach is ill-suited for our study. We try to establish following behavior, which might be more frequent for small pension funds.

⁴⁴ We conduct some additional robustness tests for the influence of fund-specific characteristics. We also test whether changes to regulatory regimes have an effect. We find no evidence of regulatory influences. The results are available upon authors' request.

investments, which include sovereign bonds and credits, is a much larger asset class, on average, 51% of Dutch pension funds' holdings for the period 1999Q1-2012Q4. Other investments and real estate amount to 4% and 10% of asset holdings, respectively.

We start by investigating how herding in shares and private equity is influenced by pension fund characteristics, financial markets, and macroeconomic circumstances. Table 12 reveals that pension funds' controls do not show a statistically and economically significant effect. Generally, we find an adverse effect on buy herd behavior for the LSDV analysis, when Eurozone economic growth increases. The sign of the Eurozone inflation changes for the different estimation strategies. The LSDV estimates show an adverse effect on buy herd behavior. Higher inflation leads to less intensive herd behavior. The VIX index shows a negative effect on buy herd behavior, which is expected because higher uncertainty will lead to a decline buy behavior. Our findings are in line with Christie and Huang (1995), who find different herd behavior under different market circumstances. Chang *et al.* (2000) find that herding is also observed during the period without market stress. We do observe this pattern as well, but the intensity is less pronounced.

Our main variables of interest reveal inconsistent signs. The LSDV estimates control for the sub-asset class effect and time-invariant effects. The OLS estimates might suffer from omitted variable bias. However, the fixed-effects also do not exploit the cross-sectional variation. Our discussion will focus on the results of the LSDV estimates. The returns of sub-asset classes show a positive effect on buy herd behavior. This indicates that pension funds trade in the same direction as the index returns. We also find indications of positive feedback trading. Positive feedback trading is a trading strategy, where pension funds buy past winners (high return assets) and sell past losers (low return assets). Pension funds also exhibit more intensive herd behavior in the sub-asset class, which had a high return in the previous quarter. In other words, pension funds chase returns. Previous studies, such as Choe *et al.* (1999), Kim and Wei (2002) and Hsieh *et al.* (2011), also find positive feedback trading for shares. Another explanation might be that pension funds continue to trade in the sub-asset class, which they traded in the previous quarter. This contrasts with earlier findings on equity investments for the Netherlands. Dutch pension funds act as contrarian traders (institutional investors that dampen market price deviations, instead of increasing them) and have been cited, as stabilizing actors in the markets they invest in (Kakes, 2006; de Haan and Kakes, 2010; Rubbaniy, 2013). Interestingly, we also find indications that a higher market index leads to lower buy herd behavior. A possible explanation is that pension funds engage in rebalancing. A high market index increases the value of shares and private equity, which might drive their actual allocation away from their strategic asset allocation. They are less willing to buy shares and private equity, simultaneously. Thus, there is less intensive buy herding during a financial market boom than in a financial market bust. In general, we find contradicting evidence on shares and private equity investments, which differs between the level of the index and returns.

Table 12 reveals the results for sell herd behavior of the shares and private equity investments. Eurozone growth has an adverse effect on sell herd behavior, whereas Eurozone inflation shows inconsistent effects. The VIX index shows more intensive sell herd behavior when the index increases. Highly uncertain environments increase sell herd behavior. There also are some indications that the strategic asset allocation influences sell herd behavior. We find more intensive herd behavior if the pension fund's actual shares and private equity holdings are more distant from their strategic asset allocation. In addition, the LSDV regressions reveal a positive effect on sell herd behavior, when the sub-asset class returns are high. This indicates that higher returns lead to more intensive sell herd behavior, which is stabilizing. This is in line with the findings of Kakes (2006), de Haan and Kakes (2010) and Rubbaniy (2013). The sell herding results contrast with our findings buy herding outcomes. A low sub-asset class index leads to intensive sell herd behavior, which might deteriorate the (sub-)asset class index further. Lao and Singh (2011) also find more severe herding in adverse market circumstances.

[Insert Table 12]

The regression models of real estate herd behavior are presented in Table 13 for buys and sells. The LSDV estimates show that buy herding in real estate intensifies when Eurozone economic growth is high. In contrast, Eurozone inflation rate decreases buy herd behavior. Furthermore, the changes of Eurozone bond rate increases buy herd behavior. Higher real estate returns cause higher buy herd intensity in real estate investments (contemporaneous positive feedback trading). The level of real estate indices has a negative effect on real estate buy herding, indicating possible rebalancing behavior of pension funds. This behavior has a stabilizing effect on the real estate markets. Stabilizing behavior is also observed for lagged real estate returns. High lagged returns lead to lower buy herd behavior. Consequently, pension funds do not actively chase high past returns.

Table 13 shows the sell herd behavior in real estate investments. For the indicators Eurozone economic growth and inflation and the VIX index, we find mixed results for the effects on herd behavior. There is a positive effect of the Eurozone bond rate on sell herd behavior for real estate. The real estate index returns contribute to sell herd behavior, stabilizing behavior of Dutch pension funds. The level of the real estate index causes destabilizing herd behavior. However, our findings only have a modest economic significance.

[Insert Table 13]

Fixed-interest investments compromise a large share of Dutch pension funds' holdings. In Table 14, we show buy herd behavior in fixed-interest investments and find consistent evidence for the impact of macroeconomic indicators. Higher Eurozone growth does lead to lower buy herd behavior, whereas an increase of Eurozone inflation leads to substantially higher buy herd behavior. The VIX index shows that buy herd behavior for fixed-interest investments decreases if risk aversion increases. A possible explanation is that pension funds hold on to fixed-interest investments when risk aversion is high. A positive change of Eurozone bond rate leads to an increase of buy herd behavior, except for model (8). For fixed-interest investments' returns and indices, we find a modest effect on buy herd behavior: pension funds follow contemporaneous returns, but not lagged returns.

Sell herd behavior for fixed-interest investments also shows consistent results for macroeconomic circumstances (see Table 14). The Eurozone growth rate has a positive effect on sell herd behavior. Higher Eurozone inflation leads to a decrease of sell herd behavior. A high VIX index increases sell herd behavior. For the sub-asset class returns and indices, we find only a minor effect on sell herd behavior.

[Insert Table 14]

Other investments consist of hedge fund investments, commodity investments, liquid assets and others (so-called, other other investments). In Table 15, we reveal factors that influence buy herd behavior for other investments. There is a positive effect of Eurozone economic growth on buy herd behavior, whereas there is a negative effect of Eurozone inflation. Furthermore, the VIX index has a positive effect on buy herd behavior, which contrasts our expectations. Our findings show a positive effect of other investments' returns and indices. We find an insignificant effect for the past returns. Thus, there is no indication of positive feedback trading on the buy side of other investments.

Table 15 shows how financial and macroeconomic factors influence sell herd behavior for other investments. These findings confirm our previous findings for macroeconomic circumstances. The Eurozone growth rate leads to a decrease of sell herd behavior, whereas higher Eurozone inflation leads to more sell herd behavior. In a similar vein, the findings for the VIX index reveal that an increase of global risk aversion leads to an increase of sell herd behavior in other investments. Our findings on sub-asset class indices and returns reveal an economically insignificant effect. Following the approach by Holmes *et al.* (2013), we generally find evidence that herd behavior, at least partly, is intentional herd behavior, because of herding changes with macroeconomic and financial circumstances.

[Insert Table 15]

In summary, we find evidence of intentional herd behavior. We reveal differences in the extent of herd behavior for different financial market circumstances, macroeconomic circumstances and pension fund's returns. This indicates that herd behavior is intentional, as it changes with different circumstances. However, most of the variation is explained by fixed-effects, which might also partly capture unintentional herd behavior. Thus, we are likely to observe both intentional and unintentional herd behavior.

We conduct some additional robustness checks by including additional indicators, such as the various market indices, the total pension fund's returns, company fund dummies and a time trend in our regression analysis.⁴⁵ We find an insignificant effect of a company fund dummy across specifications. Interestingly, we find a positive effect of the time trend, except for real estate sell herding. Hence, herd behavior increases over time, which might warrant attention. We leave this for further research. The other findings remain mostly unchanged. Furthermore, we also include a lagged herding measure in our analysis, which accounts for the possible persistence of herd behavior. Herd behavior is indeed in some instances persistent. For other investments, high lagged herd behavior has a positive effect on herd behavior in the next period. For the other classes, we find statistically insignificant or economically insignificant results.

5.3. Stabilizing or destabilizing

In this paragraph, we investigate whether herd behavior may have a stabilizing or destabilizing effect on financial markets conducting a return reversal analysis. The absence of price reversals following pension fund trading is consistent with the incorporation of information into security prices (DeLong *et al.*, 1990; Choe *et al.*, 1999; Wermers, 1999; Sias, 2004; Hung, 2014). Thus, when we find that returns continue in the same direction, this means that prices correctly reflect the fundamental value. However, there is also the possibility that pension funds ignore their own information, and follow other pension funds. This type of following behavior may move securities away from their price equilibrium and lead to abnormal volatility (Chang *et al.*, 2000). This is herd behavior, which destabilizes asset prices.

We follow the approach of Wermers (1999) to identify return reversals. First, the LSV buy and sell herd measures are divided based on the intensity of herd behavior. The lowest intensity of buy herd behavior is qualified as *B1*, whereas the most intensive buy herd behavior is qualified as *B5*. For sell herd behavior, we follow a similar approach. *S1* is the least intensive sell herd behavior and *S5* is the most intensive sell herd behavior. Following Wermers (1999), we calculate the abnormal return in the two quarters preceding and the four quarters after the purchase or sell. The quarterly abnormal return is calculated taking the return minus the average equally weighted return per asset class.

⁴⁵ A regression analysis is conducted by including market indices and market returns. In these analyses, we include the market indices and market returns simultaneous. These findings do not considerably alter our results.

Table 16 shows the extent of herd behavior across buy and sell herd quintiles. We find considerably higher buy herd behavior for quintile *B5* than for quintile *B1*. On average, buy herding in quintile *B5* equals 0.20 over all asset classes, whereas the quintile *B1*, on average, equals -0.02 over all asset classes. For sell herd behavior, we find a higher level of herd behavior for quintile *S5* than for quintile *B5*. On average, the LSV herding measure is equal to 0.22 for quintile *S5* and -0.01 for quintile *S1*. Thus, there is considerable variation in the level of herd behavior between the different quintiles, especially the quintiles *B5* and *S5* stand out in terms of herd intensity.

[Insert Table 16]

We start our analysis on whether pension funds exhibit stabilizing or destabilizing behavior for shares and private equity investments, and find possible evidence of destabilizing behavior for the most intensive sell herd behavior (see Table 17). The return reversals occur in the quarter after the sale transaction. We also see return reversals for quintiles *S2* and *S1* in the quarter after the sell transaction. For buy herding quintiles, we observe reversals in quintiles *B4* and *B3*. These results are closely related to the findings of Acharya and Pedraza (2015). According to them, stock investments exhibit short-term abnormal returns followed by returns reversals in the subsequent quarter. For the other quintiles, return continuations exist, which indicate stabilizing behavior. Brown *et al.* (2014) and Acharya and Pedraza (2015) interpret this as indirect evidence of herding related to information. In summary, we find mixed evidence on stabilizing and destabilizing behavior for shares and private equity investments.

Our findings for real estate reveal that sell herd behavior exhibit return reversals for all herd quintiles. Some of these return reversals are persistent over time. Our results indicate that real estate investments are destabilizing on the sell side. The real estate market in the Netherlands went through a considerable crisis after the financial and economic turmoil. Pension funds' trading behavior might have contributed to this crisis. We observe less intensive destabilizing behavior for buy herd behavior. The most intensive buy herd behavior (*B5*) for real estate results in a short-term return reversal, which indicates destabilizing behavior. Quintile *B3* also reveals destabilizing behavior of pension funds in the short-term. Fixed-interest investments show destabilizing behavior on the buy side. All buy herd quintiles, except quintile *B3*, reveal return reversals indicating destabilizing behavior. Most of these return reversals occur in the short-term. The notable exception is quintile *B1*, revealing long-term persistence of the return reversal. Dasgupta *et al.* (2011) find evidence of long-term return reversals after institutional herding, where our findings mostly reveal short-term return reversals. Herd behavior in other investments may be destabilizing in the most intensive sell herd quintile. However, this evidence is relatively weak, as the abnormal return for the sell quarter is insignificant. For the other sell quintiles, we do not observe evidence

of destabilization. We see similar evidence on short-term return continuation following institutional herding, like Wermers (1999) and Sias (2004). The buy herd behavior for other investments is mostly stabilizing but in some cases insignificant. This can be related to the lower number of trades in the asset-class other investments.

[Insert Table 17]

Pension funds do exhibit herd behavior, which is stabilizing and stabilizing for the same asset class depending on the quintile. The literature also shows mixed evidence for equity investments. Equity investments lead to stabilizing (Wermers, 1999; Nofsinger and Sias, 1999; Sias, 2004) or destabilizing herd behavior (Puckett and Yan, 2008; Dasgupta *et al.*, 2011; Brown *et al.*, 2014). We also find mixed evidence of stability for equity investments. Although, the destabilizing effect is mostly concentrated on the sell side. For fixed-interest investments, we find destabilizing buy side behavior. In contrast, Cai *et al.* (2012) find destabilizing behavior on the sell side. Previous studies do not focus on asset classes comparable to our asset classes: other investments and real estate investments. For real estate investments, we find strong destabilizing behavior on the sell side and destabilizing behavior on the buy side for some quintiles. Other investments reveal no evidence of destabilizing behavior.

Koetsier and Bikker (2017) find stabilizing behavior in periods of extreme price movements during crises periods. Therefore, we repeat our analysis for the financial and European debt crisis in Table 18.⁴⁶ We investigate the shares and private equity investments during the financial crisis. Our findings reveal a strong return reversal in the next quarter for the most intensive sell herding quintile. However, the sell herd behavior is mostly stabilizing, as we observe return continuations from quintile *S4* to *S1*. Even though, we do observe some reversals for more than two quarters after the sell. For buy herd behavior, we find quick return reversals for quintiles *B4*, *B3* and *B1*. Thus, destabilizing behavior is mostly concentrated on the buy side.

We investigate whether there are return reversals in fixed-interest investments during the European debt crisis. This asset class is dominated by sovereign bond investments, which is perceived as the sub-asset class that is affected by the sovereign bond market turmoil. Our findings mostly reveal stabilizing behavior of pension funds, especially on the sell side. It is, therefore, unlikely that Dutch pension funds' trading has contributed to the turmoil in countries, such as Greece, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, and Ireland. The absence of return reversals following pension fund trading is consistent with our hypothesis that pension fund's trading

⁴⁶ The pre-trading period for the Dot.com crisis is not fully included in our sample period. Therefore, we are unable to repeat the analysis for the Dot.com crisis.

reflects the way information is impounded into security prices (DeLong *et al.*, 1990; Choe *et al.*, 1999; Wermers, 1999; Sias, 2004; Hung, 2014). However, there are some indications of destabilization for quintiles *S2*, *B5*, *B2* and *B1*. The destabilizing behavior is concentrated on the buy side. These findings also confirm the findings by Koetsier and Bikker (2017) for their study on pension fund's sovereign bond investments. In summary, during crises, destabilizing behavior is concentrated on the buy side, whereas sell side behavior is mostly stabilizing.

[Insert Table 18]

The literature has identified some limitations of the return reversal approach establishing stabilizing or destabilizing behavior. There are instances in which return reversals materialize for other reasons than the incorporation of information. First, there are regulatory pressures to trade in a specific asset class (see Ellul *et al.*, 2011). Dutch pension funds are unlikely to experience these pressures, as the Dutch Pension Law has no limitations for this kind of investment strategies.⁴⁷ Second, pension funds should consider dealer's inventory costs. Jegadeesh and Titman (1995) show that dealer responses to inventory imbalances may be responsible for reversals in daily, weekly, and monthly equity returns. Furthermore, Khang and King (2004) repeat this analysis for bonds and they also find indications of return reversals due to dealer's inventory costs. Although this can be a factor for illiquid (sub-)asset classes, pension funds do generally hold most of their assets in liquid and frequently traded financial assets (*e.g.*, German government bonds or high capitalization stocks). For these financial assets, the bid-ask spread is already small due to the factors mentioned above. For similar reasons, we do not expect that market frictions, as suggested by Kim *et al.* (2017), will contribute to return reversals.

6. Conclusions

This study investigates (sub-)asset class herd behavior by Dutch pension funds covering the period from 1999Q1 to 2014Q4, which includes three major financial crises (the Dot.com crisis, the financial crisis, and the European debt crisis). Using a unique dataset of De Nederlandsche Bank, we investigate the quarterly trading behavior of Dutch pension funds in this period.

We find considerable asset class herd behavior as well as considerable heterogeneity in the extent of herd behavior across the various (sub-)asset classes. Our LSV herding measure equals 0.10 for buy herd

⁴⁷ To our knowledge, there is only one prominent case in which the pension fund regulator forced the sale of assets. The pension fund, pensioenfondsen Verenigde Glasfabrieken, was forced to reduce their holdings in gold from 13% of total assets to 3% of total assets.

behavior and 0.06 for sell herd behavior in shares and equity investments. Real estate trading behavior is equal to 0.02 for buy herd behavior and 0.08 for sell herd behavior. We also find buy herd behavior equaling 0.05 for fixed-interest investments, whereas sell herd behavior equals 0.07 for fixed-interest investments. The LSV herding measure for the other investments is equal to 0.06 for both sell and buy herd behavior. The herd behavior is most pronounced for the more ‘exotic’ (sub-)asset classes. For example, herd behavior is substantially more intensive for private equity investments than for investments in shares. Our findings for equity investments at 0.08 are quite close to the findings of Rubbaniy (2013). This is still considerably higher herding than in studies, such as Lakonishok *et al.* (1992), Grinblatt *et al.* (1995) and Jame (2011). Furthermore, we find a somewhat lower LSV herding measure at 0.10 for credits than Cai *et al.* (2012) which finds a herding measure of 0.15.

We find that pension funds with similar characteristics herd together. In contrast to earlier findings of Bikker *et al.* (2010) and Bikker (2017), we find buy (and sell) herd behavior for large pension funds equaling 0.14 (0.13) for the Dot.com crisis, 0.10 (0.10) for the financial crisis and 0.08 (0.09) for the European debt crisis, which is between two and three times as intensive as the herd behavior of small pension funds. We also investigate herd behavior during crises: buy herd behavior in shares considerably increases during the Dot.com and the financial crisis. The same holds for sovereign bonds during the European debt crisis. Buy herding in sovereign bonds intensifies during the European debt crisis.

The regression analyses reveal influences of financial market circumstances, macroeconomic circumstances, market returns and pension fund’s returns on the extent of herding. These findings are relatively constant across asset classes, like shares and private equity, real estate, fixed-interest investments and other investments. Our results indicate that herd behavior is intentional, as it changes with market circumstances. However, there is also an unintentional element in herd behavior, as a significant share of the variation is explained by the inclusion of fixed-effects.

We conduct a return reversal analysis to determine whether herd behavior is stabilizing or destabilizing. If no return reversals occur, the herd behavior is believed to be stabilizing, as it indicates an incorporating of information in the asset prices. Our study finds mixed evidence on the stabilizing behavior for shares and private equity. This reflects the mixed findings by other studies (Wermers, 1999; Nofsinger and Sias, 1999; Sias, 2004; Puckett and Yan, 2008; Dasgupta *et al.*, 2011; Brown *et al.*, 2014). When we distinguish between the buy and the sell side behavior, there are some indications that the destabilizing behavior is mostly concentrated on the sell side. Fixed-interest investments comprise the largest part of Dutch pension fund’s holdings. The destabilizing behavior is concentrated on the buy side in this asset class. These findings contrast with the destabilizing behavior on the sell side for corporate bonds of Cai *et al.* (2012). For real estate investments, we find the most pronounced indications of destabilizing behavior on both the buy and sell side. On the sell side, there are return reversals after one quarter for all quintiles. This

destabilizing behavior might have contributed to the real estate market crisis. In addition, we find stabilizing herd behavior for other investments.

Costs of destabilizing behavior during a crisis are higher than in normal times. We find other behavior of pension funds in terms of stability during these periods, pension funds' trading behavior has a stabilizing function on the sell side. For example, pension funds' trading in fixed-interest investments stabilizes the debt markets during the European debt crisis. Furthermore, pension funds' trading in shares and private equity investments stabilizes the equity markets during the financial crisis. This might indicate that pension funds do not deepen the crisis, as we do not find destabilizing on the sell side. This is in line with the findings of Koetsier and Bikker (2017) for sovereign bonds. However, pension funds do engage in destabilizing herd behavior on the buy side. Destabilizing buy herd behavior may lead to mispricing and future bubbles.

Asset class herd behavior for Dutch pension funds is intensive, and it increases over time. Berstein *et al.* (2013, p.408) recognize that "traditional measures of risk, such as the standard deviation of returns or value-at-risk, seem inadequate for long-term investors." The identification of herd behavior and its sources can benefit the supervisory activities, as it enables the identification of potential macro-prudential risks.⁴⁸ Traditional risk indicators are less suited for macro-prudential supervision and for long-term investors, a promising option might be the incorporation of herd behavior indicators in pension funds' supervision. We emphasize an increased need for macro-prudential supervision. Pension fund's behavior can be rational from the individual pension fund's perspective, but it increases macroeconomic and financial stability concerns. We find possible evidence of destabilizing behavior for various asset classes, which may lead to mispricing of assets. This occurs on the sell side for shares and private equity investments, on the buy side for fixed-interest investments and for both the buy and sell side for real estate investments. Mispricing may intensify bubbles or even crises.

Our study has some limitations. Firstly, our study focusses on (sub-)asset classes, which are at a high level of aggregation. Although these classes are highly relevant from a regulatory perspective and determine pension funds' trading behavior due to the strategic asset allocation, major adjustments within the asset classes are not included in our analysis. Further research can include more asset class specific characteristics, such as sector, country or maturity, to account for this potential problem. Secondly, the LSV herding measure has some limitations, as it does not account for inter-temporal herd behavior. Institutional trading is most likely to distort prices if it is concentrated in short intervals (Lipson and Puckett, 2010). We believe that the contribution of between quarter herd behavior is likely to be smaller than the contribution of within quarter herd behavior. However, it might be an interesting extension of our study to investigate

⁴⁸ The identification of herd behavior also shows which pension funds engage in this type of behavior. This identification is also beneficial for micro-prudential supervision.

this. Furthermore, very short-term herd behavior might not be captured by quarterly data: we might underestimate ‘true’ herd behavior by ignoring very short-term herd intervals. Thirdly, we are unable to distinguish between the different motives of herd behavior. An experimental set-up can shed some new light on the possible causes of herd behavior. In addition, further research can investigate whether different motives of herding lead to different outcomes for stabilization. Even though the underlying motives might differ, the consequences for stability remain the same.

Acknowledgement

We would like to thank Brigitte Unger for her valuable comments and suggestions, and Jack Bekooij, David Keijzer and Dirk van der Wal for their excellent research assistance. We thank the participants of the Utrecht University School of Economics seminar in April 2016 for their contributions, and we are grateful to the participants of the Res Publica workshop in March 2014 in Utrecht and the participants of the Global Academy of Business and Economic Research (GABER) conference in May 2015 in New York for their valuable suggestions.

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Appendix

Figure 1, pension fund holdings in percent of GDP for the Netherlands and in the OECD.

Source: OECD (2017)

Table 1, summary statistics of herding measures and indicators per asset class.

<i>Description</i>	<i>Shares and private equity</i>					<i>Real estate</i>				
	<i>Obs.</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>	<i>Min.</i>	<i>Max.</i>	<i>Obs.</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>	<i>Min.</i>	<i>Max.</i>
Overall herding measure	41,672	10.12	9.31	-4.18	41.93	24,058	7.96	8.92	-3.5	37.89
Buy herding measure	23,616	11.86	9.93	-4.18	41.93	5,692	4.16	6.35	-3.5	25.93
Sell herding measure	18,056	7.85	7.87	-3.39	30.26	18,366	9.14	9.27	-3.14	37.89
Lagged logarithm of total assets	40,802	5.05	2.33	-6.91	12.88	23,056	5.44	2.31	-6.91	12.88
Lagged ratio active-inactive participants	38,454	1.67	21.15	0	1169.8	21,799	1.09	8.55	0	542
Eurozone economic growth	42,898	2.96	2.36	-4.43	6.16	24,491	3.15	2.32	-4.43	6.16
Eurozone inflation	42,898	1.97	0.81	-0.37	3.89	24,491	1.98	0.8	-0.37	3.89
VIX index	42,898	21.09	8.05	11.15	45.45	24,491	20.91	7.93	11.15	45.45
Change of Eurozone bond rate	42,164	-0.9	8.53	-23.71	23.87	23,984	-0.79	8.34	-37.69	23.87
Lagged distance to the strategic allocation	40,002	6.43	9.75	0	95.56	22,299	2.3	4.28	0	98.7
Return sub-asset class index	42,827	0.8	8.76	-26.72	21.44	23,984	0.87	1.25	-3.99	5.3
Sub-asset class index	42,898	108.68	24.9	61.89	163.96	24,491	99.58	15.15	62.46	118.8
Lagged pension fund's sub-asset class return	35,291	1.08	9.32	-65.3	83	19,079	1.65	7.18	-65.3	207.29

<i>Description</i>	<i>Fixed-interest investments</i>					<i>Other investments</i>				
	<i>Obs.</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>	<i>Min.</i>	<i>Max.</i>	<i>Obs.</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>	<i>Min.</i>	<i>Max.</i>
Overall herding measure	59,216	8.3	7.8	-3.24	36.97	25,307	5.46	7.6	-23.82	38.16
Buy herding measure	29,197	6.44	6.37	-3.24	25.49	14,718	5.43	7.63	-23.82	38.16
Sell herding measure	30,019	10.11	8.59	-2.79	36.97	10,589	5.5	7.55	-17.32	31.21
Lagged logarithm of total assets	58,533	5.14	2.3	-6.91	12.88	24,886	5.64	2.24	-6.91	12.88
Lagged ratio active-inactive participants	54,642	1.81	24.2	0	1169.8	22,729	3.45	49.54	0	1271
Eurozone economic growth	61,012	2.69	2.48	-4.43	6.16	25,943	2.06	2.77	-4.43	6.16
Eurozone inflation	61,012	1.94	0.86	-0.37	3.89	25,943	1.89	1.02	-0.37	3.89
VIX index	61,012	21.27	8.33	11.15	45.45	25,943	21.23	9.27	11.15	45.45
Change of Eurozone bond rate	60,109	-1.06	8.9	-23.71	23.87	25,803	-1.68	9.45	-23.71	23.87
Lagged distance to the strategic allocation	57,209	9.44	15.17	0	94.01	15,742	3.29	5	0	97.39
Return sub-asset class index	60,805	-0.59	23.09	-88.02	274.21	25,869	-1.46	21.4	-88.02	55.94
Sub-asset class index	61,012	93.6	33.2	1.07	196.91	25,943	103.19	57.8	1.07	196.91
Lagged pension fund's sub-asset class return	50,807	1.63	4.71	-74.8	137	15,660	1.41	20.52	-99.3	457.46

Table 2, correlation coefficients of pension characteristics, macroeconomic, financial market and return indicators.

	Lagged logarithm of pension fund size	Lagged ratio active over inactive participants	Economic growth Eurozone	Inflation Eurozone	VIX index	Change of Eurozone bond rate	Lagged distance to the strategic allocation	Return sub-asset class index	Sub-asset class index	Lagged pension fund's sub-asset class return
Shares and private equity										
Lagged logarithm of pension fund size	1.000									
Lagged ratio active over inactive participants	-0.062***	1.000								
Economic growth Eurozone	-0.137***	0.009	1.000							
Inflation Eurozone	-0.041***	0.001	0.511***	1.000						
VIX index	-0.046***	0.004	-0.457***	-0.123***	1.000					
Change of Eurozone bond rate	-0.004	-0.001	0.192***	-0.056***	-0.174***	1.000				
Lagged distance to the strategic allocation	0.099***	0.000	-0.121***	-0.032***	0.006	-0.020***	1.000			
Return sub-asset class index	0.047***	-0.008	0.060***	-0.326***	-0.485***	0.146***	0.007	1.000		
Sub-asset class index	0.036***	0.008	0.392***	0.191***	-0.289***	0.195***	0.064***	0.198***	1.000	
Lagged pension fund's sub-asset class return	0.050***	-0.007	0.080***	-0.236***	-0.527***	0.146***	-0.015**	0.667***	0.155***	1.000
Real estate										
Lagged logarithm of pension fund size	1.000									
Lagged ratio active over inactive participants	-0.083***	1.000								
Economic growth Eurozone	-0.090***	-0.000	1.000							
Inflation Eurozone	-0.021**	-0.008	0.468***	1.000						
VIX index	-0.040***	0.024**	-0.455***	-0.116***	1.000					
Change of Eurozone bond rate	-0.012	-0.009	0.192***	-0.061***	-0.178***	1.000				
Lagged distance to the strategic allocation	0.034***	-0.007	-0.102***	-0.020**	0.013	-0.007	1.000			
Return sub-asset class index	-0.115***	0.012	0.656***	0.106***	-0.284***	0.176***	-0.143***	1.000		
Sub-asset class index	0.146***	-0.031***	-0.403***	0.072***	-0.118***	-0.107***	0.087***	-0.586***	1.000	
Lagged pension fund's sub-asset class return	0.017*	-0.002	0.208***	0.001	-0.341***	0.111***	-0.032***	0.244***	-0.103***	1.000

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

(continued)

	Lagged logarithm of pension fund size	Lagged ratio active over inactive participants	Economic growth Eurozone	Inflation Eurozone	VIX index	Change of Eurozone bond rate	Lagged distance to the strategic allocation	Return sub-asset class index	Sub-asset class index	Lagged pension fund's sub-asset class return
Fixed-interest investments										
Lagged logarithm of pension fund size	1.000									
Lagged ratio active over inactive participants	-0.071***	1.000								
Economic growth Eurozone	-0.139***	0.005	1.000							
Inflation Eurozone	-0.043***	0.010*	0.532***	1.000						
VIX index	-0.045***	0.004	-0.466***	-0.127***	1.000					
Change of Eurozone bond rate	-0.006	-0.004	0.189***	-0.051***	-0.170***	1.000				
Lagged distance to the strategic allocation	0.108***	-0.003	-0.154***	-0.035***	0.040***	-0.020***	1.000			
Return sub-asset class index	0.022***	-0.001	0.175***	0.055***	-0.115***	0.367***	-0.015***	1.000		
Sub-asset class index	-0.179***	0.017***	0.391***	0.221***	0.104***	0.124***	-0.092***	0.083***	1.000	
Lagged pension fund's sub-asset class return	0.021***	-0.008	-0.185***	-0.022***	0.360***	-0.259***	0.037***	-0.141***	-0.119***	1.000
Other investments										
Lagged logarithm of pension fund size	1.000									
Lagged ratio active over inactive participants	-0.083***	1.000								
Economic growth Eurozone	-0.006	-0.022*	1.000							
Inflation Eurozone	0.007	-0.026**	0.612***	1.000						
VIX index	-0.094***	0.017	-0.610***	-0.209***	1.000					
Change of Eurozone bond rate	-0.013	-0.004	0.228***	0.025**	-0.192***	1.000				
Lagged distance to the strategic allocation	-0.022*	-0.000	-0.072***	-0.026**	0.018	-0.031***	1.000			
Return sub-asset class index	0.026**	0.001	0.374***	0.085***	-0.309***	0.281***	-0.021*	1.000		
Sub-asset class index	0.030**	-0.015	0.234***	0.324***	-0.177***	0.088***	-0.001	0.195***	1.000	
Lagged pension fund's sub-asset class return	0.060***	0.009	0.101***	0.046***	-0.138***	0.019*	-0.013	0.089***	0.020*	1.000

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 3, summary statistics of the (sub-) asset class holdings (x1,000,000 Euros).

This table presents a summary statistic for the asset and sub-asset classes. The holdings include the delta and rho-equivalents, which the rho-equivalents will be excluded in the further analysis. The short-term receivables from banks include the rho-equivalents from 2009Q1 to 2011Q4, whereas the liquid assets include the rho-equivalents from 2012Q1 to 2014Q4.

<i>Asset class</i>	<i>Sub-asset class</i>	<i>Observations</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>	<i>Minimum</i>	<i>Maximum</i>
Shares and private equity		30,169	500.5	4,200	-792	142,698
	Shares	29,755	466.9	3,717	-792	120,153
	Shares mature markets	9,742	643.0	4,382	-852	94,387
	Shares emerging markets	8,594	145.8	1,005	-1	25,766
	Private equity	5,965	202.3	1,243	0	22,545
Real estate		18,837	219.5	1,620	-2	47,404
	Real estate direct investments	7,387	174.5	624	0	8,259
	Real estate indirect investments	17,104	166.4	1,575	-2	47,404
Fixed-interest investments		31,466	734.4	5,646	-595	187,942
	Bonds	31,353	687.9	5,009	-595	167,394
	Credits	9,852	367.1	2,014	-904	40,222
	Mortgage loans	8,872	173.7	1,580	-2	40,167
	Index-linked bonds	4,826	368.8	2,327	-715	32,734
	Short-term receivables from banks	7,165	-116.0	2,049	-56,159	15,863
	Sovereign bond, non-indexed	10,374	823.1	4,290	-4,835	101,582
		12,216	-85.4	2,456	-52,379	60,972
	Liquid capital	10,741	-238.3	2,589	-63,441	60,745
Other investments	Other other investments	4,842	-26.6	1,552	-19,444	37,835
	Commodities	4,901	167.6	935	-808	15,228
	Hedge funds	5,459	151.0	1,098	-29	18,793
Total holdings		31,727	1,386.5	11,542	-449	406,825

Figure 2, Kernel density function of the LSV buy herding measure.

Source: own calculations.

Figure 3, Kernel density function of the LSV sell herding measure.

Source: own calculations.

Table 4. Summary statistics of LSV herding measures per (sub-) asset class for all assets and excluding derivatives.

This table presents the overall, buy and sell LSV herding measures. The t statistics reveal whether the LSV herding measures are different from zero. The average LSV herding measure shows the simple average of the main asset classes. The weighted average LSV herding measure shows the herding measure weighted by the number of trades.

<i>Asset class</i>	<i>All assets</i>			<i>Excluding derivatives</i>		
	<i>Overall herding</i>	<i>Buy herding</i>	<i>Sell herding</i>	<i>Overall herding</i>	<i>Buy herding</i>	<i>Sell herding</i>
Share and private equity	0.10***	0.12***	0.08***	0.12***	0.15***	0.09***
Shares	0.08***	0.10***	0.05***	0.10***	0.11***	0.08***
Shares mature markets	0.06***	0.07***	0.04***	0.10***	0.14***	0.07***
Shares emerging markets	0.15***	0.15***	0.16***	0.19***	0.18***	0.23***
Private equity	0.12***	0.14***	0.10***	0.15***	0.17***	0.12***
Real estate	0.08***	0.04***	0.09***	0.10***	0.05***	0.12***
Real estate direct investments	0.15***	0.08***	0.17***	0.15***	0.09***	0.18***
Real estate indirect investments	0.05***	0.02***	0.06***	0.07***	0.03***	0.09***
Fixed-interest investments	0.08***	0.06***	0.10***	0.09***	0.08***	0.10***
Bonds	0.07***	0.05***	0.09***	0.07***	0.05***	0.08***
Credits	0.07***	0.06***	0.09***	0.08***	0.08***	0.08***
Mortgage loans	0.13***	0.05***	0.16***	0.12***	0.05***	0.16***
Index-linked bonds	0.09***	0.09***	0.09***	0.11***	0.11***	0.10***
Short-term receivables from banks	0.09***	0.07***	0.11***	0.09***	0.10***	0.08***
Sovereign bonds, non-indexed	0.07***	0.07***	0.07***	0.09***	0.10***	0.08***
Other investments	0.05***	0.05***	0.06***	0.07***	0.07***	0.07***
Liquid capital	0.05***	0.04***	0.06***	0.07***	0.06***	0.09***
Other other investments	0.06***	0.05***	0.06***	0.06***	0.07***	0.04***
Commodities	0.06***	0.06***	0.06***	0.07***	0.07***	0.08***
Hedge funds	0.06***	0.07***	0.05***	0.07***	0.08***	0.07***
Average LSV herding measure	0.08	0.07	0.08	0.09	0.09	0.10
Weighted average LSV herding measure	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.10	0.10	0.10

Table 5. Summary statistics of herd behavior per major crisis episode.

This table presents the buy and sell LSV herding measures. The t statistics reveal whether the LSV herding measures are different from zero. We define 2000Q1-2002Q3 as the Dot.com crisis, 2007Q1-2009Q4 as the financial crisis, and 2010Q2-2012Q3 as the European crisis. The average LSV herding measure shows the simple average of the main asset classes. The weighted average LSV herding measure shows the herding measure weighted by the number of trades.

<i>Asset class</i>	<i>Dot.com crisis</i>		<i>Financial crisis</i>		<i>European debt crisis</i>	
	<i>Buy herding</i>	<i>Sell herding</i>	<i>Buy herding</i>	<i>Sell herding</i>	<i>Buy herding</i>	<i>Sell herding</i>
Share and private equity	0.15***	0.07***	0.15***	0.08***	0.12***	0.06***
Shares	0.14***	0.06***	0.08***	0.06***	0.05***	0.03***
Private equity	0.21***	0.20***	0.21***	0.15***	0.20***	0.07***
Real estate	0.06***	0.11***	0.04***	0.06***	0.02***	0.08***
Fixed-interest investments	0.05***	0.14***	0.06***	0.10***	0.08***	0.11***
Sovereign bonds, non-indexed			0.04***	0.07***	0.08***	0.04***
Other investments	0.11***	-0.01*	0.07***	0.07***	0.05***	0.07***
Commodities	0	-0.17	0.10***	0.12***	0.07***	0.04***
Hedge funds	0.14***	-0.01	0.07***	0.07***	0.07***	0.06***
Average LSV herding measure	0.09	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.08
Weighted average LSV herding measure	0.12	0.12	0.09	0.08	0.08	0.08

Table 6, pension fund size and herd behavior during crises

This table presents the buy and sell LSV herding measures. The t statistics reveal whether the LSV herding measures are different from zero. We define 2000Q1-2002Q3 as the Dot.com crisis, 2007Q1-2009Q4 as the financial crisis, and 2010Q2-2012Q3 as the European crisis. This study divides the pension funds based on size into three categories. The average LSV herding measure shows the simple average of the main asset classes. The weighted average LSV herding measure shows the herding measure weighted by the number of trades.

<i>Asset class</i>	<i>Dot.com crisis</i>					
	<i>Small</i>		<i>Medium-sized</i>		<i>Large</i>	
	<i>Buy herding</i>	<i>Sell herding</i>	<i>Buy herding</i>	<i>Sell herding</i>	<i>Buy herding</i>	<i>Sell herding</i>
Share and private equity	0.07***	0.01***	0.16***	0.05***	0.19***	0.06***
Shares	0.07***	0.02***	0.16***	0.05***	0.18***	0.04***
Private equity	0.08***	-0.07***	0.15***		0.26***	0.15***
Real estate	0.00	0.05***	0.05***	0.11***	0.04***	0.11***
Fixed-interest investments	-0.01***	0.07***	0.06***	0.14***	0.09***	0.16***
Sovereign bonds, non-indexed						
Other investments	0.03***	-0.04***	0.00	-0.05***	0.09***	0.10***
Commodities						
Hedge funds	0.03***	-0.05***	0.04	-0.05***	0.16***	0.16***
Average LSV herding measure	0.02	0.02	0.07	0.06	0.10	0.11
Weighted average LSV herding measure	0.05	0.05	0.13	0.12	0.14	0.13

<i>Asset class</i>	<i>Financial crisis</i>					
	<i>Small</i>		<i>Medium-sized</i>		<i>Large</i>	
	<i>Buy herding</i>	<i>Sell herding</i>	<i>Buy herding</i>	<i>Sell herding</i>	<i>Buy herding</i>	<i>Sell herding</i>
Share and private equity	0.11***	0.05***	0.13***	0.06***	0.17***	0.10***
Shares	0.10***	0.04***	0.07***	0.05***	0.06***	0.05***
Private equity	0.06***	0.14***	0.16***	0.02***	0.24***	0.19***
Real estate	0.03***	-0.01	0.01***	0.07***	0.06***	0.06***
Fixed-interest investments	0.05***	0.05***	0.05***	0.08***	0.08***	0.12***
Sovereign bonds, non-indexed	0.03***	0.10***	0.03***	0.07***	0.02***	0.08***
Other investments	0.09***	0.03***	0.04***	0.06***	0.09***	0.10***
Commodities	0.17***	0.16***	0.06***	0.14***	0.10***	0.11***
Hedge funds	0.07***	0.09***	0.01**	0.08***	0.07***	0.08***
Average LSV herding measure	0.07	0.03	0.06	0.07	0.10	0.09
Weighted average LSV herding measure	0.08	0.04	0.06	0.07	0.10	0.10

<i>Asset class</i>	<i>European debt crisis</i>					
	<i>Small</i>		<i>Medium-sized</i>		<i>Large</i>	
	<i>Buy herding</i>	<i>Sell herding</i>	<i>Buy herding</i>	<i>Sell herding</i>	<i>Buy herding</i>	<i>Sell herding</i>
Share and private equity	0.06***	0.01	0.11***	0.04***	0.13***	0.07***
Shares	0.04***	-0.02***	0.06***	0.03***	0.02***	0.05***
Private equity	-0.06**	0.06	0.11***	-0.04***	0.21***	0.09***
Real estate	0.01	0.11***	0.00	0.11***	0.00**	0.07***
Fixed-interest investments	0.05***	0.03***	0.08***	0.06***	0.07***	0.12***
Sovereign bonds, non-indexed	0.03***	0.05***	0.07***	0.02***	0.06***	0.05***
Other investments	0.02***	0.09***	0.05***	0.05***	0.07***	0.07***
Commodities	0.05**	0.16***	0.05***	0.12***	0.09***	0.05***
Hedge funds	-0.03**	0.06**	0.07***	0.02***	0.02***	0.06***
Average LSV herding measure	0.03	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.09
Weighted average LSV herding measure	0.04	0.06	0.08	0.06	0.08	0.09

Table 7, risk-based supervision classes and herd behavior during crises.

This table presents the buy and sell LSV herding measures. The t statistics reveal whether the LSV herding measures are different from zero. We define 2000Q1-2002Q3 as the Dot.com crisis, 2007Q1-2009Q4 as the financial crisis, and 2010Q2-2012Q3 as the European crisis. The supervisory authority divides pension funds into four supervisory classes, which reflect the systemic and supervisory relevance. Class 1 requires least supervisory interest, whereas class 4 requires most intensive supervision. The average LSV herding measure shows the simple average of the main asset classes. The weighted average LSV herding measure shows the herding measure weighted by the number of trades.

Asset class	<i>Dot.com crisis</i>							
	<i>Class 1</i>		<i>Class 2</i>		<i>Class 3</i>		<i>Class 4</i>	
	<i>Buy herding</i>	<i>Sell herding</i>	<i>Buy herding</i>	<i>Sell herding</i>	<i>Buy herding</i>	<i>Sell herding</i>	<i>Buy herding</i>	<i>Sell herding</i>
Share and private equity	0.12***	0.05***	0.15***	0.04***	0.13***	0.08***	0.16***	0.27***
Shares	0.12***	0.05***	0.15***	0.03***	0.11***	0.06***	0.14***	0.42***
Private equity	0.10**	-0.10	0.20***	0.09***	0.22***	0.16**	0.18***	0.17***
Real estate	0.01***	0.08***	0.07***	0.11***	0.04***	0.14***	0.13***	0.14***
Fixed-interest investments	0.02***	0.08***	0.11***	0.15***	0.06***	0.23***	0.18***	0.17***
Sovereign bonds, non-indexed								
Other investments	0.07***	-0.02	0.13***	0.05**				
Commodities								
Hedge funds	0.07***	-0.02	0.18***	0.09***				
Average LSV herding measure	0.06	0.05	0.12	0.09	0.06	0.11	0.12	0.14
Weighted average LSV herding measure	0.08	0.08	0.13	0.12	0.09	0.16	0.15	0.18

Asset class	<i>Financial crisis</i>							
	<i>Class 1</i>		<i>Class 2</i>		<i>Class 3</i>		<i>Class 4</i>	
	<i>Buy herding</i>	<i>Sell herding</i>	<i>Buy herding</i>	<i>Sell herding</i>	<i>Buy herding</i>	<i>Sell herding</i>	<i>Buy herding</i>	<i>Sell herding</i>
Share and private equity	0.14***	0.05***	0.15***	0.07***	0.10***	0.18***	0.16***	0.20***
Shares	0.09***	0.04***	0.05***	0.05***	0.12***	0.09***	0.13***	0.34***
Private equity	0.15***	0.14***	0.20***	0.15***	0.13***	0.19***	0.19***	0.11**
Real estate	0.02***	0.02***	0.01***	0.08***	0.06***	0.12***	0.09**	0.21***
Fixed-interest investments	0.05***	0.05***	0.08***	0.09***	0.06***	0.16***	0.14***	0.20***
Sovereign bonds, non-indexed	0.07***	0.03***	0.07***	0.07***	0.00	0.16***		0.12***
Other investments	0.05***	0.01***	0.05***	0.08***	0.16***	0.22***	0.14***	0.33***
Commodities	0.13***	0.09***	0.07***	0.12***	0.09***	0.14***	0.23***	0.34***
Hedge funds	0.04***	0.05***	0.07***	0.06***	0.09***	0.16***	0.17***	0.34***
Average LSV herding measure	0.07	0.03	0.07	0.08	0.09	0.17	0.13	0.23
Weighted average LSV herding measure	0.07	0.04	0.08	0.08	0.10	0.18	0.14	0.24

Asset class	<i>European debt crisis</i>							
	<i>Class 1</i>		<i>Class 2</i>		<i>Class 3</i>		<i>Class 4</i>	
	<i>Buy herding</i>	<i>Sell herding</i>	<i>Buy herding</i>	<i>Sell herding</i>	<i>Buy herding</i>	<i>Sell herding</i>	<i>Buy herding</i>	<i>Sell herding</i>
Share and private equity	0.11***	0.01***	0.11***	0.07***	0.12***	0.10***	0.18***	0.33***
Shares	0.03***	0.01***	0.03***	0.04***	0.10***	0.02***	0.19***	0.28***
Private equity	0.14***	0.03***	0.16***	0.10***	0.13***	0.18***	0.12***	0.42***
Real estate	0.03***	0.11***	-0.03***	0.08***	0.07***	0.10***	0.23***	0.23***
Fixed-interest investments	0.07***	0.07***	0.06***	0.12***	0.09***	0.11***	0.20***	0.37***
Sovereign bonds, non-indexed	0.07***	0.02***	0.05***	0.07***	0.07***	0.09***	0.19***	0.18***
Other investments	0.06***	0.05***	0.05***	0.08***	0.02***	0.09***	0.24***	0.37***
Commodities	0.04***	-0.04***	0.05***	0.06***	0.08***	0.07***	0.20***	0.51***
Hedge funds	0.09***	0.06***	0.02***	0.08***		0.08***		0.22***
Average LSV herding measure	0.07	0.06	0.05	0.09	0.08	0.10	0.21	0.33
Weighted average LSV herding measure	0.07	0.06	0.07	0.09	0.08	0.10	0.21	0.35

Table 8, types of pension funds and herd behavior during crises

This table presents the buy and sell LSV herding measures. The *t* statistics reveal whether the LSV herding measures are different from zero. We define 2000Q1-2002Q3 as the Dot.com crisis, 2007Q1-2009Q4 as the financial crisis, and 2010Q2-2012Q3 as the European crisis. This study divides pension funds into three types, namely occupational, industry-wide and company pension funds. The average LSV herding measure shows the simple average of the main asset classes. The weighted average LSV herding measure shows the herding measure weighted by the number of trades.

Asset class	<i>Dot.com crisis</i>					
	<i>Occupational</i>		<i>Industry-wide</i>		<i>Company</i>	
	<i>Buy herding</i>	<i>Sell herding</i>	<i>Buy herding</i>	<i>Sell herding</i>	<i>Buy herding</i>	<i>Sell herding</i>
Share and private equity	0.22***	-0.03***	0.13***	0.15***	0.14***	0.04***
Shares	0.22***	-0.02***	0.13***	0.13***	0.14***	0.03***
Private equity	0.09	-0.07***	0.11***	0.34***	0.20***	0.12***
Real estate	0.08***	0.06***	0.19***	0.16***	0.02***	0.10***
Fixed-interest investments	0.12***	0.16***	0.03***	0.21***	0.10	0.12***
Sovereign bonds, non-indexed						
Other investments	0.30***	0.20***	0.07	-0.07***	0.10***	-0.05***
Commodities			0.07	-0.07***	-0.09***	
Hedge funds	0.30***	0.20***			0.12***	-0.05***
Average LSV herding measure	0.18	0.10	0.10	0.11	0.09	0.05
Weighted average LSV herding measure	0.15	0.09	0.11	0.18	0.12	0.10

<i>Asset class</i>	<i>Financial crisis</i>					
	<i>Occupational</i>		<i>Industry-wide</i>		<i>Company</i>	
	<i>Buy herding</i>	<i>Sell herding</i>	<i>Buy herding</i>	<i>Sell herding</i>	<i>Buy herding</i>	<i>Sell herding</i>
Share and private equity	0.11***	0.02***	0.14***	0.10***	0.15***	0.07***
Shares	0.04***	0.01*	0.03***	0.04***	0.09***	0.06***
Private equity	0.12***	0.09***	0.21***	0.12***	0.19***	0.13***
Real estate	0.01	0.01	0.03***	0.11***	0.05***	0.04***
Fixed-interest investments	0.13***	0.14***	0.05***	0.12***	0.07***	0.08***
Sovereign bonds, non-indexed	0.10***	0.11***	-0.02***	0.10***	0.05***	0.07***
Other investments	0.09***	0.12***	0.06***	0.09***	0.09***	0.04***
Commodities	0.08***	-0.04**	0.05***	0.09***	0.13***	0.08***
Hedge funds	0.03	0.12***	0.05***	0.18***	0.08***	0.06***
Average LSV herding measure	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.11	0.09	0.06
Weighted average LSV herding measure	0.10	0.09	0.08	0.11	0.09	0.06

<i>Asset class</i>	<i>European debt crisis</i>					
	<i>Occupational</i>		<i>Industry-wide</i>		<i>Company</i>	
	<i>Buy herding</i>	<i>Sell herding</i>	<i>Buy herding</i>	<i>Sell herding</i>	<i>Buy herding</i>	<i>Sell herding</i>
Share and private equity	0.09***	0.10***	0.15***	0.11***	0.09***	0.05***
Shares	0.07***	0.05**	0.07***	0.05***	0.03***	0.02***
Private equity	0.08**	0.11**	0.24***	0.10***	0.11***	0.11***
Real estate	0.00	0.09***	0.03***	0.13***	0.02***	0.07***
Fixed-interest investments	0.08***	0.08***	0.09***	0.08***	0.09***	0.09***
Sovereign bonds, non-indexed	0.01	0.01	0.09***	-0.01***	0.09***	0.05***
Other investments	0.05***	0.16***	0.10***	0.13***	0.08***	0.05***
Commodities	0.09***	0.07***	0.08***	0.10***	0.05***	0.02***
Hedge funds	0.11***	0.16***	0.05***	0.16***	0.07***	0.03***
Average LSV herding measure	0.06	0.11	0.09	0.11	0.07	0.06
Weighted average LSV herding measure	0.07	0.11	0.10	0.11	0.08	0.07

Table 9, herd behavior with a minimum transaction size of 0.5 million Euros.

This table presents the buy and sell LSV herding measures. All sale and purchase transactions smaller than 0.5 million Euros are excluded from the analysis. The t statistics reveal whether the LSV herding measures are different from zero. We define 2000Q1-2002Q3 as the Dot.com crisis, 2007Q1-2009Q4 as the financial crisis, and 2010Q2-2012Q3 as the European crisis. The average LSV herding measure shows the simple average of the main asset classes. The weighted average LSV herding measure shows the herding measure weighted by the number of trades.

<i>Asset class</i>	<i>Dot.com crisis</i>		<i>Financial crisis</i>		<i>European debt crisis</i>	
	<i>Buy herding</i>	<i>Sell herding</i>	<i>Buy herding</i>	<i>Sell herding</i>	<i>Buy herding</i>	<i>Sell herding</i>
Share and private equity	0.19***	0.10***	0.16***	0.10***	0.15***	0.05***
Shares	0.19***	0.10***	0.09***	0.06***	0.04***	0.04***
Private equity	0.25***	0.19***	0.26***	0.23***	0.25***	0.08***
Real estate	0.04*	0.08*	0.08***	0.05***	0.03***	0.10***
Fixed-interest investments	0.10***	0.16***	0.08***	0.11***	0.08***	0.12***
Sovereign bonds, non-indexed			0.06***	0.08***	0.07***	0.04***
Other investments	0.04*	0.08*	0.07***	0.11***	0.05***	0.09***
Commodities	-0.01		0.10***	0.13***	0.07***	0.02***
Hedge funds	0.11***	0.14***	0.09***	0.07***	0.02**	0.10***
Average LSV herding measure	0.09	0.11	0.10	0.09	0.08	0.09
Weighted average LSV herding measure	0.17	0.15	0.10	0.10	0.08	0.09

Table 10, a summary of the LSV herding measures weighted by the transaction size.

This table presents the buy and sell LSV herding measures. The analysis includes all transactions weighted by their transaction size. All LSV herding measures are significantly different from zero. The average LSV herding measure shows the simple average of the main asset classes.

<i>Asset class</i>	<i>Buy herding</i>	<i>Sell herding</i>	<i>Asset class</i>	<i>Buy herding</i>	<i>Sell herding</i>
Share and private equity	0.08	0.06	Credits	0.06	0.08
Shares	0.07	0.06	Mortgage loans	0.12	0.16
Shares mature markets	0.06	0.05	Index-linked bonds	0.11	0.08
Shares emerging markets	0.16	0.15	Short-term receivables from banks	0.09	0.08
Private equity	0.15	0.11	Sovereign bonds, non-indexed	0.07	0.06
Real estate	0.06	0.08	Other investments	0.08	0.05
Real estate direct investments	0.12	0.16	Liquid capital	0.04	0.05
Real estate indirect investments	0.05	0.06	Other other investments	0.05	0.06
Fixed-interest investments	0.05	0.07	Commodities	0.08	0.03
Bonds	0.06	0.07	Hedge funds	0.07	0.05
Average LSV herding measure				0.07	0.06

Table 11, minimal holdings per (sub-) asset class and the short selling constraint.

This table presents the overall, buy and sell LSV herding measures. The t statistics reveal whether the LSV herding measures are different from zero. We exclude the asset class observations when it does not fulfill the minimum holdings requirement. The minimum holdings equal 0.5%, 1%, 1.5%, 2.5% and 5% of the pension fund's asset holdings. The average LSV herding measure shows the simple average of the main asset classes. The weighted average LSV herding measure shows the herding measure weighted by the number of trades.

<i>Asset class</i>	<i>No minimal holdings</i>	<i>0.5% of total holdings</i>	<i>1% of total holdings</i>	<i>2.5% of total holdings</i>	<i>5% of total holdings</i>
Share and private equity	0.08***	0.08***	0.08***	0.07***	0.06***
Shares	0.05***	0.05***	0.05***	0.05***	0.05***
Shares mature markets	0.04***	0.05***	0.05***	0.05***	0.04***
Shares emerging markets	0.16***	0.16***	0.15***	0.13***	0.10***
Private equity	0.10***	0.11***	0.11***	0.09***	0.09***
Real estate	0.09***	0.10***	0.10***	0.10***	0.12***
Real estate direct investments	0.17***	0.18***	0.18***	0.18***	0.20***
Real estate indirect investments	0.06***	0.06***	0.07***	0.07***	0.08***
Fixed-interest investments	0.10***	0.10***	0.09***	0.09***	0.09***
Bonds	0.09***	0.09***	0.09***	0.09***	0.09***
Credits	0.09***	0.09***	0.08***	0.09***	0.08***
Mortgage loans	0.16***	0.14***	0.13***	0.13***	0.11***
Index-linked bonds	0.09***	0.10***	0.10***	0.10***	0.11***
Short-term receivables from banks	0.11***	0.17***	0.18***	0.19***	0.11***
Sovereign bonds, non-indexed	0.07***	0.06***	0.06***	0.06***	0.06***
Other investments	0.06***	0.05***	0.05***	0.05***	0.06***
Liquid capital	0.06***	0.06***	0.05***	0.05***	0.06***
Other other investments	0.06***	0.04***	0.05***	0.07***	0.11***
Commodities	0.06***	0.05***	0.05***	0.01***	0.03***
Hedge funds	0.05***	0.04***	0.04***	0.07***	0.04***
Average LSV herding measure	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08
Weighted average LSV herding measure	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.08	0.08

Table 12, regression models for buy and sell herd behavior in shares and private equity investments

This table represents the results of the ordinary least squares regressions (OLS) and least squares dummy variable regressions (LSDV) of the LSV herding measure.

The regressions include the asset class shares and equity investments.

	Buy herding						Sell herding					
	OLS			LSDV			OLS			LSDV		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Lagged logarithm of pension fund size	-0.00 (-0.10)	-0.01 (-0.26)	0.00 (0.07)	-0.02** (-2.70)	0.00 (0.49)	-0.03*** (-3.87)	0.13*** (6.13)	-0.02 (-0.58)	0.21*** (10.12)	0.00 (0.75)	0.01 (1.42)	-0.02*** (-4.16)
Lagged ratio active over inactive participants	0.01*** (3.20)	0.01*** (5.47)	0.01*** (5.32)	0.00** (2.04)	0.00* (1.88)	0.00* (1.90)	0.00 (0.25)	-0.00 (-1.07)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.25)	-0.00 (-0.35)	-0.00* (-1.87)
Economic growth Eurozone	0.05** (1.97)	0.00 (0.08)	0.04* (1.74)	-0.65*** (-20.52)	0.32*** (15.65)	-0.64*** (-23.24)	-1.52*** (-51.98)	-1.87*** (-48.08)	-1.50*** (-46.20)	-1.23*** (-58.95)	-0.17*** (-5.14)	0.59*** (23.13)
Inflation Eurozone	-0.40*** (-4.06)	0.81*** (8.74)	0.61*** (6.37)	-1.91*** (-9.36)	-3.16*** (-83.34)	-3.75*** (-50.92)	0.73*** (9.42)	0.36*** (5.18)	0.00 (0.00)	1.96*** (46.05)	-0.61*** (-14.62)	-1.80*** (-27.81)
VIX index	-0.19*** (-20.59)	0.00 (0.26)	-0.05*** (-8.08)	0.02** (2.19)	-0.37*** (-87.89)	-0.09*** (-18.01)	-0.23*** (-15.41)	-0.23*** (-12.83)	-0.29*** (-19.55)	0.17*** (40.28)	0.20*** (41.31)	0.21*** (33.86)
Change of Eurozone bond rate	-0.20*** (-45.07)	-0.22*** (-44.18)	-0.21*** (-49.81)	-0.12*** (-23.30)	-0.17*** (-58.22)	-0.11*** (-24.94)	-0.00 (-0.68)	-0.13*** (-40.83)	0.01** (2.20)	0.16*** (19.17)	0.27*** (31.81)	0.20*** (23.91)
Lagged distance to the strategic shares and private equity allocation	0.24 (0.27)	-0.05 (-0.06)	0.21 (0.22)	-0.12 (-0.46)	-0.05 (-0.27)	-0.21 (-0.73)	2.12*** (3.54)	-1.89*** (-3.15)	1.75*** (2.63)	0.20* (1.90)	0.16 (1.46)	0.12 (0.99)
Return shares and private equity market index	-0.27*** (-28.04)			0.20*** (12.48)			0.11*** (28.01)			0.32*** (55.04)		
Shares and private equity market index		0.02*** (5.37)			-0.32*** (-61.06)			0.12*** (46.24)			-0.08*** (-18.30)	
Lagged pension fund's shares and private equity return			-0.06*** (-14.38)			0.02*** (3.41)			-0.06*** (-8.93)			0.06*** (9.10)
Constant	16.27*** (42.78)	8.18*** (25.37)	11.15*** (32.07)	13.06*** (24.66)	60.20*** (88.47)	19.20*** (51.27)	14.63*** (32.57)	5.11*** (13.36)	17.25*** (41.70)	2.39*** (10.49)	17.14*** (28.08)	10.70*** (46.13)
Sub-asset class- fund fixed-effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time fixed-effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	21,411	21,411	19,163	21,411	21,411	19,163	15,802	15,802	14,046	15,802	15,802	14,046
Adjusted R ²	0.07	0.04	0.04	0.65	0.70	0.63	0.12	0.22	0.13	0.92	0.91	0.92

t statistics in parentheses, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 13, regression models for buy and sell herd behavior in real estate investments.

This table represents the results of the ordinary least squares regressions (OLS) and least squares dummy variable regressions (LSDV) of the LSV herding measure. The regressions include the asset class real estate.

	Buy herding						Sell herding					
	OLS	LSDV					OLS	LSDV				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Lagged logarithm of pension fund size	0.15*** (6.17)	0.26*** (6.52)	0.26*** (5.37)	0.00 (0.71)	0.00 (0.99)	0.01 (1.06)	0.37*** (6.98)	0.36*** (6.88)	0.45*** (7.16)	0.00 (0.32)	0.00 (0.60)	0.01* (1.70)
Lagged ratio active over inactive participants	-0.02* (-1.65)	-0.02* (-1.70)	-0.02** (-2.05)	0.00 (0.27)	0.00 (0.07)	0.00 (0.10)	-0.01 (-0.83)	-0.01 (-1.07)	-0.00 (-0.27)	0.00 (1.21)	0.00 (1.50)	0.00* (1.78)
Economic growth Eurozone	-0.77*** (-23.49)	-0.03 (-0.80)	0.42*** (13.26)	4.01*** (173.63)	0.77 (1.04)	1.10*** (37.59)	-0.36*** (-11.66)	-0.17*** (-5.03)	0.19*** (5.21)	-0.59*** (-15.57)	0.54*** (11.47)	-0.43*** (-14.19)
Inflation Eurozone	2.29*** (29.89)	0.52*** (5.59)	-0.40*** (-5.37)	-6.63*** (-95.67)	-0.91 (-0.67)	-4.96*** (-58.94)	0.04 (0.45)	0.04 (0.59)	-0.34*** (-4.16)	1.07*** (11.99)	-0.37*** (-3.56)	0.86*** (10.81)
VIX index	0.07*** (20.33)	-0.03*** (-4.17)	0.07*** (6.55)	-0.01 (-0.86)	-0.08*** (-5.24)	0.30*** (46.83)	-0.02*** (-4.39)	-0.07*** (-11.45)	0.01 (0.90)	0.01** (2.57)	0.09*** (54.84)	-0.01 (-1.33)
Change of Eurozone bond rate	-0.01 (-0.83)	0.14*** (10.23)	0.20*** (14.28)	0.01* (1.66)	0.11*** (17.52)	1.07*** (240.25)	0.02*** (3.39)	0.02*** (3.07)	0.01* (1.84)	0.19*** (23.82)	0.03*** (18.63)	0.18*** (24.01)
Lagged distance to the strategic real estate allocation	4.37*** (3.69)	5.97*** (3.26)	4.17** (2.08)	-0.29 (-0.77)	-0.39 (-1.08)	-0.35 (-0.67)	13.45*** (6.14)	11.73*** (5.82)	12.45*** (5.25)	0.14 (0.29)	0.18 (0.36)	-0.53 (-1.06)
Return real estate market index	4.15*** (66.53)			0.50*** (12.41)			1.19*** (13.89)			0.78*** (14.75)		
Real estate market index		-0.07*** (-10.27)			-0.39*** (-4.43)			-0.07*** (-14.62)			0.08*** (9.38)	
Lagged pension fund's real estate return			0.03** (2.25)			-0.01*** (-2.82)			0.03*** (3.07)			0.00 (1.19)
Constant	-4.67*** (-26.40)	9.53*** (10.41)	0.22 (0.73)	12.60*** (77.69)	48.76*** (6.13)	0.33*** (2.90)	6.88*** (16.30)	15.61*** (24.97)	5.80*** (11.50)	1.12*** (8.28)	-10.06*** (-14.60)	1.25*** (8.49)
Sub-asset class-fund fixed-effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time fixed-effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5,308	5,308	4,609	5,308	5,308	4,609	15,750	15,750	13,639	15,750	15,750	13,639
Adjusted R ²	0.36	0.07	0.06	0.93	0.93	0.93	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.80	0.79	0.79

t statistics in parentheses, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 14, regression models for buy and sell herd behavior in fixed-interest investments.

This table represents the results of the ordinary least squares regressions (OLS) and least squares dummy variable regressions (LSDV) of the LSV herding measure.

The regressions include the asset class fixed-interest investments.

	Buy herding						Sell herding					
	OLS			LSDV			OLS			LSDV		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Lagged logarithm of pension fund size	0.12*** (11.47)	0.15*** (12.23)	0.14*** (10.73)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (-0.63)	0.00 (0.56)	0.20*** (5.24)	0.25*** (6.98)	0.23*** (5.29)	-0.00 (-0.04)	0.00 (0.07)	0.01 (0.74)
Lagged ratio active over inactive participants	-0.00 (-1.51)	-0.00 (-1.10)	-0.00 (-1.20)	-0.00*** (-4.41)	-0.00** (-2.11)	-0.00** (-2.33)	-0.00** (-2.25)	-0.00** (-2.47)	-0.00 (-1.41)	-0.00 (-0.67)	-0.00 (-0.18)	0.00 (0.28)
Economic growth Eurozone	-0.19*** (-17.05)	-0.25*** (-19.96)	-0.19*** (-13.88)	-0.97*** (-24.12)	-1.00*** (-24.78)	-0.24*** (-12.25)	0.32*** (9.96)	0.13*** (4.70)	0.38*** (10.96)	0.69*** (64.87)	1.01*** (42.66)	0.66*** (48.31)
Inflation Eurozone	1.09*** (27.69)	1.17*** (27.59)	1.11*** (25.28)	2.28*** (35.91)	2.52*** (39.17)	1.04*** (20.80)	-0.07 (-1.20)	-0.03 (-0.53)	-0.12* (-1.75)	-3.01*** (-70.96)	-3.12*** (-56.85)	-2.36*** (-66.74)
VIX index	-0.07*** (-23.98)	-0.09*** (-29.92)	-0.07*** (-14.79)	-0.13*** (-47.39)	-0.11*** (-46.99)	-0.32*** (-74.06)	0.13*** (24.51)	0.10*** (13.81)	0.16*** (27.26)	-0.09*** (-10.30)	0.19*** (52.03)	0.18*** (35.39)
Change of Eurozone bond rate	0.03*** (9.88)	0.06*** (17.21)	0.04*** (10.38)	0.17*** (38.74)	0.14*** (33.45)	-0.24*** (-34.46)	-0.21*** (-45.06)	-0.19*** (-45.33)	-0.17*** (-47.91)	-0.16*** (-62.71)	-0.05*** (-26.49)	-0.04*** (-21.40)
Lagged distance to the strategic fixed-interest investments' allocation	0.23 (1.34)	0.21 (1.22)	0.37* (1.90)	0.02 (0.19)	-0.02 (-0.17)	0.14 (1.04)	-2.71*** (-5.92)	-2.41*** (-5.68)	-3.02*** (-6.37)	-0.23** (-2.21)	-0.15 (-1.41)	-0.09 (-0.74)
Return fixed-interest investments' market index	0.03*** (26.71)			0.02*** (22.88)			0.03*** (12.42)			0.10*** (34.57)		
Fixed-interest investments' market index		0.01*** (8.56)			0.03*** (32.52)			0.03*** (13.28)			-0.02*** (-15.68)	
Lagged pension fund's fixed-interest investments' return			-0.08*** (-7.01)			0.01 (1.21)			0.01 (0.91)			0.00 (0.45)
Constant	5.46*** (51.99)	5.18*** (40.33)	5.38*** (37.90)	7.38*** (39.20)	3.29*** (15.55)	17.57*** (135.54)	5.51*** (16.87)	3.23*** (9.90)	4.80*** (12.74)	17.10*** (55.56)	11.09*** (45.74)	9.45*** (47.31)
Sub-asset class-fund fixed-effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time fixed-effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	25,932	25,932	23,734	25,932	25,932	23,734	26,810	26,954	23,663	26,810	26,954	23,663
Adjusted R ²	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.30	0.31	0.29	0.05	0.06	0.05	0.71	0.68	0.67

t statistics in parentheses, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 15, regression models for buy and sell herd behavior in other investments.

This table represents the results of the ordinary least squares regressions (OLS) and least squares dummy variable regressions (LSDV) of the LSV herding measure.

The regressions include the asset class other investments, which consist of liquid capital, commodities, hedge fund investments and others.

	Buy herding						Sell herding					
	OLS	LSDV					OLS	LSDV				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Lagged logarithm of pension fund size	-0.14*** (-4.86)	-0.15*** (-5.01)	-0.10*** (-3.90)	0.01 (1.20)	0.01 (1.19)	0.00 (0.15)	0.08*** (2.73)	0.08*** (2.77)	0.01 (0.40)	0.01 (1.01)	0.01 (1.06)	0.03** (2.45)
Lagged ratio active over inactive participants	-0.00*** (-2.61)	-0.00** (-2.06)	-0.00*** (-3.42)	-0.00** (-2.37)	-0.00 (-1.60)	-0.00 (-1.15)	-0.01*** (-4.06)	-0.01*** (-4.10)	0.01** (2.20)	-0.01*** (-30.79)	-0.01*** (-25.96)	-0.01*** (-9.50)
Economic growth Eurozone	0.92*** (21.88)	1.03*** (24.18)	0.93*** (19.15)	1.46*** (40.37)	1.83*** (51.52)	1.69*** (40.37)	-0.61*** (-16.30)	-0.61*** (-17.56)	-0.51*** (-11.14)	-3.52*** (-88.42)	-3.61*** (-74.69)	-3.52*** (-76.39)
Inflation Eurozone	-0.82*** (-8.95)	-1.09*** (-12.73)	-0.72*** (-6.43)	-5.49*** (-63.56)	-6.24*** (-66.76)	-5.60*** (-51.29)	2.91*** (31.91)	2.95*** (29.66)	2.64*** (26.14)	5.68*** (82.36)	6.07*** (70.56)	5.87*** (76.12)
VIX index	0.34*** (39.32)	0.34*** (37.89)	0.31*** (32.62)	0.21*** (37.81)	0.19*** (30.90)	0.16*** (20.71)	0.19*** (29.30)	0.19*** (27.59)	0.21*** (21.06)	0.32*** (574.53)	0.32*** (282.04)	0.32*** (340.32)
Change of Eurozone bond rate	0.15*** (27.81)	0.17*** (29.01)	0.21*** (26.28)	-0.01 (-1.43)	-0.01*** (-3.84)	0.02*** (3.62)	-0.09*** (-16.83)	-0.08*** (-17.17)	-0.09*** (-15.06)	-0.13*** (-301.99)	-0.12*** (-168.75)	-0.13*** (-230.06)
Lagged distance to the strategic other investments' allocation	0.87 (0.65)	0.86 (0.66)	0.83 (0.62)	0.69 (1.05)	0.76 (1.14)	1.10 (1.25)	-0.91 (-0.48)	-0.88 (-0.47)	-1.91 (-0.87)	0.58 (0.70)	0.44 (0.50)	0.48 (0.46)
Return other investments' market index	0.06*** (24.72)			0.08*** (37.62)			0.00 (1.11)			-0.10*** (-22.04)		
Other investments' market index		0.02*** (25.15)			0.02*** (15.31)			-0.00** (-2.35)			-0.01*** (-3.36)	
Lagged pension fund's other investments' return			0.00 (0.23)			0.00 (1.31)			0.05*** (2.73)			0.01*** (2.78)
Constant	-1.30*** (-4.88)	-3.10*** (-11.15)	-0.81*** (-2.94)	10.93*** (51.74)	10.75*** (50.66)	10.37*** (45.05)	-4.58*** (-16.56)	-4.44*** (-16.31)	-4.30*** (-13.39)	-15.72*** (-162.22)	-15.89*** (-109.49)	-16.99*** (-135.50)
Sub-asset class-fund fixed-effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time fixed-effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	8,258	8,258	6,726	8,258	8,258	6,726	6,428	6,428	5,204	6,428	6,428	5,204
Adjusted R ²	0.16	0.16	0.13	0.53	0.52	0.50	0.18	0.18	0.16	0.66	0.64	0.64

t statistics in parentheses, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 16, sell and buy herd behavior per quintile.

The buy and sell herding measures are divided in quintiles. The highest quintile (5) represents the most intensive buy or sell herding. The lowest quintile (1) shows the least intensive buy or sell herding.

Buy herding measure

Quintile	Shares and private equity	Other investments	Real estate	Fixed-interest investments
1	0.00	-0.03	-0.02	-0.01
2	0.05	0.01	0.00	0.03
3	0.10	0.05	0.03	0.06
4	0.17	0.09	0.06	0.09
5	0.28	0.18	0.15	0.17

Sell herding measure

Quintile	Shares and private equity	Other investments	Real estate	Fixed-interest investments
1	0.00	-0.02	-0.01	0.00
2	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.05
3	0.06	0.04	0.07	0.09
4	0.11	0.08	0.14	0.13
5	0.21	0.18	0.24	0.24

Table 17, return reversals by herding quintiles in asset classes.

The buy and sell herding measures are divided in quintiles. The highest quintile (5) represents the most intensive buy or sell herding, whereas the lowest quintile (1) shows the least intensive buy or sell herding. The returns are subtracted from the average quarterly pension funds' returns. This calculation gives the ar , which is the abnormal return. The table shows whether the abnormal return is significantly different from zero for the two quarters prior to the buy or sell month (ar_{t-2} and ar_{t-1}), and for the four quarters after the buy or sell month ($ar_{t+1}, \dots, ar_{t+4}$).

	<i>Sell herding</i>							<i>Buy herding</i>						
	ar_{t-2}	ar_{t-1}	ar	ar_{t+1}	ar_{t+2}	ar_{t+3}	ar_{t+4}	ar_{t-2}	ar_{t-1}	ar	ar_{t+1}	ar_{t+2}	ar_{t+3}	ar_{t+4}
Shares and private equity investments														
S5	7.04 (6.56)	2.90 (31.22)	2.46 (20.55)	-0.96 (-6.30)	0.27 (2.04)	3.14 (18.52)	0.79 (5.37)	-0.13 (-1.01)	-2.92 (-15.23)	-9.31 (-60.59)	-1.48 (-7.41)	1.54 (9.30)	-3.92 (-21.57)	-3.88 (-17.29)
S4	1.14 (5.08)	1.86 (11.20)	5.79 (55.05)	2.76 (16.34)	-0.10 (-0.81)	3.96 (44.97)	-0.20 (-1.29)	-4.22 (-22.99)	-3.84 (-20.25)	-2.69 (-14.07)	0.34 (1.93)	-2.39 (-13.70)	0.36 (2.20)	1.71 (15.93)
S3	5.61 (34.33)	6.17 (43.09)	0.16 (2.06)	1.67 (21.32)	0.98 (8.80)	-0.18 (-1.41)	2.50 (12.09)	-0.32 (-1.53)	-3.46 (-22.39)	1.20 (9.07)	-0.66 (-5.06)	-1.17 (-5.72)	-4.26 (-22.11)	2.72 (22.53)
S2	-0.81 (-4.65)	2.11 (19.38)	3.78 (47.53)	-1.65 (-14.57)	3.00 (14.42)	-2.33 (-14.79)	-0.20 (-1.25)	-1.92 (-12.89)	0.40 (3.67)	-0.87 (-7.67)	-2.29 (-14.62)	-3.31 (-21.40)	2.24 (11.61)	-2.64 (-15.15)
S1	-0.01 (-0.04)	3.23 (21.32)	-0.05 (-0.53)	3.14 (14.36)	-2.33 (-11.57)	-2.59 (-18.97)	0.73 (3.39)	0.03 (0.26)	-3.14 (-19.31)	3.14 (15.20)	1.03 (6.13)	4.09 (32.11)	2.34 (21.54)	-3.54 (-22.10)
Real estate investments														
S5	-0.48 (-4.45)	0.32 (2.79)	1.77 (18.10)	-0.98 (-8.61)	1.21 (11.01)	0.63 (4.69)	-0.06 (-0.64)	2.07 (5.62)	0.92 (4.51)	-3.25 (-10.18)	0.79 (4.43)	0.75 (3.17)	0.06 (0.22)	-0.25 (-1.17)
S4	0.80 (7.25)	0.94 (6.54)	0.07 (0.63)	-0.26 (-2.49)	0.22 (2.26)	1.33 (11.18)	-0.77 (-6.60)	-1.92 (-9.62)	-4.48 (-20.11)	-4.17 (-21.37)	-4.88 (-15.15)	-3.67 (-10.98)	-8.21 (-17.88)	-9.66 (-17.04)
S3	1.25 (10.02)	0.26 (1.61)	-0.89 (-6.04)	2.49 (19.32)	1.59 (11.50)	0.86 (6.49)	2.46 (19.84)	1.88 (8.14)	-2.74 (-12.92)	0.71 (3.78)	-0.69 (-3.44)	1.35 (5.18)	0.92 (4.98)	-1.76 (-6.77)
S2	-0.96 (-8.49)	0.97 (7.37)	1.19 (12.55)	-1.66 (-11.05)	-1.04 (-5.30)	1.19 (9.34)	0.72 (5.11)	-1.58 (-4.11)	-1.59 (-5.55)	3.40 (12.35)	0.73 (4.43)	1.19 (7.70)	-0.68 (-3.06)	1.90 (11.39)
S1	-0.54 (-2.24)	-0.28 (-1.61)	-1.94 (-12.45)	0.33 (1.66)	0.61 (4.56)	0.28 (2.15)	0.41 (2.76)	-0.50 (-2.25)	1.24 (6.24)	2.27 (7.16)	2.15 (10.19)	-5.45 (-15.94)	-3.18 (-7.62)	2.32 (6.83)

Fixed-interest investments														
S5	0.15	-0.19	0.49	0.05	-0.13	0.46	-0.26	-0.65	-2.10	0.11	-0.79	1.83	0.75	1.22
	(2.13)	(-3.09)	(5.71)	(0.65)	(-2.10)	(4.21)	(-3.26)	(-6.54)	(-30.76)	(1.18)	(-11.29)	(15.47)	(11.15)	(12.14)
S4	-0.07	0.46	0.73	0.94	-1.07	-0.38	0.15	2.05	-0.71	-0.76	0.11	-0.53	-0.36	-0.19
	(-1.47)	(8.42)	(11.16)	(13.99)	(-16.59)	(-6.93)	(2.75)	(0.93)	(-8.73)	(-11.41)	(2.36)	(-7.19)	(-7.45)	(-2.44)
S3	-0.51	0.45	2.22	0.80	0.51	0.09	-1.12	-0.15	0.89	-0.84	-0.93	-0.22	1.24	1.05
	(-7.33)	(6.60)	(1.20)	(13.13)	(9.70)	(1.53)	(-15.19)	(-2.37)	(8.67)	(-12.82)	(-12.18)	(-3.13)	(14.01)	(10.21)
S2	0.70	-0.55	-0.29	0.16	-0.14	0.65	-0.48	-0.56	-0.34	0.13	-0.20	0.17	0.44	0.26
	(9.88)	(-12.68)	(-7.12)	(3.51)	(-3.97)	(10.21)	(-7.72)	(-7.06)	(-4.63)	(1.58)	(-2.31)	(3.07)	(0.22)	(3.20)
S1	-0.33	0.20	-1.36	-1.46	-0.34	-0.51	0.56	-1.22	1.45	-0.16	0.46	0.58	0.30	0.09
	(-6.18)	(3.12)	(-25.28)	(-25.86)	(-5.02)	(-5.67)	(8.50)	(-15.86)	(0.80)	(-2.56)	(4.55)	(5.39)	(3.21)	(1.04)
Other investments														
S5	-0.25	7.25	2.38	-6.69	-2.97	5.82	-1.96	-1.17	-1.72	-0.62	-1.87	-2.30	0.34	3.12
	(-0.35)	(1.05)	(0.38)	(-6.76)	(-3.26)	(1.12)	(-2.89)	(-1.94)	(-2.60)	(-1.06)	(-2.74)	(-3.89)	(1.06)	(0.51)
S4	4.57	11.93	-2.27	-2.24	-2.26	5.88	-1.31	0.63	-2.79	3.24	-0.88	-0.45	-2.34	-0.95
	(0.73)	(1.56)	(-2.48)	(-4.11)	(-4.51)	(1.26)	(-2.05)	(0.73)	(-5.86)	(0.91)	(-1.44)	(-1.09)	(-3.18)	(-0.58)
S3	-3.48	-2.77	-4.06	-3.33	-1.14	-0.88	-0.52	-1.18	-0.11	0.18	4.24	-3.98	1.16	1.87
	(-3.70)	(-2.81)	(-5.64)	(-4.90)	(-0.79)	(-0.59)	(-0.80)	(-2.07)	(-0.12)	(0.55)	(1.03)	(-6.86)	(0.23)	(0.56)
S2	-1.70	-2.05	-1.82	-2.47	6.00	-1.99	-1.66	-0.04	-1.59	-1.92	-0.73	5.09	3.60	11.39
	(-2.38)	(-1.58)	(-3.47)	(-3.04)	(1.07)	(-1.82)	(-4.66)	(-0.01)	(-3.17)	(-2.56)	(-0.73)	(0.93)	(0.61)	(1.44)
S1	-0.24	-3.61	3.94	1.09	0.43	0.02	-3.08	1.07	2.48	0.72	5.79	6.93	-1.44	1.38
	(-0.21)	(-5.75)	(0.70)	(1.28)	(0.58)	(0.03)	(-7.03)	(0.99)	(1.74)	(0.67)	(1.00)	(1.01)	(-1.04)	(0.93)

t statistics in parentheses

Table 18, return reversals by herding quintiles in shares and private equity investments during the financial crisis.

The buy and sell herding measures are divided in quintiles. The highest quintile (5) represents the most intensive buy or sell herding, whereas the lowest quintile (1) shows the least intensive buy or sell herding. The returns are subtracted from the average quarterly pension funds' returns. This calculation gives the ar , which is the abnormal return. The table shows whether the abnormal return is significantly different from zero for the two quarters prior to the buy or sell month (ar_{t-2} and ar_{t-1}), and for the four quarters after the buy or sell month ($ar_{t+1}, \dots, ar_{t+4}$). We define the period 2007Q1-2009Q4 as the financial crisis, and the period 2010Q2-2012Q3 as the European crisis.

	<i>Sell herding</i>							<i>Buy herding</i>						
	ar_{t-2}	ar_{t-1}	ar	ar_{t+1}	ar_{t+2}	ar_{t+3}	ar_{t+4}	ar_{t-2}	ar_{t-1}	ar	ar_{t+1}	ar_{t+2}	ar_{t+3}	ar_{t+4}
Shares and private equity investments during the financial crisis														
S5	-7.86 (-16.11)	3.27 (17.72)	0.81 (3.17)	-7.51 (-18.72)	1.19 (5.60)	12.78 (40.78)	8.01 (17.12)	-0.66 (-3.18)	-6.17 (-19.81)	-6.74 (-37.14)	-2.91 (-8.62)	-1.34 (-3.55)	-3.97 (-13.42)	-6.48 (-15.42)
S4	-4.62 (-7.05)	1.08 (4.38)	8.51 (57.53)	3.33 (16.39)	0.53 (3.28)	1.19 (4.93)	-2.27 (-16.04)	-4.07 (-11.74)	-6.39 (-25.17)	-2.93 (-7.23)	5.19 (20.00)	8.23 (42.69)	6.98 (32.72)	1.04 (4.06)
S3	8.91 (49.45)	4.81 (18.89)	2.06 (14.82)	5.52 (64.68)	-0.23 (-0.84)	2.87 (22.30)	7.93 (78.52)	-0.23 (-0.84)	2.93 (10.30)	0.31 (1.27)	-1.93 (-8.84)	-7.52 (-31.60)	-6.70 (-23.56)	2.32 (8.45)
S2	-3.61 (-24.30)	5.27 (60.56)	4.21 (31.02)	0.41 (2.98)	-8.40 (-27.94)	-3.03 (-15.42)	-13.43 (-76.35)	0.30 (0.89)	0.64 (4.11)	-4.15 (-15.32)	-6.77 (-20.34)	-3.09 (-12.11)	1.61 (3.07)	2.38 (7.40)
S1	3.59 (23.66)	-0.50 (-2.07)	-2.03 (-19.27)	-4.63 (-15.58)	-10.28 (-23.22)	-8.26 (-30.02)	-2.93 (-3.77)	-2.04 (-8.58)	-4.30 (-11.21)	-0.80 (-2.62)	4.72 (22.33)	6.43 (32.09)	1.59 (6.04)	0.83 (3.55)
Fixed-interest investments during the European debt crisis														
S5	0.13 (0.71)	0.45 (3.65)	0.27 (1.27)	0.55 (4.50)	0.46 (3.69)	1.89 (8.41)	-1.82 (-9.43)	-0.40 (-2.19)	-3.54 (-26.57)	0.63 (3.97)	-1.34 (-9.64)	3.63 (17.16)	0.37 (5.81)	2.71 (14.58)
S4	-1.59 (-24.35)	1.18 (9.02)	2.13 (14.03)	0.14 (1.00)	-3.31 (-24.45)	-2.08 (-19.43)	-0.04 (-0.28)	6.25 (1.37)	1.36 (9.92)	-0.79 (-8.19)	-0.07 (-0.71)	-3.13 (-34.14)	-0.26 (-2.08)	-0.80 (-12.92)
S3	0.95 (4.39)	0.79 (5.52)	4.68 (1.05)	0.78 (6.54)	0.77 (11.77)	0.57 (4.62)	-2.39 (-14.19)	-0.78 (-6.88)	-0.14 (-0.85)	-1.12 (-10.28)	-0.66 (-4.81)	0.38 (2.98)	0.77 (5.88)	0.93 (6.19)
S2	-0.09 (-0.95)	-0.55 (-8.19)	-1.55 (-17.94)	0.17 (2.69)	-0.69 (-10.95)	-0.62 (-4.06)	-4.15 (-27.02)	-1.73 (-14.33)	-1.12 (-14.05)	0.63 (4.50)	-0.46 (-2.79)	-0.71 (-5.96)	-2.49 (-26.45)	1.30 (7.79)
S1	0.56 (6.78)	-0.60 (-5.14)	-2.61 (-26.22)	-2.22 (-18.15)	0.13 (0.97)	-1.15 (-4.73)	-1.61 (-12.82)	-0.84 (-5.53)	3.88 (0.88)	-1.48 (-16.17)	1.19 (6.50)	1.18 (6.69)	2.80 (0.65)	0.42 (3.78)

t statistics in parentheses

Table 19, overview market index per sub-asset class.

Asset class	Market index	Source
Shares and private equity		
Shares	Euro top-100 index	De Nederlandsche Bank
Shares emerging markets	MSCI emerging market index	De Nederlandsche Bank
Share mature markets	MSCI EMU index	De Nederlandsche Bank
Private equity	Russell 3000 index	Bloomberg
Other investments		
Liquid assets	Eurozone overnight funds index	De Nederlandsche Bank
Commodities	IMF primary commodities index (all commodities)	International Monetary Fund
Hedge funds	Barclay Hedge Fund index	Barclays
Other other investments	We assume the same composition of the other investments sub-asset classes for this sub-asset class. A composite index is constructed using the indices weighted by their holdings.	Own calculation
Real estate		
Direct real estate investments	Dutch existing dwelling index	Statistics Netherlands
Indirect real estate investments	Residential property index (all dwellings)	Bank of International Settlements
Fixed-interest investments		
Bonds	Eurozone interest rate	De Nederlandsche Bank
Credits	Moody's Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bond index	Moody's
Mortgage loans	Dutch interest rate	De Nederlandsche Bank
Index-linked bonds	Gilt market index	United Kingdom Debt Management Office
Short-term claims on banks	Eurozone overnight funds index	De Nederlandsche Bank
Sovereign bonds, non-indexed	Eurozone interest rate	De Nederlandsche Bank

Table 20, sub-asset classes data and time period.

Asset class	Time period	Asset class	Time period
Shares and private equity	1999Q1-2014Q4	Real estate	1999Q1-2014Q4
Shares	1999Q1-2006Q4	Direct real estate investments	1999Q1-2014Q4
Shares emerging markets	2006Q4-2014Q4	Indirect real estate investments	1999Q1-2014Q4
Share mature markets	2006Q4-2014Q4		
Private equity	1999Q1-2014Q4	Fixed-interest investments	1999Q1-2014Q4
		Bonds	1999Q1-2006Q4
Other investments	1999Q1-2014Q4	Credits	2006Q4-2014Q4
Liquid assets	2006Q4-2014Q4	Mortgage loans	1999Q1-2014Q4
Commodities	1999Q1-2014Q4	Index-linked bonds	2006Q4-2014Q4
Hedge funds	1999Q1-2014Q4	Short-term claims on banks	2006Q4-2014Q4
Other other investments	2006Q4-2014Q4	Sovereign bonds, non-indexed	2006Q4-2014Q4

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De Nederlandsche Bank N.V.
Postbus 98, 1000 AB Amsterdam
020 524 91 11
dnb.nl